A Problem in Augustine's Use of the Category

of Relation in De Trinitate V and VII

l. - DE Tvur,c'rn V nN» VII

In Book V of De Trinitote. Augustine seeks to counter the Arian argument that,
since anything that can be said of God is said of him, not in an accidental sense,
but in a substantial sense. God the Father and the Son are distinct substances
(cluidquid de cleo rlicitur ... non secundum ttcc'idens, sed setuntlttnt substarüium
tlic:itttr. De Trin., V, 3, 4).1 Augustine's counter-argument irt Dr: Trin. Y,4, 5-5, 6,
using distinctions made in Aristotle's discussion in the Categnrles of the category
of relation, agrees with the Arians that, because God is unchangeable, nothing
accidental can said of him, btrt asserts that, at the same tirne. nrlt everything that
can be said of hinr is said in a substantial sense (secuntlwn substantittm).2 Thclc:
can be non-substantial divine attributes that are also uon-accidental. "Relation"
(ad aliquid). as in the relation Father-Son, is eternal and non-accidental. But it is
also non-substantial, because "Father" and "Son" are not said of the Father or Srtrr
ad se ipsum. in relation tcl the Fatheror Son thcmselves (in which case they rvotrltl
be substantial attributes). Rather, they are "spoken of in reciprclcal relation to clclt
t'»ther" (ud inuir:em atque ad ulterutrttm istu dic:untur). On the one hand, to hc tlrt'
Father and to be the Son is to be diff'erent (cliuersum). But on the other harrtl, thc
divine substance is not dift-erentiated (tton ... diuersa).

I . An earlier version of this papcr was read at a colloquiurn in the Tübinge r Stift in Ju ly )( X )7. Ir1
kind invitation of the Ephorus, Prof. V. H. Drecoll. I have bene flted fl'orn discnssiotts al I iilrirrr,t rr
and Borcleaux, and especially fiorn the observations of Prof. L. Abranrorvski.
2. I prefer "can be said" to "can be predicated," as it rcminds us that Augustinc. Iikc Arislrrtlt'
inthe Categorie,r, is, in general, talking about things rather tlran abclut nanrcs. ltt tltis plrrirgt:rplr
and elsewherc n De Trin. (e.g. IX,5,8) Augustine is closell,fbllorving tlistrnctiorts ttt;tt[' irr lltr'
Ctttegories, especially Cttt..'/ , 6a36-'7 a3 1 . My lranslation of Augustine's Lltl itt ltcrc is itt llttr'tti r'r l
byARIsToTLE, CotegoriestndDelnterpretotione.trl\tls. J.l..Ackrill.Oxlirrtl. l()(r.1.pp. l7 .'o
 IiS t,llt, llJ)()t)ll
Nolc (ltltl lll lllis slill]c lltt't-c is r)() tlllk ol llrc Iloly Spirit iurrl rts rt.l:rliorr:rl stirltrs.
So rvltrt( ill)()trt i{'/ ('0rrsiclcr th|cc
lrassagcs latcr iir lixrk V. Strrr.l irrg irr V. ll, l2
llrrttt u1r'ls lJ, l9 20. orr thc Holy Spirit as thc gift of Gocl, Arrgusl.irrc p.,iuts
llrrt rvc sPcuk of "thc gilt of tlre giver," ,l,tnrrti drtruttrtri.s, anj..the givcr of the
lilt." tlrtttttlttr dttrti. "iD reciprocal relation to one alrothe r" (relariue uTrtt,tttltra u4
itrrrit t'ttt tlicirrtus). Norv Father and Son are both givers of the gift:
their
Spirit. But they arc also^themselves each "spirit; ancl ,.holy,,'and so eaih
rrs wcll as giver. This gift that thcy share, their t.omtnunict,is
the spirit. It souncls
suspiciously tike a quality rhat they have in common. Augustine
problern, and wrestles with it.
ii aware of the
In V. 12' l-l he adnrits that there is no tcnrl or pair clf tcrms to cxpress ttre
reciprocity of the relation o1'the Spirit to the otherp..ron. clf the Trinity.
It is lclt
like the case .f father-sou. wc can spcak ol the §on,s holy spirit, as paul cloes
in Romuns [J, 9 r.vhen he talks of the spirit of Christ. But we cannot talk of the
Son ol'the Holy Spirit. as if thc Spirit r.vere the Father. There arc indeecl
relatives
rvhere therc is n. term.to,cxpress their reciprocal relation. Augustine
gives the
example of rhe'uvord "pledgc" (1ti,qnus).lt ref'ers to thaf of whicti it is
thä pleclge,
and it is zilways a pledge of s.mething (ulit'rrius rei pignLrs). But whereas
we can
talk of the pledgc of the Father and of the Son, we cannot talk of the Fathcr of
the pleclge or the Son of the pledge. Even the word quintessentially associatecl
rvith the Spirit-donurn
-carnot be usecl reciprocally. §o Augustine äverts to the
donum-dotrutor pair of V l l, 12.
He examines a cosnate pairttf terrns..more pr.olirundll,', (interius) in \l
_- l-5. 16.
Donuttt (gift) and donutun (given) have cliff'erent senses
leven if, lve might a«ld,
they can have the sarne reference). ln what ways can thesc ternrs be
appliecl to the
Spirit'? Nolv in the case of the Son, his generation entails. not mcrely tüät
nc exist.,
but also that he is the son..ls the Spirit qua "given', (co qrut tlotur)'not merely
gift
but also existent'l But, rvhile there can be a
-eift that is not given. tiere calnot be.
"(having been) given" a donotutn, r,vithour ther-e being. giti. sn
is the spirit r.vh6
proceecls cternally a tlottuhile, a kincl of giflpotential,Letbre
anything exisred
to which he might be a "given" (doruttum), arrcr yet, because thc spirit proceeclecl
(tiorn the Father and the son) in orcler to be given, already a gitt,/
Äugustine tioes
not explore rhe concept of a gift-potential, ancl whether ii can ue uppil"a tn
God.
The ar-{ument of this paragraph e,cls in an unacknowleclged rtp,,ric).'
A' c' Llryd nrakes much .f the fact thar Au-vustire says in De Tr-itt.xv. r9. 37
that "the spirit is the lclve rvhich is comrno. t. the Father an«l the son,,(.. . ur
illa
[sc. spirittts sunctusJ tlicutur c'aritus propric, qui spiritus et.t communis ambo_
ärrsJ.3 Lloyd argues that the Spirit is ihui "treated much more
like a quality ol
3. A. C. LLoyD, "On Augustinc's Concept of a person,,, in Augustinc.
A C ollettion o;f Crititttt
R.A. Markus (ed.), New york, 1912, pp.l9l_205, here pp. 200-l (LIoyd ref'ers
1r,rsar.r.
crronc'-
ously orr p. 200 rc XV, 19,36).
IIt(;It.\IlNt'.\ //\/ ()t IIIt (,\Il(;()li't ()1, lil,;l,r|l l()N B9
t
llrc ollre r tw() l)t.ls()ns [rceuuse it is a symnrctric relation," lvhereas the Father-Son
rclation is non synrrnctric. We have noted the tendency to make the Spirit a quality
ol'the «rther persons of the Trinity in the texts fiom Book V discussed above. Now
eut
Augustinc's escape-route in XV, 19, 37 is to say that the love that is the Spirit is
tanramouut to God or the Trinity. just as. rve mi_tht add, in v. ll. l2 (discussed
above). as r'vell as in XV 19, 37, he says that the Spirit rs the commLuzlo of Father
-eifi is the
is gift and Son, what Father and Son share, and that Father and Son are Spirit. But,
Lloyd argues, this will not do, for love (unlike e.g. r.visdom) in Augustine is not a
quality but a relation, appropriate to define a person and not a substance.4 So, does
Augustiue give us no more than, in Lloyd's rvords, "another way of describing the
paratlox. not a soluliorr rlf it".'5
Later in Book V Augustine returns to the question of the relation of the threc
persons of the Trinity, exploring a different terminology. Br"rt the problems do not
lessen. He explains why I-atin speakers/writers use the fbrmula "one essence (or
substance), three persons," undm essentiam trcl substantiom, f res atfiem person(t,\,
when talking of the Trinity. in preference to the Greek "one ott,yio. lhree hltpo.\t(t
sei,s" (V. 8. l0-9, l0). In VIl. 6. ll, discussed further below, he mentions thc tritt
pros()ptt tbrmula, wltich is behind the personae usage. At the end of V, 9, l0 lrt'
qualifies the persorute-tbrmula: it is an atternpt to overcome the inadequacy «rl lrrrr
guage. "Nevertheless. rvhen the question is asked, 'three what?,' human langrlu'r'
labours under an immense deficiency. Yet one has to say, 'three persons,' n()l s()
much fr»'the sake of saying this, as to avoicl being silent" (tarnen cum (ltt(t('t ttut
qtrid tres. iltuslna prorsus inoJtia htmtanum luborat eloquiutn. dictunr (.\t t(ttnt u
rras personae, ilon ut illttd di<'eretur, sad rra tuceretlt).
ln De Trin. VlI,6, ll Augustine maintains that, for God, "to bc" rurrl "1,,1,.
a person" is the same (tton enim alius es't deo esse, aliutl persott(tnt t \\t , \,,1
omnino idem).ln talking of the person of the Father, we are talking ol llrt' I ,rtlr,
r
substance (and likewise of the Son and Holy Spirit), just as rve do rvlr,'rr rr, ..,r
that God is great, good, just. Persona is used ud se (i.e. as a subslirrrli:rl :rttr rlrrrr,
r
Scl rvhy do we not call the
-trinity "one person"'/ Again, as in V, (). lo. ,.\rrlrr.rrrr,
see[rs to say that itis.fuutc dc nicur. We avow (following Scriptrrn') tlr.rt tlr, r, r
a Trinity, that thcre are three. and, so as not to be at a loss tirr worrls rrlr, rr .r .l , ,l
"three rvhat'?," we say "three pcrsons." But Augustine has conl'uscrl lrr',.rr1,rrrrr, rrr
by first asserting in Book V thut rclations in the Trinity are n()n srrlr',1:rrrtr.rl ,rr,,l
then arguing that the ternr that rlcrtotcs lhcsc lc-latiorrs-per.\()n(t is .r ',rrlr'.t,rrrtr rl
attribute.
4. Btrl in [X.2,2 (discussed belolv) AtrgLrstir)(' (li\tinl,rlslr( \ lrr'lrvrt'lr krvt rr:. .rrl' t,rrr, , rr,,l
lol'e as the activity'ola lovinr agent. Yct [-lo),tl is ritlrl lrr tlr('('\l(r)l lhrrl, lor ;\r],rr',rrrr, 1,, ,r,,
entails a relation with the object ot love. BLrt Auguslinc:rlso str'rns l() ir((('l)t l'Lrtrrrrr'. rr r r, ,,, ,
(discussed in Part III below) on the substanlial llr.()l)crty irrvolvt'rl irr clt ry rt'l:rtrorr
5. l.t.()yt). "Arrgrrstine's Concept," p. 202.
 l+0 (,I lillil)()'I),lll v t(;l t,\'I lNl,. {/,\/ ( )t I Iil ( v t.(;( )lil' ( )1, lil"l .ll l( )N I lt
I tl

"\'
Augustine ctlntinues in VII. 6, ll with thc obscrvatiorr tlr;rl, irr llrc uasc
ol llrc zlirrgly, lhat. likc llrt' rrrirrtl. I'rrorvlerlsc irrtrl lovc alc suhstlttccs. Ilc rlocs turl t llrtilv
Trinity, the terms "essence''' "substancc," "person" are nol rcllrlctl
rTlrr gelus irrrrl tlrs lrsscrlion: ciur llc bc irrrplyirrg that knorvledgc anrl lrrvc lurvc urr irlcrrletirlr'n, t'.
species: "person" or "substance" are not the ipecies ofthe genus.rr.,rl.. A
u.it*rc :rs tlrc I)latonic Fclrnts cltil Hc distinguishes bctrveett krvc as substiutcc. rrttrl lovt' irr
essence like God has no species. But Auguitine maintains
that if have thrcc tlrc cvcryday sense as the activity of a loving agent (IX,2,2). Wc clur scc rvlry lrt'
humans of the same sex, of the same phyisical tentperutict (temperament), 've
ancl ol. It'cls that he must talk of three substances in this conte-xt: only so, hc bclie vr's. .':rn
the same aninru (character?)..rve woulit say that they
have the säme u,turu. T^cy Irc pleserve the analogy r'vith the divine Trinity, at once thrcc substunccs rurtl orrt'
are three humans, but exhibit one nature. Is it like that rvith
the Trinity? rt is srrbstance, as the passages in Books V and VII, discr"rssed above. havc algrrctl.
ce,rtainly similar, says Augustine, observing that Latin
theorogians of earlier times
talked of nutura before the time rvhen essintict and, strhstantirr As in these passages from Books V and VII, Augustine atternpts in IX.4. 5 7
became current.(,
trr elucidate Iris position by analogies (friendship; colour and colourc(l ohjctls.
A further analogy is atterrrptecl in vll, 6, Il: three statues macle out
of the irrdivisible bcldies that none the less have parts; liquid substances that are hlcrrtlerl
same block of gord. we wourd not say that the gord
is the ge,us and the statues to fbrm a new substance but whose identities are somehorv retaincd in tlrc blcrrtl;
the species' or that the gold is the species ancl the statues
tie indiuidtrtr.T But in rings made from thc sarne mass of gold). He finds objections to all ol' tlrcst'
any case the Tri,ity is not like that: it is nclt instance
ofone material object being arralogies rvith the exception of the last (itself reminiscent of the gold block/statrre s
clivided into three. The gold statues analogy enables Augustine
,o from the analogy of VII, 6, I l, cliscussed above). But ultimately it is only in logical tcr.rrts
claim that the three persons o1'the Trinity-:arefr.m the "r.up"
iame essence: i.ather, they that he can express to his clwn satistäction the relationship of mind to its krvc urrtl
are of'the same essence (the dilTerence betw'eän eiusdem
es.sentiae antl e;r erclent knorvledge of itself. The logical vcrsion is hinted at in IX, 4. -5 and 1X,4. 7, irrrtl
e'ssentia). otherwise. it would be like s^ying that the
essence is one thing ancr the developed in IX, -5, 8.
persons another thing, as we would in the case of
the gclld statues: the gold is one
thing, the statues another thing. In the case of huma'ns too, In IX,5, 8 it is argued that the three substances-mind, its knowledgc, irrrrl ils
one couicl say that
human nature is one thing, ancl indivicruar humans another love-are inseparable: each exists in itself as well as in each other. it'tltc rrrirrtl's
thing. Furthermore, rve
could imagine more than three statues macle from the same self'-knowledge and self-love are to be fully realized. This is only possiblc il tlrt'r
bloik of gold, or more
than three humans sharing the same human nature. But in are also one substance, and this inseparability ofthe three substanccs ou!ur\ "rr
the .u." o] the Trinity.
tlrere cannot be more than the three persons. and the a rernarkable tvay" (miro itaque nrodo ffiq isto inseparabilio suttt u ,st rrr, ti1tti.t.
three cro ,ot have a greater
physical dirnension (unlike starues) oico.stitute a greater e( tomen eorttm sittgttlurn quidqtte sttbsrantiu est el .sinrul omiliu trtttt .\'ll).\t(tutt(t
nurnber (unlike humans)
than one or two. The three substances or persons are equar uel essentia). How cau Augustine maintain this paradox? Only by asscrlirrg llr:rl
to each individuar
substanc-e or person' tres simur ilrae subsrtt-.ntiae
sirre prr.r'r,,,r,, ... ueqttttres sunt
mind, love. and knowledge are each a singlc substance. "while being spokt'rr ol irr
sirtguli'r.8 The di.stinction.s establishecl in vII,6, ll reciprocal relation to one another" (t'Lrm et rclatiue dicantur utl inrrictrrr) Wt';rrt'
are important, but again they
do not clarify the issue of the spirit's relation to the othlr back with the application of the cliscussion of relation in Aristotlc's ('rttt',qrtt it s llvr
two pers.ns, or the
substance/relation confusion in Augustine,s argument. is found in the account of the Father-Son relationship in V, 5,6, the I'irst l)irssirl'('
discussed above.

II. - Rsr_xrroN AND rus Huvnx MrND rN DE TRrNrrAT.L: lX

III. _ PLoTINUS To THE, RESC]UE./
In De Trin.lx, 4, 5-5, 8 Augustine, in his search for inteiligibre
human triadic
analogies with the divine Trinity, cliscourses on the reiation Lloyd suggests that Augustine uses the argument thnt makes rclativc r»t pr.'r'soIlr I
üetween the human
mind, its knowledge, and its love.e Here, as alreacry in IX, attributes substantial and so turns relations into non-relational propcrtics. lrct'rrrrst'
2, 2, he insists, puz-
he was thinking of the Plotinian ideaof "per se activities involvecl itt rcl:rtiorrs."lo
This refers to Plotinus' critique of Aristotelian logic "fbr fäiling to rccogttizr ;r pt'r

6 Augustine thinking of Hirary? But rve really need s.meone earrier than,
_ .ls
Tcrtullian.
or as early as,

T why this lalter.statenrent'? Presumably Augustine is distinguishing

individual ..lsaac,,fmrn
species "hunran being" ancl genus..animal.,,

8. In VIII, l, I Augustine Contributions on Augustinian Phiktsophy and It.s Reccptioa, M. Vrrrvcrk (c(|.) ( , (':rllurlr,
repeats these claims in summary fbrm.
University of America School of Philosophy F'all l-ecturc Scrir's,2(XXr), to bc prthlislr,'tl lr1'( [ ,'\
have discussed in gleater cretair the passages from Book
^ .9.1 IX in ,.subject ancl .substancc: Prcss.
self-knowledee in Augustrne's on Tlrc Triiitr-," iorthcomins in Augtt.stirte
antl Aa'11ustiniuni.r,,t. lO. l.t .()yt). "Arrgrrslilrc's (\rncept," p. 202.
 ll-l (it:tirltil) O,t)tll,l
\tt(;lt,\llNl'. ',t t/,\/r r )l; llll'; ('Al'l';(;ORY OI" RI'-l.A'l'lON t43
sc".1 511fr51111lliill. pr()perty or activity...
inv.lved in every relation,,', s. thrrt c.g 'lir rcturn to what Plotinus says in VI, 1,6, ll-17, quoted above, about knorvl-
httrrtg or loving another entails per se
hitting or loving.
l-loyd does not ref'er to specific texts crlgc and the object known. The ncltion that knowledge and its object are a single
of protinus. But it is easy to i«rentify substance is farniliar to readers of Plotinus. He makes the same assertion about
texts he is thinking of. Theie are the
orgu-.nr,.f plotinus rorn,r in];,r, eatl;; 'vhicrr
yl. thcrclationof Intellectandbeing,in,forexanrple,thetreatiseV. l,onthethree
I a'd vI, -1, in the long treatise..,n tt".ät
go.i., uu.r genera. There is no eviclcnc.t. hypostascs. Tl.rere, at V, l, 4, 30-5. he says:
that Augustin. *u.. fu',ririor with this
cluestion of his sourccs. Morc interesting
i;#; nor am I concerned here wirrr rrre For untellcct and beingl arc siniultaneous and cxist together and they do not abanclon
ir-the.orr.,purison of his and proti,us. each other, but this onc is nvo things, Intellect and being «lgethcr. the thitrkcr attcl rvhat
approaches to relatecl problems.
is thought. intcllect as thinking, being as that lvhich is thought. For there could not be
Af the begi^,ing of yr: 6 pr.tinus says thirrking rvilhout otherncss. lrnd also samcness.
,,,
that one has ro ask ..rvhetrrer this statc
of being related (skhesis)has any .rurtririiui (hupostusis).,,r2 In VI, I have cited this last text in a moclified version of E,. K. Emilsson's translation.16
Plotinus attempts kr cra's.sify difi-ercnt "*istence r

relate them systematica,y.liThis

ii"är .r substa,ce, reration, etc., ancl t. Emilsscln is considcring the key Plotinus texts on the rclation of Intellect and bein-g:
ry*.-uiiru*n is less important to rny present he does not discuss thc texts fiom VI, I citcd above. but what he says seems to be
co'cern than thc- exanrores rhat prrtinus gives.
one .rr.rr highly rele-vant to those texts. Emilsson is unhappy rvith the cromnron observittion
is that of knowleclge.s ielation to
whai iJkr;;;";, "^uilfi.'i,r'vr.',, 6, fi_rl that. fbr Plotinus, the duality of lntellect is conceptual, r.vhereas it is in reality or.re.
Kn.rvredge rv.urd rndeecr have in reratio, In an attempt to represent Plotinus more accurately, he suggests rvhat he finds tcl
tcl its
existence (ni,n tinu k.ut,t,rtergt.irttt hu1r,,.r,u,ri,r1.rnd object a singre active substantiar be an appropriate analogy:
ra,rra-paaa"i,iu, ir,na-runr" *uy
in reration to its object, antl so'"voulil tt,.
o"tir. to the passi'c. granted thar they ... the rclation betu,een sub.iect and object in Intellc-ct nright bc thought to be anak>gous
acconrprish a single work, ancr the
measure to the measurccr in respect
of rneasuring it. to thtt betwecn such pairs of notions zrs "tcrp and bottonl." "verhal phrase ancl norninal
In vI, r, 12,23-6, wh.ere he.is clealing phrase" as intcrdependent componL'nts of a scntencc. or, perhaps more fittingly, triplcs
with quality and quarification, protinu.s
considers abirities a,«1 d.i-spositi.ns, Iikc "a prorlucer. an iict of procluction. and a product": just as thcre is no product
rike'toxirrg. This kind of quality, he argues,
is "a qualification by being such as rvithout a p|oduccr engaged in an act of producing and no producer engaged in the
it is. but in-so far as it has p«rwer clirectetl
something else it is calrect ability ro kr act of protlueing rvithout sornething being produced, so thcre is no objcct of thought
«io as u r.r.tiu. (1.toiärik.rt pr.^r
not the boxer rerative, and boxing itserf? rll. why then is rvithout a tlrinker r:ngagetl in the act ol thinking ancl ncl act of thinkirrg rvithtrut thcrc
For bo^ing i, altogether directed to bcing an objcct thought o1."17
body else: ,or certainry there is i. part some_
.riir. wrrich is ,ot orher_directecl.,.
The same kind of arqum.ent about "., It is irrteresting that the examples he gives are clf the kincl that Plotinus rnigl'rt havc
cloing ancr being-affected is fbund uscd (he uses active and passive in V l, I . 6, I l-17, cited above) in his discussion ol'
22. And in VI. 3, 28, 4-'8 1tti" conctu.ri,i;, in vI. l,
;?;il r 3) ptorinus surnrnarizes: rclation. The trne-nuny conccpt ol lntellect in Plcltinus-a single essence that uottc
Antl (sc' it hrs bcen said),abour rerulion. thar
it i: a crisporition o, orre thing in rerarion the less contains plural relations-could rvell have scrved as a fruitful rnodcl ol thc
to aDother, and that thcyr4.errter intrr it
is a relation when a disposition of
both r,,gether antr simurtaneously;
a,<1 there Trinitariän essence ancl its internal relations in ALrgustine. if Augustine hacl use-tl
a-substarr..-i-är.", it; trre subst.nce will nor it. For Augustine neecled to take one furthcr step, in order to account fbr a singlc:
rerative as substance. except in so far be
as i, ;r prri"r sorrething-hand or
insttnce-or a cause or a principle .r. un .I"rn",r,.ii head for substance that none the less contains relations lhat.quu relations, do not etlnstitule
its substirnce: the argument of Dt Tritt. V. 5, 6 calls tbr completkrn. Pkrtir.rus hurl
taken that step in Enn. VI, 1. 6: 'And knorvledge ... is related to the obje'ct kttorvtt
... Knorvledge woulcl indced have in relirtion to its ob.iect a single active substunliirl
ex i stence" (m i u n tin u kat' e tr e r g,e i t r n hup rt st trs i n).
I l. LI_oyD. ..Augustine,s Concopt,,,
p. 201 .

l2 ThisandfurthercitationsofpassagesinplorrNus,
Erut.,vr, r-3arctaken,rviths.mc
äl,i'Jffi':lt"l:,1,:H.§::'iil.,; o'; ; il;;;;'s' pLorNrrs vt' ,,,,,oa,
w t.5.
lS.LikeARrs.ro.r,-Einpä1,.rlcs, III, l,and Meruphl,.sics,lV, l-5,butnorinthc rcason that his bcgettirrg ofthe son is substantiill (i.e.. his substancc). rvhcr'.'us the ullribrrliorr ol
Categories. tathcrto hrm is relative" (nequc u«a.s.sisse dici lxiesl uliquid dtrt, ut l,(tl(r.li(r(l: ttt)tt ( ttittt t t't lttt
| 4. I.e. the one thing arrci the other.
l'5 Plotinus'argument in vr, I ancr vr, 3 seems to be the basis of Boethius,position
'li'itritutt' in his /)r,
-5 (rt-r-erred
to by L.Lr)yD, "Augusti,e's cur."pt,..p.202): .,For no accident carr bc s.irr 16. liIr. l Nttt \'.()\ l'h'/irrrr.rttu lnt(ll«/- ()rlirrtl. l{X)7" 1>. l5J.
Io huvc bccrr acldecl to God thar he
migit t".";" i;;il;, for he never begar.r to be farher, lirr tlrt.
I / l,Nilt .,.,r r I /'/,,/ilrrrr lr I \()
 !,1
t,l litlil)()'l),lll
l:lrrl rvlrtrl ol' l.lo_ytl's clirirrr, llrlrl Au!rrslirrt, i:
lll( t('l\ r't\ rrrl rtr ".r16(lt(.t \\,ily
ol tlcsclibirrg tlrc lrar.adox, not a solLllion «rl. it,,./ l.krltl
rrorrl,l \(.(.ur t() lt riglri.
l'clhir;ts Aucuslilrc coultl not succeed in applying
krgie:rI tlrlc.-or ir.s lo lrirrilirri:rn
n)ystcry: hut at lcast he triecl.ts

Gerard O,Der_v
Uni versity College Londorr

La divisibilit6 de l'espöce selon Augustin,

De Trinitate YII

La notiorr de divisibilit6 est fondamentale dans l'argurncntation th6ologique

tlu'Augustin ddveloppe dans le Dt T'rittitate; c'est elle qui Iui permet d'afTirmer'
tlue l'esscnce divine n'est ni une espöce. ni un genre ou, pour le dire en lermes
rrristotdliciens, n'est pils une substarlce seconde, rompant ainsi avec une interpr6-
tation qui a cours dans la patristique grccque, et que Richnrd Cross a nomm6e la
«generic view of Trinityl». L'argument augustinien se r€sume ainsi : I'essencc
rlivine est une et n'est pas divisible, sous peine de trith6isme: les genres et les
cspöces sont divisibles; I'essence divine ne saurait d«rnc 6tre uu universel gdniri-
rlue ou sp6cifique.
Capitale. la notion dc divisibilitc l'est aussi dans I'ontologie du monde sensible
rlu'Augustin esquisse dans son trait6, en ce qu'elle constitue la c16 cle la thdorie
dcs universaux qu'il semble soutenir clans ce texte. C'cst cette th6clrie quc nous
tcnterons de reconstruirc dans la prdsentc contributitrn.
Les trutcurs nioplatoniciens nous ont habituis ä l'emploi d'unc terminologic
lrr6cise pour parler des universaux en distinguant eutre universaux urrre run (les
rnodöles ou paradigmes idiaux qui subsistent dans f intellcct d6miurgique), iir
rt, (les formes participdes, ins6parables de la rnatiöre) et posl rem (les coucepts
abstraits) ou, pour utiliser une autre tcrminologie, ant6ricurs aLr multiple, clans le

I8 An altc|native cottclttsion niight run as fblloivs:

Augustine's assertion at Dc -l rin. vtr.6.
Il ' thal the three substances ()r persorls o1'the Trnity rrre cqriar to caLh sLrbsrancc o[ persor]
t:,irnr.r/ ittue siua p(r.\o,tuc ..- ruqualt,s.tunt.tittgrrli:.),is rll?.r
an ambiguous statcment. It is
Ihc kind of-.tubstdntilc
statemenl that w EMPsoN ara(r"cl in
n., classic.l-rnocler.n litcrary criricism,
,\rt't'tr Ttlta^r ol Atnbiguitt (Lorrdon, 193(): cited ",,,ty
tlonr 3rtl editi66, i9-5ii). ENtpsoN *,nr..rf .,,u.r.,
c()nsiderin-s anrbiguitv in p.erry. Bur rris I . Vcrir R. CRoss. .( On Gencric rncl Delivation Vicu's of Ciocl's Tlinitarian Substlrncc ». ,t( r)rrrslr
tJescriprr,,,rr ,,r .r,, :i"si..i nr'g.un ,rn,r.ut .lournttl of 7'luoktgr,56. 2003. p..16,1-480 et «Two Moclels 6f the Trinity'?». 'lhe Iletthrolt
rlisorcler" ancl of his seven rvpes as "stascs
of advancing"rrülori,l
rrrgicur disortler,,l.t","r, ii7r".r. p. +st ./rruntul.,+3. 1002. 1t.?75 2t)1. Not()ns ccpen.llnl que les Auteur§ !re(s Llrri c()nq()i\ent Il Trinit6
:r.c'clc'ant here. DesPite trre clis.rtlcr. ,r* p.,"rr.
rr. ururyr.; ;;""'r;;;,,ilg: thcy arc e()nrre un Lrniversel ont une conception des universattx raclicalement clifT6rcnte de cclle proposie
r)()1, nor)-sensical. otien they
express the "tiuth" of "-r,"ii."
,rrrhisui(ics. crpressing *,rr^r is a rerisi.us "rrurh..ftrr
a fi:ering ,r, auour,in":, .l.rinitar.ian par Augustin. Il est tirrt probable tluc s'ils avaient compris l'univcrsc'l conrne le dttl'init Augustin
",nnti.rr.
hirn, alc,, ii,,r",,ii"*i,r'u'i:;;.,.
iui l('t tl)üti.h) rnclrrin-ulc,.. bur rr.rcv cr) lcnnc rlc tlivisibiliti. ils auraiettt dgalenrcnt rclirsd cl'applitluel la rtotion tl'univcrsel ij l'essence
tlivirtt'.
 ('ollt't lrorr tlt's lrlrrtlt's Atrltrslirrir'rrnt's

.\t;t'it Arrtitluiti - 192

Collection des Etudes Augustiniennes

I,E DE TRINITATE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN
Fondateurs : I-.-. CnynE t et G. FOLLIET t Ex6göse, logique et no6tique
Ancien Directeur : Jean-Claude F'REDOUII-t.E t
Directer-rr : Fre<d6ric CHAPOT

Ct]nsciI scientifitlue : M. ALEXANDRE, N. BERIoU. A.-I. BOUToN.TOUBOULIC, N. DL]\AL

J. FONTAINE, CI. LEPELLEY. P. PETITMENGIN. V. ZARINI Actes du colloque international de Bordeaux, 16-19 juin 2010,

6dit6s par Emmanuel BBRnroN et Gerard O'Da.ly

Pr6face de Rowan Wtlr,rams

Diffuseur exclusif

BREPOLS Publishers
Begijnhof 67 i-i *'
B - 2300Turnhour (Belgium) L' "'' 'I '
T61.0032 14448020
Fax.00 32 14 4289 19
email : info@brepols.com
rvwr.v.brepols. net Institut d' Etudes Augnstiniennes
PARIS
Comptes Bancaires
2012
Cr6dit du Nord : Banque ING Lille :

Crdclit du Nord Cenrre Aff. Roubaix ING France-Lille

RtB 30076 02919 61068404200 t4
RIB 3043n 00008 33894 0-t 6002 40
tBAN F'R761007 6029 l96l 06ri4 0420014 IBAN rrR76 3043 8000 0833 8940 3600 240 ()trIr,^', l1'tt'iltttlu'\tlt l lttrtttttttItit't't.silttitt',1,'l"r,ttt,',',
I'trl'lt,,tttt
BIC NORDFRPP BIC TNCFRPP ,1, Il'rtlr'rsrtr \lt, lrrl,lt llrttrt,rryrt, li,,t,l,,rtrt;,t,l, ll'tttr,tttlr'rh l'rtnr.\t)) l'!tuttt'11',tttsll)

( ,t -l / ,-, ,,r . , . ( t