Property-Case Digests-Bathan-Part6

PROPERTY | MBL | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – WEEK 4
1. REPUBLIC V. JACOB, GR. NO. 146874 (ANDRIN)
PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENT: JACOB
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

The law speaks of "possession and occupation." Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. Unless, therefore, the law adds the word "occupation," it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words "continuous," "exclusive" and
"notorious," the word "occupation" seems to highlight the facts that for an applicant to qualify, her possession of the
property must not be a mere fiction.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over her own property. A mere casual cultivation of portions of land by the claimant
does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. Such possession is not exclusive and
notorious as it gives rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The applicant is burdened to offer proof of
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim over the land.
FACTS:
● President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 739 “Establishing as Reservation for the development of
geothermal energy a parcel of land in the Province of Albay.
● The subject lot was covered by the said Proclamation. 24 years later, however, private respondent, filed
an application with the RTC of Albay for the confirmation and registration of her alleged title over said
subject lot.
● Naturally, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG opposed the application claiming that the said
land is part of the public domain by virtue of the Proclamation, hence, not subject to private appropriation.
● RULINGS:
○ RTC: approved respondent’s application simply because the Republic did not offer any evidence
to support its opposition to the application. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Hence, this petition.
● OSG contention:
○ private respondent failed to prove her claim that the original owner of the property (Bondal) sold
the property to her uncle.
○ private respondent admitted that she had no copy of the deed of sale. Even assuming that the
sale existed, still, private respondent still failed to prove that her PII had exclusive, open and
adverse occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership over the property since June 12, 1945
or earlier, up to August 1970 when the property was declared as a reservation.
ISSUES: Whether private respondent can validly have the land titled under her name?
RULING:
No. PD 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides that applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must
prove the following:
1. That the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
2. They have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
Under the principle of Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable
to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Hence, occupation thereof in the
concept of owner no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
In this case, when private respondent filed her application in 1994, the subject lot was no longer alienable and
disposable property of the public domain because it was declared part of the reservation for the development of
geothermal energy on August 1970. She was 24 years too late. She further failed to present evidence to show that
by August 14, 1970, she had already acquired ownership over the property through OCENPO since 1945 or earlier.
Page 1 of 74
NOTES: na
2. SARMIENTO V. LASACA, G.R. No. L-15385 June 30, 1960 (ANDRIN)
PETITIONER: ALEJANDRA BUGARIN VDA. DE RESPONDENT: JOSEFA R. LESACA

SARMIENTO
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Articles 1461 and 1462 of the old Civil Code provide:
ART. 1461. The vendor is bound to deliver and warrant the thing which is the subject-matter of the sale.
ART. 1462. The thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the vendee is placed in the control and possession
thereof.
If the sale should be made by means of a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery
of the thing which is the subject-matter of the contract unless the contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred from
such instrument.
From the above it is clear that when a contract of sale is executed the vendor is bound to deliver to the vendee the
thing sold by placing the vendee in the control and possession of the subject-matter of the contract. However, if the
sale is executed by means of a public instrument, the mere execution of the instrument is equivalent to delivery
unless the contrary appears or is clearly to be inferred from such instrument.
FACTS:
● January of 1949 - plaintiff bought from defendant 2 parcels of land.
○ After the sale, plaintiff tried to take actual physical possession of the lands but she was prevented
by Martin Deloso who claims to be the owner thereof.
○ Hence, she sent a letter to defendant asking him to either change the lands sold with another of
the same kind or return the purchase price together with the expenses she incurred in the
execution of the sale.
○ Since defendant did not agree to said proposition, plaintiff filed a complaint praying that the
contract of sale executed between her and defendant be rescinded, because defendant failed to
place her in the actual possession of the lands she bought.
● The court rendered judgment declaring the deed of sale rescinded. CA affirmed said decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
Whether the execution of the deed of sale in a public document is equivalent to delivery of possession of the lands
sold, thus relieving defendant of the obligation to place plaintiff in actual possession thereof?
RULING:
NO. Art 1462 of the Civil Code provides that the thing sold shall be deemed delivered when the vendee is placed in
the control and possession thereof. While the 2nd par provides that the execution of a public document is equivalent
to delivery, this legal fiction only holds true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing from the
hands of the vendor to the vendee. Hence, in order for such symbolic delivery to product the effect of tradition, it is
necessary that the vendor shall have such control over the thing sold that, its material delivery could have been
moment at the moment of the sale. If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the public instrument, the purchaser
cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself because the same is
opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality – the delivery has not been effected. The
impediment in this case is the insistent refusal of Martin Deloso to surrender the property, claiming ownership thereof.
Hence, plaintiff is entitled to have the contract rescinded. The right to rescission is deemed implied in reciprocal
obligations in case one party fails to comply with what is incumbent upon him. The person prejudiced may either ask
for specific performance or rescission.
NOTES:
The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is considered to be delivered
when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the vendee." (Civ. Code, art. 1462.) It is true that the same article
Page 2 of 74
declares that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the
contract, but in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor
shall have such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been
made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and right of possession. The thing sold must be
placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of
the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is
sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality — the delivery has not been
effected. (Addison vs. Felix and Tioco, 38 Phil., 404; See also Garchitorena vs. Almeda, 48 Off. Gaz., No., 8, 3432;
3437)
3. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013 (ANDRIN)
PETITIONER: HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN RESPONDENT: REPUBLIC
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber,
or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act.
What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further
limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS:
● Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration (Cavite)
○ He and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years
○ The property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain – certification
by the CENRO of the DENR as proof
● RTC granted the application
● OSG appealed the judgment
● OSG Contention:
○ Malabanan failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain
○ RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
● CA reversed the decision
○ Cited the ruling in Republic v. Herbierto - period of possession prior to the classification of the land
as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation
of the period of possession
○ CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable
only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for
purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession
Page 3 of 74
● Malabanan’s contentions
○ The ruling in Republic v. CA and Naguit is the controlling doctrine - any possession of agricultural
land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the
period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act. (CA 141 Public Land Act)
○ What is important – during the application for land registration, the land has already been classified
as alienable and disposable
● Republic’s contention - an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application
had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUES:
1. Whether it is necessary that the land must first be classified before applicant’s possession.
2. Whether Malabanan is qualified to register the subject property under his name.
3. May a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
RULING:
1. NO. The agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land
dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. The requirement that the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
2. NO. Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in
particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession -
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that
the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
Land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.
3. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422
of the Civil Code.
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property
of the public dominion begin to run.
NOTES:
● Section 48 of CA 141. Requirements for application under Sec 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree:
1. The applicant has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier
● The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
● Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of
the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian
Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid
down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
Page 4 of 74
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public
land as agricultural.
● The choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the
sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the
lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative
intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should
interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
● Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June
12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject
of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its
eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
● Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations
may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private
ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by
the Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not
be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the
requisite period of possession.
● To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription
may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is a title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law
not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.
4. CHUA-BURCE V. CA, GR. NO. G.R. No. 109595 April 27, 2000, (ANDRIN)
PETITIONER: CHUA-BURCE, MTCB CASH CUSTODIAN RESPONDENT: CA
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing
which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
FACTS:
● August of 1985 - Ramon (Manager of Metro Bank) requested Penaflor (Assistant Cashier) to conduct a
physical bundle count of cash inside the vault which should total P4M more or less.
● They discovered a shortage of P150k. Hence, the bank initiated 4 investigations.
● The first was by Ramon (Manager), second was by the bank’s internal auditors, then the bank’s Department
of Internal Affairs.
● Thereafter, the NBI. All of these investigations concluded that the person primarily responsible was the
bank’s cash custodian Cristeta Chua-Burce (petitioner).
● Metro Bank hence filed a civil case for sum of money against petitioner and her husband Antonio Burce.
● Also, a criminal case for Estafa was filed against petitioner.
● Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, to which the court granted.
● The CA however ruled that there was no such prejudicial question.
● The court rendered a consolidated decision finding petitioner guilty of Estafa under the RPC.
● Naturally, petitioner appealed but the CA affirmed the trial court’ decision.
Page 5 of 74
● Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that there can be no misappropriation when there were other persons
who had access to the cash in the vault.
ISSUES: Whether petitioner can be held liable for Estafa.
RULING:
NO. The elements of Estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art 315 (1) b of the RPC are as follows:
1. That personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other
circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond
2. That there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on
his part that he received it
3. That such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another
4. That there be demand for the return of the property
In the case at bar, the first element is absent. When the property is received by the offender from the offended party
in trust, on commission or for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over
the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who
was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a
bank teller, both being mere bank employees. The possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. Hence,
petitioner can only be liable for qualified theft and not Estafa. (Taking without the bank’s consent – theft)
The teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or
possess the same as against the bank. An agent on the other hand, can even assert as against his own principal,
an independent and autonomous right to retain money in consequence of the agency.
Being a mere cash custodian therefore, petitioner had no juridical possession over the missing funds. The element
of juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of Estafa under the RPC.
NOTES:
● The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the possession of
the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence,
removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank, there was the taking
or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of theft.
● In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals, in said case, the receiving teller of a bank who
misappropriated money received by him for the bank, was held guilty of qualified theft on the theory that
the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the
possession by a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who
receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former
case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or
keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against
the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent,
autonomous, right to retain money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal
fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault
(Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code; Article 1730, old)
5. CARLOS VICTORIA V. REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 164823 August 31, 2005, (ANDRIN)
PETITIONER: MARIA CARLOS, REPRESENTED BY RESPONDENT: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HER DAUGHTER
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A
possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other
hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to Ususan
Page 6 of 74
Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised to deliver the certificate of title to the corporation upon its
obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her possession since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of ownership. Under
the law, only he who possesses the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is entitled to confirmation of title.
FACTS:
● December 19, 2001 - Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter, Teresita Carlos Victoria, filed an
application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land covered by a subdivision plan.
○ She alleged that she is the owner of the land which she openly, exclusively and notoriously
possessed and occupied since July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of ownership, that
there is no encumbrance, that it is not part or any military or naval reservation and that there are
no tenants on the said property.
○ Tacking her possession with that of her PII, petitioner claims that she has been in possession of
the land for more than 50 years. This application was however opposed by the Republic through
the Director of Lands.
○ Petitioner presented witnesses in court to testify on her and her PII’s possession and occupation
on the property.
○ She also presented officers of the DENR to establish that the land is alienable and disposable.
● LOWER COURT RULINGS:
○ Trial court granted the application but was later revered by the CA upon appeal.
○ CA ruled that the applicant, at the time of the application was no longer in possession and
occupation of the land since on Oct 16, 1996, applicant’s mother and PII sold the land to Ususan
Development Corporation – a fact admitted by applicant herself.
○ Hence, as early as 1996, possession and occupation of the land pertains not to the applicant but
to Ususan Development Corporation, thus applicant has no registrable title over the subject land.
ISSUES:
Whether applicant has a registrable title over the land?
RULING:
No. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following:
1. The land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain
2. They have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The second requirement is absent in this case. The applicant must show that he is in actual possession of the
property at the time of the application. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Possession is broader since
it includes constructive possession. Hence, when the law added occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Hence, to qualify, possession must not be a mere fiction.
In this case, when applicant applied for registration in 2001, Maria Carlos no longer had possession of the property
of the property since the same was sold to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996. Nonetheless, even if it were
true that it was petitioner who had actual possession of the land at that time, such possession was no longer
in the concept of an owner. Possession may be had in one of two ways:
1. Possession in the concept of an owner and
2. Possession of a holder
A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other
hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to
be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. Petitioner herein acknowledges the sale of the property to
Ususan Development Corporation in 1996 and in fact promised to deliver the certificate of title to the corporation
upon its obtention. Hence, it cannot be said that her possession since 1996 was under a bona fide claim of
ownership. Under the law, only he who possesses the property under a bona fide claim of ownership is entitled to
confirmation of title.
NOTES: NA
Page 7 of 74
6. PO LAM V. CA, G.R. No. 116220. December 6, 2000, (ANDRIN)
PETITIONER: SPOUSES ROY PO LAM and JOSEFA RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and FELIX LIM
ONG PO LAM now JOSE LEE
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

A possessor in good faith has been defined as one who is unaware that there exists a flaw which invalidates his
acquisition of the thing (See Article 526, Civil Code). Good faith consists in the possessors belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title (Pio v. CA, 198 SCRA 434
[1991]). In this case, while petitioners bought Lot No. 2581 from LAHCO while a notice of lis pendens was still
annotated thereon, there was also existing a court order canceling the same. Hence, petitioners cannot be
considered as being aware of a flaw which invalidates their acquisition of the thing since the alleged flaw, the notice
of lis pendens, was already being ordered cancelled at the time of the purchase. On this ground alone, petitioners
can already be considered buyers in good faith.
FACTS:
● Lots 1557 and 1558 are prime commercial lots located in the heart of Legaspi City’s commercial district
which were sold by Lim Kok Chiong to the Legaspi Avenue Hardware Company (LAHCO) sometime in the
early 60’s.
○ Around 1964, the brother of Lim Kok, Felix Lim, filed a complaint against his brother and LAHCO
to annul the deeds of sale on the ground that they included 3/14 pro-indiviso portion of the lots
which he inherited from his foster parents.
○ In 1965, Felix filed a notice of lis pendens over the two lots and the same was inscribed on the
TCTs.
● Trial court rendered a decision declaring LAHCO to be the absolute owner of the said lots.
○ As a consequence of its decision, the court ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
inscribed on the titles of the 2 lots. However, the other one remained uncancelled because the
duplicate owner’s copy of the said TCT was with the Continental Bank because Lot 1558 was
mortgaged by LAHCO to said bank.
● Felix appealed the decision.
○ During the pendency, LAHCO sold the two lots to petitioners Spouses Po Lam.
○ The Spouses had the notice of lis pendens cancelled. Subsequently, the certificate of title were
likewise cancelled and replaced by TCTs in the name of petitioners.
● 1 month after the Po Lam spouses purchased the lots from LAHCO, they leased the commercial building
erected on Lot 1557 to private respondent Jose Lee for one year.
○ After the contract expired, Jose Lee continued to occupy the same, paying monthly rentals.
However, Jose Lee eventually refused to pay rentals, informing the spouses that he would deposit
the payment in court since Felix Lim had promised to sell the property to him.
○ As a consequence, the spouses filed an unlawful detainer case against Jose Lee.
● Trial Court rendered a decision declaring spouses Po Lam as transferees pendente lite and NOT
purchasers in good faith.
○ The annotation of lis pendens on the TCT served as notice to the spouses that the said lot is
involved in a pending litigation.
○ Settled is the rule that one who deals with property subject of a notice of lis pendens cannot invoke
the right of a purchaser in good faith. Such decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court upon a
petition for certiorari.
○ Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: Whether spouses Po Lam are purchasers in good faith.
RULING:
YES. While a notice of lis pendens on TC 2851 covering Lot 1558 was still subsisting at the time the spouses bought
the property, there was already a court order ordering that the annotation be cancelled, as it was in fact
cancelled on May 20, 1974. A possessor in good faith is one who is unaware that there exists a flaw which
invalidates his acquisition of the thing. It consists in the possessor’s belief that the person from who he received the
thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title.
Page 8 of 74
In this case, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as being aware of a flaw which invalidates their
acquisition of the thing since the alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens was already being ordered cancelled at
the time of the purchase. On this ground alone, petitioners can already be considered buyers in good faith.
A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a real property is in litigation, serving as a
warning that one who acquires interest over said property does so at his own risk. The basis of the doctrine of lis
pendens is public policy and convenience – once the court has taken cognizance of a controversy, it should be
impossible to interfere with consummation of the judgment.
The lis pendens annotation although considered as a general notice to all the world does not mean that it is part of
the doctrine of notice. The purchaser pendente lite is affected not by notice but because the law does not allow
litigating parties to give to others pending litigation, rights to the property in dispute as to prejudice the opposite
property. The doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice. Hence, the spouses cannot be considered as having
constructive notice of any defect in the title of LAHCO as to make them purchasers in bad faith.
NOTES:
7. CABAL V. SPOUSES CABAL, G.R. NO. 153625, July 31, 2006, (ANDRIN)
PETITIONER: HEIRS OF CABAL RESPONDENT: CABAL SPOUSES
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
principle of possession in good faith
It has been said that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor
rests the burden of proof. Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual's personal good faith is a concept of his
own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence
of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another.62 Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
FACTS:
● Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a parcel of land in Zambales.

● Marcelo died, survived by his wife and children
● 5 years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son Marcelino to build his house on a portion on Lot G. Since
then, Marcelino resided thereon.
● Marcelino’s son also built his house on the said property
● Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the parcel of land owned by Marcelo (Lot G)
○ It was found out that Marcelino and his son occupied and built their houses on another lot, Lot 1-
E and not on the lot designated to him (Lot G-1)
○ Lot 1-E was owned by spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal
○ Parties agreed to a re-survey and swapping of lots but this did not materialize.
● Spouses Cabal filed a complaint for recovery of possession
○ They alleged that Marcelino introduced improvements in bad faith on their land with knowledge
that the adjacent lot is titled in his name
● Marcelino contended that:
○ Spouses have no cause of action against him because he has been in possession in good faith
since 1949 with the respondents’ knowledge and acquiescence
○ Acquisitive prescription has set in
Page 9 of 74
● RULINGS:
○ MTC COURT ruled in favor of Marcelino
○ RTC reversed the decision
■ Marcelino's possession was in the concept of a co-owner and therefore prescription does
not run in his favor
■ His possession, which was tolerated by his co-owners, does not ripen into ownership.
ISSUES: Whether Marcelino was a builder and possessor in good faith
RULING:
Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was informed by respondents of his
encroachment on their property. Marcelino’s possession of the disputed lot was based on a mistaken belief that the
lot covered by his title is the same lot on which he has built his house with the consent of his father. There is no
evidence, other than bare allegation, that Marcelino was aware that he intruded on respondents’ property when he
continued to occupy and possess the disputed lot after partition was effected.
On the possessor in good faith - In the present case, Marcelino's possession of the disputed lot was based on a
mistaken belief that Lot G-1 is the same lot on which he has built his house with the consent of his father. There is
no evidence, other than bare allegation, that Marcelino was aware that he intruded on respondents' property when
he continued to occupy and possess the disputed lot after partition was effected in 1976. Moreover, the fact that in
1977 Marcelino mortgaged Lot G-1 subject of TCT No. 22656 is not an indication of bad faith since there is no
concrete evidence that he was aware at that time that the property covered by the title and the one he was
occupying were not the same. There is also no evidence that he introduced improvements on Lot G-1. In fact, the
agreement on March 1, 1989 to a resurvey and swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstructing the land titles is
substantial proof of Marcelino's good faith, sincerity of purpose and lack of intention to hold on to two lots. Thus, the
CA's conclusion that Marcelino intended to hold on to both the disputed lot and Lot G-1 is pure speculation, palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record. Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was
informed by respondents of his encroachment on their property.
NOTES:
8. Negrete v. Court of First Instance of Marinduque, GR NO. L-31267, Nov. 24, 1972 (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Ignacio Negrete RESPONDENT: Court of First Instance of

- she and her predecessor-in-interest have been Marinduque, Igmedio Maderazo, Catalino Maderazo
in possession of the same for about seventy (son of Igmedio)
(70) years - averred that since liberation, he had been in
possession of the northern portion of the
questioned parcel of land and cultivated and
introduced improvements on the same
consisting of coconut trees and "boxes of rice
paddies"
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Ordinary acquisitive prescription of immovables and other real rights thru adverse possession of ten years, requires
possession "in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law" (Art. 1117, Civil Code of the Philippines)
In the absence of a just title or good faith, ownership of immovables can be acquired by extraordinary prescription
through an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty (30) years (Art. 1137, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Page 10 of 74
The law defines a possessor in good faith as one who is not aware of any flaw in his title or mode of acquisition; and
conversely, one who is aware of such a flaw is a possessor in bad faith (Art. 526, Civil Code of the Philippines).
We ruled that "the essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another."
A deed of sale, to constitute a just title and to generate good faith for the ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten (10)
years, should refer to the same parcel of land, which is adversely possessed.
FACTS:
● Since 1945 petitioner and her late husband had been in continuous and peaceful possession of a parcel of
land with an area of nine hectares more or less in sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog, Marinduque and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 8431 in her name.
● Ignacia Negrete filed a forcible entry suit against Igmedio Maderazo alleging among others that on January
7, 1956, said defendant through strategy, force, intimidation, and stealth unlawfully entered the northern
portion of said parcel of land.
● Defendant moved to dismiss the ejectment complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of action and improper
venue, which motion to dismiss was denied by the court for lack of merit.
● Defendant filed an answer asserting among others that the land he is presently cultivating in sitio Puting
Buhangin is a different land.
● The municipal court directed the chief of police of Mogpog to conduct an ocular inspection of the disputed
land to determine whether the land area cultivated by the defendant is the same land claimed by the plaintiff.
● The municipal court ruled that there is no dispute as to the identity if the land since the ocular inspection
showed it is the same land. Igmedio Maderazo, having proved by preponderance of evidence that he was
in the material and physical possession of the land for more than one year. that the defendant has not
unlawfully entered the land in dispute on January 7, 1956 as alleged by the plaintiffs, he being in the material
and physical possession of the said land prior to the date of the incident.
● Instead of appealing, the petitioners filed after the lapse of ten years, an action for recovery of ownership
of property (reivindicacion) against Igmedio Maderazo alleging that she is the owner of a piece of land. She
repeatedly prohibited defendant-appellee from making any improvement thereon, but defendant-appellee
threatened her and her representatives with bodily harm.
● Defendant averred that since liberation, he had been in possession of the northern portion of the questioned
parcel of land and cultivated and introduced improvements.he specifically denies threatening the plaintiff
or anyone else with physical harm. He bought for P150,00 the northern portion which is now covered by a
tax declaration in his name from Tito Oriendo and that his possession over the northern portion of the
disputed land had never been disturbed until 1956.
● Plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue, that the action had been barred by the statute of limitation for plaintiff-
appellant filed this present action over ten years after he purchased the property, and the cause of action
is barred by prior judgment, as well as a counterclaim.
● CFI: There is no dispute as to the identity of the land subject-matter of the instant suit. The defendant would
still have acquired the land by virtue of acquisitive prescription, having possessed the land in good faith
within a period of ten years. There is good faith because the defendant's possession of the land is by virtue
of a deed of sale.
ISSUES: Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting the said deed of sale as evidence of defendant-appellee's
title and possession in good faith of the land in question
RULING:
Cartalino Maderzo insists that he has acquired ownership over the disputed parcel by ordinary prescription through
adverse possession of only ten years. But ordinary acquisitive prescription of immovables and other real rights
thru adverse possession of ten years, requires possession "in good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law" (Art. 1117, Civil Code of the Philippines).
In the absence of a just title or good faith, ownership of immovables can be acquired by extraordinary prescription
thru an uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty (30) years (Art. 1137, Civil Code of the Philippines).
After finding that defendant-appellee "has been in possession of the land since 1954," the trial judge concluded that
"even if there was a flaw in their title, the defendant would still have acquired the land by virtue of acquisitive
Page 11 of 74
prescription, having possessed the land in good faith within a period of ten (10) years. There is good faith because
the defendant's possession of the land is by virtue of a deed of sale.
The crucial issue therefore is whether the deed of sale executed by Tito Oriendo in favor of the late Igmedio
Maderazo could be considered as a valid basis for good faith and as a just title, in order to justify the acquisition of
the disputed parcel by ordinary prescription thru adverse possession of only 10 years.
The law defines a possessor in good faith as one who is not aware of any flaw in his title or mode of
acquisition; and conversely, one who is aware of such a flaw is a possessor in bad faith (Art. 526, Civil Code
of the Philippines).
We ruled that "the essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of
one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another."
A deed of sale, to constitute a just title and to generate good faith for the ordinary acquisitive prescription
of ten (10) years, should refer to the same parcel of land, which is adversely possessed.
In the case at bar, the deed of sale in favor of the deceased Igmedio Maderazo covers a parcel of land patently
different from the disputed land owned by plaintiff-appellant as to area, location and boundary owners.
The disputed parcel contains an area of about nine (9) hectares, and is situated in sitio Puting Buhangin, Mogpog,
Marinduque submitted as evidence by plaintiff-appellant.
The parcel of land purchased by the late Igmedio Maderazo from Tito Oriendo was assessed and described in the
deed of sale as the southern ½ portion without any improvements thereon of that parcel of coconut-forest land. The
entire lot of Tito Oriendo is only about 7,400 square meters in area — very much less than nine (9) hectares, the
area of the questioned parcel.
The land sold by Tito Oriendo to the late Igmedio Maderazo is distinct from the land of plaintiff-appellant
Ignacia Negrete as to location, boundaries and area. Hence, defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo, along
with his late father Igmedio Maderazo, could not claim good faith in occupying said land of plaintiff-appellant
on the basis of the said instrument of sale.
Defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo cannot in good conscience assert honest belief in the validity of his right nor
absence of intention to overreach another in view of the facts and circumstances aforestated. Hence, not being a
possessor in good faith, defendant-appellee Catalino Maderazo can acquire ownership over the disputed parcel of
land of about nine hectares belonging to plaintiff-appellant only by extraordinary acquisitive prescription thru an
uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years (Art 1137, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Since he occupied the same for only about thirteen years from 1954 until 1967, when his adverse possession was
interrupted by the filing of the action for reivindicacion on January 18, 1967 (Art. 1155, Civil Code of the Philippines),
the claim of defendant-appellee is untenable.
NOTES:
9. Baltazar v. Caridad, GR NO. L-23509, (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Naty Baltazar et al. RESPONDENT: Silvina Caridad et al.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Good faith must rest on a colorable right in the builder, beyond a mere stubborn belief in one's title despite judicial
adjudication. The fact that in 1959 appellants demolished and replaced their old house with new and bigger ones,
cannot enervate the rights of the registered owners. Otherwise. the rights of the latter to enjoy full possession of their
registered property could be indefinitely defeated by an unsuccessful opponent through the simple subterfuge of
replacing his old house with a new one from time to time.
Page 12 of 74
FACTS:
● In the cadastral proceeding, the trial court rendered a decision awarding Lot No. 8864 cadastre to the
spouses Julio Baltazar and Constancia Valencia as their conjugal partnership property. The said lot was
registered in the names of applicant spouses, in the office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte.
● Julio Baltazar, the registered owner of Lot No. 8864, died. his surviving wife and children, as petitioners,
filed a motion, in the cadastral case praying for writ of possession against respondents Silvina Caridad and
her daughter who had been in possession of the southern portion of the said lot since 1939, while the
cadastral case was pending, and before the decision was rendered and the corresponding decree issued
in 1941.
● The trial court granted petitioners' motion but directed the sheriff not to remove or destroy the permanent
improvements on the lot without an express command. The order having become final, the sheriff enforced
the writ and placed petitioners in possession of the southern portion of the lot.
● Petitioners presented a motion to compel respondents Eduarda Caridad and her mother, Silvina Caridad,
to remove their respective houses and, in the event of their failure to do so, to order the sheriff to demolish
the same. Respondents again opposed said motion.
● The trial court granted petitioners' motion, ordering respondents to remove their respective houses within
thirty days from receipt of said order. Not satisfied, respondents appealed.
● Respondents-appellants question the power or jurisdiction of the trial court to order the removal of their
respective houses which were built in the disputed lot long after the issuance of the final decree of
registration. They insist that they are builders in good faith of the houses in question, and, as such, they
are accorded rights under Article 448 of the new Civil Code.
ISSUES: whether or not respondents were builders in good faith
RULING:
● We hold that the order of the cadastral court, granting petitioners' motion to compel respondents to remove
their respective houses from the disputed lot, is valid and enforceable against respondents.
● Respondents do not dispute that during the pendency of the cadastral proceeding, rendition of the judgment
awarding said lot No. 8864, and consequent issuance of the final decree of registration of the same in favor
of Julio Baltazar.
● Appellants can not be regarded as builders in good faith because they are bound by the 1941 decree
of registration that obligated their parents and predecessors-in-interest. Good faith must rest on a
colorable right in the builder, beyond a mere stubborn belief in one's title despite judicial
adjudication. The fact that in 1959 appellants demolished and replaced their old house with new and
bigger ones can not enervate the rights of the registered owners. Otherwise, the rights of the latter to enjoy
full possession of their registered property could be indefinitely defeated by an unsuccessful opponent
through the simple subterfuge of replacing his old house with a new one from time to time.
NOTES:
10. Heirs of T. De Leon Vda De Roxas v. CA, GR NO.138660 , (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. De RESPONDENT: CA, Maguesun Management and
Roxas Development Corp.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the
certificates of title and make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor.
Indeed, one who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects of the title of his vendor and of a pending
litigation over the property gambles on the result of the litigation and is bound by the outcome of his indifference. A
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on guard and then claim that he acted
in good faith believing that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
Page 13 of 74
FACTS:
● Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas filed a case to set aside the decree of registration over two unregistered
parcels of land in Tagaytay City granted to Maguesun Management and Development Corporation before
the RTC on the ground of actual fraud.
● The trial court dismissed the petition to set aside the decree of registration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court.
● Meycauayan filed a Petition for Intervention and alleged that it purchased three parcels of land from
Maguesun which form part of the property awarded to the heirs of Trinidad . Meycauayan contended that
since it is a purchaser in good faith and for value, the Court should afford it the opportunity to be heard.
Meycauayan contends that the decision cannot impair its rights as a purchaser in good faith and for value.
The court denied the petition.
● Meycauayan filed with the land registration court a Motion For Leave To Intervene And For Period Of Time
To File Opposition To The Report.
● The Court acted favorably on the Roxas heirs' Motion for Clarification and its Supplement stating that it is
now incumbent upon the LRA to issue in lieu of the cancelled decree a new one in the name of petitioners
as well as the corresponding original certificate of title.
● Meycauayan filed a Complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title with the trial court
entitled.the trial court dismissed for lack of merit Meycauayan's complaint for reconveyance, damages and
quieting of title.
ISSUES:
1. Whether this Court's Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436 bind Meycauayan (YES)
2. Whether Meycauayan's act of filing with the trial court a complaint for reconveyance, damages and quieting of title
involving parcels of land, which were the subject of this Court's Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436,
constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (YES)
RULING:
1. We find Meycauayan's Executive Vice-President Juan M. Lamson, Jr. guilty of indirect contempt. We also
find that Meycauayan committed forum shopping, and thus Meycauayan and its Executive Vice President
Juan M. Lamson, Jr. are guilty of direct contempt. The issue of whether the Decision in G.R. No. 118436
binds Meycauayan was already addressed by this Court when it denied Meycauayan's Petition for
Intervention. Furthermore, this Court's Resolution clarified the Decision by ordering the Register of Deeds
to CANCEL OCT No. 0-515 and all its derivative titles. This Court also found that there had been no
intervening rights of an innocent purchaser for value involving the lots in dispute.
2. The fact that this Court specifically ordered the cancellation of Meycauayan's titles to the disputed parcels
of land should have laid to rest the issue of whether the Decision and Resolution in G.R. No. 118436 is
binding on Meycauayan. Clearly, Meycauayan's defiance of this Court's Decision and Resolution by filing
an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages involving the same parcels of land which this
Court already decided with finality constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Meycauayan's continuing resistance to this Court's judgment is an affront to the Court and to the sovereign
dignity with which it is clothed. Meycauayan's persistent attempts to raise issues long since laid to rest by
a final and executory judgment of no less than the highest tribunal of the land constitute contumacious
defiance of the authority of this Court and impede the speedy administration of justice.
Well-settled is the rule that when a court of competent jurisdiction has tried and decided a right or fact, so
long as the decision remains unreversed, it is conclusive on the parties and those in privity with them. More
so where the Supreme Court has already decided the issue since the Court is the final arbiter of all
justiciable controversies properly brought before it.
The Court ruled in G.R. No. 118436 that Meycauayan's predecessor-in-interest, Maguesun, committed
actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration of the subject properties. The Decision in G.R. No.
118436 binds Meycauayan under the principle of "privity of interest" since it was a successor-in-
interest of Maguesun. Meycauayan, however, insists that it was a purchaser in good faith because it had
no knowledge of any pending case involving the lots. Since Meycauayan checked with the Regional
Page 14 of 74
Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Meycauayan then had actual knowledge, before it purchased the lots,
of the pending case involving the lots despite the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the titles.
Furthermore, as found by this Court in G.R. No. 118436, the Roxas family has been in possession of the
property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez who resided on the property. Where the
land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond
the certificates of title and make inquiries concerning the rights of the actual possessor.
Meycauayan therefore cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith and could not have
acquired a better right than its predecessor-in-interest. This Court has already rejected Meycauayan's
claim that it was a purchaser in good faith when it ruled in G.R. No. 118436 that there had been no
intervening rights of an innocent purchaser for value involving the lots in dispute.
Indeed, one who buys property with full knowledge of the flaws and defects of the title of his vendor and of
a pending litigation over the property gambles on the result of the litigation and is bound by the outcome of
his indifference. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on
guard and then claim that he acted in good faith believing that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor.
NOTES:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during litigation.
11. Benin v. Tuason, GR NO. L-26127 , (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Victor Benin et al. RESPONDENT: Mariano Severo Tuason y De La Paz

et al.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the registered
property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may
be demanded only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name.
The holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest
assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible.
FACTS:
● The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of agricultural lands located
in the barrio of La Loma in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal,
● They inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his
father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of
land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested
therefrom.
● During the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and
herein plaintiffs registered their claims of ownership. They declared said lands for taxation purposes in
1940. Sometime in 1942 evacuees from Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of
plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
● The plaintiffs alleged that sometime in the year 1951 the defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason
and Co. Inc., with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing
equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and
constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles),
bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements.
● Plaintiffs discovered for the first time that their lands had either been fraudulently or erroneously included,
by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of defendants.
Page 15 of 74
● The plaintiffs prayed the court to declare the owners and entitled possession of the subject land, to declare
the OCT and all the transfer certificates null and void, for respondents reconvey and transfer the title, for
respondents to pay plaintiffs for damages and the market value of the lands, and to issue writ of preliminary
injunction.
● J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three cases. This motion to dismiss was
denied.
● J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed an answer and denied plaintiffs' claim of ownership of the lands involved in
each case. The plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by prior judgment and res judicata. The complaints failed
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. is a buyer in good
faith and for valuable consideration of the parcels of land involved in the three cases. The requirements for
a valid registration of title were complied with.
ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision
RULING:
● The conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of this
Court.he conclusions of the trial court are not supported by the evidence and the applicable decisions of
this Court.
● The decision of the trial court declaring null and void ab initio Original Certificate of Title No. 735 would
invalidate the title over the entire area included in Parcel 1 — which admittedly includes the six parcels of
land claimed by the plaintiffs — and also the title over the entire area included in Parcel 2.
● The lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction to render the
decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an
amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary
and proper.
● Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had
no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the
registration court had not acquired jurisdiction.
● The most that the lower court could have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title insofar
as that area of 27.10 square meters is concerned, if that area can be identified. But certainly, the lower
court could not declared, and should not have declared, null and void the whole proceedings.
● It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been wrongly
registered in the name of another person must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It
is also the rule that a reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered
is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action for
reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the registered
property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property
registered may be demanded only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful
registration in his name.
● The circumstances attending the acquisition by the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. of Parcel 1 clearly
indicates that said corporation acquired its title in a regular transaction as purchaser in good faith
and for value. The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. in turn sold the same property to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35073 was issued in the name of the latter.
● The lower court declared that herein appellant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was a purchaser in bad faith. We
do not find any evidence in the record that would sustain such a finding of the lower court.
● The Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. acquired the land from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the receiver of the
properties of the Mayorasgo Tuason, in a sale that was authorized, and subsequently approved, by the
court.
● If the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. had acquired the land in a transaction that was authorized by the court, for a
valuable consideration, thereby acquiring a good title over the property as a purchaser in good faith and for
value, the title that it transferred to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. when it sold the same property to the latter
was also a good title, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was also a purchaser in good faith and for value
— even if it appears that the incorporators of the two corporations belong to the same Tuason family. The
records are bereft of any evidence which would indicate that the sale of Parcel 1 in question by the Heirs
of D. Tuason, Inc. to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was fraudulent.
● The buyers of the lots necessarily relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason &
Co., and because they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value.
The purchasers of these lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even
churches.|
Page 16 of 74
● The possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who hold certificates of
title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of the lower
court would annul their titles and compel them to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect
to the decision of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due process of law.
● The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a
certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest
assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible.
NOTES:
12. Suobiron v. CA, GR NO. 109903 , (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Sps. Suobiron, Jose Sullano Jr., RESPONDENT: CA, LRC, RD of Ilo-Ilo, Adelantar et
Ireneo Ferraris al.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Possession acquired in good faith may not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts
exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully,
conformably with Art. 528 of the Civil Code.
Also check notes
FACTS:
● Petitioners alleged in their complaint that the land registration court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
in issuing both orders because the requirements of the law on reconstitution of court records were not
complied with thus rendering void not only the orders but also the decrees and certificates of title issued.
● Respondents denied the allegations for the annulment of the orders and decrees. They counterclaimed for
the delivery to them of the property in litigation consisting of 26.5 hectares of sugarland and for the payment
of the net produce which they could have received had they not been deprived of possession thereof.
● The trial court found that the two parcels of land were previously subject of an LRC Case before the CFI of
Iloilo and that aside from the Director of Lands, the other oppositors.
● After the American forces liberated Panay Island, the CFI was reorganized. The clerk of court submitted a
report stating that all court records were destroyed or burned. The court issued an order directing the
reconstitution of the records. The order was published in two (2) leading newspapers in Iloilo City.
● Luis Adelantar filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of LRC Case furnishing copies thereof to
oppositors. The oppositors did not however appear when the motion was heard. Thus on the same day the
CFI gave due course to the motion for reconstitution. OCT Nos. 69237 and 69238 were issued in the name
of the spouses Luis Adelantar and Fortunata Ponce.
● CFI rendered judgment declaring the Adelantar spouses owners of the property and ordering the receiver
earlier appointed by the court to deliver to them the possession thereof as well as the produce received by
the receiver since his appointment.
● However, after the delivery of the property by the Provincial Sheriff to the Adelantars, Quintin, Basilia,
Bernabe and Fortunato Lorezo re-entered the premises. Other persons followed suit.
● Fortunata Ponce, who was already a widow, filed an answer claiming ownership in the cadastral survey.
The spouses Andres Suobiron and Socorro Suobiron also filed an answer claiming ownership of portions
thereof by purchases from Quintin, Basilia, Lorezo, Lucero. Thus prompting the cadastral court to advise
the parties to file the proper action and to litigate the question of ownership.
● Respondents filed an action for quieting of title and for recovery of possession with damages. The complaint
however was dismissed without prejudice.
● Petitioners sought annulment of the certificates of title of the Adelantars but their action was also dismissed.
Thus petitioners filed their complaint alleging co-ownership of the property. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and directed them to vacate the property and deliver possession thereof to private respondents
and to pay them,
Page 17 of 74
ISSUES:
1. whether the provisions of Act 3110 have been complied with; whether the decision in Civil Case No.
938 is conclusive upon them
2. whether they are liable to private respondents for damages.
RULING:
1. The requirements of the law for the reconstitution of a court record were fulfilled. The clerk of court, soon
after liberation, sent a notice to the then presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo informing him
of the destruction of all court records in the province. Acting thereon the judge immediately issued an order
for their reconstitution which was published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Province
and City of Iloilo once a week for six (6) months. Copies of the motion for reconstitution were served by the
movant (the now deceased Luis Adelantar) on the oppositors through their respective counsel.
2. The decision in Civil Case No. 938 declaring the Adelantar spouses owners of the two (2) parcels of land
claimed by Basilia Lorezo, Isabel Lorezo and Canuto Lucero is conclusive upon the parties therein as well
as their successors-in-interest, the parties herein, under the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court held
petitioners liable to private respondents for the net produce of the properties in question from the time the
former's possession in good faith was legally interrupted when they were served summons in connection
with private respondents' complaint for recovery of possession with damages.
It may be that petitioners acquired the disputed properties in good faith and had since then occupied the
same but such bona fide character of possession ceased when they were served summons.
Possession acquired in good faith may not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully, conformably with Art. 528 of the Civil Code.
NOTES:
Rodriguez v. Francisco
on the date of the service of summons upon appellee in this case considering that (appellant) was thereafter
declared owner by final judgment (G.R. No. L-12039), appellee's possession in good faith was interrupted and
hence from that time he lost the right to the fruits.
Tacas v. Tobon
When the owner or possessor with a better right comes along, when he becomes aware that what he had
taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in support of the adverse contention,
good faith ceases. The possessor may still believe that his right is more secure, because we resign ourselves with
difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes; but when the final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession,
all illusion necessarily disappears. Although he may not have been convinced of it before, the possessor becomes
aware that his possession is unlawful from the time he learns of the complaint, from the time he is
summoned to the trial. It is at this time that his possession is interrupted, according to Article 1945, and that
he ceases to receive the fruits, according to the first paragraph of Article 451.
13. Maneclang v. Baun, GR NO. 27876 , (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Adelaida Maneclang (Administrator of RESPONDENT: Juan Baun, Amapro Baun, City of
the Intestate Estate of Santos) Dagupan
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Since good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests
the burden of proof, it was incumbent upon the administrator to establish such proof, which We find to be wanting.
However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that: "Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this
character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware
that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully." The filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of
a vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith.
Page 18 of 74
As a possessor in good faith, it was entitled to all the fruits of the property and was under no obligation to pay any
rental to the intestate estate of Margarita for the use thereof. Under Article 544 of the Civil Code,a possessor in
good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted. Thus, the trial court
committed an error when it ordered the City of Dagupan to pay accumulated rentals in the amount of P584,602.20
from 4 October 1952 up to the filing of the complaint.
FACTS:
● Margarita Suri Santos died intestate. She was survived by her husband Severo Maneclang and nine
children. A petition for the settlement of her estate was filed by one of her legitimate children. Margarita left
several parcels of land.
● Feliciano, the administrator of the intestate estate of Margarita, filed a petition asking the court to give him
"the authority to dispose of so much of the estate that is necessary to meet the debts enumerated" in the
petition. While notice thereof was given to the surviving spouse, no such notice was sent to the heirs of
Margarita.
● The intestate court authorized the administrator to mortgage or sell properties of the estate for the purposes
of paying off the obligations.
● Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator of the intestate estate, executed a deed of sale in favor of the City
of Dagupan and was approved by the intestate court.
● The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land and constructed thereon a public market,
known as the Perez Boulevard Public Market. It has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of
the property since the construction of the market.
● The new judicial administratrix of the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang filed an action for the
annulment of the sales made by the previous administrator, cancellation of titles, recovery of possession
and damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun et al.
● The cause of action against the City of Dagupan centers around the deed of sale executed by former judicial
administrator Oscar S. Maneclang.
● The City of Dagupan interposed the following affirmative defenses: (a) the sale in its favor is valid (b) plaintiff
has no cause of action, if any, had prescribed since the complaint was filed thirteen years after the execution
of the sale; (c) plaintiff is barred by estoppel and by laches; (d) it is a buyer in good faith, and (e) it has
introduced necessary and useful improvements assuming arguendo that the sale was illegal, it has the right
to retain the land and the improvements until it is reimbursed for the said improvements.
● TRIAL COURT: In the instant case, no notice of the application was given to the heirs; hence, both the
order granting authority to sell and the deed of sale executed in favor of the City of Dagupan pursuant
thereto, are null and void. Estoppel does not lie against plaintiff as no estoppel can be predicated on an
illegal act and estoppel is founded on ignorance. The City of Dagupan is not a purchaser in good faith and
for value as the former judicial administrator, Oscar Maneclang, testified that he was induced by then
incumbent Mayor to sell the property.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the City of Dagupan is not a purchaser on good faith
and for value
RULING:
● Even if it is to be assumed that Mayor Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz induced Oscar Maneclang to sell
the property, the fact remains that there was already the order authorizing the sale. Having been issued by
a judge who was lawfully appointed to his position, he was disputably presumed to have acted in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction and that his official duty was regularly performed.
● Under Article 526 of the Civil Code,a possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it; furthermore, mistake upon a
doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. It implies freedom from knowledge
and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry.
We find no circumstance in this case to have alerted the vendee, the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or
defect in the authority of the judicial administrator to sell the property.
● Since good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the
possessor rests the burden of proof, it was incumbent upon the administrator to establish such
proof, which We find to be wanting. However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that: "Possession
acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which
Page 19 of 74
show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully." The filing
of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith.
● The date of service of summons to the City of Dagupan is not clear from the record. Its Answer, however,
was filed on 5 November 1965. Accordingly, its possession in good faith must be considered to have
lasted up to that date.
● As a possessor in good faith, it was entitled to all the fruits of the property and was under no
obligation to pay any rental to the intestate estate of Margarita for the use thereof.
● Under Article 544 of the Civil Code,a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before
the possession is legally interrupted. Thus, the trial court committed an error when it ordered the City of
Dagupan to pay accumulated rentals in the amount of P584,602.20 from 4 October 1952 up to the filing of
the complaint.
NOTES:
Tacas vs. Tobon
this Court held that if there are no other facts from which the interruption of good faith may be determined, and an
action is filed to recover possession, good faith ceases from the date of receipt of the summons to appear at
the trial and if such date does not appear in the record, that of the filing of the answer would control. Its
Answer, however, was filed on 5 November 1965. Accordingly, its possession in good faith must be considered to
have lasted up to that date.
14. Spouses Villafuerte vs. CA, G.R. No. 134239. May 26, 2005 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: REYNALDO VILLAFUERTE and RESPONDENT: HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

PERLITA T. VILLAFUERTE EDILBERTO DE MESA and GONZALO DALEON
The complaint seeks vindication for the alleged They admitted in their respective answers having caused
malicious and unlawful fencing of the plaintiffs' business the fencing of the plaintiffs' gasoline station thereat but
premises. reasoned out that they did so on account of the plaintiffs'
refusal to vacate the same despite demands.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Art. 536 of CC. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor
who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing,
must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
FACTS:
●
● Spouses Villafuerte operated a gasoline station known as Peewee's Petron Powerhouse Service Station
and General Merchandise on the premises of three adjoining lot.
● One of the owners of one lot is respondent de Mesa and respondent Daleon is the owner of one lot.
● Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon acquired their respective lots subject to the lease by Petrophil
Corporation which had built thereon the gasoline station being managed by the Villafuerte couple.
● December 31, 1988 – the lease expired; they obtained a new lease for 1 year with respondent de Mesa.
● However, instead of a lease renewal, they received a demand letter to vacate the premises form
respondent Daleon on which they ignored and still continued to operate the gas station.
● A year later, their lease contract with respondent de Mesa was not renewed, nonetheless they continued
to operate the gas station and refused to vacate the premise despite the demand.
Page 20 of 74
● February 1, 1990 - Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon, with the aid of several persons and without
the knowledge of the Villafuertes, caused the closure of the latter's gasoline station by constructing fences
around it.
● February 2, 1990 – Spouses Villafuerte countered with a complaint for damages with preliminary
mandatory injunction, the complaint seeks vindication for the alleged malicious and unlawful fencing of the
plaintiffs' business premises.
Lower Court Ruling
(May 23,1990):
● denied petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
● with the expiration of the lease on the defendants' property, the plaintiffs have no more right to stay thereon.
(November 13, 1990):
● rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendants Edliberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon to
pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs damages.
RTC RULING:
● with continued occupation despite the expiration of the lease contracts over the same, petitioners had
become "undesirable lessees."
● However, it was improper for private respondents to resort to fencing their properties in order to remove
petitioners from the premises in the light of the clear provision of Art. 536 of the Civil Code on the
matter.
● private respondents were held accountable to petitioners for the various damages prayed for by petitioners
in their amended complaint.
CA RULING:
● affirmed RTC decision but modified the damages awarded.

● Private respondents could not invoke the doctrine of self-help contained in Article 429 of the Civil
Code reasoning that the doctrine finds no application when occupation was effected through lawful
means such as in this case where petitioners' possession of the lots owned by private respondents was
effected through lease agreements;
● Petitioners' continued unauthorized occupation of private respondents' properties may have been illegal,
however, it was incumbent upon private respondents to abide by the express provision of Article
536 of the Civil Code requiring recourse to the proper court prior to ousting petitioners from their
(private respondents') lots.
ISSUES:
1. W/N respondent’s acts were justified since they are the owners of the subject lot. (NO)
2. W/N the appellate court erred in substantially reducing the amount of damages earlier awarded to them by
the trial court. (NO)
RULING:
The Supreme Court agrees that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the lease contracts
between petitioners and private respondents over the latter's respective lots had already expired. There was also a
congruence of findings that it was wrong for private respondents to fence their properties thereby putting to a halt
the operation of petitioners' gasoline station.
Page 21 of 74
Article 536 of the Civil Code previously quoted explicitly provides for the proper recourse of one who claims
to be entitled to the possession of a thing. When private respondents personally took it upon themselves to evict
petitioners from their properties, which act was in clear contravention of the law, they became liable "for all the
necessary and natural consequences of [their] illegal act."
Petitioners instituted this action praying that private respondents be held liable for actual damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of litigation.
Actual Damages: (those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered and claimant has
the burden of proof)
● Petitioners have miserably failed to proffer evidence capable of sustaining their plea for actual damages
● The petitioners only gave estimations and speculations on the amount of actual damages that they are
claiming.
● The court cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but is required to depend upon competent proof that the claimant had suffered and on evidence
of the actual amount thereof.
Temperate Damages:
● An award of temperate damages to petitioners is in order. In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be awarded where the court finds
that some pecuniary loss had been suffered by the claimant but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
Moral Damages:
● Removal of the CA of the award of moral damages.

● The appellees knew that their lease had expired. Yet, despite such awareness, they persisted in their
unauthorized occupancy of appellants' property. Being partly responsible for their present predicament
which is very much within their power to avoid, appellees cannot receive compensation for whatever mental
anguish or suffering they went thru.
● The right to recover moral damages under Article 21 is based on equity, and those who come to court to
demand equity must come with clean hands.
Exemplary Damages:
● Upheld the award for exemplary damages in order to deter similarly minded individuals from pursuing the
course of action taken by private respondents.
● (h)e who believes himself entitled to deprive another of the possession of a thing, so long as the
possessor refuses delivery, must request the assistance of the proper authority."
● The arbitrary conduct of fencing their properties under the claim that they own the same brazenly violates
the law and circumvents the proper procedure which should be obtained before the court.
Attorney’s fees:
● Petitioners do not deserve the award of attorney's fees for it was precisely their unfounded insistence to
stay on private respondents' properties that precipitated this suit.
NOTES:
15. Arambulo vs. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581. September 30, 2005 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO and MIGUEL RESPONDENT: EMERENCIANA R. GUNGAB

R. ARAMBULO III
Page 22 of 74
Denied respondent’s claim stating that Victoria Arambulo Respondent alleged

is a co-owner.
(1) that she owns the subject property;
(1) that after their father died intestate in 1964, the
property became part of the common properties of the (2) that she tolerated petitioners' occupancy of certain
Reyes clan; portions of the subject property without rent; and
(2) that their mother, allowed petitioner Victoria, to use (3) that despite her demands, they refused to vacate the
and occupy a certain portion of the subject property; subject property.
(3) that Victoria continuously used and occupied this Contention in the SC:
portion for the last 20 years;
● CA is correct since the best proof of ownership
(4) that her mother also allowed her grandson, petitioner of a piece of land is the certificate of title.
Miguel, to use another portion of the subject property ● maintains that a pending civil action for
since 15 years ago; and annulment of transfer and reconveyance of title
in a separate proceeding is of no moment in an
(5) that their "use and possession" of these portions of ejectment case.
the subject property "had
been with the knowledge, consent and tolerance of all

the other co-owners."
Contention in the SC:
● that the CA erred in reversing the RTC by

relying only on respondent's TCT without
considering that respondent was never in
possession of the property.
● They insist that they were in possession of the
subject property and so there was no physical
possession to restore and protect.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the
action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed
within one year from the date of the last demand.
Courts in ejectment cases decide questions of ownership only as it is necessary to decide the question of
possession.
The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. Respondent
has a Torrens Title over the land
FACTS:
● October 19, 1998 - respondent's counsel made a formal demand to her sister Victoria and nephew Miguel
to vacate the subject property on or before November 30, 1998.
● No amicable settelement was made even with the assistance of a barangay authorities.
● February 2, 1999 - respondent Emerenciana R. Gungab filed a separate ejectment complaint before the
MeTC of Quezon City.
Page 23 of 74
● Aside from these ejectment cases, there is also a pending case for annulment of transfer and reconveyance
of title before the RTC of Quezon City, which Victoria and three of her brothers filed against respondent
and her husband.
MeTC RULING: dismissed the ejectmenr cases for lack of cause of action and that summary proceeding is not the
proper procedure.
● that respondent's allegation of tolerance was preposterous since she failed to prove her proper acquisition
of the subject property; and
● that petitioners were entitled to retain possession of the subject property pursuant to Article 448 of the Civil
Code
RTC RULING: affirmed in toto the MeTC decision
CA RULING: reversed and set aside RTC decision
● CA resolved the issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession.

● It held that respondent had a preferred right to possess the property because she had a genuine TCT
ISSUES:
1. W/N respondent can eject petitioner. (YES)

2. W/N respondent has better right of possession. (YES)
RULING:
Here, the respondent’s cause of action was not deprivation of possession of the subject property by FISTS. But a
case of unlawful detainer as per respondent’s allegations.
The sole issue of for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession. MeTC still
has jurisdiction even if there is as assertion of ownership of the defendant.
All that the trial court can do is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can
resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve ownership. Courts in ejectment cases
decide questions of ownership only as it is necessary to decide the question of possession.
The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. Except for
petitioners' unsubstantiated claim that Victoria Arambulo is a co-owner of the property, they have not presented other
justification for their continued stay thereon.
We stress, however, that this determination of ownership is not final. It is only an initial determination of
ownership for the sole purpose of settling the issue of possession. It would not prejudice the pending action in
the RTC of Quezon City between the same parties involving title to the property
Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them
is bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Consequently, after respondent obtained title to the subject property
and withdrew her tolerance later on, petitioners' refusal to vacate it rendered their possession thereof unlawful.
Since petitioners' occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, they are not entitled to retain
its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. They are aware that their tolerated possession may be
terminated any time and they cannot be considered as builders in good faith. Moreover, as aptly found by the Court
of Appeals, petitioners have not presented evidence to prove that they made improvements on the subject property
and defrayed the expenses therefor.
Page 24 of 74
Since this is a case of unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that
she has better right to possession. Thus, petitioners' prior physical possession of the property does not automatically
entitle them to continue in said possession and does not give them a better right to the property
NOTES:
16. Spouses Barnachea vs. CA, G.R. No. 150025. July 23, 2008 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
The best indicator of what the plaintiff in an ejectment case intends with respect to the nature of his or her
complaint can be found in the complaint itself.
It has been held that a person who occupies land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose terms has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner.
FACTS:
● Before us is the Petition for Review by Certiorari filed by the spouses Narciso and Julita Barnachea against
the spouses Avelino and Priscilla Ignacio rooted in the ejectment complaint the respondents filed against
the petitioners before the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan.
● The petition prays that we nullify the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration, and that we suspend the ejectment proceedings in light of a pending action for quieting
of title involving the disputed property.
● October 20, 1998 - respondents filed their complaint for ejectment against the petitioners before the MTC.
● Subject Lot: titled in respondent Avelino Ignacio's name which lots are adjacent to the property that the
petitioners own and occupy.
● These properties were originally part of a piece of land which were further subdivided and transferred.
● The property that the petitioners own and occupy was derived from the land transferred to Santiago Isidro
(TCT No. T-188-EP). Respondent Ignacio's properties were derived, on the other hand, from the land
originally transferred to Procopio de Guzman (TCT No. T-185-E).
Complaint states:
“That in a portion of the lots 16 and 17, a portion of the house of the defendants was erected and
built thus usurping the said portion and this was made known to the defendants when the plaintiffs
caused the relocation of the subject lots, however, considering that the latter were not yet in need
of that portion, they allowed the former to stay on the portion by tolerance;
"That last July 1998, when the plaintiffs were in the process of fencing the boundary of their lots,
to their surprise, they were not allowed by the defendants to extend the fence up to the portions
they illegally occupied;
● October 5, 2000 - the petitioner Julita's sister, Leticia, representing herself to be the sole owner of EP No.
A-050545 (TCT No. T-188-EP), led a Petition for Quieting of Title.
●
CA RULING: - denied the petition and the petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration,
● The issue in an ejectment suit is limited to the physical possession of real property and is separate and
distinct from the issue of ownership and possession de jure that either party may set forth in his or her
pleading;
Page 25 of 74
● The pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of deed of
sale does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it,
and that ejectment actions generally cannot be suspended pending the resolution of a case for quieting of
title between the same parties over the same subject property.
● To the CA, the initial tolerance on the part of the private respondents did not convert the nature of their
ejectment suit from forcible entry into unlawful detainer
ISSUES:
1. W/N the ejectment case filed by the respondents against petitioners with the MTC of Pulilan is for unlawful
detainer or for forcible entry; (unlawful detainer)
2. W/N the complaint was filed beyond one year from the demand to vacate the subject premises. (NO)
3. W/N the pendency of an action involving the issue of ownership is sufficient basis for the suspension of an
ejectment proceeding between the same parties and relating to the same subject matter. (NO)
RULING:
1. The best indicator of what the plaintiff in an ejectment case intends with respect to the nature of his
or her complaint can be found in the complaint itself.
Court of Appeals is in error when it held that the present case involves forcible entry rather than unlawful
detainer.
A plain reading of the complaint shows the respondents' positions that the petitioners were in prior possession
of the disputed property; that the respondents allowed them to occupy the disputed property by tolerance; that
the respondents eventually made a demand that the petitioners vacate the property.
There is a complete absence of any allegation of force, intimidation, strategy or stealth in the complaint with
respect to the petitioners' possession of the respondents' property.
It has been held that a person who occupies land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy. The status of the defendant is analogous to
that of a lessee or tenant whose terms has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the
owner.
2. As an action for unlawful detainer, the one-year prescription period started running after August 31, 1998
— the date of receipt of the respondents' demand letter. The period ran for almost two months until it was
interrupted on October 20, 1998 when the respondents filed their ejectment complaint. This complaint, however,
was dismissed on December 8, 1999. Upon this dismissal, the prescriptive period again began to run for about
four months when another interruption intervened — the revival of the complaint on April 5, 2000. Evidently,
under these undisputed facts, the period when the prescriptive period effectively ran does not add up to
the one-year prescriptive period that would jurisdictionally bar the ejectment case.
3. The issue in an unlawful detainer case is limited to physical possession. When a claim of ownership is
used as a basis for de facto possession or to assert a better possessory right, the court hearing the case may
provisionally rule on the issue of ownership. As a rule, however, a pending civil action involving ownership
of the same property does not justify the suspension of the ejectment proceedings.
In the absence of a concrete showing of compelling equitable reasons at least comparable and under circumstances
analogous to Amagan, we cannot override the established rule that a pending civil action for ownership shall
not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. Additionally, to allow a suspension on the basis of the reasons
Page 26 of 74
the petitioners presented in this case would create the dangerous precedent of allowing an ejectment suit to be
suspended by an action filed in another court by parties who are not involved or affected by the ejectment suit.
NOTES:
Forcible entry:
● the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property until he was deprived of
possession by the defendant
● Defendant secures possession through F.I.S.T.S – possession is unlawful from the beginning.
● the law does not require a previous demand by the plaintiff for the defendant to vacate the premises;
● Bring action - 1 year from the date the defendant actually and illegally entered the property/ discovery in
case of stealth.
Unlawful Detainer:
● Plaintiff’s prior possession is unnecessary

● Possession was lawful at the start.
● the plaintiff is required by law to make a demand as a jurisdictional requirement;
● Bring action - 1 year from the date of last demand.
17. Spouses Llobera vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 142882. May 2, 2006 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: SPS. RICARDO AND LYDIA RESPONDENT: JOSEFINA V. FERNANDEZ

LLOBRERA, SPS. BENJAMIN AND ESTHER
LLOBRERA, SPS. MIKE AND RESIDA MALA, SPS. As one of the co-owners, she served a written demand
OTOR AND DOLINANG BAGONTE, SPS. EDUARDO letter for petitioner’s to vacate the premises within 15
AND DAMIANA ICO, SPS. ANTONIO AND MERLY days from notice.
SOLOMON, SPS. ANSELMO AND VICKY SOLOMON,
SPS. ALEX AND CARMELITA CALLEJO, SPS.
DEMETRIO AND JOSEFINA FERRER, SPS.
BENJAMIN AND ANITA MISLANG, SPS. DOMINGO
AND FELICIDAD SANCHEZ, SPS. FERNANDO AND
CARMELITA QUEBRAL, SPS. BERNARDO AND
PRISCILLA MOLINA, PRISCILLA BAGA AND BELEN
SEMBRANO
● they had been occupying the property in

question beginning the year 1945 onwards
● with the permission of one of the co-owners
Gualberto de Venecia, they developed and
occupied the same on condition that they will
pay their monthly rental
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Art. 1256 pf CC. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it,
the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due.
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
Page 27 of 74
FACTS:
● Respondent is the co-owner of the land; he filed a complaint of ejectment
● Peititoners refused to vacate the land alleging that they have possessed the land since 1945
● The parties did not reach an amicable settlement before the Barangay captain prompting him to issue a
certification to file action.
● Sometime in 1996, co-owners Venecia refused to accept the monthly rental of petitioners, prompting them
to consign the same to the bank – which they continued to maintain and update.
MTCC RULING: in favor of petitioner (herein respondent)
● Ordering each of the defendants (herein petitioner) to vacate the portion of the land in question they
respectively occupy and to restore the possession thereof to the plaintiff and her co-owners;
● Pay P300 rent until they vacate the land
● Pay attorney’s fees ad litigation costs.
RTC RULING: affirmed MTCC ruling
CA RULING: June 30, 1999 - affirmed RTC ruling and denied Motion for Reconsideration
● Petitioners failed to present any written memorandum of the alleged lease arrangements between them
and Gualberto De Venecia. The receipts claimed to have been issued by the owner were not presented on
the excuse that the March 19, 1996 fire burned the same. Simply put, there is a dearth of evidence to
substantiate the averred lessor-lessee relationship. . . . .
ISSUES:
W/N petitioners' possession of the subject property is founded on contract.
RULING:
From the absence of proof of any contractual basis for petitioners' possession of the subject premises, the only
legal implication is that their possession thereof is by mere tolerance.
The judgment favoring the ejectment of petitioners being consistent with law and jurisprudence can only be affirmed.
The alleged consignation of the P20.00 monthly rental to a bank account in respondent's name cannot save the day
for the petitioners simply because of the absence of any contractual basis for their claim to rightful possession of the
subject property. Consignation based on Article 1256 of the Civil Code indispensably requires a creditor-debtor
relationship between the parties, in the absence of which, the legal effects thereof cannot be availed of.
Unless there is an unjust refusal by a creditor to accept payment from a debtor, Article 1256 cannot apply. In the
present case, the possession of the property by the petitioners being by mere tolerance as they failed to
establish through competent evidence the existence of any contractual relations between them and the
respondent, the latter has no obligation to receive any payment from them.
The Court cannot find any strong and compelling reason to disturb the unanimous ruling of the three (3) courts below
on the matter of damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioners.
NOTES:
SC’s long-standing policy – when the courts below have consistently and unanimously ruled on a factual issue, such
ruling is final and conclusive, especially in the absence of any cogent reason to depart therefrom.
Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled:

A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
Page 28 of 74
18. Spouses Apostol vs. CA, G.R. No. 125375. June 17, 2004 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: SPOUSES ELPIDIO APOSTOL and RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
AMELIA APOSTOL EMMANUEL CHUA and EDNA L. CHUA
Filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and TCT Prayed the Courts to Order the defendants and all
86338 and for reconveyance with damages alleging that persons claiming under them to immediately vacate the
they had been in possession of the property since 1973. parcel of land and to pay for damages.
Contention to the SC: Contention to the SC:
(a) their possession of the property since 1976 preceded Respondents assert that contrary to the petitioners'
the sale of the property to the private respondents; claim, the petition raises questions of facts. The
respondents also aver that the CA did not commit any
(b) the respondents were purchasers of the property in error in its decision.
bad faith; and,
(c) in declaring that the petitioners had priority of

possession of the property on the sale thereof by Luz
Pascua and Paulo Pascua way back in 1976 and 1977,
the RTC did not thereby collaterally attack the title of the
respondents over the property.
According to the petitioners, an inflexible adherence to

the proscription against a collateral attack of a torrens
title may result to gross injustice.
Petitioners contend that the respondents themselves

admitted in their complaint before the MeTC that they
knew that the petitioners were in actual possession of
the property even before they purchased the same.
Hence, the petitioners argue, the respondents were
purchasers in bad faith
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
"Article 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred, if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same,
the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings."
FACTS:
● September 3, 1993 - the respondents, Spouses Emmanuel and Edna Chua, filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against the petitioners, Spouses Elpidio and Amelia Apostol, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Metro Manila and alleged inter alia that they had contracted spouses Pascua to purchase the land.
● The petitioners, who were present during the negotiations, verbally assured the respondents that they
would vacate the property within ten days from the execution of the sale.
● The petitioners then acknowledged that their stay in the property was only upon the tolerance of its former
owners.
Page 29 of 74
● June 7, 1993 - Spouses Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the improvements
thereon in favor of the respondents for P1,000,000 and was issued TCT 87610.
● However, petitioners refused to vacate the property despite demands.
MeTC RULING (August 11, 1994): in favor of respondents
● that having acquired the property from the Spouses Pascua, and being the registered owners of the
property, the respondents are entitled to the possession thereof:
● that the proceedings were not suspended by the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-94-19352.
RTC RULING (April 15, 1996): reversed MeTC ruling
● In ejectment cases, the only issue to be determined by the Court is the fact of prior physical and material
possession over the subject property. Under Article 538 of the New Civil Code.
● In this case, defendants were able to establish the fact that they have been in physical and material
possession of the subject premises from the time they purchased the same from Luz B. Pascua on July 8,
1976. Defendants, therefore, are in possession of the property in the concept of an owner, and under the
law, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with
a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it (Art. 541, NCC).
CA RULING: reversed RTC and reinstated MeTC decision

● In ruling against the petitioners, who were the registered owners of the property, the RTC thereby violated
the prescription against the collateral attack of a torrens title.
ISSUES:
1. W/N respondents are entitled to possession of the land, despite not being in possession. (YES)
2. W/N the validity of the title of respondents be assailed in this present petition. (NO)
RULING:
RULING:
A person who has a torrens title over the property, such as the respondents, is entitled to the possession
thereof. Moreover, the fact that the respondents were never in prior physical possession of the subject land is of no
moment, as prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases.
Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The
issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for
that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power
of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
NOTES:
In Pangilinan v. Aguilar , we held that it is an accepted rule that a person who has a torrens title over the property,
such as the respondents, is entitled to the possession thereof.
Page 30 of 74
Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, and declared that the registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property
covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their favor
19. Ayson vs. VDA de Carpio, G.R. No. 152438. June 17, 2004 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: LOLITA R. AYSON RESPONDENT: MARINA ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CARPIO
The trial court had no jurisdiction over the action. The

Decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the trial
court's decision is accordingly erroneous and
consequently null and void.
She claimed (1) that respondent was not in actual

possession of the property;
(2) that the latter's acquisition of title over it was

fraudulent; and
(3) that no actual conciliation proceedings had been held

before the office of the barangay chairman.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Defects in a complaint are deemed waived when the parties go to trial without challenging them. Thus, when the
plaintiff, without objection from the defendant, introduces evidence to prove a particular cause of action not alleged
in the original complaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces witnesses and other evidence to meet the cause of
action thus established, the issue is joined as fully and as effectively as if it were previously pleaded.
FACTS:
● Petitioner was the owner of three parcels of land in Manibang, Porac, Pampanga covered respectively by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 147096-R, 155262-R and 155362-R.
● Petitioner has been in possession of the aforesaid properties being the owner thereof.
● August 29, 1980 - petitioner mortgaged said properties to the Philippine National Bank, Angeles City
Branch. These were subsequently foreclosed by the Bank. After failing to redeem within the prescribed
period, petitioner’s TCTs were canceled and new ones were issued in the name of the Bank.
● April 14, 1999 – bank sold the property to respondent and issued a TCT No. 466519-R
● October 22, 1999 – petitioner filed a complaint for the annulment of TCT No. 466519-R and the deed of
sale between the Bank and the respondent as well as for reconveyance and damages.
● December 29, 1999 – demand letters to vacate were sent.
MTC RULING (June 23, 2000) - in favor of respondent ordering petitioner to vacate the subject property.
Page 31 of 74
RTC RULING: rendered a decision affirming with modification the MTC's decision.
CA RULING:
● The appellate court held that the continued possession of the property by petitioner had merely been
tolerated by respondent. Possession by petitioner became unlawful when she was divested of her
ownership of the premises. Holding that a summary action for ejectment was the proper remedy against
her, the CA explained that the parties were not precluded from ventilating their grievances in another action
based on a separate and distinct cause involving ownership of the land.
ISSUES:
W/N the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had jurisdiction over respondent's Complaint for ejectment.
RULING:
The trial brought to light the true nature of the right of possession of respondent over the property, and the
circumstances surrounding her dispossession. The facts, as culled from the evidence presented by both parties,
unequivocally show that the instant case is one for unlawful detainer.
Respondent was able to present evidence showing that after the foreclosure of the property, petitioner failed to
redeem it within the redemption period. Thus, the latter was divested of her ownership and right to retain possession
thereof. Respondent acquired a better right to possess the property after acquiring title to it through a sale between
her and the mortgagee-bank.
The continued occupation of the property by petitioner was merely tolerated by respondent. Consequently, the former
was bound by an implied promise that she would vacate the premises upon demand. Her failure to do so justified
respondent's action for ejectment filed in the MTC.
Under these circumstances, the trial court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and committed no reversible
error in taking cognizance of the case. Verily, its actuations were sanctioned by the Rules and supported by
jurisprudence.
In an effort to clothe this Petition with merit, petitioner further assails the validity of the Complaint on the basis of the
RTC's finding that it was not clear when she actually received the demand letter. She insists that there is no factual
or evidentiary basis to establish her receipt of the demand to vacate the premises.
This contention must fail. It is only in this late stage that petitioner is raising this point. It was not raised before the
MTC or the RTC. Hence, fair play, justice and due process dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time on
appeal, pass upon this question. Matters not taken up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. They must
be raised seasonably in the proceedings before the lower courts. Questions raised on appeal must be within the
issues framed by the parties; consequently, issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal
NOTES:
20. Dumo vs. Espinas (G.R. No. 141962. January 25, 2006) - Artillero
PETITIONER: DANILO DUMO and SUPREMA DUMO RESPONDENT: ERLINDA ESPINAS,et. Al.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Page 32 of 74
There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in
ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
FACTS:
The present case arose from a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or
preliminary injunction filed by Sps. Dumo against respondents.
Spouses Dumo are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy beach resort in Bauang, La Union.
Defendant Espina filed for the quieting of title and/or ownership and possession against plaintiffs, They obtained a
favourable judgment but the Sheriff was not able to enforce the same.
Disgruntled with the refusal of the sheriff to put them in possession over the questioned real property, and in open
defiance with the official action taken by the sheriff, all defendants acting for the interest of Espinas took it upon
themselves, employing force, intimidation, and threat, to enter the property.
Despite protests made by Spouses Dumo, who were there then present and visibly outnumbered by defendants and
their agents who were armed with sticks, bolos, hammers, and other deadly weapons, successfully drove out
plaintiffs, and took over the premises.
It was alleged that the defendants were boasting aloud that they were under instructions by the "judge" to do just
that – to forcibly enter and take over the premises. While inside the premises, they demolished and totally tore down
all the improvements.
Spouses Dumo prayed for the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages. The MTC rendered judgment
holding that petitioners were able to prove their right of possession over the subject property. Respondents appealed
the case to the RTC of Bauang, La Union. The RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MTC. It also ruled
that as regards damages, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property.
Spouses Dumo filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA held that the MTC correctly found that the petitioners
were in possession of the subject land and agreed with the ruling of the RTC that in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the property concerned.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA erred in holding that the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value for use
of the property.
RULING:
The CA is correct. There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral and exemplary damages in view of the
settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession;
hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he
may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
Although the MTC’s order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their alleged lost earnings over beach resort could
have been considered as compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of the property while it was in the
possession of the respondents, records do not show any evidence to sustain the same.
21. Corporation vs. Treyes (G.R. No. 170916. April 27, 2007) -Artillero
Page 33 of 74
PETITIONER: CGR CORPORATION herein RESPONDENT: ERNESTO TREYES

represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III,
HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R.
BENEDICTO
LAW & PRINCIPLES: The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and
attorney's fees and costs
FACTS:
CGR Corporation, owned by Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto, leased several hectares of public land,
mostly consisting of fishponds, in Negros Occidental.
Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr., with his men, forcibly entered the leased properties and barricaded the entrance to the
fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to CRG Corporation‘s fishponds, and harvested several
tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings.
CGR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry with Temporary
Restraining Order with Preliminary Injunction and Damages and reserved a separate civil action. The MTC found
Treyes and his men guilty of forcible entry. CGR filed a separate complaint alleging therein that he suffered damages
for the actions of Treyes during and after the forcible entry. A claim for additional damages which arose from incidents
occurring after the dispossession by Treyes of the premises was thereafter prayed for.
The MTC awarded the claims of CGR.
ISSUES:
Whether additional damages can be awarded resulting from events that took place after Treyes left the
property
RULING:
YES. The Court held that the ―renta‖ or the ―reasonable compensation for the use of the premises or the fair rental
value of the property and attorney‘s fees may be recovered through a separate action while the forcible entry case
is pending. The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases refer to ―rental or ―the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises‖ or ―fair rental value of the property‖ and attorney‘s fees
and costs. There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule
that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property
22. Wilmon Auto Supply Corp vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 97637. April 10, 1992) - Artillero
PETITIONER: WILMON AUTO SUPPLY RESPONDENT:

CORPORATION, ILOILO MULTI PARTS SUPPLY CA, STAR GROUP RESOURCES AND DEV’T INC.
CORP., VIRGILIO ANG, SOUTHERN SALES CORP.,
and CHANG LIANG, JR.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND ILLEGAL DETAINER; EJECTMENT SUITS NOT ABATED BY ACTIONS FILED IN
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; RATIONALE. — The question of whether or not the lessor's unlawful detainer suits in
the Municipal Trial Court against the lessees should be abated by the actions filed in the Regional Trial Court by the
latter based on the contention that they are entitled to a right of preemption or prior purchase of the leased premises
has been resolved by this Court in numerous cases and one to which a negative answer has invariably been given.
The underlying reasons for the above rulings were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical
or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to
delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set
up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. Thus, as regards the seemingly contrary ruling in Vda.
Page 34 of 74
de Legaspi v. Avendaño, 79 SCRA 135 (1977), this court observed, in Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167, 172-173
(1983), that "the exception to the rule in this case of Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity not found
in the present petition. The right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment case as to
warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule. In the Vda. de Legaspi case,
execution of the decision in the ejectment case would also have meant demolition of the premises, a factor not
present in this petition."
FACTS:
Wilmon Auto Supply (or Ramon Que), Iloilo, Multi Parts Supply (or Ramon Que), VirgilioAng, Henry Tan, Southern
Sales Corporation, and Chang Liang, Jr. were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas standing on registered
land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Læsin, Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin
and Ester L. Jarantilla. After the expiration of the period in the lease agreement, lessor executed an Absolute Deed
of Sale in favor of Star Group Resources and Development. In the Deed of Sale, it was stated that vendee shall
henceforth deal with the lessees and occupants of the properties herein sold without any further warranty or
obligation on the part of the Vendors. Being the vendee, Star Group then filed an action of unlawful detainer against
Wilmon Auto Supply.
Petitioner refused to concede invoking that the lessors violated their leasehold rights because they were not
accorded with: 1) rights of pre-emption; 2) buyer is not required to honor leases; 3) the lessees were denied
the option to renew their leases upon the expiration thereof. These same propositions were also raised in
the case it filed with the RTC.
In the unlawful detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should proceed against some of the lessees
but not with the others. The lessees filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. They filed a petition for
certiorari and the RTC held in the end that the pendency of the case in the RTC did not warrant suspension of the
unlawful detainer case with the MTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the unlawful detainer suits in MTC against petitioner, lessees, for the reason that their lease
had expired, should be abated by the action filed in RTC by lessees based on the contention that they are
entitled to a right of pre-emption/prior purchase of the leased premises.
RULING:
No, an ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC based on a tenant's claim of his right of
pre-emption being violated.
The Court gave relevant precedents such as:

● injunction suits do not abate ejectment
● accion publiciana does not suspend an ejectment suit
● Writ of possession does not bar execution of judgment action for quieting title does not bar an ejectment
suit.
The reason for the above rulings of the precedence were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did
not involve physical or de facto possession, and on not a few occasions, that the case in the RTC was
merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding or that the issues presented in the former
could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. SC said that the
cases cited by the petitioners were exceptions such as in Vda. De Legazpi v. Avendano case, it was based
on strong reasons of equity not found in the present petition. In Vda. De Murga v. Chan, the essential
requisite of an unequivocal demand to vacate and surrender the premises had not been fulfilled. SC
stressed that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of Inssession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the MTC, MeTC and MCTC have the competence to resolve 'the issue of ownership... .only to determine
the issue of possess on."
Hence, Petition was dismissed
Page 35 of 74
23. De Luna vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 94490. August 6, 1992) - Artillero
PETITIONER: JOSE DE LUNA RESPONDENT: CA, JUAN DIMAANO, JR., GERINO

DOBLE
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
JURISDICTION OVER EJECTMENT CASES; LIMITED TO THE ISSUE OF PHYSICAL OR MATERIAL

POSSESSION OF THE PREMISE; EXCEPTION. — Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only
issue to be resolved therein is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, or possession
de facto, independent of any claim of ownership that either party may set forth in their pleadings. If the petitioner can
prove prior possession in himself, he may recover such possession from even the owner himself. Whatever may be
the character of his prior possession, if he has in is favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him to stay
on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion
reindivicatoria. However, where the question of possession can not be resolved without deciding the question of
ownership, an inferior court has the power to resolve the question of ownership but only insofar as to determine the
issue of possession.
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel land in Zambales.
Private respondents Juan Dimaano, Jr. and Gerino Doble entered the land and began plowing it; and that said
defendants fenced the land with barbed wire and began planting sugar cane despite the petitioner's objections.
Petitioner prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the land and pay him the amount of P45.00 monthly per
hectare until possession thereof would be transferred to him, with litigation expenses and costs.
For his part, defendant Dimaano, Jr. raised as his special and affirmative defense that petitioner was not the owner
of the property. He contended that the property was originally owned by Agustin Dequiña, Sr., who had declared the
property in his name for taxation purposes in 1906.
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. Aggrieved, defendants appealed to RTC and reversed the
decision.
Hence, this case.
ISSUES: Whether the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court erred in determining the ownership of the
disputed property in an action for ejectment, and in concluding that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. is the owner of the property.
RULING: Petition is meritorious.
Well-established is the rule in ejectment cases that the only issue to be resolved therein is who is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the premises, or possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership that
either party may set forth in their pleadings. If petitioner can prove prior possession in himself, he may recover such
possession from even the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his
favor priority time, he has the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reindivicatoria.
However, where the question of possession can not be resolved without deciding the question of ownership, an
inferior court has the power to resolve the question of ownership but only insofar as to determine the issue of
possession.
In the case at bar, the inferior court acted correctly in receiving evidence regarding the ownership of the disputed
property, inasmuch as respondent Dimaano, Jr. claimed to possess the property by virtue of a lease agreement with
the alleged owner thereof, Agustin Dequiña, Jr.
Page 36 of 74
Be that as it may, the respondent Court erred in upholding the Regional Trial Court regarding the conclusion that the
subject property is owned by Agustin Dequiña, Jr. and therefore respondent Dimaano, Jr. is entitled to possess the
same.
NOTES: The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. was the owner of the disputed property since
there is no evidence whatsoever to support such a conclusion.However, it goes without saying that this case does
not bar petitioner and Agustin Dequiña, Jr. from resolving the issue of ownership over the disputed property in an
appropriate proceeding.
24. Semira vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 76031. March 2, 1994) Artillero
PETITIONER: MIGUEL SEMIRA, RESPONDENT: COURT OF APPEALS and

BUENAVENTURA AN
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

The issue of possession cannot be decided independently of the question of ownership.
FACTS:
Juana Gutierrez sold a parcel of land called Lot 4221, with an estimated area of 822.5, to respondent Buenaventura
An for P850 by a “Kasulatan ng bilihan ng Lupa” on January 4 1961. Subsequently respondent Buenaventura An
acquired Lot 4215 with an ear of 8 606 sqm. Located east of Lot 4221. He acquired another lot 11,000 sqm.
Respondent then sold Lot 4221 to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez.
On 12 March 1979, Cipriano Ramirez sold the lot to petitioner Miguel Semira for P20,000.00. However, the area
stated in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" 4 was 2,200 square meters and not 822.5 appearing in the previous
document. As delimited by its boundaries, the lot is actually much bigger than 822.5 square meters. This was
confirmed by the Taysan Cadastral Mapping Survey conducted in 1974 where it is definitely stated that the area of
Lot 4221 is 2,200 square meters; hence, the reason for the change.
On 17 March 1979, Miguel Semira entered the very same premises previously occupied by Ramirez and began the
construction of a new rice-mill. However, on 18 April 1979, a complaint for forcible entry was filed against him by
private respondent in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo. 5 The latter claimed that the area of Lot 4221
was 822.5 square meters only and that the excess of 1,377 square meters forcibly occupied by petitioner formed
part of Lot 4215 which he acquired from the Hornillas in 1964.
Petitioner admits having entered the disputed portion on 17 March 1979, but denies having illegally done so. In his
answer, petitioner claims ownership over the property by invoking the 1979 deed of sale in his favor by Cipriano
Ramirez.
ISSUES: Whether the issue of ownership is indispensable to decide the issue of forcible entry?
RULING: SC ruled in favor of the petitioner.

The issue of possession cannot be decided independently of the question of ownership.
We sustain petitioner as did the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. We have repeatedly ruled that where land is sold for a
lump sum and not so much per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine
the effects and scope of the sale, not the area thereof. 15 Hence, the vendors are obligated to deliver all the land
included within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in
the deed. This is particularly true where the area is described as "humigit kumulang," that is, more or less.
Page 37 of 74
These conclusions are drawn from Art. 1542 of the Civil code which states —In the sale of real estate, made for a
lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease
of the price, although there be a greater or less area or number than that stated in the contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for a single price; but if, besides mentioning
the boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or number should be designated
in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds
the area or number specified in the contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the
price, in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee
does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated.
NOTES:
Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to sustain petitioner over private respondent when the latter failed even
to prove prior possession in his favor. Absent such element, it cannot be said that he was forcibly deprived of the
disputed portion. Hence, his action for forcible entry must fail.
It should be emphasized, however, that the case before us is merely an action of forcible entry and that the issue of
ownership was decided for the sole purpose of resolving priority of possession. Hence, any pronouncement made
affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice
an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
25. Reynante vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 95907. April 8, 1992) -Artillero
PETITIONER: JOSE REYNANTE RESPONDENT: CA, CARLOS, et. al
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

PRIOR POSSESSION WHATEVER ITS CHARACTER ENTITLES POSSESSOR TO REMAIN ON THE
PROPERTY UNTIL LAWFULLY EJECTED. — An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual
title of the property is never determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria
ACCRETION; REQUISITES. — Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1)
that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (c)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river
FACTS:
More than 50 years ago, Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos over a fishpond in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Reynante subsequently built a nipa hut where he and his family lived and took care of the
nipa palms which they planted on lots 1 and 2, which was located between the fishpond and Liputan River.
Reynante’s family sold the nipa palms, and appropriated the fruits as his own, without interference or complaint from
Don Carlos.
Upon Don Carlos’ death, his heirs convinced Reynante to sign an affidavit, relinquishing his rights as a caretaker of
the fishpond. Reynante, however, continued to live in the nipa hut he had built, and he still took care of the nipa
palms, which he continued to sell.
This led the heirs to file a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary injunction against Reynante in the MTC. The
MTC found for Reynante, but the heirs appealed to the RTC, where the decision was reversed. The CA merely
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Page 38 of 74
ISSUES:
1, Who has prior physical possession of the property?
2. Whether accretion automatically becomes registered land just because the adjoining lot is registered in the
Torrens System?
RULING:
1. Petitioner proved prior possession for more than 50 years. What was surrendered was the fishpond and
his rights thereon, not the “sasahan” where he built his hut.
2. While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining such accretion, it does not
automatically bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land have not registered this with the proper
entity, said land will be subject to acquisition by prescription, which was what occurred in this case. Since
the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in possession of these lands for more than 50 years, the SC
rightly held that the land belongs to him. Failure of the respondents to register said accretion for more
than 50 years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
26. SPOUSES BANES vs. LUTHERAN CHURCH PHILIPPINES [G. R. No. 142308. Nov. 15, 2005]
PETITIONER: SPS. REV. ELMER J. BAÑES & RESPONDENT: LUTHERAN CHURCH IN THE
ANGELA BAÑES, SPS. REV. MANUEL DEL ROSARIO PHILIPPINES, OSCAR ALMAZAN, JAMES
& GUIA DEL ROSARIO, and SPS. PEDRO SAN CERDENOLA, LUIS AO-AS,
RAMON & NENITA SAN RAMON EDWINO MERCADO, ANTONIO REYES and THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. The owner who has title over the property
cannot take the law into his own hands to regain possession of said property. He must go to court.
FACTS:
● In 1990 certain members of the Lutheran Church in the Philippines (LCP) filed an action against its
President and six other members of the Board of Directors, before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), for accounting and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and appointment of
a management committee. This resulted in the division of the LCP into two factions, namely: the
Batong/Saguilayan group which includes herein petitioners and the Ladlad/Almazan group which includes
herein respondents Almazan.
● The SEC issued a writ of preliminary injunction. In August 1993, by virtue of said injunction, herein
respondents, with the aid of certain members of the DILG, PNP and Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)-Manila, tried to dispossess petitioners.
● Thus, respondents padlocked the main gate of the subject property, preventing the petitioners and their
families from going in and out of said place. Security guards were also stationed at the premises with an
instruction not to allow petitioners entry and exit.
● A month after this happened, petitioners Spouses Rosario and Spouses Banes wrote letters to Rev. Ladlad
asking for extension to stay in the residence. Eventually, petitioners Rosario and Banes left the premises.
On the part of Spouses San Ramon, they did not write any letter but were able to leave the premises by
befriending the guards posted at the gate
● On December 3, 1993, petitioners fled an action for forcible entry with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order and preliminary mandatory injunction against the respondents herein.
● METC BRANCH 7---granted the petitioners prayer for injunctive relief.
● Respondents in response filed a motion to suspend resolution of the prayer for issuance of preliminary
mandatory injunction and for inhibition.
● The judge inhibited herself from further hearing the case, and the same was re-raffled to Branch 18.
● Respondents then went to RTC by way of prohibition with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining
order and preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-69789, questioning the
correctness of the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the petitioners,
● RTC BRANCH 42---issued granted the prayer of herein respondents, stating that inasmuch as the case
emanated from a case before the SEC, respondents are entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for.
● Petitioners elevated said Order to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34504 via a petition for certiorari
Page 39 of 74
● CA----rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the injunction issued by the RTC
● The case was thereafter remanded to the METC, Branch 18.
● METC BRANCH 18----ruled that there was no force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, the Judge
gave weight to: the letter of petitioner Rev. Elmer Bañes to the LCP President asking that they be allowed
to live in the LCP's Caloocan property and signifying that they (Spouses Bañes) will leave the "yellow house"
once they find another place to live in.
● Petitioners appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-79078.
● RTC-------reversed and set aside the MeTC decision.
● Ordering the defendants and those who derived possession from them to vacate, surrender and restore
possession of the questioned premises to the plaintiffs;
● Ordering defendants to jointly and solidarily pay each of the plaintiffs' spouses the sum of P5,000.00 a
month, starting from October 15,1993 until defendants vacate and surrender the questioned premises to
the plaintiffs, as and for reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises.
● Respondents thereafter went to the CA on a petition for review, docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 4433.
● CA----reversed RTC decision for it found that while herein respondents (petitioners in the CA) committed
acts contrary to what is sanctioned by the laws, still, herein petitioners (respondents in the CA) are not
entitled to favorable judgment in their forcible entry case as evidence show that they were willing to vacate
the premises.
ISSUE/S: w/n petitioners were removed from the premises by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth
RULING: There was a forcible entry in this case (petitioners were removed from the premises by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth).
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the
basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.
In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire
jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must also allege
that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important
is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property.
Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the
owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to
prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to institute a state
of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion
of force over the property which is all that is necessary and sufficient to show that the action is based on the
provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, it is true that petitioners Bañes and Del Rosario wrote LCP expressing their willingness to voluntarily
vacate the premises upon finding another place to live in, but this is after respondents had padlocked the
premises and used armed men to prevent their coming to and from the premises. Otherwise stated, said letters
do not negate the initial use of force by respondents which constituted forcible entry. It is undisputed that respondents
owned the property occupied by petitioners, still their use of force in evicting petitioners therefrom was not justified.
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. The owner who has title over the property cannot take the law into
his own hands to regain possession of said property. He must go to court.
Likewise, the claim that petitioners-spouses San Ramon had no valid lease contract with respondent LCP is not a
proper defense in the forcible entry case filed by herein petitioners inasmuch as petitioners-spouses San Ramon,
just like petitioners spouses Del Rosario, ought not to have been forcibly driven out of the premises without due
process of law which is the Bling of the proper unlawful detainer case against them in the proper court by respondent
Page 40 of 74
LCP instead of it making use of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the SEC in forcing them to leave the
premises.
Respondents cannot justify their forcible entry in the premises occupied by petitioners by claiming that the latter
have no valid right to the continued possession of the property. Respondents should have filed the appropriate
unlawful detainer case against them instead of forcing them out of the premises.
However, while we find that there was forcible entry in this case, we cannot grant the prayer of petitioners-spouses
Bañes that they be restored to the subject premises. It is on record that the spouses Bañes are now staying in
another property owned by the LCP in Caloocan City without paying rent. It can be said, therefore, that they have
lost their cause of action to ask for restitution having transferred, as they have requested, to another property of LCP
without paying any rentals.
The situation is different insofar as petitioners spouses Del Rosario and spouses San Ramon are concerned.
Evidence does not disclose that they asked for or were given by LCP another place to stay in. Thus, We affirm the
RTC in Civil Case No. 96- 79078 ordering the respondents and those who derived possession from them to vacate,
surrender and restore possession of the questioned premises to petitioners Del Rosario and San Ramon.
NOTES:
Sec. 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 17. Judgment. — If, after trial, the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. If it finds that said
allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is
established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice
requires.
27. FLORENCIO BALATERO and HEIRS OF JOSEFA BADELLES vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and JUAN VELOSO [G. R. No. 73889. September 30, 1987]
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

The "constructive possession" over the parcel of land mentioned by the will not ripen into ownership. The rule is that
only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring dominion. (Article
447, old Civil Code, Article 540, new Civil Code)
FACTS:
● The Director of Lands initiated the court proceedings to settle and adjudicate 1419 lots to rightful claimants
inside the tract of land in Iligan City designated as the Iligan Cadastral 292
● The claimants for Lot No. 433 with an area of 216 square meters and Lot No. 817 with an area of 34 square
meters were:
● Petitioner Florencio Balatero, for a portion of both lots by purchase from Josefa I. de Badelles and Leona,
Salvacion, Jose, Catalina and Dominga, all surnamed Badelles;
● Josefa Iglupas Badelles, for Lot No. 433 having inherited the same from her parents. Josefa died during
the pendency of the case and was substituted by her heirs, petitioners herein;
● Private respondent Juan A. Veloso, for Lot No. 433, having purchased the same from Josefa Iglupas; and
● Anacleto Iglupas for Lot No. 433, having inherited the same from his deceased parents Alejo Iglupas and
Tomasa Ronda.
● The subject parcel of land (Lot 433 Iligan Cadastre) was originally owned by the parents of Josefa Iglupas
● After the death of Josefa's parents, Lot 433 was given to Alejo Iglupas who is married to Tomasa Ronda
● Alejo died, now Tomasa Ronda sold the said lot to Josefa Iglupas for P111.00 as evidenced by an 'Escritura
de Compra Ventra' (Exh. "E").
● In a June 23, 1930 document denominated as "Pacto de Retro Sale" (Exh. "B") this Lot 433 was allegedly
sold by Josefa Iglupas to private respondent Juan Veloso for the amount of P68.00.
● Veloso had never any actual possession or control over the property or any portion thereof which could
open into a registrable title."On the other hand, the Heirs of Josefa Iglupas and Florencio Balatero, the latter
Page 41 of 74
through the late Josefa Iglupas have always been in possession of the property under claim of ownership
since 1918."
● TRIAL COURT----- rendered judgment adjudicating Lot No. 433-A containing an area of 98 square meters
to claimant Florencio Balatero and Lot No. 433-B containing an area of 118 square meters to the Heirs of
Josefa Iglupas Vda. de Badelles. But "Lot No. 817 containing an area of 34 square meters is hereby
declared as property of the State, the same having been provided for the widening of a national road.
● IAC------rendered judgment adjudicating the whole of Cadastral Lot No. 433 (Lot Nos. 433-A and 433-
B) to claimant Juan Veloso,
● Petitioners Florencio Balatero and the Heirs of Josefa Badelles filed a motion for reconsideration on the
decision but the motion was denied by the appellate court.
● Hence, this petition over the ownership of Lot No. 433.
ISSUES: Whether or not this contract was really a contract of sale or was an equitable mortgage
RULING: The contract was an equitable mortgage. Juan Voloso’s constructive possession over the parcel of land
did not ripen to ownership.
On its face, the contract would show that the disputed parcel of land was transferred to private respondent Juan
Veloso by way of sale with pacto de retro. However, there are circumstances present in the instant case which clearly
indicate that the contract should be treated as an equitable mortgage.
First, the 216 square meters parcel of land remained undisturbed in the possession of the vendor Josefa
Iglupas even after the execution of the contract. Had Josefa Iglupas really executed a contract of sale in favor of
Juan Veloso, this small parcel of land should have been delivered to the latter and he would have taken immediate
possession after the execution of the contract of sale.
Second, the price or consideration in 1930 of P68.00 is unusually inadequate. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that the same parcel of land was bought by Josefa Iglupas in 1918 for the price of P111.00. If the contract
was indeed one of sale, why should the vendor, Josefa Iglupas sell the parcel of land for a price almost half of what
she paid for it twelve years earlier. It is common knowledge that the value of real property appreciates through the
years and not otherwise. This fact also shows that the contract was an equitable mortgage rather than a contract of
sale.
Therefore, the fact that four (4) years after the execution of the contract, private respondent Juan Veloso executed
an affidavit (Exh. "D") to consolidate his right of ownership over the subject parcel of land is of no consequence.
The "constructive possession" over the parcel of land mentioned by the appellate court did not ripen into ownership.
The rule is that only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring
dominion. (Article 447, old Civil Code, Article 540, new Civil Code) As can be gleaned from the facts earlier stated,
Juan Veloso never owned the subject parcel of land because the contract over the same between Josefa Iglupas
and Juan Veloso was actually an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale.
NOTES:
Article 1602 of the present Civil Code states:
"The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:
"(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
"(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
"(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending
the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
"(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
"(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
"(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation.
Page 42 of 74
28. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. HEIRS OF ISABEL TESALONA and the HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT. [G.R. No. 66130. September 8, 1994.]
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS:
● The subject property is about 7.4343 hectares land, alleged to have been originally acquired by Maria
Rosita Lorenzo under a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896 under the Royal Decree
● Maria Rosita begot two (2) sons, Laureano and Cipriano. Cipriano died a bachelor and without any issue.
● Upon the death of the spouses, Laureano inherited the land.
● Laureano Lizada married Baldomera Roces and the couple had two (2) children, Andres and Magdalena.
● Andres died a bachelor and without any issue, so upon the death of Laureano, Magdalena inherited the
land.
● Magdalena married Nerio Tesalona and they had three (3) daughters, Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia,
applicants herein.
● Isabel, Consuelo and Serapia Tesalona filed an application for registration of five (5) parcels of land
denominated as Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of plan Psu215382 with the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
● The Director of Lands through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed his opposition to the
application alleging that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title of the
land applied for nor had they been in possession thereof for a period of at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application and that the same is public land.
● The applicants filed a reply to the government's opposition claiming that the land in question is private
property covered by a possessory information title dated May 20, 1896.
● Constancio dela Pena Tan likewise filed an opposition even as he supported the government's contention
that the lands applied for are part of the public domain. Tan averred that he had possessed the land as
lessee for a period of more than thirty five (35) years.
● Pending the resolution of whether or not the opposition of Constancio dela Pena Tan should be admitted,
the lower court learned that the special counsel who had withdrawn the government's opposition was not
authorized to do so. Acting accordingly, the court reinstated the opposition of the Director of Lands and
directed that the opposition of the private oppositor be considered as evidence in support of the claim of
the government that the land applied for is part of the public domain.
● TRIAL COURT--- rendered judgment adjudicating Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in favor of the applicants and
declaring Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as owned by the government subject to the rights of the lessee, Constancio dela
Pena Tan, pending the approval of his sales application.
● Not satisfied with the trial court's ruling, herein applicants interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
seeking confirmation of title over Lot Nos. 1 and 2.
● INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT---AFFIRMED but modified declaring the confirmation of the title of
applicants-appellants over Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan PSU-215382, and ordering the registration of said
Lots in their names, along with Lots 3, 4 and 5.
ISSUE/S: w/n IAC acted contrary to law in confirming the private respondents’ alleged title to Lot Nos. 1 and 2
RULING: YES. This Court denies the application for registration of Lot Nos. 1 and 2 without prejudice to the right of
the government to pursue whatever means appropriate with respect to Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5.
Well-entrenched is the rule that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens System, nullifies
the title.
Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classified as swampy areas and were as early as 1955, filled with mangrove trees. This belies
the contention of herein private respondents that said lots were planted to coconuts in 1909 and, thereafter, to palay
Page 43 of 74
and other seasonal crops. Being a swampy area covered by mangrove trees and the like, these lots may very well
be considered and classified as forest lands.
NOTES:
In the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, we declared that:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. (Emphasis ours)
29. RESURRECCION BARTOLOME vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (now Court of
Appeals) and HEIRS OF SPOUSES BERNABE BARTOLOME and URSULA CID. [G.R. No. 76792.
March 12, 1990.]
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Tax declaration is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.
FACTS:
● A 725-square meter portion of said Lot No. 11165 located in Barrio, Laoag, Ilocos Norte, was first declared
as his property by Epitacio Batara under tax declaration No. 5708 dated May 23, 1906.
● The property was described therein as bounded on the north by the property of Pedro Manuel, on the east
by the road, on the south by the property of Doroteo Bartolome and on the west by the property of one
named Esteban.
● Epitacio Batara and his wife, Maria Gonzales, had two children: Catalina and Pedro. The latter died a
bachelor and without issue. Catalina, who married someone surnamed Bartolome, bore five children named
Isabela, Tarcila, Calixto, Resurreccion and Ruperta.
● Epitacio died. Maria Gonzales stayed in the premises for a while, thereafter went to Isabela and entrusted
the land to DOROTEO BARTOLOME. After sometime Maria Gozales, and later on Doroteo Bartolome died.
● Now, the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the land involved herein (Cadastral Case
No. 53).
● Ursula Cid, the widow of Bernabe, the son of Doroteo Bartolome, who died in 1928, filed an answer in
Cadastral Case No. 53, claiming ownership over Lot No. 11165. More than three months after,
Resurreccion Bartolome also filed an answer in the same cadastral case claiming ownership over a portion
of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 864 square meters.
● From then on, no further proceedings were held in the cadastral case. Meanwhile, in 1934, Resurreccion
Bartolome verbally entrusted the portion she had claimed to Maria Bartolome, whom she later described
as the daughter of Doroteo Bartolome.
● In June, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sent out notices for the "continuation of the hearing"
on June 13, 1968 in Cadastral Case No. 53.
● MARIA BARTOLOME: she filed an answer claiming coownership over Lot No. 11165 with Clemente, Julia
and Rosario Bartolome and Ursula Cid, the widow of Bernabe. She likewise alleged therein that she and
her siblings inherited the 1660-square meter lot from Doroteo Bartolome.
● URSULA CID: stated that she was the absolute owner of Lot No. 11165. Furthermore, she had been the
possessor of Lot No. 11165 for over fifty years. Additionally, she "acquired by inheritance from Bernabe
Bartolome, who together with her, purchased the . . . lot which used to be three adjoining lots from their
respective owners;" and that Lot No. 11165 had been declared for tax purposes in the name of her late
husband Bernabe Bartolome.
● RTC---- It found that the lots described in Exhibits 2 and 3 presented by Ursula Cid "are not within Lot
11165" and that said exhibits "are defective as the vendors are not the real owner(s)" of the lots described
Page 44 of 74
therein. As to Exhibit 4, the court ruled that it has "no probative value as the same is incomplete and
unsigned."
● IAC---In reversing the lower court’s decision, held that the deeds of sale presented by Ursula Cid are
ancient documents under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It also ruled that Ursula Cid's
continuous possession of the lot from its acquisition and her exercise of rights of ownership over it vested
her with the legal presumption that she possessed it under a just title.
● Having her motion for reconsideration denied, Resurreccion Bartolome filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
a] whether the provisions of Rule 132 on ancient documents are applicable with respect to Exhibit 4; and
[b] whether acquisitive prescription runs during the pendency of a cadastral case
RULING:
1. Exhibit 4 did not meet the requirement of Rule 132, Sec. 22.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary. — Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced
from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances
of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given."
We agree with the appellate court that the first two requirements ordained by Section 22 are met by Exhibit 4. It
appears that it was executed in 1917, Exhibit 4 was more than thirty years old when it was offered in evidence in
1983. It was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally
keep it. We notice, however, that the Court of Appeals failed to consider and discuss the third requirement; that no
alterations or circumstances of suspicion are present.
Admittedly, on its face, the deed of sale appears unmarred by alteration. We hold, however, that the missing page
has nonetheless affected its authenticity. Indeed, its importance cannot be overemphasized. It allegedly bears the
signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in question and therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary
transmission of rights over the subject of the sale. Without that signature, the document is incomplete. Verily, an
incomplete document is akin to if not worse than a document with altered contents.
Finally, the signature of Maria Gonzales on the missing fourth page of Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the
document if it is proven to be genuine. But as there can be no such proof arising from the signature of Maria Gonzales
in the deed of sale, the same must be excluded.
2. No. The institution of cadastral proceedings, or at least the publication of the notice therein issued, has
the effect of suspending the running of the prescriptive period.
Neither can Ursula Cid successfully assert that prior to the institution of the cadastral proceedings, she and her
husband had gained acquisitive prescription over the property.
Until Doroteo Bartolome migrated to Davao City in 1926, he was in possession of the whole lot including the portion
entrusted to him by Epitacio Batara. Granting that the 1520- square meter lot Bernabe Bartolome had declared as
his own in 1925 39 is within Lot No. 11165, still, the period from 1925 until the filing of the cadastral case in 1933
failed to give him an advantage.
It is short of the 10-year actual, adverse and uninterrupted period of possession mandated by Section 41 of the Code
of Civil Procedure in order that a full and complete title could be vested in the person claiming to be the owner of a
piece of land.
Furthermore, while it is true that the property had been declared for tax purposes by Bernabe Bartolome and that,
subsequent to his death, taxes thereon were paid in the name of his son, Dominador, ownership thereof had not
been acquired by Ursula Cid or her heirs. Aside from the fact that said declarations and payments were made during
the pendency of the cadastral case, a tax declaration in the name of the alleged property owner or of his predecessor-
in-interest, does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. In the same manner, neither
does the payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid for.
NOTES:
Page 45 of 74
30. FRANCISCO M. ALONSO, substituted by his heirs vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. [G.R. No. 130876.
January 31, 2002.]
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Although tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind will be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Francisco Alonso, who died pendente lite and substituted by his legal heirs, was the only son
and sole heir of the late Tomas Alonso and Asuncion Medalle.
● Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records showing that his father acquired Lot No.
727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government of the Philippine Islands in or about the year
1911 in accordance with the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120).
● The documents showed that the original vendee of the subject lot assigned his sales certificate to
petitioner's father, who completed the required installment payments thereon under Act No. 1120 and was
consequently issued a patent
● The Director of Lands executed a final deed of sale in favor of the petitioner's father. However, the deed
was not registered with the Register of Deeds because of lack of technical requirements as required by
law.
● Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out that the title of Lot No. 727 had been
administratively reconstituted from the owner's duplicate under a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of
United Service Country Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. Upon order of the court, the
name of the registered owner in the said TCT was changed to Cebu Country Club, Inc.
● Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint for declaration of nullity and non-existence of
deed/title, cancellation of certificates of title and recovery of property against defendant Cebu Country Club,
Inc
● Trial court decided in favor of Cebu Country Club, declaring that the contested property or Lot 727 as legally
belonging to the defendant.
● On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES: whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Cebu Country Club, Inc. is owner of Lot No. 727
RULING: YES. Neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the latter's heirs are the lawful owners
of Lot No. 727 in dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a clear title
over the contested estate.
The most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in the name of Tomas N.
Alonso. The sales patent, however, and even the corresponding deed of sale were not registered with the Register
of Deeds and no title was ever issued in the name of the latter. This is because there were basic requirements not
complied with, the most important of which was that the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void.
Moreover, Cebu Country Club, Inc. was in possession of the land since 1931, and had been paying the real estate
taxes thereon based on tax declarations in its name with the title number indicated thereon. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are strong evidence of ownership. This Court has ruled that although
tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia
of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind will be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession.
This Court declared that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title
Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines.
NOTES:
Page 46 of 74
31. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O. PLAZA.
[G.R. No. 108926. July 12, 1996.]
PETITIONER: aside from mere tax declarations, private RESPONDENT:

respondent has not established actual possession of the
property in question in the manner required by law
(Section 14, P.D. 1529) and settled jurisprudence on the
matter
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
FACTS:
● This petition is filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging that: "the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the RTC granting private respondent's application for registration, is not supported
by and is contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence.
● The subject property situated at Liwanag, Talon (formerly Pamplona), Las Piñas, Rizal, now Metro Manila,
having an area of 45,295 sq. m., was first owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared the same in his name
under Tax Declarations.
● Subsequently, the subject property was successively bought or acquired by Pedro Cristobal, Regino
Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra, evidenced by respective Tax Declarations.
● After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned the subject property and declared it in their
names under Tax Declaration Nos. 5595 and 5596 for the year 1960.
● "On 14 November 1986, petitioner-appellee filed a petition, which was amended on 17 July 1987, for the
registration and confirmation of his title over the subject property.
● Aside from the Republic, there were others who opposed the petition and filed their opposition thereto.
● On 13 March 1990, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, West Sector (CENRO-
WEST) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources requested the lower court to furnish it
photocopies of the records of the petition as the property in question was the subject of a request for a
Presidential Proclamation reserving the land in question for Slum Improvement and Resettlement Site (SIR)
of the National Housing Authority.
● On 22 June 1990, upon order of the lower court, an ocular inspection was conducted on the subject property
by the court-appointed commissioner who submitted his report on 2 July 1990.
● "On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President of the Republic of the Philippines
withdrawing the subject property from sale or settlement and reserve (the same) for slum improvement
and sites and services program.
● On 31 May 1991 petitioner-appellee filed his memorandum. The oppositors did not. Nevertheless, among
them, only the Republic and the Heirs of Santos de la Cruz formally offered their evidence."
● On 14 June 1991 the lower court (RTC) rendered the judgment referred to earlier.
● On appeal, CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUES: w/n CA decision affirming the decision of the RTC granting private respondents application for registration
is contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence
RULING:
NO. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
In this case, the evidence on record reveals that: (1) the predecessors-in-interest of petitioner-appellee have been
declaring the property in question in their names in the years 1923, 1927, 1934 and 1960; and, (2) in 1966, petitioner-
appellee purchased the same from the Heirs of Gil Alhambra and since then paid the taxes due thereon and declared
the property in his name in 1985.
Page 47 of 74
As properly stated by the public respondent,

". . . Their alleged possession is not based on any right. Neither do they claim to have any title or interest over the
subject property. As a matter of fact, they did not bother to oppose the petition. The most that can be said of their
alleged possession is that it was only with the tolerance of rightful owners of the property — plaintiff-appellee and
his predecessors-in-interest, hence, is no bar to the granting of the petition. We do not see why we should accept
the bare assertions of the alleged occupants at their face value as against the claim of ownership of plaintiff-appellee
backed up by legal documents, tax declarations, and tax receipts."
Thus, reason and law find respondent entitled to rights of ownership over the disputed property.
NOTES:
32. Cequena v. Bolante, GR NO. 137944 , (RUBENECIA)
PETITIONER: FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA and RESPONDENT: HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE

RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie
proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public
and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. That is,
one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto by the means established
by law. Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership
in this case should be established in one of the ways provided by law.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years.
Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property,
can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.
FACTS:
● Prior to 1954, the land having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 26-0027
situated in Binangonan, Rizal was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, the
father of respondent. Sinforoso died in 1930. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name
of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of
Margarito Mendoza, the father of the petitioners and brother of Sinforoso.
● During the cadastral survey, respondent Honorata is the present occupant of the land together with Miguel
Mendoza, another brother of the petitioners. The trial court rendered the petitioners as the lawful owner
and possessors of the land. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision because the genuineness
and the due execution of the affidavit. It was said to be insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent
and her mother. Moreover, the probative value of petitioners’ tax receipts and declarations paled in
comparison with respondent’s proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. The actual, physical, exclusive
and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil
Code. The petitioners contended otherwise that she came into possession through force and violence,
contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
Page 48 of 74
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession of the land.
2.) Whether or not tax declarations and receipts are conclusive evidence of ownership or possession.
RULING:
1.) Yes. Possession by the petitioner before 1985 was not exclusive, as the Respondents also acquired it before
1985. The records show that the petitioners’ father and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefitting from her
father’s tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the
other hand, petitioners’ father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
2.) No. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima
facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual
public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. The
petitioners’ claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.
NOTES:
33. Seriña v. Caballero, GR NO. 127382, (RUBENECIA)
PETITIONER: DR. JESUS SERIÑA and ENRIQUETA RESPONDENT: VICTOR CABALLERO, TEODORO
SERIÑA (deceased), represented by DR. JESUS DONELA, OLIVER DONELA, COURT OF APPEALS,
SERIÑA, JR., ANTONIO SERIÑA, VIOLETA SERIÑA and THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
TAN, REYNALDO SERIÑA and EMMANUEL SERIÑA BRANCH 20, MISAMIS ORIENTAL
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

A person who claims ownership of real property is duty-bound to clearly identify the land being
claimed, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership. When the record
does not show that the land subject matter of the action for recovery of possession has been exactly
determined, such action cannot prosper, as in the case of petitioners. In sum, proof of ownership coupled
with identity of the land is the basic rule.
In order that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who
brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed,
by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof
FACTS:
● Dr. Jesus Seriña and his wife, Enriqueta Seriña filed a Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession,
and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents Victor
Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro Donela and Oliver Donela. When Dr. Seriña died, he was substituted
by his children, petitioners Jesus, Jr., Antonio, Violeta, Reynaldo and Emmanuel. The petitioners alleged
in their complaint that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual and constructive possession
for 35 years of a parcel of land.
● The petitioners averred that they discovered that respondent Caballero was claiming ownership over the
said land and offering it for sale or mortgage to third parties. They also discovered that the respondents
Donelas were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of the land.
● The petitioners claimed that their father, Dr. Seriña, bought the land from Lucia Vda. de Marbella who
inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri. They presented a Deed of Sale showing that Dr. Seriña bought 5
hectares of ricefield, bounded on the North by Raymundo Seriña, on the East by Teofilo Saburnido, on the
South by Obdelio Caballero, on the West by Obdullo Caballero, from Lucia Vda. de Marbella. Dr. Seriña
was issued Tax Declaration allegedly for the said property. As indicated in the tax declaration and
Page 49 of 74
subsequent tax declarations issued in the name of Dr. Seriña, they were issued for Cadastral Lot and
covered a ricefield with the same boundary owners as those in the complaint. The petitioners also averred
that they regularly paid taxes thereon since 1947 up to the present.
● Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had been in actual physical possession of the disputed
land since time immemorial. He averred that the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot C-7 of the Cagayan
Cadastre and originally owned by his grandfather, Eustaquio Caballero.
● The respondents averred that Eustaquio Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for tax purposes even
before the war. Tax Declaration was issued in lieu of the records that were destroyed during the war.
● The trial court ruled that it was not clearly shown that the land bought by Dr. Seriña from Lucia Vda. de
Marbella was the same land owned by Victor Caballero, and that the petitioners failed to show that Lucia
Vda. de Marbella bought the land from Eustaquio Caballero, the original owner and cadastral claimant of
the land. It also noted that the deed of sale between Lucia Vda. de Marbella and Dr. Seriña showed that
the land had an area of 5 hectares, whereas, the petitioners only claimed 2.5 hectares. Furthermore, the
boundaries of the land stated in the complaint did not coincide with what was stated in the Deed of Sale, or
in Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of Eustaquio Caballero. The trial court ruled that the petitioners
failed to explain these discrepancies, and that there was no showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442 was
cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 4029 in the name of Dr. Seriña. The trial court interpreted this to mean
that Eustaquio Caballero's right as owner of the land remained.
ISSUES: (1) whether the petitioners were able to establish the identity of the land being claimed by them; and (2)
whether acquisitive prescription should be appreciated in favor of the petitioners.
RULING:
The petitioners failed to establish that the parcel of land in the possession of the respondents is the same as that
subject of their complaint. The land subject of the complaint has boundaries different from the land in possession of
the respondents. In fact, the land described in the complaint appears to be different from the land described in the
Deed of Sale which the petitioners invoke as the basis of their ownership.
There was no showing that Tax Declaration in the name of Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled. Absent any specific
statement therein to that effect, it cannot be presumed that Tax Declaration in the name of Dr. Seriña cancelled Tax
Declaration of Eustaquio. Moreover, the land covered by Tax Declaration of Eustaquio is different from that covered
by Tax Declaration of Dr. Seriña.
The fact remains that the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the petitioners did not prove the
identity of the land being claimed. The petitioners did not present evidence to prove that the land registered in the
name of Eustaquio Caballero was sold to Lucia Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from whom they
purchased the land subject of their complaint.
Since the property has not been clearly identified by the petitioners, their claim of acquisitive prescription cannot be
considered. Insufficient identification of the portion of land claimed in absolute ownership cannot ripen into
ownership. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction.
Assuming, however, that the disputed land has been clearly identified, acquisitive prescription will still not lie in favor
of the petitioners because they were not able to prove that they have been in possession of the property for the
requisite number of years. Prescription requires public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the
property in the concept of an owner for ten years, in case the possession is in good faith and with just title.
Aside from the testimony of Leonardo Vacalares that certain tenants of the petitioners cultivated the land for a total
of seven years, the petitioners did not present any other evidence to show that they have been in actual possession
of the property for at least ten years. ax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most,
they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence
of actual, public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.
NOTES:
Beo vs. Court of Appeals:
…[B]ecause petitioners failed to explain the discrepancy or present other evidence to prove with certainty
the location and area of the land they seek to recover, respondent court correctly applied the invariable rule
that a person who claims ownership of real property is duty-bound to clearly identify the land being
claimed, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership. When the record
does not show that the land subject matter of the action for recovery of possession has been exactly
determined, such action cannot prosper, as in the case of petitioners. In sum, proof of ownership coupled
with identity of the land is the basic rule.
Corollarily, the rule is likewise well-settled that in order that an action for recovery of possession may
prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but
Page 50 of 74
also the identity of the property claimed, by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.
As the appellate court succinctly stated, he who claims to have a better right to the property must clearly
show that the land possessed by the other party is the very land that belongs to him.
34. Ramel v. Acquino, GR NO. 133208, (RUBENECIA)
PETITIONER: LAURENCIO C. RAMEL, ET AL. RESPONDENT: DANIEL AQUINO. ET AL
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Absent any direct proof on the value of improvements and the fruits, it is just to offset the claim of improvements to
the claim of fruits derived from the land and then place the parties in their previous positions before the agreement.
FACTS:
● Daniel Aquino is a registered owner od a land which he mortgaged to DBP. As the property was in danger
of being foreclosed, respondents sold to petitioners a portion of the land with the agreement that petitioners
would assume the remaining mortgage obligation of respondents with DBP and the balance shall be paid
to respondents. Petitioners were allowed by respondents to take possession of the land. Subsequently,
petitioners applied for a restructuring of the mortgage loan with DBP for 10 years.
● Petitioners went to DBP to pay for the amortization but they found out that respondents had paid the bank
and the latter told the former that they would return whatever the petitioners paid for the land and threatened
to withdraw the title from the bank. Petitioners filed for Specific Performance with preliminary injunction and
damages. Respondents withdraw the amount they paid to the bank.
● The trial court rendered a decision assailed by herein petitioners on the ground, among other, that the
offsetting the claim of improvements by petitioners and the claim of the fruits derived from the land by
respondents is erroneous.
ISSUES:
W/N there is legal ground to order the offsetting of the claim of improvements by petitioners to the claim of
fruits derived from the land by respondents
RULING:
YES. The records show that both parties failed to prove their claims through any receipt or document. Despite the
lack of proof, the trial court ordered that whatever improvements spent on the land shall be offset from the fruits
derived therefrom. The plaintiffs claimed that they were able to improve the land after possession was given to them.
No receipts were shown to guide the court as to how much were the costs of the improvements. Likewise the
defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were able to cultivate the land and harvest palay although their testimonies to
this effect are based on their presumptions and calculations not on actual harvest such that the court also cannot
make determination of the real fruits derived from the land. This being so, the court shall just offset the claim of
improvements to the claim of fruits derived from the land and then place the parties in their previous positions before
the agreement. Whatever improvements spent on the land shall be compensated from the fruits derived therefrom.
NOTES:
35. MWSS, GR NO. L-54526, (RUBENECIA)
PETITIONER: METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND RESPONDENT: THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
SEWERAGE SYSTEM CITY OF DAGUPAN
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Page 51 of 74
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that “he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land
of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.”
FACTS:
● The city of Dagupan filed a complaint against NAWASA (now MWSS) for the recovery of the ownership
and possession of the Dagupan Waterwork System.
● NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership,
possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims
the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful improvements amounting to
P255,000.00. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the Dagupan City on the basis of a
stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to
the reimbursement claimed by it. NAWASA appealed to the then Court of Appeals and argued in its lone
assignment of error that the Dagupan City should have been held liable for the amortization of the balance
of the loan secured by NAWASA for the improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System.
ISSUES:
whether or not it has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to the Dagupan
Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith
RULING:
No. Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that “he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the
land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.” As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA
lost whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Moreover, under Article 546 of said code,
only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and
under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done without
damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of
reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove improvements applies only
to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful
possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession
NOTES:
36. Sabido v. IAC, GR NO. 73418, (SURNAME)
PETITIONER: PELICULA SABIDO and MAXIMO RESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE

RANCES APPELLATE COURT and DOMINADOR STA. ANA
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of
retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the
possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad
faith to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing
suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at
the time he enters into possession
Page 52 of 74
FACTS:
● This case originated from an action for quieting of title which was filed by the spouses Victor Dasal and
Maria Pecunio against herein petitioners, Maximo Rances and Pelicula Sabido on the question of
ownership over two parcels of land otherwise known as Lots "B" and "D". The trial court presided by Judge
Delfin Sunga declared the petitioners as owners of Lots "B" and "D". The decision became final. However,
when the decision was being carried out to put the petitioners in possession of Lot "B", the Provincial Sheriff
found three (3) persons occupying portions of Lot "B". One of them was private respondent Dominador Sta.
Ana.
● The petitioners filed a motion to require the private respondent to show cause why he should not be ejected
from the portion of Lot "B". In his answer, Sta. Ana claimed ownership by purchase from one Prudencio
Lagarto, of a bigger area of which Lot "B" is a part. He stated that the two other persons occupying the
disputed portion are his tenants. Subsequently, an order of demolition was issued by the trial court against
the private respondent. This order was challenged by the private respondent
● After conducting an ocular inspection and hearing, Judge Sunga issued an order for the private respondent
to vacate Lot "B" upon finding that there is no proof that what the respondent allegedly purchased from
Lagarto covers a portion of Lot "B" but on the contrary, the deed of sale and tax declaration show that what
was sold to the respondent was bounded on the south by Tigman river and therefore, the respondent's
ownership could not have extended to Lot "B" which was separated by the Tigman river and mangrove
swamps from the portion he purchased.
● The execution of the order met with some further delay when the records were reconstituted. Judge Palma,
feeling the need for a clearer understanding of the facts and issues involved in the case, proceeded to hear
and received evidence. Judge Palma issued a resolution finding that there was privity between the private
respondent and the spouses Victor Dasal and Maria Pecunio as to the ownership of Lot "C" and as to the
possession over the western portion of the private road and the disputed Lot "B"; and that Lot "B" and the
private road are not included in the land purchased by the respondent from Lagarto.
ISSUES:
W/N the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the private respondent the
option of exercising the alternative choice of staying in the disputed land
RULING:
When this Court ordered the remand of the case between the petitioners and the private respondent it was precisely
to determine whether herein respondent was privy to the spouses Dasals as to make the decision against the latter
and in favor of the petitioners over Lot "B" binding upon him. And this fact was clearly pointed out by Judge Palma
stating that if there is privity between the private respondent and the spouses Dasals, then the former is bound by
the final decision in CC No. R-396 (2040) which is the case between the Dasals and the petitioners.
However, an apparent confusion was brought about by the dispositive portion of the aforementioned resolution when
it recommended to this Court either to order the respondent to remove all his constructions over Lot "B" or to require
said respondent to pay the petitioners the value of the disputed area which was already enclosed by a wall
constructed by the respondent. This, nevertheless, was rectified when we issued the series of resolutions denying
the respondent's petition and motions for reconsideration before this Court wherein we stated that the resolution of
May 16, 1983 was in accord, among others, with the order of December 12, 1974 "which ordered the petitioner
(private respondent) to vacate the premises (which is presumably final)."
Hence, it is clear that the private respondent has to remove all his constructions over Lot "B" and vacate the
premises. This is his only option. Being adjudged in privy with the spouses Dasals, he cannot avail himself of the
rights granted to a builder in good faith. He, therefore, must remove all his useful improvements over Lot "B" at his
own expense and if the same have already been removed, he cannot be entitled to the right of retention or to any
reimbursement.
The appellate court committed reversible error in holding that the private respondent is entitled to exercise the option
to pay the value of the disputed area of Lot "B" and to reimbursement for the value of the demolished portion of his
building. We, however, affirm its ruling that the petitioner's bill of costs must be set aside and that while the resolution
of May 16, 1983 included attorney's fees and damages, the necessity of proof cannot be dispensed with. Since no
proof was presented before the trial regarding any of these claims, they cannot be awarded.
NOTES:
Page 53 of 74
37. Edu v. Gomez, GR NO. L-33397, (SURNAME)
PETITIONER: ROMERO F. EDU RESPONDENT: AMADOR E. GOMEZ
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

In the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be compelled to surrender possession nor
to be required to institute an action for the recovery of the chattel, whether or not an indemnity bond is issued in his
favor. The filing of an information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa from its true owner
by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the possession of the chattel against the
will of the possessor.
FACTS:
● The 1968 model Volkswagen, bantam car, allegedly owned by Lt. Walter A. Bala under whose name it was
originally registered, was reported to the Office of the Commission on Land Transportation as stolen on
June 29, 1970 from the residence of Lt. Bala. Upon receipt of such information the agents of Anti-
Carnapping Unit of the Philippine Constabulary, on detail with the Land Transportation Commission
recognized subject car on 2 February 1971 in the possession of LUCILA ABELLO and immediately seized
and impounded the car as stolen property.
● Romeo F. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation, seized the car pursuant to Section 60 of
Republic Act 4136 which empowers him to seize the motor vehicle for delinquent registration aside from
his implicit power deducible from Sec. 4(5), Sec. 5 and 31 of said Code, "to seize motor vehicles fraudulently
or otherwise not properly registered.”
● Lucia Abello filed a complaint for replevin with damages in the Court of First Instance of Manila. CFI ruled
in facor of ABELLO. CFI found that the car was acquired by ABELLO by purchase from its registered owner
Marcelino Guansing for P9,000 and that she has been in possession thereof since then until when the car
was seized from her by ANCAR who acted in belief that the car was stolen from Lt. Bala.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the seizure of the car by the officials are valid.
RULING:
NO.
There is no merit in the petition considering that the acquirer or the purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable
property is entitled to be respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a
competent court rules otherwise. In the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be
compelled to surrender possession nor to be required to institute an action for the recovery of the chattel, whether
or not an indemnity bond is issued in his favor. The filing of an information charging that the chattel was illegally
obtained through estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona fide possessor does not warrant disturbing
the possession of the chattel against the will of the possessor.
Finally, the claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize and impound the car under Section 60 of
Republic Act 4136 which reads:
Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles. Any balance of fees for registration, re-registration or delinquent registration
of a motor vehicle, remaining unpaid and all fines imposed upon any vehicle owner, shall constitute a first lien
upon the motor vehicle concerned.
is untenable. It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 that the Commissioner's right to
seize and impound subject property is only good for the proper enforcement of lien upon motor vehicles. The Land
Transportation Commission may issue a warrant of constructive or actual distraint against motor vehicle for
collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of vehicles.
NOTES:
38. EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos, G.R. No. 80298, April 26, 1990 (ARRIESGADO)
Page 54 of 74
PETITIONER: EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp RESPONDENT: The Spouses Leonor and Gerardo
Santos, doing business under the name and style of
“Santos Bookstore,” and the Court of Appeals
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● The possession of a movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title. There is no need to
produce a receipt.
● Subsequent dishonor of a check, which did not render the Contract of Sale void does not amount to an
unlawful deprivation of property. In this case, there was a perfected Contract of Sale, so the proper remedy
should have been specific performance.
FACTS:
● Petitioner EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz who
ordered the same by telephone. The parties agreed the books would be payable upon delivery.
Subsequently, the books were delivered to Cruz together with the corresponding invoice, which he paid
with a personal check.
● Cruz then sold 120 of the delivered books to Respondent Leonor Santos who asked for verification and
was then shown the invoice for the books.
● Petitioner EDCA became suspicious when Cruz placed another order for another set of books before his
check had even cleared. Upon investigation, EDCA found that the check released did not have funds, and
that Cruz was not the person that he claimed to be – as there was no professor under the name of Jose
Cruz that worked for De La Salle College. Instead, it was found that Jose Cruz’ real name was Tomas de
la Peña.
● Petitioner EDCA thus had the police capture Cruz, as well as had the books seized from Respondent
Santos. As a result, Respondent Santos demanded the return of the books.
● The RTC granted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not Petitioner EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the property. (NO)
B. Whether or not the Petitioner EDCA may seize the books from the private respondent because it has been
unlawfully deprived or the books due to the dishonored check issued by the impostor. (NO)
RULING:
A. In this case, Respondent Leonor Santos was a buyer in good faith after taking steps to verify the identity of
the seller. When she was shown the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.
With regard to unlawful deprivation, Petitioner EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the property by mere
failure of consideration. There was already a perfected Contract of Sale. The proof was even substantiated
when Petitioner EDCA gave the invoice as proof of payment upon the delivery of the books. This did not
amount to unlawful taking because, by the delivery of Petitioner EDCA of the books to Cruz, the ownership
of the books had already transferred to him.
B. In its extended Memorandum, Petitioner EDCA cites numerous cases holding that the owner who has been
unlawfully deprived of personal property is entitled to its recovery, except only where the property was
purchased at a public sale, in which event, its return is subject to reimbursement of the purchase price. In
this case, the Court finds that Petitioner EDCA is begging the question and is putting the cart before the
horse. Unlike in the cases invoked, it has yet to be established in the case at bar that Petitioner EDCA has
been unlawfully deprived of the books.
Actual delivery of the books having been made; Cruz had already acquired ownership over the books which
he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them was a
matter between him and Petitioner EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the Respondent Santos
to the books.
It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice sustained by Petitioner
EDCA, as a result of its own negligence. The Court does not see the justice in transferring Petitioner EDCA’s
loss to the Respondent Spouses Santos who acted in good faith – and with proper care, when they bought
the books from Cruz.
Page 55 of 74
NOTES:
● The 406 books Petitioner EDCA prepared for Cruz amounted to P8,995.65.
39. Moralidad v. Pernes, G.R. No. 152809, August 3, 2006 (ARRIESGADO)
PETITIONER: Mercedes Moralidad RESPONDENT: Sps. Diosdado Pernes and Arlene

Pernes
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Article 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or
expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but
he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it
be possible to do so without damage to the property.
● Article 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against
any damage to the same.
FACTS:
● Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Davao City which is the subject of the controversy.
● The petitioner had worked in the U.S.A. for years until retirement. Being single, she would usually stay in
the house of her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes, at Mandug, Davao City during her vacation.
● In 1986, when petitioner received news from respondent Arlene that Mandug was infested by NPA rebels
and many women and children were victims of crossfire between government troops and the insurgents,
she immediately sent money to buy a lot in Davao City proper where Arlene and her family could transfer
and settle down.
● Petitioner also wanted the property to be available to any of her relatives wishing to live and settle in Davao
City and made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986.
● Upon her retirement, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the respondents in the house that
they built on the subject property. However, over the course of time, their relations turned sour – resulting
in violent confrontations and the filing of suits at the barangay lupon and to the Ombudsman for conduct
unbecoming of public servants, and at the MTCC, for an ejectment suit filed for unlawful detainer.
● MTCC’s Ruling: The MTCC rendered judgment favoring the petitioner and directing the defendants to
vacate the premises and to yield peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff.
● RTC’s Ruling: The respondent spouses appealed to the RTC where the decision of the MTCC was
reversed, holding that the respondents’ possession of the property in question was not by mere tolerance
of the petitioner, but rather by her express consent. It further ruled that Article 1678 of the Civil Code on
reimbursement of improvements introduced is inapplicable since the said provision contemplates a lessor-
lessee arrangement, which was not the factual milieu obtaining in the case. Instead, the RTC ruled that
what governed the parties’ relationship are Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
● CA’s Ruling: Petitioner went to the CA wherein her petition was denied on the ground that it is still
premature to apply Article 448 and 546 of the Civil Code considering that the issue of whether
respondents’ right to possess a portion of petitioner’s land had already expired or was already terminated
as it was not yet resolved. The CA further ruled that what governs the rights of the parties is the law on
usufruct, but the petitioner failed to establish that the respondents’ right to possess had already ceased.
ISSUES:
A. What provisions of the Civil Code should govern the rights of the parties.
B. Whether or not the respondents’ right to possess the land had been terminated. (YES)
RULING:
A. Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise: “Article 562. Usufruct gives
a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the
title constituting it, or the law provides otherwise.”
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property. It is also defined
as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi,
with the owner retaining the jus disponendi, or the power to alienate the same.
Page 56 of 74
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document, made known her intention to give the respondents and her
other relatives the right to use and enjoy the fruits of her property and the respondents were being given
the right “to build their own house” on the property and to stay there “as long as they like”. Paragraph #5 of
the same document earmarks “proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties” for the
petitioner’s “nearest kin who have less in life in greater percentage, and lesser percentage to those who
are of better standing”. The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the
property but also granted them, among the petitioner’s other kind, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof.
There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished.
The Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment in Article 603, stating that “Article 603.
Usufruct is extinguished: (1) by the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) by expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfilment of any resolutory condition
provided in the title creating the usufruct; (3) by merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) by renunciation of the usufructuary; (5) by the total loss of the thing in usufruct; (6) by the termination of
the right of the person constituting the usufruct; and (7) by prescription.
B. In this case, the document executed by the petitioner constitutes the title creating and sets forth the
conditions of the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states that “anyone of my kin may enjoy the privilege to
stay therein and may avail the use thereof; provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose
thereof”. What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding
paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear that “anybody of my kin who wishes to stay on the
aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony, and must avoid
bickering with one another”. That the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations between and
among the kin constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clear deduced
from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated that “anyone of my kin who cannot conform with
the wished of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own”.
In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or
cessation of harmonious relationships between/among the kin constitutes a resolutory condition which,
by the express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family, as well
as the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are
enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated.
The relationship between the petitioner and respondents with respect to the property in question is one of
owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents’ claim for reimbursement of the improvements they
introduced on the property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be governed by the applicable
statutory provisions and principles on usufruct.
In this regard, the notes of Justice Edgardo Paras on the matter are cited, stating: if the builder is a
usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Articles 579 and 580. By express provision of law,
respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have
introduced on the property.
40. Baluran v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-44428, September 30, 1977 (ARRIESGADO)
PETITIONER: Avelino Baluran RESPONDENT: Hon. Ricardo Y. Navarro, Presiding

Judge, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch
I and Antonio Obedencio
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● To determine the nature of a contract, the courts are not bound by the name or title given to it by the
contracting parties.
● Article 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form
and substance, unless the title constituting it, or the law otherwise provides.
Page 57 of 74
FACTS:
● Spouses Domingo and Fidela Paraiso owned a residential lot which they bartered with spouses Avelino
and Benilda Baluran for their unirrigated riceland.
● The agreement was covered by a document entitled “BARTER” wherein they agreed to “barter and
exchange” their properties subject to a condition that stated that if any of the children of spouses Paraiso’s
daughter shall choose to reside in the municipality and build his/her own house in the residential lot,
spouses Baluran shall be obliged to return the lot to such children.
● Eleven (11) years thereafter, Antonio Obedencio filed a case to recover the bartered property from Baluran.
In his answer, Baluran alleged that the “barter agreement” transferred to him the ownership of the residential
lot in exchange for the unirrigated riceland.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not there was a transfer of ownership of the properties covered in the “barter agreement”. (NO)
RULING:
● The Supreme Court held in the negative as it is a settled rule that to determine the nature of a contract,
courts are not bound by the name or title given to it by the contracting parties (Shell Co. of the Philippines
v. Fireman’s Insurance Co.).
● The Court has further held in the case of Borromeo v. Court of Appeals that contracts are not what the
parties may see fit to call them, but what they really are as determined by the principles of law.
● Thus, the use of the term “barter” in describing the agreement is not controlling. The agreement was clear
that there was no intention on the part of the signatories thereof to convey the ownership of their respective
properties; all that was intended – as was provided in the agreement – was to transfer the material
possession thereof. It is also clear that the parties retained the right to alienate their respective
properties, which is a right that is an element of ownership.
● All that the parties acquired was the right of usufruct which, in essence, is the right to enjoy the property
of another – as provided for by Article 562 of the Civil Code.
● Under the agreement, spouses Paraiso would harvest the crop of the unirrigated riceland while Baluran
could build a house on the residential lot, subject to the condition that if any of the children of spouses
Paraiso’s daughter shall choose to reside in the municipality and build his house on the residential lot,
Baluran shall be obliged to return the lot to said children “with damages to be incurred”.
● Thus, the mutual agreement of each party enjoying “material possession” of the other’s property was
subject to a resolutory condition – the happening of which would terminate the right of possession and use.
● Lastly, although it was not proper to decide the issue of possession in this case, the Court nevertheless
decided on the matter and ordered the Obedencio family to vacate the property inasmuch as there was an
extinguishment of a reciprocal obligation and rights.
NOTES:
● A resolutory condition is one which extinguishes rights and obligations already existing.
● The right of “material possession” granted in the agreement ends if, and when, any of the children of
spouses Paraiso’s daughter would reside in the municipality and build his house on the property.
● Article 579 allows the usufructuary to remove the improvements he has made, so Baluran may, therefore,
remove the house he has constructed on the property.
● Inasmuch as the condition opposed is not dependent solely on the will of one of the parties to the contract,
but is dependent on the will of third persons, the same is valid.
41. National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148830, April 13, 2005 (ARRIESGADO)
PETITIONER: National Housing Authority RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals, Bulacan Garden

Corporation and Manila Seedling Bank Foundation,
Inc.
FACTS:
● In 1968, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 481, setting aside a 120-hectare portion of land in
Quezon City owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA) as reserved property for the site of the
National Government Center (NGC).
Page 58 of 74
● Subsequently, he issued Proclamation No. 1670 in 1977, which removed a 7-hectare portion from the
120-hectare land, giving the usufructuary rights to the Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. (MSBF),
for use in its operation and projects, subject to private rights if any there be, and to future survey, under the
administration of the Foundation. This parcel of land, which shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be determined
by the future survey based on the technical descriptions found in Proclamation No. 481, and most
particularly on the original survey of the area, dated July 1910 to June 1911, and on the subdivision survey
dated April 19-25, 1968.
● Over the years, MSBF occupied the area. However, it exceeded the 7-hectare subject of the usufruct and
instead occupied 16 hectares. By then, the land occupied by MSBF was bounded by Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the south, and a creek to the
north.
● In 1987, MSBF leased a portion of its area to BGC and other stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing
EDSA, which occupies 4,590 sqm. of the 16-hectare area.
● In November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127 which revoked the
reserved status of the 50 hectares, more or less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property
reserved as the site of the NGC. It also authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to the
public.
● In August 1988, acting pursuant to M.O. No. 127, the NHA gave BGC ten (10) days to vacate its occupied
area. Any structure left behind after the expiration of the 10-day period will be demolished by the NHA.
● BGC then filed a Complaint for Injunction on April 21, 1988 before the trial court. Later, on May 26, 1988,
BGC amended its complaint to include MSBF as its co-plaintiff.
● Both the NHA and MSBF conducted a survey on the subject parcel of land.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not the MSBF has the right to determine the subject 7-hectare portion of land. (YES)
RULING:
● Article 565 states that the rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in the title
constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions contained in the two
following Chapters shall be observed.
● In the present case, Proc. No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct. It categorically states that the 7-
hectare area shall be determined by future survey under the administration of the Foundation, subject to
private rights, if there by any. Thus, it authorized MSBF to determine the location of the 7-hectare area.
This authority, coupled with the fact that Proc. No. 1670 did not state the location of the 7-hectare area
leaves no room for doubt that Proc. No. 1670 left it to MSBF to choose the location of the 7-hectare area
under its usufruct.
● However, the Court cannot countenance MSBF’s act of exceeding the 7-hectare portion granted to it by the
proclamation as a usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges.
● A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owner’s interest. Under Article 601 of the Civil Code, the law
provides that the usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person, of which he
may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of ownership, and he shall be liable should he
not do so, for damages, as if they had been caused through his own fault.
● The controversy would not have arisen has MSBF respected the limit of the beneficial use given to it. Hence,
there is a need for a new survey, conducted jointly by the NHA and the MSBF wherein the existing structures
of MSBF would, as much as possible, be considered and included within the 7-hectare portion without
sacrificing contiguity.
NOTES:
● Article 605 of the Civil Code provides that a usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation,
or association for more than fifty (50) years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of such
period, the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be
extinguished by reason thereof.
● Proclamation No. 1670 was issued in 1977, or twenty-eight (28) years ago. Hence, under Article 605, the
usufruct in favor of MSBF has twenty-two (22) years left. Furthermore, even if M.O. No. 127 released
approximately 50 hectares of the NHA property as a reserved site for the NGC, it does not affect MSBF’s
7-hectare area since under Proc. No. 1670, MSBF’s 7-hectare area was already excluded from the
operation of Proc No. 481, which established the NGC site.
Page 59 of 74
42. Policarpio v. Asuncion, G.R. No. L-21809, January 31, 1966 (ARRIESGADO)
PETITIONER: Gil P. Policarpio, et al. RESPONDENT: Jose V. Salamat, et al. and Vicente
Asuncion, et al.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● This case deals with usufruct in favor of several persons.
FACTS:
● In a duly probated last will and testament of one Damasa Crisostomo, she gave the naked ownership of
a fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz while its usufruct to the children of her cousins
Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo.
● The children of Antonio, Patricia, and Canuto turned out to be 14 in total. On the other hand, Teodorica,
the naked owner, bequeathed in her will all her rights to the fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
● The 14 usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to Gil P. Policarpio who used to give them their shares
proportionately from the usufruct corresponding to them. During the term of the lease, however, three of
the usufructuaries died, namely, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez, and so, upon
their death, both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to
the deceased usufructuaries. Because of these conflicting claims, the lessee withheld said amount.
● Subsequently, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Batas Riego de Dios who, after
executing the contract of lease, came to know of the existing conflicting claims, and not knowing to whom
of the claimants the shares of the deceased usufructuaries should be paid, said lessee was also constrained
to withhold the corresponding part of the usufruct of the property. So, the two lessees commenced the
present action for interpleader against both the naked owner and surviving usufructuaries to compel them
to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.
● Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense that he is the successor-in-interest of Teodorica dela
Cruz and as such he is entitled to the shares corresponding to the three deceased usufructuaries in as
much as the usufruct in their favor was automatically extinguished by death and became merged with the
naked owner.
● The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere to the theory that since the usufructuaries were
instituted simultaneously by the late Damasa Crisostomo, the death of the three usufructuaries did not
extinguish the usufruct; hence, the surviving usufructuaries are entitled to receive the shares corresponding
to the deceased usufructuaries, the usufruct to continue until the death of the last usufructuary.
● RTC: ruled in favor of defendant Jose Salamat. The surviving usufructuaries took the present appeal.
ISSUES:
● Whether the eleven surviving usufructuaries of the fishpond in question are the ones entitled to the fruits
that would have corresponded to the three deceased usufructuaries, or the naked owner Jose V. Salamat.
RULING:
● Appellants argue that it is the surviving usufructuaries who are entitled to receive the shares of the
deceased by virtue of Article 611 of the Civil Code which provides: "a usufruct constituted in favor of several
persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last survivor."
● On the other hand, appellee contends that the most a usufruct can endure if constituted in favor of a natural
person is the lifetime of the usufructuary, because a usufruct is extinguished by the death of the
usufructuary unless a contrary intention clearly appears (Article 603, Civil Code). Hence, appellee argues,
when the three usufructuaries died, their usufructuary rights were extinguished and whatever rights they
had to the fruits reverted to the naked owner.
● If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of the three usufructuaries has the effect of consolidating
their rights with that of the naked owner were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous,
because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless
the contrary appears.
● Furthermore, said theory would cause a partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the provisions of
Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of the last
survivor. The theory of appellee cannot, therefore, be entertained.
● There is accretion among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies
before the end of the usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament
Page 60 of 74
and the testator makes a contrary provision. In the instant case, there is none. On the contrary, the testatrix
constituted the usufruct in favor of the children of her three cousins with the particular injunction that they
are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of
them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. These provisions of the will are clear.
They do not admit of any other interpretation.
● Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby
declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary,
appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to them the money withheld
by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries. No costs.
43. North Negros Sugar Co. v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 42334, October 31, 1936 (ARRIESGADO)
PETITIONER: North Negros Sugar Co. RESPONDENT: Serafin Hidalgo
FACTS:
● North Negros Sugar Co. (NNSC) is the owner of a site known as the “mill site”. It is where its sugar central,
with its factory building and residence for its employees and laborers are located. It also owns the adjoining
sugar plantation known as Hacienda “Begoña”.
● Across its properties, NNSC has constructed a road connecting the “mill site” with the provincial highway.
This road allowed vehicles to pass upon payment of a toll charge of P0.15 for each truck or automobile,
while pedestrians were allowed free passage through it.
● Immediately adjoining the above-mentioned “mill site” of the NNSC is the hacienda of Luciano Aguirre,
known as Hacienda “Sañgay”, where Hidalgo has a billiard hall and tuba saloon. Like other people in and
about the place, Hidalgo used to pass through the said road of the NNSC because it was his only means
of access to the Hacienda “Sañgay”.
● Later on, by order of the NNSC, every time that Hidalgo passed by driving his automobile with a cargo of
tuba, plaintiff, the gatekeeper, would stop him and prevent him from passing through the said road.
● Hidalgo, in such cases, merely deviated from the said road and continued on his way to Hacienda “Sañgay”
across the fields of Hacienda “Begoña”, likewise belonging to the NNSC.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not the NNSC can enjoin Hidalgo from passing through the property. (NO)
RULING:
● This case involves an easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of a community.
● Article 531 of the Civil Code provides that easements may also be established for the benefit of one or
more persons or of a community to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.
● Moreover, Article 594 of the same Code states that the owner of an estate may burden it with such
easements as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider desirable, provided he
does not violate the law or public order.
● As may be garnered from the language of Article 594, in cases of voluntary easement, the owner is given
ample liberty to establish them: “as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider
desirable”.
● In this case, the plaintiff “considered it desirable” to open the road to the public in general, without imposing
any condition save for the payment of a P0.15 toll by motor vehicles, and it may not now go back on this
and deny the existence of an easement.
● Voluntary easements under Article 594 are not contractual in nature; they constitute the act of the owner.
If he exacts any condition, like the payment of a certain indemnity for the use of the easement, any person
who is willing to pay it makes use of the easement. If the contention be made that a contract is necessary,
it may be stated that a contract exists from the time all those who desire to make use of the easement are
disposed to pay the required indemnity.
● The plaintiff in this case contends that the easement of way is intermittent in nature and can only be acquired
by virtue of a title under Article 539. The defendant, however, does not lay claim to it by prescription. The
title in this case consists in the fact that the plaintiff has offered the use of this road to the general public
upon the payment of a certain sum as passage fee in case of motor vehicles.
Page 61 of 74
● The cases of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Roxas and Cuaycong v. Benedicto are not controlling
as in these cases, the attempt was to establish that the right to an easement of way had been acquired by
prescription.
● Here, defendant’s contention is that while the road in question remains open to the public, he has a right to
its use upon paying the passage fees required by the plaintiff and while, indeed the latter may close it at its
pleasure – as no period has been fixed when the easement was voluntarily constituted, while the road is
thrown open, the plaintiff may not capriciously exclude the defendant from its use.
● Furthermore, plaintiff’s evidence discloses the existence of a forcible right of way in favor of the owner and
occupants of Hacienda “Sañgay” under Article 564 of the Civil Code because, according to said evidence,
those living in Hacienda “Sañgay” have no access to the provincial road except through the road in question.
44. LEOGARIO RONQUILLO vs JOSE ROCO , GR NO. L-10619, FEBRUARY 28, 1958, (Alolor)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
EASEMENTS; CLASSIFIED AND HOW THEY ARE ACQUIRED. — Under the Old as well as the New Civil Code,
easements may be continuous or discontinuous (intermittent), apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those
used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and New
Civil Codes, respectively). Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by title or prescription,
continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by
virtue of a title. Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil Codes respectively.)
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY MAY NOT BE ACQUIRED THROUGH PRESCRIPTION. — Under the provisions
of Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively, the easement of right of way
may not be acquired through prescription.
FACTS:
● This is an appeal from the Court of First instance of Camarines Sur, which dismissed the complaint of
plaintiffs.
● The plaintiffs have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which traversed
the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest for more than 20 years. The defendants and
the tenants of Vicente Roco, the predecessors in interest of the said defendants have long recognized and
respected the private legal easement of road right of way of the plaintiffs. On May 12, 1953, the defendants
Jose Roco thru his co-defendants, Raymundo Martinez and their men with malice aforethought and with a
view to obstructing the plaintiffs’ private legal easement over the property of the late Vicente Roco, started
constructing a chapel in the middle of the said right of way which disturbed the continuous exercise of the
rights of the plaintiffs over said right of way.
● On July 10, 1954 the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr. with the approval of the
defendant, Jose Roco and with the help of their men and laborers, by means of force, intimidation, and
threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed the road
passageway and their right of way in question against their protests and opposition.
● The plaintiffs in their amended and supplemental complaint, claim to have acquired the easement of right
of way over the land of the defendants and the latter’s predecessors in interest, Vicente Roco, thru
prescription by their continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants.
Page 62 of 74
ISSUES:Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription
RULING: NO.
The lower courts’ dismissal was based on the ground that an easement of right of way though it may be
apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired through
prescription, but only by virtue of a title.
Under old as well as the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-
apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of
man. Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription, continuous non-
apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a
title.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, it would therefore appear that the easement of right of
way may not be acquired through prescription. In the case of Cuayong vs. Benedicto, 37 Phil., 781 where
the point in issue was whether or not vested rights in a right of way can be acquired through user from time
immemorial. It held that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the
time the Civil Code took effect. Under that Code (Article 539) no discontinuous easement could be acquired
by prescription in any event.
The essence of this easement (“servidumbre de paso”) lies in the power of the dominant owner to cross or
traverse the servient tenement without being prevented or disturbed by its owner. As a servitude, it is a
limitation on the servient owner’s rights of ownership, because it restricts his right to exclude others from
his property. But such limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually crosses, or passes over the
servient estate because when he does not, the servient owner’s right of exclusion is perfect and
undisturbed. Since the dominant owner cannot be continually and uninterruptedly crossing the servient
estate, but can do so only at intervals, the easement is necessarily of an intermittent or discontinuous
nature.
Because possession of a right consists in the enjoyment of that right (old Civil Code, Art. 430; Art. 423, new
Civil Code) and to enjoy a right is to exercise it, it follows that the possession (enjoyment or exercise) of a
right of way is intermittent and discontinuous. From this premise, it is inevitable to conclude, with Manresa
and Sanchez Roman, that such easement cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription (adverse
possession) because the latter requires that the possession be continuous or uninterrupted.
The opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that under the present law, particularly, the provisions
of the Civil Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed or clarified, the easement of right of
way may not be acquired through prescription.
NOTES:
Page 63 of 74
45. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION , petitioner, vs . CARLOS VILLAMOR, Respondent. [G.R. No.
160080. June 19, 2009., (Alolor)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

NATURE OF EASEMENT: Easement of right of way falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. In installing the 230 KV Talisay-Compostela transmission lines
which traverse respondent's lands, a permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner against
the use of the lands for an inde􀁂nite period. This deprives respondent of the normal use of
the lands. In fact, not only are the affected areas of the lands traversed by petitioner's
transmission lines but a portion is used as the site of its transmission tower. Because of
the danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-tension live wires, the
landowner will not be able to use the lands for farming or any agricultural purposes.
FACTS:
● Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned and controlled corporation created
and existing by virtue of Republic Act No. 6395 (RA 6395), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938.
Its objective was to develop a hydro-electric generation power and the production of power from any other
source. Its charter grants to NPC the power, among others, to exercise the right of eminent domain.
● Due to its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, NPC's 230 KV Talisay-Compostela transmission lines and
towers have to pass parcels of land in the City of Danao and Municipality of Carmen, both situated in the
province of Cebu. Two of these lands situated in Cantipay, Carmen, Cebu are owned by respondent Carlos
Villamor (Villamor).
● On 22 July 1996, NPC filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Danao City, Cebu (trial court), a
complaint for eminent domain of Villamor's lands. NPC deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Fuenta
Osmeña branch, P23,115.70, representing the assessed value on the tax declaration of the lands. The trial
court, in its Order dated 14 July 1997, ordered the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession in favor
of NPC.
● In the course of the proceedings, several parties intervened, namely Teodolo Villamor, Teofilo Villamor and
Nunila Abellar. They were allegedly the siblings of respondent Villamor and the heirs of the late spouses
Jose and Dolores Villamor. The intervenors claimed that NPC violated their legal rights in negotiating only
with Villamor, who is just one of seven heirs. Villamor was allegedly not authorized by the other legal heirs
to negotiate and receive payment for the land sought to be expropriated.
● The only issue between NPC and Villamor involves the reasonableness and adequacy of the just
compensation of the properties. The trial court created a board of three commissioners to determine the
just compensation for the lands and improvements. In the Joint Commissioners' Report submitted to the
trial court, the board of commissioners recommended the amount of P433 per square meter as the fair
market value of Villamor's lands. On these lands stand fruit-bearing trees, such as mango, coconut,
avocado, soursop or guyabano, jackfruit, tamarind, breadfruit, sugar apple or atis, Spanish plum or
siniguelas and banana; and non-fruit bearing trees, such as mahogany and gemilina.
● On 24 November 1997, Villamor filed his Comment to the Commissioners' Report. Villamor exhibited a
similar expropriation case, Civil Case No. DNA-426, filed by NPC against Francisco Villamor, involving a
lot, designated as Lot 2 of 6191, Cad. 1046-D, adjoining the lands of Villamor. In said case, the trial court
rendered a decision fixing the just compensation at P600 per square meter. However, upon motion of NPC,
the amount was reduced to P450. Villamor prayed that the trial court consider the same amount of just
compensation as that awarded to the landowner adjacent to his lands. Likewise included in the report were
the respective values of the fruit bearing and non-fruit bearing trees planted on Lots 3 and 4.
Page 64 of 74
● The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Villamor. Later on he filed for motion for reconsideration
praying that the trial court's decision be reviewed by ordering NPC to likewise pay for the small isolated
portion of Lot 4, consisting of 15.23 square meters. On 22 January 1998, the trial court, acting on Villamor's
motion, rendered a Resolution amending its earlier decision.
● NPC filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On 19 August 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and affirmed the decision of the trial court. NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This was denied
by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 28 August 2003. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether the fair market value awarded by the trial court may be reduced taking into account that petitioner is
allegedly acquiring only an easement of right of way and that the lands affected are classified as agricultural.
RULING: NO. Fair market value should not be reduced.
Petitioner contends that under Section 3A of its charter, RA 6395, where private property will be traversed by
transmission lines, NPC shall only acquire an easement of right of way since the landowner retains ownership of the
property and can devote the land to farming and other agricultural purposes. Moreover, in the present case, since
the lands are agricultural with no sign of commercial activity, the amount of P450 per square meter awarded by the
trial court as market value of the property is excessive and unreasonable.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the affected portions of the lands are not only traversed by petitioner's
transmission lines but a portion is also used as the site of its transmission tower. He asserts that petitioner cannot
hide behind the provisions of Section 3A and claim that it may only pay landowners an easement fee not exceeding
10% of the market value of the property. Further, respondent points out that other landowners similarly affected by
the Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project were compensated in the amount of P420 to P450 per square meter as
shown by deeds of absolute sale and compromise agreements executed by petitioner in other expropriation cases.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 3A of RA 6395 has been struck down by this Court in a number of cases. Easement
of right of way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. In installing the 230 KV Talisay-Compostela
transmission lines which traverse respondent's lands, a permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner against the
use of the lands for an indefinite period. This deprives respondent of the normal use of the lands. In fact, not only
are the affected areas of the lands traversed by petitioner's transmission lines but a portion is used as the site of its
transmission tower. Because of the danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-tension live wires,
the landowner will not be able to use the lands for farming or any agricultural purposes.
Thus, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial and appellate courts.
Indeed, the respondent is entitled to just compensation or the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The petition was dismissed.
NOTES: Sec. 3A. In acquiring private property or private property rights through
expropriation proceedings where the land or portion thereof will be traversed
by the transmission lines, only a right-of-way easement thereon shall be
acquired when the principal purpose for which such land is actually devoted
will not be impaired, and where the land itself or portion thereof will be
needed for the projects or works, such land or portion thereof as necessary
shall be acquired.
In determining the just compensation of the property or property sought to be acquired
through expropriation proceedings, the same shall
(a) With respect to the acquired land or portion thereof, not exceed the market value
declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or
such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Page 65 of 74
With respect to the acquired right-of-way easement over the land or portion
thereof, not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the market value declared by the
owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such
market value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower.
46. SPS. VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ v. SPS. FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD
TABISULA, GR No. 175510, 2008-07-28, (ALOLOR)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
REQUISITES: A legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following requisites must be complied
with:
(1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is... not the result of the owner of the dominant estate's own
acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
FACTS:
● Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a Deed of Absolute Sale from respondent-
spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a portion of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land located in San
Fernando, La Union. They shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters [sic] wide road right-of-way on the western side
of their lot but which is not included in this sale.
● Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject property.
● Believing that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the deed, petitioners, through their
representative, reported the matter to the barangay for mediation and conciliation. Six years after the
execution of the deed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against respondents before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
● In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject property on the strength of
respondents' assurance of providing them a road right of way. They thus prayed that respondents be
ordered to provide the subject property with a 2½-meter wide easement and to remove the concrete wall
blocking the same.
● Respondents, in their Answer averred that the 2 ½-meter easement should be taken from the western
portion of the subject property and not from theirs
● Respondents further averred that they could not have agreed to providing petitioners an easement "on the
western side of their lot" as there exists a two-storey concrete house on their lot where the supposed
easement is to be located, which was erected long before the subject property was sold to petitioners.
● The RTC dismissed petitioners' complaint and granted respondents' Counterclaim
● On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court, it holding that the deed only
conveyed ownership of the subject property to petitioners, and that the reference therein to an easement
in favor of petitioners is not a definite grant-basis of a voluntary easement of right of way.
Page 66 of 74
● The appellate court went on to hold that petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement
of right of way as they failed to present circumstances justifying their entitlement to it under Article 649 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
WON THE RIGHT OF WAY IS NOT PART OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE
RULING: NO. IT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE SALE.
From the allegations in petitioners' complaint, it is clear that what they seek to enforce is an alleged grant
in the deed by respondents of an easement
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or disposition of real property
must be in writing.
The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that they "shall be provided a 2 ½ meters wide road right-of-way
on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale" is not a disposition of real property.
The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is "not included in this sale" could only mean that the
parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the purpose.
The use of the word "shall," which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be
construed as merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to
be given an imperative meaning.
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of Property in order
not to prejudice third parties.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of way. For to be entitled to such
kind of easement, the preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which
is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
xxxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following requisites must be
complied with:
(1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is... not the result of the owner of the dominant estate's own
acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
Page 67 of 74
consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the...
shortest.
The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein
petitioners.
As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by the Sketch of the location of the lots of the
parties and those adjoining them, a common evidence of the parties, petitioners and their family are also
the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or
highways.
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no right to demand
the grant by respondents of an easement on the "western side of [respondents'] lot."
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the grant of the
Counterclaim of respondents, Spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula, is reversed and set aside.
NOTES: An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on another's property, corporeal and
immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else
to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person."
Article 613 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is
subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two kinds of easements according to source - by law or by the will of the owners.
So Article 619 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal
and the latter voluntary easements.
47. Quintanilla vs. Abangan (G.R. NO. 160613 February 12, 2008) , (ALOLOR)
PETITIONER: APOLINARDITO C. QUINTANILLA and RESPONDENT: PEDRO ABANGAN and DARYL'S

PERFECTA C. QUINTANILLA , COLLECTION INT'L.
petitioners, INC., respondents.
LAW & PRINCIPLES: It should be remembered that to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the
following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate.
Page 68 of 74
FACTS:
● This controversy flows from a case for Easement of Right of Way filed by petitioner Apolinardito C.
Quintanilla (Apolinardito) and his mother, petitioner Perfecta C. Quintanilla (Perfecta) against respondent
Pedro Abangan (Pedro) and respondent Daryl's Collection International, Inc. (DARYL'S).
● Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, with an area of 2,244 square meters, located
at Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) from one Dionisio Abasolo, who formerly owned all the
properties therein. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito, who is now the
registered owner thereof.
● Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-
made furniture. In the conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and
finished products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse on their property
(the dominant estate), they asked for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April 1994. But Pedro sold the
lot to DARYL’S and it constructed a warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the same with a concrete
fence.
● Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an easement of right of way, six (6) meters in width, or a total
area of 244 square meters, over the servient estate.
● The RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit holding that petitioners failed to establish that the imposition
of the right of way was the least prejudicial to the servient estate. The RTC noted that there is already a
concrete fence around the area and that six (6) meters from the said concrete fence was a concrete
warehouse. Thus, substantial damage and substantial reduction in area would be caused the servient
estate. It also observed that it is easy for the vans of the petitioners to pass through and stated that mere
convenience to the dominant estate was not necessarily the basis for setting up a compulsory easement of
right of way.
● Aggrieved, petitioners went to the CA on appeal. CA affirmed the RTC Decision, holding that the criterion
of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortest distance. A longer way may, thus, be
established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls which
can be avoided by a round-about way, as in this case.
● Petitioners elevated the case to the SC on the ground that DARYL'S constructed the concrete fence only
after petitioners filed the case for an Easement of Right of Way against Pedro on May 27, 1994. They
submit that the criterion of least prejudice should be applied at the time of the filing of the original complaint;
otherwise, it will be easy for the servient estate to evade the burden by subsequently constructing structures
thereon in order to increase the damage or prejudice. Moreover, they pointed out that a Notice of Lis
Pendens was annotated on Pedro's title. Thus, petitioners aver that DARYL'S is in bad faith and is guilty of
abuse of rights as provided under Article 19 of the New Civil Code.
● On the other hand, DARYL'S counters that petitioners belatedly imputed bad faith to it since petitioners'
pre-trial brief filed with the RTC contained no allegation of bad faith or misrepresentation.
ISSUES: 1. WON IN A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, AS SET FORTH IN THE

PRECONDITIONS UNDER ARTICLES 649 AND 650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, THE DETERMINATION OF
THE LEAST PREJUDICIAL OR LEAST DAMAGE TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE SHOULD BE AT THE TIME OF
THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND NOT AFTER THE FILING, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE OWNER
OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE IS GUILTY OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS.
2. WON COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRECONDITIONS SET FORTH IN ARTICLES 649 AND 650 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE IS SUPERIOR TO THE "MERE CONVENIENCE RULE AGAINST THE OWNER OF THE DOMINANT
ESTATE."
Page 69 of 74
RULING: The instant petition lacks merit.
1. Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate together with Perfecta failed to discharge the burden of
proving the existence and concurrence of all the requisites in order to validly claim a compulsory right of
way against respondents.
It should be remembered that to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must
be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The fourth requisite is absent. Provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the
easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be
established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be
chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, as in the instant case, the way
which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of least
prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance.
2. As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and egress
to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to
make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if
it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. It is also undisputed
that there is already a newly opened public road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants,
which only shows that another requirement of the law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not been met
to establish a compulsory right of way.
NOTES:
48. Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, G.R. No. 152230,
[August 9, 2005], 503 PHIL 845-874 , (ALOLOR)
LAW & PRINCIPLES: The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The
respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right--of--way under
the New Civil Code
FACTS:
● The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E.R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig
Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light
Page 70 of 74
materials, were located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so
that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration.
● The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791 square meter property of
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to
acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor.
● RTC Pasig. The municipality filed a complaint,amended gainst the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of
the property under Section 19 of the LGC.
● The defendants answered that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI.
JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant intervention, which was granted.
● In its decision, the RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was
substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and
that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid. Dissatisfied,
JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA.
● Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the order of the RTC.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be
dispensed with.
(2) WON respondent was able to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s property
and not elsewhere.
RULING:
1. Yes. The requisites for an easement for right of way under Articles 649 to 657 may be dispensed with. The
petitioner’s assertion that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment of an
easement of right--of--way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least prejudicial to
the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway was rejected by the court.
The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated
to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right--of--way under the New Civil Code
Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public
character. Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. The respondent
has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E.R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The
witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through
which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except
through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a
genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required,
only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.
Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain
may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and
wantonly injurious.
Page 71 of 74
2. No. The respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been surveyed
as the best possible ingress and egress.
However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims. There is no
showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. The petitioner was, there-
fore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as
evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. The findings
of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
Petition granted. The Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the
complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof.
NOTES:
49. REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR., petitioner, vs. GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., EDUARDO ASPREC, ENELDA
ASPREC, ERNESTO ASPREC, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents G.R. No. 75905, [October 12,
1987 , (ALOLOR)
LAW & PRINCIPLES: requisites for easements as stated in the case of Bacolod Murcia Milling Company,
Inc. vs Capitol Subdivision. These requisites are the following:
1. That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par.
1);
2. After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1, end);
3. That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. That the right of way claimed is 'at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. (Art. 650).
FACTS:
● Ramos acquired a lot (Lot 4133G-11) from Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision. Two road lots touched
Ramos property namely, Lot 4133G-12 which is a proposed road in the Lombos Subdivision and Lot 4135
known as Palanyag Road, commonly known as Gatchalian Road.
● Respondent Asprec owns Lot4135. Gatchalian Realty was granted the road right of way and drainage along
Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivisions. Ramos filed a complaint for an easement of a
right of way alleging that during the constructionof his house Gatchalian Realty built a 7-8 feet high wall,
blocking his entrance and exit to Gatchalian Road, which is the nearest, most convenient and adequate
road to public highway. Gatchalian on the other hand, argued that the Palanyag road is a private street
intended for the sole and exclusive use of its residents.
Page 72 of 74
● Further, Gatchalian argued that the grant of right of way is not necessary because there was an existing
road (Lot 4133G-12) towards the Sucat Road. Ramos answered that the road of right of way does not exist
because it remained as a proposed road.
ISSUES: Whether or not Ramos has successfully shown all the requisites necessary for the grant of an
easement of a right of way in his favor are present rule under Article 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.
RULING: No. Ramos failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except
through the Gatchalian Avenue. The records shows that a road of right of way was provided by the Lombos
Subdivsion, which is the Lot 4133G-12. The inconvenience it caused to Ramos because it is still
undeveloped is not sufficient to establish that there was no adequate outlet to a public highway. Ramos
should have first demanded improvement and maintenance from Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision,
where he acquired the lot, and not from Gathcalian.
In summary of the provisions above, these provides for requisites for easements as stated in the case of
Bacolod Murcia Milling Company, Inc. vs Capitol Subdivision. These requisites are the following:
1. That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par.
1);
2. After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1, end);
3. That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. That the right of way claimed is 'at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. (Art. 650).
On the first requisite, the petitioner contends that since the respondent company constructed
the concrete wall blocking his ingress and egress via the Gatchalian Avenue, the "nearest, most
convenient and adequate road" to and from a public highway, he has been constrained to use as his
"temporary" way the adjoining lots belonging to different persons. Said way is allegedly "bumpy and
impassable especially during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses
thereon." Moreover, according to the petitioner, the road right of way which the private respondents
referred to as the petitioner's alternative way to Sucat Road is not an existing road but has remained a
proposed road as indicated in the subdivision plan of the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision.
The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find no reason to disturb the appellate
court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the
Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a
road right of way provided by the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in
its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes
inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within
the ambit of the legal requisite. We agree with the appellate court's observation that the petitioner
should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the
improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said
subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents
Asprec. To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right
of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows
petitioner a much greater case in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely
Page 73 of 74
ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a
right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To
justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it.”
NOTES:
Page 74 of 74

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PROPERTY | MBL | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – WEEK 4

1. REPUBLIC V. JACOB, GR. NO. 146874 (ANDRIN)

PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENT: JACOB

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

2. SARMIENTO V. LASACA, G.R. No. L-15385 June 30, 1960 (ANDRIN)

PETITIONER: ALEJANDRA BUGARIN VDA. DE RESPONDENT: JOSEFA R. LESACA

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

3. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179987

PETITIONER: HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN RESPONDENT: REPUBLIC

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

PETITIONER: CHUA-BURCE, MTCB CASH CUSTODIAN RESPONDENT: CA

ISSUES: Whether petitioner can be held liable for Estafa.

PETITIONER: MARIA CARLOS, REPRESENTED BY RESPONDENT: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

6. PO LAM V. CA, G.R. No. 116220. December 6, 2000, (ANDRIN)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ISSUES: Whether spouses Po Lam are purchasers in good faith.

PETITIONER: HEIRS OF CABAL RESPONDENT: CABAL SPOUSES

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

principle of possession in good faith

● Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a parcel of land in Zambales.

ISSUES: Whether Marcelino was a builder and possessor in good faith

PETITIONER: Ignacio Negrete RESPONDENT: Court of First Instance of

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

9. Baltazar v. Caridad, GR NO. L-23509, (CABASAG)

PETITIONER: Naty Baltazar et al. RESPONDENT: Silvina Caridad et al.

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ISSUES: whether or not respondents were builders in good faith

10. Heirs of T. De Leon Vda De Roxas v. CA, GR NO.138660 , (CABASAG)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

11. Benin v. Tuason, GR NO. L-26127 , (CABASAG)

PETITIONER: Victor Benin et al. RESPONDENT: Mariano Severo Tuason y De La Paz

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision

12. Suobiron v. CA, GR NO. 109903 , (CABASAG)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Also check notes

13. Maneclang v. Baun, GR NO. 27876 , (CABASAG)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

PETITIONER: REYNALDO VILLAFUERTE and RESPONDENT: HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Lower Court Ruling

● denied petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction

(November 13, 1990):

● affirmed RTC decision but modified the damages awarded.

● Removal of the CA of the award of moral damages.

PETITIONER: VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO and MIGUEL RESPONDENT: EMERENCIANA R. GUNGAB

Denied respondent’s claim stating that Victoria Arambulo Respondent alleged

been with the knowledge, consent and tolerance of all

Contention in the SC:

● that the CA erred in reversing the RTC by

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

RTC RULING: affirmed in toto the MeTC decision

CA RULING: reversed and set aside RTC decision

● CA resolved the issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession.

1. W/N respondent can eject petitioner. (YES)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Plaintiff’s prior possession is unnecessary

PETITIONER: SPS. RICARDO AND LYDIA RESPONDENT: JOSEFINA V. FERNANDEZ

● they had been occupying the property in

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

MTCC RULING: in favor of petitioner (herein respondent)

RTC RULING: affirmed MTCC ruling