Hutcheson's Reflections upon Laughter

Author(s): Elizabeth Telfer

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn, 1995), pp.
359-369
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/430971
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 ELIZABETH TELFER

Hutcheson's Reflections Upon Laughter

Francis Hutcheson's three short essays on which show that a sudden perception of one's
laughter first appeared in The Dublin Journal in superiority is neither necessary nor sufficient
1725, the same year as the first publication of for the production of laughter. Among the kinds
the Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of of laughter which do not depend on a sudden
Beauty and Virtue. The first essay is a refutation perception of superiority he mentions a favorite
of Thomas Hobbes's account of laughter, which topic of his, laughter at burlesque or parody;
had been discussed by Joseph Addison in The among the perceptions of superiority which do
Spectator in 1711.1 The second is Hutcheson's not normally arouse laughter are the cases of
own account of the nature of laughter. The third a rich man suddenly seeing a poor man or a
is a discussion of the uses and dangers of laugh- healthy man a sick one.
ter. I will show that the limitations of Hutche-
son's account of the nature of laughter weaken II
his account of its uses and dangers. But I am
aware that it was impossible in any case for
Hutcheson's reasons for rejecting Hobbes's ac-
Hutcheson to do more than scratch the surface
count as a general account of all kinds of laugh-
of this enormous topic in the space of three very
ter are sound ones, although Hobbesian consid-
short essays. Nevertheless, they are an impor-
erations do have a place in a full account of
tant and interesting contribution to an ongoing
laughter. Hutcheson's own theory of laughter in
debate on the nature and morality of humor
the second essay is more problematic. The first
which began with Plato and Aristotle and con-
problem is to work out what the theory is a the-
tinues today.
ory of. He says that laughter is a "sensation, ac-
According to Hobbes, the "passion of laugh-
tion, passion, or affection, I know not which of
ter" is a "sudden glory" which arises when we
them a philosopher would call it."'5 This list runs
suddenly see ourselves as eminent in compari-
together laughter the observable phenomenon
son with the "infirmity" of others or with our
and what produces it; laughter itself is not a sen-
own former selves. The account is simple in
sation, passion, or affection. But neither is it
Hobbes's Human Nature,2 the version that Ad-
usually an action, something deliberately per-
dison quotes; in Leviathan Hobbes adds the ob-
formed for a reason. (Where laughter is deliber-
servation that people laugh a lot at others if
ate, it is called insincere or not genuine laugh-
conscious of many deficiencies in themselves.3
ter.) Hutcheson is really more interested in what
This kind of account of laughter has a long his-
produces laughter. In his third essay he dis-
tory: it is somewhat akin to Plato's doctrine in
tinguishes between laughter which "begins in
the Philebus4 that comedy is based on a mali-
the natural manner, from our perception in the
cious pleasure in weak characters' delusions
mind of something ludicrous"6 and laughter
about themselves or their situation.
arising "unnaturally from external motions in
Hutcheson dislikes Hobbes's account, partly
the body."7 By the latter he presumably means
because it is one manifestation of the doctrine
laughter when tickled and the like-though the
that all human behavior is self-interested. He ar-
fact that one cannot tickle oneself suggests that
gues against it by producing counterexamples
a psychological element is actually present there

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 53:4 Fall 1995

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360 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

too.8 He seems to think that all "mental" laugh- The theory that amusement is produced by a
ter arises from a "perception of the ludicrous." combination of incongruity and resemblance
Strictly speaking, this is false; we can laugh for certainly fits some kinds of amusement very
joy or from a sense of relief, for example. But it be- well. Hutcheson says that the same principle ap-
comes clear that Hutcheson is attempting to give plies to all kinds of amusement. But many of his
an account only of our reactions to what we see examples do not involve simile, metaphor, or
as funny: amusement, in one sense of that word. other deliberately created resemblance, and it
Hutcheson thinks amusement is based on the is not clear that resemblance must always be
perception of an incongruity between some- involved. Hutcheson says that our amusement
thing dignified and something mean. He gives at the slipping-on-a-banana-peel type of case
various examples: (i) a dignified piece of writ- arises from the incongruity between two ideas:
ing, such as a passage of the Bible, or a dignified our idea of a person as dignified and of the inci-
manner of writing, applied to a trivial or undig- dent befalling that person as undignified. Here
nified subject; (ii) an undignified event happen- the humor seems to arise only from a difference,
ing to a dignified person (or to anyone, since he rather than from a difference combined with a
says we think of humanity itself as having dig- resemblance. Hutcheson might say that we see
nity); (iii) silly mistakes, unworthy of the dig- the man's undignified fall as incongruous be-
nity of man as a rational creature (typical of us cause he partly resembles the same man walking
Irish, he says); (iv) strong emotions, which have in a dignified way. But some comic incon-
their own dignity, aroused by an object which is gruities between the dignified and the mean-
either unworthy or (as in the April-Fools'-Day for example, a dog wandering into a church ser-
type of joke) nonexistent; (v) mean manners or vice-do not seem to involve even this degree of
dress on a dignified occasion. It is clear at once resemblance. Perhaps what Hutcheson should
that Hutcheson's account of amusement can be say is that incongruity presupposes some kind
applied to a much wider range of cases than of connection, often but not necessarily resem-
Hobbes's, including the literary examples of blance, between the elements seen as incongru-
burlesque and parody with which Hobbes can- ous. In the case of the dog in church, the con-
not cope at all. nection is simply one of place. But in many
In outline, Hutcheson's theory falls into the other kinds of humor, the connection is a resem-
category of incongruity theories of humor, blance combined with incongruous elements.
which, like superiority theories, have a long his-Thus in the burlesque or satirical cartoon, re-
tory.9 But his account of the incongruity is quitesemblances which "have contrary additional ideas"
complex. He begins by considering the use of are presented to us by the writer or artist.
apt, dignified simile and metaphor in heroic po- Hutcheson does not claim that we laugh at all
etry, and moves via a consideration of "grave incongruities. His claim seems to be that when
wit"-the use of unexpected comparison or the we do laugh it is always at something we see as
extension of it to more and more points of like- in some way incongruous. This has an intuitive
ness, as perhaps in the metaphysical poets-to plausibility, but even so it is rather a strong
the cause of laughter as the "bringing together claim. What are we to say about being amused
of images which have contrary additional ideas, by someone, whether in real life or in a play,
as well as some resemblance in the principal saying or doing exactly what we expect? This
idea."10 The contrast is between "ideas of common situation seems to be a case of being
grandeur, dignity, sanctity, perfection, and ideasamused by the congruous rather than the incon-
of meanness, baseness, profanity."' 1 Thus in a gruous. I think, however, it may be possible to
burlesque, a banal incident might be compared reconcile it with the incongruity theory. We can
to a heroic one which is somewhat similar in divide such cases into two types. The first type
content but totally different in dignity. Similarly,
of case is that of stereotyped behavior. For ex-
a cartoonist of today might depict Lady ample, the person repeats a stock phrase, like a
Thatcher as a turkey, and thereby link her with schoolmistress I had who greeted every misde-
something which is or can be made like her in meanor with the words: "They would never have
appearance, but which is also banal and there- done that at St. Leonard's, St. Andrews." De-
fore incongruous with her dignity. spite its predictability, this kind of behavior

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Telfer Hutcheson's Reflections Upon Laughter 361

does have a certain incongruity, because human the dignified and the mean, perhaps the notions
beings are normally more spontaneous; it is per- of the dignified and the mean are too vague to
haps a case of the mechanicalness which Berg- tell us much. I think there is something in this
son thought of as the essence of the amusing. criticism; we feel disappointed by the dilution of
The second kind of predictability is that where the notion of dignity from the narrower, more
people amuse us because what they say or do, informative sense it carries when Hutcheson is
while not mechanical, is very much in character. talking about burlesque and the comic misappli-
This is much more difficult for an incongruity cation of sacred texts. On the other hand, if an
theory to accommodate. But I think we tend to account of humor is to have any hope of apply-
be amused only where what is predictably said ing to all varieties of it, its basic ideas will need
or done betrays a foible or weakness (or some- to be very broad. Perhaps the basic idea which
thing which we see as such) such as meanness, Hutcheson requires is that of incongruity as im-
vanity, or an inability to say no to anyone. In- propriety, the failure (deliberate or accidental)
deed, we can be amused by a single incident to conform to some norm or canon of appropri-
which clearly reveals a weakness in an other- ateness. Since there are many different kinds of
wise respectable person. We might therefore con- norms, this is a very general idea indeed: the in-
strue this kind of amusement also as based on congruity between elevated styles of writing and
the perception of an incongruity: for example, lowly subject matter, between a formal occasion
that between the image of acceptability the per- and disordered dress, and between an enormous
son tries to maintain and the weakness which display of anger and a trivial provocation are all
inevitably reveals itself despite her efforts, or examples of it. If Hutcheson had employed this
between her perception of herself and others' conception, the incongruity between the digni-
perception of her. fied (in the sense of "elevated," "formal") and
I am inclined to accept that what amuses us is the mean would have retained its significance as
always something seen as incongruous. But a very important subclass of improprieties.
must the incongruity be between the dignified and What is the relationship between amusement
the mean? If dignity is always "grandeur, sanc- and the perception of incongruity supposed to
tity, perfection," as when Hutcheson first intro- be? Is Hutcheson simply equating the two? At
duces the notion, one is inclined to say that the the beginning of the third essay he says: "laugh-
theory does not cover all cases, though it does ter, like many other dispositions of our mind, is
apply to many important ones. But later Hutch- necessarily pleasant to us, when it begins in the
eson introduces the notion of man himself, his natural manner, from our perception in the mind
reason and his emotions, as having dignity, and of something ludicrous."'3 What does "neces-
so he is able to depict minor failures and mis- sarily pleasant" mean here? The passage is very
takes of many different kinds as incongruous similar to his claim in the Inquiry Concerning
because they are unbecoming to human dignity. 12Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design: "the ideas of
beauty and harmony, like other sensible ideas,
This is a very far-reaching idea. It can even cope
with such cases as our amusement at a row of are necessarily pleasant to us.'14 If we take the
tap-dancing children in a pantomime coming two cases to be parallel, we might interpret
on stage one by one, all in pink except the last Hutcheson thus: just as the perception of unity
who is in blue. At first sight this seems like a in variety gives rise to the idea of beauty, which
counterexample, because we cannot say that in its turn always gives rise to pleasure, so the
pink is dignified and blue mean or vice versa. perception of an incongruity between the digni-
But Hutcheson could say that the regularity is fied and the mean gives rise to the idea of the lu-
dignified because it expresses human order and dicrous, which in its turn always gives rise to
rationality, and the irregularity-deliberate in pleasure. But sometimes Hutcheson seems to
this case, of course-is mean because it sub- say that the idea of beauty actually is a kind of
verts them. pleasure, as when he equates "our power of per-
However, one might wonder at this point ceiving the beauty of regularity, order, har-
whether Hutcheson's theory has not become mony" with "the determination to be pleased
vacuous; if every human mistake or irregularity with certain complex forms" in the Preface to
can count as an example of incongruity between the two Inquiries. ' 5Perhaps he would similarly

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362 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

say that our power of perceiving the amusing- whereas with beauty the emphasis is on the unity,
ness of certain incongruities just is a disposition with humor it is on the variety.'6
to be pleased with them.
This is a complex issue which I cannot ex- The unity Kivy speaks of in connection with
plore at length here. It is impossible to be sure humor is the resemblance which, as we saw, ap-
precisely what Hutcheson has in mind, because plies to all types of humor according to Hutche-
he does not directly discuss the question in the son's account. But "variety" does not mean the
Reflections Upon Laughter, and it is not clear same in the accounts of beauty and humor. In
how closely his doctrines on the "ludicrous" are Hutcheson's aesthetic theory, variety is really
meant to mirror those on beauty and virtue. For multiplicity: Hutcheson sees beauty as the repe-
example, it is not clear whether the sense of the tition of one form in a number of instances. In
ludicrous is meant to be a specific sense, like the
his theory of humor, however, "variety" is vari-
sense of beauty. I think he should be saying ance or discrepancy, the failure to repeat a uni-
three things: (i) we can distinguish between per- fied motif. So it looks as though Hutcheson
ceiving the incongruities and being amused by should indeed be puzzled by our enjoyment of
them; (ii) being amused by incongruities is a humor.
species of enjoyment; and (iii) this enjoyment, In one sense, of course, the problem is solved
if keen enough, is naturally expressed in laugh- for him by his belief in a Divine Providence. As
ter. We can show that there is a distinction be- he shows in the third essay, the pleasures of
tween the perception of the incongruity and the humor are useful to us; that is why we have been
amusement by recalling those cases where we made capable of this kind of pleasure. But there
know that something would amuse us if we were is still a problem about how we can be capable
in a better mood, and those where we speak as of it if the amusing is a species of the ugly.
though we can choose our attitude toward the in- I think that two approaches to this problem
congruous situation: "I couldn't decide whether are open to Hutcheson. Within the constraints
to laugh or cry." But the possibility of drawing of his aesthetic theory, he might deal with
this distinction between perception and enjoy- humor on the analogy with discords in music,
ment does not mean that the perception of the which, he says, "often give as great a pleasure as
incongruity is simply a neutral observation of continued harmony, whether by refreshing the
facts. As Hutcheson himself says, seeing some- ear with variety, or by awakening the attention,
thing as incongruous may itself involve a value and enlivening the relish for the succeeding har-
judgment-about what degree of emotion is ap- mony of concords."'17 Perhaps what is funny can
propriate in a particular situation, for example. be seen as giving this kind of pleasure. But a
And to see things as incongruous may also re- more promising approach would be to see the
quire a particular kind of imagination. pleasure of humor not as aesthetic pleasure but
But why do we enjoy these incongruities? as the pleasure of play. Play involves activity
Though he does not say so, Hutcheson is in a which is seen as not mattering or not serious,
difficulty here: according to his own theory of done in fun or for fun. Humor is similarly con-
beauty, his account of the amusing as a kind of trasted with what is serious: of both words and
incongruity seems to make the comic into a actions, people say "I wasn't serious, it was only
species of ugliness. In particular, where what is a joke." I suggest then that people who make
amusing is a moral failing, it is a blot on its pos- jokes are either pointing out or creating incon-
sessor's moral beauty. It looks as though we gruities for fun-or ostensibly for fun: they can
ought to find these incongruities distressing have an ulterior motive, as we shall see. And
rather than delightful. Peter Kivy, in his in- people who laugh at others' jokes, or at things
troduction to the Reflections Upon Laughter, they themselves see as funny, are adopting a
makes a brave try at resolving the problem by playful attitude toward these incongruities-
assimilating Hutcheson's account of the amus- usually involuntarily, but sometimes apparently
ing to his account of beauty: by choice, as I have already said. If we see
humor as a kind of play or as involving a nonse-
In a certain sense ... the quality of humor, like that of rious attitude, we can explain why it tends to be
beauty, is based on the notion of unity in variety; but concerned with small weaknesses, petty mis-

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Telfer Hutcheson's Reflections Upon Laughter
takes, trifling mishaps, and so on. A playful at-
titude involves a kind of detachment from see-
ing something as mattering, and this detachment
may be more difficult to achieve if in reality the
thing is harmful, frightening, or deplorable. (I
am not claiming that it is impossible to adopt
this playful attitude toward terrible things. A
skillful use of humor can make us do just this, as
in Charlie Chaplin's film The Great Dictator, in
which he invites us to laugh at Hitler. In this
case, the humor depends on the sharpness of the
contrast between our awareness that Hitler was
appalling and the playful attitude that we are
made to adopt toward him while watching the
film.)
The question of why we are intellectually
playful in this way is probably one for psychol-
ogy rather than philosophy. Hutcheson, in the
third essay, notes that laughter puts us in an
"easy, happy state" and cures "a soured temper."'18and lamenting the bad use people make of it:
This may be because the incongruities offer a
release from restraint, a mental holiday from the
proprieties, whether these be the norms of re-
spectable behavior, the oppressive demands of
the sacred and sublime, or simply the rules of
language. Another possible psychological ex-
planation of many cases of amusement, as sev-
eral commentators have said, is along Hobbes-
ian lines. That is to say, we might agree with
Hutcheson that to be amused by someone slip-
ping on a banana peel is to enjoy the incongruity
between the dignity of his progress and the in-
dignity of his fall, but look to Hobbes for a psy-
chological explanation of why such things please
us. It would be too extreme to say that we always
feel superior to people in such situations. But it
might be plausible to say that we feel a kind of
reassurance that we are not inferior, not the only
people to be subject to petty humiliations.
I can now sum up my discussion of Hutche-
son's theory of the nature of amusement. I agree
that what is amusing is a kind of incongruity.
But I think it is difficult to construe all amusing
things as incongruities between the dignified
and the mean without reducing these notions to
triviality; it would be better to see comic incon-
gruity as some kind of impropriety. I also think
that Hutcheson needs a distinction between per-
ceiving the incongruity and being amused by it.
The latter, I suggest, is a species of enjoyment,
more akin to play than to aesthetic appreciation;
perhaps we enjoy this kind of play as a mental
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363
escape from everyday restrictions or as a reassur-
ance that other people are as vulnerable as our-
selves.
III
The third essay is on the effects and proper use
of laughter, capacity for which Hutcheson as-
sumes to be implanted in our natures by the
Almighty for some good purpose. This ap-
proach to laughter, as involving useful pleasure
given to us by God, is of course similar to the ap-
proach to beauty and virtue in the Inquiry. In the
case of laughter, Hutcheson may have had an ad-
ditional reason for stressing its God-given use-
fulness. Addison, in one of his Spectator papers
on the subject, had been rather ambivalent about
the basic value of laughter, quoting a suggestion
that it essentially belongs to man's fallen nature
[the Talent of Ridicule] is generally made use of to
laugh Men out of Virtue and Good Sense, by attack-
ing everything that is Solemn and Serious, Decent
and Praise-worthy in Human Life.'9
Hutcheson does not mention Addison in the
third essay, as he does in the first. But the way
in which he combines emphasis on laughter's
providential status with words of caution about
its dangers suggests that he may have the Spec-
tator essay in mind.
The third essay begins with brief general re-
marks about the beneficial effects of laughter,
but soon turns to consider its more specific uses
and dangers. Most of the types of jokes which
Hutcheson discusses are about individuals'
foibles and weaknesses. But one group of topics
may be called impersonal: jokes about things
which are truly great in every respect, jokes ap-
plying lofty sayings to mean subjects, and jokes
about the meaner aspects of important things.
On the first of these topics, Hutcheson says
that things which are truly great in every re-
spect, such as "the opinion of a good and wise
mind governing the whole universe"20 or con-
spicuous virtue, cannot be joined to any mean
idea with any natural resemblance, and so any
joke about them will be "forced and remote."'21
It will not please a man of sense and reflection,
but will show the joker to be "void of just sense
of those things which are truly great."22
364 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

It is hard to understand Hutcheson's argument (It is not clear whether Hutcheson thinks that Dr.
here. If we link a truly great thing with a mean Pitcairn was making a joke, or making a pious
thing, we have surely produced just the kind of comment without realizing that it was all too apt.)
incongruity which he says is the basis of humor. Hutcheson does not condemn this type of
Why must such a connection be "forced and re- joke as "forced or unnatural," presumably be-
mote"? Perhaps Hutcheson thinks this because cause he cannot help appreciating its possible
he assumes that the connection must involve im- aptness. He is doubtful about the propriety of
puting to the perfect thing a deficiency which, Biblical jokes (though he says so in the second
by definition, it cannot have. This need not be essay,24 not the third), so he does realize that
so: the film Monty Python's Life of Brian, for ex- a joke can be both neat and improper. But the
ample, links the life of Christ to an absurd par- point he is most eager to make, both about jokes
allel story without in any way imputing imper- on truly great things and about the misapplica-
fection to Christ's life. But Hutcheson does not tion of lofty words, is that such jokes are harm-
make clear at this point that there is also a dif- less even though tasteless: he says that people
ferent kind of objection to such jokes. The man are not going to lose their admiration of con-
of sense and reflection may concede that a re- spicuous virtue or great literature simply be-
semblance is natural and apt, but still fail to be cause jokes are made about them.25 In saying
amused because he thinks that the subject mat- this, he is presumably relying on his doctrine
ter is too sublime to be linked with something that there is a basic natural sense of beauty and
lowly for the sake of a joke. In other words, he virtue. But one might wonder whether his confi-
thinks the joke is not silly but tasteless. dence is misplaced. It may be possible to under-
But is it not possible to be amused by jokes mine people's reverence for something by per-
which one sees as tasteless? Throughout this sistent joking about it. Jokes treat a thing as not
essay Hutcheson writes as though this is not mattering even if it does matter; and it may be
possible for the man of sense. Hutcheson says that in the end, for good or ill, people's percep-
that when a joke is unsuitable, a man of sense tions can be shifted. This is one context where
cannot relish it; in other words, the man of sense Hutcheson underestimates the dangers of humor.
does not merely think he ought not to be amused The last case of impersonal humor is laughter
by such jokes, he is genuinely not amused. Pre- at the mean aspects of things which are basi-
sumably Hutcheson's idea is that any pleasure cally important. Hutcheson talks of what is truly
that might have been taken in the incongruity isvaluable in any "character, institution, or of-
banished by dislike of the impropriety, and fice,"26 so, presumably, jokes about the faults of
probably he would say that a man cannot count public figures would be an example. He says
as a man of sense-of proper feeling-unless that the danger is that "people of little judg-
his reactions are coherent in this way. ment" may be misled into thinking that the
The second kind of impersonal joke is the ap- whole thing, not only the mean aspect, is con-
plication of grand words to mean subjects. temptible. But his suggestion for avoiding the
Hutcheson gives an example by referring again danger is problematic: he says we should always
to the true story which he tells as follows in the join "just veneration" of the good aspects of our
first essay: target to our jokes about the mean aspects. Pre-
sumably, we have to express the just veneration
Many an orthodox Scotch Presbyterian, which sect if we are to avoid misleading the people of little
few accuse of disregard for the holy Scriptures, has judgment. Now it is true that we sometimes have
been put to it to preserve his gravity, upon hearing the an instinct to do just this if we feel our jokes are
application of Scripture made by his countryman Dr. going too far: having made the joke, we say
Pitcairn, as he observed a crowd in the streets about a things like "It's a shame to laugh at him, he does
mason, who had fallen along with his scaffold, and a lot of good." But there are valuable kinds of
was overwhelmed with the ruins of the chimney which jokes in this class, such as satirical criticism of
he had been building, and which fell immediately the government of the day or other institutions,
after the fall of the poor mason: "Blessed are the dead which depend on the absence of a softening fac-
which die in the Lord, for they rest from their labours,tor. Satire will be neither funny nor effective if
and their works follow them."23 it always has to have a cautionary footnote, be-

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Telfer Hutcheson's Reflections Upon Laughter
cause its effectiveness rests on the fact already
noted: that ridicule can undermine awe and
make us realize that it is possible to criticize
things which we are apt to revere unthinkingly.
Of course, there is also a danger of making peo-
ple cynical about the whole thing, as Hutcheson
this time realizes. But this is a risk which satire
has to run if it is to be useful.
The personal uses of humor discussed by
Hutcheson are of two kinds. First, we can use it
to lessen another person's excessive emotion, of
fear, veneration, resentment, and so on. Second,
we can use it to criticize trivial faults. On the
first use he says:
When any object either good or evil is aggravated and
increased by the violence of our passions, or an enthu-
siastic admiration, or fear, the application of ridicule
is the readiest way to bring down our high imagina-
tions to a conformity to the real moment of the affair.
Ridicule gives our minds as it were a bent to the con-
trary side; so that upon reflection they may be more
capable of settling in a just conformity to nature.27
And later:
by our sense of the ridiculous, we are made capable of
relief from any pleasant, ingenious well-wisher, by
more effectual means, than the most solemn, sedate
reasoning. Nothing is so properly applied to the false
grandeur, either of good or evil, as ridicule.28
It is not clear whether Hutcheson is talking of
ridicule which attaches something incongruous
to the object of fear or awe, points out incon-
gruities in it, or laughs at the disproportion of
emotion to its object. Presumably, any of these
types of ridicule might achieve its aim.
There are two problems about Hutcheson's
doctrine here. First, he writes as though there is
always an objectively correct degree of admira-
tion, fear, resentment, and so on; thus he writes
of "conformity to the real moment or impor-
tance of the affair" and "a just conformity to na-
ture." But is it always possible to say what the
"real moment or importance" of a thing is? In-
deed, in the second essay29 Hutcheson himself
makes the point that people differ over the im-
portance of ceremony, of gallantry, of financial
security, and therefore over the degree of emo-
tion appropriate to them. Perhaps he thinks that
there are some things which are naturally im-
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365
portant-important to everyone-such as the
conspicuous virtues already mentioned as truly
great, and that strong emotion about other
things is misplaced. But then the second prob-
lem arises: does ridicule always produce the cor-
rect degree of emotion, or does it simply lessen
emotion, whether appropriately or not? Sup-
pose, for example, I get heated about some in-
justice or cruelty. Someone wishing to cheer me
up may succeed by ingenious jokes in making
me feel that my passion is ridiculous. But it does
not follow that it is. And whereas Hutcheson is
writing here about "well-wishers," the same tech-
nique of ridicule can be used by opponents to
undermine people's commitment to their cause
by getting them to feel that they are over-con-
cerned about it. This is just the kind of thing that
Addison was worried about, and it constitutes
an example of Hutcheson's failure to see that
humor can be dangerous for the same reasons
which make it useful.
Hutcheson does not mention another impor-
tant use of ridicule, later pointed out by Thomas
Reid: to expose intellectual absurdity. Reid says:
We may observe that opinions which contradict first
principles, are distinguished, from other errors, by
this:-that they are not only false, but absurd; and, to
discountenance absurdity, nature hath given us a par-
ticular emotion-to wit, the use of ridicule-which
seems intended for this very purpose of putting out of
countenance what is absurd, either in opinion or prac-
tice.
This weapon, when properly applied, cuts with as
keen an edge as argument. Nature hath furnished us
with the first to expose absurdity; as with the last to re-
fute error. Both are well fitted for their several offices,
and are equally friendly to truth when properly used.
Both may be abused to serve the cause of error; but
the same degree of judgment which serves to detect
the abuse of argument in false reasoning, serves to de-
tect the abuse of ridicule when it is wrong directed.
... But it must be acknowledged that the emotion of
ridicule, even when most natural, may be stifled by an
emotion of a contrary nature, and cannot operate till
that is removed.
Thus, if the notion of sanctity is annexed to an ob-
ject, it is no longer a laughable matter; and this visor
must be pulled off before it appears ridiculous.30
It is interesting to compare this passage with
Hutcheson's account of the use of ridicule to
366 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

lessen excessive emotion. Reid writes as though Laughter is received in a different manner by the per-
ridicule's exposure of absurdity is purely intel- son ridiculed, according as he who uses the ridicule
lectual and can take place only after the hearers evidences good-nature, friendship, and esteem of the
have lost the notion of sanctity which they pre- person whom he laughs at, or the contrary.3'
viously attached to the absurd thing. It is surely
more plausible to say, as Hutcheson does, that And later:
a very important aspect of the role of this kind
of ridicule is that it can also undermine the awe Ridicule upon the smallest faults, when it does not ap-
itself and so enable the absurdity to be per- pear to flow from kindness, is apt to be extremely
ceived. provoking, since the applying of mean ideas to our
The other personal use of humor is in cur- conduct discovers contempt of us in the ridiculer, and
ing people of minor faults by ridiculing them. that he designs to make us contemptible to others.32
Hutcheson says this is effective if at the same
time the ridiculer testifies his esteem of the goodHutcheson thus gives us a twofold classification
qualities of the person ridiculed, so that the vic-of personal jokes. On the one hand, there is con-
tim realizes it is done for his own good. This temptuous ridicule; some of this, despite the
reminds one of nothing so much as an agony laughter, does not really involve amusement,
aunt's advice. Reader: My friend has B.O.- though Hutcheson does not point this out. (This
how can I tell her? Agony Aunt: Make a joke of is one context where laughter can be a deliberate
it, but tell her at the same time how marvelous action.) On the other hand, there is friendly
you think she is, so she knows you're not just ridicule, sometimes with the aim of improving
being unkind! the butt. The first kind of ridicule is resented,
But is Hutcheson right, nonetheless, in think- the second (according to Hutcheson) accepted.
ing that it is easier to cope with criticism if it is But even friendly ridicule can seem to the vic-
couched in the form of a joke? This sounds like tim like an attack. Indeed, Hutcheson seems to
an empirical question; but my analysis of the admit this elsewhere. At the beginning of the
amusing shows why Hutcheson may be right. If third essay he says: "We are disposed by laugh-
a person makes a straightforward criticism of ter to a good opinion of the person who raises
me, I have to take up a position on it: for exam- it, if neither ourselves nor our friends are made
ple, challenge his right to make it, attempt to the butt."33 Here he implies that people dislike
rebut it, or admit its probable justice. If a joke being laughed at, whether or not they think the
is made, however, I need not do any of these laughter is contemptuous. If this is so, there is a
things, because as we saw, a joke is in itself an general problem, which he does not discuss,
invitation not to take something seriously. I can about the morality of laughing at people: why is
therefore save my face and avoid confrontation it not regarded as unkind to enjoy oneself, and
by apparently taking the joke at face value and give pleasure to others, by using other people's
laughing merrily, while privately taking the crit- oddities and weaknesses in a way they tend to
icism to heart. However, this technique of criti- dislike?
cism is not foolproof. One danger is that I may I can suggest three possible answers to this
not realize that a criticism is implied and may question, which seem to me to be complemen-
assume that my failing is merely pleasantly tary rather than mutually exclusive. First, we
funny. The other danger is that I might see thatmight
a think of joking as a kind of game or con-
criticism is intended but resent the fact that test, in which the rule is that it is fair to laugh at
making it is turned into an occasion for others toothers provided you are willing to let them laugh
enjoy themselves at my expense: "If what you at you. On this view, being laughed at can be
mean is that I shouldn't eat with my mouth open, seen as rather unpleasant, but the compensation
why can't you simply say 'Don't eat with your is that if one can "take a joke" oneself, one has
mouth open'?" Hutcheson is not alert to this sec- the right to laugh at others. According to this
ond problem, because he thinks that whether or view, it is unkind to laugh at someone who is not
not we are hurt by jokes depends only on how in a position to retaliate. Second, there is the
we interpret the motive of the person making view suggested by Roger Scruton in his paper on
them: laughter.34 He says in effect that although peo-

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Telfer Hutcheson's Reflections Upon Laughter
ple do not generally like being laughed at they
may still seek it, because it is impossible to love
those who are so perfect that they cannot be
laughed at. In other words, it is endearing to be
funny, and so people put up with being laughed
at because others then love them all the more.
This view fits with three ideas we tend to have:
that some jokes against us are acceptable from
friends but not from acquaintances; that making
a joke about someone in his presence is some-
times a gesture of friendship and acceptance
rather than of criticism; and that those who
make perpetual butts of themselves seek not
laughter but affection. The third defense of jok-
ing is that people who are upset by jokes at their
expense often reveal a failing in themselves
rather than in the joker. Since there are plenty of
things about ourselves which we would laugh at
in someone else, those who have a sense of pro-
portion and some humility should be able to see
the joke (not merely "take a joke") and enjoy it
themselves.
None of these considerations would show that
all jokes have to be put up with-indeed, there
can be a lack of self-respect in being willing to
accept any and every joke, however harsh. Nor
do they confirm Hutcheson's view that jokes
about non-disgraceful attributes are always ac-
ceptable to the butt.35 Such jokes (for example,
jokes about a person's striking good looks or
silly name) can still be seen by the victim as an
attack, if they are persistent (as they tend to be);
this is because they can give the victim the feel-
ing that she or he is- valued only for the scope she
or he gives for others' humor.
Finally, Hutcheson discusses some unsuitable
subjects for personal humor. Great misfortunes,
he says, provoke pity rather than laughter, and
"forced" connections with them for the sake of
a joke will seem heartless to the sufferer.36 This
seems to miss the point; a joke about a great
misfortune can be unforced and ingenious, but
still seem heartless to the sufferer. For example,
Dr. Pitcairn's mason would certainly have
thought the joke heartless if he had lived long
enough to hear it. Nor is the effect on the suf-
ferer the only possible ground for criticism of
such jokes. Suppose Dr. Pitcairn had made his
joke later, or out of earshot. We might still dis-
approve of it on moral grounds, because we
would feel that although it caused no distress it
showed an unpleasant lack of compassion; a
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367
person of moral sensibility should not be able to
make or enjoy such jokes. In other words, we
would apply to this kind of case the very point
about the man of sense which Hutcheson makes
about profane jokes but does not employ here.
The same issues arise about Hutcheson's sec-
ond unsuitable subject for personal humor,
namely "imperfections which one cannot
amend"37-presumably such things as stam-
mers and enormous noses. We would expect him
to say that these jokes too, like the jokes about
great misfortunes, are heartless when made in
the subject's presence-as surely they are. But
he does not say so, perhaps because he thinks it
is obvious. What he does say is that such jokes
are "useless," because "men of sense cannot rel-
ish them," and "foolish and trifling minds" can
be led by them to despise worthy people. How-
ever, he does not say why he thinks that men of
sense cannot relish such jokes; prima facie "im-
perfections which one cannot amend" give rise
to just the kind of incongruity which is funny.
Perhaps he thinks that compassion for the af-
flicted person should prevent us from being able
to make or appreciate such a joke, even in his
absence; in other words, perhaps he is employ-
ing the idea of moral tastelessness to which he
should have appealed in connection with jokes
about great misfortunes. Or perhaps he thinks
that because the blemish cannot be amended,
such jokes are unjust. This would make the func-
tion of jokes as moral criticisms essential rather
than incidental-an interesting idea, but not one
he endorses earlier. Or perhaps he simply thinks
it is undignified to take notice of such things,
which are, after all, the very stuff of children's
jokes. It seems impossible to say which is the
most plausible interpretation.
I think we can agree with Hutcheson that
jokes about great misfortunes or incurable blem-
ishes are in general unattractive. But there are
situations, not mentioned by him, where we re-
joice in them. One such situation is that where
the sufferer himself makes the joke. We can
enjoy such jokes without moral unease because
they show a kind of courage, an ability to take
one's own misfortunes lightly; whereas lack of
compassion is morally ugly, courage is beauti-
ful. Another such situation is farcical comedy, in
which grievous calamities and incurable imper-
fections are both standard ingredients, as are
barbarous crimes, another subject which Hutch-
368
eson thinks unsuitable for laughter.38 Is Hutche-
son committed to the view that a "man of sense"
cannot relish farce? And if so, should we agree
with him?
This is a difficult question to answer. Hutch-
eson might claim that his remarks are not in-
tended to cover stage humor. But real-life comic
narrations also can be stylized performances, in
which the humor depends, not on suffering and
wrongdoing as such, but on the mechanical,
one-sided way in which they are presented. The
man of sense might think that in these stylized
circumstances, the suspension (which the suc-
cessful farce or farcical narration produces) of
the normal reactions of pity, disapproval, and
even disgust is permissible and even useful, as a
kind of holiday in safe surroundings from the
"proper" attitudes. Another example of useful
but normally unsuitable humor is gallows
humor, or the black humor characteristic of doc-
tors, soldiers, and others who work in distress-
ing situations and use such jokes to distance
themselves from the emotions which would oth-
erwise make their work impossible.
But perhaps in all this there is also a danger,
of the kind Hutcheson points out in other con-
texts, of being led to take real sufferings and
crimes too lightly. As we saw, Hutcheson says
that "weak and foolish minds" can be misled by
humor into feeling contempt for what is worth-
while and important, instead of simply laughing
at blemishes in it or funny associations set up
with it. Perhaps the same thing can happen with
jokes about suffering or crime. In all these cases,
after all, we have a motive for allowing this to
happen. Funny things are presented as things
we need not take seriously or do anything about,
so the more things we can think of as merely
funny, the more we are let off the hook.
Humor, then, is a weapon to be used with
care, as Hutcheson saw:
Ridicule, like other edged tools, may do good in a
wise man's hands, though fools may cut their fingers
with it, or be injurious to an unwary bystander.39
The usefulness of humor, as well as its pleasure,
depends on the same anarchic quality which
makes it risky: it is because the play of humor
loosens our attachment to rigid attitudes and
ideas that it pleases and helps us. Hutcheson
sometimes seems too fearful of the dangers of
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The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
humor, sometimes not fearful enough, as I have
tried to show. If we endeavor to make it ab-
solutely safe by adding warning notices to our
jokes, as Hutcheson suggests in connection with
satire, we will not be able to benefit from it. But
if we are too ready to assume, as Hutcheson
does, that some things are immune to the danger
of being undermined by persistent mockery, we
may be harmed by humor.
Humor is an important topic. One must not be
misled by its quality of presenting things as not
mattering into thinking that humor itself has no
significance in human interaction. Hutcheson
realizes this and tries to explain and assess its
importance. His account has many limitations,
but it also contains many interesting and impor-
tant insights.40
ELIZABETH TELFER
Department of Philosophy
University of Glasgow
Glasgow G12 8QQ
United Kingdom
INTERNET: AJM@ARTS.GLA.AC.UK
1. The Spectator, vol. I, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 200-204 (No. 47, Tuesday,
April 24, 171 1).
2. Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature, chap. IX, par. 13, in
The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, vol.
IV, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: John Bohm,
1840), pp. 45-47.
3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, part I, chap. 6, in The En-
glish Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, vol. III, ed.
Sir William Molesworth (London: John Bohm, 1839), p. 46.
4. Plato, Philebus, ed. and trans. R. Hackworth as Plato's
Examination of Pleasure (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1945), pp. 92-98 (Stephanus 47d5-50e2).
5. Francis Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, ed. R. S.
Downie (London: Everyman, J. M. Dent, 1994), p. 52.
6. The meaning of the word "ludicrous" has shifted. In
Hutcheson's time the word often meant what we now mean
by "amusing," rather than bearing the pejorative sense ("ab-
surd," ridiculous") which is the only sense now current.
7. Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, p. 57.
8. I owe this point to Simon Blackburn.
9. For modern discussions of humor as incongruity, see
D. H. Monro, "Humor," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
vol. 4, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company and the Free Press/London: Collier Macmillan
Publishers, 1967, 1972), pp. 90-93; Michael Clark, "Hu-
mour as Incongruity," Philosophy 45 (1970): 20-32; and
Roger Scruton, "Laughter," in his The Aesthetic Under-
standing: Essays in the Philosophy of Art and Culture (Man-
chester: Carcanet New Press, 1983), pp. 153-165. Scruton
discusses Clark's article in the course of his own.
 Telfer Hutcheson's Reflections Upon Laughter 369
10. Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, p. 53.
1 1. Ibid.
12. Compare Roger Scruton: "If I were to propose a can-
didate for the formal object of amusement then the human
(in its widest significance) would be my choice," Scruton,
"Laughter," p. 162.
13. Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, p. 57.
14. Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, p. 12.
15. Ibid., p. 4.
16. Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning Beauty,
Order, Harmony, Design, ed. Peter Kivy (The Hague: Mart-
inus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 99. The essays on laughter are in-
cluded in this book as an appendix, with their own intro-
duction by Kivy.
17. Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, p. 18.
18. Ibid., p. 57.
19. The Spectator, vol. II, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 465-469 (No. 249, Saturday,
December 15, 171 1).
20. Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, p. 58.
2 1. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., pp. 47-48.
24. A modern example of how admiration for great works
of art can survive humorous attack is provided by the Wag-
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ner parodies of Anna Russell, which are particularly cher-
ished by Wagner devotees.
25. Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, p. 54.
26. Ibid., p. 6 1.
27. Ibid., p. 59.
28. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
29. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
30. Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of
Man, essay VI, chap. IV, in The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D.,
ed. Sir William Hamilton (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and
Stewart, 1863), pp. 438-439. I am grateful to Professor
Donald Todd for bringing Reid's discussion to my attention
and for many other valuable suggestions on this paper.
31. Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, p. 59.
32. Ibid., p. 60.
33. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
34. Scruton, "Laughter."
35. Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, p. 60.
36. Ibid., p. 59.
37. Ibid., p. 62.
38. Ibid., p. 59.
39. Ibid., p. 61.
40. This paper is based on one read at a conference on
Francis Hutcheson, held at Glasgow University in April
1994, to commemorate the tercentenary of Hutcheson's birth.