Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Secure and Reconfigurable Network Design For Critical Information Dissemination in The Internet of Battlefield Things (Iobt)
Secure and Reconfigurable Network Design For Critical Information Dissemination in The Internet of Battlefield Things (Iobt)
Secure and Reconfigurable Network Design For Critical Information Dissemination in The Internet of Battlefield Things (Iobt)
at time t with degree k and information strand i ∈ for i ∈ {m, mn, o}, ∀m, n = 1, . . . , M . An obvious solution
{m, mn, o}, ∀m, n = 1, . . . , M . for this fixed-point system is Θ(i) (α) = 0; however, it is trivial.
It can be shown that (8) may have at least one solution in
Remark 1. A strand m refers to a message or piece of the domain Θ(i) (α) > 0 depending on the value of α (See
information propagating in the network of devices of type m. Appendix B). The condition for this bifurcation to hold is
By extension, strand mn refers to the inter-layer information E[Ki ]
α ≥ E[K 2 . We show that this bifurcation point is unique in
i]
between devices of type m and n that originates from layer
the domain 0 < Θ(i) (α) ≤ 1 (See Appendix C). Obtaining
n. Finally, strand o refers to the global information that is
this solution in closed form for a PPP setting is not always
shared by all devices.
possible due to the complicated form of P(Ki = k). Hence,
The first term in (5) explains the annihilation of information an approximate solution can be obtained using the following
with time, i.e., the informed devices return to the uninformed theorem:
state at a rate of unity. The second term accounts for the
Theorem 1. If a non-zero solution exists for the information
creation of informed nodes due to the spreading. The rate E[Ki ]
spreading dynamics in (6) and (7), i.e., α ≥ E[K 2 , then for
of increase in the density of informed nodes with degree i]
E[Ki ] ≫ 1, a lower bound approximation of the average
k is directly proportional to the degree, the probability of
probability that a neighbour of a device with degree k is
successful transmission of information α, the probability that
(i) informed, can be expressed as follows:
the node with degree k is not informed, i.e., (1 − Ik (t)),
1
and the average probability that a neighbour of a device with Θ̂(i) (α) ≈ max 0, 1 − , (9)
degree k is informed, denoted by Θ(i) (t). In our case, since αE[Ki ]
the network is PPP, i.e., uncorrelated, Θ(i) (t) can be expressed Proof. See Appendix D.
as follows: As shown in Appendix D, the solution is a lower bound
X kP(Ki = k) (i)
Θ(i) (t) = Ik (t), i ∈ {m, mn, o}, (6) for the true solution and becomes a tight approximation for
E[Ki ]
k≥0 E[Ki ] ≫ 1. In the IoBT network, the physical interpretation
where P[Ki = k] and E[Ki ] are evaluated in Section II-B. of E[Ki ] is the average number of communication neighbours
2) Steady State Analysis: We are interested in determining of a device related to information strand i ∈ {m, mn, o}. It is
the steady state of the information dissemination. To this end, reasonable to assume that E[Ki ] ≫ 1 due to the potential high
(i)
dI (t) density of devices in IoBT networks and hence, the solution
we impose the stationarity condition, i.e., set kdt = 0. It
results in the following expression: presented in Theorem 1 is indeed a good approximation to the
αkΘ(i) (α) true solution. The corresponding solution for the density of
(i) (i)
Ik =
1 + αkΘ(i) (α)
, i ∈ {m, mn, o}. (7) informed devices Iˆk can be obtained by substituting (9) into
(7). The average density of informed devices with information
Notice that Θ(i) (α) is now a constant that depends on α.
strand i can then be evaluated
X (i)as:
Now, (6) and (7) present a system of equations that needs to
ˆ(i)
I = Iˆk P(Ki = k). (10)
be solved self-consistently to obtain the solution for Θ(i) (α)
(i) k≥0
and Ik . In the subsequent section, we deal with the solution
of the dynamical information spreading process for the IoBT
network. B. Secure and Reconfigurable Network Design
Once the equilibrium point for the information dissemina-
tion has been determined, the next step is to design the IoBT
III. M ETHODOLOGY
network to achieve mission specific goals while efficiently
In this section, we first present a solution to the dynamical using battlefield resources. In essence, the network design
information spreading system in IoBT networks and then use it implies tuning the knobs of the network, which in the case
of IoBT networks are the transmission ranges and the node TABLE I: Physical Parameter Ranges.
deployment densities of the different types of battlefield things.
The problem is eventually to find the modes of the intra-layer Deployment Density (km−2 ) Transmission Range (m)
and iter-layer degree distributions of the network. The objec- λmin
1 λmax
1 λmin
2 λmax
2 r1min r1max r2min r2max
tive is to ensure a certain information spreading profile in the 0.1 10 1 40 100 1000 10 500
network while deploying the minimum number of devices and
using the minimum transmit power. Let λ = [λ1 λ2 . . . λM ]T sub-optimal approach to avoid this intractability while still
represent the vector of device deployment densities and r = yielding a plausible solution. Instead of ensuring that the aver-
[r1 r2 . . . rM ]T be the vector of communication ranges of age densities of informed devices Iˆ(i) exceeds the respective
each of the devices in the IoBT network. The minimum density thresholds Ti , i ∈ {m, mn, o}, we impose a constraint on the
of each device in the network, determined by the mission densities of informed devices that possess a degree equal to the
requirements, is denoted by λmin = [λmin 1 λmin
2 . . . λmin T
M ] , average degree of the network. In other words, we ensure that
min (i)
λm ≥ 0, ∀m = 1, . . . , M . The maximum deployment IˆE[Ki ] ≥ Ti′ for some Ti′ < Ti , i ∈ {m, mn, o}. It is reasonable
density of each device, defined by the capacity of the available because the proportion of devices with the mean degree
devices, is denoted by λmax = [λmax 1 λmax
2 . . . λmax T
M ] , contribute the most in the average information spreading. The
max min
λm ≥ λm , ∀m = 1, . . . , M . Similarly, the tunable resulting problem, after substituting the required expressions
transmission range limits of the devices can be expressed as from Lemma 1, 2, and 3, simplifies to the following:
rmin = [r1min r2min . . . rM min T min
] , rm ≥ 0, ∀m = 1, . . . , M , minimize c(λ, r) (17)
max max max max T max min
and r = [r1 r2 . . . rM ] , rm ≥ rm , ∀m = λ,r
T
PM
1, . . . , M . If w = [w1 w2 . . . wM ] such that m=1 wm = 1 2 1
subject to λm πrm ≥ , ∀m = 1, . . . , M, (18)
represents the weight vector corresponding to the relative α(1 − Tm′ )
Cost Function
600
25 120
500 20 100
80
15
400
60
10
40
300
5
20
200 0 0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Threat level, δ Threat level, δ Threat level, δ
(a) Transmission ranges against threat level. (b) Deployment densities against threat level. (c) Cost function against threat level.
30
50
Cost Function
800
25
40
700 20
30
15
600
20
10
500 10
5
400 0 0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Threat level, δ Threat level, δ Threat level, δ
(a) Transmission ranges against threat level. (b) Deployment densities against threat level. (c) Cost function against threat level.
according to the importance of each mission and the path-loss deployment and operation cost of the network, also increases
exponent η = 4. as shown in Fig. 3(c). Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) show that the
transmission range of the commanders is always higher than
the followers while the densities of the followers is higher
A. Mission Scenarios
than that of the commanders. This observation makes sense
In the battlefields, there can be several types of missions as the followers equipped with sensors should be more in the
such as intelligence, surveillance, encounter battle, espionage, total number while the commander network should have a
reconnaissance, etc. In our results, we will focus particularly larger influence area to be able to gather information for the
on the two most common mission scenarios, i.e., intelligence intelligence mission. Another important observation is that the
and encounter battle. Both of them have completely different framework tends to increase the deployment density of the
requirements in terms of the information flow in the network, devices first before increasing their transmission ranges. It is
which are described as follows: due to a high cost of power consumption that tends to force
1) Intelligence: In the intelligence mission, the goal is to the devices to minimize the transmission ranges.
provide commanders with the information from a range of 2) Encounter Battle: In the encounter battle or meeting
sources to assist them in operational or campaign planning. engagement scenario, there is a contact between the battling
It implies that there is a need for strong coordination in the forces. In such situations, commanders need to act quickly to
follower network, i.e., soldiers and other sensors, as well as gain advantage over the opponents. This requires robust infor-
reliable flow of information from the follower network to mation spreading from the command network to the follower
the commander network. The coordination among commander network. Hence, there is a need for strong coordination among
network may not be that critical. Hence, to emulate such an commanders and a reliable information flow from commanders
intelligence mission, we select the following set of information to followers. Additionally, the common status information
spreading thresholds: T1 = 0, T2 = 0.7, T12 = 0.8, T21 = 0, sharing between all network devices must be high to ensure
and To = 0.7. The unit cost of power is selected to be high, accurate decision-making. Therefore, we set the following
i.e., p = 40, which signifies the preference of the network information spreading thresholds: T1 = 0.6, T2 = 0, T12 = 0,
to spend less on power consumption during intelligence. T21 = 0.7, and To = 0.7. In addition, the unit cost of power
The optimal physical parameters obtained for the intelligence is selected to be low, i.e., p = 8, which implies a willingness
mission against increasing threat level δ are shown in Fig. 3. of the network to spend more on power consumption during
There are several interesting observations in the intelligence the encounter battle. Also, we fix the deployment density of
mission. A general trend is that the required transmission the commanding devices as λmin 1 = λmax
1 = 5 km−2 since
ranges and deployment densities increases as the threat level it may not be practical to increase or decrease the number of
increases. Consequently, the cost function, which signifies the commanders during an encounter battle. The resulting optimal
parameters against the changing threat level are presented in follows:
Fig. 4. In contrast with the intelligence mission, the framework P(x ∈ Φm )P(Ko = k|x ∈ Φm ) (22)
tends to increase the transmission ranges of the devices first Now, P(x ∈ Φm ) = λΛm and P(Ko = k|x ∈ Φm ) =
before increasing deployment, in the encounter battle. This 2
exp(−Λπrm 2 k
)(Λπrm )
observation is a result of the lower unit power cost for the k! . Substituting these in (22) and summing
encounter battle. Fig. 4(a) shows that the transmission range over all possible values of m proves the result.
of the commanders and followers increases as the threat level A PPENDIX B
increases until the capacity of the follower devices is reached P ROOF OF U NIQUENESS
at δ = 0.4. To counter higher levels of threat, the framework To prove that the fixed point equation described by (8) has
increases the deployment of follower nodes while the density a unique solution in the domain Θ(i) > 0, we make use
of commanders is fixed as shown in Fig. 4(b). Once the of the Banach fixed-point theorem (or contraction mapping
threat level is higher than δ = 0.7, the transmission range theorem) [21]. We prove that thefunctional
of the followers is actually reduced to decrease power cost as 1 Ki2 αΘ(α)
increasing the device density is directly related to the power F (Θ(α)) = E (23)
E[Ki ] 1 + Ki αΘ(α)
consumption. The cost function for the encounter battle in
experiences a contraction for all Θ(α) ∈ (0, 1]. More precisely,
Fig. 4(c) is lower than the intelligence mission in Fig. 3(c)
we prove that |F (Θ1 (α)) − F (Θ2 (α))| ≤ c|Θ1 (α) − Θ2 (α)|
mainly due to the difference in power cost.
for any Θ1 (α), Θ2 (α) ∈ [0, 1], where 0 ≤ c < 1. The fact that
Many other interesting mission scenarios can be emulated
the constant c is strictly less than 1 implies that the functional
by defining the information thresholds as well as the physically
is contracted. The proof is as follows:
constrained network parameters. Moreover, further insights
can be obtained by investigating the behaviour of the system |F (Θ1 (α)) − F (Θ2 (α))| =
Ki2 αΘ1 (α) Ki2 αΘ2 (α)
with more sophisticated network structure, i.e., more types of 1 1
E[Ki ] E − E ,
devices and their respective roles. However, in this work, we 1 + Ki αΘ1 (α) E[Ki ] 1 + Ki αΘ2 (α)
do not delve into these details since they are specific to the |Θ1 (α) − Θ2 (α)| Ki2 α
battlefield missions and the actual combat equipment used in = E .
E[Ki ] (1 + Ki αΘ1 (α))(1 + Ki αΘ2 (α))
the battlefields. (24)
V. C ONCLUSION & F UTURE W ORK To complete the proof, we need to show that
1 Ki2 α
In this paper, we have presented a generic framework for E < 1, (25)
secure and reconfigurable design of IoT empowered battlefield E[Ki ] (1 + Ki αΘ1 (α))(1 + Ki αΘ2 (α))
K2α
networks. The framework provides a tractable approach to tune Let g(Ki ) = (1+Ki αΘ1 (α))(1+K
i
i αΘ2 (α))
. It can be proved that
the physical network parameters to achieve the desired real- g(Ki ) is concave for Ki ≥ 0 by showing that g ′′ (Ki ) <
time data dissemination among different types of battlefield 0, ∀Ki ≥ 0. Therefore, using Jensen’s inequality [22], we
devices according to the assigned missions. It takes into can say that E[g(Ki )] ≤ g(E[Ki ]), with equality iff Ki is
account the perceived threat level from the opponent as well deterministic. It follows that
Ki2 α
as the costs involved in deployment and operation of combat 1
E <
equipment to provide a robust and cost effective design of E[Ki ] (1 + Ki αΘ1 (α))(1 + Ki αΘ2 (α))
communication networks in battlefields which can be highly E[Ki ]α
useful in military planning. Optimized network parameters are =
(1 + E[Ki ]αΘ1 (α))(1 + E[Ki ]αΘ2 (α))
provided for the two typical mission scenarios of intelligence 1
and encounter battle in which the desired information spread- . (26)
Θ1 (α) + Θ2 (α) + E[Ki ]αΘ1 (α)Θ2 (α) + E[K1i ]α
ing direction is completely opposite to one another. Results
The expression in (26) is strictly less than 1 only if the
have shown that the mission goals can be achieved by either
following condition is satisfied:
changing the deployment of combat units or by changing their
1
transmission powers or both in response to a changing threat Θ1 (α) + Θ2 (α) + E[Ki ]αΘ1 (α)Θ2 (α) + > 1. (27)
E[Ki ]α
perception, according to the design preferences.
The condition in (27) depends on the relative magnitudes of
Although, the IoT is being widely accepted and appreciated
the quantities E[Ki ] and α. Regardless, it reveals that we need
by the commercial sector due to the huge economic impact,
to exclude the values of Θ(α) that are too close to zero. For
the military is still reluctant to adopt this technology due to the
sufficiently large values of Θ(α), it is clear from (27), that
privacy and security issues. The main concern is that without
F (Θ(α)) is indeed a contraction with respect to the absolute
proper safeguards, this linkage of systems provided by IoBT
value metric. Hence, by the contraction mapping theorem,
could be compromised leading to disastrous consequences.
F (Θ(α)) has a unique fixed point in the domain Θ(α) > 0.
Hence, the privacy and security aspects of IoBT are one of the A PPENDIX C
major challenges that need to be addressed by the researchers. P ROOF OF E XISTENCE
A PPENDIX A The non-zero equilibrium solution can be obtained by
P ROOF OF L EMMA 3 solving the following equation:
Ki2 α
Let x denote a typical device in the combined network. The 1
1= E . (28)
probability that device x has a degree k can be expressed as E[Ki ] 1 + Ki αΘ(α)
Ki2 α
h i 1
1
Let h(Θ(α)) = E[K i ] E 1+K i αΘ(α) . We need to find a Exact Solution
0.9
Approximation
solution to the equation h(Θ(α)) = 1 in the domain 0 < 0.8
Θ(α) ≤ 1. It is clear that h(Θ(α)) is monotonically decreasing 0.7
E[K i] = 12.57
for Θ(α) > 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that h(0) > 1 0.6
E[K i] = 6.28
and h(1) < 1 for a unique non-zero solution to exist for the
Θ (α )
0.5
equation h(Θ(α)) = 1. This result is proved below: E[K i] = 3.14
0.4
1 E[Ki2 ]
E Ki2 α = α
h(0) = , (29) 0.3
E[Ki ] E[Ki ] 0.2
Ki2 α
1 1 Ki α 0.1
h(1) = E = E Ki ,
E[Ki ] 1 + Ki α E[Ki ] 1 + Ki α 0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
1 Information spreading rate, α
< E[Ki ] = 1. (30)
E[Ki ]
Ki α
Fig. 5: Accuracy of Jensen’s lower bound.
In (30), the inequality follows from the fact that 1+K iα
<
1, ∀Ki > 0, α > 0. A non-zero solution to (28) exists only if [5] N. Suri, M. Tortonesi, J. Michaelis, P. Budulas, G. Benincasa, S. Russell,
E[Ki ] C. Stefanelli, and R. Winkler, “Analyzing the applicability of internet of
h(0) ≥ 1, which implies that α ≥ E[K 2] . things to the battlefield environment,” in Intl. Conf. Mil. Commun. and
i
Inf. Sys. (ICMCIS 2016), Brussels, Belgium, May 2016.
A PPENDIX D [6] O. Bello and S. Zeadally, “Intelligent device-to-device communication
in the internet of things,” IEEE Syst. J., vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 1172–1182,
P ROOF OF T HEOREM 1 Sept 2016.
[7] J. G. Andrews, F. Baccelli, and R. K. Ganti, “A tractable approach to
Obtaining the non-zero solution for the fixed point equation coverage and rate in cellular networks,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 59,
(8) in closed form is not possible since we need to solve the no. 11, pp. 3122–3134, Nov. 2011.
following equation for Θ(α): [8] M. Haenggi, J. G. Andrews, F. Baccelli, O. Dousse, and
∞ M. Franceschetti, “Stochastic geometry and random graphs for
1 X Ki2 α the analysis and design of wireless networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas
1= P (Ki ), (31) Commun., vol. 27, no. 7, pp. 1029–1046, Sep. 2009.
E[k] 1 + Ki αΘ(α) [9] F. Brauer, P. van den Driessche, and J. Wu, Eds., Mathematical Epi-
k=0
2 demiology. Germany: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008.
e−λi πri (λi πri2 )K
where P (Ki ) = Ki !
i
.
Therefore, we resort to find [10] A. L. L. R. M. May, “How viruses spread among computers and people,”
an approximation for the solution which is asymptotically ac- Science, New Series, vol. 292, no. 5520, pp. 1316–1317, May 2001.
K2α [11] N. C. Valler, B. A. Prakash, H. Tong, M. Faloutsos, and C. Faloutsos,
curate. Let g(Ki ) = 1+Ki iαΘ(α) . Since g ′′ (Ki ) > 0, ∀Ki ≥ 0, “Epidemic spread in mobile ad hoc networks: Determining the tipping
so g(Ki ) is a convex function for Ki ≥ 0. Using Jensen’s point,” in Proc. 10th Intl. IFIP TC 6 Conf. Netw. - Volume Part I. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2011.
inequality, we can say that E[g(Ki )] ≥ g(E[Ki ]), with equality [12] E. Yanmaz, “Epidemic propagation in overlaid wireless networks,” in
only if Ki isdeterministic. This
implies the2 following: IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM 2008), New
Ki2 α E[Ki ] α Orleans, LA, USA, Nov 2008.
E > . (32) [13] A. B. M. Gharbieh, H. ElSawy and M.-S. Alouini, “Spatiotemporal
1 + Ki αΘ(α) 1 + E[Ki ]αΘ(α) stochastic modeling of iot enabled cellular networks: Scalability and
Therefore, we can write (31) as follows: stability analysis,” in IEEE Global Commun. Conf. (Globecom 2016),
E[Ki ]α Washington D.C, USA, Dec. 2016.
1> , (33) [14] D. Stoyan, W. S. Kendall, and J. Mecke, Stochastic geometry and its
1 + E[Ki ]αΘ(α) applications, ser. Wiley series in probability and mathematical statisitics.
which leads to the final solution, Chichester, W. Sussex, New York: Wiley, 1987.
1 [15] J. Dall and M. Christensen, “Random geometric graphs,” Phys. Rev. E,
Θ(α) > 1 − . (34) vol. 66, p. 016121, Jul 2002.
αE[Ki ] [16] A. Marttinen, A. M. Wyglinski, and R. Jntti, “Statistics-based jamming
Using our prior knowledge that Θ(α) ≥ 0, we need to ensure detection algorithm for jamming attacks against tactical manets,” in
that αE[Ki ] ≥ 1. In general, the complete solution can be IEEE Mil. Commun. Conf. (MILCOM 2014), Baltimore, USA, Oct 2014.
1 [17] R. Sanchez, J. Evans, and G. Minden, “Networking on the battlefield:
expressed as Θ(α) > max(0, 1 − αE[K i]
). To measure the challenges in highly dynamic multi-hop wireless networks,” in IEEE
accuracy of this bound, we solve the fixed-point equation Mil. Commun. Conf. (MILCOM 1999), 1999.
exactly using an fixed-point iteration and compare the results [18] R. Pastor-Satorras, C. Castellano, P. Van Mieghem, and A. Vespignani,
“Epidemic processes in complex networks,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 87,
for different values of α and E[Ki ] = λi πri2 . We choose a pp. 925–979, Aug 2015.
fixed ri = 0.2 km and λi = [25, 50, 100] km− 2, which results [19] J. Marro and R. Dickman, Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions in Lattice
in E[Ki ] = [3.14, 6.28, 12.57]. A plot of the results is provided Models. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1999, ch. The
contact process.
in Fig. 5. It can be observed that the lower bound obtained [20] J. Gorski, F. Pfeuffer, and K. Klamroth, “Biconvex sets and optimization
using Jensen’s inequality is tight for all values of α when with biconvex functions: a survey and extensions,” Mathematical
E[Ki ] ≫ 1. Methods of Operations Research, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 373–407, 2007.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-007-0161-1
R EFERENCES [21] J. K. Hunter and B. Nachtergaele, Applied Analysis. World Scientific,
2001, ch. The Contraction Mapping Theorem.
[1] D. Evans, “The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the [22] Z. Cvetkovski, Inequalities: Theorems, Techniques and Selected Prob-
Internet Is Changing Everything,” Cisco Inc., White Paper, 2011. lems, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012, ch. Convexity, Jensen’s In-
[2] The Internet Of Things: Mapping the Value Beyond the Hype. Mckinsey equality, pp. 69–77.
Global Institute, 2015.
[3] “The Internet of Things For Defense,” Wind River Systems, 2015.
[4] N. A. Stanton and C. Baber, Modelling Command and Control: Event
Analysis of Systemic Teamwork. CRC Press, 2008.