Property-Case Digests-Bathan-Part4

PROPERTY | MBL | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – WEEK 2-2
e. REAL ACTION VS. PERSONAL ACTION

f. ACTION IN PERSONAM VS. ACTION IN REM
g. OBLIGATIONS OF AN OWNER (ARTS. 431-432)
h. PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP (ART. 433)
i. NATURE
ii. REQUISITES
iii. RESORT TO JUDICIAL PROCESS
i. ACTION TO RECOVER
i. REQUISITES (ART. 434)
HEIRS OF L. VENCILAO SR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, p.r. GEPALAGO [G.R. No. 123713. April 1,
1998] (MARCELO)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: (WON)
SPECIAL DETAIL/S:
What petitioners claimed in their complaint was a parcel of land located in Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area
of 3,625 square meters.
The piece of land registered in the name of the Gepalagos, is Lot No. A-73 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-60558,
LRC Rec. No. H-4251, and located in Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol, with an area of 5,970 square meters.
LAW/PRINCIPLE INVOLVED:
REQUISITE OF ACTION TO RECOVER:
In order that an action to recover ownership of real property may prosper, the person who claims that he has a better
right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but also satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.
PRESUMPTION ON THE VALIDITY OF VENDOR’s TITLE

As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value
has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the title. He is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate.
By way of exception, the vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title
which indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property.
FACTS:
A parcel of registered land was mortgaged by Pedro Luspo to the PNB as security for a loan. Since Luspo failed to pay
the obligation upon maturity the mortgage was foreclosed. Thereafter PNB, the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale,
conveyed the whole property to 56 vendees among whom were the spouses Sabas and Ruperta Gepalago who acquired
the 5,970 square-meter portion thereof.
Since then, they had been the owner and possessor of the land until they donated the same in 1988 to their son
Domiciano Gepalago.
On February 12, 1990, petitioners led a complaint for recovery thereof claiming ownership by virtue of acquisitive
prescription in favor of their deceased father who had declared the property for taxation purposes.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners holding that they had been in possession thereof for more than
thirty (30) years and that the Gepalagos knew that the land had long been possessed and enjoyed in the concept of
owners by petitioners.
On appeal, CA reversed the trial court and held that the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the
certificate of title and that a certificate of title is the best evidence of ownership of registered land.
Vencilaos then filed a motion for reconsideration but CA denied, thus filed this petition for review.
ISSUE/S: w/n CA erred in declaring Gepalago(respondents) as the rightful owner of the subject land
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RULING: No. It is trial court that erred in finding that petitioners had been in possession and enjoyment of the property
for more than thirty (30) years.
First, It should be noted that the land in dispute is a registered land placed under the operation of the Torrens system
way back in 1959, for which a Certificate of original Title was issued. The rule is well-settled that prescription does not
run against registered land. Second, neither can the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners as
evidence of ownership prevail over respondents' certificate of title which, to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of
ownership. It should be stressed that tax declarations and receipts do not by themselves conclusively prove title to the
land.
But assuming by arguing that petitioners had indeed acquired the land they were claiming by prescription, there is still
a serious doubt on the precise identity of the disputed property.
What petitioners claimed in their complaint was a parcel located in other part of Bohol, with different land area from that
of the piece of land registered in the name of Gepalago(see special details☺). Even the commissioner's report failed to
clarify the difference in the area and location of the property claimed. In order that an action to recover ownership of
real property may prosper, the person who claims that he has a better right to it must prove not only his
ownership of the same but also satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.
As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value
has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the title. He is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. By way of exception, the vendee is required to
make the necessary inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title which indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership
of the property. (for further explanation see notes)
The exception contemplates a situation wherein there exists a flaw in the title of the vendor and the vendee has knowledge
or at least ought to have known of such flaw at the time he acquired the property, in which case, he is not considered as
an innocent purchaser for value.
In the instant case, we discern nothing from the records showing that the title of PNB, the vendor, was flawed. Petitioners
not only failed to substantiate their claim of acquisitive prescription as basis of ownership but they also failed to allege,
and much less adduce, any evidence that there was a defect in the title of PNB. In the absence of such evidence, the
presumption leans towards the validity of the vendor's title.
Thus, CA’s decision is affirmed.
NOTES:
By way of exception, the vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title
which indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property. Otherwise, his mere refusal to believe that such defect
exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not make him
an innocent purchaser for value if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had
such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may
reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.
HEIRS OF ANASTACIO FABELA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 142546. August 9, 2001] (MARCELO)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: (WON)

the respondent court
(1) departed from the stringent jurisprudence on
default and appeals filed out of time
(2) erred in the appreciation of the findings of fact of
the lower court.
SPECIAL DETAIL/S:
Escritura de transaccion", a notarized document in a Visayan dialect, which provided that Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a-retro
had been entrusted with the possession of a parcel of land for a period of fourteen (14) years from the date of the instrument
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which was May 10, 1924 and upon the expiration of said period Carmelino Neri was to restore the possession of the property
to Simeona Balhon and her children-heirs of Anastacio Fabela, without need of "redemption.”
The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action for recovery of ownership, the person who
claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the property claimed but also the identity
thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land claimed by describing the location, area and
boundaries thereof.
FACTS:
Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a-retro, was entrusted with the possession of a parcel of land for a period of fourteen (14) years
from the date of the instrument. Upon the expiration of said period, possession of the property was to be restored to Simeona
Balhon and her children (heirs of Anastacio Fabela) without need of "redemption."
In 1977 or 1978, Barrio Abacan road was constructed across the subject land, which divided it into two separate lots known
as Lot 868 and 870. Roque Neri, Sr. declared these two parcels of land in his name with the Bureau of Lands and the
Assessor's office.
Sometime in 1980, the Philippine Veterans Industrial Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC), negotiated with Roque Neri,
Sr. for the purchase of Lot 870, however, the heirs of Anastacio Fabela, protested.
As a consequence, Roque Neri, Sr. executed a waiver of rights stating that the 8,000 sq. meter portion of Lot 870 was
erroneously included in his name, thus plaintiff heirs of Anastacio Fabela eventually received the proceeds of the sale.
Thereafter, the late Roque Neri, Sr. continued to ignore plaintiffs' demand for the return of Lot 868. The heirs of
Anastacio Fabela filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages against the heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. involving said lot.
The case was submitted for decision on the basis of plaintiffs' evidence since all the defendants were declared in default.
After trial and hearing ex-parte, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. In finding that the property belonged
to the heirs of Anastacio Fabela, the trial court concluded that in the "Escritura de Transaccion," Carmelino Neri was obliged
to restore the subject property in or about 1938 to the heirs of Anastacio Fabela.
Defendants, heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. filed a motion to set aside orders of default and judgment which the trial court denied.
The Heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which rendered its assailed decision reversing
the trial court's judgment by default and dismissed the complaint. CA sustained the trial court's declaration of default against
appellants Heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. but found that the judgment of default was contrary to the evidence or the law. It concluded
that petitioners had not successfully adduced the required preponderance of evidence on their claim of absolute ownership
over lot 868.
This petition.
ISSUE/S: w/n CA erred in declaring Heirs of Neri as the righful owners of Lot 868
RULING: No.
The invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action for recovery of ownership, the person who
claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the property claimed but also the identity
thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land claimed by describing the location, area and
boundaries thereof.
Petitioners failed to identify the land with that degree of certainty required to support their affirmative allegation of
ownership.
In the instant case, petitioners based their claim of ownership on the "1924 Escritura de Transaccion", the original copy of
which was not presented in the trial court, while the photocopy was also lost when the original records were elevated to the
respondent court. This was the only piece of evidence that would establish petitioners' ownership and the identity of subject
lot 868.
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Furthemore, nowhere in the trial court's narration of facts were the boundaries of the parcel of land indicated with particularity,
nor the parcel of land referring to as lot 868. What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description,
but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
From the evidences presented, this Court noticed that the total area of lots 868 and 870 would only be about about six (6)
hectares which fails to correspond to the eighteen (18) hectare parcel of land allegedly owned by the late Anastacio Fabela
which was the subject of the "Escritura de Transaccion" and testified to by Teodula Fabela Paguidopon.
Finally, the waiver of rights executed in 1980 by Roque Neri Sr., in favor of petitioners referred only to a portion of lot 870
and not to lot 868. Thus such waiver which petitioners capitalized on as an admission against Neri's interest did not in any
way support petitioners' claim of ownership of lot 868.
Therefore, CA’S decision is affirmed.
NOTES:
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right
granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. When the record does not show that the land which is the subject
matter of the action for recovery of ownership has been exactly determined, such action cannot prosper, inasmuch
as the petitioners' ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the
trial.
ii. EVIDENCE TO PROVE OWNERSHIP

iii. QUANTUM OF PROOF
REPUBLIC VS. CARRASCO [G.R. No. 143491. December 6, 2006.] (MARCELO)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
CA erred in affirming the lower Court's ruling that respondent is maintains that he is entitled to apply for
qualified to apply for the Registration of title over the subject registration of title over the subject
parcel of land under P. D. No. 1529. property because his open, adverse and
continuous possession thereof for more
Assuming arguendo that respondent is qualified to apply for than 30 years has ripened into
registration of the questioned lot, still the honorable CA erred in ownership
ruling that based on jurisprudence, Republic v. Court of appeals,
235 SCRA 567 (1994), respondent had been in possession argues that the CA has found his
thereof within the period prescribed by law for the same to be evidence sufficient to establish his and
acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title. his predecessor-in-interest's ownership
and possession of the land, which
factual finding is conclusive on this
Court.
SPECIAL DETAIL/S:
• True, a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership. Nonetheless, it may serve as
sufficient basis for inferring possession.
• prescription can be availed of to acquire ownership if the claimant’s possession was in the concept
of an owner and he complied with the period required by law
FACTS:
Respondent Carrasco filed an application for registration of title over a parcel of land situated at
Province of Rizal.
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Petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an opposition to the application. There
being no private oppositor, the trial court issued an order of general default and proceeded on the same day with
the markings of the respondent's documents and the reception ex parte of his evidence.
Thereafter, or on November 26, 1997, the respondent testified in support of his application. He likewise adduced the
testimony of one Teosito Avesado. Avesado testified that he personally know Mingao, the person allegedly gave the
land to Respondent Carrasco, and also supported herein respondent’s claim.
The trial court find that respondent has sufficiently established his ownership of the land in question, thus, ordered
the registration thereof in his name.
Republic appealed.
Pending appeal, the respondent filed a motion with the appellate court praying for the admission of additional
evidence, which additional evidence included an Affidavit of Ownership of Norberto Mingao.
CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. It found that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain and concluded that the respondent has established his ownership of the land
in question for the period of possession required by law.
Unable to accept the judgment, the Republic is now with this Court.
ISSUE/S: whether the respondent was able to sufficiently prove his possession, in the concept of an owner, of the
land sought to be registered for the period required by law so as to entitle him to the registration thereof in his name.
RULING:
Resolved the issue in the negative.
First, the respondent failed to prove that Norberto Mingao from whom he allegedly derived his title, was the owner
of the subject land and hence can transmit rights over the same in his favor.
The Court cannot give full credence to respondent's Affidavit of Ownership dated for he simply alleged therein that
Mingao had occupied the land for the last 25 years. Likewise, respondent's testimony regarding Mingao's possession
and ownership, aside from being self-serving, consists merely of general statements with no specifics even as to
when his predecessor began occupying the land. Indeed, such is hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence
required in cases of this nature. Respondent must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate his
claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession.
Furthermore, there is no proof that Mingao declared the land in his name for taxation purposes or paid taxes
due thereon. True, a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership. Nonetheless, it may serve
as sufficient basis for inferring possession.
Since Mingao's possession and ownership of the subject land were not sufficiently proven, Mingao himself cannot
validly transmit his rights over the land in respondent's favor. At any rate, the mode by which respondent alleged to
have taken possession and ownership of the land is not one of those provided for under Article 712 of the Civil Code
Second, prescription cannot be availed of to acquire ownership not only because the respondent's possession was
not in the concept of an owner, but also because he failed to comply with the required period. Respondent cannot
tack his possession to that of Mingao's since there is no privity between them, the transmission of rights not having
been proven. Thus, respondent's possession must be reckoned only from the time of his actual possession which,
as admitted by him, commenced in 1990.
But even assuming, by arguing, that respondent may validly derive his right of possession from Mingao, still, he may
not rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land in question for, as the CA correctly found, and which the
respondent does not dispute, Mingao's possession started only in 1950 which is 5 years later than the reckoning
point of June 12, 1945 under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529).
It is thus clear that respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation not only as required
by Section 14(1), supra, of the Property Registration Decree but also by the Public
Page 5 of 30
Land Act or Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141.

The law requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier for the land to
be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title.
In sum, the respondent could not have acquired an imperfect title to the land in question because he has not proved
possession openly, continuously and adversely in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945, the period of
possession required by law.
NOTES:
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, the pertinent provision of which is Section 48(b):
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefore, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
note☺ the reliance placed by the appellate court in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we ruled that occupation
and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessor-in-interest vest title on such applicant so
as to segregate the land from the mass of public land, is erroneous. Said ruling has been effectively superseded by
subsequent legislations which amended Section 48(b) the Public Land Act.
ZENAIDA RAMOS-BALALIO VS. RAMOS [G.R. No. 168464. January 23, 2006] (MARCELO)
PETITIONER: (PARTIALLY WON) RESPONDENT:

• the land was allegedly sold to her by her mother Susana
• argues that her petition may be treated as an accion publiciana and not merely
an action for recovery of inheritance
SPECIAL DETAIL/S:
Zenaida and her brother Alexander (now deceased) are the children of spouses Susana Bueno and Abundio Ramos.
The spouses started occupying Lot No. 204 in 1938. Abundio died in 1944.
Susana met her second husband, respondent Eusebio Ramos in 1946, with whom she had five children, one of
whom is respondent Rolando.
Time and again, we have held that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
FACTS:
This is a case about siblings who fought over possession of a parcel of land. It was alleged that Zenaida(petitioner)
has long been cultivating the subject land, together with her maternal grandfather. That after sometime, their mother,
Susana sold to her the land. She later on partitioned it among herself, her brother Alexander and respondent Rolando
(her half-brother) and his siblings.
The partition was not registered but evidenced by Deeds of Sale in favor of both Rolando and Alexander.
Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share; however, it came to her knowledge that respondents Rolando and
Eusebio had usurped her share and deprived the mortgagees of possession over the land.
Page 6 of 30
After settling the mortgage, petitioner led a case for recovery of inheritance, possession and damages with a petition
for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Trial court rendered its decision holding that petitioner was deprived of her right to cultivation and possession of her
share of Lot No. 204.
CA reversed trial court’s decision; it found that neither Zenaida nor Alexander complied with the homestead
application requirements in order to acquire superior vested right.
ISSUE/S:
a. w/n the honorable court of appeals gravely erred in holding that petitioner is not in prior possession of the
said land,and declaring that she has no right whatsoever to the disputed land.
b. w/n the honorable court of appeals erred in ignoring the issue of accion publiciana in the case at bar and
confined itself to the claim of recovery of inheritance
RULING:
a. No. A careful examination of the records shows that petitioner has not satisfactorily established that a valid
application for homestead patent was filed by her parents. The decision of the Bureau of Lands in 1958
only addressed Zenaida's family's right of preference over the land, in view of their possession and
cultivation of the land. Nonetheless, the Bureau of Lands ordered the filing of an appropriate application for
its registration which indicates that as of that time, there was as yet no valid application filed.
The purported sale, therefore, between petitioner and her mother cannot be given effect, nor can it be a
source of right for Zenaida, because Susana did not have the authority to sell what did not belong to her.
The invalidation of the sale consequently nullifies the partition of the property among Zenaida, Alexander,
and Rolando and his siblings because Zenaida could not have disposed of the land which she did not own.
For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor Rolando can claim any right whatsoever as heirs of Susana.
Their reliance in Section 105 of Public Land Act is misplaced because the cited provision speaks of an
applicant, grantee, or lessee. Susana was not one of these. In her lifetime, despite her possession and
cultivation of the land, she failed to apply for a homestead patent and to acquire any vested right that
Eusebio or Rolando can inherit vested right that Eusebio or Rolando can inherit.
b. Yes. We find that Zenaida has proven prior possession of the portion of land she claims as her share, which
possession antedates the filing of the homestead application. She produced evidence showing that she
has filed a verified application for the registration of the land with the Bureau of Lands on August 10, 1971,
which is still pending. The documents remain uncontested and the application has not been assailed by
any of the parties to the case.
Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that of her predecessor-in-interest
(mother Susana Bueno) covering the property. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties.
Petitioner Zenaida's uncontested and verified application for a homestead patent coupled with her open
and notorious occupation of the land convinces us of her preferential right to possess the land claimed,
which entitles her to be protected by the law in such possession.
NOTES:
An accion publiciana is an action for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.
SPOUSES AZANA VS. LUMBO (G.R. NO. 157593. MARCH 22, 2007)
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Spouses Alberto and Jocelyn Azana (Lose) CRISTOPHER LUMBO and ELIZABETH LUMBO-
JIMENEZ (Win)
SPECIAL DETAILS:
Respondents wish to nullify the sale made by spouses Gregorio to the petitioners, because they allege to be the
lawful owners of Lot64 situated in Malay Aklan.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Jurisprudence is consistent that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership of the properties
stated therein|||
● Equiponderance of evidence; When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the
evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under said
principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of
action.
FACTS:
Respondents filed an action for Quieting of Title when they discovered that a deed of absolute sale was executed
by the spouses Emilio and Estela Gregorio over Lot 64 to petitioners.
This cast a cloud over their title. To prove their claim, petitioners submitted a deed of absolute sale of real property
dated March 25, 1976 to show that Ignacio Bandiola sold to Estela Gregorio 3.4768 hectares of land located in
Manoc-Manoc, Malay, Aklan.
Respondents stated that Lot 64 was originally part of the 8.0488-hectare land bought in a public auction by their
parents, which they inherited entirely; that such sale in the public auction was evidenced by a final bill of sale dated
September 18, 1939; that Lot 64 was separately designated during the national reservation survey only because it
was also being claimed by the spouses Gregorio; and that, if Lots 63 and 64 were combined, the boundaries of the
resulting lot coincided with the boundaries of the lot purchased under the final bill of sale.
Finding equiponderance of evidence, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and upheld the validity of the sale of
Lot 64 to them.
On review, the CA arrived at a different conclusion. It declared respondents as owners of Lot 64 and nullified the
sale by the spouses Gregorio to petitioners.
ISSUES: Were the respondents able to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence?
RULING: Yes. Clearly, respondents have been able to establish by preponderance of evidence that they are the
rightful owners of Lot 64.
When an owner of real property is disturbed in any way in his rights over the property by the unfounded claim of
others, he may bring an action for quieting of title. The purpose of the action is to remove the cloud on his title created
by any instrument, record, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid and prejudicial to his title.
Here, the deeds of sale executed in favor of petitioners and the spouses Gregorio were prima facie valid and
enforceable. However, further scrutiny and investigation established that petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Ignacio
Bandiola, could not have owned the disputed lot. Consequently, the subsequent conveyances of Lot 64 to the
spouses Gregorio and thereafter, to petitioners, were null and void. Therefore, respondents, as the adjudged owners
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of Lot 64, are entitled to have the aforementioned deeds of sale nullified to remove any doubt regarding their
ownership of the lot.
NOTES:
Equiponderance of evidence is defined as:
When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one
side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.
|||
FULE VS. LEGARE (G.R. NO. L-17951, FEBRUARY 28, 1963)
PETITIONER: Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes E. RESPONDENT: Emilia E. de Legare and Court of
Aragon (WON) Appeals (LOST)
SPECIAL DETAILS:
● Emilia and Purita ended up staying in the hotel for around a month and a half, occasionally visited by
John. During one of these visits, Emilia told John that she wanted to go home, but he told her that it
was not yet safe.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Section 55, Act 496

“The production of the owner’s duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for
registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deed to enter a new
certificate or to make a memorandum or registration in accordance with such instrument, and the new
certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons claiming under
him, in favor of every purchases for value and in good faith.”
Article 1434, Civil Code

“When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor
acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.”
FACTS:
● This case involves an action for annulment of certain deeds of sale and conveyance covering a parcel
of land, together with the improvements existing thereon, situated in the municipality of San Juan,
province of Rizal, and for damages.
● Emilia E. de Legare, the plaintiff, was the owner of a parcel of land, together with a residential house
erected thereon, situated at No. 146 Sta. Mesa Boulevard Extension, San Juan, Rizal. Her ownership
was evidenced by TCT No. 21253, issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal. She lived in said house together with defendant John W. Legare, her adopted son, and a maid
named Purita Tarrosa.
● On September 26, 1951, the plaintiff, through a public deed, constituted upon the above mentioned
house and lot a first class mortgage in favor of defendant Tomas Q. Soriano to guarantee the payment
of a loan in the amount of P8,000.00.
● At about 9 P.M. on March 29, 1953, while Emilia, John, and Purita were seated in the drawing room
of the house, an unknown man intruded into the room, approached Emilia, covered her mouth and
pressed a knife on her side. He demanded that she give him P10,000.00 if she did not want to be
Page 9 of 30
killed, but she told him that she did not have that amount. Thus, the intruder told her to raise the
necessary amount as he would come back the following morning and would kill her if she would fail
to do so.
● After having made the threat, the intruder left the house. John did not call for help nor made any
attempt to defend his mother, and when Purita stood up to go down the house to call for a policeman,
he held her by the hand and slapped her.
● Thereafter, John asked Emilia to sign a piece of paper so that he could secure from the U.S. Veterans
Administration the amount which they needed to deliver to the intruder. Emilia, who did not know how
to read or write, asked John what the paper was, to which the latter replied that it was an application
for payment of compensation. As she trusted John, she signed the paper. John also had Purita sign
as witness without allowing her to read the document.
● After the paper was signed, John told Emilia and Purita to pack up their things as they were leaving
the house to hide in the Windsor Hotel in the City of Manila. After setting them up in their room, John
told Emilia and Purita not to leave the room nor peep out of the window as they might be seen by the
men who came to their house the previous evening.
● On May 7, 1953, John came to the hotel and gave Emilia a five peso bill. He told her that she could
use the amount for transportation expenses if she wanted to leave the hotel. The following morning,
Emilia and Purita left the hotel and went back to the house, which they found to be occupied by
strangers.
● It was then discovered that the paper which John had Emilia sign in the evening of March 29, 1953
was a deed of sale of the lot and house in question in favor of John for the sum of P12,000.00 and
that it was supposed to have been executed on the 7th day of April 1953, and acknowledged before
a notary public on that date.
● Furthermore, it was found that sometime prior to May 9, 1953, John approached Elias B. Fermin, the
real estate broker who intervened in the securing of the loan contracted by John from Soriano, and
sought the broker’s help to sell the lot and house in question which was accepted by Fermin.
● The property in question was sold to defendants spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon.
Conrado C. Fule read the title papers in the hand of John W. Legare and inspected the premises,
and satisfied with the result of his inspection, he agreed to purchase the property for P12,000.00 on
condition that the sum of P7,000, the unpaid balance of plaintiff's indebtedness to Tomas Q. Soriano
secured by a mortgage thereon, would be deducted from the price, and that he would assume said
mortgage.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not herein petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for value of the properties
contested.
RULING:
● The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals, instead dismissing the
respondent’s complaint and declaring the petitioners herein the lawful owners of the properties
involved.
● As guided by the facts found by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners
were innocent purchasers for value of the house and lot disputed. Consequently, they are adjudged
as the lawful owners.
● The negotiation and transaction which eventually caused the certificate of title to be transferred from
herein respondent to the petitioner spouses were conducted by a real estate broker licensed since
1938. Nothing in John W. Legare’s person or behavior suggested anything suspicious. He was the
adopted son of the respondent, and, at the time that he was contracting with petitioner spouses, he
had not been known to commit crime or dishonestly. On the contrary, John has had previous dealings
with the real estate broker during which he exhibited the expected degree of trustworthiness.
● Notably, the deed of sale was regular upon its face, and no one would have questioned its authenticity
since it was duly acknowledged before a notary public.
● Moreover, even if petitioner spouses had the opportunity to compare the signature of the respondent
on the deed of conveyance with a specimen of her genuine signature, the same would have been in
vain since the signature on the document was admittedly the respondent’s.
● Finally, the respondent, during the whole period of the negotiation, was not available to confirm or
deny the execution of the deed as she was hiding, or hidden, at the Windsor Hotel in Manila.
● The diligence and precaution observed by the petitioners themselves was also not lacking as the
records show that they did not rely solely and fully upon the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare
and the fact that John had then in his possession the corresponding certificate of title of the registered
Page 10 of 30
owner. Instead, petitioners demanded and insisted that the sale in favor of Legare be first registered
and that the transfer in their favor be thereafter likewise registered. It was only after all of these were
complied with that they paid the purchaser price.
● Although it is true that at the time the petitioners purchased the properties from John W. Legare, he
was not yet the registered owner of the same, this fact alone could not have caused the petitioners
to lose their status as innocent purchases for value. It should be recalled that although the title was
in the name of the respondent Emilia E. de Legare, the certificate of title was in the possession of her
adopted son, John.
● Under Section 55 of Act 496, John’s possession of the certificate and his subsequent production of it
to the herein petitioners operated as a “conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register
of deed to enter a new certificate.”
● There is still another reason why the property in question should be adjudged to the petitioners even
after their good faith has already been established, and that is that although the deed of sale in favor
of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a registered title to
the house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners.
● Although it is true that the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Director of Lands v. Addison that
a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title, the Supreme Court has also laid down
the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a
valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of
the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate
(Inquimboy v. Cruz).
● As decided in Reynes v. Barrera, when there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud
or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance therein, the purchaser is not required
to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy
and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely
be futile and nugatory as the public shall then be denied its foremost motivation for respecting and
observing the Land Registration Act. In the end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced
and prejudiced.
● Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name of John W. Legare,
and thereafter registered the same, John W. Legare, insofar as third parties were concerned,
acquired valid title to the house and lot here disputed. When, therefore, he transferred the title to the
petitioners, the entire transaction fell within the purview of Article 1434 of the Civil Code. Thus, the
registration in John W. Legare’s name effectively operated to convey the properties to him.
● Lastly, although the court sympathizes with the respondent, being aware of the treacherous and
painful fraud committed on her by her adopted son, the positive provisions of law and settled
jurisprudence cannot be subordinated to that feeling. Besides, according to the facts of the case,
respondent is not entirely blameless because when John presented to her the document which turned
out to be a deed of conveyance in his favor, she readily affixed her signature thereto upon the simple
representation of John that it was a document pertaining to her claim with the U.S. Veterans
Administrations. She could have asked her maid to read the contents of the same for her and yet she
did not, amounting to a lack of prudence and precaution on the part of Mrs. Emilia de Legare.
NOTES:
● A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscientious advantage of
another (Cui and Joven v. Henson). Thus, the conduct of the petitioner spouses was measured by
this yardstick.
RUMARETE VS. HERNANDEZ (G.R. NO. 168222. APRIL 18, 2006)
PETITIONER: Spouses Teodulo Rumarate RESPONDENT: Hillario Hernandez et al. and The
(deceased) and Rosita Rumarete Register of Deeds of Quezon Province
Page 11 of 30
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Article 476 of the Civil Code states that the remedy of quieting of title may be availed of only when,by reason
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real property or any
interest therein.
Article 477 of the Civil Code also states that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the
real property which is the subject matter of the suit. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.
An action for quieting of title is imprescriptible, where the person seeking relief is in possession of the disputed
property. A person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
FACTS:
● Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and cultivated by the godfather of Teodulo Rumarate
(Teodulo), Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with the Rumarate family in
San Pablo City.
● Between 1923 and 1924, Santiago and the Rumarate family transferred residence to avail of the land
distribution in Quezon. From 1925 to 1928, Santiago occupied Lot No. 379, cultivating five hectares
thereof.
● Before moving in 1929, Santiago orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo and
entrusted to him a copy of a Decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tayabas recognizing his
(Santiago’s) rights over Lot No. 379.
● Since Teodulo was only fourteen (14) years old then, his father helped him cultivate the land. Their
family thereafter cleared the land, built a house and planted coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables
thereon.
● In 1960, Santiago executed an "Affidavit (quit-claim)" ratifying the transfer of his rights over Lot No.
379 to Teodulo.
● In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, respondents'
predecessors-in-interest, were able to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. He did not immediately file a
case against respondents because he was advised to just remain on the land and pay the
corresponding taxes thereon.|||
● Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that in 1964, Santiago sold the questioned lot to their
parents, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.
● Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964, he accompanied his father in
inspecting the lot which was then planted with coconut trees.
● Thereafter, he visited the land twice, once in 1966 and the other in 1970. From 1966 up to the time
he testified, his family declared the lot for taxation and paid the taxes due thereon.
Decisions of the Lower Courts

● The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It held that since the latter possessed the
land in the concept of an owner since 1929, they became the owners thereof by acquisitive
prescription after the lapse of 10 years, pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, when Santiago
sold the lot to respondents' parents in 1964, the former no longer had the right over the property and
therefore transmitted no title to said respondents.
● The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that Teodulo did
not acquire title over Lot No. 379, either by donation or acquisitive prescription; that Teodulo's bare
allegation that Santiago orally bequeathed to him the litigated lot is insufficient to prove such transfer
of ownership; and that even assuming that the property was truly donated by Santiago to Teodulo in
1929, or in the 1960 Affidavit, said conveyance is void for not complying with the formalities of a valid
donation which require the donation and the acceptance thereof by the donee to be embodied in a
public instrument.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the action of quieting the title will prosper (YES).
Page 12 of 30
(2) Whether or not the petitioner has a valid claim to the property (YES).
(3) Whether or not there was a valid sale to the respondent (NO).
(4) Whether or not the petitioner’s action to quiet title has prescribed (NO).
RULING:
(1) Action of Quieting of Title. - Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, the remedy of quieting of title may
be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding,
which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby
cast on the complainant's title to real property or any interest therein.
Article 477 of the same Code states that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest
in the real property which is the subject matter of the suit. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
(2) Equitable Title. - The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Teodulo and his
witnesses that his (Teodulo's) possession of the land since 1929 was open, continuous, adverse,
exclusive, and in the concept of an owner. It is a settled rule in civil cases as well as in criminal cases
that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial courts are given great weight and
highest degree of respect by the appellate court considering that the latter is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.
A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that Teodulo possessed and occupied Lot
No. 379 in the concept of an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo cultivated the controverted land, built his
home, and raised his 11 children thereon. In 1957, he filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379
but failed to pursue the same. After his demise, all his 11 children, the youngest being 28 years old,
continued to till the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago never challenged Teodulo's possession of Lot
No. 379 nor demanded or received the produce of said land. For 31 years Santiago never exercised
any act of ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed that he is no longer interested in
asserting any right over the land by executing in favor of Teodulo a quitclaim.
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the land as owner thereof since 1929.
While the oral donation in 1929 as well as the 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are void
for non-compliance with the formalities of donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his
family's long years of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature of their possession thereof.
(3) Invalid Cloud on Title. - Spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta cannot be considered as
purchasers in good faith because they had knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such an inquiry. The Court notes that Santiago was not residing in
Lot No. 379 at the time of the sale. He was already 81 years old, too old to cultivate and maintain an
18-hectare land. These circumstances should have prompted the spouses to further inquire who was
actually tilling the land. Had they done so, they would have found that Teodulo and his family are the
ones possessing and cultivating the land as owners thereof.
In the same vein, respondents could not be considered as third persons or purchasers in good faith
and for value or those who buy the property and pay a full and fair price for the same because they
merely inherited Lot No. 379 from spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.
(4) Prescription of Action. - The settled rule is that an action for quieting of title is imprescriptible, as in
the instant case, where the person seeking relief is in possession of the disputed property. A person
in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. Considering that
petitioners herein continuously possessed Lot No. 379 since 1929 up to the present, their right to
institute a suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot be barred by the statute of limitations.
Page 13 of 30
Neither could petitioners' action be barred by laches because they continuously enjoyed the
possession of the land and harvested the fruits thereof up to the present to the exclusion of and
without any interference from respondents. They cannot therefore be said to have slept on their rights
as they in fact exercised the same by continuously possessing Lot No. 379.
j.
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY (ART. 435-436)
i. AS AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
1. REQUISITES
ii. AS AN EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
k. HIDDEN TREASURE (ART. 438-439)
B. RIGHT OF ACCESSION (ART. 440)
a. GENERAL PROVISIONS
i. DEFINITION
ii. ACCESSION VS. ACCESSORY
iii. NATURE
iv. KINDS OF ACCESSION
v. RIGHT OF OWNER TO THE FRUITS (ARTS.
441-442, 444)
1. KINDS OF FRUITS
vi. OBLIGATION OF RECIPIENT OF FRUITS
(ART. 443)
b. RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
i. GENERAL RULE (ART. 445 AND 446)
ii. BASIC PRINCIPLES
iii. APPLICABILITY OF ART. 445 AND 446
iv. RULES WHERE OWNER OF LAND USES
MATERIALS OF ANOTHER TO BUILD ON HIS LAND (ART. 447)
v. RULES WHERE BUILDER/SOWER/PLANTER
BUILDS/SOWS/PLANTS ON A LAND NOT BELONGING TO HIM
1. BUILDER/SOWER/PLANTER IN GOOD FAITH (ART. 448)
a. GOOD FAITH
ROSALES VS. CASTELLTORT (G.R. NO. 157044. OCTOBER 5, 2005)
PETITIONER: Rodolfo v. Rosales and Lily RESPONDENT: Miguel Castelltort, Judith

Rosqueta-Rosales Castelltort, and Lina Lopez-Villegas
SPECIAL DETAILS:
● In this case, respondent Castelltort’s good faith ceased on August 21, 1995 when the petitioners
personally apprised him of their title over the questioned lot. Hence, should the petitioners opt to
appropriate the property, they are only liable to pay for that part of the improvement at the time good
faith still existed. If the petitioners oblige Miguel to pay the price of the land and its value is more than
that of the structures, the payment of reasonable rent should commence at the time Miguel was
notified of petitioners’ lawful title.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Article 448 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision in this case, thus:
(1) Petitioners have the right to appropriate as their own the building and other improvements on the
subject lots, but only after payment of indemnity;
(2) Petitioners also have the option to oblige Miguel to pay the price of the land, provided that the value
of the land is not more than that of the structures; and
(3) If the value of the land is more than that of the structures, Miguel shall pay the reasonable rent.
Page 14 of 30
It is to be noted, however, that the choice belongs to the owner of the land because of the principle of accession
- that the accessory follows the principal. However, petitioners cannot refuse to exercise either option and
compel instead Miguel to remove it from the land.
FACTS:
● Spouses Rosales, herein petitioners, are the registered owners of Lot 17, covered by a TCT. On
August 16, 1995, they discovered that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their
knowledge and consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort.
● Respondent Castelltort and his wife Judith claimed that they purchased Lot 16 from respondent
Villegas but after a survey thereof by a geodetic engineer, Lot 16 turned out to be Lot 17.
● Thus, negotiations for the settlement of the case began. Villegas offered a larger lot near the
petitioners’ lot as a replacement thereof and even proposed to pay for the purchase price. However,
this proposal was rejected by petitioners. A letter was then sent through counsel to the Castelltorts,
directing them to stop the construction of and to demolish their house and any other structure that
may have been built thereon, and to desist from entering the lot.
● The petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction.
● On their end, the Castelltorts claimed that they were builders in good faith. Villegas alleged that the
Castelltorts acted in good faith in constructing the house on petitioners’ lot as they, in fact, consulted
her before commencing any construction, and they relied on the technical description of the lot sold
to them, which was verified by the geodetic engineer.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not Miguel Castelltort is a builder in good faith.
RULING:
● Yes. Miguel Castelltort is a builder in good faith as he relied on the title which the intervenor showed
to him. The same had no annotation of any prior adverse claim. Thus, they cannot be faulted for
having relied on the expertise of the land surveyor who is more equipped and experienced in the field
of land surveying.
● A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land that he is building on is his, or
that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title.
Good faith is always presumed and the one who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor has the
burden of proving the same.
● In fact, Miguel even went to the Registry of Deeds of Laguna to procure a certified true copy of the
Transfer Certificate of Title, which bore no annotation indicating any prior adverse claim in Lot 16.
● The confusion in the identification of Lot 16 was traced to the error committed by the geodetic
engineer in placing stone monuments on petitioners’ property instead of on Lot 16. Hence, when
Miguel began constructing his house on petitioners’ lot, he believed that it was Lot 16 which he
bought, and which was delivered to him by Villegas.
NOTES:
● Good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known to
the possessor by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.
JM TUAZON CO., INC. VS. VDA DE LUMANLAN (G.R. NO. L-23497. APRIL 26, 1968)
PETITIONER: J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. RESPONDENT: Estrella Vda. de Lumanlan and the
Court of Appeals (Fifth Division)
SPECIAL DETAILS:
● The property in question was 800 sqm.
FACTS:
● On April 30, 1959, petitioner filed an ejectment suit against respondent alleging that it was the
registered owner of the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision property and that, around April 1949,
Page 15 of 30
respondent Estrella unlawfully entered into possession of the property and constructed her house
therein.
● On her end, Estrella denied all of the allegations, stating that she bought the property from Pedro
Deudor and that, in a compromise agreement between Pedro and Tuazon, she was one of the
recognized buyers of the subject property.
● The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Tuazon, as it is the registered owner and, as the question was
purely one of possession, Estrella’s evidence was completely immaterial. Estrella was thus ordered
to vacate the property and to remove the house and other structures constructed thereon.
● However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision as it found that the Compromise
Agreement constituted a valid defense against the possessory action filed by Tuazon. Under
Paragraph 7 of the same agreement, Tuazon bound and committed itself to sell to respondent Estrella
the lot occupied by her at a reasonable price. Furthermore, it found that Estrella had a right to compel
Tuazon to accept payment for the lot in question as the Compromise Agreement legalized her
possession.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Compromise Agreement legalized the possession of Estrella.
(2) Whether or not Estrella should be deemed a builder in good faith.
RULING:
(1) No. The Compromise Agreement did not legalize the possession of Estrella as all that petitioner
Tuazon agreed to was to grant the Deudor buyers the preferential right to purchase at “current prices
and terms” the lots occupied by them, upon recognizing the title of Tuazon and signing new contracts
therefore.
In her answer, Estrella did not claim that she signed a new contract with Tuazon for the purchase of
the lot occupied. Even worse, instead of recognizing the title of Tuazon, she repudiated and assailed
the compromise between the Deudors and Tuazon, saying that they conspired together by entering
into a supposed compromise where Pedro Deudor quitclaimed all of their rights in the property in
favor of Tuazon without her knowledge and consent. Hence, there is no legal basis with the
pronouncement that the Compromise Agreement legalized the possession of Estrella since she
herself does not rely on the compromise but, on the contrary, assails it.
Without the Compromise Agreement, Estrella must justify her possession on the basis of a pretended
superiority of the Deudor’s old Spanish informacion posesoria over Tuazon’s OCT. Thus, Estrella is
now barred from assailing the decree of registration in favor of Tuazon’s predecessors twenty (20)
years after its issuance.
(2) No. Estrella cannot be deemed to be a builder in good faith since there was a presumptive knowledge
of the Torrens title issued to Tuazon and its predecessors in interest since 1914. Hence, Estrella,
being a buyer from Deudor, cannot, in good conscience, say now that she believed her vendor had
rights of ownership over the lot purchased.
As she has chosen to ignore the Torrens title of Tuazon and has relied, instead, upon the Deudor’s
claim of ownership (perhaps because the same had appeared more advantageous to her), she only
has herself to blame for the consequences.
Had she investigated before buying and building her house on the said lot, she would have been
informed that the land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of Tuazon. Thus, as she
failed to make the necessary inquiry, she is bound conclusively by Tuazon’s title.
QUEVADA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 140798. SEPTEMBER 19, 2006)
FACTS:
1. Juanito (respondent) is the lessor of a parcel of land with a residential house in Sampaloc.
2. Sometime in 1994, he entered into a contract of lease with petitioner Marcelito as the lessee.
After the expiration of the lease, they entered into another one
Page 16 of 30
After the expiration of the extended lease, Marcelito continued possessing the premises,
but without payment of any reasonable compensation
Juanito made several demands to vacate but Marcelito refused without justifiable reason.
3. Marcelito alleged that

He already started building the house on the lot at the time he occupied the house as his
residence.
Sometime in 1994, Juanito negotiated for the purchase of the lot from the previous
owner, and he likewise offered to buy the lot but was not able to raise the amount for
the purchase price
Juanito went on with the sale but with the assurance that should he be in a financial
position to do payment, Marcelito will transfer the title to him. Thus, a lease contract was
executed for the meantime, but only with respect to the land since the house belonged to
him.
He likewise assured Juanito that if he would not be able to purchase the lot after a
reasonable period of time, he was willing to deliver possession of the house after payment
of P500,000
Juanito did not give him a chance to pay the purchase price and likewise refused to accept
the monthly rental of the lot
4. MeTC ruled in favor of Juanito and ordered Marcelito to vacate the property.
Judgement was affirmed by both RTC and CA
ISSUES:
1. Whether the action for ejectment is proper
YES. The necessary allegations in the complaint meet the requirements for an unlawful detainer
case.
2. Whether such action can be brought by respondent who is not the titled owner of
the property YES. An action for unlawful detainer being conclusive only on the issue of
possession.
3. Whether petitioner can be reimbursed for the value of the house on the property
YES. Petitioner should be paid for the value of the portion of the house covered by the lease, to be
offset against rentals due.
RULING:
1. YES. The necessary allegations in the complaint meet the requirements for an unlawful
detainer case.
2. YES. An action for unlawful detainer being conclusive only on the issue of possession.
3. YES. Petitioner should be paid for the value of the portion of the house covered by the lease,
to be offset against rentals due.
It is true that Art 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be
owners of the land or at least have a claim of title thereto and does not apply when the interest in the land is
merely that of a holder such as a tenant. However, in special cases decided by the Supreme Court, it can be
applied to cases where a builder has constructed improvements with the consent of the owner.
In this case, while there is no supporting evidence presented showing that petitioner’s construction of the
house was with the consent of the land’s previous owner, good faith should still be presumed especially since
the lease relationship was open and in plain view. However, as a mere tenant, petitioner must pay reasonable
Page 17 of 30
rent for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises from the time the last contract expired until
he final vacates and surrenders it.
It would not be fair for respondent to receive both the rent and the portion of the house covered by the lease.
Everyone must act with justice in the exercise of rights and performance of duties. Respondent, by insisting
on ejecting petitioner, elects to appropriate the building. The principle of unjust enrichment then now applies.
Hence, to have a just transfer of the leased portion of the houses, its value should be offset against the
reasonable rent due.
MACASAET VS. MACASAET (G.R. NOS. 154391-92. SEPTEMBER 30, 2004)
PETITIONER: Ismael and Teresita Macasaet (Ismael RESPONDENT: Vicente and Rosario Macasaet
is the son of respondents. Teresita is the wife of (Parents of Ismael)
Ismael)
PRINCIPLE:
General rule:
Article 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters acted in good faith – that is, they
believe themselves to be the owners of the land or at least to have a claim or title thereto. IT DOES NOT
APPLY when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usurfructuary.
Reason: Lessee recognizes that the lessor is the owner of the property. Hence, they cannot be
possessors nor builders in good faith because they know that their occupancy of the premises
continues only during the life of the lease.
Exceptions:
However, in some special cases, this Court has used Art 448 by recognizing good faith beyond this limited
definition. Thus, children are deemed to have
acted in good faith when they built structures on the lots owned by their parents who invited them to occupy
and use said lots and fully consented to
the improvements introduced by them.
FACTS:
FROM THIS POINT FORWARD, LET US REFER TO RESPONDENTS AS “PARENTS”
AND PETITIONERS AS “CHILDREN” FOR EASIER UNDERSTANDING.
Dec 1997 – parents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit against the children.
Alleged that they are the owners of 2 parcels of land covered by TCTs
Children occupied the said lots in 1992 by virtue of a verbal lease agreement and used the same as their
residence and the situs of their construction business
Despite repeated demands, children failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week.
Children denied the existence of the verbal lease agreement.

Alleged that parents invited them to construct their residence and business on the said lots so they could live
near one another and help in resolving family problems.
Lot 1 was allotted to Ismael as advance inheritance
Lot 2 was given to them by parents as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of
respondents’ house.
MTCC ruled in favor of the parents and ordered children to vacate the premises.
Page 18 of 30
Children occupied the lot not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement but by tolerance of the parents, therefore
they are bound by the implied promise to vacate the lands upon demand.
RTC upheld the findings of the MTCC.
Allowed parents to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by the children, after payment
of the indemnity provided for by Art 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
Parents could also oblige children to purchase the land, unless the value of the land is more than the building.
If the value of the land is more than the building, children should pay rent if parents would not choose to
appropriate the building.
CA sustained the findings of the two lower courts that children had been occupying the lots only by
the tolerance of parents.
CA modified the RTC decision by declaring that Art 448 was not applicable.
Applied Art 1678 instead – children had the right to be reimbursed for ½ of the value of the improvements
made.
ISSUE AND RULING:

Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises?
The parents. Children failed to justify their right to retain possession of the lots, which the parents owned.
Since possession is one of the attributes of ownership, parents are clearly entitled to physical or material
possession. Also, unlawful detainer was sufficiently alleged in the complaint and was duly proven during the
trial. Hence, the lower courts did not err in ordering the ejectment of the children.
Whether children’s possession of the lots was only by mere tolerance of the parents?
NO. Children were able to establish that parents invited them to occupy the land so they could live near one
another and help in resolving family problems. Hence, children’s right to occupy the lots is clear.
The issue is the duration of possession.
In the absence of a stipulation, the Civil Code allows the courts to fix the duration or period. However, this
applies to a situation where the parties intended a period, which is not obtaining in the case at bar. Based on
parents’ reasons for gratuitously allowing children to use the lots, it can safely be concluded that the agreement
subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually benefited from the arrangement. Having based on
parental love therefore, the agreement would end upon the dissipation of the affection. Hence, when
persistent conflict and animosity overtook the love and solidarity between them, the purpose of the
agreement ceased. Hence, children no longer had any cause for continued possession of the lots.
WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE CIVIL CODE PROVISION
Whether Art 447 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case?

NO. Art 447 is not applicable because it relates to the rules that apply when the owner of the property uses
the materials of another. It does not refer to the instance when a possessor builds on the property of another,
which is the issue here.
What then is the applicable law?

When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 is the applicable provision.
Art 448 - The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner
Page 19 of 30
of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."
This provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters acted in good faith – that is, they
believe themselves to be owners of the land or at least to have a claim or title thereto. It does not apply when
the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usurfructuary. However, in some
special cases, this Court has used Art 448 by recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition.
Article 448 applies to the present case. The facts clearly shows that parents fully consented to the
improvements introduced by the children. In fact, they approved to the construction of the same. Thus,
children may be deemed to have been in good faith when they built the structures on those lots.
WHETHER CHILDREN HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE INDEMNIFIED FOR THE IMPROVEMENTS THEY
CONSTRUCTED ON THE LOTS.
The structures built by petitioners were “useful” improvements because they augmented the value or income
of the bare lots. Thus, indemnity to be paid by respondents under Art 448 is provided for by Art 546. Art 546 –
Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain
the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. The landowner having the option to either (1) refunding the
amount of the expenses or (2) paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason
thereof. THUS, Parents have the right to appropriate as their own the building and other improvements on the
subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of the children, or (2) paying the increase in value
acquired by the properties by reason thereof. Parents also have the option to oblige the children to pay the
price of the land, provided that the value of the land is not more than that of the structures.
If the value of the land is more than that of the structures, children shall pay the reasonable rent.
FINAL RULING This case must be remanded to the trial court to determine matters necessary for the proper
application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546. Such matters include the option that respondents would
take and the amount of indemnity that they would pay, should they decide to appropriate the improvements
on the lots.
MORES VS. YU-GO (G.R. NO. 172292. JULY 23, 2010)
PETITIONER: Alida Mores RESPONDENT: Shirley Yu-Go, Victoria Yu-Lim,

Estrella Yu
- prayed for the reimbursement of the value of
the residential building illegally demolished
as well as for the payment of moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs
of suit.
SPECIAL DETAILS:
● Antonio Mores used to be an errand boy of appellants' family.
● Renovations made- consisting of a 3-bedroom annex, a covered veranda and a concrete hollow block
fence, at their own expense (petitioners)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies
only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It
does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always
be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
Article 1678 of the Civil Code:
Page 20 of 30
If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the
lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to
reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary.
With regard to the ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any reimbursement, but he may
remove the ornamental objects, provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not
choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.
FACTS:
● Antonio Mores passed away during the pre-trial stage. Hence, Alida Mores remained as the only
defendant.
● Respondents filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction before the RTC in Naga City.
● They alleged that they co-owned a parcel of land located in Sto. Tomas, Magarao, Camarines Sur
on which a building of strong materials was built. Petitioners pleaded to respondents that they be
allowed to stay in the subject property in the meantime that they did not own a house yet.
● They readily agreed without asking for any rental but subject only to the condition that the said stay
would last until anyone of respondents would need the subject property. Forthwith, appellees and
their children occupied the same as agreed upon.
● Respondents made known to petitioners that they were in need of the subject property. They
explained that appellant Shirley Yu-Go needed the same and, besides, petitioners already have their
own house in Villa Grande Homes, Naga City. Petitioners begged for a 6-month extension or until
May 1998.
● Even after May 1998, petitioners failed to make good their promise and asked that they be allowed
to stay until October 1998, which was again extended until the end of the same year.
● In the first week of January 1999, respondents gave their final demand for them to vacate the subject
property. Instead of heeding such demand, petitioners hired some laborers and started demolishing
the improvements on the subject property.
● Petitioners continued their demolition and even took away and appropriated for themselves the
materials derived from such unlawful demolition. Respondents instituted an action for injunction
where they also prayed for the reimbursement of the value of the residential building illegally
demolished as well as for the payment of moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs of suit.
● Petitioner’s Arguments: They claimed that appellee Antonio Mores was appellants' uncle and used
to be the assistant manager and cashier of appellants' father at their Caltex Service Station until the
latter's death.
Respondents Caltex Filling Station had stopped operation and was just rented out to Herce Trucking
Service. Upon the expiration of such lease contract, petitioners were allowed to occupy the subject
property as their dwelling places. They were the ones who caused its renovation with appellants'
consent, which renovation was made without altering the form and substance of the subject property.
They denied that appellants made a demand for them to vacate the subject property, insisting that it
was merely a sort of reminder that sooner or later appellees should yield possession thereof since,
after all, they had already bought a second-hand house which was undergoing repair. Appellees
argued that what they removed was merely the improvements made on the subject property, which
did not cause any substantial damage, it remained intact. They demanded payment of actual
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Trial Court’s Ruling: In favor of the Petitioners.

- were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that they removed only the improvements they
introduced without destroying the principal building, after the plaintiffs refused to pay them the
reasonable value of the improvements. Both parties having acted in good faith, the court will not
disturb the present status, and will leave the parties where it found them.
CA Ruling: Partially granted the Yu siblings' appeal. The appellate court disagreed with the trial court's
conclusion that the spouses Mores were builders in good faith and have the right of accession under Articles
Page 21 of 30
546 and 547 of the Civil Code.Instead, the appellate court believed that the relationship between the Yu
siblings and the spouses Mores is one between a lessor and a lessee.
ISSUES: W/N the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
● Alida Mores argues that in case of breach of contract between a lessor and a lessee, moral damages
are not awarded to the lessor if the lessee is not shown to have acted in bad faith. She proves her
and her husband's alleged good faith by quoting the appellate court's decision.
● Tenants like the spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension
to be owners of the property. Full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one's only
interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the
tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
● The appellate court is correct in ruling that Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the present
case.
● There is no reason for the appellate court's award of moral damages to the Yu siblings. We agree
with the trial court's finding that the spouses Mores "removed only the improvements they introduced
without destroying the principal building, after the Yu siblings refused to pay them the reasonable
value of the improvements." When the spouses Mores demanded reimbursement, the Yu siblings
should have offered to pay the spouses Mores one-half of the value of the improvements. Since the
Yu siblings failed to make such offer, the spouses Mores had the right to remove the improvements.
NOTES:
DEL CAMPO VS. ABESIA (G.R. NO. L-49219. APRIL 15, 1988)
FACTS:
• This case involves a parcel of land, Lot No. 1161 covered by a TCT. Petitioners and
respondents are co-owners of the said lot in proportion of 2/3 and 1/3 share each, respectively.
• An action for partition was filed by spouses Del Ocampo.
o Trial court appointed a commissioner to conduct a survey and prepare a sketch plan to be
submitted to the court
o Commissioner recommended that the property be divided into 2 lots. Lot A with an area of
30 sqm for spouses Ocampo and Lot B with an area of 15 sqm for Bernarda.
o However, the house of Bernarda occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of
Lot A of spouses Ocampo.
o Parties asked the court to finally settle who among them should take possession of the 5
sqm of the land in question.
• RTC ruled that:
o Spouses cannot be obliged to pay for the value of the portion of Bernarda’s house which
encroached an area of 5 sqm of their land
o Bernarda cannot likewise be obliged to pay for the price of said 5 sqm
o Rights of a builder in good faith under Art 448 does not apply to a case where one co-owner
has built, planted or sown on the land owned in common. The matter should be governed
by the provisions on co-ownership and not on accession.
o Bernarda has no other alternative but remove and demolish part of their house that
encroached an area of 5 sqm on the land of spouses Ocampo
ISSUES: Whether Bernarda could be considered as a builder in good faith under Art 448
RULING:
Page 22 of 30
YES. It is true that Art 448 cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common
for then he did not build, etc. upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner.
However, when the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of Bernarda
which she obviously built in good faith, overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 sqm of the land of spouses Del
Ocampo, then Art 448 should apply. Said provision may apply even when there was co-ownership, provided
good faith has been established.
Spouses Ocampo have the right to appropriate said portion of the house, upon payment of indemnity to
Bernarda. They may also choose to oblige Bernarda to pay the price of the land occupied by her house,
provided that the value of the same is not more than the value of the house. Otherwise, Bernarda could not
be obliged to buy the land – only pay the reasonable rent. (Bernarda may demolish or remove said portion of
her house at her own expense, if she so desires)
BOYER-ROXAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 100866. JULY 14, 1992)
PETITIONER: Rebecca and Guillermo Roxas RESPONDENT: Heirs of Eugenia Roxas, Inc.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS:
• Respondent corp filed 2 separate complaints for recovery of possession against petitioners
Rebecca and Guillermo Roxas.
o Prayed for the ejectment of petitioners from buildings inside the Hidden Valley Springs
Resort owned by the respondent corp.
o Case of Rebecca Roxas – respondent alleged that she is in possession of 2 houses, one of
which is still under construction and built at the expense of the respondent corp, and her
occupancy on the 2 houses was only upon the tolerance of respondent.
o Case of Guillermo Roxas – respondent alleged that he occupies a house which was built at
his expense during the time when his father was still living and was the general manager of
the respondent corporation. Said house was originally intended as a recreation hall but was
converted for his residential use and that his possession was only upon the tolerance of the
respondent corporation.
o That the houses occupied by petitioners were built from corporate funds
o Petitioners possession impeded petitioner’s expansion and normal operation of the resort
o In both cases, petitioners never paid rentals and ignored the demand letters to vacate.
• Petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint.

o Alleged that they are heirs of Eugenia Roxas and therefore, co-owners of Hidden Valley
Springs Resort. And as co-owners, they have the right to stay within the premises.
o Their occupancy were with the blessings of the deceased husband of Eugenia Roxas, who
was the majority and controlling stockholder of the corporation. Hence their occupancy can
no longer be questioned by the stockholders.
o The cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners possession of the questioned properties must be respected in view of

their being stockholders of the corporation
2. Whether the veil of corporation fiction be pierced
3. Whether Rebecca Roxas is a builder in good faith with respect to the unfinished building
Page 23 of 30
RULING:
1. NO. Respondent is a bona fide corporation. As such, it has a juridical personality of its own separate
from the members composing it. There is no dispute that title over the land is registered in the name
of the corporation. Records also show that the staff house and residential house occupied by
petitioners are likewise owned by the corporation.
• Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate
and distinct from its members. While shares of stock constitute personal property, they do
not represent property of the corporation. A holder of a share of stock is not the owner of
any part of the capital of the corporation nor is he entitled to the possession of any definite
portion of its property. A stockholder is not a co-owner or tenant in common of the corporate
property.
• Petitioners’ stay was merely by tolerance of the corporation in deference to the wishes of
the late Eufrocino Roxas, who during his lifetime, controlled and managed the corporation.
His actions however, could not have bound the corporation forever. In the absence of any
existing contract between petitioners and respondent corporation, the corporation may
choose to eject the petitioners at any time it wishes.
2. NO. The separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded only when the corporation is
used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or where necessary to achieve equity. Absent any
showing of the same, the general rule stands.
3. YES. The construction of the unfinished building started when husband of Rebecca was still alive and
was the general managers of the corporation. The couple used their own funds to finance the
construction. The Board of Directors did not object to the construction. Hence, Article 453 of the Civil
Code applies.
NOTES:
Art 453 – if there was bad faith on the part of the owner of the land and the person who built on the land of
another, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
In such case, Art 448 govern the relationship between Rebecca and respondent corporation.
Respondent corporation has the right to appropriate said unfinished building, upon payment of indemnity to
Rebecca. It may also choose to oblige Rebecca to pay the price of the land occupied by her house, provided
that the value of the same is not more than the value of the building. Otherwise, Rebecca could not be obliged
to buy the land – only pay the reasonable rent.
SARMIENTO VS. AGANA (G.R. NO. 57288. APRIL 30, 1984)
PETITIONER: Leonila Sarmiento RESPONDENT: Hon. Enrique Agana, CFI Rizal and
Spouses Ernesto Valentinoand Rebecca Lorenzo
Valentino
SPECIAL DETAILS: The Spouses Valentino built their house in good faith in a lot they thought was owned by
Rebecca’s mother. Said lot was sold to Sarmiento and Sarmiento demanded that they vacate the lot.
Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against the Spouses Valentino. The Court of First Instance Pasay ruled that
Sarmiento may either sell the lot or pay for the house. Sarmiento did neither, while the Spouses Valentino
deposited P25K with the Court as payment for the land. Sarmiento filed petition for certiorari. SC ruled that
RTC decision was correct based on Art. 448 and dismissed the petition.
LAW & PRINCIPLES: The landowner on which a building has been constructed in good faith by another has
the option to buy the building or sell his land to the builder, he cannot refuse to exercise either option.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession
of the land until he is paid the value of his building.
The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to
the owner of the building. But he cannot refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the
Page 24 of 30
owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected.He is entitled to such remotion only when,
after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
FACTS: In 1967 -ERNESTO Valentino constructed a residential house on the land in question (Lot D,
subdivision in Paranaque) at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00.
The Spouses Valentino assumed that the lot was in the name of the wife’s mother since the latter told Ernesto
that they could build on the lot.
Turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santos, Jr. who, on September
7, 1974, sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO.
January 6, 1975, SARMIENTO asked ERNESTO and wife to vacate.
April 21, 1975, Sarmiento filed an Ejectment suit against Spouses Valentino.
In the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal Court, SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the LAND
in her favor, which showed the price to be P15,000.00.
On the other hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. The figures were not questioned by SARMIENTO.
Municipal COurt: Private respondents had built the house in good faith, and, disregarding the testimony of
ERNESTO, valued house at P20,000.00. Ordered ERNESTO and wife to vacate the land after SARMIENTO
has paid them the mentioned sum of P20,000.00.
The Ejectment suit was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Pasay where, after the submission of
memoranda, said Court rendered a modifying Decision under Article 448 of the Civil Code:
SARMIENTO w/in 60 days: EITHER reimburse ERNESTO and wife the sum of P40,000.00 as the value of the
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE, or sell the LAND to them for P25,000.00.
SARMIENTO did not exercise any of the two options within the indicated period, and the Valentinos were then
allowed to deposit the sum of P25,000.00 with the Court as the purchase price for the LAND.
SARMIENTO instituted Certiorari proceedings.
ISSUES:WON CFI Pasay decision was correct?
RULING: YES.
SC quoted Ignacio vs. Hilario and Art 546 and 448:
“The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession
of the land until he is paid the value of his building Article 546.
The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under Article 448, either to pay for the building or
to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the
building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected.
He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for
the same. …”
(Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608 [1946])
NOTES:
b. OPTION GIVEN TO LANDOWNER
Page 25 of 30
i. OPTIONS
1. TOAPPROPRIATE IMPROVEMENT UPON
PAYMENT OF THE REQUIRED INDEMNITY (ART.
546, 548, 448)
a. LIABILITY OF BUILDER TO
ACCOUNT FOR FRUITS RECEIVED
2. TO OBLIGE THE BUILDER OR PLANTER TO
PAY THE PRICE OF THE LAND AND THE SOWER,
TO PAY THE PROPER RENT
ii. WHEN THIS RIGHT CANNOT BE EXERCISED
iii.FIXING OF PRICE REMEDIES OF LANDOWNER

IF BUILDER/PLANTER REFUSES TO PAY
c. REASON FOR THE OPTION
OCHOA VS. APETA (G.R. NO. 146259, SEPTEMBER 13, 2007)
PETITIONER: FLORENTINO, TROADIO and RESPONDENT: MAURO APETA and APOLONIA

PEDRO, all surnamed OCHOA ALMAZAN
SPECIAL DETAILS:
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS:
Since 1910, the above-named petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been occupying Lot No.
1580 consisting of 886 square meters situated in Malaban, Biñan, Laguna. They built their lot houses and
apartment buildings therein.
Sometime in May 10, 1982, Mauro Apeta and Apolonia Almazan, respondents, found that they are the true
owners of Lot No. 1580 being occupied by petitioners. Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners. Petitioners
denied the allegations in the complaint, contending that they are the owners of Lot No. 1580 as shown by TCT
No. T-40624 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.
During the proceedings before the RTC, upon agreement of the parties, the trial judge commissioned Engr.
Romulo Unciano of the Bureau of Lands of Region IV to conduct a resurvey of the disputed property. The
result of the resurvey (approved by the Bureau of Lands) shows that Lot No. 1580, occupied by petitioners,
was registered in the name of Margarita Almada, respondents' predecessor-in-interest; and that the lot covered
by TCT No. T-40624 is not Lot No. 1580, but Lot No. 1581 registered in the name of Servillano Ochoa,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. This lot has been occupied by Isidro Jasmin.
RTC declared that the Apetas are the owner of the contested property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution 4 dated
November 20, 2000. Petitioners contend that Lot No. 1580 belongs to them and that respondents' action is
barred by prescription.
Hence, the instant petition.
Page 26 of 30
ISSUES: WON the petitioners are the owner of the lot and that the respondents’ action is barred by
prescription.
RULING: Petitioners' contention lacks merit.
The issue raised by petitioners that they are the actual owners of Lot No. 1580 is factual in nature and requires
a review of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties. Thus, we can no
longer pass upon and evaluate the lower courts' finding that based on the evidence presented before them,
specifically the result of the resurvey conducted by Engr. Romulo Unciano, respondents are "the true and
lawful owners of Lot 1580. Anent petitioners' second contention that respondents' action has been barred by
prescription, suffice it to state that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Neither can prescription be allowed against the hereditary
successors of the registered owner, because they step into the shoes of the decedent and are merely the
continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest.
Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that respondents are the true
and lawful owners of Lot No. 1580. Hence, they "should now be placed in possession
thereof."
Respondents, as owners of Lot No. 1580, may choose between appropriating as their own the houses and
apartment building constructed thereon by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest by paying the proper
indemnity or value; or obliging petitioners to pay the price of Lot No. 1580 which is not more than that of the
improvements.
NOTES:
2. RIGHT OF LANDOWNER TO REMOVE OR DEMOLISH IMPROVEMENT

See: ROSALES VS. CASTELLTORT, SUPRA.
DEPRA VS. DUMLAO (G.R. NO. L-57348. MAY 16, 1985)
PETITIONER: FRANCISCO DEPRA RESPONDENT: AGUSTIN DUMLAO
SPECIAL DETAILS:
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-3087, known as Lot No. 685, situated in the municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo. Sometime in 1972,
when DUMLAO constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of thirty four
(34) square meters of DEPRA's property. After the encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of
DEPRA's lot made on November 2, 1972, his mother, Beatriz Derla, after writing a demand letter asking
DUMLAO to move back from his encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer.
Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good faith, and applying Article 448 of the Civil Code. It
then ordered a forced lease between the parties. Neither party appealed so that, if it were a valid judgment, it
would have ordinarily lapsed into finality, but even then, DEPRA did not accept payment of rentals so that
DUMLAO deposited such rentals with the Municipal
Court.
Page 27 of 30
DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO before the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch IV (Trial Court), involving the very same 34 square meters, which was the bone of contention in the
Municipal Court. DUMLAO, in his Answer, admitted the encroachment but alleged, in the main, that the present
suit is barred by res judicata by virtue of the Decision of the Municipal Court, which had become final and
executory.
Rebutting the argument of res judicata relied upon by DUMLAO, DEPRA claims that the Decision of the
Municipal Court was null and void ab initio because its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession,
whereas decisions affecting lease, which is an encumbrance on real property, may only be rendered by Courts
of First Instance. The Court hold that the same was null and void. The Municipal Court overstepped its bounds
when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease",which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored
in law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroaching part of
DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to
pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroached part of his land, as he had manifested
before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation is not binding because it was made in a void proceeding.
ISSUES: WON the Municipal trial court’s decision is correct in imposing a forced lease between the parties.
RULING: The Court hold that the same was null and void. The Municipal Court overstepped its bounds when
it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease",which like "forced co-ownership" is not favored in law.
Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Courts). DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroaching part of DUMLAO's
kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO. He cannot refuse to pay for the
encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroached part of his land, as he had manifested before the
Municipal Court. But that manifestation is not binding because it was made in a void proceeding.
As to Dumlao, he is a builder in good faith. Thus, "ART. 448. The owner of the land on which has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay
the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof."
Additional benefits were extended to the builder but the landowner retained his
Options. The fairness of the rules in Article 448 has also been explained as follows:
"Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners,
and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of
the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just
solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper
indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay for the proper rent. It is
the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
MTC DECISION WAS SET ASIDE. THIS CASE WAS REMANDED TO THE RTC.
NOTES:
3. BUILDER’S/SOWER’S/PLANTER’S RIGHT TO RETAIN IMPROVEMENT
Page 28 of 30
NUGUID VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 151815. FEBRUARY 23, 2005)
SPECIAL DETAILS:
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building.
For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer of Quezon City to
Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn sold it to the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC In its Decision. The RTC upheld the spouses'
title but declared that the four-door two-storey apartment building was not included in the auction sale. This
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court
As a result, the Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building. The
Trial court ruled that the Spouses Nuguid were to reimburse Pecson for his construction cost following which,
the spouses Nuguid were entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot and improvements.
In the same order the RTC also directed Pecson to pay the same amount of monthly rentals to the Nuguids
as paid by the tenants occupying the apartment units Aggrieved, Pecson then filed a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court affirmed the order of payment of construction costs but rendered the issue of possession
moot on appeal Frustrated by this turn of events, Pecson filed a petition for review. The Court handed down
the decision and the Order of the Regional Trial Court are hereby SET ASIDE.
On the basis of this Court's decision Pecson filed a Motion to Restore Possession and a Motion to Render
Accounting, praying respectively for restoration of his possession and for the spouses Nuguid to be... directed
to render an accounting under oath, of the income derived from the subject four-door apartment until
possession of the same was restored to him. The RTC denied the Motion to Restore Possession to the plaintiff
averring that the current market value of the building should first be determined. Pending the said
determination, the resolution of the Motion for Accounting was likewise held in abeyance.
With the submission of the parties' assessment and the reports of the subject realty. The trial court issued the
following Order:
“the parties manifested that they have arrived at a compromise; agreement that the value of the said
improvement/building is P400,000.00 The Court notes that the plaintiff has already received P300,000.00.
However, when defendant was ready to pay the balance of P100,000.00, the plaintiff now insists that there
should be a rental to be paid by defendants.”
After paying the said P100,000 balance to Pedro Pecson the spouses Nuguid prayed for the closure and
termination of the case, as well as the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the title of the property on
the ground that Pedro Pecson's claim for rentals was devoid of factual and legal bases.
After conducting a hearing, the lower court issued an Order... directing the spouses to pay the sum of
P1,344,000 as reimbursement of the unrealized income of Pecson. The Nuguid couple then appealed the trial
court's ruling to the Court of Appeals In the Court of Appeals, the order appealed from was modified.
The CA reduced the rentals from P1,344,000 to P280,000 in favor of the appellee.[19] The said amount
represents accrued rentals from the determination of the current market value
Page 29 of 30
ISSUES: WON petitioners are liable to pay the rent over and above the market valueof the
improvement?
RULING: No. The construction of the four-door two-storey apartment, subject of this dispute, was undertaken
at the time when Pecson was still the owner of the lot.
When the Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot by virtue of entry of judgment of the Court's
decision the apartment building was already in existence and occupied by tenants.
The Court declared the rights and obligations of the litigants in accordance with Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code. These provisions of the Code are directly applicable to the instant case.
Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as his own upon
payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article
546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful
expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.
The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection of builders in
good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain
in possession while he has not been reimbursed for those necessary expenses and useful improvements
made by him on the thing possessed. Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals
during the period of retention[25] nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate.
In addition, as in this case, the owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the necessary
and useful expenses with the fruits... received by the builder-possessor in good faith. since petitioners opted
to appropriate the improvement for themselves... they could not benefit from the lot's... improvement, until they
reimbursed the improver in full, based on the current market value of the property.
Despite the Court's recognition of Pecson's right of ownership over the apartment building, the petitioners still
insisted on dispossessing Pecson by filing for a Writ of Possession to cover both the lot and the building.
Clearly, this resulted in a violation of respondent's right of retention.
Worse, petitioners took advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly valued, income-yielding, four-unit
apartment building by collecting rentals thereon, before they paid for the cost of the apartment building.
The text of the decision in G.R. No. 115814 expressly exempted Pecson from liability to pay rentals, for we
found that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial court's determination of the indemnity, but
also in ordering him to account for the rentals of the apartment building.
The right of retention, which entitles the builder in good faith to the possession as well as the income derived
therefrom, is already provided for under Article 546 of the Civil Code. Given the circumstances of the instant
case where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his right of retention for almost half a decade, we
find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable.
The petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced by the respondent during said
period, without paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his construction costs and expenses.
They should account and pay for such benefits.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
NOTES:
Page 30 of 30

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PROPERTY | MBL | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – WEEK 2-2

e. REAL ACTION VS. PERSONAL ACTION

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: (WON)

PRESUMPTION ON THE VALIDITY OF VENDOR’s TITLE

Thus, CA’s decision is affirmed.

PETITIONER: RESPONDENT: (WON)

Therefore, CA’S decision is affirmed.

ii. EVIDENCE TO PROVE OWNERSHIP

REPUBLIC VS. CARRASCO [G.R. No. 143491. December 6, 2006.] (MARCELO)

Land Act or Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141.

PETITIONER: (PARTIALLY WON) RESPONDENT:

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Equiponderance of evidence is defined as:

FULE VS. LEGARE (G.R. NO. L-17951, FEBRUARY 28, 1963)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Section 55, Act 496

Article 1434, Civil Code

RUMARETE VS. HERNANDEZ (G.R. NO. 168222. APRIL 18, 2006)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Decisions of the Lower Courts

ROSALES VS. CASTELLTORT (G.R. NO. 157044. OCTOBER 5, 2005)

PETITIONER: Rodolfo v. Rosales and Lily RESPONDENT: Miguel Castelltort, Judith

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

3. Marcelito alleged that

MACASAET VS. MACASAET (G.R. NOS. 154391-92. SEPTEMBER 30, 2004)

Children denied the existence of the verbal lease agreement.

Lot 1 was allotted to Ismael as advance inheritance

RTC upheld the findings of the MTCC.

ISSUE AND RULING:

The issue is the duration of possession.

WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE CIVIL CODE PROVISION

Whether Art 447 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case?

What then is the applicable law?

MORES VS. YU-GO (G.R. NO. 172292. JULY 23, 2010)

PETITIONER: Alida Mores RESPONDENT: Shirley Yu-Go, Victoria Yu-Lim,

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Article 1678 of the Civil Code:

Trial Court’s Ruling: In favor of the Petitioners.

ISSUES: W/N the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

• Petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint.

1. Whether petitioners possession of the questioned properties must be respected in view of

SARMIENTO VS. AGANA (G.R. NO. 57288. APRIL 30, 1984)

January 6, 1975, SARMIENTO asked ERNESTO and wife to vacate.

SARMIENTO instituted Certiorari proceedings.

ISSUES:WON CFI Pasay decision was correct?

SC quoted Ignacio vs. Hilario and Art 546 and 448:

b. OPTION GIVEN TO LANDOWNER

ii. WHEN THIS RIGHT CANNOT BE EXERCISED

iii.FIXING OF PRICE REMEDIES OF LANDOWNER

OCHOA VS. APETA (G.R. NO. 146259, SEPTEMBER 13, 2007)

PETITIONER: FLORENTINO, TROADIO and RESPONDENT: MAURO APETA and APOLONIA

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Hence, the instant petition.

RULING: Petitioners' contention lacks merit.

2. RIGHT OF LANDOWNER TO REMOVE OR DEMOLISH IMPROVEMENT

DEPRA VS. DUMLAO (G.R. NO. L-57348. MAY 16, 1985)

PETITIONER: FRANCISCO DEPRA RESPONDENT: AGUSTIN DUMLAO

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

3. BUILDER’S/SOWER’S/PLANTER’S RIGHT TO RETAIN IMPROVEMENT

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

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