1947 Kashmir Invasion by

Pakistan – The Tightening

of Stranglehold

10 SATURDAYJUN 2017
POSTED BY ळाळु क IN END OF KINGDOMS, INDIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA, JAMMU AND KASHMIR, PAKISTAN, POST INDEPENDENCE
HISTORY, UNCATEGORIZED
≈ 2 COMMENTS
These sort of books should not be hidden by the Defence Ministry. These books, where very
serious study is made, in this case, over why Pakistan acted the day it acted and how it
acted to launch a war are a must for detailed study of a subject. And probably, this is the
closest we will ever reach to understand why Qayyum Khan was that interested in invasion
of Kashmir.

ECONOMIC BLOCKADE

While the raiders were securing the dispersal of the State’s army by their hit-and-run
attacks, the Pakistan government was softening up the State by economic blockade. Under
the Agreement, the imports into the State were to be maintained at the normal level by the
Pakistan government. Kashmir’s economy being predominantly agricultural, the State was
dependent on imports for many of the necessities of life. The most important of these were
cloth and petrol, and the State also needed salt and rice from outside sources. Payment for
these normal imports had already been made in most cases. But supplies were held up in
Pakistan. Some of the essential commodities of which the State was being starved were the
following

1. Rice for four months valued at Rs 601,000/-, of which only about 406 tonnes, less
than one month’s quota, was received and the rest withheld
2. Two month’s quota of wheat, 637 tonnes, withheld, as also supplies of gram
3. 189 bales of cloth lying at Rawalpindi were not allowed to be brought in
4. Ten wagons of salt, 206 tonnes, lying at Rawalpindi detained
5. Almost the entire quota of petrol for the State, about 1 75 mn litres and 5000 tins of
kerosene od were withheld
Pakistan also sought to freeze all communications in the State

Lack of petrol immobilised many of the lorry and truck fleets on which Kashmir depended
for its internal transport. On 12 September 1947, the Post Office at Mirpur, under Pakistani
control, refused to accept registered insured covers and money orders One week later, the
railway service from Sialkot to Jammu was suspended. Very soon, the Pakistan Post Offices
within the State refused to operate the Savings Bank accounts of the people and to cash
postal certificates. Cheques from the branches, within the State, of banks in West Punjab
were not honoured, and remittances of money from the Lahore Currency Office for the
Srinagar branch of Imperial Bank were stopped. The people suffered considerable hardships
and trade came to a standstill. With all arteries blocked, a slow creeping paralysis set m
within Jammu and Kashmir

NEGOTIATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

About the end of September, the State government informed the Prime Minister of Pakistan
about the stoppage of essential supplies and requested him to order their release. On 2
October, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan telegraphed a reply saying that they were trying
their best to send the supplies, but due to the disturbances “drivers of lorries are reluctant
to carry supplies between Rawalpindi and Kohala, and it is impossible for us to spare troops
for this escort”. This was a particularly lame excuse, for, as the State government pointed
out, “Military escort for taking European families now here could have escorted petrol supply
[into the State] if local authorities had so desired. Moreover, one petrol tanker had been
turned back actually from the

Pakistan Customs Post at Kohala, while some salt also was stopped by the Pakistan officials
at the octroi barrier on the border of the State.

Very soon the problems of trade and raiding were lashed together. Pakistan, while
expressing eagerness to send supplies, protested strongly against alleged atrocities by the
State’s army on Muslims in Punch and against the reports of armed Sikhs infiltrating into
Jammu. The State government denied both allegations, and asked Pakistan to stop armed
raiders entering the State from Rawalpindi district to loot and murder people within the
State About the frozen imports, it acidly commented that the laudable intentions of the
Pakistan government would not solve the problem when the supplies were actually held up
by the local officials.

The situation deteriorated rapidly The State troops were now in action against hordes of
well-armed raiders all along the Pakistan border south and west of Punch, Fort Owen had to
be evacuated by the State troops on 15 October, the Kotli-Punch road was breached, and
heavy concentrations of the raiders and bitter exchanges of fire were going on around
Bhimbar, Mirpur and Mangla.

On 15 October, therefore, a cablegram was sent to the Bntish Prime Minister detailing the
raiders’ activities and the economic blockade, and requesting him to advise Pakistan to treat
Kashmir with fairness and justice, “consistent with the good name and prestige of the
Commonwealth of which it claims to be a member”. On 18 October, a stiffly worded
telegram was despatched to Mohammad Ah Jinnah and Liaquat Ah Khan requesting them
once again to stop raids into the State from Pakistan territory and send supplies The
telegram concluded that if Pakistan did not stop these raids, the State government would be
compelled to seek “friendly assistance” in fulfilling its sacred duty of protecting its subjects
and frontier. Liaquat Ali in his reply repeated the charge that the State army was killing and
driving out Muslims, which must be stopped immediately, while Jinnah considered it almost
an ultimatum, saying that the State authorities were putting up excuses to join the Indian
Union After the receipt of these telegraphic replies, Mehr Chand Mahajan, the Prime Minister
of J & K State, sent another telegram on 22 October, trying to prove his contention about
the raiders’ activities by quoting messages received from the agitated Hindus of Punch
reporting grave danger from the Pakistani raiders and praying for quick reinforcements to
save the situation.

Before anything could be done in response to their prayer, all hell was let loose in the
Kashmir Valley.

THE INVASION PLAN

The invasion of the Kashmir Valley from Pakistan was planned with meticulous care and
showed considerable strategic and tactical insight. The plan was first to split up the State’s
army into tiny groups by means of hit-and-run attacks all along the long frontier with
Pakistan. In trying to control these apparently uncoordinated attacks, the defending force
was compelled to distribute itself into garrisons of platoon strength spread very thin indeed
along the entire southern frontier. The terrain was hilly and communications primitive, so
this distribution of the State army into innumerable tiny garrisons meant that it ceased to
exist as a strong cohesive force able to offer battle to any strong invader anywhere along
the frontier. The defending army was thus hamstrung most effectually. Vicious communal
propaganda, at the same time, was turned in full blast at the State, and the Muslims in the
frontier areas and in the State army were incited to rebel against the Hindu Maharaja and to
murder their neighbours of the minority community.

The motive behind the Pak invasion of Jammu and Kashmir is not difficult to guess “When
the British transferred power, one of the problems left unsolved by them was that of the
tribal people, and Pakistan had to tackle it. Crores of rupees were spent by the British out of
Indian revenues to appease these people, but the newly-born State of Pakistan could ill
afford to spend so much money on them. Besides, the leaders of Pakistan have made Islam
the basis of modern nationality, and all their high-sounding words would lose meaning if
they treated the tribal people, their co-religionists, in the British way. There was again
another menace growing rapidly in the N W F Province Badshah Khan (Khan Abdul Ghaffar
Khan) started his Pathanistan Movement — autonomy for the Pathans — and they were
afraid lest it should disrupt Pakistan. It had to be nipped in the bud before the movement
lured the Pathans both of the N W F. Province and the tribal areas into one hostile camp.
The urgent need felt by Pakistan to force the issue of Kashmir, and secure its speedy
accession to Pakistan contained the possibility of a solution of more than one problem. To
hold out to the poor tribal people the alluring promise of land and plenty in Kashmir, to give
them a lurid description of the supposed atrocities done to Muslims so that they might be
worked up to fever pitch, and allow them a free run of the beautiful valley-why, this would
secure Kashmir, solve the problem of the tribal people, kill the Pathanistan Movement and
secure Pakistan’s safety and prosperity — all at one stroke”.

With passions aflame, lawlessness rampant and authority paralysed, the raiders struck.
Thousands of tribal warriors swarmed across the frontier, and, like a mighty flood, spread
deep inside the State by every bridle-road and mountain track. The main invasion was
planned and launched by the Army Headquarters of Pakistan and was called ‘Operation
Gulmarg’. Orders were issued through DO letters marked Personal/Top Secret and signed
personally by the British C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, within a few days of Pakistan coming
into existence.

From History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir(1947-48)

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