Daf Ditty Succah 25: Multi-Tasking and wedding nights

In today’s modern, technologically advanced world, with email and

smartphones and Twitter and Facebook demanding all of our attention all of
the time — even as we work, socialize, and play — multitasking may seem like
the only answer.

But science cautions us to restrict multitasking efforts: do not deceive yourself

— you are not accomplishing more by multitasking.1

“Who chases two rabbits catches neither.”

Publilius Syrus2

1
https://brainworldmagazine.com/the-myth-of-multitasking/
2
Publilius Syrus (85–43 BC), was a Latin writer, best known for his sententiae. He was a Syrian from Antioch who was brought as a slave
to Roman Italy. Syrus was brought to Rome on the same ship that brought Manilius the astronomer and Staberius Eros the grammarian. By his wit
and talent, Syrus won the favour of his master, who granted him manumission and educated him. He became a member of the Publilia gens.
(Wikipedia)

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MISHNA: Those on the path to perform a mitzva are exempt from the mitzva of sukka. The
ill and their caretakers are exempt from the mitzva of sukka. One may eat and drink in the
framework of a casual meal outside the sukka.

2
GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived that one who is performing
a mitzva is exempt from the mitzva of sukka? The Sages taught in a baraita that it is written in
the Torah that one recites Shema at the following times:

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 ,‫ ְוִדַבּ ְרָתּ ָבּם‬,J‫ז ְוִשַׁנּ ְנָתּם ְלָבֶני‬ 7 and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt
,T‫ ַבֶדֶּר‬J‫ וְּבֶלְכְתּ‬J‫ ְבֵּביֶת‬J‫ְבִּשְׁבְתּ‬ talk of them when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest
.J‫ וְּבקוֶּמ‬J‫וְּבָשְׁכְבּ‬ by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up.
Deut 6:7

“When you sit in your house, and when you walk by the way, and when you lie down, and when
you rise up” (Deuteronomy 6:7). The Sages interpret: “When you sit in your house,” to the
exclusion of one who is engaged in the performance of a mitzva, who is not sitting at home; “and
when you walk by the way,” to the exclusion of a groom, who is preoccupied with his mitzva
of consummating the marriage and is not walking along the way. The baraita adds that from here
the Sages stated: One who marries a virgin is exempt from reciting Shema on his wedding night,
and one who marries a widow is obligated.

4
The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred in this verse that a groom is exempt from the
mitzva of Shema? Rav Huna said: The circumstances when one is obligated to recite Shema are
like the circumstances when one walks along the way: Just as the walking by the way described
in the verse is voluntary and involves no mitzva, so too, all those obligated to recite Shema are

5
similarly engaged in voluntary activities, to the exclusion of this groom, who is engaged in the
performance of a mitzva.

The Gemara asks: The verse does not specify the way along which one is walking. Are we not
dealing with one who is walking along the way for a matter of a mitzva, and nevertheless, the
Merciful One says to recite Shema? Apparently, one is obligated to do so even if he set out to
perform a mitzva. The Gemara answers: If it is so that the intention was to obligate even those
who are engaged in performance of a mitzva, let the verse state: When sitting and when
walking. What is the meaning of: “When you sit…and when you walk”? It comes to
underscore: It is in your walking, undertaken for personal reasons and of one’s own volition, that
you are obligated to recite Shema; in walking with the objective of performing a mitzva, you
are exempt from reciting Shema.

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The Gemara asks: If so, even one who marries a widow should also be exempt, as he too is
engaged in the performance of a mitzva. That, however, contradicts the baraita. The Gemara
responds that there is a distinction between one marrying a virgin and one marrying a widow. One
who marries a virgin is preoccupied by his concern lest he discover that his bride is not a virgin,
while one who marries a widow is not preoccupied.

RASHI

“One cannot perform two things at once”

Steinzaltz

“One is worried about whether he will find her to be a virgin therefore his mind
is not free to recite Shema with intent”

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The Gemara asks: And wherever one is preoccupied is he indeed exempt? But if that is so, then
one whose ship sank at sea, who is preoccupied, should also be exempt. The Gemara reinforces
its question: And if you say that indeed, that is so, didn’t Rabbi Abba bar Zavda say that Rav
said: A mourner is obligated in all the mitzvot mentioned in the Torah, including reciting
Shema, except for the mitzva to don phylacteries, from which he is exempt, as the term splendor
is stated with regard to phylacteries? If a mourner, who is clearly pained and preoccupied, is
obligated to recite Shema, then certainly all others who are preoccupied, even one whose ship sank
at sea, whose loss was merely monetary (Birkat Hashem), should be obligated. Why, then, is a
groom exempted due to his preoccupation and one who lost his property is not?

The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a distinction between the cases. Here, in the case of a
groom, he is preoccupied with the preoccupation of a mitzva that he must perform; there, in
the case of a ship lost at sea, he is preoccupied with the preoccupation of a voluntary act that
he chooses to perform.

§ The Gemara asks: And is the halakhic principle that one who is engaged in a mitzva is exempt
from performing another mitzva derived from here? It is derived from there, as it is taught in
a baraita that it is written:

‫ ֲאֶשׁר ָהיוּ ְטֵמִאים ְלֶנֶפשׁ‬,‫ו ַו ְיִהי ֲאָנִשׁים‬ 6 But there were certain men, who were unclean by the dead
‫ ַבּיּוֹם‬,‫ַהֶפַּסח‬-‫שׂת‬ ֹ ‫ָיְכלוּ ַלֲﬠ‬-‫ ְול ֹא‬,‫ָאָדם‬ body of a man, so that they could not keep the passover on
--‫ ְוִלְפֵני ַאֲהֹרן‬,‫ַההוּא; ַו ִיְּק ְרבוּ ִלְפֵני ֹמֶשׁה‬ that day; and they came before Moses and before Aaron on
.‫ַבּיּוֹם ַההוּא‬ that day.
Num 9:6

“There were certain men who were impure by the corpse of a person and they could not observe
the Pesaḥ on that day” Before proceeding with the discussion, the baraita seeks to clarify with

8
regard to those men who became impure: Who were they? The baraita answers: They were the
bearers of Joseph’s coffin, which the Jewish people brought with them in the desert. This is the
statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

Summary

Our new Mishna teaches us three things:3

1) one who is walking on their way (to perform a mitzva) is exempt from the mitzvot of sukkot
2) the ill and their caregivers are exempt from performing the mitzvot of sukkot
3) it is permitted to eat and drink casual meals outside of the sukka

Our daf covers much of the first teaching. What does the baraita mean when it says that one is on

3
https://dafyomibeginner.blogspot.com/2014/02/

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a path to perform a mitzvah? The rabbis look to Deuteronomy 6:7, where the rabbis had interpreted
similar wording in reference to reciting the Shema. The rabbis use this interpretation and note
that grooms are exempt from reciting the shema.

We learn that men who marry virgins - and possibly men who marry widows, as well - are exempt
from performing a mitzvah - that of reciting the shema - because of his preoccupation with
performance of the mitzvah that follows the wedding. For days grooms are allowed to ignore this
mitzvah.

But where did the idea come from; one is allowed to forgo the performance of one mitzvah if one
is in the midst of performing another mitzvah. We learn that at Pesach, two men were exempt
from bringing their offering as they were impure from carrying a corpse to the Temple. They were
allowed to wait until the second Pesach to perform the mitzvah of bringing their offerings.

The rabbis turn their attention to mourners. Why are mourners required to perform the mitzvot of
sukkot? If grooms and those who are impure are allowed to forgo their obligations, why not
mourners? The rabbis suggest that mourners are not exempt because they can continue their
mourning rituals in the sukka. However, they note that mourners are allowed to forgo residence
in the sukka if they find it impossible to perform the rituals of mourning while in the sukka. For
the most part, however, mourners are required to fulfill their obligations regarding the mitzvot of
sukkot just like they are not exempt from other obligations
.

The daf ends with a lively discussion about whether all of the groomsmen are allowed to forgo
wearing tefillin; saying the shema; etc. due to their preoccupation with the wedding and care of
the groom. The rabbis go on to consider whether or not the newlyweds should also reside in the
sukka. Would they be offered enough privacy? Would the wife be forced to be alone with other
men when the groom occasionally leaves the sukka?

Today's daf was easy to follow. It focused on one point, and I was able to follow the arguments
with relative ease. I have been wondering about those who put together all of these disparate,
multi-layered commentaries and references. It is almost impossible to imagine how to decide
which details should go where. Two points: I'm thrilled it was done, and I'm thrilled that I was not
asked to perform the task.

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Daf Shevui writes:4

People who are busy performing a mitzvah and find it difficult to eat or sleep in a sukkah are
exempt from the sukkah. This is due to the general rule that one who is engaged in one mitzvah is
exempt from performing another mitzvah.

People who are sick enough so that being in the sukkah would be a discomfort for them, are not
obligated for the laws of the sukkah. Being in the sukkah is not supposed to be painful and
therefore, one who would be pained by being in the sukkah is exempt. Note, that the mishnah is
not addressed to those who might “fake” being sick in order to get out of sleeping or eating in the
sukkah. It is addressed to those who are so zealous about keeping the commandments that they
would risk injury or at least illness to do so. The rabbis tell such a person to get out of the sukkah—
the sukkah is not supposed to cause one pain.

Meals must be eaten in the sukkah. However, snacking may be done outside of the sukkah.

The Talmud now cites a baraita which provides scriptural support for why an agent on his way to
perform a mitzvah is exempt from sitting in a sukkah. There is a general principle that whenever
one is occupied with one mitzvah, he is exempt from performing another mitzvah. This is derived
from the words from the Shema: “You shall speak about the words of Torah when you sit in your
house and when you are going on the path.” “Sitting in the house” implies that you don’t have to
study Torah when you are engaged in another mitzvah. “Going on the path” implies that a
bridegroom is exempt from the Shema. How this midrash functions will be discussed below. After
the midrash, the baraita appends a halakhah that states that when a man marries a virgin he is
exempt from the recitation of the Shema, but when he marries a widow (or divorcee) he is liable.
Below, the Talmud will discuss why there exists such a difference.

The Talmud asks how we can use the words “when you are going on the path” to exclude one who
is going to perform a mitzvah from being obligated to read the Shema. R. Huna answers that going
on a path, meaning a trip, is not a mitzvah—it is an optional act. From here we can deduce that
one is obligated to recite the Shema only when one is performing an optional act, but when one is
occupied with a mitzvah, he need not recite the Shema.

The Talmud presses the question. How do we know that the person referred to in the Shema as
“walking on the path” was going to perform an optional act? Maybe he too was going to perform
a mitzvah? The answer is that R. Huna derives this from the fact that the Torah says, “When you
sit” or “when you walk.” The word you (expressed by the suffix kaf) implies that only when you
are sitting or walking and occupied in something that is “for you” are you obligated to recite the
Shema. If you are going on a religious errand, or occupied with a mitzvah, you are exempt.

4
https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.25a.4?lang=bi&p2=Daf_Shevui_to_Sukkah.25a.11&lang2=bi&w2=all&lang3=en

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In yesterday’s section we learned that anyone going to perform a mitzvah, is exempt from other
mitzvot occurring at the same time. But the baraita quoted said that a man is exempt from the
Shema only if he is marrying a virgin. If he is marrying a widow/divorcee he is obligated. Our
section questions that distinction.

The answer is that one who marries a virgin has his mind quite preoccupied. I think the assumption
is that usually this is also his first marriage. One can understand just how nervous he is, and in
light of that, he can’t think about reciting the Shema. One who is marrying a woman with some
experience will be less worried or preoccupied. Therefore, he is liable to recite the Shema.

The problem with the above solution is that it implies that anyone preoccupied with anything is
exempt from the Shema. If this were really true, then even one standing on the shore watching his
ship sink would be exempt from the Shema. But we know this is not true because a mourner is
obligated for the Shema. He is only exempt from wearing tefillin because Ezekiel calls them
“beautiful” (this is based on a midrash) and a mourner is not supposed to make himself look
beautiful. But despite the fact that his thoughts are also occupied with other matters, he is liable to
recite the Shema. So too in general anyone who is preoccupied with something is still obligated.

The answer is that there is an important distinction between being preoccupied with performing a
mitzvah and being simply upset. If someone is preoccupied with performing a mitzvah such as
marriage, he is exempt from the Shema. But if he is preoccupied with an optional activity, such as
worrying about his ship, he is liable.

Note that it is a mitzvah to marry either a virgin or a widow. But if he marries a widow he is not
preoccupied. Therefore, despite the fact that he is going to perform a mitzvah, he is liable for
Shema.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:5

The Mishna rules that one who is engaged in performing a mitzvah is exempt from the mitzvah of
Sukkah. A sick person and his attendants are also exempt from the mitzvah of Sukkah. (25a1-
25a2) The Gemora cites a braisa as a source for the Mishna’s halachah: When you are sitting in
your house: this excludes one who is engaged in the performance of one mitzvah (oseik bimitzvah
patur min hamitzvah; one who is occupied with the performance of one mitzvah is exempt from
performing another mitzvah).

And while you are going on the way: this excludes a bridegroom (for he is also preoccupied with
the performance of a mitzvah; Rashi explains why a special exclusion is necessary for this).
Therefore, they ruled that one who marries a virgin is exempt (from the obligation to recite the
Shema in the evening), whereas one who marries a widow is obligated (as the Gemora will proceed
to explain the distinction).
The Gemora asks: How is the lesson (that one who is occupied with the performance of one
mitzvah is exempt from performing another) implied (from the verse)?
5
http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Sukkah_25.pdf

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Rav Huna said: [It is written: ‘the way.’] The circumstances must be similar to ‘the way.’ Just as
(journeying on) ‘a way’ is optional, so too whatever is optional (is when the obligation of reciting
the Shema applies; this excludes a case where one is occupied with performing a mitzvah – a non-
discretionary act).

The Gemora asks: But doesn’t the verse refer as well to one who is going (on ‘the way’) to perform
a mitzvah, and even so the Torah said that he is obligated to recite (the Shema)? The Gemora
answers: If that were so, the Torah should have simply written: while sitting and while walking;
what is the necessity to write: when you are sitting and when you are walking? It must be to teach
that when you are engaged in ‘you’re sitting’ or ‘you’re walking’ – that is when you are under the
obligation, but when you are engaged in the performance of a mitzvah (which is not ‘you’re’ sitting
or walking), you are exempt.

The Gemora asks: If that is so, one who marries a widow should also be exempt? The Gemora
answers: This one (who marries a virgin) is preoccupied (for he is worried that he will not be able
to rupture the hymen and complete cohabitation); the other (who is marrying a widow) is not.

The Gemora asks: If a state of preoccupation is the cause of exemption, it should apply also to the
case of one’s ship sinking at sea (where he is preoccupied with his loss)! And you cannot say that
this is so, for surely Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said in the name of Rav: A mourner is required to
observe all mitzvos except for tefillin which is called pe’er, glory, and a mourner is not allowed to
glorify himself.

The Gemora answers: In that case (when he is marrying a virgin) the preoccupation is over a
mitzvah; here (regarding a mourner) it is over an optional matter.

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:6

ONE WHO IS INVOLVED IN A MITZVAH IS EXEMPT FROM

OTHER MITZVOS
The Gemara teaches that one who is involved in a Mitzvah is exempt from the Mitzvah of Keri'as
Shema. This is the source for the general rule, "ha'Osek b'Mitzvah Patur Min ha'Mitzvah" -- "One
who is involved in one Mitzvah is exempt from another Mitzvah."
If one is exempt from a Mitzvah while he is involved in the performance of another Mitzvah, then
every man who wears Tzitzis or Tefilin should be exempt from all other Mitzvos! This certainly
is not the Halachah, though. When exactly does involvement in one Mitzvah exempt a person from
another Mitzvah? (TOSFOS DH Sheluchei Mitzvah)

6
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/sukah/insites/su-dt-025.htm

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(a) TOSFOS answers that only when the second Mitzvah will interrupt one's performance of the
first Mitzvah is one exempt from the second Mitzvah. If the fulfillment of the second Mitzvah will
not interfere with one's performance of the first Mitzvah (such as in the case of the Mitzvah of
Tzitzis or Tefilin), he is not exempt from the second Mitzvah.
The OR ZARU'A questions the answer of Tosfos. It is obvious that one may not interrupt one
Mitzvah in order to perform another. Why would one have thought that one Mitzvah takes
precedence over another, had the verse not taught otherwise?
Perhaps Tosfos learns from the verse that one who is involved in one Mitzvah is exempt from other
Mitzvos even in a case where the opportunity for the second Mitzvah will pass if it is not done
right away. One might have thought that in such a situation, he should interrupt the performance
of the first Mitzvah and fulfill the second Mitzvah. The verse teaches that even in such a case, one
may not interrupt the first Mitzvah to perform the second. (M. KORNFELD)

(b) The RASHBA in the name of RAV HAI GA'ON, the MAGID MISHNEH (Hilchos Sukah
6:4) in the name of the GE'ONIM, and the OR ZARU'A (Hilchos Sukah) explain that as long as
a person is involved in the preparations for a Mitzvah, such as one who is traveling in order to
perform a Mitzvah, he is not obligated by the Torah to perform other Mitzvos even if they do not
distract him from the first Mitzvah. Hash-m does not expect a person to do two things at once.
Accordingly, with regard to Tzitzis and Tefilin, one has already done all that was necessary in
order to prepare for the Mitzvah. The man who wears Tzitzis or Tefilin is now in the process of
passively fulfilling the Mitzvah and not in the process of preparing to fulfill the Mitzvah. The
exemption from other Mitzvos applies only when one has not yet fulfilled the first Mitzvah and is
involved in the preparatory stages of fulfilling the Mitzvah.

(c) The RAN suggests a compromise. He agrees with the Rashba that one is exempt from the
second Mitzvah even if its performance does not distract him from the first Mitzvah. However, if
there is a way for him to fulfill the second Mitzvah and still perform the first Mitzvah in its normal
manner, then he is not exempt from the second Mitzvah (as the Ran writes, "why not fulfill a
Mitzvah if nothing is lost while doing so?"). Only when he must change the normal way in which
he performs the first Mitzvah in order to fulfill the second Mitzvah is he exempt from the second
Mitzvah.7

HALACHAH: The REMA (OC 38:8) cites the opinion of the Ran as the Halachah. When there is
a way to fulfill the second Mitzvah and still perform the first Mitzvah in its normal manner, he is
not exempt from the second Mitzvah. If there is no way to fulfill the second Mitzvah and perform
the first Mitzvah in its normal way, he is exempt from the second Mitzvah.

TRAVELING TO LEARN TORAH

7
According to the Ran, it is possible that the obligation to do the second Mitzvah does not stem from the normal obligation to perform Mitzvos,
but rather from the requirement that one avoid disgracing a Mitzvah. Technically, he may be exempt since he is involved in another Mitzvah, but
in practice -- since he could perform the second Mitzvah without any deviation from his normal way of performing the first Mitzvah -- he must
perform the second Mitzvah in order not to disgrace it.

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The Mishnah teaches that a person who is en route to perform a Mitzvah is exempt from the
Mitzvah of Sukah. RASHI gives three examples: one who is traveling to greet his Rebbi, one who
is traveling to learn Torah, and who is traveling to redeem captives.
Why is one who is traveling to learn Torah exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah? The Gemara in
Moed Katan (9a) teaches that a person must interrupt his Torah study in order to perform any
Mitzvah which cannot be performed by others. Why, then, does the act of traveling to learn Torah
exempt a person from the Mitzvah of Sukah? Traveling to learn Torah certainly is not a greater
Mitzvah than the learning of Torah itself.

Moreover, the Yerushalmi (Berachos 1:2) says that even Rebbi Shimon bar Yochai would stop
learning in order to perform Mitzvos such as Sukah and Lulav, since "if one learns Torah but does
not accept upon himself to perform the Mitzvos, it would have been better had he not been created."
The same should apply to one who is traveling to learn Torah; he should be required to interrupt
his traveling in order to perform the Mitzvah of Sukah.8

The OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Talmud Torah 3, and in MESHECH CHOCHMAH, Parshas Ki

Savo 28) quotes the RI of KURVEILLE (as cited by Tosfos to Kesuvos 17a, DH Mevatlin), who
says that even though the Mitzvah of learning Torah does not exempt one from performing the
Mitzvah of Hotza'as ha'Mes (burial of the dead), the Mitzvah of "Shimush Talmidei
Chachamim" does override the Mitzvah to bury the dead (even in the case of a "Mes Mitzvah").
"Shimush Talmidei Chachamim" refers to learning the reasons and explanations of the Torah
directly from a Rebbi. It is not in the same category as normal Torah study, because it is done only
through close interaction with a Rebbi who transmits the tradition that he has received for the
reasons and explanations of the Mitzvos. Therefore, it overrides even a Mitzvah which cannot be
done by someone else.

The Mishnah here refers to this type of learning. When the Talmidim travel to the home of their
Rebbi in order to learn Torah from him, they have the status of those who are fulfilling "Shimush
Talmidei Chachamim," which overrides other Mitzvos.

The CHAZON YECHEZKEL quotes the VILNA GA'ON (in the beginning of Pe'ah) who
points out that every word of Torah that a person learns is another Mitzvah. This might explain
why one must stop learning Torah in order to fulfill another Mitzvah, but one who is on the way
to learn Torah does not have to stop traveling in order to perform a Mitzvah. When one is involved
in the Mitzvah of learning Torah, he fulfills a Mitzvah with every word that he learns. If the
opportunity to perform another Mitzvah arises, he must do that Mitzvah first before he begins to
fulfill another Mitzvah of Talmud Torah (by learning the next word). His fulfillment of the second
Mitzvah is not an interruption of the Mitzvah of Talmud Torah, because he completed one Mitzvah
of Talmud Torah and did not yet start the next, when the other Mitzvah needed to be performed.
In contrast, when one travels to learn Torah, the act of traveling itself is one Mitzvah, and therefore
he is not required to interrupt it in order to perform another Mitzvah.

WHY A MOURNER IS NOT EXEMPT FROM THE MITZVAH OF SUKAH

8
The MAHARACH OR ZARU'A #183 says even more than Rashi: even when one has arrived at his place of learning and has started to learn, he
is exempt from Mitzvos for the entire time that he learns.

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Rebbi Aba bar Zavda says in the name of Rav that an Avel (mourner) is obligated to fulfill the
Mitzvah of Sukah. The Gemara says that without his statement, one might have thought that an
Avel is exempt since he is distressed ("Mitzta'er"), and one who is distressed is exempt from the
Mitzvah of Sukah. Rebbi Aba bar Zavda teaches that distress exempts a person from the Mitzvah
of Sukah only when the distress comes from an external source. In the case of an Avel, the mourner
causes his own anguish, and therefore he is not included in the category of "Mitzta'er." He is
obligated to perform the Mitzvah of Sukah because "he should settle his mind."

The Gemara implies that if the Avel does not "settle his mind," he will not be able to fulfill the
Mitzvah of Sukah and he is exempt. This is difficult to understand. The distress of an Avel is not
related to his sitting in the Sukah in any way. Why should it prevent him from fulfilling the
Mitzvah? The only reason why one who is "Mitzta'er" is exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah is
because of the principle of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" -- one must live in the Sukah during Sukos in
the same manner in which he lives in his house during the rest of the year. Normally, when one
becomes uncomfortable in his house, he leaves it (TOSFOS 26a, DH Holchei). If, however, a
person is "Mitzta'er" in such a way that leaving the house or the Sukah will not relieve his distress,
then he certainly is not exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah (as the MORDECHAI (#740) writes
in the name of the YERE'IM, and as is clear from many Rishonim; see Rashi 26a, DH Mitzta'er).
Why, then, does the Gemara say that an Avel must "settle his mind" and alleviate his distress? His
distress is not the type that exempts him from the Mitzvah of Sukah! (MAHARIK, Shoresh 176,
cited in an addition to the MORDECHAI here.)

(a) The ROSH apparently is bothered by this question. He explains that an Avel prefers to be alone
and to sit in the dark. If he leaves the Sukah, he will be more "comfortable" (according to his
subjective experience of "comfort"), because he will no longer be with other people (who stay in
the Sukah) or be in a place with food to eat. For the Avel to remain in the Sukah will cause him
more distress; he wishes that he could avoid the relaxing environment of the Sukah. (In other
words, the Avel experiences distress in the Sukah because of the lack of distress there. The distress
he experiences in the Sukah is that as long as he is in the joyful atmosphere of the Sukah he is
unable to experience the distress that he seeks for himself.)
If, however, being in the Sukah causes the Avel more distress, then why indeed is he not exempt?
The Gemara teaches that even though he experiences discomfort by being in the Sukah, he is not
exempt from the Mitzvah because his discomfort is a result of his own choice to feel
uncomfortable in the Sukah.

(b) RASHI (28b, DH Bar mi'Metalalta) implies that a person in distress, such as an Avel, usually
feels more comfortable in the open outdoors than in an enclosed Sukah. Why, then, is an Avel not
exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah due to his distress?

The RITVA answers this question with a novel interpretation of the Gemara's words. When an
Avel enters the Sukah, the joyful atmosphere there contributes to the alleviation of his distress,
and he begins to feel better. Since the cause of his distress is psychological and not physical, once

16
he overcomes his initial apprehension and enters the Sukah the atmosphere of the Sukah relaxes
him and makes him less distressed, so that he feels completely comfortable in the Sukah.9

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:10

The Mishna on our daf teaches about situations where people can forgo the mitzva of sukka.
According to the Mishna, sheluhei mitzva – people occupied with performance of a mitzva – are
not obligated in the commandment of sukka. Also included on this list are people who are ill,
together with their caretakers.

Finally, the Mishna teaches that only a formal meal needs to be eaten in the sukka; a snack can be
eaten outside of the sukka. The idea that ha-osek be-mitzva patur min ha-mitzva – that someone
engaged in a mitzva is free from his obligations in other commandments – is derived from a passage
in keri'at shema. We read in shema that we are obligated to discuss the words of shema - be-
shivtikha be-veitekha u-velekhtekha va-derekh – when you are sitting in your home and when you
are walking on your way.

The emphasis on "your home" and "your way" teaches that when you are occupied in matters that
are not your own choice, that is to say, matters that you are obligated to be involved with – i.e.
mitzvot – then you are not obligated in shema, nor, for that matter, are you obligated in other
mitzvot.

One point that is not clear, and is the subject of debate among the poskim, is whether we apply the
rule of ha-osek be-mitzva patur min ha-mitzva only in a case where performing the additional
mitzva will adversely affect fulfillment of the first mitzva (for example, if spending time looking
for a sukka will limit the amount of time the travelers will be able to devote to their travel, making
fulfillment of the mitzva take a longer time).

Others argue that involvement in a mitzva simply creates a situation whereby a new obligation
cannot be imposed on the person who is already occupied with a mitzva. According to this view,
even if the second mitzva can be done with no additional strain or effort, the person is still not
obligated to do it.

9
The TAZ (OC 640:7-8) suggests that perhaps any type of distress exempts a person from the Mitzvah of Sukah, even if the distress is unrelated
to the Sukah, because the Mitzvah requires concentration and one who is distressed is unable to concentrate properly. When one sits in a Sukah, in
order to fulfill the Mitzvah he must have in mind that Hash-m protected the Jewish people in Sukos when they left Mitzrayim (Vayikra 23:43). A
person who is distressed is unable to have such concentration, and therefore he is exempt.
10
https://www.steinsaltz-center.org/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=68446

17
The rule is that as long as someone is involved in a mitzvah pursuit, he is exempt from performing
a different mitzvah.11

Tosafos (‫ )מצוה שלוחי ה”ד‬concludes that this exemption is only in regard to other mitzvos which
would interfere with completing the mitzvah in which he is already involved. For example, in our
Gemara (26a), Rav Chisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna were exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah
because they were already involved in the mitzvah of visiting their Rebbe on Yom Tov, and had
they sought a sukkah in which to dwell, they would not have been able to complete their original
mission.

However, any mitzvah which can be done without interfering with the current observance is
definitely required to be done. (Someone wearing tzitzis is certainly required to do other mitzvos
at the same time!) Ritva asks why we need a special verse to teach us this lesson. Why would we
think that one mitzvah should be interrupted in deference to another? One answer he gives is that
a person might be doing a mitzvah when the opportunity arises to do a much bigger or more
important mitzvah.

The verse teaches us that here, too, the mitzvah which is in progress should not be stopped, even
though a greater opportunity now presents itself. Another answer Ritva gives is that a person might
have the chance to begin a mitzvah before the hour of reading shema arrives. He may commence
the mitzvah, even knowing that the set time to read shema will elapse without his being able to
read it, due to his involvement with the first mitzvah. We would not have necessarily known this
ruling without the lesson of the verse.

We learn on our daf that one who is occupied with a mitzvah is exempt from performing another
mitzvah.

The Chiddushei HaRim, zt”l, taught that this is because one performs a mitzvah with all of his
strength and attention. How can a person be obligated to devote himself to another duty when the
prior mitzvah is occupying every bit of his mind, heart, and body?

After many hours of deliberation and inspiring speeches attended by nearly three hundred
prominent Rabbonim gathered together to strengthen Torah observance and Torah-true
institutions, sunset was rapidly approaching.

One of the rabbis in the audience approached the podium and pointed this out to those seated on
the dais. “If we don’t start soon, we will surely miss Minchah!” he whispered.

The Chofetz Chaim, zt”l, heard this and was clearly annoyed. “We are desperately trying to uphold
‫ שמים כבוד‬by strengthening the yeshivos - and they want to daven Minchah!?” Since the majority

11
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Sukkah%20025.pdf

18
of those in attendance wanted to break for the afternoon prayers, the discussions were paused for
a short time.

After Minchah, the head of the assembly, Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzensky, zt”l, remarked, “The truth
is that the objection of the Chofetz Chaim is an explicit halachah: ‘He who is involved in a mitzvah
is exempt from performing another mitzvah.’ This is especially true of such an important mitzvah
as that which occupies us now— strengthening Torah observance within the Jewish community.
However, this is only true when a person devotes his entire self to the mitzvah, as the Chofetz
Chaim himself does. But those who left space in their minds for Minchah must have also left space
in their heads for other things, since we see that they were not involved in the mitzvah of this
gathering with their whole selves.

They actually were halachically obligated to stop and daven since it is obvious that they were not
preoccupied with the mitzvah to the extent that they would be exempt from prayer!”

Sue Parker Gerson

On today’s daf, the mishnah teaches:

Those on the path to perform a mitzvah are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah.

This is actually a general talmudic precept: If you’re already performing a mitzvah, you are exempt
from doing another one until you are finished. The Gemara goes on to inquire about the biblical
prooftext for this precept, which many of us will find familiar as it is found in the Shema: Impress
(words of Torah) upon your children. Recite them when you stay at home and when you walk upon
the way, when you lie down and when you rise up. (Deuteronomy 6:7)

The Gemara then asks:

The verse does not specify the way along which one is walking. Are we not dealing with one who
is walking along the way for a matter of a mitzvah, and nevertheless, the Merciful One says to
recite Shema? Apparently, one is obligated to do so even if he set out to perform a mitzvah.

The Talmud raises a logical challenge. We learn in the Shema that we are commanded to do two
things at the same time: teach one’s children Torah while walking with them. How can we then
say this verse leads to the opposite conclusion — namely, that we are exempt from doing a second
mitzvah while engaged in the first?

The Gemara answers:

What is the meaning of: “When you sit…and when you walk”? It comes to underscore: It is
in your walking, undertaken for personal reasons and of one’s own volition, that you are
obligated to recite Shema; in walking with the objective of performing a mitzvah, you are exempt
from reciting Shema.

19
The Gemara here makes clear that the verse is referring to discretionary tasks, which do not exempt
one from performing a mitzvah, not to obligatory ones — i.e. those undertaken in the performance
of a mitzvah — during which one is exempted from performing a second mitzvah. If you are
walking to perform a mitzvah, you are in fact exempt from reciting the Shema. Only if you’re
walking for your own purposes are you obligated.

The Gemara cites various examples of this precept. A groom is not required to say the Shema on
his wedding night when he is presumably preoccupied with the upcoming mitzvah of procreation
with his new bride. During the week of celebration following the wedding, neither the groom nor
his attendants are required to pray or to put on tefillin. And more germane to the subject at hand is
where the mishnah started: If you are on your way to do a mitzvah, you are not obligated in the
mitzvah of sukkah.

This makes sense if there is a journey involved and there is no sukkah to be found. But what if
there is? Why would one then be exempt?

The rabbis of the Talmud may have once again been ahead of their time in establishing this rule.

Recent research about multitasking and its effect on brain health shows that rather than increasing
productivity, trying to do two things or more at once can actually decrease effectiveness by up to
40%. That’s because goal shifting (changing from one task to another) and role activation
(changing the set of rules from the previous task to the next) require attention. If you try to do two
things at once, it’s likely you’re not able to truly attend to either.

The rabbis apply this thinking to the fulfillment of mitzvot, positing that one of the reasons for this
rule is that you may be unable to muster the proper intention for performing a mitzvah if you are
in the midst of performing a different one. So the next time you have an opportunity to do two
mitzvot, rejoice! And then do them one at a time.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:12

Our daf (Sukkah 25b) informs us that a bridegroom is exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah either,
as Rava explains, because a bride and groom would feel uncomfortable being physically intimate
in a sukkah which is relatively open, or as Abaye explains, because the openness of the sukkah
would mean that their guests would come to visit them at times when they would want their
privacy. As Rav Zeira explains, in his week of marriage ‘I ate in the sukkah and rejoiced in the
marriage residence’ – meaning that he struck a balance between being in the sukkah and being
with his new bride within their new residence.

Yet while this exemption applies to a newly married couple, it does not apply to a ‘seasoned’
married couple. Given this, how should a married couple (or, to be technical, a married man)
balance the mitzvah of sukkah with the duty/mitzvah of intimacy? And is a man exempt from
sleeping in a sukkah if he and/or his wife would rather he sleep inside even at a time when they
are not able to be intimate?
12
www.rabbijohnnysolomo.com

20
Various commentaries emphasize that ideally one should build a sukkah in a manner that enables
both husband and wife to sleep there. However, even if this were to be done, it is possible that the
wife might not wish to sleep there, and it is also possible that other children/guests may want to
sleep in the sukkah.

Given this, the Rema (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 639:2) rules that if a husband and wife cannot
sleep in their normal manner in a sukkah – meaning whether together or separate - then the husband
is exempt from sleeping in the sukkah, whereas the Mishna Berura (OC 639:18) quotes the Gra
and the Magen Avraham who rule that this exemption only applies where the discomfort of
sleeping apart is heightened such as when they would expect to have relations. Yet while there is
some disagreement on this topic, as Rabbi Melamed explains in his Peninei Halacha one can rely
on the more lenient view of the Rema.

Ultimately, situations can arise when the duties of presence, affection and intimacy in marriage
can seemingly conflict with other mitzvah obligations. Where possible, one should endeavour – as
did Rav Zeira – to strike a balance between the two.

However, in those situations where it is not possible, the Rema comes to emphasize the importance
of fulfilling both the emotional and the physical needs of a couple in the spirit of ‫תשבו בעין תדורו‬-
‘dwell [in the sukkah] in the way that you [normally] live’.

Rabbi Moshe Newman writes:13

“People involved in a mitzvah are exempt from the mitzvah of Succah.”

This teaching in the mishna on our daf is explained in the gemara as an example of a well-known
rule that “One who is involved in a mitzvah is exempt from a different mitzvah.” Rav Huna derives
this rule from the mitzvah of saying the “Shma”. The verse states that “Shma” is a mitzvah to do
when “going in your way” – but not while in the middle of going in a way commanded by G-d —
i.e. a different mitzvah.

Rashi writes that the mishna is speaking about people who are, for example, travelling to learn
Torah, visit their Rabbi or redeem captives — and they are exempt from the mitzvah of
Succah even while they are encamped during their travel. Tosefot seems amazed by this
exemption, since why can’t they fulfill both mitzvot at the same time? “Is someone with tzitzit on
his garment exempt from other mitzvot?”

Tosefot clarifies that a person is exempt from another mitzvah only while actively involved in
fulfilling the first mitzvah, but not while passively fulfilling it. And that is the case in
our mishna about Succah as well.

13
https://ohr.edu/this_week/talmud_tips/5726

21
Rav David Brofsky writes:14

Introduction

Last week, we discussed those who are exempt from the mitzva of sukka due to the
principle of “teshvu ke-ein taduru,” which teaches that one’s dwelling in the sukka should be
similar to the manner in which one lives in his home. Therefore, as we saw last week, those who
are traveling, as well as those who are guarding the city or even gardens or orchards, are exempt
from the sukka.

This week, we will continue our study of those who are exempt from eating and sleeping
in the sukka, as we study the laws of one who is sick and one who experiences discomfort in
the sukka. We will also discuss the impact of rain upon the mitzva to sit in the sukka and conclude
with a universal exemption taught in the context of sukka – one who is engaged in the fulfillment
of a mitzva (osek be-mitzva).

Cholim – The Exemption of the Sick

The mishna (Sukka 25a) on our daf teaches that “the sick and their attendants are free from
the obligation of sukka.” The Tosefta, cited by the gemara (Sukka 26a), explains:

Our Rabbis taught: The sick spoken of here is not [only] a sick person who is in danger,
but also one who is not in danger, even one who suffers from eye ache or headache. R.
Shimon b. Gamliel said: On one occasion, I was suffering with my eyes in Caesarea and
R. Yose be-Rivi permitted me and my attendants to sleep outside the sukka.

The Rishonim (see Tosafot 26a, s.v. holkhei, for example) explain that the sick are exempt from
dwelling in the sukka because of “teshvu ke’ein taduru” – as a sick person might even leave his
own home in order to find a more comfortable place. Therefore, many Acharonim (Levush 640:3;
see also Mishna Berura 640:9 and Arukh Ha-shulchan 640:3) assume that this exemption only
applies to one who can seek relief outside of the sukka.

Some Acharonim offer another reason. The Taz (640:8; see also Maharik 178 and Teshuvot
Ha-Geonim, Musafie 51) maintains that the exemption for the sick and of the “mitzta'er” in

14
https://www.etzion.org.il/en/halakha/orach-chaim/holidays/those-who-are-exempt-mitzvat-sukka-2

22
the sukka is due to one’s inability to properly concentrate on the mitzva of sukka while
experiencing discomfort. Therefore, regardless of whether one’s discomfort will be alleviated upon
leaving the sukka, such a person is exempt from the mitzva of sukka.

The Acharonim disagree as to the reason for the exemption of the “attendants”
(meshamsheihen). Some (Levush 640:3; see also Shulchan Arukh Ha-Rav 640:7 and Mishna
Berura 640:7) explain that the attendants are exempt due to the principle of “ha-osek ba-mitzva
patur min ha-mitzva,” one who is engaged in the performance of one mitzva is exempt from
another. The Arukh Ha-Shulchan (640:3-4) argues that the exemption of the attendants is also
based upon teshvu ke-ein taduru, as one who serves a sick person will also leave one’s house when
necessary. R. Yaakov Reischer (1661-1733) argues in his Shevut Ya’akov (3:51) that the
attendants are exempt because they are “mitztaer,” as they feel the pain the sick to whom they are
attending.

The Shulchan Arukh (640:3) rules that those who are sick, even those who suffer from a
headache, are exempt from the sukka, while their attendants are only excused when they are
needed.

Mitzta'er – One who Experiences Discomfort in the Sukka

The gemara (Sukka 26b) teaches:

Rav permitted R. Acha Bardela to sleep in an enclosed bed in a sukka in order [to shut
out] the gnats. Rava permitted R. Acha b. Adda to sleep outside the sukka on account of
the odor of the day. Rava is here consistent, since Rava said: He who is in discomfort is
free from the obligation of sukka.

One who suffers discomfort, according to the gemara, is exempt from the sukka.
The Rishonim debate the halakhic significance of this discomfort, as well as the type of discomfort
that may exempt one from the sukka.

As mentioned above, most Rishonim view teshvu ke-ein taduru as the source of this
exemption – just as one would not remain in one’s house when feeling discomfort, so too one may
leave the sukka upon experiencing discomfort. Some, however, exempt one experiencing
discomfort for different reasons. The Ramban (cited by Ritva 28b; see also
Ramban, Vayikra 23:42), for example, which we discussed last week, understands that “the
obligation of sukka applies only to one who is 'like a green tree (ezrach ra’anan) in its native soil'
(Tehillim 37:35) – to the exclusion of wayfarers, produce watchmen, and one who suffers
discomfort.” Similarly, the Taz (640:8) maintains that the exemption of the “mitztaer” is due to
his inability to properly concentrate on the mitzva of sukka while experiencing discomfort. This is
consistent with the position of the Bach (625), the Taz’s father-in-law, who rules that one must
keep in mind the intention of the mitzva of sukka, as the verse (Vayikra 23:42) says, “that your
generations may know …” Therefore, regardless of whether one’s discomfort will be alleviated
upon leaving the sukka, such a person is exempt from the mitzva of sukka.

23
 The Rema (640:4) rules that one is only exempt if leaving the sukka will relieve his
discomfort.

What are considered legitimate sources of discomfort? In addition to gnats and foul odors,
the gemara (Sukka 29a) relates that if strong winds cause small pieces of sekhakh to fall into
the sukka, causing discomfort, one is exempt. The Yerushalmi (Sukka 2:10) mentions extreme heat
and mosquitoes as cause to leave the sukka as well.

The Terumat Ha-Deshen (Teshuvot 93) rules that if one’s light is extinguished during the
Shabbat meal and there is light in the house, one may leave the sukka and eat in the house.
Furthermore, one need not exert much effort to bring one’s meal to another’s sukka, as this is also
considered to be “uncomfortable.” The Shulchan Arukh (640:4) mentions winds, flies, and foul
odors. The Rema cites the Terumat Ha-Deshen.

Is there an objective level of discomfort, at which point one is exempt from the sukka? The
Tur (640) writes:

It seems that an individual person cannot say “I am uncomfortable” in order to be

exempt from the sukka. Rather, [one is only exempt] with a situation which people
ordinarily find uncomfortable.

In other words, the Tur maintains that there must be some sort of “objective” criterion for mitzta'er.
The Bi’ur Halakha (640) notes that the Ran (Sukka 12a, s.v. chatan) most likely disagrees, but the
Rema (640:4) rules in accordance with the Tur.

The Acharonim question the validity of this ruling, as the gemara (Sukka 29a) brings the
case of R. Yosef, who wished to leave the sukka when it began to rain, before his “porridge
spoiled,” as the mishna (Sukka 28b) prescribes. He said, “For me, as I am fastidious, this is like
the porridge becoming spoiled.” R. Yosef apparently maintains that an istinus, an especially
sensitive person (aninei ha-da’at), may be exempted before others. This seems to imply that the
standards of mitztaer are subjective, and not objective. The Taz (640:6) explains that since
all istinuses would experience discomfort in such a situation, as this constitutes and objective level
of discomfort for them.

Building a Sukka in a Place of Discomfort

The Yerushalmi cited above mentions excessive heat as a reason to deem one mitzta’er,
and it would seem that extreme cold should also be reason to exempt one from sitting in the sukka.
Rashi (Sukka 25b, s.v. tza’ara) in fact mentions cold as a source of discomfort, and the Rema
(639:2), for example, writes that “people do not sleep in the sukka, except for those who are careful
about mitzvot, because of the extreme cold, since it is uncomfortable to sleep in cold places.”

The Rema (660:4), citing the Yerei’im (421), raises a new and serious concern, however:

If one made [the sukka] in a place in which one would be uncomfortable to eat, drink,
or sleep or where he cannot perform one of the above acts because of the fear of robbers,

24
 one does not fulfill [the mitzva] with that sukka at all, even when those actions that are
not uncomfortable, because it is not similar to living-dwelling [in a house] where one
can perform all his needs.

According to this position, if one cannot sleep in the sukka due to the cold, then the sukka may be
invalid, and one may not even eat in the sukka during the day!

R. Tzvi Hirsch b. Yaakov Ashkenazi (1656–1718) disagrees with the Yerei’im in his
Responsa (Chakham Tzvi 94; see also Sha’are Teshuva 640:5, Mishna Berura 640:20 and in
the Sha’ar Ha-Tziyun 25), ruling that one may erect one sukka intended for eating and another for
sleeping.

What is the basis of this debate? The Yerei’im must maintain that a sukka in which one
cannot sleep in simply not considered to be a sukka; in other words, the sukka itself is disqualified.
The Chakham Tzvi argues, on the other hand, that the principle of teshvu ke-ein taduru, from
which the exemption of mitzta’er is derived, relates to the person’s personal obligation, and not to
the validity of the sukka. (The Gra, Be’ur Ha-Gra 640:4, offers numerous examples in which
discomfort may indeed invalidate the sukka- see Shulchan Arukh 634:1, 633:9, 628:1.)

Assuming that we accept the position of the Yerei’im, the Acharonim question how one
may ever build a sukka in a cold or hot climate, or in any place in which one cannot reside in
the sukka both day and night. They offer numerous justifications. The Mishna Berura (640:18), for
example, cites those who explain that even a sukka built in a cold place may be considered “fit for
sleeping” if one has sufficient blankets and sheets.

However, we might suggest an entirely different understanding of the Yerei’im. While the
Chakham Tzvi understands that only a sukka that is unfit for both sleeping and eating is invalid,
the Yerei’im may maintain that one’s obligation to “dwell” in a sukka entails ensuring that one can
eat and sleep in a sukka, just as one ensures that one can both eat and sleep in one’s house. If,
however, one were to build one sukka for eating and another for sleeping, that would seemingly
also suffice.

Furthermore, if one is simply unable to construct a sukka in which he can sleep, this is
possibly also sufficient, as one has ensured that he may live in a sukka to the best of his abilities,
and thus fulfilled “and you shall dwell…” Similarly, the Peri Megadim (Eshel Avraham 640:6)
writes that if it is impossible to build a sukka in a place where one can sleep, “this is considered to
be ke-ein taduru.”

The Acharonim (Mishna Berura 640:20, Arukh Ha-Shulkhan 640:9) write that be-di’avad,
one may eat in a sukka constructed in a place in which one cannot sleep.

Finally, as mentioned above, the Rishonim debate whether a mitzta’er is exempt from
the sukka on the first night as well. The Rema (ibid.) writes that on the first night of Sukkot,
a mitzta’er is obligated to eat in the sukka. The Mishna Berura (640:25 and 639:39) rules that since
one sits in the sukka out of doubt in this case, one should not say the blessing “leishev ba-sukka.”

25
Rain – The Exemption of Yardu Geshamim

The Talmud (Sukka 28b) teaches that one who is sitting in the sukka when it begins to rain,
may leave the sukka:

All the seven days [of the festival], a man must make the sukka his permanent abode and
his house his temporary abode. If rain fell, when may one be permitted to leave it? When
the porridge would become spoiled. They propounded a parable. To what can this be
compared? To a slave who comes to fill the cup for his master, and he poured a pitcher
over his face.

The gemara explains the parable: “The master poured the pitcher over his face and said, ‘I have
no desire for your service.” As the Rema (639:7) writes, “One who leaves the sukka because of
rain should not leave in a contemptuous manner, but rather he should humbly leave like a servant
who poured a drink for his master, who then poured it on his head.”

The mishna implies that the ideal fulfillment of the mitzva of sukka – “teshvu” – entails
“making the sukka his permanent abode.” Most Rishonim assume that one may therefore leave
the sukka when it rains, just as anyone who experiences discomfort in the sukka may seek relief in
one’s house (Rosh Berakhot 7:23; Rashba, Responsa 4:75), as we discussed last week. If so, then
we must understand why the mishna specifies an objective “shiur,” at which point one may leave
the sukka.

According to the Tur (640), who maintains that there must be a somewhat objective level
of discomfort in order to leave the sukka, the mishna simply spells out this objective level.
Interestingly, the Ran (Sukka 13a, s.v. matnitin), who, as we saw, may maintain that the level of
discomfort that frees one from the obligation of sukka is subjective, offers a different interpretation
of our mishna. He explains that one who experiences discomfort from the rain certainly does not
need to enter the sukka. The mishna, however, relates to an additional concern – one who leaves
the sukka in the middle of his meal may appear to be “rejecting the sukka” (ke-meva’et be-sukka),
and therefore may only leave the sukka after his food has spoiled. He concludes, however, that he
personally does not rely upon this leniency, as it cannot be supported by other sources.

Must one start a meal in the sukka when it appears that it will begin raining shortly? The
Ritva (Sukka 29a, s.v. tannu rabannan) writes that if one sees that it is about to rain, one is already
exempt from the sukka. Seemingly, one would not begin eating a meal in one’s house, with all the
necessary preparations, if he knows that he will have to stop in the middle and continue eating
elsewhere (teshvu ke-ein taduru). The Radbaz (6:320) disagrees, and the Shulchan Arukh (639:6)
implies that this exemption only applies once one has begun to eat in the sukka.

Some understand the exemption due to rain in a completely different manner. They suggest
that while one who experiences discomfort may be not be required to remain in the sukka,
a sukka which cannot protect those sitting in it from rain cannot be considered a home at all!
Indeed, the verse says (Yeshayahu 4:6), “And there shall be a pavilion (sukka) for a shadow in the
day-time from the heat, and for a refuge and for a covert from storm and from rain.” A sukka that
cannot provide shelter from the rain cannot be considered a sukka (see Sukka 2b).

26
 Whether we view this halakha as a “petur gavra” (a personal exemption) or a “pesul be-
cheftza” (a disqualification of the sukka) may yield numerous differences. For example, as we
discussed previously, the Rishonim debate whether teshvu ke-ein taduru and the exemption of one
who experiences discomfort applies on the first night of Sukkot. Some Rishonim (see
Tosafot, Berakhot 49b, s.v. iy; Rosh, Berakhot 7:23; Hagahot Asheri, Sukka 2:20) cite a view
which maintains that even if it rains one must eat in the sukka. (See also Meiri, Sukka 26a who
reports that often, if it would rain on the first night of Sukkot, his teaches would “put their hats on
their heads and eat in the sukka.”) Others (Rashba, Responsa 4:78; Ritva Sukka 26a, s,v, ha de-
amrinan) insist that the gemara (Sukka 28b) did not distinguish between the first night and other
nights; one may always leave the sukka when it begins to rain.

The Rema (639:5) rules that on the first night, one should eat at least a ke-zayit in the sukka,
even if it is raining. The Acharonim debate whether, in this case, one should eat without the
blessing of “leshev ba-sukka,” as the Rema may only requires on to eat in the sukka as a stringency
(see, for example, Hagahot R. Akiva Eiger, 639:7, who cites the Tzalach; see also Mishna Berura
639:35, who also discusses whether on should wait until midnight, lest it stop raining), or whether
one should say the berakha, in accordance with those Rishonim who maintain that one must eat in
the sukka on the first night, even in the rain (Taz 639:17). Practically, if it rains on the first night
of Sukkot, it is customary to eat a ke-zayit of bread in the sukka without the berakha, and if the rain
stops, to return to the sukka and eat a ke-beitza of bread with the blessing.

The Gra (Bi’ur Ha-Gra 639:7) writes that those who maintain that one is exempt from
eating in the sukka on the first night in the rain believe that “ein shem sukka alav” – the sukka is
not considered to be a valid sukka. The Sefer Ma’ase Rav (217) records that the Gra ruled that one
should not eat in the sukka in the rain on the first night, because the sukka is not considered to be
a sukka at all. However, he held that one should stay up all night, waiting for the rain to stop, in
order to eat in the sukka. The Gra apparently agreed that teshvu ke-ein taduru does not exempt one
from eating in the sukka on the first night, but until it stops raining, there is no sukka to eat in!

The Acharonim debate whether one may rely upon the lenient opinion and eat in one’s
home if it rains on the second night of Yom Tov outside of Israel or whether one must
recite kiddush and eat a ke-zayit in the sukka, and then conclude in it one’s home (see Terumat Ha-
Deshen 95, who concludes that one who wishes to be stringent may eat a ke-zayit of bread in
the sukka before concluding the meal; see Radbaz, Responsa 6:320). The Mishna Berura (639:36)
writes that one may recite kiddush and she-hechiyanu and eat the entire meal in one’s home, and
afterwards eat a kezayit of bread in the sukka and then recite Birkat Ha-Mazon in the house.

What should one do when the rain stops after leaving the sukka? The gemara (Sukka 29a)
cites a Tosefta, which teaches:

Our Rabbis taught: If he was eating in the sukka and rain fell and he left [the sukka],
he need not trouble to return there until he has finished his meal.

27
The Acharonim explain that the effort expended to return to the sukka may constitute a sort
of mitzta’er (Levush 639:6), and changing location in the middle of a meal is certainly not “ke-ein
taduru” (Arukh Ha-Shulchan 639:24).

Similarly, one who is sleeping is the sukka when it begins to rain, may leave the sukka, and
does not need to return after the rain stops. (See Rema 639:7, who writes that even a bit of rain
may justify one who is sleeping in the sukka to return to his house.)

If he was sleeping in the sukka and rain fell and he left, he need not trouble to return
until it is dawn. They asked them: [Is the reading] “she-ye'or” (until he awakens) or
“sheye'or” (until it is dawn)? Come and hear: [It has been taught]: Until he awakens
and the morning star appear.

One does not need to return to the sukka until one awakens, the next morning.

One Who is Fulfilling a Different Mitzva – Osek Be-Mitzva Patur min Ha-Mitzva

We discussed above those who are exempt due to the principle of teshvu ke-ein taduru. As
we saw, travelers, guards and watchmen, the sick, and those experiencing discomfort are not
obligated to dwell in the sukka, as each of them would not normally hesitate to leave his home in
the given situation. Interestingly, the mishna (Sukka 25b) on our daf begins its discussion of those
who are released from the mitzva of sukka with a universal exemption: osek be-mitzva patur min
ha-mitzva. The gemara teaches:

Those who are engaged on a religious errand (sheluchei mitzva) are free from [the
obligations of] sukka.
It has been taught: R. Chanania b. Akabya said: Scribes of books of the
Law, tefillin and mezuzot, their agents and their agents’ agents, and all who are engaged
in holy work, including sellers of tekhelet, are free from the obligation of prayer
and tefillin and all the commandments mentioned in the Torah. This confirms the words
of R. Yose the Galilean, who laid down: One who is occupied with the performance of a
religious duty is [at that time] free from the fulfillment of other religious duties.

The gemara relates a story about “R. Chisda and Rabba son of R. Huna, who, when visiting on
the Sabbath of the Festival the house of the Exilarch, slept on the riverbank of Sura, saying:
We are engaged on a religious errand and are [therefore] free [from the obligation of Sukka].”
Traveling to greet the Exilarch constitutes a religious duty (see Rosh Ha-Shana 16b), a mitzva,
which would suffice to exempt one from sitting in the sukka.

The Rishonim debate whether one is only exempt from the second mitzva if its performance
would hinder the fulfillment of the first (Tosafot, Sukka 25a, s.v. sheluchei), or whether even one
who can fulfill both mitzvot is exempt as long as he is actively engaged in the fulfillment of the
first (Ra’avad, Rif, Sukka 11b; see also Ran, Sukka 11a, s.v. ve-ika). Apparently,
these Rishonim disagree as to whether one is essentially obligated in both mitzvot but excused from
one if its performance will hinder the fulfillment of the first, or whether fundamentally one cannot

28
be obligated to actively fulfill two mitzvot concurrently. These approaches may yield different
halakhic conclusions.

For example, in general, one who misses one of the three obligatory daily prayers should
recite the next prayer twice; one who did not recite the morning Shemoneh Esrei should recite
the Shemoneh Esrei of Mincha a second time, known as a tefillat tashlumin (a “make-up” prayer).
The Acharonim debate whether one who missed a prayer because he was involved in the
performance of another mitzva, such as one who was involved in communal needs
(tzarkhei tzibbur), should recite a tefilla tashlumin. The Derisha (Yoreh De’ah 341) writes that
since he was exempt from prayer at the time, as he was osek be-mitzva, he does not need to recite
a tefillat tashlumin. The Taz (Orach Chaim 108:1) disagrees and writes that one who is involved
in the performance of a mitzva is no different than one who is sick, and unintentionally, or because
of reasons beyond his control, could not pray, in which case one prays the next Shemoneh
Esrei twice.

The Derisha and the Taz clearly disagree as to whether one who is engaged in the
fulfillment of a mitzva is completely exempt from the second mitzva or simply excused from it.
Similarly, the Acharonim question whether one who does fulfill both mitzvot should recite a
blessing on the second mitzva (see Sha’ar Ha-Tziun 475:39).

The Rema (38:8) rules in accordance with the Tosafot, and the Shulchan Arukh (640:7)
rules that sheluchei mitzva, including those traveling to great their teacher on the festival, to learn
Torah, or to redeem captives are exempt from the sukka (Mishna Berura 640:35). Some (see Sefer
Sukka Ke-Hilkhata, pg. 130, ftnt. 25) suggest that one may visit one’s parents on the festival, a
fulfillment of the mitzva of kibbud av ve-em (honoring one’s parents), even if he will not have
a sukka within which to sleep.

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 The gemoroh in brochos and our daf discusses the distraction of the wedding night and the
mitzvah of keriyas shma which (unlike other mitzvot) requires one’s full attention.

What is the current understanding of holding two tasks at the same time?

Multicosts of Multitasking

Kevin P. Madore and Anthony D. Wagner write:15

As you go about your day, you may barely notice that you are frequently multitasking. It may be
driving to work while listening to a radio program or talking to a loved one on the phone (putting
yourself and others at risk), or perusing Facebook while texting a friend, or switching back and
forth between a high-level project like compiling a report and a routine chore like scheduling an
appointment. Multitasking means trying to perform two or more tasks concurrently, which
typically leads to repeatedly switching between tasks (i.e., task switching) or leaving one task
unfinished in order to do another.
The scientific study of multitasking over the past few decades has revealed important principles
about the operations, and processing limitations, of our minds and brains. One critical finding to
emerge is that we inflate our perceived ability to multitask: there is little correlation with our actual
15
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7075496/ Cerebrum. 2019 Mar-Apr; 2019:

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ability. In fact, multitasking is almost always a misnomer, as the human mind and brain lack
the architecture to perform two or more tasks simultaneously. By architecture, we mean the
cognitive and neural building blocks and systems that give rise to mental functioning. We have a
hard time multitasking because of the ways that our building blocks of attention and executive
control inherently work. To this end, when we attempt to multitask, we are usually switching
between one task and another. The human brain has evolved to single task.
Together with studies of patients who have suffered focal neural injuries, functional neuroimaging
studies indicate that key brain systems involved in executive control and sustained
attention determine our ability to multitask. These include the frontoparietal control network,
dorsal attention network, and ventral attention network.
The first of these networks is thought to support the coding of a task goal and the selection of task-
relevant information. This means identifying a task goal, selecting relevant information, and
disregarding irrelevant information that does not help us to achieve the goal. In the context of
multitasking, we know that the brain has a hard time processing and completing two or more tasks
at once: the inherent ways the dorsal and ventral attention systems interact with the frontoparietal
control network makes this so. When we approach a task, a goal representation in the frontoparietal
control network is thought to guide top-down attentional allocation, mediated by the dorsal
attention network, to select information that is relevant to achieve the task goal. This information
can include external sensory information or internal thoughts.
For this reason, having multiple task goals places greater demands on the frontoparietal control
and dorsal attention networks, which are limited in their capacities. At the same time, the ventral
attention network is believed to support more automatic attention reorienting, which can include
the capture of attention by distracting information. Importantly, when we multitask, the ventral
attention network is more prone to be captured by competing streams of information, including
information that is relevant to one task but irrelevant to––and thus disruptive of performance of––
another task. Because on-task behavior emerges from interactions among the three brain networks,
when we multitask, there are multiple competing sources of what constitutes relevant and
irrelevant goals and information. This can cause interference and complex interactions between
attention and control brain networks.

Switch Costs in Mind and Brain

One way we can examine the effects of multitasking on behavior and the demands it places on
relevant brain networks is by analyzing “task switch costs.” A switch cost is a reduction in
performance accuracy or speed that results from shifting between tasks. Arich body of research in
psychological science has documented that the behavioral costs of task switching are typically
unavoidable: individuals almost always take longer to complete a task and do so with more errors
when switching between tasks than when they stay with one task. Neuroimaging work from our
lab and others has helped to highlight the effects of task switching in the brain.
In one functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we had subjects classify stimuli on
one of three dimensions (color, shape, or pattern). In terms of behavior, one finding was that
subjects took longer to classify stimuli in switch trials (i.e., where the task had changed from the
previous trial) compared to stay trials (i.e., where the task stayed the same). In terms of the brain,
we found that frontoparietal regions––including those of the frontoparietal control and dorsal

31
attention networks––were more responsive during switch than stay trials. In fact, consistent with
the view that multitasking creates heightened neurocognitive demands, the strength of task
representation in the control network was greater when subjects switched to a new task than when
they stayed with the same task. This means that when we switch from one task to another, it
requires more neural processing because we have to bring back to mind the new task’s
representation and then use it to allocate attention to information that is relevant to perform the
new task. As a consequence, when we switch between tasks, we lose the benefits of automaticity
and efficiency that come from staying focused on a single task.
Studies from other labs have reached similar conclusions. study examined the effects of switching
between tasks: subjects performed a single task repeatedly or two tasks intermixed in a block of
trials. Response times were slower during task-switch blocks, and brain patterns reflected this
effect. Nodes of the frontoparietal control network and dorsal attention network were more active
during switch blocks, revealing increased neurocognitive demands associated with switching.
From developmental studies, we have learned that older individuals often exhibit reduced abilities
to selectively attend to and engage cognitive control in support of goal-directed behavior. Age-
related fMRI studies provide initial hints as to what neural changes make multitasking (or task
switching) particularly challenging for older adults. In one, older adults’ diminished multitasking
ability was associated with reduced connectivity between brain networks of attention, control, and
memory, compared to young adults.
Psychological science and neuroscience indicate that our minds are taxed by multitasking. When
we attempt it, we must engage in task switching, placing increased demands on neurocognitive
systems that support control and sustained attention. While engaging these systems can partially
mitigate its behavioral costs, multitasking is not free––we pay a price in increased demands on
these systems and some performance deficit typically occurs.

A Spotlight on Media Multitasking

With the explosion of digital media and the commodification of our attention (referred to as the
“attention economy”), “media multitasking” has become ubiquitous. Have you ever opened your
laptop to check your email or complete a work assignment, and put on Spotify or Netflix in the
background? This kind of multitasking––engaging with or switching between multiple media
streams––has attracted considerable interest given behavioral trends. We know that American
youth spend an average of 7.5 hours a day with various media and at least 29 percent of that time
involves media multitasking. Data from other countries show a similar pattern, and the
phenomenon extends to adults.
In 2009, Cliff Nass’s lab at Stanford developed what has become a widely used index––the Media
Multitasking Inventory (MMI)––to quantify the extent to which an individual engages in this
practice. The original MMI asked individuals to report their hours of media consumption for each
of 12 different media categories (television, music, text messaging, and so forth), along with the
extent to which when engaged with one medium they were also engaged with each of the others.
Test-retest reliability of MMI is high over a week (r = .93) and moderate over a one-year period (r
=.52), and shorter versions and different variants have been developed.

32
The MMI score from the Nass lab represents the mean number of media with which an individual
multitasks during a typical consumption hour. A high MMI score means an individual engages in
a lot of media multitasking (e.g., checking email while also perusing Facebook and watching
Netflix), and a low score means he or she does not (e.g., checking email without any secondary
media). In the 2009 study, heavier and lighter media multitaskers were asked to perform a set of
cognitive tasks that place demands on attention, control, and memory. This study initiated a rapidly
evolving literature that seeks to answer the fundamental question: does media multitasking in
everyday life impact our minds and brains, affecting performance even when we are single
tasking?
One might expect a heavier media multitasker (HMM) to perform better on other tasks that require
multitasking. While this inference seems reasonable, empirical studies are pretty mixed: some
suggest that HMMs perform worse—i.e., exhibit larger switch costs––in task switching paradigms
than do lighter media multitaskers (LMMs), while in others HMMs apparently perform as well as
or better than LMMs.
Another finding that has emerged is that HMMs sometimes perform worse than LMMs even
when single tasking, and this is most consistently seen on tasks that require sustained attention,
working memory, long-term memory, and various forms of impulsivity and inhibitory control.
That is, even when performing only a single task that requires them to maintain top-down attention
or to keep information active in working memory, HMMs do more poorly––whether their
performance is assayed by accuracy rates, response times, or related metrics––than LMMs. Some
evidence suggests that this relationship holds even when controlling for the total number of media
consumption hours, which means that the total number of hours spent with media is less predictive
than the extent to which multitasking with media occurs during those hours.
For example, one recent study from our lab measured media multitasking, working memory, and
long-term memory in undergraduate students at Stanford University. In one part of the study,
subjects were asked to keep simple visual objects in memory over a brief (one second) delay and
to make a memory-dependent decision after the delay. This is a standard task to measure working
memory capacity (that is, the amount of information that can be held active in mind). After this
came a long-term memory test: the subjects were shown the same objects they had seen during the
working memory task along with novel ones and had to indicate which were seen earlier and which
were new. We found that heavier media multitasking (as measured by the MMI) was associated
with worse performance on both the working memory and long-term memory tasks. This was the
case whether using an extreme groups approach (comparing the top 25 percent of individuals who
were HMMs to the bottom 25 percent as LMMs) or a continuous approach (using data from all
subjects, including light, intermediate, and heavy media multitaskers).
These results add to a growing body of work documenting the relationship between media
multitasking and cognitive operations linked to sustained attention and working memory. To build
on our prior work, one approach we have recently taken is to measure attention lapses at the trial
and subject level while individuals of varying media multitasking habits perform single cognitive
tasks. By trial level, we mean moment-to-moment (i.e., state-level) attention lapses during a task
that could help predict why an individual performed well at one moment and less well at another;
by subject level, we mean individual (i.e., trait-level) differences in attention lapsing that could
help to predict differences in task performance across people. Previous work has shown
that fluctuations in pupil diameter from eye tracking data and fluctuations in alpha and theta

33
oscillatory power from electroencephalographic (EEG) data reliably track attention lapses during
various single tasks.
In this ongoing project, we are measuring moment-to-moment changes in pupillary response and
alpha and theta oscillatory power to quantify attention lapsing, with the aim of testing the
relationship between lapsing, task performance, and MMI status. We are also learning more about
which indices of sustained attention may relate to MMI status. (Here, we should note that while
we and others have identified sustained attention as a potential mechanism behind performance
differences between HMMs and LMMs, not all studies come to this conclusion. As we review in
a recent publication, the discrepancy between studies could be due to differences in: (a)
multitasking and performance measurement methodology, (b) demographics of the measured
samples, (c) statistical power, and/or (d) analytic approach, among other reasons.)
There are a number of potential practical consequences of media multitasking in everyday life, one
being academic outcomes. While we have primarily examined the relationship of MMI status and
single tasking and multitasking performance in the lab, new translational studies offer a
complementary perspective. For example, recent work has shown that students learn less when
texting or using social media while attending lectures. Reading proficiency and homework
accuracy have also been shown to decrease as individuals multitask with instant messaging and
various computer programs.
In modern society, we are often pulled in different directions by competing sources of information,
and how we react can affect our performance and quality of life, as highlighted by work on the
“attention economy.” A take-away from this body of research is that individuals should be
thoughtful about the degree to which they engage in media and other forms of multitasking. As
consumers of knowledge (and media), we should be cognizant of the potential relationships
between task-switching, brain, and behavior, whether we are trying to complete a single task or to
multitask. When we multitask, the context may matter. For example, recent data suggest that there
are certain domains––like creative problem solving ––that may benefit from task switching by
reducing fixation on a problem. Weighing the costs and benefits of multitasking is important.
Critical challenges for the future include addressing the central question of causality, as well as
determining the brain mechanisms that may underlie relationships between levels of media
multitasking and cognition. For example, do pre-existing trait differences in attention or
impulsivity lead to differences in media use and multitasking, or do media use and multitasking
increase inattention and impulsivity? Are there tasks where heavier media multitaskers might
outperform lighter media multitaskers? How do brain networks of attention and control differ
between heavier and lighter media multitaskers, and how do these neural profiles relate to task
performance? These are questions that researchers are just beginning to tackle––in the lab and in
the field––highlighting how psychological science and neuroscience are living and breathing
disciplines whose discoveries can inform fundamental issues faced by modern society.

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 Multitasking Overloads the Brain

The brain works most efficiently when it can focus on a single task for a longer period of
time.16

Previous research shows that multitasking, which means performing several tasks at the same time,
reduces productivity by as much as 40%. Now a group of researchers specialising in brain imaging
has found that changing tasks too frequently interferes with brain activity. This may explain why
the end result is worse than when a person focuses on one task at a time.

‘We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure different brain areas of our
research subjects while they watched short segments of the Star Wars, Indiana Jones and James
Bond movies,’ explains Aalto University Associate Professor Iiro Jääskeläinen.

The impact of a short segment of Indiana Jones movie on the diverse areas of
the brain. NeuroscienceNews.com image is credited to Juha Lahnakoski.

Cutting the films into segments of approximately 50 seconds fragmented their continuity. In the
study, the subjects’ brain areas functioned more smoothly when they watched the films in segments
of 6.5 minutes. The posterior temporal and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices, the cerebellum and
dorsal precuneus are the most important areas of the brain in terms of combining individual events
into coherent event sequences. These areas of the brain make it possible to turn fragments into
complete entities. According to the study, these brain regions work more efficiently when it can
deal with one task at a time.

Inadequacy and overloading

16
Iiro Jääskeläinen – Aalto University
Image Source: NeuroscienceNews.com images are credited to Juha Lahnakoski.
Original Research: Abstract for “Neural mechanisms for integrating consecutive and interleaved natural events” by Juha M. Lahnakoski, Iiro P.
Jääskeläinen, Mikko Sams, and Lauri Nummenmaa in Human Brain Mapping. Published online April 5 2017 doi:10.1002/hbm.23591

35
Jääskeläinen recommends completing one task each day rather than working on a dozen of
different tasks simultaneously.

The subjects’ brain areas functioned more smoothly when they watched the
films in longer segments. Credit: Juha Lahnakoski.
‘It’s easy to fall into the trap of multitasking. In that case, it seems like there is little real progress
and this leads to a feeling of inadequacy. Concentration decreases, which causes stress.
Prolonged stress hinders thinking and memory,’ says Jääskeläinen.

The neuroscientist also sees social media as a challenge.

‘Social media is really nothing but multitasking, with several parallel plots and issues. You
might end up reading the news or playing a game recommended by a friend. From the brain’s
perspective, social media only increases the load.’

In addition to Jääskeläinen, Juha Lahnakoski from Max Planck Institute, Mikko Sams from Aalto
University and Lauri Nummenmaa from the University of Turku participated in the research.

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David Yang writes:17

Science says that multitasking — the art of doing multiple things at once — is nearly impossible.
When you multitask, your brain switches between each task very rapidly to the point that you feel
as though you are doing tasks simultaneously.

The anatomical portions of the brain primarily responsible for multitasking-type behaviors have
been mapped to sections of the prefrontal cortex, an area well developed in humans compared to
other primates. The prefrontal cortex is generally responsible for focusing on input and deciding
which response is most ideal. Drs. Earl Miller and Melissa Warden, in a study published in The
Journal of Neuroscience, show that certain neurons within this portion of the brain are actually
capable of multitasking themselves.

So why is it that science maintains that we are still so bad at it?

On the whole, as we make a decision involving a single task, portions of the brain including both
frontal lobes are active. According to Miller, when attempting to accomplish two tasks
simultaneously, the neuronal circuitry within our brains can suffer from what is known as
“interference.” This is in part due to tasks competing for finite resources, sometimes within similar
areas of the brain.

Furthermore, research by Dr. René Marois and colleagues, published in the journal Neuron,
shows that portions of the brain act as information bottlenecks, clogging information transfer from
one portion of the brain to another. The results from this study indicated the primary bottleneck
occurred when the lateral frontal, superior frontal, and prefrontal cortices had difficulties
processing two tasks simultaneously. Rather, a “queuing” of the tasks was shown to result as the
brain processed them. Marois noted that if tasks were presented with a delay of one second or more
between, the bottlenecking effect was eliminated.

Another angle from which one can ponder the negatives of multitasking is through the “Dunning-
Kruger effect.” This is a phenomenon of cognitive bias, named after the team from Cornell
University that produced the research, in which individuals have the propensity to overrate their
abilities and lack the metacognitive ability to realize that the decisions they have made are
incorrect. Simply put, we are likely the worst judges of our own abilities.

This was exemplified in research by Drs. Melina Uncapher and Anthony Wagner, published in
the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, detailing how certain types of heavy
multitaskers believe they are very good at multitasking, but in reality are most often the worst at

17
https://brainworldmagazine.com/the-myth-of-multitasking/

37
it. In addition, the study found productivity to be decreased, while further research supported the
notion that multitasking impairs and can even harm cognitive performance.

It came therefore as a surprise that a study published in Science, by a group headed by Dr. Etienne
Koechlin, has emerged arguing for the possibility of limited multitasking. When volunteers were
asked to complete a single task for monetary reward that researchers had designed, areas of both
frontal lobes known as the medial prefrontal cortex became involved and appeared to be working
in conjunction to solve the problem.

When volunteers were then asked to complete two tasks, Koechlin and his colleagues were able to
discern that the two frontal lobes appeared to divide their attention, with one pursuing completion
of the first task while the other targeted the second.

Most interestingly, when accosted with three tasks, completion accuracy dramatically decreased.
It appeared that the third task could simply not find the available brain space in which to
concurrently process. Koechlin observed that the individuals seemed to perform as if one of the
three tasks was forgotten.

While the results of the study seem to indicate that we may be capable of multitasking two things
at once, does this truly mean we can dual-task? While some evidence shows that multitasking can
be improved and optimized to some degree, this remains a tricky question. Given that our daily to-

38
do lists typically run higher than two and likely also include decisions, this could easily overwhelm
our neural circuitry.

Finally, while research by Drs. Jason Watson and David Strayer, published in Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, has indicated that there may be in our midst a small subset (around 2.5%) of
individuals that multitask extremely well (termed “supertaskers”) — it still seems prudent that,
given the chances, one should not yet throw caution to the wind when considering whether one
should multitask.

In a world plagued with lives that must fit into decreasing amounts of time, people naturally
attempt to multitask. However, as science continues to provide us with evidence of our
multitasking limitations, perhaps it is best that society attempt a return to the basics: Finish an
item, then cross it off. As Publilius Syrus wrote in the 1st century B.C., he “who chases two rabbits
catches neither.” (Known today as “To do two things at once is to do neither.”) Sadly, it has taken
us until the 21st century to realize that Syrus may have had a point.

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 How Multitasking Affects Productivity and Brain Health
Kendra Cherry writes:18

Multitasking seems like a great way to get a lot done at once, but research has shown that our
brains are not nearly as good at handling multiple tasks as we like to think they are. In fact, some
research suggests that multitasking can actually hamper your productivity by reducing your
comprehension, attention, and overall performance.1

What is it that makes multitasking such a productivity killer? It might seem like you are
accomplishing multiple things at the same time, but what you are really doing is quickly shifting
your attention and focus from one thing to the next. Switching from one task to another may
make it difficult to tune out distractions and can cause mental blocks that can slow you down.

What Is Multitasking?

• Working on two or more tasks simultaneously

• Switching back and forth from one thing to another
• Performing a number of tasks in rapid succession

How Multitasking Hampers Productivity

Multitasking takes a serious toll on productivity. Our brains lack the ability to perform multiple
tasks at the same time—in moments where we think we're multitasking, we're likely just
switching quickly from task to task.2 Focusing on a single task is a much more effective approach
for several reasons.

Multitasking Is Distracting

Multitaskers may feel more distracted than people who focus on one task at a time. This makes
sense when you consider that, by habit, multitaskers constantly refocus on a new task, effectively
distracting themselves from their original assignment.

Some research suggests that multitaskers are more distractible, and they may have trouble
focusing their attention even when they're not working on multiple tasks at once.3 Other research
shows that while there may be a connection between multitasking and distraction, that link is
smaller than originally thought and varies quite a bit from person to person.4

Multitasking Slows You Down

While it may seem contrary to popular belief, we tend to work slower and less efficiently when
we multitask.2 Multitasking leads to what psychologists call "task switch costs," or the negative

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https://www.verywellmind.com/multitasking-2795003?utm_source=MJL_Maropost&utm_campaign=MJL_Daf_Yomi&utm_medium=email

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effects that come from switching from task to task. We encounter task switch costs (like a slower
working pace) because of the increased mental demand that's associated with jumping from one
thing to another.

Changing our focus also keeps us from relying on automatic behaviors to finish tasks quickly.
When we're focused on a single task that we've done before, we can work on "autopilot," which
frees up mental resources. Switching back and forth bypasses this process, and we tend to work
more slowly as a result.2

Multitasking Impairs Executive Function

Multitasking is managed by executive functions in the brain. These control and manage cognitive
processes and determine how, when, and in what order certain tasks are performed. There are
two stages to the executive control process:5

1. Goal shifting: Deciding to do one thing instead of another

2. Rule activation: Changing from the rules for the previous task to rules for the new task

Moving through these stages may only add a few tenths of a second, but it can start to add up
when people switch back and forth repeatedly. This might not be a big deal when you are folding
laundry and watching television at the same time. However, if you are in a situation where safety
or productivity is important, such as when you are driving in heavy traffic, even small amounts
of time can prove critical.

Multitaskers Make Mistakes

Multitasking may lower your performance and make you more prone to making
mistakes.2 Research has shown that students who multitask in class tend to have lower GPAs
(and, if they continue multitasking at home, they often take longer to finish their homework).6

Adults may also experience lower performance while multitasking. One 2018 study found that
older adults were likely to make more mistakes while driving if they were multitasking.7

7 Useful Tips for Improving Your Mental Focus

Brain Function in Multitaskers

Doing several different things at once can impair cognitive ability, even for people who
multitask frequently. In fact, research suggests that people tend to overestimate their ability to
multitask, and the people who engage in this habit most frequently often lack the skills needed to
be effective at it.8

Chronic multitaskers tend to show more impulsivity than their peers, and they may be more
likely to downplay possible risks associated with tackling multiple things at once. They also
seem to show lower levels of executive control and are often distracted easily.8

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Limited cognitive resources may be involved in this phenomenon.2 Several networks in the brain
interact to guide our behavior whenever we set out to complete a task. This behavior includes:

• Setting a goal
• Identifying the information we need to achieve it
• Disregarding irrelevant distractions

When we try to engage in this process for multiple tasks at once, it can lead to cognitive errors.
We might fail to disregard irrelevant information, for instance, which would lead to more
distraction.

The research isn't clear on the exact relationship between multitasking and brain function. It's
possible that chronic multitasking changes the brain over time, leading to more distractibility and
problems with focus, or it may be that people with these traits are more likely to multitask in the
first place.8

Teens and Multitasking

The negative impact of chronic, heavy multitasking might be particularly detrimental to

adolescent minds. At this age, brains are busy forming important neural connections. Spreading
attention so thin and constantly being distracted by different streams of information might have a
serious, long-term, negative impact on how these connections form.9

Media Multitasking
Some research suggests that people who engage in media multitasking (using more than one
form of media or type of technology at once) might be better at integrating visual and auditory
information. In one study, participants between the ages of 19 and 28 were asked to complete
questionnaires regarding their media usage.10 The participants then completed a visual search
task both with and without a sound to indicate when an item changed color.

Heavy multitaskers performed better on the search when the sound was presented, indicating that
they were more adept at integrating the two sources of sensory information. Conversely, heavy
multitaskers performed worse than light/medium multitaskers when the tone was not present.

Break the Multitasking Habit

If you feel like multitasking is negatively impacting your life, it is possible to make some
changes that will increase your productivity and efficiency. Next time you find yourself
multitasking, take a quick assessment of the various things you are trying to accomplish. Then,
determine which task you need to focus on first. Try to:

• Limit the number of things you juggle at any given time to just one task. If you do
need to work on multiple things at once, try to combine something automatic, like folding
laundry, with something that requires more focus, like having a conversation.

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 • Use the "20-minute rule." Instead of constantly switching between tasks, try to fully
devote your attention to one task for 20 minutes before switching to the other.
• Batch your tasks. If you're having trouble resisting the urge to check your email or
engage in another distracting task, schedule a set time in your day to tackle it. By
batching similar tasks together and setting a time to handle them, you can free your mind
up to focus on something else.
• Limit distractions. This may mean seeking out a quieter place to work, switching your
phone off, and turning off notifications and alarms.
• Practice mindfulness. Adding mindfulness to your daily routine may help you notice the
times when you're multitasking. Mindfulness can also improve your ability to focus and
pay attention to one thing at a time.

Working on one task at a time may help you become more productive and it may make each task
more enjoyable.

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