Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

University of California Institute for Mexico and the United States

Constitutional Crisis: How Reforms to the Legislature Have Doomed Mexico

Author(s): Michael C. Taylor
Source: Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer, 1997), pp. 299-324
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the University of California Institute for
Mexico and the United States and the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
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 Constitutional Crisis:
How Reforms to the Legislature
Have Doomed Mexico

MichaelC. Taylor
New York

Este articulo examina la manera en que los procedimientos electorales

incluidos en la Constituci6n mexicana socavan la democracia en el pais.
Dos reformas constitucionales, la prohibici6n de la reelecci6n legislativa y
la creaci6n de la representaci6n proporcional, han contribuido grande-
mente a las tendencias antidemocraticas en Mexico, incluyendo la centrali-
zacion del poder en la rama del ejecutivo, el fomento de la apatia y la des-
confianza en el gobierno entre los ciudadanos y el dominio de los partidos
politicos sobre los ciudadanos de la naci6n.

Introduction
Political assassinations,1 financial crashes that threaten world
markets,2 scandals involving hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in
Swiss accounts,3 and latent and nascent armed rebellions in the
country's poorest states,4 all add up to the big cliche of Mexican
politics and political science: Mexico is in a crisis. But what caused
this crisis?
1. See Sam Dillon, "ZedilloLecturesthe Mexicans:Obey the Law,"New York
Times (1 October 1996).
2. The depression of financialmarketsthroughoutthe developing world fol-
lowing the peso crashof December 1994 was referredto as the "TequilaEffect."In-
vestors shied awayfrom emergingmarketsfor nearlya yearand a half.
3. See Julia Preston, "Mexico's Former Chief Expresses 'Amazement' at
Brother'sHoard,"New YorkTimes(27 November1995).
4. SeeJuliaPreston,"MexicoConfrontsRebelswith LimitedCrackdown," New
YorkTimes(16 October 1996).

Mexican Studies/EstudiosMexicanos 13(2), Summer1997. ? 1997 Regentsof the Universityof California.

299

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300 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

Most independent analysts see Mexico's lack of democracy as

the primary cause. These same analysts further agree that the fac-
tors which undercut and prevent democracy in Mexico include a
tripartite government ruled by the executive branch,5 a political
culture of mistrust and nonparticipation,6 and a long-standing sys-
tem of one-party domination.7
Each of these explanations is correct in its own way and, taken
together they explain a majority of the mess in which Mexico finds
itself. This essay will not refute the accepted causes of Mexico's
"perfect dictatorship,"8 but will offer something new: a constitu-
tional cause of the causes. The Constitution of 1917, Mexico's
post-revolutionary Magna Carta, prevents democracy as we know
it from flourishing south of the border. More specifically, two types
of constitutional reforms to the legislative branch-the ban on re-
election and the creation of proportional representation-have
contributed greatly to the three obstacles to democracy in Mexico:
presidential domination of political power, a harmful civic culture,
and the longest one-party rule in the world.
The legislature of Mexico has been studied before,9 but de-

5. For studies which focus on the presidency, see, for example, Jorge Carpizo,
Elpresidencialismo mexicano (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1983); George Philip, The Presi-
dency in Mexican Politics (London:Macmillan,1992);Ensayos sobrepresidencia-
lismo mexicano (Mexico: Editorial Aldus, 1994).
6. See, for example, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Po-
litical Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston:Little,Brown, and Co.,
1965); Ann L. Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius, "Political Culture in Mexico: Continu-
ities and Revisionist Interpretations," in The Civic Culture Revisited, ed. Gabriel
Almond and Sidney Verba (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1980); Roger Bartra
"Changes in Political Culture: The Crisis of Nationalism," in Mexico's Alternative Po-
litical Futures, ed. Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman, and Peter H. Smith (LaJolla,
California: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego,
1989).
7. See generally Daniel Cosio Villegas, El sistemapolftico mexicano, (Mexico:
Joaquin Mortiz, 1972); Wayne Cornelius and Ann L. Craig, Politics in Mexico: An In-
troduction and Overview (La Jolla, California: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies,
University of California, San Diego, 1988); Tom Barry, Mexico: A Country Guide
(Albuquerque: The Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1992), 10-30,
208-26; Reforma del ststema politico mexicano: condici6n para la moderniza-
ci6n, coord. Norma Alvarez and Beatriz Magaloni (Mexico: CIDAC, 1990).
8. To borrow a phrase from Mario Vargas Llosa, who dubbed the Mexican
state thus at a government dinner in his honor, much to the embarrassment of his
hosts. See Barry,Mexico:A CountryGuide,14-15.
9. Among the few studies written in English about Mexico's legislative branch
are Roderic Camp, "Mexico's Legislature: Missing the Democratic Lockstep?" in
Legislaturesand the New Democracies in Latin America, ed. David Close (Boul-
der: Lynne Rienner, 1995), and Rudolfo de la Garza, "The Mexican Chamber of
Deputies and the Mexican Political System," (Ph.D. Diss. University of Arizona,

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 301

serves a new examination more than ever.10 David Close's anthol-

ogy on the role of the legislature in Latin America's emerging
democracies underscores two important points.1' First, national
legislatures in Latin America play difficult but vital parts in shaping
the democratic policy of their respective countries by legislating,
checking the executive, publicizing government actions, represent-
ing the electorate, and managing conflict.12 Second, Roderic
Camp's essay in the Close anthology shows that Mexico's Congress
is not fulfilling this vital role.'3 In the past it may have been enough
to dismiss the role of the Mexican legislature as merely instrumen-
tal for legitimizing the government or for recruiting elites,'4 unim-
portant when compared to the power of the executive branch,15 or
of second-order importance when compared to chronic problems
such as fraudulent elections.'6 As Close's anthology and Camp's

1972). By and large, scholars of Mexico's legislatureare south of the border.For

examples of scholarsin Mexicoconcerned with both the Constitutionand the poli-
tics of Mexico's legislativebranch,see DiegoValades,"LaConstituci6nreformada,"
in Los Derechos del Pueblo Mexicano:Mexico a travdsde sus constituciones XII
(Mexico: Manuel Porria, 1979), 83-102; Alvarezand Magaloni,Reforma del Sis-
tema, 152-3: Jaime F CardenasGarcia,Transici6npolitica y reforma constitucio-
nal en Mdxico,(Mexico:UniversidadNacionalAutonomade Mexico, 1994);Alonso
Lujambio,Federalismoy congreso en el cambio polftico de M6xico,(Mexico:Uni-
versidadNacionalAut6nomade Mexico, 1995), 173-9.
10. Lujambioin particular,calls for scholarlywork by listinga multitudeof re-
search questions about the MexicanCongressstill left unanswered.Lujambio,Fede-
ralismo y congreso, 162-4.
11. Close's anthology is not the first of its kind. Its predecessoris Weston H.
Agor,Latin American Legislatures:TheirRole and Influences;Analysisfor Nine
Countries (New York:PraegerPublishers,1971).
12. These are the five functionalroles of the Congressin a democracy,accord-
ing to DavidClose, "Introduction,'ed. Close, Legislatures,2-4.
13. Camp,"Mexico'sLegislature",17-36.
14. De la Garzaargues that the function of Congresswas communication,
legislation, legitimization,and elite recruitment.De la Garzahimself is not dismis-
sive of the function of Congress.A readerof his dissertation,however, could con-
clude that the Congress(at least in 1972) playeda very minorfunctionalrole in the
Mexicanpolitical system.
15. As ElisurArteagaNavaelegantlywrote in 1994, "Thesystems of subordi-
nation [of Congress] have varied. It has been many years since June 1843 when
SantaAnnapreventedCongressfrom meeting;or since 1913 when Huertadissolved
the legislatureand sent to prison a great numberof its members.There is nothing
more to say about the Congressof the Union. It is not nice to speak of the dead. It
is in bad taste."(Translationby author). Clearly,the subordinationof Congressto
the president is a traditiondatingback to the last century.
16. This last point, that strengtheningthe legislatureis a second-order de-
mocratizationissue comparedto the first-orderproblemof ensuringfairelections,
is beyond the scope of this paper but deserves mention. Conventionalscholarly

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302 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

essay demonstrate, however, a strong congress is essential for

checking the over-powerful presidencies which plague Mexico
and, indeed, all of Latin America.
This essay does not seek to break new ground, however, in
proving the necessity of a strong legislature for democracy, for few
would dispute the assertion. The purpose instead is to provoke de-
bate about the role Mexico's Constitution has played and continues
to play in undermining the possibility of democracy in Mexico.
One of the best scholars of Latin American constitutions is
Keith Rosenn, who has attempted to answer the question, "why has
constitutionalism worked so well in the United States and so poorly
in Latin America?"17Rosenn explains that Latin American constitu-
tions look good from a distance but function poorly in practice. I
believe he is only partly right. While he is correct in highlighting
the crucial difference between the law written in books and the
law as practiced in action, I take issue with his unstated assumption
that the constitutions are textually perfect. In the case of Mexico,
for example, the majority of scholars and politicians agree among
themselves (and by implication with Rosenn) that the Constitution
as text serves the country well; it is only the deviations from the
written word in practice that threaten democracy and the rule of
law in Mexico. As I argue below, this faith in the letter of the Con-
stitution is misplaced. But first, a return to Rosenn.
Rosenn's main argument is that particular cultural and political
factors prevent LatinAmerican constitutions from being as effective
as the U.S. Constitution. He specifically cites socioeconomic in-

wisdom since the middle of the 1980s has focused on the problem of elections in
Mexico-with good reason,because elections were neitherfree nor fair.See, for ex-
ample, earlyscholarlyinterestin elections in ElectoralPatternsand Perspectivesin
Mexico, ed. ArturoAlvaradoMendoza(SanDiego: Centerfor U.S.-MexicanStudies,
1987), especially the articleby AlbertoAziz Nassif,"ElectoralPracticesand Democ-
racy in Chihuahua,1985,"192-5. See also WayneCornelius,"PoliticalLiberalization
and the 1985 Elections in Mexico,"in Elections and Democratization in Latin
America 1980-1985, eds. PaulW Drakeand EduardoSilva(San Diego: Centerfor
Iberianand LatinAmericanStudies, 1986). It is easy to see that without reasonably
clean elections democracyis impossible.While questions remainabout the quality
of elections in Mexico, however,by and largethe vigilanceof nationaland interna-
tional electoral observers has reduced the efficacy and likelihood of widespread
electoralfraud.Mexico has consequentlywitnessed an upsurgein opposition repre-
sentationand victories.The challengefor democratizationin Mexicois now how to
approximatean equitablebalanceof powers within the nominallytripartitegovern-
ment. Myargumentsabout the Constitutionaddressthis new greatchallenge.
17. Keith S. Rosenn, "TheSuccess of Constitutionalismin the United States
and Its Failurein LatinAmerica:An Explanation"The Universityof Miami Inter-
American Law Review 9, (fall 1990), 22.

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 303

equalities, the political inexperience of leaders, the misapplication

of foreign models, a lack of society-wide education about laws,
utopian legislation, the inability to check the executive branch, his-
torically poor economic performance, and militarism. Because
these factors play such key roles in Latin American politics, Rosenn
concludes that changing the text of a constitution will do little to
improve government.'8 Again, I argue that Rosenn is partly correct:
His explanation of the variables which weaken stable constitutional
government hits the mark straight on. In addition, he is right to
conclude that altering the text of a constitution can do little to im-
prove basic societal structures which threaten good government.
However, he fails to address the basic problem that the constitu-
tions themselves may be flawed. Setting out to explain the failure of
Latin American constitutions, Rosenn ends up instead explaining
the failure of governments. There is a difference. This essay picks
up where Rosenn left off, by using the example of Mexico's legisla-
tive branch.
My argument is that beyond the already mentioned political, so-
cial, and economic variables, we must be open to, and therefore
study, ways in which constitutions themselves undercut democracy.
I hypothesize that constitutional institutions in Mexico have con-
tributed to an overly presidentialist regime, a political culture of ap-
athy and mistrust of the government, and a one-party system, all of
which combine to prevent democracy.19 Constitutional reforms to
legislative reelection and proportional representation have encour-
aged the political and social factors which political scientists have
already noted as the culprits in Mexico's troublesome political
system.
The following section explains the constitutional reforms to
legislative reelection and proportional representation through a
chronology of changes. Following this, I review the major political
party positions in Mexico and speculate why democratic reform is
not forthcoming. I conclude with a cautionary note about studying
constitutions and constitutional reforms in Latin America.

Reforms since 1917

1917. The 1917 Constitution set up a bicameral legislature con-
18. Rosenn, "TheSuccess of Constitutionalism". 20-30.
19. A critical review of legislative reforms is only one way of studying the
antidemocraticeffects of a constitution.I makea similarargumentin an essay about
the judicial branch. See MichaelC. Taylor,"WhyNo Rule of Law in Mexico?Ex-
plaining the Weaknessof Mexico'sJudicialBranch,"in New Mexico Law Review,
27, no. 1 (winter 1997).

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304 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

sisting of a chamber of deputies and a chamber of senators. The

number of deputies who formed the lower house depended on a
representative formula which varied according to the population.20
Each deputy held office for two years, after which time he or she
could run for reelection. According to the original Constitution of
1917, the Senate consisted of two representatives from each state
plus Mexico City, the capital district. Each senator served for four
years, after which he or she could seek office again.
1933. The year 1933 marks a low point in constitutional reform
to the legislative branch. Much of the blame for the current weak-
ness of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate stems from re-
forms in this year. While constitutional historians in Mexico gener-
ally recognize 1933 as a significant year, few recognize the
transcendental importance of these reforms. The Mexican scholar
Diego Valades is an exception.
Valades demonstrates how the 1933 reform made a strong legis-
lature nearly impossible.21 First and foremost, the reform barred
deputies and senators from seeking direct reelection.22 That is, the
only way they could be reelected was to leave office for a term. To
compensate for this, reformers increased the term in office for
deputies and senators to three23 and six24 years respectively. Re-
formers simultaneously extended the presidential term to six years,
while prohibiting presidential reelection.25
Valades calls the debate that preceded these reforms "one of
the most enlightening which has taken place in the last few
decades of the Mexican parliament."26In order to justify forbidding
reelection, the commission that proposed the series of reforms re-
called the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz,
Withhistoryin hand... we can say thatreelectionin our social and political
milieu is an attackon our democracy;that it is necessaryto oblige the exec-
utive to leave office, as a guaranteeof our freedomof vote; that the govern-

20. If the Constitution called for one deputy per fifty thousand inhabitants, for
example, then the number of deputies grew as the population grew, according to
the latest census. See the Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
Article 59 (original). The original Mexican Constitution of 1917, as well as every re-
form ever made to it, is contained in one invaluable book for constitutional scholars
in Mexico. See Sergio Elias Gutierrez and Roberto Rives S., La Constituci6n alfinal
del siglo XX (Mexico: Las Lineas del Mar, 1995).
21. Valades, Derechos, 83-102.
22. Constttucl6n de Mexico, Article 59 (modified 29 April 1933).
23. Constituct6n de Mxtico, Article 51 (modified 29 April 1933).
24. Constituct6n de M6exco, Article 56 (modified 29 April 1933).
25. Constttuct6n de Mxtico, Article 83 (modified 29 April 1933).
26. Valades, Derechos, 85.

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 305

ment of one man should only last as long as is strictly necessary in order to
avoid despotism; and that no reelection ought to be, with effective suffrage,
the necessary antecedent to preventing imposition.27

The commission took aim at the executive branch, without address-

ing reasons for prohibiting legislative reelection. The reformers rec-
ognized that no precedent existed in Mexico for denying reelection
to legislators. Nevertheless, they argued that the advantages of for-
bidding reelection were self-evident, and argued that reelection
should be banned. Due to its unprecedented nature, the reform was
adopted with an "experimental character," until constitutionalists
could better see the advantages and disadvantages of the system.28
During the debate some legislators saw clearly the intent of the
legislative reforms. Congressional leader Gonzalo N. Santos wrote
later that former President Calles, who ruled Mexico without offi-
cially holding office, intended to strengthen the presidency with
this reform. When Santos objected to the ban on reelection, he was
threatened by party members and told to keep quiet. At the same
time another deputy, Gonzalo Bautista, had argued that the reform
would weaken the already tenuous power of the legislative branch.
Santos and Bautista stood nearly alone among legislators against the
ban on legislative reelection. Hindsight shows how right they were.
It is important to note that the ban on legislative reelection
came at a time of intense power consolidation in the hands of the
Mexican president. Jeffrey Weldon argues that the reform was mas-
terminded by Calles, who meant both to centralize power from the
state and local party organizations into the central party executive
committee, and to centralize the branches of government into the
office of the presidency.29 One year later in 1934, President Lazaro
Cardenas stripped the judicial branch of its power through consti-
tutional reforms which left Supreme Court justices fully depen-
dent upon the presidency.30
Valades criticizes the ban on reelection in the legislature in
three ways. Historically, no tradition existed in Mexico for prohibit-
ing the reelection of deputies and senators. Although the Mexican
Revolution was carried out under the banner of "effective suffrage
and no reelection!" this slogan referred to the dictatorship of Diaz
and a history of power-usurping presidents, not legislators. Valades

27. Valades, Derechos, 84. (Translation by author).

28. Valades,Derechos, 86.
29. See Jeffrey Weldon, "Congress, Political Machines, and the Maximato: The
No- Reelection Reforms of 1933" paper prepared for the Latin American Studies
Association, XVIII International Congress, 10-12 March 1994), 2-3.
30. See Taylor, "Why No Rule of Law in Mexico?"

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306 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

argues that confounding presidential tyranny with legislative reelec-

tion misses the lessons of history. Valades next points out that pro-
hibiting the possibility of reelection forces legislators to seek good
terms with the president in anticipation of their next appointment.
Legislators' obsequiousness toward the president for career ad-
vancement gravely threatens legislative independence. The prohibi-
tion of direct reelection turns out to be an extremely effective way
of assuring loyalty to the resident, a goal the reform's architect,
Calles, undoubtedly had in mind. Finally, Valades notes that the
technical aspects of being a legislator require a period of "learning
by doing," made impossible by a mere three or six years in office.
The professionalism of the nation's legislators suffers because they
cannot learn over time.31
Many of the Mexican legislature's seemingly cultural practices
such as legislative obsequiousness to the president, distance between
legislators and citizens, and party discipline are derived from or rein-
forced by the 1933 ban on reelection. Legislators' abject attitude to-
ward the nation's president, for example, becomes more understand-
able when we realize that every ruling party deputy and senator's job
after his or her term ends depends on the good will of the executive.
Subordination to the president stems from the ban on reelection. In
addition, because congressmen can make no appeal to the electorate,
the prohibition on reelection exacerbates the perceived distance be-
tween legislative representatives and the citizenry. Whether the legis-
lator does a terrible or a wonderful job, the outcome is the same: he
or she leaves office. One's professional fate has nothing to do with
the electorate and, as a result, professional practice has nothing to do
with the electorate.32 Party discipline, a third characteristic of Mexi-
can politics, derives from the ban on legislative reelection because
the legislator's relationships with key officials in his party play the de-
ciding role in creating political opportunities. Political dominance by
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (known by its Spanish acronym
as the PRI) evolved in no small part through the reelection ban of
1933. Because the legislator cannot appeal over the party's dictates
31. Valades, Derechos, 88.
32. The party loyalty in Mexico resulting from the prohibition on legislative
reelection has had peculiar effects on politics. Fear of 'party-ocracy,' the rule of
parties that excludes independent citizen opinion, has risen. A backlash to party-
ocracy has surfaced in Mexico in the last ten years to challenge the rigidity of party
doctrine, both official and opposition. The rise of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and the belief in civil society and 'citizenizing' politics are responses to
this fear. For a further discussion of this phenomenon in Mexico, see Michael C.
Taylor, "Civic Alliance: The Emergence of a Political Movement in Contemporary
Mexico," (senior honors essay, Harvard College, May 1995, on file at Harvard's li-
brary and with the author).

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 307

to his voters, for example, no incentive exists to challenge the party

line. Disloyalty is easily punished. The official will simply not be in-
cluded in the list of candidates for office next time around. The ban
on reelection helps explain the remarkable party adhesion not only
within the dominant PRIbut also within the opposition parties.33
In terms of technical competence, the legislature is relatively
helpless in producing legislative initiatives. In every session of Con-
gress, the legislators must begin anew, learning such basic activities
as parliamentary procedure.34 As a natural consequence, the execu-
tive branch produces over 90 percent of the legislative initiatives.35
Without long-term experience, legislators can hardly expect to ful-
fill their main duty-legislating.
In response to Valades's and my criticisms, it may be argued
that the possibility of legislative reelection in fact does exist. The
ban specifically applies to consecutive reelection to the same of-
fice. Technically, a legislator may leave office for a term, to legally
return to the assembly three years later.36 Or, the legislator may
leave the Senate, serve in the Chamber of Deputies, and then gain
reelection in the Senate for another six years. One example exists
of a husband and wife team who swapped offices every three
years: one served in the state legislative assembly while the other
served in the national Chamber of Deputies, and vice-versa. They
practiced this switch for multiple reelections. These career routes
leave open the possibility of a sort of legislative continuity, in addi-
tion to a process of "learning by doing" in the art of legislating. Be-
sides the institutional discontinuity caused by legislative office-hop-
ping, however, few actually do return to the legislature.37 Political

33. It should be noted that the deleterious effect of no reelection is aug-

mented by the fact that none of the majorparties has a traditionof a primaryfor
candidatenomination.Apartfrom some signs that the PRImay begin to consult its
members in some local elections (as noted in Camp, "Mexico'sLegislature,"33)
party leaders generallymakecandidatenominations.As a result,reinstatingthe pos-
sibility of legislativereelection would not end the problemsof excessive partydis-
cipline, weakness with respect to the executive branch,and the distance between
voters and their representatives.Rather,ending the banwould be justone of a num-
ber of importantchanges.
34. Lujambio, Federalismoy congreso, 174-5.
35. Camp states that over 90 percent of legislation has been executive-
initiatedsince 1976. "Mexico'sLegislature," 25.
36. The ban on direct legislativereelectionis contrastedwith the absoluteban
on reelection for the president. Once having served as president,even as a substi-
tute or an interim officeholder,the Constitutionfirmlyoutlaws reelection, at any
time. See Constituct6nde Mexico,Article83 (modified29 April 1933).
37. Lujambiohas an interestingdiscussion of the legislativecontinuity made
possible by non-consecutive reelection. He acknowledges the work of student
Emma Campos in the investigation. Lujambio Federalismo y congreso, 176-9.

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308 MexicanStudies/EstudiosMexicanos

scientist Alonso Lujambio has shown that in the last three legisla-
tures a maximum of 3 percent of the deputies have previous expe-
rience in the Senate. Less than 20 percent have served as deputies
previously. Since 1933, only 9 percent of PRI deputies have been
reelected to the lower house.38 Lujambio conclusively demon-
strates that the legislatures are not significantly made up of experi-
enced members. A vast majority enter with no previous work as
lawmakers. Instead, after every election the Congress is made up of
almost wholly new members, "eternal amateurs in legislative
work."39
It is logical that without continuity of personnel in Congress,
the legislative branch will never act as an effective check on the
president. No official serves long enough in Congress to develop
loyalty to the legislative body, which explains why so few Mexican
legislators have been willing to try to defend Congress in the face of
a dominant executive. In functioning democracies, the legislative
branch typically depends on its senior members for its leadership.
These distinguished, many times reelected officials have the experi-
ence and the long vision, not to mention the confidence and the
prestige, to stand up to the nation's most powerful person and, at
times, to force the president to back down. In its most naked,
Machiavellian form, this confrontation serves as the division of
powers in a democracy. In Mexico, however, the game of musical
chairs for legislative positions guarantees that no legislator will chal-
lenge the president. The chief executive, in turn, need not respect
the equality of the legislative branch.
Without exaggeration, the prohibition of legislative reelection
is the most injurious institutional arrangement in the entire Mexi-
can Constitution. While a ban on reelection remains in effect, Con-
gress has no chance of checking the power of the chief executive.
And while the president acts without accountability to Congress,
democracy is impossible in Mexico.
The paucity of constitutional literature criticizing the prohibi-
tion of direct legislative reelection is troubling. In his exhaustive
study of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, Felipe Tena Ramirez
treats the ban on legislative reelection with a thundering silence.40
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 175.
40. Tena Ramirez devotes one page and a half to explaining the historical
roots of no reelection for the president, giving the opinion only that the principle
of prohibition of reelection is antidemocratic. He devotes not even an entire sen-
tence to stating that deputies and senators may not be reelected. Felipe Tena
Ramirez, Derecho Constitucional Mexicano (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 1995),
448-50.

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 309

Equally reticent is the usually critical Elisur Arteaga Nava, in a re-

cently published and equally exhaustive study. The constitutional
theorists of Mexico have missed one of the most important expla-
nations for executive dominance over the legislature. The mystery
of their silence deepens considering that almost every official doc-
ument produced by the Mexican government ends with the excla-
mation "Effective Suffrage and No Reelection!" in the place where
writers in English would sign "Sincerely."If most constitutional the-
orists have missed the explanatory importance of no reelection, it
is not because the rule is unknown. It is as if the prohibition of leg-
islative reelection is a terrible embarrassment, which will go away
only if it is ignored completely.
The prohibition on reelection is still in effect today and has
been extended to every state legislature and municipal government
in Mexico. So ingrained is the idea of no reelection that an informal
poll of law school students finds that most believe permitting re-
election of legislators would result in political corruption. It is the
rare law student in Mexico who understands that allowing reelec-
tion is the only way legislators could function as an effective check
on the president. It is also the rare law professor who acknowl-
edges the defect of the ban.
1963. The decades between 1933 and the reform of 1963 rep-
resent the Golden Age of presidential rule and one-party domi-
nance of Congress. No opposition party gained representation in
the legislature until 1940. The introduction of legislative opposi-
tion in that year did not, however, significantly alter the essential
power equation between Congress and the president. Pablo
Gonz'alez Casanova provides the statistics which demonstrate the
degree of "separation of powers" in those days.41 Deputies ap-
proved the vast majority of the president's legislative proposals
unanimously. In the years 1935, 1937, and 1941, all presidential
proposals passed without a single opposing vote. Through 1961,
five percent represented the ceiling on opposition votes to a presi-
dential initiative. In some years, such as 1943 and 1959, more than
ninety percent of all executive-branch initiatives passed unani-
mously.
Reform introduced the system of proportional representation in
1963. While the ban on legislative reelection since 1933 largely ex-
plains the complete dominance of the executive and partly explains
disaffected voters, understanding proportional representation helps
explain one-party dominance and further voter alienation.
41. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, La democracia en Mexico (Mexico: Ediciones
Era, 1978) 31.

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310 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

Table 1: The Golden Age of Presidential Rule

Year %ofpresidential initiatives Greatest %of opposition
approved unanimously vote to any initiative

1943 92 4
1947 74 3
1949 77 3
1953 59 3
1955 62 5
1959 95 4
1961 82 3

In December 1962 the president sent a reform initiative to Con-

gress, introducing a proportional representation system called
"party deputies" to the legislature. Up until 1963 all congressmen
were elected by the system of relative majority, also known as the
"first past the post" system. While opposition parties existed before
1963, they won so little of the popular vote that they rarely stood a
chance of winning a seat, and the reform of 1963 aimed at 'help-
ing' opposition parties.
Through 1976, the PRI had never come close to losing in nine
presidential races, about two hundred and fifty gubernatorial elec-
tions, nearly five hundred senatorial races, and many thousands of
municipal contests. Save between ten or twenty seats ceded to the
loyal opposition, the PRI remained unchallenged in the nearly three
thousand races for representation in the Chamber of Deputies.42
Why did the ruling party want to open up Congress to the op-
position? Three explanations spring to mind. First, given the over-
whelming dominance of the PRI at all levels of political life in
1963, public-relations-minded leaders may have been worried
about the nation's image. A 'democracy' without an opposition, af-
ter all, does not smell as sweet both at home and abroad. Second,
events in 1958 probably spurred leaders to open up Congress to op-
position a few years later. In 1958 violence and repression marred
elections to the extent that the National Action Party (PAN) decided
to leave the Chamber of Deputies in protest. Two of the six elected
deputies from the PAN renounced their position, while the other
four renounced their party and kept their post. The absence of the
PAN between 1958 and 1961, which until then had acted as a very
42. Diego Valades, "Elpoder legislativo en Mexico (1950-1975)" in Evoluci6n
de la organtzact6n polftico-constitucionalen America Latina (Mexico: Universi-
dad Aut6nomade Mexico, 1978), 54.

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 311

convenient 'loyal opposition,' helps explain the reforms made to

the Chamber of Deputies in 1963. Roderic Camp suggests a third
explanation which hindsight makes more clear. Congress's margin-
alized position made it a suitable institutional vehicle for channel-
ing opposition energy without risking any loss of power.43
Help for the opposition arrived in the form of party deputies.
The reform maintained the system of relative majority voting, but
added additional seats for opposition parties on the basis of propor-
tional representation. Five seats in the Chamber of Deputies were
promised to any party which won at least 2.5 percent of the na-
tional vote. For every half percent more of the national vote won,
the minority party would be awarded an additional seat in the
Chamber of Deputies, up to a total of twenty deputies, that is, up
to 10 percent of the national vote. An additional clause limited this
'help' to minority parties. Any party which won twenty or more
seats by majority representation would be ineligible for party
deputies.44
From the perspective of the majority party, the reform was
very convenient. It did not reduce the number of seats which the
PRI could win. This meant that the party deputies came at no cost
in terms of the PRI's ability to award a great number of legislative
seats in exchange for party loyalty. Opposition parties would
achieve some representation in Congress, although only in small
numbers.
The fact that any party winning over twenty majority represen-
tation seats was ineligible for proportional representation seats
acted as an impediment to opposition parties' growing too large. If
a minority party won nineteen seats by majority voting, and an-
other twenty seats through proportional representation (that is, by
winning 10 percent of the national vote), that party could com-
mand thirty-nine seats in total. If the same party won one more ma-
jority voting seat, however, it would lose its right to the twenty pro-
portional seats. In effect, by legitimately winning one more seat in
Congress, a minority party would lose twenty seats.
Constitutional reformers designed the system of party deputies
to keep small parties small. This bias was no accident. The reform
of 1963 represented the first of many attempts by the ruling party
to retain absolute dominance of the legislature while encouraging
the legitimating existence of opposition. It is easy to see that the
dominant party ran few risks with the party deputies, and even

43. Camp,"Mexico'sLegislature," 22-3.

44. All of these are specified in Constituci6nde Mxico, Article54 (modified
22 June 1963).

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312 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

managed to weaken future opposition. Party deputies acted as an

incentive system for creating small opposition parties, diluting op-
position forces. With only minimal support, a group could achieve
representation, thereby fracturing the opposition into splinter
groups.
The reform served as a disincentive to legitimate and growing
opposition. In the history of party deputies only the PAN ever won
its full quota of twenty. It had little incentive to win more votes,
however, because it would lose its right to party deputies upon
winning twenty legitimate seats by relative majority voting. The
electoral system tended to lock in an opposition party like the PAN
at twenty seats.
The system was a political distortion which gave way easily to
corruption. For example, in the absence of legitimate opposition,
the PRI was forced to create opposition. Thus began the tradition,
still in effect today, of nominal opposition parties which receive
nearly all of their funding and support from the PRI. Although it
seems incredible to foreign observers of Mexico, it is an accepted
fact that the need for opposition created a minor industry of small
parties whose only base of support was and still is financing from
the dominant party.
An even more blatant example of corruption caused by the sys-
tem of party deputies was instituted after elections in 1964. Al-
though the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) had not won the minimum
2.5 percent of the popular vote, the Electoral College nevertheless
awarded the party ten seats in the Chamber of Deputies.45 Later, in
1970, when the Party of the Authentic Mexican Revolution (PARM)
failed to win even 1 percent of the vote, the Electoral College
granted it five party deputy seats. Since the newly elected members
of the Chamber of Deputies formed their own electoral college at
this time,46 they could simply give seats to the party of their choos-
ing. A number of small parties still in existence today owe their fi-
nancial birth and legislative representation entirely to the PRI. Be-
tween 1964 and 1972, the PPS and the PARM never got the
minimum 2.5 percent vote to qualify for party deputies, but they
benefitted from the reform nonetheless.47 The Electoral College jus-
tified its actions at the time by recalling the goal of proportional
45. De la Garza, "The Mexican Chamber of Deputies," 67.
46. The newly elected members of the Chamber of Deputies ratified their
own election by forming an electoral college up until Constitutional reform in 1993.
Constituci6n de Medxco, Article 60 (modified 3 September 1993). The Electoral
College system was replaced by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which is still
struggling to establish its independence from the executive branch and the PRI.
47. De la Garza, "The Mexican Chamber of Deputies,' 34.

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 313

representation. Although the PARMhad not complied with the let-

ter of the law by winning the popular vote, PRI deputies reasoned,
the Electoral College would comply with the spirit of the law,
which was to encourage opposition parties. Since the PARMalmost
always voted exactly like the PRI, the diversity of opposition parties
was hardly enriched by the PRI's political largesse.48
1972. So successful were the party deputies from the public-
relations perspective, that the leaders of the dominant party de-
cided to expand the system in 1972. The minimum requirement for
earning seats was lowered to 1.5 percent of the popular vote, while
the maximum number of seats available was raised to twenty-five.
Few opposition parties could win 2.5 percent, but the system
seemed to encourage more to reach the 1.5 percent barrier.
Soon after this reform, however, it became increasingly clear
how the party deputies reforms actually favored a dominant party.
Foreign commentators like Giovanni Sartori noticed the trick.
... the Mexicansystem has seeminglyliberalizeditself with the electoralre-
form of 1963 (as reflectedin the 1964 to 1970 distributionsof seats). Upon
second thought, however, the 20 seat ceiling (lifted to 25 in 1973) assigned
to the minor parties amountsto a fixed barrierthat freezes the secondary
role of the 'out' parties. PANalreadyattained20 seats in 1964 and is actu-
ally penalized by the arrangement:14 percent of the vote correspondsto
9.4 percent of the seats in the 1970 congress,and the ratiodoes not change
significantlyin 1973.49
Perhaps the fact that the system worked too well pushed the major-
ity leaders into further reforms in 1977.
1977. President Lopez Portillo initiated sweeping constitutional
and political reforms in 1977. In the Chamber of Deputies a new
proportional representation formula seemed simultaneously to en-
sure increased opposition and to guarantee continued majority
party domination. The initiative expanded the Chamber of
Deputies to three hundred deputies elected by relative majority
vote, and up to one hundred deputies allocated by proportional
representation.50 Until 1977 the number of relative majority seats
had been determined by a frequently reformed ratio of representa-
tives per population.51 From 1977 to the present, the number of
majority-vote seats has been fixed at three hundred.

48. Valades, Evoluci6n, 54-5.

49. GiovanniSartori,Parties and Party Systems (New York:CambridgeUni-
versity Press, 1976), 234, as cited in Valades,Derechos,93-4.
50. Constituci6n de Mexico, Article 54 (modified 6 December 1977).
51. Constituci6n de Mxtico, Article 54 (as modified in 1928, 1942, 1951,
1960, 1972, and 1974).

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314 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

By setting aside one hundred proportional representation seats

for the opposition, the reformers followed the established pattern
of encouraging the representation of small minorities, while main-
taining the overwhelming advantages of a dominant party. The min-
imum requirement to qualify for proportional representation seats
remained at 1.5 percent of the total vote.52 The law considered any
party which won sixty relative majority seats ineligible for propor-
tional representation and divided the one hundred proportional
representation seats evenly among five electoral regions of the
country. Within the five regions, minority parties were awarded the
number of deputies corresponding to the percentage of the popu-
lar vote they obtained.53 For example, a ten percent vote in one of
the five regions qualified a minority party for ten percent of the
available seats in that region-that is, two seats.
The reform of 1977 also included a safety catch for maintaining
the PRI's dominance in the lower house. Not only would a minority
party be penalized if it won sixty relative majority seats but, addi-
tionally, if two or more parties won ninety or more relative majority
seats, the number of proportional representation seats available
would be reduced by half.54 This clause seemed to say that if mi-
nority parties started to challenge the PRI'sdominance, they would
be thwarted: proportional representation would be cut in half. This
eventuality never occurred because the opposition parties re-
mained very weak. The clause, however, covered all possibilities in
favor of the ruling party, as members of the PRI could never be too
careful when playing with their dominance in Congress. The im-
portant feature to notice about this 'liberalization' of the Chamber
of Deputies was the extent to which the PRI reformers did not risk
any of their power. They created opposition, but they maintained
control.
The PAN understood the discriminatory aspect of the 1977 re-
form as well. In the Chamber of Deputies, PAN party members
complained that even if the minority parties won 89 majority seats,
in addition to all of the 100 proportional representation seats, the
opposition could still only control 189 seats, well shy of challeng-
ing the PRI's domination of the 400 seat chamber. If the PAN won
52. Constituct6n de Mexico, Article 54 (modified 6 December 1977). Begin-
ning in 1977, proportionalrepresentationseats were no longer referredto as party
deputies, perhapsbecause they no longerjoinedthe Chamberas 'extras, but rather
were determinedby a fixed number,one hundredseats.
53. Foran analysisof the 1977 reformssee JorgeCarpizo,"Lareformapolitica
mexicana de 1977," in Los derechos del pueblo mexicano: Me'xco a traves de sus
Constituciones(Mexico:ManuelPorria, 1979) 220-2.
54. Conststuct6n de Mxtico, Article 54 (modified 6 December 1977).

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 315

more than 89 seats they would be eligible for only 50 proportional

representation seats. In this way the opposition would be severely
penalized for mounting any serious challenge to the majority
party.55While such a challenge was never mounted, the PAN's criti-
cism caught the essence of the 1977 reform.
1986. The Chamber of Deputies increased in size again in
1986, when an additional one hundred seats for proportional repre-
sentation brought the total membership to five hundred.56 The
1986 reform instituted the most complicated proportional repre-
sentation formula to date, as well as the most clear constitutional as-
surance of official party domination. The important point is not to
memorize the formula but to see the ways in which it decreased
the likelihood of a democratically formed legislature. Additionally,
it is important to see that insofar as reform guaranteed an opposi-
tion, kept it small, and assured one party dominance, the formula
represented continuity with earlier 'liberalizing' reforms.
The rules determined that any party winning between 1.5 per-
cent and 50 percent of the national vote qualified for proportional
representation.57 A party which won less than 50 percent nationally
and also won a total number of majority seats less than the party's
proportion of the electoral vote would be awarded proportional
representation seats until the total representation in the Chamber
of Deputies equaled the percentage of votes won nationally. No
party had the right to more than 70 percent of the seats in the
Chamber of Deputies. All of these requirements seemed to favor
minority representation in Congress. In this sense the 1986 reform
continued one goal of the party deputy and proportional represen-
tation plans of 1963, 1972, and 1977.
1986 reform also continued-through an even more explicit
manner than usual-the old practice of ensuring the domination of
the party in power by the newly created governability clause. If no
party obtained 50 percent of the vote, the reform stated, the largest
party would be awarded seats until it constituted an absolute major-
ity in the house.58 For those worried about the declining success of
the PRI, this clause seemed to ensure that the party could continue
to dominate even if it won less than a majority of the popular vote.
A second part of the governability clause ensured that any party
which won between 51 percent and 70 percent of the national

55. The PAN's complaint is recorded in Carpizo, "LaReforma', 222.

56. Constituct6n de Mexico, Article 54 (modified 15 December 1986).
57. The reform described in this paragraph is all contained in Constituct6n de
Mexico, Article 54 (modified 15 December 1986).
58. Constituct6n de MWxico,Article 54 (modified 15 December 1986).

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316 MexicanStudies/EstudiosMexicanos

vote would be awarded proportional representation seats until it

comprised a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies equal
to its electoral support.59
The infamous governability clause laid bare the intention of the
majority party to continue its dominance. Awarding proportional
representation seats to an already dominant party runs counter to
any idea of increasing opposition. This reform even more than any
other demonstrated the PRI's paradoxical need to dominate, while
propping up a weak and divided opposition. As one constitutional
scholar points out, the governability clause has no business in a
democratic nation. The last developed nation to use such a formula
was Fascist Italy under Mussolini.60
As with the reforms to the Chamber of Deputies of 1963 and
1977, it was clear who the big winners and losers were. The big
winners were splinter parties with little national support, which
were periodically resuscitated through proportional representation
to present the face of 'loyal opposition.' The other big winner was
the dominant party, which kept its dominance through a formula
which automatically awarded it an absolute majority in the Cham-
ber, in the event of a truly pluralist electoral result. The big loser
was any party which threatened to challenge the dominant party in
elections. Through the governability clause in this case, and other
formulas in previous years, a surging opposition would be cut
down by the Constitution itself. The charter penalized any opposi-
tion party which gained widespread electoral support.
1993. The 1993 reform again changed the mix of majority vote
and proportional representation seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
Reform set the upper limit of the majority party at 315 seats, or 63
percent of the total.61 In addition, any party which gained at least
60 percent of the national vote has a right to the percentage of
seats in the Chamber equal to its percentage of the national vote,
up to a limit of 63 percent. The 1993 reform erased the governabil-
ity clause, which had automatically given the largest minority party
the absolute majority in the lower house.
By erasing the governability clause the PRI currently runs the
risk of becoming just one of many plural groups in the Chamber of
Deputies. If the party wins 60 percent of the national vote, domi-
nance is still assured. Until now, winning 60 percent of the total
has not been a problem for the PRI. The reform of 1993, however,

59. Constituct6n de Mtxico, Article 54 (modified 15 December 1986).

60. Manuel Barquin iAvarez, "Articulo 54, Constituci6n polftica mexicana
comentada (Mexico: Instituto de Investagaciones Juridicas, 1995), 634.
61. Constituci6n de Mxitco, Article 54 (modified 3 September 1993).

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 317

does represent a significant move toward accepting real plurality in

the lower house, because it allows the possibility of several strong
parties. For the first time in decades, the Constitution does not
seem to serve as a disincentive to opposition parties. In a halting
fashion, after years of formulas to ensure dominance, reforms have
begun to allow, and in fact mandate, pluralist politics in the Cham-
ber of Deputies.
It is also important to note that with an upper limit of 63 per-
cent, the dominant party is guaranteed to be at least one seat short
of the two-thirds majority needed for constitutional reform.62 This
limitation is of great significance because it forces the majority into
negotiation with the opposition parties in order to enact further
changes to the Constitution. In fact this process of opposition con-
sultation had already begun a few years earlier.63 The mandate,
however, ensures that the trend will continue, at least in the lower
house.
In the upper house, the reform of 1993 transformed the Senate.
Negotiated by both the PRI and the PAN, the change created a
mixed system of majority voting and proportional representation.
The Senate doubled in size as each state and the federal district was
awarded four senators instead of two, three by relative majority vot-
ing and one to the party which achieved second place in the vot-
ing.64 The new rules for the expanded Senate mean that no more
than 75 percent of the entire body may be controlled by one party.
Applauded by all of the opposition parties, this reform has radically
increased the plurality of the upper house.
Before the 1993 reform, the opposition parties had only rarely
appeared in the Senate.65 The PPS had been 'awarded' a Senate seat
in 1976 because of the PRI's political largesse. But the first real op-
position senators arrived in 1988 with the victory of four senators
from the center-left group which became the Party of the Demo-

62. Constituci6n de Mexico, Article 135 (original).

63. Lujambio,Federalismoy congreso, 162.
64. Constituci6n de Mexico, Article 56 (modified 3 September 1993).
65. The Chamber of Deputies itself recognized the paucity of opposition in
the Senate when it reformed the Constitution. See "Dictamen de las Comisiones
Unidas, Primera y Segunda de Gobernaci6n de Puntos Constitucionales, Tercer sec-
ci6n de Estudios Legislativos y de asuntos relativos al Pacto Federal de fecha 28 de
agosto de 1993, respecto de reformas a la Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Uni-
dos Mexicanos y en lo concerniente al Senado para su nueva integraci6n a partir de
1994, con cuatro senadores por cada Estado y el Distrito Federal, tres de mayoria
relativa y uno de primera minoria," in El Senado de la Republica: Su Restauract6n
en 1875 y Su Presencia Republicana en 120 afos (Mexico:LVILegislatura,Senado
de La Repiblica, 1996), 104.

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318 MexicanStudies/EstudiosMexicanos

cratic Revolution (PRD). In 1991 the PAN won one Senate seat, rais-
ing the opposition in the Senate to five.66 In contrast with the
paucity of opposition before 1993, after the latest reform at least
thirty-two of the 128 senators must come from the opposition-a
significant jump. In the 1994 elections the PRI won ninety-five
seats, or 74 percent. Bearing in mind that the constitutional limit
was 75 percent, the elections proceeded as planned for the domi-
nant party.
It is important to note that similar to earlier proportional repre-
sentation reforms to the Chamber of Deputies, the 'liberalization'
of the Senate includes an absolute expansion of positions available
in Congress. While more opposition seats have opened up, the
dominant party will not likely lose any seats in absolute terms, and
may even gain some. Understanding legislative positions as rewards
for loyalty to the party, this reform inconvenienced the PRI very lit-
tle. As long as positions remain to be awarded as necessary, the PRI
avoids internal struggle. In addition, 74 percent of the Senate still
leaves an ample majority to avoid serious debate or compromise
with opposition parties. Hailed as a liberalization of the Senate by
all parties, it is easy to see how the 1993 Senate reform resembled
the early reforms to the Chamber of Deputies in terms of both en-
couraging opposition and controlling it.

Review of Constitutional Reforms to the Legislative

Branch
After nearly eight decades of reforms to the legislative branch,
what has changed? The Mexican Congress still fails to fulfill its basic
role as a check on the president, as an institution for resolving con-
flict, and as a method of representing the citizenry. Amidst the con-
tinuity, however, is some change. The formulas for ensuring opposi-
tion party representation in the upper and lower houses of
Congress added a new dimension absent in the first half century af-
ter the Constitution went into effect. Most importantly, propor-
tional representation has given opposition groups in Congress a
fighting chance for voicing opinions in the legislature by ensuring
access to seats to dissident groups. Even if the opposition parties
remained systematically subordinated and even if the opposition
members owed their positions to the questionable benevolence of
the dominant party, different perspectives in the legislature are nev-
ertheless valuable. A weak opposition is better than no opposition
at all.

66. El Senado de la Reptblica, 104.

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 319

The current legislative alchemy sets the minimum opposition

representation at 25 percent in the Senate and 37 percent in the
Chamber of Deputies.67 One significant outcome of the upper limit
in the Chamber of Deputies is that the majority party must negoti-
ate for all future constitutional reforms. As a result, constitutional
reform is currently likely to be a compromise between different
groups, as it should be, rather than a part of the political program
of the group in power.
In terms of democracy, however, proportional representation
exacts a heavy cost for minimal benefits. Formulas which ensure mi-
nority representation, while bringing opposition to the legislature,
are at best distorting and at worst antidemocratic. Proportional rep-
resentation in Mexico has strengthened parties at the expense of
the citizens' power, has given a false pluralist image to an authoritar-
ian regime, and has distorted the wishes of the electorate.
Proportional representation, though it has merits, breaks the
link between the candidate and the voters. Citizens may choose
party candidates from an ordered list, of which a certain number
will be elected according to the strength of the party. The result is
that the ability to choose candidates shifts to a small number of
party officials who create the list, removing this power from the
electorate. Citizens do not determine through suffrage which candi-
dates to elect and which to reject. As a result, elected officials owe
their primary allegiance not to the electorate but to party leaders.68
The PRI has always operated according to this top-down model for
choosing candidates. The effect of proportional representation,
however, is to encourage all other parties to also centralize the se-
lection of candidates to a small number of leaders. Given the pre-
sent strength of parties and their legislative discipline, Mexico runs
the risk of creating a 'party-ocracy' rather than a democracy, in
part because of proportional representation.
As a public relations strategy since 1963, proportional repre-
sentation has served the dominant party well. Some could argue
that its continued popularity with the PRI may be due to a gener-
ous-hearted, liberalizing, do-gooder wing of the official party. Per-
haps many in the PRI wish to create a competitive multiparty
democracy in Mexico, regarding proportional representation as a

67. Constituci6n de Mextco, Chamber of Deputies, Article 54 (modified 3

September 1993); Constituci6n de Mxtico, Senate Article 56 (modifed 3 September
1993).
68. Barquin agrees that majority voting allows a more direct connection bet-
ween citizens and the elected officials. Manuel Barquin Alvarez, "Articulo 52,"
Comentada, 618-19.

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320 MexicanStudies/EstudiosMexicanos

useful way to achieve this end. Unfortunately, the proportional rep-

resentation formulas have served the authoritarian wing of the PRI
even better. Proportional representation has been a useful cover for
what has been at base an uncompetitive, unfair electoral system. By
awarding seats to the opposition through proportional representa-
tion, the PRI avoids competition but creates the appearance of lib-
eralization. The fraud of 1964 and 1970, when the Electoral College
broke the law to award opposition seats, represents a most cynical
form of 'liberalization,' and it is proportional representation which
facilitated the charade of opposition representation.
Until 1993 the formulas used to ensure minority representation
have favored the domination of one party, distorting the elec-
torate's preferences. The official justification has been to ensure
that the legislative branch does not become chaotic, or ungovern-
able. In nine elections for the Chamber of Deputies since 1970, the
PRI has been overrepresented by the proportional system every
time except in 1976.69 After the 1994 elections, the PRI was over-
represented by 8 percent in the lower house, which translates to
about forty extra deputies. Meanwhile the PAN and the PRD, the
largest opposition parties, are systematically underrepresented. The
PAN has been underrepresented by the proportional formulas in
every federal election since the inauguration of proportional repre-
sentation, except once in 1988. In that year the PAN and the PRI
benefited at the expense of the National Democratic Front, the pre-
decessor to the PRD. The PRD has been underrepresented by the
formulas in all three elections in which it participated.70
The opposition parties up until now have mostly remained
silent on the issue of systematic underrepresentation through pro-
portional representation. This may be in part because they recog-
nize their impotence to effect change for a more equitable system. I
would also argue however, that theirs is a silence of collusion. For
although proportional representation threatens democratic govern-
ment and weakens the legitimacy of the Mexican Congress, politi-
cal parties in Mexico (the PRI, PAN, PRD, and the others) and their
leaders have generally benefitted in three ways: through additional
positions in Congress, by strengthened internal party loyalty, and
by the centralization of power in the hands of party leaders.
Each reform since 1963 has periodically thrown opposition par-

69. Over and underrepresentationis calculatedby subtractingthe percentage

of representationin the lower house by the percentage of the nationalvote ob-
tained by the party.
70. These statistics all come from calculations in Lujambio,Federalismo y
congreso, 172.

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 321

ties a few additional scraps from the electoral table-a small in-
crease in their minority representation. Thus, the opposition has
been complicit with the PRI's 'liberalizing' policy since the begin-
ning. Opposition party leaders know that they owe most of their
party's legislative positions to formulas ensuring minority represen-
tation. As long as they receive their 'fair share' of guaranteed posi-
tions, they too are more than willing to vote for constitutional
alchemy.71 Second, proportional representation ensures legislative
loyalty to the party because a legislator knows that he or she may
be easily dropped or added to the proportional representation list.
Just as citizens lose the power to select legislators because of pro-
portional representation, so do parties gain control over their mem-
bers. Third and concurrently, party leaders centralize their author-
ity through proportional representation, which enables them to
reward or punish party members without the interference of the
electorate.
As an instrument of patronage, party discipline, and centralized
authority since 1963, proportional representation has been a con-
stitutional pillar of authoritarian rule in Mexico. Proportional repre-
sentation, in sum, brings with it as many problems as solves. There
are good reasons for its existence in Mexico: Without it the opposi-
tion might not have participated in the national government until
very recently. The route to better government in Mexico, however,
is not through increasing proportional representation.
Finally, above all other defects of constitutional reform stands
the ban on legislative reelection. No other article of the Constitu-
tion has done as much to subordinate the legislature to the execu-
tive as "no reelection." Forbidding reelection condemns legislators
to career dependency on their party and the executive branch.72
The ban is partly responsible for the greatest vices of the Mexican
political system: excessive presidential power, distance between
parties and the electorate, and the dominance of one party through
discipline over its own members. Often explained as political cul-
ture, these problems stem from the constitutional reform of 1933.
The United States Congress acts as an effective check on the
U.S. president, preventing him from wielding dictatorial control of

71. It is no wonder, given this constitutionallybasedpartycollusion, that Mex-

ican voters are some of the most disaffectedin the world, mistrustfulof all political
parties.
72. This is not to imply that legislatorsin a democracydo not have strongloy-
alties to their parties or presidents.On the contrary,it is proper and necessarythat
these bonds of loyalty exist. The problem in Mexico is one of degree, not kind.
Dependence and submissivenesshelp nobody.

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322 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

politics. The Mexican Congress enjoys a similar theoretical mandate

to serve as a check on the Mexican president because the Mexican
Constitution enumerates congressional powers and presidential
checks roughly similar to those of the U.S. Constitution.73 The dif-
ference between the experiences of the two countries is that legis-
lators in Mexico lack effective power, prestige, and preparation
because they never serve consecutive terms.
To be sure, it is important to understand the other institutional,
cultural, and historical explanations for the weakness of Mexico's
legislative branch. Legislators lack, for example, professional re-
sources such as staff and library materials which would facilitate
legislating. Because they are nominated by party leaders and not
through a democratic process, legislators typically lack a grassroots
constituency which would give them legitimacy and direction. In
addition, the legislature has no history from which to derive inspi-
ration. Each of these institutional, cultural, and historical factors
weakens the Mexican Congress. I suggest that the effects of each
variable, however, are less influential than the effects of the ban on
legislative reelection.
To forbid reelection constitutionally guarantees that legislators
will be inexperienced, unsure of their career future, and techni-
cally incompetent to produce effective legislation. Thus, to institute
democracy in Mexico, it is essential to end the ban. What is little
recognized in Mexico is that, even if elections became fair and le-
gitimate tomorrow, even if parties became representative, even if a
'rule of law' was instituted and the political assassinations cases
were solved, even if clientelism ended, even if politics took a
whole series of positive steps towards democracy, Mexico's Consti-
tution would still encourage the "perfect dictatorship." Without the
possibility of reelection, the legislature will never fulfill its demo-
cratic mandate.

The Party Positions

Interestingly enough, the two main opposition parties agree on

73. The Mexican Congress has constitutionally vast powers to legislate on all
manner of government business. Congress is responsible for setting the national
budget, approving or disapproving of executive appointments to major positions of
government, including the foreign ministry and the judiciary, ratifying international
treaties, and declaring war. See Constituct6n de Mxtico, Article 73 (modified 31
December 1994). See also El Congreso Mexicano: Estructura, Organizacion, Fun-
cionamtento, Analisis Polttico, coord. Francisco Gil Villegas (Mexico: LV Legisla-
tura, Camara de Diputados, 1994), especially 189-202. See also Cardenas, Transi-
ci6n politica, 79-84.

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 Taylor: Legislative Reforms Have Doomed Mexico 323

the need for legislative reelection but neither makes it a part of

their political platform.74 A number of leaders from the PAN have
publicly called for a return to legislative reelection.75 In private,
they reiterate their belief that legislative reelection is a sina qua
non of democracy in Mexico.76 The leader of the PRD in the Cham-
ber of Deputies presented a speech in favor of strengthening Con-
gress in early 1996. The linchpin of his argument was the reintro-
duction of legislative reelection, although in private he says the
issue is too controversial within his own party to make it part of
the platform.77 Presumably, legislature reelection is too controver-
sial because it raises the specter of presidential reelection, which
has historically produced disastrous results in Mexico.
The most important reason for not pushing for reelection, I be-
lieve, is that top party leaders have nothing to gain and everything
to lose in terms of their control over political careers. Power would
logically devolve from party leaders to the electorate. Citizens
would have control, as they should in a democracy, over the careers
of their representatives. Such a loss of control would be a difficult
change for both opposition and dominant party leaders.

Conclusion
I argue that particular constitutional reforms have prevented
democracy in Mexico by encouraging antidemocratic institutions,
practices, and political cultures. I have sought to provoke debate

74. See the PAN's La fuerza de la democracia: Plataforma Polftica

1994-2000, January1994, and see the PRD's"Losochenta y cuatropuntos parala
transformaci6ndemocraticadel pais,' March1996. PRIleaders,unliketheir opposi-
tion counterparts,publicly and privatelyreject the idea of legislative reelection.
Even liberalmembers of the PRI,who realizethe need for a strongerCongress,re-
ject the idea of legislativereelection on the groundsthat Mexico'selectorate "isnot
readyyet."FlorencioSalazarAdame,Secretary-General of the PRI'sliberalthink-tank
"Fundaci6nMexicanaCambioXXI, 10 April 1996, interview with author.While a
PRIpresident remainsin power, the party has nothing to gain from a strong Con-
gress-except maybe democracy.
75. FranciscoJose Paoli Bolio, "Autonomiade los organos electorales" En
Busca de un Consensopara la ReformaElectoral(Mexico:Centrode Estudiopara
la Reformadel Estado, 1995), 135. The leader of the PANin the Senate, Gabriel
JimCnezRemus, held a press conference calling for reopening the issue of reelec-
tion. "Pidenreelegirlegisladores,"Reforma,(22 November1995).
76. AssemblymanFranciscoJose Paoli Bolio, 27 September 1995, interview
with author; Senator Gabriel Jimenez Remus, 27 March 1996, interview with
author.
77. "DeputyJesus OrtegaMartinez,"DesarrolloInstitucionaldel Congresode
la Union,"speech presented at the Universidadde Guadalajara,February 1996;
Deputy Ortega,27 March1996, interviewwith author.

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324 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

about the role a constitution may play in preventing good govern-

ment. If one accepted my argument, it is logical to suppose that
constitutional reform is necessary to undo the damage and set Mex-
ico back on the path to democracy. Such a simple solution would
be deceptive though; a few constitutional reforms cannot in them-
selves create the conditions for democracy.
There are two main reasons for this, one practical and the other
theoretical. From a practical standpoint, Mexico faces an entire syn-
drome of obstacles to democracy, a number of which were briefly
suggested but not elaborated above. First and foremost, although
progress has been made, doubts remain in and out of Mexico about
whether elections are truly free and fair. In addition, as the discus-
sion above has implied, candidate selection within parties is far
from a grassroots process. The party discipline and centralization
derived from proportional representation and no reelection are
strengthened by the fact that parties do not consult the electorate
when choosing candidates. Third, a tradition of political clientelism
and presidential power will not be quickly washed away by fiat, or
through constitutional reform. The list of practical obstacles to
democracy is extensive, and that means that democratization will
be a slow process.
Perhaps more important, however, are the theoretical reasons
why constitutional reform will not lead quickly to democracy. We
should remember Rosenn's warning that having a good constitution
is not enough to create democracy. As one of Mexico's most distin-
guished constitutionalists, Emilio Rabasa, wrote almost a century
ago,
Law does not have the power to make a democracy;but it does have the
power, absolutely, to prevent it. The Constitution,purged of its errors,
would make popularparticipationin the nationalregimepossible;as it is, it
makes the stabilityof legal governmentimpossible.78
We should not expect democracy to have a fighting chance if the
fundamental laws work against it, as is the case with proportional
representation and the ban on legislative reelection. Mexico has
enough reasons why transitioning to democracy is difficult, if not
impossible. The Constitution should not add to them.

78. Emilio Rabasa, La Constituci6n y la dictadura (Mexico: Editorial Pornia,

1990) 244. Translation by author.

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