Axiomathes

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09571-6

ORIGINAL PAPER

On the Onto‑Epistemological Status of the Empty Set

and the Pure Singleton

Osman Gazi Birgül1 

Received: 16 October 2020 / Accepted: 20 June 2021

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021

Abstract
This article discusses the quiddity of the empty set from its epistemological and lin-
guistic aspects. It consists of four parts. The first part compares the concept of nihil
privativum and the empty set in terms of representability, arguing the empty set can
be treated as a negative and formal concept. It is argued that, unlike Frege’s defini-
tion of zero, the quantitative negation with a full scope is what enables us to repre-
sent the empty set conceptually without committing to an antinomy. The second part
examines the type and scope of the negation in the concept of nihil privativum and
the empty set. In the third part the empty set is interpreted as a rigid abstract gen-
eral term. The uniqueness of the empty set is explained via a widened version of
Kripke’s notion of rigidity. The fourth part proposes a construction for the pure sin-
gleton, comparing it with Zermelo’s conception of singletons with the Ur-elements.
It is argued that the proposed construction does not face the criterion and ontologi-
cal inflation problems. The first conclusion of the article is that the empty set can be
construed as a negative, formal and unique abstract general term, with quantitative
negation full in scope. The second conclusion is that the pure singleton constructed
out of the empty set construed in this way overcomes the criterion and ontological
inflation problems.

Keywords Absence · Nihil privativum · Nihil negativum · The empty set axiom ·

The pure singleton · Zero

For their helpful comments, I owe a debt of gratitude to Mehmet Hilmi DEMİR, Koray
AKÇAGÜNER, Can ÇÖTELİ and Şafak ŞAHİN.

* Osman Gazi Birgül

gazibir@metu.edu.tr
1
Department of Philosophy, Middle East Technical University, Universiteler Mah. Dumlupinar
Bulvari, No:1, Cankaya, 06800 Ankara, Turkey

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 Axiomathes

1 Introduction

The existence and the quiddity of the empty set have been problematic issues, even
for the founding fathers of the set theory. Cantor, for example, explicitly rejects the
existence of the empty set. Although the disjoint sets have the empty set as an inter-
section, he denies the existence of the intersection, and thus the empty set: “If any
two sets P and Q do not have any common element, then we say, they have no inter-
section” (Cantor 1932, p. 145). Another example is Zermelo, who writes in a letter
to Fraenkel that the empty set is “not genuinely a set and was introduced by me
only for formal reasons” (quoted in Ebbinghaus 2007, p. 135). Furthermore, having
doubts about the justifiability of the empty set, Zermelo describes the empty set in
another letter as an ad hoc formal tool: “I increasingly doubt the justifiability of the
‘null set’. Perhaps one can dispense with it by restricting the axiom of separation
in a suitable way. Indeed, it serves only for the purpose of formal simplification”
(quoted in Ebbinghaus 2007, p. 135). His suggestion to dispense with the empty
set by improving another axiom indicates that positing the empty set by an axiom
does not necessarily provide a consensus among the philosophers. If the axioms of
set theory can be improved, they are not axioms in the sense of being unquestionbly
true statements  but postulates. Maddy  (1988) points out this aspect of the axioms
from the methodological angle:
Conversely, the axiomatization of set theory has led to the consideration of
axiom candidates that no one finds obvious, not even their staunchest support-
ers. In such cases, we find the methodology has more in common with the
natural scientist’s hypotheses formation and testing than the caricature of the
mathematician writing down a few obvious truths and preceeding to draw logi-
cal consequences (p. 481).
Regardless of the opposing views of the founding fathers of the set theory, the empty
set axiom is welcomed without any need for explanation. The orthodox view treats
the empty set as a formal tool and does not spare room for the philosophical debates
about its quiddity. Unlike the orthodox treatment, this article proposes an epistemo-
logical and linguistic explanation for the existence and the quiddity of the empty set.
The proposed explanation is built from an onto-epistemological standpoint. Accord-
ingly, mathematical knowledge is performative and artifactual in essence and the
mathematical objects are the constructions of mind. There is no distinction between
the knowledge of the performance and the knowledge of the artifact, nor is there
a distinction between construct-that and construct-how. From this perspective, the
empty set cannot be regarded as a formal ad hoc tool or some mind-independent
object that can be argued to exist without any solution for the epistemic access
problem. The objects in set-theoretical ontology are neither like Platonic ideas nor

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 Axiomathes

made-up ad hoc tools, but epistemologically accountable constructions. The basic

purpose of this article is to propose an onto-epistemological account that avoids not
only the epistemic access problem that challenges the realists, but also the ad hoc-
ness criticisms that the pragmatist-formalists face.
To propose the onto-epistemological explanation, in what follows, I identify the
empty set with Kant’s concept of nihil privativum, namely the concept of the empty
object of a concept.1 The ground for this identification is that sets in the Canto-
rian sense and concepts in a specific Kantian sense are both objects of thought. As
known, Cantor defines sets as objects of thoughts: “By a ‘manifold’ or ‘aggregate’ I
generally understand every multiplicity which can be thought as one, i.e., any totality
of definite elements which by means of a law can be bound up into a whole” (1932,
p. 204f.). Similarly, Kant defines concepts as thought entities: “The word ‘concept’
itself could already lead us to this remark for it is this one consciousness that unifies
the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one
representationˮ (A103).2 Nonetheless, the identification of the empty set with the
concept of nihil privativum needs some further elaboration on their essential fea-
tures in addition to being thought entities. These essential features are negativity,
formality, and having a quantitative negation with a scope applying to the whole
universe of possible elements and uniqueness. The first part discusses negativity and
formality. Negativity distinguishes the empty set from non-empty sets. Non-empty
sets negatively refer to their non-elements and positively refer to what they contain
in their extensions where at least one element is posited. Unlike these, the empty set
refers to any possible member negatively, i.e., it is the only utterly negative set as it
has no element. Formality is the necessary condition for the mind to represent the
empty set, and it serves as a ground for the explanation of the difference between
how one experiences absences and how one  represents the concept of absence in
general. The second part evaluates the type and scope of the negation in the for-
mal statement of the empty set axiom. It is argued that quantitative negation with
a full scope sheds light on the function of the universal quantifier. Leaving no need
for paradoxical or impredicative definitions such as Frege’s definition of zero, it is
the type and scope of the negation that explains the conceptual construction of the
empty set and the representation of zero cardinality in sensu fundemantali. As the
last feature, uniqueness is discussed in the third part. The claim is that uniqueness
allows the interpretation of the empty set as a rigid abstract general term from its

1
  The interpretations that identify sets with concepts or note their similarities are neither new nor based
on mere analogies. There are some theoretical and textual grounds that either allow such interpretations
or can be used in such interpretations. See Parsons (1984), especially pp. 111–115.
2
  As is known, the Critique of Pure Reason is quoted according to the German paginations of the first
and second editions, respectively. Kant’s other works are quoted by volume and the page number of the
Akademie-Ausgabe. For these works, the following abbreviations are used: HS = Kant’s Handschriftli-
cher Nachlass, LM = Lectures on Metaphysics, NS = Natural Science, P = Prolegomena to any Future
Metaphysics, TP = Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770. Regarding the translation of the quotes, when
available, the Cambridge edition is used (sometimes with minor modifications), or I translate the quoted
passages.

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 Axiomathes

linguistic aspect, which is explained through a broadened version of Kripke’s notion

of rigidity.
Doubtless, an account
{ } for the empty set has further implications regarding the
pure singleton, i.e., ∅  , as well as the constructions of pure numbers. The num-
bers concerned here are not the numbers that we use when we count the objects of
experience, but the numbers that we construct without any appeal to objects. In the
fourth and the last part it is argued that the pure singleton constructed by using the
concept of nihil privativum overcomes two problems, namely the ontological infla-
tion problem and the criterion problem. The ontological inflation problem arises
when there is an overpopulation of the ontology with unnecessary objects. The cri-
terion problem arises as a result of the ontological problem because when there is an
ontological inflation problem there is neither any criterion for determining an ele-
ment for the pure singleton nor any criterion for picking one of the singletons as the
model of the pure number 1. These two problems are exemplified through Zermelo’s
appeal to the Ur-elements, and it is shown how the singleton constructed out of the
concept of nihil privativum overcomes them.

2 Negativity, Formality, and Representability

Both the empty set and the concept of nihil privativum are negative in essence. The
former does not positively refer to any element, and the latter does not positively
refer to any object. The significance of negativity can be observed set-theoretically
by a theorem about the empty set. The epistemological significance of negativity
gets clearer by an analysis of the concept of nihil privativum. Let me ( start )with the
set-theoretical significance of negativity through the theorem ∀A � ⊆ A  , which
asserts that the empty set is the subset of any set. The subset relation is defined as
A ⊆ B ↔ ∀x(x ∈ A → x ∈ B) . According to this relation, the only condition for a set
not to be a subset of another set is to contain an element that is not contained by
the other one. Considering the negativity of the empty set and the subset relation,
this theorem should be read as whatever( element which) is contained by ∅ is also
contained by any other set S, i.e., ∀A∀x x ∈ � → x ∈ S  . Nevertheless, the empty
set axiom
( refers) negatively to any membership relation between any arbitrary x and
∅ : ∀x¬ x ∈ �  . It is due to the negativity of the empty set that ∀x there is only ¬ ∈
relation to ∅ . Of course, any set is negative when their non-elements are considered.
However, as the theorem shows, the only completely negative set is the empty set.
Regarding the epistemological aspect of negativity, the concept of nihil priva-
tivum refers to no object of intuition positively. Otherwise stated, it is about the
deprivation, or apparent absence of objects. Kant explains this feature by giving
the examples of negative concepts cold and darkness. Describing the former as the
deprivation of warmth, and the latter as the deprivation of light, he contends that:
“Warmth is thus something positive like light, and cold as well as darkness are sim-
ply names for their apparent absence” (NS 9:251). Let me explain Kant’s point on
the negative use of the concepts by examining a recent explanation on the identifica-
tion of absence in experience.  According to Sorensen (2008a):

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 Axiomathes

Happily for us modellers of empty quotation, there are many common-sense

examples of perceiving absences. We hear pauses, feel holes, and see shadows.
This makes it plausible that a student can see the empty string on a blackboard
just as he can see a crack in a wall (p. 59).
Using shadows, pauses, and holes in a positive sense is a case for the misuse of neg-
ative concepts in a positive sense. According to Sorensen, shadows are perceivable
by the virtue of their “contrast with their environment” (2008b, p. 74). The misuse
is a result of mistaking the inference of absence for the perception of the contrast-
ing environment. The absence of objects is not and cannot be perceived, but it can
be inferred from the assumption that the perceived contrasting environment must be
uninterrupted. In the case of pauses, we keep perceiving some sound, and perception
stops for some time, which Sorensen calls hearing the pauses rather than not hear-
ing the sounds. The same applies to holes where we feel the rest of the fabric, not
the holes themselves. Leave out the contrasting environment; there is no perception
left. When the fabric is left out altogether, no one could feel anything in the positive
sense. Kant clarifies this point when he writes that through sensibility we cannot
receive “the concept of lack, for negation cannot affect the senses, and I cannot say:
I have seen that no one is in the room, for I cannot see nothing” (LM 28:235). In this
regard, just as the empty set leaves any element out of its extension, the concept of
nihil privativum leaves everything out and refers to no object positively.
As the examples indicate, for the representation  of the concept of nihil privati-
vum of the existence of some particular object(s) of intuition should be perceived in
advance so that one can identify their apparent absence in experience. When Kant
writes “If light were not given to the senses, then one would also not be able to
represent darkness” (A292/B349), he actually reminds us the representation of exist-
ence and presence of objects is epistemically prior to the representation of their non-
existence and absence—i.e., in the case of the concept of nihil privativum, we can
conceptualize and represent only the absence of the previously given objects. It is
the representation of the concept of absence where formality gets into the picture.
Formality is a necessary condition for conceptual representation and it allows the
concept of nihil privativum to be treated as an object of thought. Dividing the con-
cept of an object in general into as something and nothing, Kant classifies the con-
cept of nihil privativum under the class of something in its formal sense:
A nothing is a merely formal concept, to the extent that the lack of everything
material in intuition is found with it. It is thus only a nothing in the material
sense <nihilum in sensu materiali>, but by all means a something in the for-
mal sense <in sensu formali>, ... From this it follows that all concepts belong
here for which all empirical intuition is lacking (LM 29:962).
The representation of the concept of nihil privativum becomes possible through an
abstraction process. By this process one abstracts the common property of existing
conceptually but being absent materially. The abstraction begins with the cognitions
of the absence of sensible particular objects. And by abstraction, one obtains the
concept of absence in general, namely the concept of nihil privativum. For example,
the phrase the Tasmanian tigers, require some cognition of the existence of tigers as

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 Axiomathes

objects present in advance, such that their absence can be represented in the form of
a concept without an object. As one experiences many cases where there are  con-
ceptually existing but materially non-existent things  one abstracts the concept of
nihil privativum out of several experiences. By abstraction, what is obtained is not
a concept without some particular objects but the concept of absence in general.
As it is the concept of absence in general, the concept of nihil privativum acts as
an abstract general term. This point is in line with Kant’s treatment of the concept
of nihil privativum. He subsumes all cases where there is a concept with no object
under the concept of nihil privativum. This concept ranges over all the terms empty
in this world, as well as the made-up concepts and the fictitious names:
[…] a nihil privativum, although it still can be thought, is one to which noth-
ing existent corresponds; e.g., the aether in physics is an invented concept that
has no reality intuitu objecti, but which can be thought without contradiction.
Likewise a positive cold, as absolute cause of cold, contains nothing contradic-
tory in thinking it, but it has no existence. All fictions belong here, since they
are not to be met with in nature quoad objectum (LM 29:961).3
So introduced, nihil privativum refers to absence itself when it is used, and when it
is mentioned, i.e. ‘nihil privativum’, it is the concept of absence.4 It is ‘nihil privati-
vum’ that is identified with the empty set.
When disregarded, the distinction between the used and mentioned versions
of the empty set and its formality lead to different types of confusions. The first
type of confusion arises from mistaking the used version of nothing for ‘noth-
ing’ and this ends up in denying the existence of the empty set as a represent-
able object of thought. As stated above, the used version refers to nothing in
its material sense and the mentioned version refers to the concept of nothing in
its formal sense. According to Kant, confusing these two is hardly pardonable.
He gives an example that clarifies the point: “you have money in the chest–for
if you did not have that, then there would be nothing of money in the chest,
then nothing would be money, thus you must have money. The mistake is that
nothing < nihil > is meant one time as negation, another time as a concept” (LM
29:815–6). As pointed out by Oliver and Smiley, many people make this first
type of confusion: “These authors’ confusion of the empty set with nothing
(‘the same null content’, ‘the contents of two empty bags’) is surprisingly com-
mon” (2018, p. 397). As w have seen, Cantor makes the first type of confusion

3
  Zermelo (1908a) treats the empty set as fictitious: “Axiom II. (Axiom of elementary sets.) There exists
a (fictitious) set, the null set, 0, that contains no element at all” (p. 202). Notice that the fictitious names
are linguistically empty terms and they have no designatum. And epistemologically, they are cases for
the concept of nihil privativum. Unlike Zermelo’s treatment, I identify the empty set with the concept
of nihil privativum and argue that the concept of nihil privativum is not itself fictitious, but an abstract
general term by which the fictitious terms can be explained. The relevant details will be presented in due
course.
4
  For coherence in usage, from here on I write the terms absence and nihil privativum in single quote
marks when they are mentioned. In due course, there are some usages where ‘nihil privativum’ is men-
tioned as ‘‘nihil privativum’’. Please note that they are all single quote marks.

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 Axiomathes

in his quote above by claiming that the disjoint sets have no intersection, rather
than empty intersections. Oliver and Smiley (see 2018, p. 397) give more recent
examples of the confusion. Let me discuss two of them. According to  Bar-
row,  the disjoints “have no members in common and the set that is defined by
their intersection is the empty set” (2000, p.166). His conception of the empty
set may seem different from Cantor’s. But on the same page, he maintains that
we are able “to create all of the numbers from literally nothing, the set with no
members” (Barrow 2000, p. 166). In the former quote, he identifies the empty
set with ‘nothing’ and in the latter with nothing. This amounts to the claim that
‘nothing’ is nothing. Devlin is another example given by Oliver and Smiley. He
claims that “we may construct even the natural numbers by assuming only the
existence of nothing... We assumed the existence of the empty set (i.e., nothing),
and took this to be the number 0” (Devlin 1977, p. 12). Like Barrow, Devlin
mistakes nothing for ‘nothing’, but while nothing does not exist, ‘nothing’ does
exist as a formal object of thought. Thus, considering the distinction between
nothing and ‘nothing’, I side with Oliver and Smiley: “Burgess, Stewart, Barrow
and Devlin need to be told loud and clear: if there is an empty set, it is some-
thing, not nothing” (Oliver and Smiley 2018, p. 397).
The second type of confusion arises from abolishing formality and construing
the empty set as an irrepresentable type of nothing. Frege’s definition of zero
is one of the explicit examples. He defines zero in the form of logical opposi-
tion. The problem is that his definition does not pick out the empty extension,
but no extension. That is to say, his definition fails to pick out the represent-
able ‘nothing’. Badiou draws attention to this problem: “Even the concept ‘not
identical to itself’ could well turn out not to have any existent extension, which
is something entirely different from having an empty extension” (2008, p. 20).
Obviously, Frege’s definition of zero as “the number which belongs to the con-
cept ‘not identical with itself’ ˮ (1960, p. 87) is in the form of an impredicative
definition as there is simultaneous affirmation and denial of the predicate being
self-identical. According to Kant, when a predicate is simultaneously affirmed
and denied of the same thing, the result of this vicious circle is not a new and
contradictory concept, but nothing at all, which he formulates as “nihil negati-
vum irrepraesentabile” (TP 2:171). Kant defines nihil negativum as: “The object
of a concept that contradicts itself is nothing because the concept is nothing, the
impossible, like a rectilinear figure with two sides (nihil negativum)ˮ (A291/
B348). Frege’s definition does not correspond to an empty object of a concept,
but an empty object without a concept. Due to its logical impossibility, the
empty object without a concept is not a formal thought entity. Logical possibil-
ity is a necessary condition for formality and it is the main distinction between
nihil negativum and ‘nihil privativum’: “The concept is always possible if it
does not contradict itself. That is the logical mark of possibility, and thereby the
object of the concept is distinguished from the nihil negativum” (A596/B624f.).
One serious implication of disregarding logical possibility is that it cancels the
uniqueness of the empty set. To create a logical contradiction, one can prefer
any concept, predicate, or quality. Frege is aware that he could have chosen
some other quality or a predicate to form a contradictory definition. He gives

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 Axiomathes

examples of some alternative phrases such as square circle and wooden iron (see
Frege 1960, pp. 87–88).  According to Frege, one may not grasp the contradic-
tion in the cases where the  contradiction is not purely logical, which is why he
prefers not identical with itself, thinking that it is provable  “on purely logical
grounds” (Frege 1960, p. 88). Nonetheless, this does not make any difference
because regardless of beingpurely logical or not, no definition in the form of
logical contradiction produces a unique and formal object of thought but nothing
at all. Thus, the alternative definitions have no fundamental difference from the
one Frege favors, and as alternatives they do nothing but simply make the lack
of a unique extension that can be identified with zero more visible.

3 The Type and the Scope of the Negation

In the context of ‘nihil privativum’, there are two types of negations quantita-
tive and qualitative. Both types explain the zero cardinality that we model by the
empty set, yet there are two important distinctions. Firstly, quantitative negation
explains the constitutive role of the negation in ‘nihil privativum’ and in the for-
mal statement of the empty set axiom. And secondly, while both negations pave
different representational paths to zero cardinality, the quantitative negation
allows the representation of zero cardinality in sensu fundamentali. To elaborate
on these distinctions, let me start by quoting Kant on the issue:
The negation is either in terms of quantity or quality. In the first case it is
to be seen as a vanishing quantum and nothing but mere limitation and the
reality is not contradictorily opposed, so that one of both would take place,
but disparatum or defectum; in the second case it is negatio oppositionis
(HS 18:361-62).
In this paragraph, the key phrase that defines the quantitative negation is nega-
tio oppositionis, which Kant formulates elsewhere as “ ‘A-A = 0’; this formula
expresses the following idea: there are two things, of which one is the negative to
the other; … one of them cancels that which is posited by the other” (TP 2:177).
His formulation concerns the same kind and amount of opposite things, such as
two equal magnitudes that move at the same speed in opposing directions. The
opposition between equal things is essentially real, not logical as in Frege’s defi-
nition of zero. This point makes a crucial distinction between nihil negativum
and ‘nihil privativum’. Kant calls only the latter as repraesentabile: “The conse-
quence of the opposition is also nothing, but nothing in another sense to that in
which it occurs in a contradiction (nihil privativum repraesentabile). We shall, in
the future, call this nothing: zero = 0” (TP 2:172). It is obvious that, contrary to
logical oppositions, it is the real oppositions on which the formality and repre-
sentability of ‘nihil privativum’ rest because, as quoted above, ‘nihil privativum’
still can be thought and it contains nothing contradictory in thinking it.
To compare, qualitative negation repeals the ground of a quality in terms of
being both being applicable and inapplicable. In other words, when a quality
is qualitatively negated, it becomes non-applicable because for Kant this type

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 Axiomathes

of negation “does not require a positive ground, but merely the lack of such a
ground” (TP 2:178). When a quality F is non-applicable, no matter how many
objects one might have in the domain, it cannot qualify over them because there
is no ground to assert either Fa or ¬Fa . Actually, the qualitative negation is a
method of obtaining zero and looks like an alternative for the quantitative nega-
tion. Comparing it with quantitative negation, Kant formulates this method in the
form of the equation A x 0 = 0 : “The nihil of deprivation A − A = 0 or it is that of
defectus A x 0 = 0 ” (HS 22:433). At this point, to decide which type of negation
is epistemically prior, there is need for a comparison in terms of how they allow
us to obtain zero. I do not endorse the qualitative negation as epistemically prior
to the quantitative, because zero shows up on both sides of the equation sign. In
the formulation of the qualitative negation, zero is first given on the left side, and
later replicated on the right. Thus, the equation does not serve as a method of
obtaining zero but only as a method of replicating what has been already given.
When compared, the quantitative negation, i.e., A − A = 0 , has epistemic prior-
ity over the qualitative one. The reason is that the replication of a given entity
requires it to be obtained in the first place. By the quantitative negation, one
obtains zero or the empty set at the outset and without any circular reasoning.
Regarding the scope of the quantitative negation in ‘nihil privativum’ or the
empty set, let me begin by specifying two points about the categories limitation
and full negation. In the context of the quantitative negation, these two categories
provide different routes to zero and they have a conclusive role in figuring out to
what sort of opposed magnitudes the quantitative negation applies. Kant classifies
both categories as the categories of quality: “for quantity and quality there is merely
a progression from Unity to Totality, or from something to nothing (for this pur-
pose the categories of quality must stand thus: Reality, Limitation, full Negation)
ˮ(P 4:325f.). The difference is that limitation is about intensive magnitudes and full
negation is about extensive magnitudes. In the first critique, under the section of the
Anticipations of Perception, Kant defines intensive magnitudes as follows: “Now I
call that magnitude which can only be apprehended as a unity, and in which mul-
tiplicity can only be represented through approximation to negation = 0, intensive
magnitude” (A168/B210). Accordingly, intensive magnitudes are about degree in
quality, such as the degrees of color or speed. He contends that if the scope of the
quantitative negation does not cover the reality in its full sense, e.g., extending wider
and wider in scope without applying fully, this results in infinitesimals rather than
zero (see A168/B210). Applying the quantitative negation with a gradually increas-
ing scope implies that ‘nihil privativum’ should be interpreted along with the cat-
egory of limitation. A further implication is that zero should be conceptualized as
the end of a continuum. These implications are in line with the dynamic approach to
matter. An example of the dynamic approach can be found in Kant’s explanation on
limitation and its connection with shadow:
Limitation, i.e. the representation of a thing, whose being is affected by its
nonbeing, thereby whose concept contains a being combined with nonbeing.
E.g. light is reality; darkness is negation; shadow is limitation, since it is a
darkness which is bounded by light (LM 29:998).

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 Axiomathes

To compare, let me explain the category of full negation in the context of the exten-
sive magnitudes. Giving the example of a line as a totality of points, Kant defines
an extensive magnitude as “that in which the representation of the parts makes pos-
sible the representation of the whole (and therefore necessarily precedes the latter)”
(A162/B263). When one cognizes the apparent absence of an object that is a total-
ity of parts, one applies the quantitative negation to the parts of the object in its
full sense and obtains a concept with no object. The important question is whether
there is any flaw in representing zero as the end of a continuum from the perspective
of the dynamical approach. Indeed, there is not, and the dynamical approach may
offer a more comprehensive perspective to understand nature. However, notice that
the mechanical approach is epistemically more fundamental than the dynamical one.
First of all, the main concern is not about which representation of zero cardinality
helps us in understanding nature better, but how we represent it to ourselves in sensu
fundamentali. I think the representation of zero cardinality as the representation of
absence is more fundamental than representing it as the end of a continuum. There
are two reasons for this. The first is that representing zero as the end of a continuum
requires the category of limitation. Limitation, as quoted above, is about the repre-
sentation of a thing, whose being is affected by its nonbeing, thereby whose concept
contains a being combined with nonbeing. The combination of the being and non-
being of a thing in a concept requires one to represent the concept of non-being in
advance. That is, the category of full negation is epistemically prior to the category
of limitation in representing zero cardinality. For a mathematical example, let us
take representing zero as the end of the continuum of the rational numbers from 1 to
0. Obviously, one needs to construct the natural numbers in the first place. One can-
not represent the continuum from 1 to 0 without constructing 1 and 0 beforehand.
This is also the reason why we need the natural numbers to construct the rational
numbers. The second reason is that while limitation is about sensations of degree
or density in alteration, full negation is simply about the non-being or absence of
objects. Epistemically, non-being is the source of sensation even for the cases of
alteration in degree. Kant indicates this priority by describing zero cardinality as the
source of the intuitions of degreed sensations:
Principium of the mathematical cognition of appearances: All appearance has
as intuition its extensive magnitude and as sensation its degree. For (as far as
the latter is concerned) every sensation arises from nonbeing, since it is modi-
fication. Thus through alteration. All alteration, however, proceeds from 0 to a
through infinitely many small steps (HS 18:241).
Hence, instead of the gradual alteration in degree by the category of limitation, the
in sensu fundamentali representation of absence or non-being under ‘nihil privati-
vum’ is possible only through mere lack by the category of full negation. There is
no difference between ‘nihil privativum’ and the empty set in this respect. The con-
siderations regarding the category of full negation apply to the empty set as well.
If the scope of its negation did not negate the membership relation for all quantity
of possible elements in the universe, it would not be a truly empty extension at all.
The empty set is not a set whose elements decrease gradually, but a set simply with

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 Axiomathes

no elements. Thus, instead of limitation, the universal quantifier in its formulation

∃A∀x ¬(x ∈ A) should be interpreted as the category of full negation.

4 Uniqueness by Rigidity

Although the Kantian framework provides an epistemological account of ‘nihil

privativum’, the uniqueness of ‘nihil privativum’ is not its concern. Despite there
being no epistemological account for the empty set, its uniqueness is a concern
for the set theory. Identifying these two thought entities with each other, it is pos-
sible to argue that absence itself is what lies in the extensions of both ‘nihil priva-
tivum’ and the empty set. Namely, there is no element contained by only one of
these thought entities such that it creates an extensional difference. Due to the
identity of their extensions, it is possible to prove the uniqueness of the empty
set by the extensionality axiom and there is nothing wrong with it. However, I am
required to show the uniqueness of the empty set by other means because having
treated the axioms of set theory as postulates, it would be question-begging to
show the uniqueness of the empty set by appealing to another axiom. To explain
uniqueness, there is need for an explanation that steps beyond Kantian epistemol-
ogy and builds uniqueness on a basis other than the extensionality axiom. With
some modifications, Kripke’s notion of rigidity serves as a defensible basis for
the uniqueness of the empty set.
Kripke’s definition of rigidity has two limitations. The first is that   while the
rigidity of the singular terms is more or less a resolved issue, it is not the case for the
general terms. According to him, a singular term is “a rigid designator if in every
possible world it designates the same object, a non-rigid or accidental designator
if that is not the case” (Kripke 1980, p. 4). When it comes to the general terms,
despite that Kripke (see 1980, pp. 119–121) argues for the rigidity of some general
terms, he never gives an explicit account that explains what exactly the rigid gen-
eral terms designate. The second limitation is that Kripke takes the existence of a
designatum as a necessary condition for the rigidity of terms. He maintains that “a
designator rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object wherever
the object exists” (Kripke 1980, pp. 48–49). Nonetheless, in the case of ‘nihil priva-
tivum’, nothing makes things complicated because it does not exist in the Kripkean
sense. Due to these two limitations, Kripke’s notion of rigidity fails to apply to ‘nihil
privativum’ or the empty set. Thus, there arises a need to broaden the scope of the
notion of rigidity wide enough to become applicable to abstract general terms. As is
known, there is no consensus among the Kripke scholars about what a general term
designates and there are several views each defending a different account of rigidity.
On this issue, I situate myself among those who completely reject the idea of rigidity
for general terms. Despite my position on the issue, the rigidity of ‘nihil privativum’
is an exception. To show its exceptionality, the extensionalist view can be adopted.
According to this view, a general term is rigid if it designates the same extension in
all possible worlds.. As an example, take the term tiger. Tiger is a rigid designator
if it satisfies the sameness of extension, i.e., it designates the same extension with
the same objects in all possible worlds. However, this account is most probably the

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 Axiomathes

weakest account of rigidity because the objects in the extension are not necessary
beings, they are all contingent. To show the rigidity of a general term by the exten-
sionalist account, one needs to show that whatever is in extension is necessary.
Using this broadened version of rigidity let me test the rigidity of ‘nihil priva-
tivum’. The designatum of this abstract general term is  nihil privativum, or noth-
ing. Recall that although Kant treats ‘nihil privativum’ as an abstract general term
and subsumes all concepts … for which all empirical intuition is lacking under it,
he subsumes only fictions and made-up concepts of this world under ‘nihil privati-
vum’. Yet, the point is that a thing that is absent in this world may exist in another,
e.g., there might be a world where the assertion “Pegasus exists.” takes T as its truth
value. Thus, unlike the contingent cases of nihil privativum, ‘nihil privativum’ itself
must exist as a rigid abstract general term in all possible worlds. To test its rigidity,
let me make a reductio assumption that there is at least one possible world where
‘nihil privativum’ does not designate nihil privativum or nothing. From this assump-
tion, it follows that there is a possible world where there are no concepts without
objects. Put otherwise, there is a possible world where everything exists. In a world
where everything exists, ‘nihil privativum’ must also exist. The conclusion contra-
dicts the reductio assumption. From this, it follows that ‘nihil privativum’ exists in
all possible worlds and designates nihil privativum or simply nothing.
The rigidity of the empty set can be tested right in the same way. Before the test,
let me briefly elaborate on what it designates. As is known, Cantor did not take the
empty set as the ground of his theory. However, he did write a passage on the dis-
joint pointsets of real numbers, revealing that the notion of lack has a place in his
theory in the form of the predicate of being empty. Formulating the identity of the
two pointsets P and Q as “P ≡ Q” (Cantor 1880, p. 355), Cantor characterizes the
disjoint sets as without intersection; and introduces the letter O as an indicator of
emptiness: “for the absence of points … we choose the letter O; P ≡ O indicates that
the P contains no single point” (1880, p. 356). In his formulation, P is an arbitrary
term. This means that O stands for the absence of points in all cases where there are
no points. Thus, as accurately interpreted by Kanamori, the operation ‘≡ O’ acts
“more like a predication for being empty” (2003, p. 275). As is known, properties
are the extra-linguistic qualities that can be predicated of sets, and it is the prop-
erty  empty being predicated of all the sets with empty extension. The empty set des-
ignates the empty extension. To test the rigidity of the empty set, let me begin with
a similar reductio assumption that the empty set does not designate the empty exten-
sion in at least one possible world X. Then, in X, all  sets must be non-empty. As the
intersections of sets are also sets, then in X all the disjoint sets have non-empty inter-
sections. This amounts to saying that there are sets with extensions that are both
empty and non-empty, which is a contradiction. Thus, the empty set designates the
empty extension in all possible worlds.

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 Axiomathes

5 Constructing the Pure Singleton

There are two chronic problems regarding the conceptions of singletons: the cri-
terion problem, and the ontological inflation problem. Starting with the first prob-
lem, if an account has the criterion problem, it is generally the case that there is no
criterion for determining an element for the proposed singleton because there are
many similar objects that can be taken as a singular element. The criterion problem
becomes an issue also when there are many possible candidate singletons and there
is no criterion to treat a specific one as the construction of 1. Thus, it is possible that
whenever there is a criterion problem, there is also subjectivity in the ways the ele-
ment or the singleton are determined. The ontological inflation problem concerns the
simplicity of the account. An account with the inflation problem clashes with Ock-
ham’s razor by sparing room for unnecessary objects that can be modeled by a sim-
pler ontology. In the problematic cases, generally a complicated ontology is accom-
panied by a complicated epistemology. Thus, as a result of the ontological inflation
problem, the inflated ontologies clash with Ockham’s razor epistemologically.
Let me illustrate these two chronic problems by a brief example. For the sake of
argument, let us assume that there is an{ account that } allows
{ the empirical } objects
as the elements of the singletons; e.g., John′ s car and George′ s desk are sin-
gletons. According to the criterion problem, there is no criterion for picking either
John’s car or George’s desk as the element for the singleton that can be taken as
the construction of the pure number 1. When one picks, say John’s car, there is
no answer for the question of why one does not pick George’s desk as the element.
The same problem is encountered in the case
} of singletons, i.e., there is no crite-
rion to pick John′ s car or George′ s desk as the construction of the pure number
{ } {
1. Regardless of having a pure or impure element, no singleton with a composite
element can be taken as the construction of the pure number 1. The reason is that
compositionality brings divergence in quantity and induces the criterion problem. In
the case of the objects of experience, they are composite entities, diverging in size,
weight, density, etc. Although we can still count them, e.g., one tree, two trees, etc.,
they are not qualitatively identical and their singletons stand for different quantities.
Hence, treating the concept of one such object as the standard singleton would be
confusing the composite empirical unities with the pure simple unit, namely with
the pure singleton.5 Yet, expanding the set-theoretical ontology with any object
other than sets is the second problem, the ontological inflation problem. In ZF, there
are no objects other than sets. One can begin with the empty set and build up a hier-
archy without any need for non-set objects. Now let me examine Zermelo’s account
of singletons in the context of the two problems and compare it with the pure single-
ton that I propose.

5
  The purity of the singleton { ∅ } needs some clarification. In the Kantian terminology, the pure con-
cepts are the categories and unlike the empirical concepts they are not derived from experience. I use the
adjective pure in a slightly different sense. Accordingly, ‘nihil privativum’ is derived from experience
and it is an empirical concept in terms of how it is derived. However, it does not contain any object of
intuition or experience in it, but the absence itself. It is called pure only in this respect.

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 Axiomathes

Zermelo’s account exhibits both problems. Allowing the Ur-elements in his

ontology, Zermelo treats them as tools for constructing singletons (see Zer-
melo
[ 1908). The Ur-elements act like the empty set as indicated by the axiom
 
, and the powerset of any Ur-element is taken to be the sin-
]
∀x Ur(x) → ∀y¬(y ∈ x)
gleton ∅  . Nevertheless, there are two fundamental differences between the Ur-ele-
{ }
ments and the empty set: (1) the Ur-elements are not sets but objects, and (2) while
the empty set is unique, the Ur-elements are many. The problem raised by (1) is the
ontological inflation problem. Allowing non-set objects overpopulates the set-the-
oretical ontology and clashes with Ockham’s razor. The ZF set theory without the
Ur-elements is ontologically simpler and comprehensive enough to model the Ur-
elements. Noticing that without the Ur-elements set-theoretical ontology does not
suffer from any impediment, Fraenkel aptly points out that the Ur-elements are not
necessary for mathematics (see Fraenkel 1928, pp. 355–356). The problem raised by
(2) is basically a conceptual representation problem that eventually evolves into the
criterion problem. The primary cause of the conceptual representation problem is
the characterization of the Ur-elements as numerically diverse but qualitatively iden-
tical objects. That being said, one cannot represent qualitatively identical thought
entities as numerically diverse.6 Regarding the limits of conceptual representation of
the objects of pure understanding, Kant maintains that when “an object is presented
to us several times, but always with the same inner determinations (qualitas et quan-
titas), then it is always exactly the same if it counts as an object of pure understand-
ing, not many, but only one thing (numerica identitas)” (A263/B319). Our inability
to represent numerical diversity without qualitative difference applies to the homog-
enous manifolds{ of pure
} understanding that consist of qualitatively identical parts,
such as the set ∅, ∅  . Due to the limits of conceptual representation, “an attempt
to use concepts alone to represent a multiplicity of identical things inevitably col-
lapses into
{ the} representation of just one {thing”
} (Sutherland 2008, p. 137). Thus,
the set ∅, ∅ collapses into the singleton ∅ because it is impossible to represent
the empty sets in it as both numerically diverse and qualitatively identical. Contrast-
ingly, in the case of Ur-elements the set {Urx, Ur y} does not collapse into a singleton
due to the numerical diversity of the Ur-elements. Recall Kant’s famous example
of two qualitatively identical and numerically diverse water drops. One represents
them as numerically diverse because even if they are perceived simultaneously, one
drop is perceived in S1 and the second drop is perceived in S2. While the form of
space makes it possible to represent the drops as numerically diverse, the same is
impossible in the case of the Ur-elements. If the Ur-elements are objects of pure
understanding at all, Zermelo mistreats them as if they act the same as objects of
experience. Due to this mistreatment, the representation problem further develops

6
  Of course one may claim that it is possible to represent two identical thought entities, such as two equi-
lateral triangles. However, these triangles are not counterexamples because they are imaginary in essence
and they are not qualitatively identical, i.e., one of them is imagined on the right and the other one on
the left. The thought entities concerned here are concepts. The claim is that if there are any two qualita-
tively identical concepts, they cannot be represented as numerically distinct. As an example, one cannot
represent two equilateral triangle concepts because the concepts are not triangular figures. Due to their
qualitative identity, they eventually collapse into one single concept, i.e., the concept equilateral triangle.

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 Axiomathes

into the criterion problem. There is no criterion to pick any Urx to any Ur y for con-
structing the singleton that can be taken as the pure number 1. As any Ur-element
can be picked for constructing a singleton, the account provides many singletons. It
is at one’s own pleasure to determine one of them as the standard. That is, there is a
missing step in the construction process.
After Zermelo’s account, let me explain the pure singleton account which I
build upon the ‘nihil privativum’ and compare it with Zermelo’s. In the context of
mention and use, one can iterate the following sequence:

(a) Absence is nihil privativum.

(b) ‘Nihil privativum’ is {}{ , namely, ∅.
(c) ‘‘Nihil privativum’’ is ∅ .
}

The singleton appears at step (c) and there are three important points to be
made. The first point is that this construction does not face any of the chronic
problems. The second point is that the pure non-subjective singleton is the only
singleton that can be takens the construction of 1. And the third point is that when
it comes to the construction of the numbers other than zero and 1, the proposed
construction does not imply the superiority of any construction method over the
others.
Regarding the first point, the pure non-subjective singleton is built on the con-
cept of absence, namely ‘nihil privativum’. As mentioned, ‘nihil privativum’ is
the concept of nihil privativum. Note that there are many cases of nihil priva-
tivum such as the absence of the object a as nihil privativuma, and the absence
of the object b as nihil privativumb, etc. This may sound like there is a criterion
problem regarding the construction of the empty set, and further in the pure sin-
gleton. Yet, while we can distinguish nihil privativuma and nihil privativumb in
experience, once ‘nihil privativum’ is abstracted, anything that pertains to experi-
ence is left out, and so is subjectivity. As the uniqueness of the empty set or ‘nihil
privativum’ indicates, there are no multiple ‘nihil privativum’ cases that require a
criterion to pick one of them as the element of the pure non-subjective singleton.
This is simply because it is impossible to represent two cases of ‘nihil privati-
vum’ as numerically diverse and qualitatively identical without causing any con-
ceptual collapse. In other words, there is neither any subjective conception of
‘nihil privativum’ that implies subjectivity of the pure singleton, nor are there any
multiple representations of ‘nihil privativum’ that necessitate a criterion. When
it comes to the ontological inflation problem, constructing the singleton out of
the concept of nothing, namely ‘nihil privativum’ leaves all the non-set entities
out of the framework. As explained, this is achieved through identifying sets with
the concepts, and allowing the sets that can be generated or iterated from ‘nihil
privativum’.
According to the second point, although it is possible to construct uncountably
many legitimate singletons, only the pure singleton can be taken as the construc-
tion of 1. The reason is that it is not only the composite empirical unities that are
confused with the pure unit, but also the pure composite unities can become a

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 Axiomathes

source of confusion. To compare,{{{{take the pure singleton

{{ { ∅} on { the
{ one hand and
{ }
the arbitrary singletons K = and on the
}}}} }}}}
� M = �, � , �, �
other. Noticeably, the first reason to treat ∅ as the only construction of the car-
{ }
dinality of 1 is that
{ } the construction of any singleton such as K or M requires the
construction of ∅ in the first place, i.e., the pure singleton has ante constructio-
nem priority over any other singleton. The second reason is that the pure single-
ton is the simplest singleton with a unique element while any other singleton is
a heterogeneous and composite{ set. } Regardless of being constructed in NBG or
ZFC, the singletons other than {∅ } have complex constructions that require more
constructional operations than ∅  . The complexity of other singletons leads to
a clash with Ockham’s razor and further raises the criterion problem. Ockham’s
razor becomes an issue due to preferring composite { } sets to the simplest one. And
disregarding the ante constructionem priority of ∅ , by allowing any singleton to
be interpreted as the construction of 1, one cannot answer to the question of why,
e.g., K should be taken as the cardinality of 1 but {not} M. Hence, although all the
singletons have one element, none of them except ∅ can provide a construction
that can be taken as the simplest construction that has ante constructionem prior-
ity over any other candidate.
The third point is actually a recapitulation of a point made by Benacerraf long
ago (see Benacerraf 1965), i.e., there is no superior set theory in regard to the con-
struction of pure numbers. Zero has some special status and it is not obtained suc-
cessively. Thus, for the successive construction of pure numbers, zero or the empty
set must be obtained first. Or simply as Fraenkel maintains, “only those quantities
are permitted that come from zero quantity and that through” (1928, p. 355).7The
pure singleton enjoys such a special status for the reasons discussed above. Unlike
the empty set and the pure singleton, any set in the hierarchies of ZFC and NBG is
composite. Their compositionality implies that what has been obtained so far can
be synthesized into new composite sets. It is legitimate to synthesize the rest of
the hierarchy or the numbers by the repetition of the ‘set of’ operation as in NBG,
or simply by the combination of the previously obtained sets into new units as in
ZFC. One can construct 2 in the form of a successive mentioning of the empty set
as in ‘‘‘Nihil privativum’’’, or in the form of mentioning what has been obtained
separately as in ‘‘Nihil privativum’, ‘‘Nihil privativum’’’. Both operations basically
rely on the associative laws of thought. Considering one construction as superior to
another is the same as treating one law of thought is as superior to another. There-
fore, there is no single construction for the rest of the numbers, as the human mind
does not operate on a single associative law.

7
 This point gets clearer when the )axiom of infinity is considered. In the axiom of infinity,
∃I � ∈ I ∧ ∀x ∈ I ( ( x ∪ {x}) ∈ I ) ) , the iteration through union can be carried out only after con-
(
structing the empty set.

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 Axiomathes

6 Conclusion

The first conclusion of the article is that the empty set is an accountable object of
thought. It is a negative, formal and unique abstract general term, with quantitative
negation full in scope. The second conclusion is that the ontological inflation and cri-
terion problems do not pose any difficulty for the construction of the pure singleton
account that I built on ‘nihil privativum’. The last conclusion is that the construction of
the rest of the numbers may have different procedures and this perfectly accords with
the nature of the human mind, which does not operate on a single associative law or
procedure.

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