Augustine's Cognitive Voluntarism

in De Trinitate 17
Whether or not Augustine discovered (or invented) the will- as he is sorr rclirrrt's
supposed to have done-he certainly found lots of interesting thcorctic:rl rvolk
fbr it to do. In Dc Trinitate Augustine identifies a particularly intercsting ('v('n
surprising-role fbr the will. He tells us that will is an essential c()llrp()n('nt il
our most basic cognitive activities. Every act of sense perception, llc sct'rrrs lrr
claim, and every occurrent act of thinking is partly constituted by an rrt't ol rvrll
Our most basic cognitive acts are in their very nature trinities o1'a sorl: caclr torr
sists in (l) an object toward which cognition is directed, (2) an actuulizrrtiorr ol
the cognitive instrument (the sense organ or the mind's gaze), and (J) rrrr rrt l ol
will which directs the cognitive instrument to the object. Augustinc suggt'sts llr:rt
this trinitarian structure can be found in sense perception, in oul irrrirgirrirrp :urrl
thinking about sensory objects, and in our purely intellective thinking irlrorrl rrorr
sensory objects. There are trinities in our cognitive systems fiom root l«r lr;rrrr lr.
as it were. Moreover, this trinitarian structure is fbund not just at evcly lelt'l ol
human cognition, it is fbund in every cognitive act at each of thosc lcvcls.
Of course the details of Augustine's account matter, and I will look lt thcrn irr :r
moment. But one's first impression, on discovering horv broad and dccp Arrgrrstirrt'
takes will's involvement in cognition to be, is likely to be skepticisrn. Sulcl_y. rr,ill
and cognition interact in significant ways, and their interaction is irrtcglrrl to rrrrv
plausible account of human thought and activity. But Augustine sccnrs lo go loo
far. Is it not the case that many of our cognitive processes function intlcpcrrtlentll,
clf our lvills'l And, even when will interacts rvith cognition, is not thc eoprritr,rrr
itself distinct from any act of rvill with which it interacts? An act ol' will rrriry' r'lrrrs,'
or explain the occurrence of a particular act of cogr.rition or may cxpluirr (('rtiurl
of its features, but that should not lead us to suppose that the cognitivc trt't itst'll
is anything other than purely cognitive. Augustine's account invitcs tlrcse solls
questions.
Augustine's view that an act of will is an essential part clf every hurrurrr e,rrrritrvt'
act is what I call his cognitive or epistemic voluntarisnr. In this papcr I cxrrrrrirrt'
one part of that general view, namely, the claim that, whcrc hurnan cogrrizt'rs :rrt'
concerned, an act of will is an essential part of evcry act of .slrr,r'rrll tolrrrtiorr
Follo'"ving Augustine, I take sensory cogniti«rn to inclurlc scnsc l)crccl)liorr. st'nsor y
l.l(r .\('( ) l "l' ltl.,l(' I )(
nremory, sensory imagination. ancl scnsory thouglrt thal is, 1-rc|ccpliolr. lllcrnoly,
imagination, and thought involving bodics. I bcgin by sctting out Augustirrc's
voluntarism regarding sensory cognition. Then I deveklp the ob.lccti«ln (hat hc
has indeed gone too far in extending will's reach into the very essence ()f scnsory
cognition. I finish by ofl'ering a qualified defense of Augustine's position and
reflecting on what the cost of adopting the line I ofTer might be tbr his larger
project.
I. - THE PROJECT IN DE TRIN\TATE 11
Augustine sets out the views I have ceilled attention to in book ll of De Trinitate.
But betbre turning to the details of the text it will be useful to remind ourselves
of book 1l's place in Augustine's larger project. The preceding book-book l0-
marks a critical juncture in the argument of the work. By the end of book 10
Augustine has, at least in a preliminary way. found what he has been Iooking
for since book 8-the image of God in the human mind: the trinity of memory,
understanding, and will (memoria, intelligantia, uoluntas).1 He suggests there the
significance clf this result, but also records its tentative or preliminary status:
Are we already then in a position to rise with atl our powers of conccntration to that
supreme and most high being of which the human mind (ntens) is the unequal image,
but the inrage nonetheless? Or have we still to clarify the tlistinctions between these
three in the soul by comparing them with our sensory grasp of things outside, in ivhich
the arvareness of bodily things is imprinted on us temporally? (De Trin. 10.19)
A few lines later Augustine answers the questions he raises here:
And so even those r.vho are slolver on the uptake will flnd sorne light shed on these
matters if rve discuss things that corne to our mind (uttinun) in tinre. antJ oce ur irr
it temporally rvhen it remembers something it did not remember before, and sees
something it did not see before, and loves something it did not love befbre. (De
Trin. lO.l9)
Some remedial work is required beftrre rve ascend from memory. understand-
ing, and will to the divine being itself.
Book 11, then, marks a new point of departure, the beginning of a nerv project
that will culminate in books l4 and l -5 with the return to the mental trinity of mem-
ory, understanding, and will, and the step to that "supreme and most high being
of rvhich the human mind is an unequal image." This nerv project in books I l-13
l. Augustine first identifies this mental trinity at De Trin. 10. l7: "Now let us put aside for the
moment the other things which the mind is certain about as regards itself, and discuss jusl these
three. memory, understanding, and will." ln the next p;rragraph (10. l8) he draws the inrportant
conclusion that these three f-eatures of mind are in fact one substance. thereby showing that they
satisty the primary requirement tirr any adequate image of the divine trinity: "These three then,
mernory, unclerstanding, and will, are not three lives but one lif'e, not three minds but one mind. So
it follows of course that they are not three substances but one substance." [Translations here and
throughout are fiom AuGUs'tNE, The Trinity, tr. E. Hill, O.P. Brooklyn, NY, l99l . I occasionally
modify Hill's translation. I refer to passages of De Trin. by book and paragraph numbcr, onrittrrrg
the (redundant) chapter numbers.l
)N tll.l ) Atl( ; U S7.l N l.'S ('OG N ITIV E VO LLt Nl'Alt IS M , \l
takes the tbrm of a characteristic Augustinian asccnt. Auguslirrc tclls rrs tlrrrt lrt'
will start with the outer human being (exterior htnut), that is, tlrc hurruur lrt'rrrli
insotar as it is endowed rvith sense perception through rvhich il clclls lvitlr rxtt'r'n;rl
bodies. the lorvest of all created things. In book l2 he will asccnrl (o tlrt' innt'r
human being (interior homrt)-the human being insofär as it is crrclon,ctl rvrllr
understanding or rational mind-and from the lower function of ntincl. irr [xxrks I .)
and 13, to its highest function-ct'rntemplation-in book l4.l
So book 1l begins the warm-up exercise fbr the main event of thc lttlcr lxroks
of De Trinitarr,. We will be better able to understand the naturc ancl signilicrrrrt't'
of the image of the trinity consisting in memory, understanding. ancl will il ri.'t'
take the tirle to discern the trinitarian structures in sensory cognition lvhclc tlrt'
temporality of the processes lnakes the structures easier to identity rul(l iu'ticul:rl('.
Here is h«lr.v Augustine puts that point in the opening lines of book I I : "As llcst rvt'
can then let us Iook for some model of the trinity (tlnandutn trinituti:s t'.|'lixit,ttr) il
this human being who is decaying; even if it is not a more accurate rnotlcl, il rr:r\
perl.raps be easiel to distinguish" (De Trin. ll.l).
II. - TnrNnrp,s rN SENSoRy CocNrrroN-Sr,NsE PERcrrp'r'roN
Augustine thus begins with sense perception, choosing vision as thc) rcl)r'('s('ntir
tive sensory mcldality. His very first observation identifies three corrstilucnt l)iut\
in the the act of seeing a body:
When rve sec some particular body, there are three thines rvhich rve can vcry r':rsilr
remark and distinguish tiom each other. First of all there is the thing (rt,.r) rvc st't.. ;r
stone or a flame t.lr ar)ything elsc the eyes can sec, rvhich ol course couid crisl crL.rr
before it was seen. Next there is thc seeing (rri.rio), which did not exist hclirrt.ut'
sensed that object presented to thc sense. Thirdly there is what holds the scrrsc ol rlrt'
eyes on the thing being scen as long as it is being seen, namely the nrind's intcrrrr,rrr
(animi intentio). These three are not only manit'estly distinct but rlso ol (lill(.r.rl
natures. (D. Trin. 11.2)
This is the first trinitarian structure to emerge in book 11. By the cncl ol lrook I I
Augustine will have identified threc such structures, all in the outcr hulnirrr lrt'r11'
or, as we might pret'er to put it, all having to do with the processcs 0r ilclivitirs trl
2. "For if we refcr to the rnind's (ntens) inner memory with which it rcrr.rcrrrbcrs ilst'lt rrrrrl
the inner understanding rvith rvhich it understancls itself'and the inncr will rvith *lritlr it Irvr.s
itself-,uvhere these three are simultaneously together and always have bct'n sirrrrrllrrrcorrslr
together from the monrent they began to be, whether they were bei ng thouglrt ilb( )u t ( )r n( )l r u l l r r
indecd seem that the image of that other trinity belongs only «l thc rncnk)rv. Ilrr( lrct urrst. llrt.r,' , rrrr
be no word in it without thought-we think everything we sity, inclurlirrg whut rvt'slry rvrllr tlr;rt
inner word that is not part of any peopie's language-it is rtthcr irr thcsc llrlce th:rt tlri' rn:rl'( r,,
to bc recognized. namcly rnemory, understandirtg. artd rvill" (l)t''liirr. 1.1.lO) lrrrrnrtli;r(t'lt ;rlt, r
this passirl3c Arrgrrsline rcnrinds us ofthe plan he hlrs hccrt ptrrstriru-l sirret.llrt.('n(l ()l ln\)k lo ll
rv:rs lirttt tltis poittl tlr;rt I slrtrtctl, in theclevcrrth l»rxrL, il 1'ou tctltcrttltt'r, l() l('it(l tn) slorvr'l lr.;rrlt.r,,
lhrorrl,lr ,'rrlu:rr,l ,r'rrrrlrlt' tlrilrr,s llrirl :trc scctl witlt lltt'cvt'r."
 r t!
s('tls()ly (()iltliti()tl-l'l'ltc llu'cc vcrticitl colttntrts irr llrt'l:tlrlt'lrt'lor." lrrlttrrllllc tllcsc
lltt.t'c tlirrilitriiril struclttlcs: it) sct.t\c pcrecPlirrrr. se'ns()t-\,nt('il)()ly, iln(l scnsory
{lrorrgltt.
Visual Sonse Pcrception
l ll 2,sl
RES
visrble body (<ttrpu.s Ltisibifu)
l. ri.ihlc hod) (()r it\ lonn
speties crtrprtri.r) impresses
a fbrnr (its Iikeness) in the
SCNSC
2. z.r "begets" li,rlo
3. visible body's nature is that
of body
species I of (l) the tunctionirl role that component plays in the act of perception, (2)tho
VISIO
infbrmed sense: fbrm (fornut).
species (.rpecles) . image ( intu gr t )
in the sense
l. res inrpresses a form in the
sense; the impressed tbrm is a
likeness ol' the res (quutLlunt
i rnogo s i trt i Lli na re i )
2. rri.rlo is "begotten" bY re..
-1.al.rlrr's lurlute ir thal rrl l
Iiving thing (onimans): s<tul
mixed with body
species 2 - couplinp I-
INTENTIOANIMI III.2I
Also called: uoluntus unini
lll.5l. uoluntas u1.5; I1.91,
i nte ntio uoluntct ti s I I 1.7 |
f. inttntio joils [coniungit I
the sense and the rzs: i.e..
directs fadmouel/ the sense
to the res and holds [detinet,
tenet I the sense on the ras
2. intentirt is neither begetlor
nor begotten
3. intcntilr's nature is that of
rnind ()r s()ul lunimus. urtittutl
3. There are three trinitarian structures identitled in book ll. although. for reasons that rvill
ernerse, Augustine explicitly restricts his f'ocuses to just two of the three and calls just tlrose tivo
"trinities."
\1 ( ) l l il \( l)( )N,.ll.l ) t\ll( il t,\ I tNt,\ ( t )( ;Nl l'l)/1. l:( )l,l tN I t\lil,\ltl ) l1)
'l'hc l'ilst colulnn of the tablc "Visual Scnsc I)crccption" r'cprcscnts tltc cusc
Arrgustine hirnsclf lre-eins lvith in tlre passage I have .just quotcd (Dc'l'ritr.ll2).
It is the crase in which we sensc'-in Augustine's example. scc-an extcrnal
co+x)rcal object. Augustine tells us that, in that sort of case-an act of visual
'liinities in the Outer Human Being
scnse percepticln- there are three components: the body that is seen (the res), the
instzrnce of seeing (the uislo), and r'vhat he calls variously the mind's intc-ntion
Sensory l\{emory Scnsory Thought
(intetttio trnimi), the will (Lroluntu.s). and the will's intentio (irrtcntio uoluntati.s).
lll.l6l Iil.6 el
The tlrrec- components äre representcd each on one row in the first column ttl'the
VISIo N,IEN,I0RIA
table. (l take up the details of sccclnd ancl third columns-"Sensory Menrory" and
retairred likeness ( similirudo) of
the pcrccptiblc budy or of it.
"Sensory Thought" later in the paper.)
fctrm (t'orporis, species uisi)
species 2 - coupling l- uisb I l. the fbrm impressed in the
Each bclx in the table's tlrst column lists rvhat I take to be the crucial pieces
sense is in turn inrpressed and of Augustine's account of the trinitarian structure in sense perception. The Latin
tetained irt nttnnrio nanrcs of the trinitarian components appear at the top of the boxes. Immecliately
2. menoriu "begets" lrrrarna belo',v the name is a brief description of that comp()nent, the kind of thing Augustinc
Ltisio
3. mc»rtria's nature is that of
takes it to be. The itcmized list in each box summarizes Augustine's understarlding
mind (unimus)
species3-cquplins2 component's functional role stated in terms that identity that role's place am()ng
MEMORIA INTERNA VISIO the trinitarian relations. and (31 the elelrent's essential nature or substance.
infcrrmed nlental gaze (dcles Norv, in the casc of sense pcrception, Augustine is especially concerned to ar!Lrc
rtconlantis anini)
1.ucies unimi rs infbrrned by for the existcnce and explain the naturc of risio, thc particular act ofseeing. A
likeness in menturil particular instance of visual perccption consists in a certain kind of actualizatiort
?. intertru li.sio is "tregotten" of the sense causccl b;-' the intcrzrcticln of the scnse and the cxlen)al visible botly.
species3-coupling2 by menutriu That interacticln procluccs a lorrn in thc sense. rvhich lcrrm is an image rlr likc-ncss
3. interno uisitt's nature is that
of ninJ (uninus) of thc form of the body. (Augustine's preferred term fbr thc form of the bocly is
spccies-specie.s crtrTruris.) So ui.rlo is thc infbrmed sensc, the sense r,vith a tirrnr
species 1 - coupling 3 - visio 2
impressed in it. Ausustine emphasiz.es that rrislo is not the sense itself. The sc-nsc
is nrlrmally present r.r'hether or not one is actually looking at sonrething (as u'hcn
t'isio I one is aslccp). Visio. horvcver. occurs only when one is actually seeing sornething.
VOLUNTAS VOLUNTAS Moreover, Augustine emphasize's that al,rlo is not the visible botly or the body's
l. t«tlLrntas jctins (copulut) spet'ies. The body impresses a distinct fclrm in the sense; the form impressecl in thc
interna uisio Io rnenutria'. sense and thc form or species in the body are numerically distinct.
i.e., directs (conuertit, .fert
tt rclert) ar'lt'r 1o rvhat is Augustine expects tlrat rve r.vill firrcl it dillicult to distinguish. in an act of visuirl
retirined in nrc»Loriu
2. rutluntas is neither begettor perception, betrveen thc body (or the body's sltecies), on the one hancl, and (hc
nor begotten uisio (the firrm impressed in the sense), on the other. So he devotes c:onsitlcr
3. the nature of uolunkts is able eflbrt to makin-l the case for their distinctness. A signet ring-ALrgLrstirrc's
animus
exanrple impressecl in soft rvax procluces the fbrrn of the ring in the rvax. Tlrat
the lbrm in the ring and thc form in the r'vax are nunrerically distinct is clcar u,hcrr
the ring is removed frorn the rvax: the fornr in the ring rernaius in thc rirrg: thc
firrrn irnpressecl in thc u,ax renrains in the r.vax-trvo numerically clistinct lirrrrrs.
Sirnilarly, Augustine points out. rr signet tint placecl in rvatcr instcarl ol u'ax
procluces in the rvater a fbrrn distinct fiom its rlrvn form. In this casc. ol't'orrlsc.
thc fblnr in the r.vatr-r'clisappcars the rnourcnl the ling is rcrnovctl. []trt il is e lcru,
ArrqLrstinc thinks. that bclilre thc ring is rcrnovctl tlrcrc urc (rvo tlistirtct lorttrs jrtsl
ls tlrerc lut'u.'ltcrt thc ring is itt rvlrx. So rrl,r'ir,. the lilr-rrr rrttlllcssetl irt st'rr.'. ir lr
l.l( ) \( t,ll l\l\( lr()N,\l,l
lirrttt nuntcrically tlistinct lirrnt thc lirrrn in thc boily rvlrrr'lr irrrprr.sst's il lrrrtl ol'
rvhie h it is rr likcrrt'ss ()r iln intirrt'.
Thcthirdcornponentinvisual perception,inadditiontothc/r^randthc uisio.is
an ilct of rvill (the tl.rircl row in the first colurnn). When Augustine first introduccs
thc three-part structure in visual perception (it De Trin. I 1.2) he calls this comp()-
nent intentio animi. Äs he develops his account he calls it simply ttoluntas (wlll)
and intentio Ltoluntutis (lvill's intention).+ The rolc of this component, Augustine
tclls us. is k'r conjoin the external visible body r.vith the sense. or to apply the sense
to the external visible body. The intenio or t«tluntus explains the achievement of
cognitive contact betrveen thc perceiving subject and the perceived object. He
typically distinguishes intuntio's bincling or conjoining activity into trvo kinds:
directing the sense to the olrject-achieving crtgnitive contact, we nright say-and
holding the sensc on the object-nraintaining cognitive contact.5
Now, on Augustine's account. this act of intentio or lvill is an essential com-
ponent of an act of sense perception just as the re.l and the uisio are essential
conrponcnts. Without it, the sense and the object of perception do not join and
there is no pcrception. This is the f'eature that rnakes Augustine's account of sense
perception voluntarist in my sense. As one can glcan from the sec«rnd and third
colurnns of the table, this f-eature is replicated tbr the other sorts of se nsory cogni-
tion Augustine considc.rs in book ll. Hence, his account of sensory cognition in
sencral is v<lluntarist in this sense.
IIl. -'fnrNrrrES rN SENSORy CocNrrroN-SENSoR.r' MEuony
AND SENSORY THOT]C]H].
Befbre I l«rok more carefullv at the rolc Augustine gives the rvill in
sense per-
ception in particular, let me sketch bricfly the place of sense perception in the
rvider account of sensory cognition. In visual perception the will binds the visual
sense to the cxtcrtral visiblc' body with thc result that the body impresscs a fbrrn
(an irnage «rf its or,vn sp<,cies) on the sense. The informed sense is a uisio. an actual
instancc of visual perception. Sense perccption is t'rur basic cognitive activity. and
Augustinc thinks that all our rncntal activity involving boclily images, rvhether
it be lemenrbcring. imagining, or thinking, presupposes sense perception. Hcre's
horv he puts thc point nc'ar the cnd of book 1l :
.{. Sec I)z Trin. ll.5: "This bcing so, let us renrenrber that although these thrce-that is lo sav.
the tbrm of the body (spccit',t torltori.s) rvhich is seen, and its image irnprinted on the sense shich
is sight (al^ria.) or lirrmed selrse, and the mind's will (utluntu,s unimi) tyhich applies the sense t()
thc scnsible thing and holds thc sight on it cliffer in uirturr., they are conrpoundetl into a kintl ol
unity. l...lThethirdli.c,,LrolLrntuszurlinil belongsonlytothesoul,becauscitisrvill (tutluntu.s)."
lttDtTritr. il.TAugustinecallsthethirdconrponentintentioLu)lLrntati,t. in ll.9heirlcntilicsit
agrtin rvitlr u tl uttttt.t.
t
5. Scc. c.g.. thc passaqc frorn /)r,Trin. ll.5 quotecl in the prcvious notc.
) r\ II(|I l.\' I' I N l'.'.\' (' ( )( ; NI l l V l'. V( ) I -l / N'l'A l? I S M ).1 I
l'flhe reason no one can think about anything botlily unless hc ltrs sensctl il is tlrrt rro
one rcrnembers anything bodily unless he has senscd it. So the Iinrits ol thrrrkirrg rrrt'
sct by the memory.iust as thc limits of sensing are set bl borlies. Ilrc scnscs leccrrt
the tbrm (:pct;ies) of a thing from the body u,e sense. the memory reccilr:s it fhrrrr tlrt'
senses, irnd the gaze of the pcrson rvho is thinking (ocies cogitunti.r) lront the nronl()r',!.
(Dt'frin. 11.11\
The chain of transmission sketchecl in this passage--from basic sensory c()ntrcl
rvith boclies through sensory memory to thought about bodies-is represcntcrl irr
thc three columns of the table, proceeding fiom leti to right. In appropriatc corrtli
tions, the Ltisio in rvhich visual perception of a visible body consists (ctllurnrr l.
row 2) is recorded in memory. That is to say, the fbrrn irnpressed in the sensc by llrc
visible body is retained in memory. The secorrd colutnn represents the thrcc-plrrt
structure that constitutes the retention of the form in memory. The fclrm impressctl
in the sense is lrorv the object, thc mcrnory is the recipient of the tbrm-rvlrll is
intormed by that fbrm-and the rvill oncc again exercises its bincling functiorr.
conjoining that tbrm and the memory (or applying the mernory to the firrm). 'l'lrt'n'
is transmission fiorn sensc perception to \ensory memory precisely becausc llrt'
fbrn'r lvhicl'r is the object of the act of retention in sensory memory is thc s:rrrrc rs
the fbrnr impressed in the sense in visual perceptiorl-the fbrm in columrr l. r'os' -)
is numerically the same as the fbrm in column 2. rorv l. The form now lc(r.rrllv
rctained in memory (column 2. rotv 2) becomes. in turn, the object of occrrrrt'rrl
sensory thouglrt (colun.rn 3. rorv l), ancl so there is transmission fnrnr scns()r'y
lnemory to sensorv thought.
Aurgustine introduces thc notions of sensory menlory and sensol'y tlrouslrl irr /),'
Trin. 11.6, on analogy."r,ith the analysis he has give of sense perception:
For even rvhen the lirrm of thc hody is takcrr arva1, rvhich rvas per-ceived by thc hotlilr'
scnses, therc remains a likeness ol it in thc memory. to rvhich thc rvill can again trrrn
tlre gaze (u<it'nt)tct be fornrccl by it fiom rvithin.just ls (he scnse rvas tirrrled llorrr
r'vithout by the sensible body presentcd k) it. And so one gets anothcr trinity. out ol tlrc
nrenrory ancl internal sccirrq flirlr,rrrrr uisio) alntl thc lvill rvhich couples them toccthcr.
(DaTi'irt. ll.6)
In the right circuntstartces, once rve have lookecl at thc signet ring (tilr exanrplc ).
u,e retain an image of the ring in memory. and by virtue of the presence in n.rcnroly
of that irnage. we are able, when the ring is no longer present to the scnscs. l()
remenrbel it zrncl to think abclut it.6
6. 'l'here is an ambigLrity in the term "remernber" herc. On thc onc hancl, to r-cnre rrrhcr lhe sigrrr'l
rirrr's appearance is actuall,r, to recall it. that is. to bring rt to mind (occurrcrrlly). 'l his is §lrrrt
Augustine |cfers to in this contcxt as thinking about it (rrr,girrrrr,/or-l}lrvirrg il in tl](]u!.ll( (ii r , ,),q/
totion() rvhat I ant calling "scnsory thought." On thc other hlrnrl. lo rcrrrcrnbcr lhc srlrrt t rrrn' r
rppcurzrnce is sinrply to hare rctaincd its appcarartcc in orrc's r)lenr{)ry {tlisposiliorr:rllv). rrlrirlr
is a ncccssluy cortrlitiorr tirr. htrt not the samc as. hrirtuirtq il otctrllcrtll\ lo rrrirrrl. l'lrir is rrlrrl
Attgrrslirrt' inl('n(l\ ir lllis contcxt rvltcn hc s1,lclrks ol lurvin! sorrrcllting irr orrL"s nr( nror\ ulr;rt I
.ll)) ( illllrll' r'lt'.. 'l \ rrl, lrrr \
'l
 t.ll \'('( ) t"t hl.l('t )( )N,v t) ll t( ;ll,\'l lN1, ( ( )( ;NI I tYt, t'( )l.lIN'I'ARt.\M -l lt
"\'
rvhen Augustirlc says in Dc'l'ritt. ll.(r tllrt "onc gcls rrnollrcr tr.irrily.,rrl
-Ncrw. Lct us lirllor'v Augustirrc, thcn, in leaving asidc the lrritldlc colurrrrr irrrrl lotrrs
of the mcmory and internal seeing ancr the lvirl lvhich c,lL,prc, trrcrn ltuclrrcr,"
rre orr lhe third colurnn-"Sensory Thought." Augustinc gocs on in ll.(r to skcltlr :r
is ref'erring to the trinity in sensory thought-thc third c«rlirnrn ol
tlrc tablc. S. hc ckrsc analogy between the trinity he has fbund in sense pcrccptioll arrd thc trirrity
is,,in this passage, skipping over the process clr activity rcprcscntccl in
thc secorrrl Irc wants us to recognize in sensory thought:
column of the table. It is only at the end of book I I th"rt Augusti,e explicitly
iclc,- Instead of the form of the body (species corprtris) which rvas sensed outsitlc. lhcrc
tifies this mediating rhree-part structure (at De Trin. I l.l6j, and he iells
us thcrc now appears memory retaining that form (speciem)rvhich the soul drank in thr-ough
why he has lefi it out of his.account, ancl rvhy he does not corrsicler it a
thircl trinity the sense of the body; and instead ofthat seeing (alsio) rvhich was outsidc whcrr lhc
altrngsidc thc other two. Il is hecause thcre is no conscious or ot.currenl
cogniti.n sense was being fbrmed from the sensible body. we nor.v have a similar seeing rvilhirr
r'vhen the sensory form is recorcled or stored in the memory.
or as he puts it, therc when the mind's gaze (acies animi) is formed from what the mcmory retains, antl
are just trvo seeings, uisione';. in sensory cognition: ,rn" rri.,", absent bodies are thought aboü (t:ogituntttr); antl the same will that in thc l'irst case
we perceive a bocly
with the scnses and one rvhen we think about it, having previouiry perceivecr applied the sense for formation to the body presented to it outside and kept rt joirrcrl
it.
The mere retaining of the sensory tbrm in the memo,y i, ,ut acc,rnpanied to it once lbrrned. now turns the recollecting mind's gaze to the niemory so that lthc
by mind's gazel might be formed from what the memory has retained, and sorlething likc
li'rlo' Hcnce, Augustirle tells us, he wanted to call to our attentiol just trvo trini-
seeing might occur in thought (in c'ogitatione). (De Trin. ll.6)
tics: the ones represented in the first ancl thircl columns of the table.
Augustine is less than lully explicit in book r l about his reasons tbr
In this case, as in the case of sensory or external ursio, Augustine argucs (lrirt
thi,king the form retained in memory and the form which intbrms the mind's gazc (.r( l(,,\
that thc occurrcncc of uisio is essential to an act of sensory cognition,s
counting unimi) in an act of sensory thought are two distinct individuals. So, whcrr I lccirll
as a rnodel of trinity. But it would be reasonable to suppose ttrat
tre is moved the signet ring I once sa'ü and think about it, an act of will directs rny rrrirrrl's
by thc idca that conscious, occurrent cognitive acts are, in'comparison
rvith their gaze toward the image of the ring stored in memory and holds the rlirrtl's glzt'
corrcsponding cognitive dispositions. Iully actualizecl instances of their
kind. To on that image with the result that the gaze is infbrmed by a numerically clislirrtl
occurrently think of a signet ring one has previously seen is for one,s
cognition likeness of the retained image. Augustine concludes, then, that in the chuirr llrrrl
of it to be fully realized, for .ne to bc fully cognizant of it. By contrast. to have
extends from sense perception through sensory thought there are: Iour clil'li't't.lrt
the signet ring (or its image) in one's memory fwhen n.t thin[ing of it) is
not tcr .\pecies or forms: the form of the external body, the form impressed in scnsc, llrt'
be l'ully cognizant «rf it but rnerely t. be clispösecl to a fully actuaiizeil
cognirion. form retained in sensory memory, and the form which informs the mind's gazt'. ln
or to put the idea the nther rvay rouncl: the form retainecl in ,lr"-,r.y is not tutty
ex;rressecl or articulated until it is actually thought.T
addition, there are three difTerent couplings (the boxes in the second row ol errt lr
column), and two different uisiones.S (I have enumerated these in the tahlc. rrt tlrt'
bottom of the relevant boxes.)
Now, recall that the announced agenda for book I I was to look for moclcls ol llrt'
trinity that might prepare us fbr the more difficult but also more adequatc irrr:rgt.
of the divine trinity that consists in memory, understanding, and will. Augustirrt.
has now identified two trinities in sensory cognition. Each is a modcl ol'trirrity
'Ihis
7 way of characterizing ai^rro-as fully realized cognition-fits r.vith Augustine's
Iater that "Ihere catl be no word.lrr'rht.utt) it't
remark by virtue of possessing or approximating three essential trinitarian credcntitrls:
inrenr,,r1l rvithout thought (sinr: t.ognitiont),,' pre- (a) each trinity has three distinct members,e (b) the three members in cach rrinily
sunrably becausc the firrm mcrely retained in mcrnory is not fully,expressecl--not
yet.,spokcn,,
in the.rvay in u'hich thinking constitutes the speaking of an inner ivord. constitute a kind of unity, and (c) the three members in each trinity are rclatctl to
Of course, conceivi,g .f
thought as the (inner) uttL:ring ofan inner rvord gives Augustine a critrcal one another in trinitarian ways, namely, as begetter, begotten, and conjoining r,vill
link bctrvcel his or.vn
theory of'mind. ivhich he hopes rvill uncover thc image of thc clivine
trinit)' in humirn boings, (or love).
ancl cxplicit biblical rellection on thc clivirre persons ui.l ,h"i,
trinitarian relarions. .l.he rclcvant
passagc is fKlm 1Jc'!'t'itt. 14.10: "Because there can he n<i rvorcl (Lrcrhtrn)
in lrnemoryl rvith.ut
tlrought (.rüra «tgttitionc) rvc think everl,thing rve say. inclucling what
rvc say r.vith that in,cr
rvord thät is not part of any people's language-it is raihcr in thesc
thrce that tliis image is to be
recognizcd. namely rnetnory. uncicrstancling. and ri,ill. Ancl hcre I
mcan the understandins wc
understand rvith as lve think. that is rvhen things are brought up that
rvere to hand in lhe mern.ry
bttt r'vere not bcing thought about, attd our thought is firrmed fionr thcrn;
ancl the rvill or lovc or
estcem l tnean is the one that.ioins this otfspring to its parent ancl is 8. See De Trin.11.16.
in a certain measurc colrnlo.
to lhern btlth." Austtstine is here talking about intellcctivc (rather than
sensory) thoughl. but t6c 9.'fhis is one reason rvhy Augustine is particularly corrccnrecl l() afgue llurt rri,rlo is ir lorrrr
threc-part stl'tlcturo in the trvtt cases is the same. Moreover. the emphasis
on occurrcrlt llr().ght tlistittcl liorrr lhc lirrttt ttf the object which impresscs it. Hc nccds lhc dislirrct lirrrr irr ortlu to 1't'l
(t rt,qilttrt) is corrrnr<ln to thü two catscs.
lltrcr: tttcrttlx'ts (iilr(l l() g('l thC begcttcr-bcgotten lclation).
l.l,l \( ( )l t lt.\t l)()N \l ,l ) (,)( ;Nllll l'. V()l.llN'l'Altl'\M
,,1 \
^tl(itl,\'IINL',\'(
ol rvill's rolc itt visual perceptiOn scenls roughly plirtrsihlc itt (ltcsc sotls ttt t'rt:t's
IV. AN OelucltoN 'l'cl Crx;Nt't tvri V()r .lN'rAr{rsM (Sclmething similar is ihe case for sensory thought. Il I ask y()u t() thilrk ol llrc
gitt"t toru.r. you may <1o it, prompted by my requcst. delibcrately. Bttt I rtttt lcilr'
I turn nolv to Atrgustine's clairn that will is involvcd in cverl' act of scnsrlry ing sensory thought aside for present purposes.)
cognition binding the cognitive power to its object. For present purposcs I tbcus
It is clear, horvever, that not all cases of sense perception are like thesc tlritt is.
on the case of sense perception in particlrlar.
cases in tvhich rve exercise voluntary control over perception. A significilrll artlotll)l
Augustine has what we might call extrinsic reasons fbr tinding will in sense
of our perceptual experience Seems to occur without our exercising any cotttrol ol'
perception. (By "extrinsic" reasons I mean reasons that are not also reasons fbr I artt
this sort .)u.i it. If you are attentively looking at my hand counting the fingcrs
thinking that the view in question is true.) Recall that he is looking for ruodels just behind me a portion of the ceiling collapses and lirlls to tltc
holding up and,
of the trinity in the outer human being and that models of the trinity minimally will it visually whether you want to or ll()1.
t1oor, yoriwill notice it; you perceive
require three members constituting a kind of unity that are suitably trnalogous to
uelle iotte,we might say. The sudden activity in your visual fielcl will irttract
yottr'
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit-begetter, begotten, and the love that proceeds fiom Thcrc itrc.
perceptual attention and you will visually perceive the falling debris.
and is cclmmon to both. Love, the distinguishing characteristic of the Holy Spirit,
nf .ou.ra, goocl evolr,rtionn.y ..otnnt for this: there is obvious survival valttc itt
is an act of will. So if there is rvill in these acts of sensory cognition, then there
possessing-perceptual Systems that monitor the environment. detect chatrgcs. rtlrtl
is in thern sornethirrg in some way analogous to the Holy Spirit. Moreover, the
iesult in Ägnition without requiring volitional comtnand or response' Tht' srttttc
is
divine love binds the persons of the trinity together. an activity analogous to the If celling collapses in the back tlf thc t'txrttl
true for othir sensory modalities. the
role Augustine attributes to will in sensory cognition. So if will is integral in the
and falls to the floor rvith a crash, the sound will attract your attentit'rn witltotrl
way Augustine claims to the sorls of uisio that characterize sense perception and (lrrrl
your needing cleliberately to direct your auditory attention to it. It seems' thctl'
scnsory thought, tlren those cogrritive activities \vill better model the members and entirely on their own. without intcrvcttli()rr
our sensory processes sometimes act
relations in the diviue lrinity.
from will. if Augustine's account requires the activity of will in every act ol'scttst'
Moreover. Augustne is convinced that the way we see things, the rvay we cog- perception, then his account does not conform to the facts'
nize the world, is deeply nrorally inflected. What we see and believe is explained
in part by r'vhat we care ab<lut, whzrt lve love. l0 Cognitive eror. therelirre, is otien So appeal to clear cases irt which we exercise voluntary contrcll ovcl' scrls('
a manit'estation of moral disorder and. by building acts of will into the very nature perceptl;n is uot enough to establish Augustine's universal claim about lhc rolc ol
of cognition, Augustine is in a better position tcl explain hor.v this should be so. ll *iff in sense perception. Moreover, on reflection, it might seem that cascs ol lltc
sort I have mäntioned--deliberately clirecting one's eyes to',vards a visiblc ohiett
But docs rvill in fact functicln in thc r,vay Augustine claims it does in these cogni-
in order to see it, fbr example-are in fact ir:relevant to Augustine's thcsis llis
tive processes? Let us start with sorne easy cases. lt seems clear that we sometirnL's
thesis is that an act of will is essential to, partly constitutive of, any act ol'scttst'
exercise direct voluntary control over sonre of or-rr perceptual acts. If I say to you,
perception. But the cases I have mentioned do not make the act clf will itlvolvt'tl
"Look at my hand; how many fingers I arn holding up'/" you rvill likely, prompted
.rr"niiut to the act of sense perception but only an external cause of it. Just ils rrry
by my request, intentionally direct your vision toward my hand in an effrrrt to
wtlking from the corridor into my office in order to be able to see what is ott ttt.\'
gather thc infbrrnation necessary fbr ansrvering nry question. If you drr s«r, it seems
desk dJes not make my walking constitutive of my seeing the book on the dcsk.
st I
plausible to claim that your will has directed your sense toward a particular visible will explains how my eyes come to be directed at the strrl ircc
the tact that an act of
body-my hand. Similarly. if I am looking for rny book and remember leaving
of my desk cloes not make that act of will essential to my seeing what is ott tltc
it on rny desk, I will direct my vision torvard the surface of the desk in search of ly
desk. goth my walking and my voluntarily directirrg my eyes seem to be rncre
my book. In cases like these, one looks deliberately, intentionally, or voluntarily:
external causes of my act of perception.
rny visual perception is under my voluntary control. The account Augustine gives
Moreover, Augustine's account faces a related soft of problem. Many non-httttlittt
animal species appear to have perceptual experiences similar t() ours. Prcsultlithly.
the correct account of their perceptual experiences will be similar to lhc corrc(l
10. Materialists about reality are materialists in part because they love bodies excessively and,
account of ours. But unlike human beings. non-human animals do nol l)()sscs:i
corrsequently cannot recognize or conceive incorporeal things. See, e.g., De 7'rin. lO.7 9 and
lvills, ancl so Augustine'S account of human sense perceptitltt cannot bc e x(ctttlctl
u.6.
to cover non-human animal perception.l2
ll. See, e.g., De Trin. ll.5: "The will exerts such fbrce in coupling the two together that it
applies the sense to be fbnned to the thing that is being looked at and holds it there oncc it is
fbrmed. And if it is violent enough to be called love or covetousness or lust, it will even deeply
affect the rest of the living being's body." 12. PcteI King suggestecl this clifficulty in a workshop tlisctlssion ll ('ornt'll irr l(X)()
 ).1(r
\( t)ll ll.l('l)()N,,ll.l
V. Two Rt:t't .ilrs
I can see two stratesies for defending Augustine's account against these objec-
tions. Both invcllve weakening his claim that will is integral to every instance of
sense perception.
The first strategy acknowledges that serrse perception sometimes occurs auto-
matically, as it were, rvithout the intervention of will. But on this strategy, although
the occurrence ofthe sensory experience is beyond our control, the persistence of
the experience beyond a very short period tirne is not beyond voluntary control.
That is because it is generally open to us. virtually as soon as lve become aware
that we are having a sensory experience, to terminate it. As soon as I become aware
that the falling debris has caught my visual attention, it is open to me to divert my
gaze or close my eyes, thereby bringing this particular visual perception to an end.
Moreover, if I do not terminate the experience at the onset of my arvareness of it,
but it was Itevefiheless open to me to terminate it from that point, then the persist-
ence of the experience thereby becomes voluntary, and it's reasonable to claim
that it is now my will, rny consent, rvhich is responsible for the conjunction of the
sense with the sensible object. so on this strategy, it need not be the case that the
will initiates the conjunction of sense and object, but if it permits the persistence
of the conjunction when it could terminate it, the will can be said to be responsible
lor the persisting conjunction. I 3
My second strategy fbr def'ending Augustine's account, like the first, lveakens
the role of rvili in the account of sense perception ancl acknowledges that sense
perception sometimes occurs automatically, apart fiom will's activity. But this
strategy might seem tcl weaken the role of rvill in sense perception still more
clrarnatically. This second strategy takes its point of departure from a brief renrark
Augustine rnakes in De Trin. 11.2 together with a f'elv similar rernarks in De
Genesi ad litteram.
Here is the idea: when Augustine first introduces the three elements in his
account of sense perception (in I 1.2) he identifies the thircl part as the intentio
animi. Yery soon thereafter he refers to that element using locutions involving
the term uolwüas, suggesting that intentio animi is to be understood as will. But
suppose we ignore the use of uoluntas in these passages and take our lead tiom
the expression itientio anlrnl. Augustine appeals to the notion of al intentio animi
in many of his works: it is an important idea fbr him, though a precise meaning
for it is difficult to pin down. Nevefiheless, the term intentio suggests somethin!
13. This strategy might be suggested by what Augustine says at De Trin. 11.15: "Just as it is the
rvill which joins sense to botly, so it is the will which joins memory to sense and the thinker's gaze
to memory. And what joins them together and assembles them also disjoins and separates them.
narnely the will. It is by movements of the body that it separates the senses of the body fro6 thc
bodies to be sensed. either to avoid sensing or to stop sensing something; as when rvc. shut eur cyes
or turn them away from something we do not want to see.,,
) All(;ll,\ I lNl,\' ( (/(,t\"I I ll l,. l'( )l.l IN l'Altl,\ll| ).t t
likc dircctcrlrlcss ()r tclcological oricntation. If rvc pick up thlt rrrcarrirrg. tlrcrr tlre
itttuntio animi might be something tike the rmirrd's dircctctlrrcss ol tlrc rrru«l's
orientation towards an end or a telos of sorne sort.
Now focusing on just that idea, leaving aside any questions about aclivitics ol
the will, consider what Augustine says just a ferv sentences furthcr aklng irr I 1.2
I{e has just been explaining that the bodily instrument (the eyes. in thc casc he
is considering) which is the sense (in this case, the sense of sight) is a part ol rr
f iving body (the eyes) mixed with the soul (anünu). That is rvhy an affliction ol'tlrc
relevant body pat can affect the sense:
When sonreone goes blind through sonre affliction of the body this sensc is cut o1f arrtl
extinguishcd, but the rlind (animu,s) remains the samei ancl though its intenlion. norv
that the eyes have been lost, has no sense of the body which it can join in the act ol'
seeing (r.r1.slo) to a body outside, and keep its gazc fixed on it once seen, noncthcless
it shows by ils very exertions (ni.r./r) that it neither perishes nor even diminishes rvith
the loss of the bodiiy sense: a kind of desire (t1uidum oppetitu,\) to see rcnrrins intact.
rvhether this happens to be possible or not. (De Trin. ll.2\14
Augustine's point here is that the sense of sight cannot survive blindncss irr
the eyes because the sense of sight is partly cclnstituted by the functitlrring botly
part. So irn aflliction of the eyes can result in the loss of the sense of sight. Itrrt.
Augustine tells us, both the uninrus (the human soul, or the rational soul, or thc
mind) and its intentio remain when the eyes have been damaged. Evidence that
the animus survives damage to the eyes is no doubt not rreeded, and Augustinc
of'f'ers none. His eviclertce tlratthe itrtentio anizrl survives is that itcontinues t«r tr'-y'
to exercise its binding function. Augustine explains the continued attempts (thc
nlsr.s) by postulating the continued presence of a kind of desire (quidant upp(t it tt \ )
fbl seeing.
I do not know whether Augustine means here to be reporting the phcrtorne rrirl
experiences of the blind. (Do the blind really have the experience of tryins l()
see things? Perhaps the newly blind do?) What matters for our purposcs is thrrl
Augustine believes that the intentio animl manifests a sort of n1.r'zr^r fbr binding scrrsc
to sensible object, and tlrat it has (or perhaps is) a kind of desire tbr seeirrg. Thcse
irssertions confirm that Augustine is thinking of the intentio unimi in tclcokrgicrrl
terms: the intentio anini has a function-binding sense to sensible objcct antl il
is directed torvard, aims at. has a rrlsrrs for perforrning that function.
There is another interesting f-eature of this passage that I want to call atlcrr
tion to. The critical terms describing the intentio animiin the passage--ll.rrr,r lrrtl
appetitus-need not suggest anything as robust or sophisticated as will. Indccrl I
think they most naturally suggest a contrast with rvill. Ni.rrr.s and upltt,titrr,r nlighl
naturally be taken to describe natural inclinations, the sorts ol'tclc«rkrgical ori
entation and impetus that are hardrvired into tlre naturcs of things. Thc lact tlurt
Augustine uses the term oppetitus, "desire," with some caution q tr idtt nr ( tl)lr(t itu \ .
lir
1.1. :r lrirrtllcl tliscussion sce De (jctt. ul litt. 11.,tr) .\
l{li \( (,)/'/ hl,.\('l)( )N,,ll.l )
he says-reirrfirrccs thc intpressiott tltat ltc irttclttls lo lrt' tlliru rrrg ortr rtttcttliolt lo
basic natural inclinations tlrzitdo not rise to thc levcl ol ortlirrary corrscious clcsircs
or acts of rvill.
My idea that intentio unimi might be. for Augustine in De Trin. I l, a teleologi-
cally oriented l-eature of mind that exercises its binding function by virtuc of a
natural, sub-volitional ni,ras finds some support in a interesting passage in De Gen.
ad litt.bookT:
If the soul is made to be sent int<l a bod1,, we rlay ask rvhether it is cornpelled o go
though unwilling. But it is more reasonable to suppose that it has such a rvill (uelle)by
nature. that is, thc nature rvith which it is created is such that it rvishes (uelit) abody,
just as it is natural fbr us to wish to live . . . (Dc Gan. utt litt. 7.38)15
Augustine is here discussing the soul's embodiment. not sensory cognition.
But the passage shows Augustine appealing fairly clearly to the kind of natural
inclination or ri.sr.r.r I am clain-ring to find in De Trinitate 11.2. What Augustine
is here claiming to be more reasonable to sllppose is that the soul has a natural
inclination or wish tbr embocliment, is teleologically directed toward it by its
nature. Augustine appeals to our natural desire to live to explairt r.vhat he means by
a natural wish, and our natural desire to live seems a paradigm case of a naturally
irnplanted teieological orientation toward sonre end. an orientation that explains a
good deal of our activity but often does not involve any conscious desire or act of
will. So this passagc seems to rne to verify the Augustinian credentials of the idea
I arn suggesting rve might attribute to him in De Trin. 11.2 in connection rvith the
intentio animi.
Moreover, it seerns to me that this passage from De Gen. ad /ill. advances the
strategy I am developing in another way. When I started developing this clef'ense
of Augustine's position I suggested we sct aside the fact that Augustine stands
ready to substitute uoluntas for intentio in his discussion of the third constituent
in sense perception. One might suppose, however, that that täct is in tensicln with
rny deflationary explanati<tl of intentio aninti as a teleologically oriented nlsa.s.
One might think that if Augustine thinks it appropriate to call the third elernent in
sense perception Lnluntus, he must think that what he ref'ers to with intentkt animi
is sornething more than a mere natural inclination or riislr.r.
But the De Gen. ad litt. passage just cited blunts the point of that worry. It
shows Augustine happily using not exactly uolLtntos but nevertheless the closely
related uelle and nolLe to describe what are clearly merely natural inclinations. If
ttelle and nolle can do duty of this wide-ranging sott, then perhaps uoluntas can
range widely too. If it can, then the regular occurrence of uoluntas in De Trin. ll
need not conllict with thinking of the intentio animi as fulfilling its role- in sense
perception by virtue of a sub-volitional, non-voluntary rl.ru.r.
I5. ALr(iusTtNF-. l'lte Liter«l Me«ning oJ Genesis, tr. J.H. TAYt-oR, S.J., N*v York, N\
Mahivah. N.l. 1S82.
tlll( it l,\' t tN t",\ ( ( r(,N I I ll'l' l'( )l,ll N'l'Alll'\L4 l.l,)
S6 pcrhalts it is
lxrssible to readAugustinc's clitirtr that rvill is plrrtly cortsliltrlrvt'
"rvill^'
ol'any act o1'sensc perception in this cleflatiortary wäty: hc tklcs Itol tttcittt
in thc sensc associated with cleliberate action and voluntary control but iltstcrrtl irr
the broacl sense suggested by its rough synonym (synclnyrn at lcast in this corrtcxl)
intentio animi. That reacling gives Augustine an accoutrt of scnsc pc|ccptiott lltrrl
is cornpatible with the observation that much of our serlse c-xperictrec occttt's itttlc
pendently of our will, the observation I raised earlier as an objection to Attg trslirrc's
cognitive voluntarism.
Moreclver, the iclea that our sensory expcrience is explainable in part as llrc
activity of a teleologically oriented system seems to rne independently pllrtrsiblc'
It seems right to think of our perceptual systems as designed by nature to lllotti
tor our immediate environment, independently clf the state of our consciolrs rvill.
with the aim of cletecting significalt perceptible objects in our vicinity. Whcrr thcv
respoltd to perceptible objects thereby causing us to perceive them, thosc syste llts
are lullilling their functiolts.
VI, -AWORRY AND A REPLY
It is rvorth asking. thcn. whether there are reasolls that rvould prevel)t Attgttslitte
fiom accepting thc readilrg I arn suggesting. I offer a brief objectitln. atttl lltttt
reply to it.
Objet.tion.. The weaker the phenornenon identified as the third clclncrlt irr tlrt'
trinitarian structtlre essential to sellse perception the less adequatc tltaI stlttelttte
will be as a model clf the trinity. If the nature of the third element is t(x) (listillll
from more rclbust notions of will clr love, it rvill ntlt sufficiently modcl thc tlrirrl
persol of thc clivine trinity, the divine love that proceetls from and birtrls togcllrcr
ih. Foth"1. ar.rcl the Sttn. A natural inclination or nlslis to perceive is ttlo distaltt ll ortr
will or love to till the requisite role.
/lepi1': The phenomenon of the natural inclintation or ru isa.r integral to scllsc l)e I
's
ception is tlistant tiom the <livine love but perhaps not too clistant tilrAugtlslilre
lltc
pripor.r. We shoulcl expect that the model of the trinity to be found itt lorvcst
t-unctions ol anintus will be woefully inadequate. If the arralogue in scllsc l)cl'('cl)
tion to the sort of rvill or love characteristic of the Holy Spirit is a basic ttitltttltl
inclination, perhaps that is not only appropriate but to be expected. Othcl tlirri
ties-and otirer analogues fbr the Holy Spirit-in the human mincl will clllülft' irl
later books of Dc Tritt..triuities and analogues fbr the Holy Spirit thut will bc trlotr'
zrdequate to the task.
perhaps, then, it is best to think of something like a spectrunl tll'dcsirc l.lrrrgilrg
from funclamental natural inclinations On one end to conscious will or love ott
ot[.rer. We can imagine Augustine recognizing in the sclrts of te letllogically rtricrrtetl
nl.us that characterize our basic pel'ceptual systenls a phcttollrcnr)ll ('()l)lrll()ll l()
corrsciotts acts of will an«l love. That phenomenotl-dcsire (oplttlitrt'r). or pct'ltrtps
intentis (as Augustine uses that terrn)-is nranif'estcd itt rttr-lituclltlt'v lirlttl irr
natultl telcrllogical systents. It is nranit'ested irr its ll1ost r()[)tls1 liltttts in ü()r)\( ir)ll\
will irrrtl krvc.
 150 .\'('()l"t At,t( t)()N,,ll t)

Itt cottclttsiort, llrcrt. it is clcur rvhy Arrgustirrc's pnr jcct in l)t l't ittittrtr, lt'ltls lrirrr
irt ltook II to tlisctlvcr itt ottr scns()r'y cx;rclicrtte sorncllring trkirr lo lovc or rvill. ll
is ttot as clcar prcciscly wl.ral that thing is. If Auguslinc is corrrrritlcrl to its bcilrEi
an act of will ol'thc sort required tirr dcliberate action and voluntaly corrtnrl, thclr
his trccount is implausible. But if he takcs the third element in the trinily hc l'inds in
sense perception to be only a rudimentary manif'estation of the kind ol'dcsirc that
morc robustly manifested in will and love-a natural inclination or nlslrs tlrcrr
his account may be not only defensible but also illuminating of the nature ol'our
sensory experience. l6
Scott MACDONAT-I) The Background of Augustine's
Cornell University
Triadic Epistemology in De Trinitate 1 1-15.
A Suggestion
One of the most remarkable f-eatures of Augustine's attempt to achievc a ratiorurl
understanding of the mystery of the Trinity in the last five books <tf Dc'li'itritrttl is
what we may call his "triadic epistemology." Starting from the premisc Illrt ntrn
is made "in the image of God" (Gn 1.26f .), Augustine assumes that if thc lrrrrrurn
mind can be shown to consist of three different elements that are rclatctl to r'rrr'lr
other but are nevertheless one in substance, and thus to meet the basic rct;rrirt'rrrt'rrt
of Nicene Trinitarian theology, the triadic structure of the image shoulcl bc irblt' to
give at least a faint idea of what the original, the Triune God, is like; and hc lro;x's
to find a triadic structure of the required kind in the mind's most chanrtlt'r'istit'
feature, cognition. Books I I to l-5 of De Trinitale are therefore largcly tlcvolt'rl ro
elaborating an epistemological theory that makes it possible to interprcl ull tolyrrr
tive acts the human mind is capable of-sense perception. imaginatiorr, pnrt lit'rrl
reason and theoretical reason or contemplation-as the combination ol'llrrcc t'lt'
ments: [l] an object of cognition which may either be external to thc mirrtl (rrs irr
the case of sense perception) or internal to it, as in the case of the imaginativc iurrl
rational activities, the objects of which are contained in memory; [2] u eogrritivt'
faculty of the mind (variously termed as contuitus, obtutus, cogitatio, itrtcllcguttirt\
that must be activated or, as Augustine puts it, formed by its ob.lect f<rr a e ogrr it i vc
act to come about; [3] a voluntary or intentional act of the mind (wtlunttts, itttt tr
tio)that makes the cognitive faculty turn towards its object so that it bccomcs ublc
to be formed by it. I This epistemological pattern is introduced at thc bcginrrirrg ol

l.Forsenseperceptioncf.DeTrin. l1.5,CC.!L50,Turnhout, 1968,p.-l3tt. l2'1 ();li» irrrirgi

I I
am grateful to audiences at the University of Bordeaux, the University of I-ausanne, :rrrtl
6. n'ation:ihid. 11.7,CC5L50,p.342.26-34 12.25,CCSL-50,p.379.(10 3.Rrliorlrl :rclivity: l,l lo.
the Cornell Sumnrer Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy for helpful discussion of this p:rpe r. I CCSL -504. Turnhout, 1968, p.435.53-7.
- Foreasc ol rclercncc I will irrscrt nrrnrbt'r' irr sr;r;rrt'
anr especially gratefirl also to Charles Brittain for what is now years of fiuitful collaborilti()n on brackcls h()lh in quotations fiom ancient authors and in nry orvn tcxl wllcnevcr.ont' ol llrt' llrrt t'
l)c'l'rinitutt'. cltrntcrtls is rrrcrrl ioncrl.
 ('ollt't lrorr tlt's lrlrrtlt's Atrltrslirrir'rrnt's

.\t;t'it Arrtitluiti - 192

Collection des Etudes Augustiniennes

I,E DE TRINITATE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN
Fondateurs : I-.-. CnynE t et G. FOLLIET t Ex6göse, logique et no6tique
Ancien Directeur : Jean-Claude F'REDOUII-t.E t
Directer-rr : Fre<d6ric CHAPOT

Ct]nsciI scientifitlue : M. ALEXANDRE, N. BERIoU. A.-I. BOUToN.TOUBOULIC, N. DL]\AL

J. FONTAINE, CI. LEPELLEY. P. PETITMENGIN. V. ZARINI Actes du colloque international de Bordeaux, 16-19 juin 2010,

6dit6s par Emmanuel BBRnroN et Gerard O'Da.ly

Pr6face de Rowan Wtlr,rams

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