CRIM LAW 2
2)because after Lamera’s
Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security
Abandonment of one’s victim
Lamera v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93475 | June 5, 1991 | Davide, Jr.
Case Summary:
An owner type jeepney, driven by Lamera, hit a tricycle resulting to the damage of
the tricycle, and physical injuries to the passengers of the said tricycle. Two
information were filed against him: (1) reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property and physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code; (2)
abandonment of one’s victim under Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. The
second information was filed because the petitioner, instead of giving assistance to
the victims, fled and left them. He invoked his right against double jeopardy
saying that his conviction of reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property
and multiple physical injuries is a bar for the prosecution to charge him with the
crime of abandonment of one’s victim. The lower court and the Court of Appeals
ruled against the petitioner, hence this appeal.
The Court held that there is no double jeopardy, because these two offenses
are not identical. Reckless imprudence is a crime falling under the chapter on
criminal negligence, while abandonment of one’s victim is a crime falling under the
chapter on crimes against security. The former is committed by means of culpa,
while the latter is committed by means of dolo. In Art. 365, failure to lend help only
increases the penalty by one degree, while in Art. 275, it is considered as an
offense.
Provisions applicable:
Art. 275. Abandonment of person in danger and abandonment of one's own
victim. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
1. Anyone who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall
find in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can
render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission
shall constitute a more serious offense.
Elements: 1) The place is uninhabited; 2) The accused found
there a person wounded or in danger of dying; 3) The accused can
render assistance without detriment to himself; 4) The accused
fails to render assistance
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he
has accidentally wounded or injured.
3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of
age, shall fail to deliver said child to the authorities or to his family, or shall
fail to take him to a safe place.
In the case at bar, there is an abandonment (no.
jeepney hit a tricycle, instead of giving assistance to the victims, he fled and left
them.
Art. 365.  Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in
its maximum period shall be imposed.
xxxxx
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall
be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A.
1790, approved June 21, 1957). 
Doctrine of the case:
1) Requisites before double jeopardy could attach: a) valid indictment; b)
before a competent court; c) after arraignment; d) a valid plea having been
entered; e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
2) Among the condition for double jeopardy is that the accused must have
been arraigned in the previous case
- In the case at bar, when Lamera was arraigned, tried, and convicted in
his crime for abandonment (Crim Case no. 2793) before the MTC, he was not yet
arraigned for his crime for reckless imprudence (Crim Case no. 64924) before the
RTC.
3) Protection against double jeopardy may only be invoked for same or
identical offense.
- In the case at bar, the court held that Reckless imprudence and
Abandonment of one’s victim are different crimes.
Facts
1) At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street,
Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit
and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to
the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.
2) As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a)
an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and (b) an
Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code
on Abandonment of one's victim.
3) [MTC] On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding the
petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and
penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 6 months of arresto mayor and to pay the
costs.
4) Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the RTC of Pasig. In the meantime,
on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned for violation of Article 365. He
entered a plea of not guilty.
5) [RTC] His appeal was decided by the RTC of Pasig. It affirmed with
modification the MTC decision: reduced the penalty of imprisonment from 6 to 2
months.
6) [CA] He filed a petition for review in the CA arguing that par. 2 of Art. 275
does not apply tho him because it was the tricycle driver (Erensto Reyes) who
negligently caused the accident.
This petition to the CA was denied for lack of merit. According to the CA, it is
enough to show that the petitioner accidentally injured the passengers of the
tricycle and failed to help them. There’s no need to prove that he was
negligent and that it was negligent that caused the injury.
If the factor of criminal negligence is involved, Art. 365 of the RPC will come into
play as its last paragraph provides that “The penalty next higher in degree to those
provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on
the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give ”. However,
petitioner was charged under par. 2 of Art. 275 and not under Art. 365 of
the RPC.
7) [SC] He raised before the SC that that he cannot be penalized twice for an
“accident” and another for “recklessness.”
He maintained that since he is facing a criminal charge for reckless
imprudence, which offense carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under Article 275, par. 2,
for abandonment for failing to render to the persons whom he has
accidentally injured.
Issues with holding and ratio
W/N prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar
to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code because it
constitutes double jeopardy?1 NO
1) Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the accused
must have been arraigned in the previous case
According to People v Bacar, the following are the requisites before double
jeopardy could attach: a) upon a valid indictment; b) before a competent court;
c) after arraignment; d) a valid plea having been entered; e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
1
Stated Differently, “Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code when, he was previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property with multiple physical injuries" under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code?”
IN THE CASE AT BAR, when Lamera was arraigned, tried, and convicted in his
crime for abandonment (Crim Case no. 2793) before the MTC, he was not yet
arraigned for his crime for reckless imprudence (Crim Case no. 64924) before
the RTC.
2) Lamera is charged for two separate offenses under the RPC
On invoking protection against double jeopardy and separate offenses
Protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense
or identical offenses. Where two different laws (or articles of the same code)
defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each
crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other. (People v Doriquez)
A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact which other does not, an
acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
(People v Bacolod)
IN THE CASE AT BAR, the two informations filed against petitioner are clearly
for separate offenses.
 The first, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter
(Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the
Revised Penal Code. The second, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2,
Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine
(Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same
Code.
 Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa.
Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo.
 In Art. 365, failure to help one’s victim is not an offense by itself nor an
element of reckless imprudence. It merely increases the penalty by
one degree. Thus, it must be specifically alleged in the information.
However, in this case it does not so allege. Upon the other hand, in
Art. 275, par.2, failure to help or render assistance is an offense.
Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of the
offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available
only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged. IN THIS CASE, THERE IS NO IDENTITY OF OFFENSE. THUS,
there is no constitutional, statutory, or procedural obstacle barring the
filing of the two information’s.
RULING
Petition is DENIED.