Proquest 2017

You might also like

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 293

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/343345148

THE ESOTERIC PHILOSOPHY OF ALICE A. BAILEY: AGELESS WISDOM FOR A


NEW AGE

Thesis · August 2012

CITATIONS READS

0 1,047

1 author:

David Borsos

2 PUBLICATIONS   0 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by David Borsos on 31 July 2020.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.


THE ESOTERIC PHILOSOPHY OF ALICE A. BAILEY:

AGELESS WISDOM FOR A NEW AGE

by

David Borsos

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

California Institute of Integral Studies

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Integral Studies with a concentration in

Learning and Change in Human Systems

California Institute of Integral Studies

San Francisco, CA

2012
UMI Number: 3517075

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS


The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI 3517075
Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346
CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read THE ESOTERIC PHILOSOPHY OF ALICE A.

BAILEY: AGELESS WISDOM FOR A NEW AGE by David Borsos, and that in

my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a dissertation submitted in

partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in Integral

Studies with a concentration in Learning and Change in Human Systems at the

California Institute of Integral Studies.

________________________________________________

Bernard O. Williams, PhD, Chair

Dean of Graduate Studies, Energy Medicine University

________________________________________________

Constance A. Jones, PhD

Professor, California Institute of Integral Studies

________________________________________________

Shelton A. Gunaratne, PhD

Professor Emeritus, Minnesota State University Moorhead


© 2012 David Borsos
Permission Letter, McKechnie/Lucis Trust

withheld for privacy

withheld for privacy

withheld for privacy


Permission Letter, Robbins/Seven Ray Institute

withheld for privacy

withheld for privacy

withheld for privacy


David Borsos
California Institute of Integral Studies, 2012
Bernard O. Williams PhD, Committee Chair

THE ESOTERIC PHILOSOPHY OF ALICE A. BAILEY:

AGELESS WISDOM FOR A NEW AGE

ABSTRACT

During a thirty year period Alice A. Bailey (1880–1949), in telepathic

collaboration with the Tibetan teacher Djwhal Khul, wrote two dozen volumes on

the origins and evolutionary development of Matter and Consciousness within our

solar system, our planet, and the human kingdom. Her writings elucidate the

forces and energies underlying the world of phenomena which can be consciously

developed, controlled, and directed. Based on the ageless wisdom of the world’s

religious traditions, yet updated for the needs of our modern intelligence, these

teachings reveal a path to soul consciousness and the establishment of right

human relations.

The purpose of this dissertation is to introduce Bailey’s esoteric

philosophy in a way that will stimulate academic study, critique, and debate. My

claim is that her writings embody a transcendent wisdom and intelligence which

illuminate the problems of humanity and provide practical means for their

solution.

vi
In this dissertation I provide an overview of Bailey’s life, her worldview,

and the major themes expressed in her writings. I also address criticisms of

universal wisdom traditions and structural-hierarchical models of human

development that have arisen in the field of transpersonal studies. The criticisms

of three leading scholars in this field, Ken Wilber, Michael Washburn, and Jorge

Ferrer, while not directed at Bailey’s writings, draw into question many

traditional metaphysical assumptions that appear to be unwarranted in light of our

modern understanding. I argue that their criticisms do not apply to Bailey’s

esoteric philosophy.

I then demonstrate the strength, comprehensive logic, and moral force of

Bailey’s writings by using them to outline the possibilities for reconstructing the

theory of communicative rationality put forth by philosopher and social theorist

Jürgen Habermas. I argue that his intuitions regarding the universal and

emancipatory potentials of rationality are correct, but limited by his relatively

narrow worldview, and that the force he finds inherent in intersubjective

communication is a faint reflection of the transformative powers of the Soul.

vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the following family members, friends, and co-
workers for their help in making this dissertation possible.

I thank . . .

My parents, Robert and Shirley, and my brother Bob for their love,
support, and encouragement over the many years. I would especially like to honor
the efforts of my father who sacrificed so much in a lifetime of service to his
community. I also want to express my thankfulness for the love and laughter
shared with my brother John (1953–1988) whose academic endeavors are an
inspiration.

Connie Jones, my academic advisor and committee member, for her


steadfast support over many years, and for her valuable insights and suggestions.

My dissertation committee chair, Bernard Williams, and committee


member Shelton Gunaratne, for their thoughtful communications which greatly
improved this dissertation.

Reference librarians at the California Institute of Integral Studies, the


University of California, Berkeley, and especially Jason Dezember at John F.
Kennedy University, for their generous assistance.

Sarah McKechnie, President of Lucis Trust, for her support and


communications over many years.

Michael Robbins for his efforts and commitment to bringing the esoteric
teachings of Alice Bailey and H. P. Blavatsky to greater public awareness.

Everyone who worked with and supported the non-profit group Light on
the Bay, especially Caite Bennett, Chris Fong, Kathy Fugitt, Frances Harriman,
David and Joann Hopper, Launa Huffines, David Kesten, Ron LeBlanc, Gus
Makreas, Eric Malone, Alex Pappas, Diane Poole, Neil Whitelaw, and Jeff
Whittier.

All of the graduate students in Cohort 5 at CIIS for their support and
encouragement, and for teaching me about authenticity.

Donald Rothberg for the helpful conversations we’ve had regarding


Habermas.

viii
Eugene Halton for sharing his insights, and for his kindness and generous
spirit.

Eduardo Mendieta for research assistance and for allowing me to


videotape the Habermas colloquium held at the University of San Francisco in
December of 1997.

Chris Fong for teaching me, a former introvert and recluse, the value and
skills of communication.

Susan Sanders for her support, encouragement, and friendship over many
years.

John Kirkmire for his friendship, support, sharing of ideas, and for
providing copyediting assistance with an earlier draft of the dissertation.

Colin Bell for reading my original dissertation proposal and for offering
sound advice.

Shailja Patel for her love, support, and inspiration.

ix
DEDICATION

Dedicated to those who demonstrate

the soul laws of sacrifice and service.

x
Table of Contents

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................... vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................. viii
DEDICATION .................................................................................................... x
PART 1 ................................................................................................................... 1
THE ESOTERIC PHILOSOPHY OF ALICE A. BAILEY ................................... 1
CHAPTER 1 ....................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
Overview ......................................................................................................... 1
Limitations of the Study.................................................................................. 9
Editorial Notes ................................................................................................ 9
CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................... 13
BAILEY’S WORLDVIEW .............................................................................. 13
Overview ....................................................................................................... 13
Biography ...................................................................................................... 13
Blavatsky’s Influence.................................................................................... 16
Ontology ....................................................................................................... 19
Epistemology ................................................................................................ 20
The Seven Rays ............................................................................................. 22
The Nature of Esotericism ............................................................................ 25
CHAPTER 3 ..................................................................................................... 28
FUNDAMENTAL ESOTERIC CONCEPTS .................................................. 28
Overview ....................................................................................................... 28
The Initiatory Process ................................................................................... 28
The Spiritual Hierarchy................................................................................. 33
The New Group of World Servers ................................................................ 34
The Creation of Thoughtforms ..................................................................... 36
Devic and Elemental Lives ........................................................................... 38
The Etheric Body .......................................................................................... 42
The Nature of Magical Work ........................................................................ 46

xi
Glamour and Illusion .................................................................................... 48
CHAPTER 4 ..................................................................................................... 55
BAILEY AND TRANSPERSONAL THEORISTS ......................................... 55
The Transpersonal Movement ...................................................................... 55
Wilber’s Three “Problems” with Wisdom Traditions................................... 57
Problem One ............................................................................................. 59
Problem Two ............................................................................................. 62
Problem Three ........................................................................................... 64
Washburn’s Criticisms of Structural-Hierarchical Models ........................... 67
The Dynamic-Dialectical Model............................................................... 67
Comparisons with Wilber’s Model ........................................................... 70
Comparisons with Bailey’s Model............................................................ 74
Ferrer’s Criticisms of Transpersonal Psychology ......................................... 77
The Experiential Vision of Human Spirituality ........................................ 78
The Empiricist Colonization of Spirituality.............................................. 84
The Perennial Philosophy Revisited ......................................................... 86
PART 2 ................................................................................................................. 91
RECONSTRUCTING HABERMAS ................................................................... 91
CHAPTER 5 ..................................................................................................... 91
HABERMAS’ THEORY OF RATIONALITY ............................................... 91
The Great Question ....................................................................................... 91
Introduction to the Problem of Rationality ................................................... 92
“Rationality”—A Preliminary Specification ................................................ 95
The Criticizability of Actions and Assertions ............................................... 96
Esoteric Critique ........................................................................................... 99
CHAPTER 6 ................................................................................................... 101
THE SPECTRUM OF CRITICIZABLE UTTERANCES ............................. 101
Three Forms of Rationality—Objective, Social, and Subjective ................ 101
Esoteric Critique ......................................................................................... 102
Morality................................................................................................... 103
Subjectivity and the Problem of Illusion ................................................ 108
Rational/non-rational dualism............................................................. 109

xii
Freeing oneself from illusion. ............................................................. 110
Habermas’ appropriation of psychoanalysis. ...................................... 116
CHAPTER 7 ................................................................................................... 121
AN EXCURSUS ON ARGUMENTATION .................................................. 121
The Role of Argumentation in Justifying Validity Claims ......................... 121
Esoteric Critique ......................................................................................... 122
CHAPTER 8 ................................................................................................... 131
MYTHICAL AND MODERN WORLDVIEWS ........................................... 131
The Structures of Mythical Understanding ................................................. 131
Esoteric Critique ......................................................................................... 133
Habermas and the Fifth Ray ................................................................... 136
Mythical Thought and the Fourth Ray .................................................... 140
CHAPTER 9 ................................................................................................... 146
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF FORMAL WORLDS ................................... 146
Basic Attitudes Toward the Objective, Social, and Subjective Worlds ...... 146
Esoteric Critique ......................................................................................... 147
Further Problems with Habermas’ Concept of Subjectivity ................... 148
An Excursus on the Stages of Duality .................................................... 151
CHAPTER 10 ................................................................................................. 153
THE RATIONALITY DEBATES.................................................................. 153
Introduction ................................................................................................. 153
Substantive and Formal Standards of Rationality ....................................... 154
Empirical and Systematic Arguments ......................................................... 155
Esoteric Critique ......................................................................................... 157
Ontological and Epistemological Aspects of Rationality ....................... 159
The Etheric Body and the Chakras ......................................................... 160
CHAPTER 11 ................................................................................................. 165
DECENTRATION AND THE LIFEWORLD ............................................... 165
Cognitive Development and Decentration .................................................. 165
The Lifeworld as Background Knowledge ................................................. 166
Esoteric Critique ......................................................................................... 169

xiii
Decentration Interpreted Esoterically ..................................................... 169
The decentration of worldviews. ........................................................ 169
The decentration of self. ..................................................................... 172
The Lifeworld ......................................................................................... 175
System and Lifeworld ............................................................................. 187
CHAPTER 12 ................................................................................................. 192
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................... 192
NOTES............................................................................................................ 197
REFERENCES ............................................................................................... 249
APPENDIX A: FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE AGELESS
WISDOM ................................................................................................... 268
APPENDIX B: RAY CHARACTERISTICS: STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES ......................................................................................... 269
APPENDIX C: GENERAL CONTRASTS BETWEEN RAY 4 AND
RAY 5 ........................................................................................................ 273
APPENDIX D: QUALITIES OF THE RAYS CONDITIONING THE
MIND ......................................................................................................... 275

xiv
PART 1

THE ESOTERIC PHILOSOPHY OF ALICE A. BAILEY

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

The writings of Alice A. Bailey (1880–1949) make a valuable contribution

to human understanding in a variety of fields, most notably religious studies,

philosophy, and psychology. Although not well-known, they create a powerful

synthesis of Eastern and Western thought and constitute an important modern

presentation of the Ageless Wisdom tradition. Regarding this tradition Bailey

observes,

Methods and techniques may change; dogmas and doctrines appear and
disappear as the Ageless Wisdom presents itself, generation after
generation, and the continuity of revelation unfolds as the need of
humanity demands it. (Bailey 1951b, 281; italics in the original)

She states her understanding of the Ageless Wisdom tradition in eight

fundamental doctrines which also serve as a concise summary of her worldview

(see Appendix A). Bailey repeatedly emphasizes the limitations and temporal

nature of any presentation of the Ageless Wisdom and references the Buddha’s

injunction in the Kalama Sutta for students to ascertain meaningful truths for

themselves rather than to rely on any supposed authorities (Bailey 1925, xv–xvi).

Following in the lineage of H. P. Blavatsky’s theosophy, Bailey’s esoteric

writings provide a view of the Cosmos and humanity’s role in it by offering a

1
wealth of theoretical and practical knowledge regarding mind, matter, the soul,

and the evolution of consciousness. Bailey defines esotericism in terms of a

science of energy relationships which underlie and permeate the world of

phenomenal forms. She claims that these writings are not her own but result from

a thirty-year telepathic collaboration with the Tibetan Master, Djwhal Khul,

whose understanding transcends the usual limits of the individual rational mind.

The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that Bailey’s esoteric

philosophy constitutes a theoretical system, methodology, and embodied practice

worthy of serious consideration, research, and academic debate.

In his study of Western esotericism and New Age religions, Wouter

Hanegraaff states, “Bailey’s influence on the New Age movement, especially in

its early phase, is pervasive; it is she who is also generally credited with having
1
introduced the term New Age” (Hanegraaff 1998, 95). Among the many

characteristics of the New Age into which humanity is now entering, Bailey

emphasizes the qualities of synthesis, inclusiveness, unselfish group work, and the
2
renunciation of materialism (Bailey 1944, 23; 1948, 129; 1954, 3).

Despite the worldwide influence of her teachings, however, Bailey’s work


3
is virtually unknown in the academic world. Religious historian Olav Hammer

writes, “It is something of an oddity that prominent religious innovators such as

Alice Bailey . . . [and her] doctrines have been slighted by historians of religion”

(Hammer 2004, xiii). Hammer also notes that despite having played an important

role in the intellectual history of the West, esoteric theories in general have been

largely ignored by scholars, a tendency due to the latter’s

2
exclusivist and elitist view of Western intellectual development.
According to this view, the development of science, of technology and of
rationalist philosophies are part of a dynamic modernity, whereas folk
religion in various guises, occult and esoteric currents, new religious
movements and idealist beliefs form a kind of cultural arrière-guarde,
stagnant survivals of magical thinking or reflexes of pre-scientific
speculation. (2004, xiii)

This rational-scientific view typically devalues earlier magical, mythical,

metaphysical, and religious worldviews. For example, several thinkers (including

Jürgen Habermas and Ken Wilber, whose work will be analyzed in this

dissertation) imagine a type of “post-metaphysical thinking” and a “post-

metaphysical age.” And in response to the apparent resurgence of religious

fundamentalism, particularly Christian and Islamic, several authors have written

popular accounts that are dismissive of religious beliefs and the possible existence
4
of God in our modern secular age.

There are, however, serious problems with this rational-scientific view and

with its supposed “overcoming” of earlier worldviews. Foremost is the fact that

the view of scientific materialism is itself based on largely unexamined

metaphysical principles (Wallace 2000, 21). While honoring the great advances of

science it is also important to constantly bear in mind its limitations as well. For

example, it is important to acknowledge that the modern scientific view does not

clearly understand the nature of matter (see Chapter 3). The use of the term “post-

metaphysical,” therefore, is unfortunate in that it implies that we have somehow

achieved a complete understanding of the domain of metaphysics or that it is

simply no longer necessary and can be ignored. In fact, traditional metaphysical

questions regarding the nature of Time, Space, and Matter among others, are still

3
relevant and some scholars maintain that metaphysics remains “the most central”

or “basic” part of philosophy (Kim and Sosa 1995, xiii; Aune 1985, 3).

The great strength of Bailey’s esoteric philosophy is that it can integrate

knowledge and provide understanding across all worldviews—the magical,

mythical, metaphysical, religious, and the scientific—without denying the truths

of any one of them. Once the equivalency of matter-energy is acknowledged and

the nature of subtle energies is understood, magic can be interpreted as creative

subjective activity and as the power to bring forms into manifestation, the most

notable example being speech. Myths can be interpreted as revealing enduring

universal truths in pre-scientific, narrative forms. Bailey’s teachings reveal new

insights into many metaphysical subjects that cannot be ignored, such as the

nature of matter and the nature and development of the mind and the intuition.

With respect to religion, her teachings incorporate ideas from primarily three

traditions—Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity—and integrate them into a

logical and coherent whole, thereby providing a rational and practical approach to

religion and spirituality consonant with the needs of humanity today. And finally,

her approach is scientific—she claims that esotericism is a science and that the

forces and energies underlying phenomenal forms can be understood and

controlled in a rational and scientific manner.

Despite the “exclusivist and elitist” orientation of mainstream academics

noted by Hammer, there has been an increasing trend towards synthesis and

inclusiveness. This is reflected in a growing popular and academic interest in

Eastern religions, consciousness studies, indigenous wisdom traditions, and other

4
forms of holistic studies. Transpersonal psychology is a particularly good

example of an area of academic research that integrates knowledge from many

cultural traditions and explores the furthest reaches of human development

including the spiritual domain. While it is understandable that mainstream

academics have virtually no knowledge of Bailey’s esoteric philosophy, it is quite

surprising that her work is also relatively unknown or ignored within the

transpersonal community of scholars. For example, three of the leading theorists

in the field of transpersonal psychology, Ken Wilber, Michael Washburn, and

Jorge Ferrer, have never mentioned Bailey or her important contributions to the

field of psychology (Bailey 1936, 1942). In addition, they have been critical of

“wisdom traditions,” “structural-hierarchical paradigms of human development,”

and “universal, all-encompassing philosophies” respectively, criticisms that may

appear to provide grounds for dismissing Bailey’s teachings.

In Part 1 of the dissertation I provide an introduction to Bailey’s

worldview (Chapter 2) and highlight several important esoteric themes and

concepts (Chapter 3). I then analyze the criticisms of the above mentioned

transpersonal theorists (Wilber, Washburn, and Ferrer) to further explicate

Bailey’s teachings and to show that their criticisms are not applicable to her work

(Chapter 4). In Part 2 of the dissertation (Chapters 5–11) I further demonstrate the

strength of Bailey’s writings by using them to sketch the possibilities for an

esoteric reconstruction of philosopher and social theorist Jürgen Habermas’

theory of communicative rationality. My analysis of his theory follows the

structure he provides in the introductory chapter of The Theory of Communicative

5
Action (Habermas 1984, 1987; hereafter TCA). I use the term “reconstruction” in

the general sense proposed by Habermas’ translator, Thomas McCarthy, who

writes, “The aim [of reconstructing another theorist’s work] . . . is to excavate and

incorporate their positive contributions, to criticize and overcome their

weaknesses, by thinking with them to go beyond them” (McCarthy 1984, vii).

Habermas is widely considered to be one of the world’s greatest

intellectuals of the past half-century and the leading representative of second

generation critical theorists emerging from the Institute of Social Research,

commonly referred to as the Frankfurt School (Held 1980, 249). There are many

similarities between the ideas promoted by Habermas and Bailey, most notably

concerning the vital roles of rationality and reflection in human development and

in achieving emancipation. This similarity between their systems is a primary

reason for my selecting Habermas’ theory of rationality for an esoteric

reconstructive analysis. My interest is focused primarily on his role as a

philosopher and on his understanding of ontology, epistemology, subjectivity, and

ethics, and not so much on his role as a social theorist. Another reason for

choosing to reconstruct Habermas’ theory of rationality is my conviction that a

logically sound critique of such an eminent intellectual would demonstrate the

value of Bailey’s esoteric philosophy in a powerful and convincing way. I

endeavor to point out and support the strengths of Habermas’ intuitions and

arguments where they correspond with Bailey’s model. I also, however, point out

and critique his apparent weaknesses from the esoteric perspective. I argue that

Bailey’s esoteric philosophy provides a more comprehensive framework than

6
does Habermas’ communicative theory, and that her practical injunctions for

achieving enlightenment and emancipation, the original goals of critical theory

(Geuss 1981), are more consonant with the needs of humanity in a new age.

Although Habermas continuously modifies his thinking, the essential

structure of his theory of rationality as it is developed in TCA—its linguistic basis

and its reliance on a theory of formal pragmatics—has remained unchanged in his

later works (Edgar 2006, 163). There has, however, been a noticeable shift in

Habermas’ attitude toward the role of religion. In TCA, Habermas maintains that

the function of creating and sustaining social integration has been transferred

from religious traditions to secularized communicative practices, a process he

describes as “the linguistification of the sacred” (Habermas 1987, 77–111). From

this perspective, religion assumes the form of a premodern and outmoded

historical stage of development. Since the 1990s, however, Habermas has

explicitly asserted the important role of religion, not only in balancing a

“naturalism founded on a naïve faith in science,” but also in rescuing

postmetaphysical thinking from the “defeatism lurking within it” as modern

reason threatens “to spin out of control” (Habermas 2010, 18). Habermas

repeatedly insists that for religion to achieve a reciprocal relation with modern

secular reason, it must translate its unexhausted potentials into secular, scientific,

and philosophical language, an as yet outstanding task (Habermas 1992c, 234;

2009, 5, 6, 113; 2010, 16, 22). He contends that religion cannot be replaced or

repressed

as long as religious language is the bearer of semantic content that is


inspiring and even indispensable . . . [although] this content eludes (for the
7
time being?) the explanatory force of philosophical language and
continues to resist translation into reasoning discourses. (1992b, 51)

My fundamental claim is that Bailey’s esoteric philosophy possesses such

explanatory force and is well capable of translating religious language into the

philosophical language of reasoning discourses.

In terms of Habermas’ schema, my arguments take the form of aesthetic

criticism as I challenge the adequacy of his historically and culturally situated

value standards and his vocabulary of evaluative language (Habermas 1984, 20). I

assert that the value standards and vocabulary supporting his theory of

communicative action represent the apotheosis of a modern Western rationality

that is narrowly circumscribed and declining in influence. I assert that Habermas’

value standards and vocabulary are remnants of a passing age and are incapable of

integrating the full range of human knowledge—Eastern and Western, ancient and

modern. Through Habermasian aesthetic criticism I intend to demonstrate that

Bailey’s esoteric philosophy embodies “a claim to authenticity . . . [made] so

evident” that it will rationally motivate the acceptance of more holistic standards

of value appropriate for a new age (Habermas 1984, 20).

This claim to authenticity can be demonstrated through C. S. Peirce’s

concept of abduction which maintains that an explanation is probably true if it

provides the best available explanation for all of the known facts. In a similar way

Dieter Henrich has observed, “The human being recognizes as true what has the

most comprehensive self-evidence and opens up the most illuminating

perspectives” (Henrich 1982, 31). In this light, my claim is that Bailey’s esoteric

8
philosophy derives from a transcendent source of wisdom and provides one of the

most comprehensive and illuminating perspectives available at this time.

Limitations of the Study

I would like to emphasize the provisional nature of the dissertation and my

intention that it serve as a prolegomenon for future research and as a preliminary

effort to chart the contours of an esoteric interpretive and reconstructive

methodology. The dissertation is limited by the fact that I have not formally

studied philosophy, social theory, or transpersonal psychology at the graduate

level. Further, I am able to study publications only in English. The power of the

dissertation arises from my being uniquely situated with a view of three domains

of understanding (Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality, transpersonal

studies, and Bailey’s esoteric philosophy) which so far have been unrelated.

Editorial Notes

In general, I follow Bailey’s Anglicization of foreign words. However,

when quoting from or referencing other sources, I incorporate the spellings and

diacritics as they are used in those sources. At times, Bailey capitalizes certain

words and at other times she does not, without any readily apparent logic (e.g.,

Soul, soul; Monad, monad; Planetary Logos, planetary Logos; Idea, idea).

Therefore, there may be some discrepancies in capitalizations throughout the

dissertation. I endeavor to use the term “Soul” (uppercase) to denote the universal

Soul, and “soul” (lowercase) to denote what appears to be its individual human

expression, although a clear distinction may not always be possible. Bailey

utilizes the adjective “buddhic” (intuitional) in lowercase, as in “buddhic plane”

9
“buddhic vehicle,” or “buddhic energy.” She also capitalizes pronouns when

referring to the Masters of Wisdom or to the planetary or solar Logos (e.g., He,

They, etc.) which I only do in direct quotations. There are other discrepancies in

her writings as well, such as the presentation of the word “thoughtform” as one

word, two words, or hyphenated. I use the expression as one word except in direct

quotations where it may be presented otherwise.

The field of esoteric studies includes many traditions (Versluis 2000).

However, unless noted otherwise, all references to esotericism and esoteric

philosophy in the dissertation refer specifically to Bailey’s writings and I

generally use the expression “Bailey’s esoteric philosophy.” Blavatsky used the

expression “Esoteric Philosophy” much earlier than Bailey, however, and because

of the close relationship between their two systems and my intent to honor

Blavatsky’s original contributions, I use the expression “Esoteric Philosophy”

(uppercase) to refer to what I observe to be aspects of their teachings that

Blavatsky and Bailey held in common. It should be noted that followers of

Blavatsky’s teachings do not necessarily consider Bailey’s work to be a legitimate

extension of Blavatsky’s theosophy.

In the Esoteric Philosophy, the term “emotional” can be substituted for the

term “astral” without loss of meaning (as in “the emotional body” or “the

emotional plane of consciousness”). I utilize the word emotional except in direct

quotations where I maintain the original use of the term “astral.” Also, the terms

“occult” and “occultism” are synonymous with the terms “esoteric” and

esotericism.” Finally, the term “ego” (often capitalized) means the individual

10
spiritual self, higher self, or soul in Bailey’s esoteric philosophy. The more

common use of the term “ego” in Western psychology and everyday usage is

equivalent to the term “personality” in Bailey’s system.

Bailey wrote during a time when the use of gender biased language was

standard. With this understanding, in direct quotations I maintain her original

expressions without alteration or the frequent use of “sic.” In my own writing I

endeavor to balance this gender bias by utilizing feminine pronouns when

possible. In my discussion of Habermas’ analyses of mythical worldviews, I

retain his use of the term “primitive” with respect to early tribal societies and

cultures, a usage which was appropriate at that time (Rothberg 1983, 382n99). In

applying the possessive case to Habermas, authors use both the general and

alternative forms (i.e., Habermas’s and Habermas’). I use the latter form except in

direct quotations. All commentaries within brackets are my own.

I employ many quotations in the dissertation for several reasons. First,

given that Bailey’s writings are virtually unknown and that they are claimed to

originate from a transcendent source, I quote her frequently to introduce complex

and abstract concepts accurately and concisely, and to allow the reader to evaluate

directly the level of intelligence and wisdom contained in her writings. Second,

the methodology of the dissertation is hermeneutic and reconstructive as I

interpret, criticize, and expand on Habermas’ theory of rationality in the light of

Bailey’s esoteric philosophy. It is, therefore, also comparative as I attempt to

reveal the esoteric structure underlying Habermas’ arguments and assumptions, as

well as those of his critics. Comparing original texts in close proximity, as I do

11
especially in Chapter 8, helps to identify strong similarities and contrasts between

esoteric and more traditional ideas. Finally, I use many quotations from the

secondary literature on Habermas as concrete examples to support my arguments.

12
CHAPTER 2

BAILEY’S WORLDVIEW

Overview

I begin my introduction to Bailey’s worldview by providing a biographical

account of her life and of her relationship with the Theosophical Society. I then

highlight aspects of her ontology, epistemology, and scheme of seven divine

qualities, or seven ray energies. The chapter concludes with a description of

esotericism as Bailey uses the term.

Biography

Alice La Trobe-Bateman (1880–1949) was born into an aristocratic family

in Manchester, England. In her autobiography (Bailey 1951b) she relates how she,

a “rabid” and “narrow-minded” fundamentalist Christian, became an occult

teacher with world-wide influence. Despite her family’s wealth and privilege,

Bailey recounts that she was extremely miserable as a child and attempted suicide

three times between the ages of five and fifteen. Both of her parents died of

tuberculosis before she was nine years old. Alice and her younger sister were

raised in a disciplined environment by their extended family at various residences

throughout Europe. At the age of fifteen, while Alice was sitting alone reading, a

stranger entered the room, sat down next to her and told her that if she could gain

some self-control and change her disagreeable attitude there was some work

planned that she could do in the world. The uninvited guest left almost

immediately without Alice having spoken a word. Being aware of “adolescent

mysticism and religious hysteria” she never mentioned the episode to anyone and

13
believed the visitor to have been Jesus and herself a modern-day Joan of Arc

(1951b, 34–38). It was approximately twenty years later that she learned his

identity when she saw his picture at the Theosophical Headquarters in California.
5
He was the Master Koot Hoomi, or K. H.

Having completed finishing school, at age 22 Alice became an evangelist

with the British army, at first in Ireland and later in India, and went about

“furiously and fanatically” saving souls and trying to “do good.” During this time

she met and fell in love with an army private, Walter Evans. For propriety in the

context of the well-defined caste system in Great Britain, it was arranged that

Walter would travel to America to receive an education and become a priest of the

Episcopal Church before the couple would be married. After their marriage and

Walter’s ordination the couple settled in California, but as the years went on

Walter became physically abusive and the marriage did not last. In 1915, with

three young daughters to support on her own, Alice became a sardine packer in a

cannery in Pacific Grove. Her faith in fundamentalist Christian theology had been

challenged for many years and she was now completely disillusioned and living in

poverty and despair.

Loneliness led Alice to seek out two English women in the small town

who by happenstance were Theosophists. Alice was thereby introduced to the

writings of H. P. Blavatsky, joined the local Theosophical Lodge, and began

almost simultaneously studying and teaching Theosophy. She moved to

Hollywood in 1917 to work at the Theosophical headquarters (American Section

of the Adyar society), and became the editor of the sectional magazine, The

14
Messenger. In 1919 she there met Foster Bailey who later that year would become

the National Secretary of the Theosophical Society and to whom she would soon

be engaged to marry. Serious problems were developing within the Theosophical

movement, however, and Bailey claims that

it was degenerating into a sectarian group more interested in founding and


sustaining lodges and increasing the membership than in reaching the
general public with the truths of the Ageless Wisdom. (1951b, 157)

According to Bailey the greatest point of tension was created by the domination

of the entire Theosophical Society by the leadership of the elite and exclusive

Esoteric Section which demanded pledges of loyalty from all members and
6
asserted an unquestionable authority.

It was during this time, in November of 1919, that Alice was contacted

(clairaudiently) by the Master Djwhal Khul or D. K., who is commonly referred to


7
as The Tibetan. He requested Alice to collaborate with him telepathically and to

write some books for the general public. She refused immediately, not wanting to

be involved with any form of psychism. The Tibetan replied that she “had a

peculiar gift for the higher telepathy . . . [that] embodied no aspect of the lower

psychism” (Bailey 1951b, 163). After a period of several weeks, she agreed to

engage in the work as an experiment. The result of their efforts was the book
8
Initiation: Human and Solar (1922b). The first few chapters were published in

The Theosophist, the journal produced by the international headquarters of the

Theosophical Society in Adyar, India. Then, Bailey relates, “the usual

theosophical jealousy and reactionary attitude appeared and no more was printed”

(Bailey 1951b, 167).

15
The power struggle between “those who stood for the democratic point of

view and those who stood for spiritual authority and the complete control of the

Theosophical Society by the Esoteric Section” climaxed at the Theosophical

convention of 1920 (Bailey 1951b, 170). The Esoteric Section maintained control

and both Foster and Alice were dismissed from their positions. They soon

relocated in New York and during the next thirty years Bailey wrote seventeen
9
more books for the Tibetan and authored five on her own. As the telepathically

received teachings were published under her name and given the unverifiable

claim as to their true source, I refer to the author of these writings as Bailey unless

context or emphasis requires reference to the Tibetan. Bailey took complete


10
responsibility for founding the Arcane School, and incorporated the non-profit

organization Lucis Trust which oversees the service organizations of World

Goodwill and Triangles, as well as the Lucis Publishing Company and the journal

The Beacon. Her books have been translated into many languages and have never

gone out of print.

Blavatsky’s Influence

Bailey’s esoteric teachings are grounded in the theosophical writings of

H. P. Blavatsky (1831–1891) and their great breadth and depth span the fields of

cosmogony, cosmology, ontology, epistemology, healing, and psychology.

Bailey’s writings integrate Eastern and Western spiritual traditions, particularly

ideas found in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity, and they also provide new

interpretations and ideas consonant with the evolving needs of humanity as

humanity enters into a new age. Bailey characterizes the fundamental effects of

16
this transition in many ways, including: as an increased mental focus within

humanity as reason and rationality supersede emotional devotion and idealism; as

a new emphasis on group progress and group work as opposed to individualism

and separative instincts; and as a shift in attitude from self-interest to self-sacrifice

and the inauguration of the age of “divine service” (1936, 357–75; 1949, 107–36;

1950a, 197).

Blavatsky, together with Henry Steel Olcott, William Quan Judge, and
11
others, founded the Theosophical Society in 1875. Blavatsky’s writings

introduced ideas from Eastern philosophies and other metaphysical traditions to

the public and have had a continuing influence on many scientists, writers, artists,
12
and composers. Her turbulent life and work attracted many critics and charges
13
were made that she was an imposter, fraud, and plagiarist. In 1986, one hundred

years after the “much-publicized Hodgson report,” the Society for Psychical

Research reversed itself and announced that Blavatsky had been “unjustly

condemned” and apologized for having taken so long “to demonstrate that she

wrote truly” (Cranston 1993, xvii–xviii). While her character and at times

questionable actions have long been the target of criticism, comprehensive


14
critiques of her ideas are quite rare.

Bailey clearly acknowledges her debt and gratitude to Blavatsky for

bringing the Light of the East to Europe and America (Bailey 1925, xi). The

introductory postulates of Bailey’s A Treatise on Cosmic Fire contain a reiteration

of the three fundamental postulates found in the Proem to the first volume of

Blavatsky’s occult classic The Secret Doctrine (Blavatsky [1888a] 1977).


17
I. There is one Boundless Immutable Principle: one Absolute Reality
which antecedes all manifested conditioned Being. It is beyond the range
and reach of any human thought or expression . . .
II. There is a basic law called the Law of Periodicity . . .
III. All souls are identical with the Oversoul. (Bailey 1925, 3–7; italics in
the original)

Bailey’s teachings provide an account of the development of


15
Consciousness (human, planetary, and solar ) through well-defined stages, each

culminating in an initiatory process leading into an expanded state of awareness


16
and field of service (1922b). Like Blavatsky, Bailey asserts that humanity as a

whole is developing through major stages, or root-races, “during the great cycle of
17
planetary existence,” or “world period” (Bailey 1922b, 224).

As implied by the second fundamental postulate regarding the Law of

Periodicity, the Esoteric Philosophy is founded upon the Doctrine of Rebirth

which asserts that, with respect to humanity, the evolution of consciousness

occurs over numerous life experiences. This is one of the most important aspects

of Bailey’s teachings and it has profound implications, especially for ethics and

morality. It is a postulate that has a great deal of evidential support and is widely
18
believed in within modern Western societies. The third fundamental postulate

asserts that ultimately there is no individual soul that needs “saving;” only the
19
Universal Soul needs to be revealed and expressed through every human being.

This postulate maintains that all “individuals” are in fact united on “higher” or

“deeper” levels of being.

18
Ontology

Bailey develops a complex exegesis of a standard hierarchical ontology, or


20
Great Chain of Being, common to many religious traditions. This ontology is

based on seven planes or dimensions of Consciousness, and each plane is further

divided into seven subplanes. It is important to note that these seven planes,

ranging from the physical plane to the divine, are merely the seven “subplanes of

the cosmic physical plane, and are therefore phenomenal in nature” (Bailey 1960,

436; see also 1925, 116–21, 655). In defining the concept of “plane” Blavatsky

writes,

As used in Occultism, the term denotes the range or extent of some state
of consciousness, or of the perceptive power of a particular set of senses,
or the action of a particular force, or the state of matter corresponding to
21
any of the above. (Blavatsky [1892] 1918, s.v. “Plane”)

A human being gains experience within these seven planes of

consciousness and evolves through them by means of structures, variously

described as bodies (sharīras—Skt.), vehicles (rūpas—Skt.), or sheaths (koshas—

Skt.), composed of the substance of the seven planes. According to Bailey, the

three primary bodies which sequentially condition a human being in the early

stages of development are the physical, emotional, and mental bodies. It is

important to note that in Bailey’s esoteric philosophy there is a clear distinction

between the physical brain and the more subtle mental body. She also makes an

important distinction between matter and substance. Substance is the underlying

force from which all dense material forms (matter) are built (Bailey 1934, 565;

1960, 105–6), and the terms substance and light are synonymous (Bailey 1954,

19
68). In their totality, these three bodies (physical, emotional, and mental)

constitute what Bailey refers to as the “personality,” the sense of “self,” the jīva
22
(Skt.) or ahamkāra (Skt.) principle as it is known in Hinduism. Through long

“experiment, experience, and expression,” these bodies or forms are gradually

constructed and refined over many cycles of incarnation, as more subtle matter of

the higher subplanes is built into them and the soul and spirit aspects thereby find

greater expression (Bailey 1960, 337).

Following Blavatsky, Bailey asserts a hylozoistic theory of matter which

posits a living substance, composed of a multiplicity of sentient lives


which are continuously swept into expression by the “breath of the divine
Life.” This theory recognises no so-called inorganic matter anywhere in
the universe, and emphasizes the fact that all forms are built up of
23
infinitesimal lives. (Bailey 1936, 149)

She also affirms the identity of Spirit and Matter, and quotes Blavatsky’s

statement, “‘matter is spirit at the lowest point of its cyclic activity’ and ‘spirit is

matter on the seventh plane,’ or the highest” (Bailey 1936, 17). The interplay of

Spirit and Matter produces Consciousness (Bailey 1925, 243–45; 1934, 37) and

Bailey’s entire corpus can be viewed as a treatise on this Trinity which she often

describes as Life-Quality-Appearance, or with respect to a human being, as spirit,

soul, and personality (1936, 14–22).

Epistemology

Bailey suggests that knowledge can be divided into three categories.

Theoretical knowledge includes the commonly accepted, unquestioned, everyday

understanding of the average, untrained mind. Discriminative knowledge is allied

20
with the scientific method and is created through the use of the “the rational,

argumentative, scholastic, and concretising mind” (Bailey 1934, 14). Intuitive

knowledge is apprehended only by the highly trained mind and emanates from the

world of ideas on the buddhic, or intuitive plane that transcends the plane of
24
mind.

Bailey elucidates three primary vehicles that link spirit, soul, and

personality on the plane of mind: the mental permanent atom (the lowest point of
25 26
the spirit aspect, or monad, and the highest aspect of mind); the causal body

(the vehicle of the soul); and the mental unit (the lower, concrete, rational mind).

She asserts that the antahkarana (Skt.), the “thread of light” or “consciousness

thread,” connects these three aspects of mind and is constructed through life
27
experience and the science of meditation. The three aspects of mind are

eventually unified at the fourth initiation (Bailey 1934, 387–88).

The causal body, or egoic lotus, manifests on the higher subplanes of the

mental plane and contains all three aspects of a human being—spirit,

consciousness, and form. Through the form aspect of the three “permanent atoms”

within the causal body (physical, emotional, and mental), qualities are developed

and knowledge is gained in any one life experience (Bailey 1925, 762). The

permanent atoms also store these developed capacities through successive cycles

of incarnation (Bailey 1925, 516).28 The consciousness aspect is developed and

expressed through the nine petals of the egoic lotus. These fiery petals are

arranged in three concentric circles of three petals each; each circle (or triad), and

each petal within them, reflects an aspect of the Trinity which Bailey describes

21
using the terms sacrifice, love, and knowledge (Bailey 1925 816–25). As

consciousness is developed over numerous life experiences, these petals emerge

from an apparently closed bud and increase in vibratory and radiatory activity as

they unfold. The spirit aspect, the “jewel in the lotus,” is enclosed within three

additional petals at the heart of the egoic lotus. More information on this

fundamental aspect of Bailey’s teachings will be introduced later in the

dissertation.

The Seven Rays

One of Bailey’s most important contributions to the Ageless Wisdom

tradition is her presentation and analysis of the seven rays, or seven cosmic
29
energies, briefly mentioned by Blavatsky. This typology of the seven rays is

essentially an extension of the concept of the Trinity. Bailey terms the major three

rays (Will or Power, Love-Wisdom, and Active Intelligence or Adaptability)

Aspects of Divinity (the Trinity) and describes the four minor rays (Harmony

through Conflict, Concrete Knowledge or Science, Devotion or Idealism, and

Ceremonial Order or Magic) as Attributes of Divinity (1936, 33–89). Elucidating

the nature of the seven rays was one of the primary objectives of the Tibetan in

his work with Bailey and information regarding the rays is found in almost every
30
one of her published volumes. Michael Robbins has analyzed and compiled

these teachings in a concise and approachable reference which will be cited, along

with Bailey’s work, to explicate her teaching (Robbins, 1988a, 1988b; see

Appendices B, C, and D for concise descriptions and comparisons of the ray

qualities).

22
Bailey asserts that each of the personality vehicles (the physical,

emotional, and mental bodies), and the personality as a whole, are each governed
31
by a particular ray energy in any one incarnation. Typically, these conditioning

energies change from one life experience to the next in order that all seven

qualities are gradually developed. The soul or causal body is also governed by a

particular ray but it does not alter as frequently as do the rays of the personality

vehicles. The ray of the monad, or spirit aspect of the human being, is on one of

the three major rays and does not vary over the entire cycle of incarnations. In the

second half of the dissertation I extensively utilize “ray analyses” and attempt to

demonstrate in particular that Habermas is deeply imbued with the qualities of the

fifth ray of Concrete Knowledge and Science, most likely on the level of the

personality and/or soul, an influence that has dramatically shaped his life work

and commitment to defending the potentials of rationality.

The following synopsis provides a cursory introduction to the qualities of

the seven rays. The historical figures (real or fictional) listed below are suggested

by Robbins as exemplars of particular ray characteristics. I add other suggested


32
exemplars within parentheses, which also include groups or movements.

Ray One—Will or Power; The Father aspect; Shiva—the Destroyer.

Virtues: will; purpose; strength; courage; steadfastness; power of beneficent

destruction; practical action. Demonstrates especially through politics, leadership,

and the military. Exemplars: Alexander the Great; Julius Caesar; Napoleon
33
Bonaparte; (Friedrich Nietzsche); (Arthur Schopenhauer); Emma Goldman;

Susan B. Anthony; V. I. Lenin; Josef Stalin; Mohandas Gandhi; (Pragmatism).

23
Ray Two—Love-Wisdom; The Son aspect; Vishnu—the Preserver.

Attractive, magnetic energy. Virtues: inclusiveness; empathy; compassion;

patience; sensitivity; serenity. Demonstrates especially through teaching and

healing. Exemplars: The Buddha; Christ; Plato; Albert Schweitzer; Martin Buber;

Elizabeth Barrett Browning; Florence Nightingale; Clara Barton; Roberto

Assagioli; Mother Teresa; the Dalai Lama.

Ray Three—Active Intelligence; The Mother aspect; Brahma—the

Creator. Virtues: creativity; capacity for abstract theorizing; adaptability; the

power to manipulate. Demonstrates especially through philosophy, higher

mathematics, communication, and finance. Exemplars: Aristotle; Voltaire;

Immanuel Kant; Gertrude Stein; Lewis Carol; J. P. Morgan; John D. Rockefeller;

Andrew Carnegie; Bertrand Russell; Albert Einstein; James Joyce.


34
Ray Four—Harmony through Conflict, or Harmony, Beauty, and Art.

Dialectics, rhetoric, irony, mediation, music, drama, aesthetics, literature, poetry.

Virtues: skill in reconciliation; passion; imagination; intuition; capacity for

psychological or spiritual growth through suffering, struggle, and crisis.

Exemplars: Leonardo da Vinci; Ludwig van Beethoven; Johann Wolfgang von

Goethe; Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart; Richard Wagner; (the Romantics); (Søren

Kierkegaard); (Carl Jung); (Bob Dylan); (Theodor Adorno); (Jacques Derrida);

(Jean-François Lyotard).

Ray Five—Concrete Knowledge and Science. Rationality, logic, analysis,

linear thinking. Virtues: knowledge; clarity; precision; objectivity; discrimination;

veracity. Demonstrates especially through science, research, engineering, and

24
technology. Exemplars: Tycho Brahe; Galileo Galilei; Louis Pasteur; Thomas

Alva Edison; George Washington Carver; (Empiricism); (Logical Positivism);

(Jürgen Habermas).

Ray Six—Devotion and Idealism. Virtues: devotion; faith; loyalty;

reverence; zealotry; self-sacrificing; optimism; vision; purity; sincerity;

perfectionism. Demonstrates especially through the religious impulse and


35
patriotism. Exemplars: Jesus (for the esoteric distinction between the Christ and

Jesus see endnote 45); Muhammad; St. Joan of Arc; St. Augustine; Don Quixote;

John Calvin; Mary Baker Eddy; Thomas Paine; Carry A. Nation; William

Jennings Bryan; Martin Luther King; (Mel Gibson); (religious fundamentalism).

Ray Seven—Ceremonial Order or Magic. Organization, design, alchemy,

manifestation, transformation. Virtues: orderliness; appropriateness; keen sense of

rhythm and timing; power to understand and implement the law. Demonstrates

especially through architecture, choreography, law, managerial skills, diplomacy,

and ritual. Exemplars: Paracelsus; Aleister Crowley; Eliphas Levi; William Butler

Yeats; John Marshall; Oliver Wendell Holmes; Emily Post; Frank Lloyd Wright;

Walt Disney; B. F. Skinner; (J. K. Rowling).

The Nature of Esotericism

Bailey uses the term “esoteric” to define an approach that analyzes the

energy structure and dynamics underlying phenomenal forms, an approach that

she warrants by the assertion, “All that exists is, in reality, spirit in manifestation”
36
(1954, 63). A concise overview of Bailey’s esoteric philosophy can be found in

M. Temple Richmond’s demonstration that Bailey’s writings satisfy the six

25
essential characteristics or criteria of Western esotericism as proposed by scholar
37
Antoine Faivre (Richmond 1999). Given the fundamental importance of the

concept of esotericism for this dissertation, I will quote Bailey at some length to

provide an adequate definition.

The basic approach for all who endeavour to grasp esotericism . . . is


to lay the emphasis upon the world of energies and to recognise that
behind all happenings in the world of phenomena (and by that I mean the
three worlds of human evolution [physical, emotional, and mental]) exists
the world of energies; these are of the greatest diversity and complexity,
but all of them move and work under the Law of Cause and Effect . . . He
thus acquires entrance into the world of meaning. Events, circumstances,
happenings and physical phenomena of every kind are simply symbols of
what is occurring in the inner worlds, and it is into these worlds that the
esotericist must enter as far as his perception permits; he will sequentially
discover worlds which will call for his scientific penetration . . .
One point should here be stated: Esotericism is not in any way of a
mystical and vague nature. It is a science—essentially the science of the
soul of all things—and has its own terminology, experiments, deductions
and laws . . .
All true esoteric activity produces light and illumination; it results
in the inherited light of substance being intensified and qualified by the
higher light of the soul . . . If esotericists would accept, in its simplest
form, the pronouncement of modern science that substance and light are
synonymous terms, and would recognise also that the light which they can
bring to bear on substance . . . is equally substantial in nature, a far more
intelligent approach would be made. (1954, 59–68; italics in the
original)

In light of the above definitions, I suggest that not only are many
38
individuals and groups in the physical sciences acting as esotericists, but so also

are many who are working in the social sciences. These efforts would include, for

example, various forms of structuralism and Habermas’ effort to develop a

reconstructive science or formal pragmatics, “a quasi-transcendental analysis that

reconstructs the universal pretheoretical and implicit knowledge that makes

possible practical processes of understanding” (Cooke 1994, 3). This esoteric

26
approach can be inferred as well not only from Habermas’ frequent use of esoteric

concepts such as light, illumination, and intuition, but also from his valorization

of efforts to “penetrate a given context, to burst it open from within and to

transcend it” (Habermas 1984, 120; italics added), and from his statement, “In

principle, I considered worthwhile anything that had a cognitive, structural or

hermeneutical element—anything that would allow one to open up objects from

the inside” (1992a, 98; italics added).

To summarize Bailey’s worldview, I suggest that the greatest strength of

her esoteric philosophy is that it is grounded in the teachings of the world’s great

wisdom traditions and it is presented in an intelligent, systematic, and logical

manner that is capable of satisfying the demands of a modern scientific

rationality. She asserts that all forms manifest cyclically as the trinity of Spirit,

Consciousness, and Matter unfolds divine purpose on all levels of Being. She

explicates a seven-fold typology of divine qualities which serves as a powerful

analytical tool for understanding psychological, cultural, social, and historical

forces. And she elucidates a theoretical and practical science of esotericism which

assists in the comprehension and utilization of the forces and energies underlying

the world of phenomena. I present more detailed descriptions of fundamental

esoteric concepts in the next chapter. These concepts further elucidate Bailey’s

esoteric philosophy and support my critiques of transpersonal authors Wilber,

Washburn, and Ferrer in Chapter 4, and of Habermas in Part 2 of the dissertation.

27
CHAPTER 3

FUNDAMENTAL ESOTERIC CONCEPTS

Overview

Bailey’s teachings present a vision of an evolving Consciousness which is

cosmic in scope. In this chapter I introduce key esoteric concepts that situate

humanity within this creative cosmic process and clarify humanity’s role as an

active participant. These concepts include the initiatory process which leads all

forms of life through sequential stages of development. For humanity, this process

leads some advanced individuals, those who constitute the New Group of World

Servers, to the stage of cooperating with the spiritual Hierarchy of the planet, and

to their eventual transition into this kingdom of God, or kingdom of heaven, as it

is known in the Christian tradition. The concept of thoughtforms and the role of

mind are explored in this creative process, as are the devic and elemental life

forms constituting the matter and substance in which consciousness unfolds. The

nature of the etheric body, which underlies the dense physical body, is introduced

and the concept of magic is presented as the creative technique of manifestation,

of bridging the subjective and objective worlds. Finally, the concepts of glamour

and illusion are identified as the inevitable distortions restricting an individual’s

progress which must be overcome to achieve emancipation from the physical,

emotional, and mental domains of experience.

The Initiatory Process

Bailey asserts that all manifested lives, from an atom to a solar Logos, are

governed by the initiatory process. This developmental similarity on atomic,

28
human, planetary, and solar levels follows from the first characteristic of

esotericism proposed by Faivre, the Principle of Correspondences, or what Bailey

refers to as the Law of Analogy. Briefly stated, this law maintains that “the

microcosm reflects the macrocosm and, therefore, each human being is related to
39
Deity through essential similarity” (1950b, 131; italics in the original). Bailey

presents a considerable amount of her teachings (especially in her major work—A

Treatise on Cosmic Fire [1925]) in terms of solar and planetary forces and

energies to provide a comprehensive understanding and to stimulate the higher

mind and intuition. As this scope is generally not relevant to the dissertation,

however, I will limit my remarks regarding the macrocosm and include them only

in an effort to demonstrate the holistic nature of Bailey’s worldview.

With respect to humanity, Bailey delineates the basic stages of spiritual

endeavor as the Path of Probation, the Path of Discipleship, and the Path of

Initiation. These stages, together constituting The Path of Return, are entered into

consciously and follow the stage of appropriation (or The Path of Outgoing)

wherein one gains experience “blindly and unconsciously” over a period of many
40
lifetimes (Bailey 1942, 76). She offers an etymological definition of initiation in

suggesting that the word connotes the “going into” of a new stage of experience

and development (1942, 12; 1960, 677). In other places she emphasizes a

different perspective and defines initiation not as a new beginning, but rather as “a

culminating moment of achievement” (1960, 337). Both perspectives contain the

idea of initiations as transition points, points of increasing tension and crisis in

“an expanding series of inclusive recognitions” (1960, 341, 662). Other

29
definitions of initiation provided by Bailey include “a graded series of liberations”

(1960, 685) and a process of “successive integrations . . . [and] consequent

expansions of consciousness” (1960, 563). These would appear to be simplistic

and relatively meaningless phrases were it not for the fact that Bailey provides
41
over 1,000 pages of detailed information on various aspects of initiation.

There are several points I would like to emphasize regarding Bailey’s

depiction of the initiatory process:

1. This process occurs on all levels, not simply the human. Both our

planetary and solar Logoi are undergoing similar expansions, as are all

forms of Life in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms.

2. Initiation is a scientific process involving definite changes in structures as

well as in consciousness. Bailey provides detailed information with

respect to how the vehicles of human consciousness (physical, emotional,

mental, and the causal body) are gradually transformed and prepared to

withstand tremendous forces from planetary and solar-systemic levels

during the evolutionary journey toward re-integration with Spirit.

3. The initiatory process is a very long and difficult journey associated with

much pain and suffering. As Bailey states, “Initiation is profoundly

difficult of attainment, and calls for a strenuous discipline of the entire

lower nature, and a life of self-effacing and self-abnegating devotion”

(1922b, viii).

4. Each initiation is conditioned by one of the seven rays and awakens one of

the seven centers (chakras—Skt.) into full activity (1960, 338–40).

30
5. Initiation in the past was undertaken by the individual aspirant but more

recently it has become a group process (1955, 351–52; 1960, 341, 345).

Bailey asserts that not only individuals and groups undergo the process of

initiation but so does humanity as a whole. The human race underwent its first

crisis of initiation as a species during the process of Individualization millions of

years ago in the middle of the third, or Lemurian root-race. This was the moment

when the divine Sons of Mind, Solar Angels, Manasaputras (Skt.), or Mind-born

Sons of Brahma, awakened the spark of Mind or the mental principle within the

human race of the time, which was largely yet merged with the animal kingdom
42
(Barborka 1980, 133–36). Geoffrey A. Barborka, in his comprehensive study of

Blavatsky’s The Secret Doctrine, notes that this major crisis has been presented in

many allegorical forms including the story of the “fall,” narratives of fallen

angels, and the Greek legend of Prometheus who brought the fire of mind to

humanity. Blavatsky states, “‘Living Fire’ was needed, that fire which gives the

human mind its self-perception and self-consciousness, or Manas” ([1888b] 1977,

102; italics in the original). Bailey claims this event was associated with an

intensification of light, heat, and radiance, and brought about within humanity

self-realisation, purpose and a sense of separation from all other individualized

selves (1925, 345). Technically speaking, this was the point at which the human

kingdom came into being, emerging from the animal kingdom, and individual

causal bodies (vehicles for the soul or solar angel) were created from the

substance of the higher mental plane (Bailey 1925, 343–45, 707–32).

31
Bailey asserts that humanity is now passing through the test and crisis of

the second initiation, a process which began with the conditions leading to the

Great War (1914–1945) (1934, 224; 1960, 674). Sacrifice is playing a major role

in this transition (1955, 397) as the emotional nature is being brought under

control by the Soul. Desire is being transmuted into love through this process, a

love whose “transforming, magnetic and radiatory power . . . [will be] essential

for the reconstruction of the world and for the establishment of the new world

order” (1953, 156–57).

With respect to an individual, the first three initiations sequentially

demonstrate the development and relative control of the physical, emotional, and

mental bodies. At the third initiation, after the mental principle has adequately

developed and the nine petals of the egoic lotus have unfolded, the soul and

personality are unified and the sense of duality comes to an end. At the fourth

initiation the central point of electric fire, or spirit, within the causal body, the

“jewel in the lotus,” is revealed. Its blazing light and intense radiatory heat

destroy the form of the causal body, and the solar angel, or soul, withdraws

(Bailey 1922b, 117; 1925, 883). The initiate now functions on the buddhic plane,

the plane of intuition or pure reason, and is increasingly influenced by the monad,

or spirit aspect. At this point the necessity of further human experience comes to

an end (Bailey 1942, 152). At the fifth initiation, the initiate is united with the

monad and stands forth as a Master of wisdom and compassion. Bailey briefly

discusses the higher initiations at which point the Masters are most likely

removed from “the Path of Earth Service” (1960, 718–38).

32
The Spiritual Hierarchy

The Tibetan states that one of his primary objectives is to bring the fact of

the spiritual Hierarchy and their work to public attention. This information is

intended to help counteract distorted teachings given out by others (teachings, for

example, that portray the Masters as infallible and interested in the personal lives

of their disciples) and to reveal the profound unity and synthesis within humanity

(1944, 789; 1949, 36; 1960, 300).


43
The Hierarchy is the heart center of the planetary Logos and its members

“embody and express the love aspect of the divine purpose” (1955, 211). Most

briefly stated, their work is to: (1) develop self-consciousness in all beings;

(2) develop consciousness in the three lower kingdoms (mineral, vegetable, and

animal); (3) to transmit the will of the planetary Logos; and (4) to set an example

to humanity (1922b, 20–27). Bailey emphasizes that the Masters of Wisdom have

themselves passed through every step of the initiatory process (through the fifth

initiation) and therefore they understand the depths of sin, pain, and suffering.

As all else in manifested existence, the Hierarchy exhibits a triadic structure of

will, love, and intelligence, (or atma, buddhi, and manas—Skt.). It is therefore

divided into three departments with three Department Heads. Within each

department work the Masters of Wisdom within one or other of the many spheres

of influence, or ashrams, associated with the seven rays. The first ray Masters

embody the Will aspect of the planetary Logos and work under the direction of

the first Department Head, the Manu (Skt.). The current Manu of our fifth root-

race, the Aryan, is Vaivasvata (Skt.) who

33
is largely concerned with government, with planetary politics, and with the
founding, direction, and dissolution of racial types and forms. To Him is
committed the will and purpose of the Planetary Logos. (Bailey 1922b,
44
42)

The Masters of the second ray ashrams embody the love aspect of the planetary

Logos and work with the second Department Head, the World Teacher, the Christ

as he is known by many, or as the Lord Maitreya (Buddhism) or the Iman Mahdi

(Islam) in other traditions. The Christ transmits energy from the heart center of

the planetary Logos. The third department is led by the Mahachohan (Skt.), the

Lord of Civilization, who embodies the intelligence aspect and transmits energies

from the throat center of the planetary Logos. Under the Mahachohan work the
45
Masters of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh rays. Initiates, disciples,

and aspirants (or “probationary disciples”) work subjectively within a particular

ashram according to the ray conditioning their soul and at a level of conscious
46
participation allowed by their point in evolution. They act as mediating agents

as their work and service in the three worlds transmit the will, love, and

intelligence of the Hierarchy to humanity.

The New Group of World Servers

Bailey describes The New Group of World Servers as those persons who

have achieved some degree of soul contact and control, and the consequent ability
47
to cooperate with the planetary Hierarchy. The concept of this group is

significant as it represents the “revolutionary agent” who will carry forward the

work of enlightenment and emancipation in the New Age. As noted in the second

half of this dissertation, one of Habermas’ great weaknesses is his inability to

34
provide a concept for any type of “revolutionary change agent” to replace the

earlier Marxist idea of the proletariat as the historic force of political and social
48
transformation.

This group is constituted of women and men of goodwill who are

recognized only by their intellect, selflessness, and inclusiveness. They serve as

mediators between Hierarchy and humanity, and are found in all parts of the

world, in all races, professions, and religions. As a group, they work subjectively

and do not belong to any outer organization, impose any dogmas, or emphasize

any doctrines or authorities. I suggest these women and men are forming what

Rothberg has referred to as an “expanded civic movement . . . or supra-national


49
civic identity,” a group united by the qualities of intelligent love and oriented

toward selfless service. I also suggest these individuals, working subjectively as a

group, form part of the “cultural creatives” identified by Paul Ray and Sherry

Anderson. Their research suggests there is a new culture in the making, a culture

created by people who are spiritually and socially active in manifesting new

values that transcend traditional values based primarily on self-interest (Ray and

Anderson, 2000).

Bailey states that this group was stimulated in its formation by the

Hierarchy several hundred years ago in order to accelerate the mental unfoldment

of humanity and to assist in the achievement of unity among the various political,

religious, and racial groupings. One of the primary outcomes of this effort has

been the emphasis on group work. No longer are the achievements in any field

due solely to the efforts of a great individual but more likely are the result of a

35
50
group endeavor as can be seen in the example Bailey gives of philosophy, or in

the examples of Nobel Prize laureates who are increasingly acknowledged as a

group. Another important outcome of this Hierarchical effort has been the

development of a

wide-spread philanthropic enterprise, and the growth of the sense of


responsibility for one’s brother, which was totally unknown in the year
1500. Movements such as the Red Cross, educational foundations,
hospitals, and the present economic relief measures to be found in every
51
country are its exoteric manifestations. (Bailey 1934, 407)

Essentially The New Group of World Servers are the recipients, attuned to

the higher levels of mind and to the soul, of the divine purpose of the planetary

Logos as it is transmitted via the Hierarchy (whether registered consciously or

subconsciously). They in turn formulate their ideas, insights, and “discoveries”

into thoughtforms and transmit them to all of humanity. I suggest that these ideas

of group work, group understanding, and subjective group (i.e., Soul)

consciousness underlie today’s academic emphasis on intersubjectivity and efforts


52
to transcend the narrow perspective of the isolated subject. Bailey claims that

the work of the New Group of World Servers will lead to “a universal public

consciousness” that recognises the fundamental unity underlying diverse

manifestations, and to “an international synthesis which will be characterised by


53
political and national unselfishness” (1934, 408).

The Creation of Thoughtforms

The Esoteric Philosophy is essentially concerned with Creative Activity,

whether of a solar Logos, a planetary Logos, or of a human being. It is through

this creative activity on the plane of mind that forms are brought into
36
manifestation, the inherent consciousness is developed, and the imprisoned Life

aspect is liberated as the forms are ultimately destroyed. Bailey provides a concise

description of the three functions of every thoughtform, whether Cosmic or

human. These are: (1) to respond to vibration; (2) to provide a body for an idea;

and (3) to carry out a specific purpose (1925, 552). Together these three

statements reflect the three logoic aspects—consciousness, form, and purpose.

With respect to a human being it should be understood that the three vehicles of

personality manifestation, the physical body, the emotional body, and the lower

mind, are all thoughtform creations of the soul and respond to its vibration. The

second statement, that thoughtforms serve to provide a dense body for an idea,

expresses “the basic principle of incarnation . . . of activity, even of existence

itself” (1925, 556). The process can also be interpreted as an electrical

phenomenon as the positive impulse or idea is clothed in negative substance

(1925, 560). While this dissertation will focus on thoughtform creation within the

human kingdom it is important to note that the three subhuman kingdoms, the

mineral, vegetable, and animal, are themselves manifested thoughtforms of some


54
great Being and they “all have body, vitality, quality and purpose” (1925, 564).

Bailey makes an important distinction between ideas and thoughtforms.

Ideas emerge from the Universal Mind and exist on the intuitional or buddhic
55
plane. Thoughtforms are the reflected (and typically distorted) manifestations of

ideas and exist on the plane of lower mind where they can be consciously
56
registered and have an influence on humanity. It is essentially the task of highly

developed individuals who have, to some degree, unified the three aspects of

37
mind, who have achieved some measure of soul contact, and who are therefore

capable of working subjectively as a group in the light of the intuition, to contact

the world of ideas and to transform ideas into concrete thoughtforms that are
57
capable of guiding the evolution of humanity.

The relevance and importance of thoughtforms, their relation to ideas, and

their role in the evolution of human consciousness can be seen in their

correspondences with the modern concepts of “episteme” and “meme.” Michel

Foucault uses the word “episteme”

for the anonymous, historically emergent structures of thought [i.e.,


thoughtforms], which set conditions and boundaries for what can be
thought or said within a certain social and intellectual setting . . . The word
has, however, been used for sets of ideas which can be described simply as
a predominant theory or ideology. (Mautner 1997, s.v. “Episteme;” italics
added)

Biologist Richard Dawkins has introduced the concept of “meme” as “a unit of

cultural replication [i.e., thoughtform] . . . in analogy with the concept of a gene,

the unit of biological replication” (Mautner 1997, s.v. “Meme;” Dawkins 1976).

A new field of memetics has been created in response to this idea, with meme-

theorists adopting a materialistic approach which hypothesizes that memes evolve


58
by natural selection (Heylighen and Chielens 2008). It is also interesting to note

that Walter Benjamin, an early associate of the Frankfurt School, worked on an


59
esoteric theory of ideas.

Devic and Elemental Lives

To provide an esoteric understanding of matter and consciousness, Bailey

explicates the nature of devas (Skt.—literally “shining ones”) and elementals,

38
those living, fiery forces or lives that constitute not only what we think of as the

material world but more subtle worlds as well (1925, 550–1026). It should again

be emphasized that the three lower planes of human experience and evolution

(physical, emotional, and mental) are all planes of dense physical matter from the

perspective of our solar Logos, while the higher four planes of our system,

(buddhic, atmic, monadic, and divine) are constituted of etheric matter or

substance, and that these seven planes together comprise the seven subplanes of

the cosmic physical plane (Bailey 1950b, 155, 189). For the purposes of this

dissertation, devic and elemental lives will generally refer to these lives as they

constitute the physical, emotional, and mental planes of human evolution (1925,

65–66, 615, 665–66, 887). Bailey states that all of these fiery lives are ruled by

Agni (Skt.), the Lord of Fire, one of the central deities of the Vedas (1925, 65–
60 61
66), and that they exist in innumerable grades and differentiations. It might be

easier to accept these premises as a working hypothesis if one considers, or

imagines, that the subatomic particles known to modern science are “fiery lives,”

permeated with Life and Consciousness. While it may be useful to think of these

fiery lives as the infinitesimal “builders” of all forms on subatomic levels, the

concept of size as we understand it can be misleading, as the major planes of our


62
solar system are said to be great Devic Lives (Bailey 1925, 625–35).

There is a fundamental distinction to be made between devic and

elemental lives. Devic lives are the greater Builders and are aspects of positive

force. They are found on the evolutionary arc and participate consciously in the

building of forms. Elemental lives, on the other hand, are known as the lesser

39
Builders and are aspects of negative force on the involutionary arc and respond

passively or unconsciously to the incoming energies from greater lives (1925,

612, 887). According to Bailey, this essential duality of positive and negative

forces underlies the great mystery of electricity and concerns all creative work,

whether of the Macrocosm, a solar Logos, or of the Microcosm, a human being

(1925, 612). Bailey makes this teaching practical by relating this creative process

to one’s daily life practice.

Man in the three worlds, consciously or unconsciously, recapitulates the


logoic process, and becomes a creator, working in substance through the
factor of his positive energy. He wills, he thinks, he speaks, and thought-
forms eventuate. Atomic substance is attracted to the enunciator. The tiny
lives which compose that substance are forced (through the energy of the
thinker), into forms, which are themselves active, vitalised and powerful.
What man builds is either a beneficent or a maleficent creation according
to the underlying desire, motive, or purpose . . . Men should remember
that through the power of their thoughts and their spoken words they
definitely produce effects upon other human beings functioning on the
three planes of human evolution and upon the entire animal kingdom.
63
(1925, 888–89)

The subject of the devic kingdom and the work of the elementals is of

particular importance in understanding Bailey’s theory of mind and the

construction of thoughtforms, as devic and elemental lives constitute the


64
substance of the mental plane as well as of the physical. Such insights also
65
provide an important approach to understanding the “mind-body problem.”

While these teachings regarding the devic and elemental kingdoms may appear to

be mythical or metaphysical speculation, they are logical and coherent, and they

have empirical support as well. In her biography of Blavatsky, Sylvia Cranston

40
recognizes prominent scientists who suggest that matter is living, intelligent
66
substance.

Much of humanity has long acknowledged the existence of devas, or

“nature spirits.” Perhaps the best known and well documented case of contact

with the devic kingdom is related in the experiences of members of the Findhorn

community in Scotland during the 1960s (Maclean 1980). The stupendous,

seemingly miraculous, growth of vegetables and flowers “on barren, sandy soil”

was the result of a claimed telepathic communication with the devas of the

vegetable kingdom. According to the research of Alexandra H. M. Nagel,

That everything on earth might have (something like) “soul stuff,” as is


believed in many cultures, is a rather alien concept in current Western
society, but it makes sense to some clairvoyants, who often claim to see
the auras of humans and animals, and sometimes plants, flowers, and
trees . . .
According to these writers, when nature intelligences are
channeled, a whole range of entities can come through, as all elements of
nature appear to be available. All plant and animal species, all woods,
mountains, caves, rivers and rock formations seem to have a “soul,” a
consciousness of their own. Often the unit of consciousness of plant and
tree species is called a “deva,” a Sanskrit word for “shining one,” used to
describe what is understood as an embodiment of creative intelligence that
functions in an architectural and organizational kind of mode . . .
Everything on earth, even everything in the cosmos is alive,
moving, changing, growing, evolving; everything, in one way or another,
is conscious and aware. (Nagel 1997, 221–22, 225)

Such ideas are completely consonant with the Esoteric Philosophy.

Bailey claims that her extensive teachings on the devic kingdom are

necessary because humanity will need to work with devic substance in an

intelligent manner as the evolutionary process unfolds. She emphasizes that there

is much potential danger associated with this work, a wise and cautious approach

41
67
is necessary, and much information must be withheld at this time as well. There

are two primary dangers inherent in the occult work of manipulating devic

substance. The first is that devic and elemental forces and energies can be

destructive as well as constructive regardless of one’s intentions, for one is

literally working with fire. The second danger lies in the fact that occult or

“magical” work with the creative forces of nature can be motivated by evil
68
intentions as well as good.

The Etheric Body

According to Vedantic and other traditions, an etheric or energy field

underlies the world of dense physical form. Bailey states that the primary

functions of the human etheric body are to serve as the receiver, assimilator, and

distributor of prana (Skt.—literally “breath of life”), both solar and planetary


69
(1925, 97). She variously describes prana as the “vital principle,” “life force,” or

“active radiatory heat” that animates all, “the driving force of the evolving form”

(1925, 45, 77, 102, 833). She asserts that information regarding the etheric body

will be of very real interest for future generations as its study will: (1) provide

scientists and those of the medical profession with “a fuller comprehension of the
70
laws of matter and the laws of health;” (2) reveal the stimulating and

constructive effects of solar pranic emanations; and (3) inform abstract thinkers

and metaphysicians of the nature of logoic manifestation and of objectivity (1925,

77–79).

Bailey describes the human etheric body as “a network, permeated with

fire, or as a web, animated with golden light,” and she identifies it with the
42
71
“golden bowl” of Ecclesiastes (1925, 79). It is the prānamaya-kosha (Skt.) or

linga-śarīra (Skt.) of Hinduism, “the model or pattern for the building of the

physical body” (Barborka 1980, 120–21). Bailey asserts that humanity is ready to

comprehend the nature of the etheric body.

Science, as we know, is fast reaching the point where it will be forced to


admit the fact of the etheric body, because the difficulties of refusing to
acknowledge it, will be far more insuperable than an admission of its
existence . . . before long (perhaps within this century) the FACT of the
etheric body and its basic function will be established past all controversy,
and the whole aim of preventive and curative medicine will shift to a
higher level. All we can do here is to give simply, and in a condensed
form, a few facts which may hasten the day of recognition, and further the
interest of the true investigator. (Bailey 1925, 89; see also 1934, 331–32)

The idea that an etheric or energy body underlies the world of dense

physical form may yet appear to many as metaphysical speculation. However,

there are several thoughts that should be kept in mind before making such a

judgment.

1. Modern science does not clearly understand the nature of matter.

2. “Ordinary matter” constitutes only four percent of the matter density in the

universe. The rest is almost entirely made up of “dark energy” and “dark

matter.” Of that other 96%, “apart from the properties just mentioned, we

know absolutely nothing” (Smolin 2006, 16).

3. Mass, energy, and light are related through Einstein’s famous equation

E=mc2.

4. Perhaps the most famous failed experiment to date, the Michelson-Morley

experiment of 1887, seemingly disproved the existence of a “luminiferous

aether.” It was based, however, on the simplistic assumption that light

43
must have a material medium through which it is carried (the aether), just

as water and sound waves were known to have.

5. The concept of an ether is taking on new forms as some studies are


72
investigating the relationship of dark matter to the ether.

A major step in advancing our understanding of the etheric body has been

achieved by Rupert Sheldrake in his work on morphic fields (1989, 1995). His

“hypothesis of formative causation proposes that morphogenetic [etheric] fields

play a causal role in the development and maintenance of the forms of systems at

all levels of complexity” (Sheldrake 1995, 71; italics in the original). Cranston

notes that Sheldrake is a member of the Theosophical Society and that while he

acknowledges possible similarities with aspects of occult systems, he insists that

his hypothesis of causative formation is strictly scientific and that it must be

judged by empirical testing (Cranston 1993, 440–44).

Sheldrake’s contribution to revealing the relationships between energy,

matter, and form in a new light has encountered hubristic and hostile resistance.

John Maddox, the senior editor of the scientific journal Nature, ignited a great

deal of controversy and debate when he published an editorial entitled, “A Book

for Burning?” He claimed that

Sheldrake’s argument is an exercise in pseudo-science. Many readers will


be left with the impression that Sheldrake has succeeded in finding a place
for magic within scientific discussion—and this, indeed, may have been a
part of the objective of writing such a book (Maddox, 1981).

Maddox elaborated on his criticisms of Sheldrake’s work in a 1994 BBC

television documentary titled “Heretics.”

44
Sheldrake’s is not a scientific theory. Sheldrake is putting forward magic
instead of science, and that can be condemned, in exactly the language that
73
the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same reasons: it is heresy.

Quite surprisingly, Maddox seems to be unconcerned by the fact that Galileo’s

heretical point of view eventually prevailed over existing dogma. Similarly,

Robert Carroll has alleged that Sheldrake “is one of a growing horde [sic] of

‘alternative’ scientists . . . [who] has clearly abandoned conventional science in


74
favor of magical thinking.”

I suggest that these criticisms reveal more about the “conventional” or

dogmatic beliefs of those who maintain them than about the merits of their

arguments. In discussing “a new science of consciousness,” Alan B. Wallace

describes the conventional principles of scientific materialism which such critics

more comfortably, and perhaps often unthinkingly, embrace. These principles

embody

a number of sacrosanct theories and a priori statements, namely the


principles of objectivism, monism, universalism, reductionism, the closure
principle, and physicalism. While these metaphysical principles of
scientific materialism are not matters of scientific fact, they are commonly
presented . . . as if they were on a par with genuine scientific theories that
are subject to empirical verification or refutation. (Wallace 2000, 21)

Bailey notes in several places that scientists will play a prominent role in

developing new forms of understanding in the New Age. However, she asserts

that their work will no longer be based on the principles of what Wallace

describes as “scientific materialism.”

Like all else at this time, science itself is in process of transformation, and
little as it is realized by many, their work with what they call matter, and
their investigations of the atom are entering into a new field. In this field
the older techniques and mechanisms will gradually be discarded and a

45
new approach and a different fundamental concept as to the nature of
matter will mark the new age . . . The truth of certain basic premises of the
Ageless Wisdom will be demonstrated. (Bailey 1934, 331–32)

The Nature of Magical Work

Those who adhere to the commonly accepted, yet metaphysical principles

of scientific materialism fail to appreciate the role of magic as the science of

manifestation or form building, or simply as the domain of the super-natural

which will in time yield to scientific understanding. In discussing the work of


75
scientists as one group of ten “seed groups” Bailey states,

The work of the seventh group, which is in the field of science, is closely
allied to that of the seventh ray and is one with a most practical physical
purpose. It is strictly magical in its technique, and this technique is
intended to produce a synthesis between the three aspects of divinity upon
76
the physical plane [i.e., purpose, quality, form]. (1957, 56)

Some scientific thinkers do embrace the concept of magic. Edward Witten of the

Institute for Advanced Study In Theoretical Physics and the founder of M-theory,

a conjectured fundamental theory underlying the dominant string theory in

particle physics, has suggested that the “M” could stand for “mystery” or “magic”
77
(Duff 1998). And the “Third Law” of Arthur C. Clarke, who in 1945 first

proposed the idea of a geostationary satellite orbit for high-speed global

communication, states, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is


78
indistinguishable from magic” (Clarke 1984, 29, 36).

According to Bailey, magic is essentially the science of manifestation

which unites the three divine aspects—purpose, consciousness, and form—on all

levels, macrocosmic and microcosmic. Regarding the origins of the Universe,

46
Bailey emphasizes the creative, magical aspect of sound, vibration, and speech in
79
the process of manifestation.

If we study the various cosmologies of the world, we shall see that the
process of creation was carried on by the means of sound or speech or the
Word. We have it in the Christian Bible, “In the beginning was the Word,
and the Word was God. All things were made by Him and without Him
80
was not anything made that was made.” Thus, according to the Christian
teaching, the worlds were made by the Word of God.
In the Hindu Scriptures we will find that the Lord Vishnu, Who
stands for the second Person of the Trinity, is called “The Voice.” He is
the great Singer Who has built the worlds and the universe by His song.
He is the Revealer of the thought of God Who has constructed the
universe of solar systems . . .
Through speech a thought is evoked and becomes present; it is
brought out of abstraction and out of a nebulous condition and
materialised upon the physical plane, producing (could we but see it)
something very definite on etheric levels. Objective manifestation is
produced, for “Things are that which the Word makes them in naming
81
them.” Speech is literally a great magical force, and the adepts or white
magicians, through knowledge of the forces and power of silence and of
82
speech, can produce effects upon the physical plane. (1925, 979–81)

On the microcosmic level, Bailey introduces fifteen rules for white


83
magic, which are essentially the rules whereby a disciple is trained for creative

activity in the physical world by aligning with, and manifesting the powers of the
84
soul (Bailey 1925, 963–1026; 1934). She provides a general definition of “white

magic” as a process whereby a disciple, having achieved an alignment between

the soul, mind, emotions, and physical brain, is able to ascertain the purpose of

the soul, create a thoughtform through the manipulation of mental matter, vitalize
85
the thoughtform with emotional desire, and concretize it in the physical world.

She states the basic law governing all magical work as “energy follows thought”

(1934, 249), and she summarizes the process by stating, “Every externalized idea

47
is, therefore, possessed of form, animated by desire, and created by the power of

the mind” (1934, 458).

Bailey asserts that the practical application of these teachings on white

magic, or thoughtform creation, is of the utmost importance for all intelligent

thinkers motivated by goodwill.

There is no life so circumscribed and no person so situated who cannot


begin to work intelligently and to build thought-forms under law and with
understanding. There is no day in any man’s life, particularly if he is an
aspirant or a disciple, when a man cannot work in mental matter, control
his use of thought, watch the effect of his mental processes on those he
86
contacts, and so handle his “chitta” or mind-stuff (as Patanjali calls it )
that he becomes more and more useful. (Bailey 1934, 280–81)

Up until this point of self-imposed training, most people perform magic

unconsciously, bringing about events in their world through vague mental effort

and mostly emotional desire. The fact that most inchoate thoughtforms lack the
87
power to manifest is a most fortunate thing.

Glamour and Illusion

Bailey explicates how distortions inevitably arise, not from external

factors, but from the inherent human condition within the physical, emotional, and

mental domains. The essential task confronting each individual is to emancipate

herself from these distortions over numerous life experiences. Distortions on these

three planes are classified by Bailey as: maya (Skt.—literally “deception” or

“appearance”) on the physical plane; glamour on the emotional plane; and illusion

on the mental plane. She also uses the term glamour to refer to these distortions

collectively, and her context usually clearly indicates whether she is referring

specifically to glamour on the emotional plane or, more broadly, to forms of

48
distortion on any or all of the three planes of human experience and growth.

Overcoming these distortions and progressively achieving a relative freedom on

each of these planes (physical, emotional, and mental) corresponds with

sequentially achieving each of the first three initiations. Liberation from any

restricted dimension is gradually achieved by utilizing the energies of the next

higher level of consciousness in order to control, integrate, and transcend the

forces within the lower dimension (aufheben/aufgehoben—Gm.). For example,

Bailey asserts that most people at this time are focused on the emotional plane and

are dominated by forces such as desire, fear, and hatred. Such glamours are

overcome by the sustained and controlled use of the rational mind. Similarly,

distortions (illusions) that arise on the mental plane can be dispelled through the

“pure reason” or intuitive understanding of the soul. Bailey is careful to

acknowledge the non-linear nature of this process.

You must bear in mind that none of these three stages are, in reality,
divided off from each other by clear lines of demarcation, nor do they
follow each other in a clear sequence. They proceed with much
overlapping and often with a partial simultaneity. (1950a, 103)

Regarding the nature of the three forms of glamour, Bailey states that

maya is primarily a problem concerning the etheric body and the forces pouring

through the seven centers (chakras) (1950a, 85). Glamour (in the specific sense) is

emotional in character and is exceedingly potent at this time because most of

humanity is focused on the emotional plane. Illusion is concerned fundamentally

with mental processes. The minority of people (“the strongly mental types”) who

are immersed in illusion are prone to misunderstand and misinterpret ideas and

thoughtforms and are unable to clearly distinguish between the two (Bailey
49
1950a, 26, 29; italics in the original). The relevance of Bailey’s teachings on the

nature of illusion is highlighted in Benjamin R. Barber’s claim that illusion is the

most serious problem in the United States today. In an article on the “treacherous

epistemological deficit that is putting democracy at risk” he writes,

Daniel Boorstin, a former Librarian of Congress, wrote, “We risk being


the first people in history to have been able to make their illusions so
vivid, so persuasive, so ‘realistic’ that they can live in them. We are the
most illusioned people on earth.”
The tyranny most corrosive to democracy is not the tyranny of
money but the tyranny of illusion. As Chris Hedges says in his book
Empire of Illusion, “A populace deprived of the ability to separate lies
from truth, that has become hostage to the fictional semblance of reality
put forth by pseudo-events, is no longer capable of sustaining a free
society.” (Barber 2010)

In her discussion of illusion Bailey is not concerned primarily with the

idea that most people are focused emotionally and suffer an “epistemological

deficit.” Rather, she is more concerned with explicating a specific understanding

of illusion as the difficulties encountered as one attempts to interpret a newly

contacted idea and bring it into concrete manifestation on the plane of lower mind

and within the physical brain consciousness. Illusion in this narrower sense is

only applicable, therefore, to the minority of individuals who are capable of

working on the plane of higher mind and who are capable of contacting ideas. Of

this particular stage on the Path of Return Bailey writes,

The mind is still self-centred, the contact feeble and the alignment
[between soul, mind, and brain] uncertain. The ideas are therefore only
dimly sensed . . . The idea, or ideas, which he has contacted are, if he
could realise, only a fragment of a far greater Whole. That which he brings
to their interpretation is inadequate. The idea which has emerged in his
consciousness, through the partial awakening of his intuition, will be
distorted in its descent to his brain consciousness in several ways. That
which he brings to the materialising of the idea and to its transformation

50
into a practical working scheme is as yet wholly unsuitable. The
equipment does not suffice for accuracy. (1950a, 55)

She outlines the general stages in the descent of an idea from the plane of the

intuition to brain consciousness, as well as the seven ways in which illusion

usually demonstrates: through wrong perception of an idea; wrong interpretation;

wrong appropriation; wrong direction; wrong integration; wrong embodiment;

and finally, through the wrong application of ideas (Bailey 1950a, 55–65).

When these three glamours (maya, glamour, and illusion) are focused in

an integrated personality at a relatively advanced stage of development on the

Path of Return, the term “Dweller on the Threshold” applies. The Dweller “is in

reality a vitalised thoughtform—embodying mental force, astral [emotional] force

and vital [etheric] energy” (Bailey 1950a, 27). According to Bailey, the Dweller is

essentially oneself which, on the final stages of the Path, must ultimately be

confronted and “occultly obliterated” (or less drastically phrased, integrated and

synthesized) before the soul can assume complete control (1950a, 269–71).

Three major theses for the second half of the dissertation arise from this

model of glamour and illusion. The first is that Habermas virtually ignores

distortions on the emotional plane. According to Bailey, emotional distortions are

the primary source of the problems confronting humanity, since most of humanity

is yet focused in the emotional body, not in the rational mind. The second thesis is

that despite Habermas’ great intellect, or perhaps more accurately because of it,

he is enmeshed in distortions and illusions on the mental plane, as are all great

thinkers as they labor to clarify ideas. The third thesis is that Bailey’s teachings

on maya, glamour, and illusion, and on techniques for their overcoming, represent
51
an advanced form of the critical theory associated with the Frankfurt School.

Critical theory has been defined as “a reflective theory which gives agents a kind

of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation” (Geuss

1981, 2). I suggest that Bailey’s theory of distortions and their overcoming

constitutes a critical theory and form of knowledge most definitely “productive of

enlightenment and emancipation,” a critical theory adequate for the needs of

humanity in a New Age.

As I attempt to show in the remainder of this dissertation, the esoteric

concepts introduced in this chapter have important relevance for academic debates

and they possess great practical usefulness and potential influence. These

concepts represent important aspects of a cosmic scheme of interpenetrating and

interdependent forces and energies. Within this scheme, humanity is not depicted

as the most advanced form of intelligent life in the universe, or even on our

planet. Rather, humanity is portrayed as a center of evolving consciousness which

has ever been guided by the spiritual Hierarchy. For much of humanity today,

developing the rational mind and the capacity to work with thoughtforms

constitutes the immediate stage of participating in this cosmic process. Others are

entering the next stage in the unfoldment of consciousness and are working to

transcend the confines of the lower mental plane. As they learn to contact and

work with ideas on the higher levels of mind, and as they develop the intuition, or

pure reason, these individuals participate in a process of decentration which

reveals a group consciousness and the relative omniscience of the Soul. (The

theme of decentration will be explored in Chapter 11.) As a group, they are able

52
to comprehend a greater planetary purpose beyond a limited self-interest and their

actions demonstrate increasingly the Soul qualities of sacrifice and service.

Bailey’s extensive teachings on the nature of mind provide an important

alternative to strictly materialistic explanations of consciousness (e.g., Dennett

1991). They also invite a reconsideration of the “Theory of Ideas,” a traditional

school of philosophic thought that has been supplanted by “the linguistic turn”

(Hacking 1990). Her teachings on devic and elemental lives offer a

comprehensive account of the forces and energies that constitute not only what we

think of as matter, but of the mind as well, and they offer an important approach

to understanding the mind-body problem that has confronted philosophy for

centuries. Her explication of the etheric body and etheric forces also contributes

to the scientific understanding of matter. This level of matter/energy may well be

the next domain unveiled by science. Bringing forth this knowledge and

understanding will have profound implications, for healing and medicine

especially. It will also again reveal the dynamic nature of the scientific process

and the limitations of maintaining rigid and authoritative views.

Magic is understood typically as an outmoded belief system of primal

cultures. Bailey, however, develops the concept as the scientific process of

manifestation, a process based on the energies of light, sound, and vibration. This

esoteric science, which integrates purpose, consciousness, and form, will

characterize more and more the actions of those who are soul-influenced as the

New Age unfolds. It also invites a new perspective on debates concerning

rationality that focus on the magical beliefs of primal cultures, an esoteric

53
perspective and analysis explored in Chapter10. A final example of the potential

influence and practical usefulness of the esoteric concepts introduced in this

chapter is the development of an esoteric critical theory that will emerge from

Bailey’s teachings on glamour and illusion, and from her presentation of

techniques for their overcoming.

54
CHAPTER 4

BAILEY AND TRANSPERSONAL THEORISTS

The Transpersonal Movement

The transpersonal psychology movement developed from the pioneering


88
works of William James, C. G. Jung, and Abraham Maslow among others.

Transpersonal researchers and theorists often integrate ideas from Eastern and

Western traditions as well as from indigenous cultures and are concerned with

exploring the nature of mystical experiences, higher states of consciousness, and


89
aspects of spirituality that transcend the known limits of the individual ego. The

transpersonal psychology movement took on its modern form in the 1960s and

became firmly established with the publication of the Journal of Transpersonal

Psychology beginning in 1969. The transpersonal field ignited with the

publication of Ken Wilber’s first book (1977) which became exceedingly popular

and introduced and integrated ideas of Eastern religion, psychotherapy, and

psychology. His prodigious writings over the following three decades are

characterized by an enormous breadth of knowledge and the ability to weave


90
many complex ideas into new theoretical formulations.

Michael Washburn was one of the first transpersonal theorists to challenge

Wilber’s perceived dominance (1990, 1995). He contrasts Wilber’s “structural-

hierarchical” model with his own “dynamic-dialectical” or “spiraling to

integration” model that is largely based on Jung’s depth psychology. Jorge Ferrer

has entered the field of transpersonal studies by claiming that in the West, our

religious and spiritual understanding is today in a state of confusion, chaos, and

55
apparent anarchy (Ferrer 2002, xvii). He contends that some of the foundational

assumptions of transpersonal theory have actually distorted our understanding and

that a reconstruction is required to engender a participatory approach to human

spirituality. Donald Rothberg is another leader in the field of transpersonal studies

and a Habermasian scholar. He is not concerned with developing his own

particular theory of human development as are the three theorists mentioned

above. He focuses instead on clarifying and harmonizing perspectives, and on

asking critical questions within the community of scholars. He has observed that

“existing models of individual human development, whether transpersonal or

more conventional, are typically highly simplistic” (Rothberg 1999, 44).


91
Neither Wilber, Washburn, nor Ferrer have referenced Bailey’s work

and only rarely have they briefly acknowledged Blavatsky’s influence on

transpersonal psychology (Ferrer 2002, 84; Wilber 1996, 86; 2000a, 200). They

each do, however, acknowledge the significant influence of Roberto Assagioli

(Assagioli 1981) on transpersonal psychology without, however, apparently

understanding the close connection between Assagioli and Bailey (Ferrer 2002, 6;
92
Rothberg 1999, 42; Washburn 1995, 2; Wilber 1997, 267). As noted in Chapter

1, Wilber, Washburn, and Ferrer have been critical of ideas that could possibly be

associated with Bailey’s esoteric philosophy. In this chapter I address their

critiques of “wisdom traditions,” “structural-hierarchical models of human

development,” and “universal, all-encompassing philosophies” respectively, and

attempt to demonstrate that their criticisms do not apply to Bailey’s teachings.

56
Wilber’s Three “Problems” with Wisdom Traditions

Wilber claims that the teachings of the ancients, philosophers, saints and

sages, generally referred to as the wisdom traditions, were produced by

experiences of human consciousness (2006, 218; 233–34; 270) and that these

teachings, such as those describing the Great Chain of Being (a hierarchical

ontology), therefore suffer from monological awareness, or “the philosophy of

consciousness,” and are “caught in various types of illusion and ignorance.” He

therefore concludes that the wisdom traditions have been “rejected,” “trashed,”

“slammed,” “savaged,” and “crucified” by the “onslaught” of modernity and

postmodernity (Wilber 2006). Wilber insists that only something like his own

Integral Methodological Pluralism, with its broader perspective, can save the

wisdom traditions. He undertakes this task by identifying three major problems

with the wisdom traditions and by providing three simple solutions, taking us

from the premodern Great Chain of Being to postmodernity in three easy steps

(2006, 213–29).

Wilber’s understanding of the wisdom traditions is premised on the claim

that they

were, in the last analysis, interpretive frameworks that the sages gave to
their spiritual experiences. These schemes, such as the Great Chain, were
interpretations of living experiences—they were not some sort of fixed,
rigid, ontological grids that are true for all eternity. (2006, 218; italics in
the original)

There are at least two problems with this claim. First, Wilber is implying that all

spiritual teachings are constructions that have derived from temporarily expanded

states of human consciousness achieved through meditative or mystical

57
experiences (2006, 233–34). By limiting the wisdom traditions to interpreted

expressions of human experience, Wilber is implicitly denying the doctrine of


93
Avatāras (Skt.), the role of Bodhisattvas, the existence of the Masters of

Wisdom (the planetary Hierarchy), and any other Beings who may have traversed

and transcended the stages of human development and who have played a role in

teaching and aiding humanity through attained wisdom and knowledge, through
94
having achieved an advanced stage of development or initiation. A second

problem with the above claim is that Wilber makes the typically erroneous

assertion that all portrayals of the Great Chain of Being represent it as “fixed,

rigid, ontological grids that are true for all eternity” (2006, 218). Bailey certainly

never makes this assertion and rather claims that “Everything in the solar system

is in a state of flux, as is everything in the universe” (1925, 1030).

There is a constant changing and shifting, an endless interweaving and


interlocking, and a ceaseless ebb and flow, in the dramatic interplay of the
forces that stand for the dual synthesis of Spirit and matter. There is a
constant rotation in the Rays and planes [i.e., The Great Chain of Being],
in their relative importance from the standpoint of time, which is the
standpoint most closely associated with us. (Bailey 1925, 598; italics
added)

Wilber begins the task of updating of the wisdom traditions by providing a

general account of the process of involution that precedes evolution (2006, 213–

18). He describes involution as the process whereby Spirit takes on successive

sheaths (or koshas—Skt.), which Wilber defines as levels/structures (2006, 213),

and becomes “infolded” or “deposited” in increasingly dense levels until finally,

within the lowest level of matter, the higher levels of “being and knowing” are

least conscious of their Source and are “sleeping,” existing in a “potential” state

58
95
(2006, 216). Wilber concludes that although this “brilliant and beautiful”

interpretive scheme is not necessarily wrong, many aspects of it “are deeply,

desperately, achingly in need of updating and revising” in light of modern and


96
postmodern understandings (2006, 218, 233).

Problem One

Wilber states that the first problem with the interpretive frameworks of the

wisdom traditions that requires updating is found in “any” of their representative

diagrams. He reasons that all levels of reality “higher than matter are indeed meta-

physical” because they are shown as higher rungs on a ladder, the lowest rung

being “matter” (2006, 219; italics in the original). He concludes that “premodern

sages” took metaphysical realities to be above nature, not within it; beyond

matter, not interior to it (2006, 222). Wilber claims that “part of the problem”

raised by such depictions is that the relations between “spiritual realities” and

“material realities” are revealed to be discontinuous and therefore unrealizable to

the sages of pre-modernity. Their teachings are therefore deficient because they

did not have available to them “the finite facts that modern science has

discovered” (2006, 219). He goes on to claim that if Plotinus or Shankara were

alive today, we “can bet” that they would devote part of their teachings to

describing the relations of spiritual realities to modern scientific facts, such as the
97
“relation of the nadis [Skt.] to neurotransmitters” (2006, 219).

There are several difficulties with the way Wilber has formulated this

initial “problem.” First, by looking at a two-dimensional diagram and concluding

that “matter is the lowest rung of the ladder” and is therefore “lower” than and

59
separate from higher levels, is to mistakenly “confuse a map with the territory,”

an error that Wilber has written about at length (1977, 41–49, 230). Bailey

cautions against making such errors when she observes,

We must remember that in using all such words as “upwards” and


“downwards,” “higher” and “lower,” we are talking symbolically. One of
the first things a mystic learns is that dimensions do not exist in
consciousness, and that the “within” and “without,” the “higher” and the
“lower” are only figures of speech, by which certain ideas are conveyed as
to realized conditions of awareness.” (1932, 130–31)

It is surprising that after providing a rather traditional account of the involutionary

process and acknowledging that “Great Chain theorists” affirm (as does the

Esoteric Philosophy) that matter is a form of Spirit (Wilber 2006, 217, 232),

Wilber goes on to assert that one can “see” that the higher levels are separate

from matter, they are “above” and “beyond” matter, and they merely “imprint” or

“leave footprints” in matter (2006, 219, 222). They are “completely trans-

material (metaphysical, supernatural),” “ontologically pre-existing and separable

from matter,” “hovering metaphysically beyond matter” (Wilber 2003a; italics in

the original). Wilber is apparently claiming that the wisdom traditions as a whole

have somehow separated Spirit from matter but he does not provide a single

reference to support such a claim, a claim which is entirely at odds with the

Esoteric Philosophy.

A second difficulty is that Wilber assumes spiritual teachings must include

the latest findings of science. Bailey provides an enormous amount of teachings

on the nature and evolution of consciousness and feels little need to present the

“finite facts” of modern science. She acknowledges that her focus is on

60
explicating the “inner relations” and notes that “science can handle with skill and
98
insight the evolution of form” (1936, 234–37).

A third difficulty with Wilber’s position is that he seems to be completely

unaware that Bailey has made extensive references to the relationship between the
99
nadis and the nervous system. A final difficulty with his formulation of the first

“problem” is that Wilber is discontent with the specificity of information provided

by “sages.” This discontent ignores at least three points. First, Bailey clearly

acknowledges that she is writing for the general public and for “the reader who

has no academic or scientific training” (1936, 221). Second, the omniscience of

the Masters of Wisdom is relative; they have only achieved the next level of

consciousness beyond the human and are themselves yet subject to illusion

(Bailey 1960, 600). Bailey writes that the Masters “are oft amused at the

importance which the disciples and aspirants of the world attach to Them, and at

the manner in which They are overestimated” (1942, 219). She also emphasizes

that knowledge “is associated with the factual world” and should not be confused
100
with intelligence (Bailey 1955, 279). The Masters do not necessarily know

“mundane details” but when such information is required they can rely on the

diverse knowledge of their disciples. Third, the Masters do not indiscriminately

provide the full extent of their knowledge to the general public as Wilber seems to
101
expect. To access the deeper teachings and knowledge of the “sages” that

cannot be found printed in books, one must develop the capacities and earn the

right to subjectively enter, on the higher planes of mind, a Master’s Ashram.

61
The solution that Wilber suggests for the first problem of there being an

apparent discontinuity between “spiritual realities” and “material realities” is to

move “‘matter’ off the bottom rung of existence” and to recognize it as the

“exterior form of all of the [other] levels” (2006, 219–22). He offers the insight

that “matter is not lower, with consciousness higher, but matter and consciousness

are the exterior and interior of every occasion” (2006, 220). The problem with this

“solution” to a pseudo-problem is that the Esoteric Philosophy (and perhaps most

of the “wisdom traditions”) never made this separative claim. It is one of the

fundamental tenets of the Esoteric Philosophy that all material forms are
102
permeated with Life and Consciousness. What Wilber takes to be a profound
103
insight, which he repeats at least a dozen times in ten pages (2006, 219–29),

the idea that “matter and consciousness are the exterior and interior of every

Occasion,” is simply a definition of esotericism and is the fundamental basis of

Bailey’s teaching.

Problem Two

For Wilber, resolving the first “problem” of the wisdom traditions by

recognizing that matter is the exterior form of all levels instead of the bottom

rung, constitutes Step One of easily updating the wisdom traditions. This step

essentially “adds” the insights of modern science, of which the saints and sages of

the past were supposedly unaware, to the teachings of the wisdom traditions

(2006, 46, 226). Step Two involves adding another major insight to the

“speculative metaphysics” of the premodern sages—the insights of post-

modernity, or the cultural and social networks of which the ancients were also

62
presumably unaware. According to Wilber these insights have been provided by

“postmodern poststructuralism” and “systems theory” (2006, 223–24). The

“problem” that necessitated this addition is Wilber’s contention that “much of

what the ancient sages took as metaphysical absolutes are actually culturally

molded and conditioned” (2006, 223, 233–34).

The problem with Wilber’s second “problem” is that the Esoteric

Philosophy does not present “metaphysical absolutes.” Bailey goes to extreme

lengths in qualifying the partial and provisional nature of any presentation of the

Ageless Wisdom teachings. For example, she writes that the value of her

teachings is not to be found in the detail of their expression for two reasons:

Language . . . hides truth and does not reveal it . . . ; [And] there are many
types of minds . . . no approach to such abstruse subjects as the nature of
spirit and soul could have a general definition and submit themselves to a
universal terminology. (1934, 32–33)

Wilber assumes that the teachings of the ancients are their best efforts to

completely convey their “experiences” without apparently considering the

possibility that they may be merely exoteric hints, couched in the language of a
104
particular culture in a particular time, of deeper, inexpressible esoteric truths.

Another problem with Wilber’s assertions is that Bailey is very much

aware of the larger perspective Wilber claims is missing from most wisdom

traditions. Although Bailey provides a wealth of information regarding matter and

substance she is little concerned with the many concrete facts and discoveries of
105
modern science. Wilber’s concerns with cultural and social perspectives are

addressed by Bailey in her discussions of culture and civilization respectively.

63
She maintains that human culture is essentially the subjective aspect of the outer

forms of human civilization in a collective sense, just as the soul is the subjective

aspect of an individual (1948, 129; 1954, 38–59; 1957, 32–33). Writing as she did

during the greatest crises of the 20th century, Bailey also provides a great deal of

insight into both the esoteric and exoteric aspects, the causes and the effects, of

world conditions, ideologies, and political systems (1936, 379–407; 1942, 629–

751; 1947; 1949; 1957). And, as noted, Bailey is well aware of the limitations of

language. Regarding Wilber’s claim that the wisdom traditions are limited by

culturally conditioned and relative forms of knowledge, I suggest that there is a

clear and important distinction between constructing thoughtforms on the lower

mental plane while immersed in culturally conditioned worldviews, and

presenting ideas originating on the buddhic plane, via the higher mental plane,

within culturally specific conditions and times. The processes, limitations, and

errors associated with the former at the level of the personality and lower mind

are of an entirely different nature than those experienced by the adepts and sages

who have accessed the higher mind and intuition and who have thereby produced

the wisdom teachings. Wilber apparently fails to appreciate this distinction.

Problem Three

Wilber bases the third problem with the wisdom traditions on the

erroneous assumptions contained in his first “problem,” namely the supposed


106
“premodern lack of clarity about the role of matter” and his contention that the

ancients held subtle energies to be “supernatural,” i.e., disconnected from matter


107
(2006, 227). In light of these alleged deficiencies of the wisdom traditions, he

64
summarizes the third problem in the form of two questions, “How can we

reinterpret in a more adequate fashion the relation of subtle energies to gross

material forms?” or, “Put simply, because matter is not the bottom of all levels but

the exterior of all levels, where does subtle energy fit into this scheme?” (2006,

227).

Wilber begins to formulate an answer with the suggestion that mass and

energy (“gross,” “subtle,” and “causal” energy) “represent some of the exterior

forms” of individuals and systems (2006, 226–27; italics in the original). The fact

that he classifies subtle and causal energies as exterior and classifies the body as
108
interior, brings into question the logic of his distinction between interior and
109
exterior. Wilber’s “solution” to the third “problem” takes the form of three

hypotheses:

(1) Increasing evolution brings increasing complexity of gross form . . . ;


(2) Increasing complexity of form . . . is correlated with increasing
interior consciousness . . . ; and (3) increasing complexity of gross form is
correlated with increasing subtlety of energies. (2006, 227–28; italics in
the original)

These three hypotheses basically state that physical forms evolve and that

simultaneously there is a corresponding increase in both consciousness and

“subtlety” of energies. Wilber claims to provide “a long academic treatment” of

this third hypothesis on his website (2003a, 2003b). He asserts that the wisdom

traditions had a profound understanding of the relationships between

consciousness and subtle energies, but in their ignorance of modern science they

did not understand gross matter and its relations to both consciousness and subtle

65
energies. Therefore, they maintained erroneously that gross matter was separate

from consciousness and subtle energies.

Wilber’s solution to this “problem” is to correlate the spectrum of subtle

energies (“physical, etheric, astral, psychic, etc.”) with the corresponding

complexifications of gross forms revealed by modern science. He claims that this

correlation of subtle energy fields with the evolutionary record of gross forms

creates a “natural history of subtle energies.” The best he can do, however, is to

correlate subtle energies with gross forms, and to simply state that “the increasing

degree of gross complexity is accompanied by subtler and subtler corresponding

. . . energy patterns” (2006, 228; italics added). Wilber fails to provide any

detailed understanding of, or information regarding, the nature of “subtle


110
energies.” He simply draws diagrams (2006, 228; 2003a, Figure 7) depicting

subtle energies “accompanying” gross forms and states that these energy fields

somehow “emerge in intimate correlation with complexifications of matter”

(2003a). His simplistic statement that these energy forces “accompany” and

“surround” their associated material bodies does not explain the relations between

forms and subtle energies “in a more adequate fashion” than the wisdom

traditions (or the Esoteric Philosophy) which was his initial intent (2006, 227).

Wilber’s attempt to salvage or update the wisdom traditions in three easy

steps has little relevance for Bailey’s esoteric philosophy. His first solution is

simply a restated definition of esotericism. His second solution is unnecessary as

Bailey is well aware of all four of Wilber’s “quadrants,” of the limitations of

language, of the problem of cultural conditioning, and of methods that help to

66
overcome such conditioning. And finally, Wilber’s third solution of simply

asserting “hypothetical correlations” between subtle energies and dense forms

fails to demonstrate a more adequate reinterpretation of subtle energies than the

comprehensive theory outlined by Bailey.

Washburn’s Criticisms of Structural-Hierarchical Models

The Dynamic-Dialectical Model

Michael Washburn was among the first within the field of transpersonal

psychology to directly challenge Wilber’s model (Washburn 1990; 1994; 1995)

and he has been perhaps Wilber’s most persistent critic (Washburn 1996a; 1996b;

2003a). In contrast to Wilber’s “structural-hierarchical” paradigm, Washburn

introduces a “dynamic-dialectical” model of human development based on the


111
depth-psychology of Carl Jung. The distinctive feature of his model is that it is

based on a bipolar concept of the psyche. The psyche is comprised of both the ego

and the Dynamic Ground from which the ego emerges and to which it may

eventually return. At birth the ego is initially embedded in the non-egoic pole,

“the seat of” the Dynamic Ground, variously characterized by Washburn as the

Jungian collective unconscious, libido, psychic energy, and spirit (1995, 11–13).

A dialectical interplay ensues between these two poles through specific stages as

the ego emerges from the Ground, represses aspects of the Ground, asserts its

independence as the mental or Cartesian ego, has a “tendency” to “undergo a

reversal” (“regression in the service of transcendence”) and be drawn back toward

the Ground. The ego may then experience a second reversal (“descent gives way

to ascent” [1995, 21]), or redemptive transformation, and may possibly be united

67
or synthesized with the Ground, a result characterized by Washburn as
112
“regeneration in spirit.” While Washburn has more recently acknowledged at
113
least five major transpersonal perspectives, his work in large part has been to

contrast what he perceives to be the two major paradigms within transpersonal

psychology—his own dynamic-dialectical model and Wilber’s structural-

hierarchical model (Washburn 1994, xii–xiv; 1995, 2).

I suggest that Washburn’s model, like Jung’s upon which it is based, is

largely an expression of fourth ray qualities. Jung describes his mode of discourse

and contrasts it with the rational, linear, quantifying mode characteristic of the

fifth ray, as follows:

It is possible to describe this content in rational, scientific language, but in


this way one entirely fails to express its living character. Therefore, in
describing the living processes of the psyche, I deliberately and
consciously give preference to a dramatic, mythological way of thinking
and speaking, because this is not only more expressive but also more exact
than an abstract scientific terminology, which is wont to toy with the
notion that its theoretic formulations may one fine day be resolved into
114
algebraic equations. (Jung 1948, 13)

In this declaration of his own preference (or subjective influence), Jung is not

only clearly distinguishing between fourth and fifth ray characteristics. His tone

also reflects an historical indignation toward the hegemony of scientific, rational


115
thought. I also suggest that: (1) Washburn’s project derives subjectively from a

deeply ingrained fourth ray influence (most likely the fourth ray governs his

mental body, personality, and/or soul); (2) his own model therefore reflects a
116
fourth ray perspective; and (3) his critiques of Wilber’s model consistently

highlight the contrast between fourth and fifth ray approaches and serve to combat

68
the perceived hegemony of linear, rational thought. In essence, I suggest that

Washburn is a fourth ray champion who valorizes qualities such as conflict,

polarity, struggle, and eventual synthesis. In this role he also confronts the

presumed legitimacy of fifth ray dominance, presented here in the form of

Wilber’s psychological model of human development and its emphasis on

rational, linear, hierarchical, logical, organized, and systematic structures.

In a more recent writing Washburn has emphasized that the dynamic-

dialectical and the structural-hierarchical perspectives “are not inherently in

conflict.” He adds, “the implication for transpersonal psychology is clear: an

inclusive ‘both-and’ position with respect to . . . [these] perspectives is needed”

(2003a, 7). Neither model in itself is correct. Rather, Washburn asserts, they each

constitute a perspective that can be brought together in a “productive

collaboration” or utilized independently in a “fruitful division of labor” (2003b,

1). Bailey’s esoteric philosophy concurs and affirms the importance of both

perspectives as the fourth and the fifth rays (together with the first ray) generally
117
govern the mental bodies of most human beings (Bailey 1942, 288).

The esoteric model of human development shares many similarities with

Wilber’s structural-hierarchical model, including the idea of the progressive

development of consciousness through specific, universal stages, or what

Washburn refers to as a “hierarchically oriented metaphysics” grounded in

Buddhist and Vedantic traditions (1995, 9). However, Bailey’s esoteric

philosophy also supports most of Washburn’s criticisms directed against this

model in the problematic form presented by Wilber. Specifically, Washburn has

69
identified several points of disagreement between his model and Wilber’s with

respect to the three major stages of human development common to all

transpersonal theories—preegoic, egoic, and transegoic—and the two transition

stages that separate them (Washburn 1995, 36–45). These points of disagreement

serve as the starting point for my analysis of Washburn’s criticisms of structural-

hierarchical models.

Comparisons with Wilber’s Model

Washburn identifies the main point of disagreement between Wilber’s

model and his own as a difference in emphasis on the importance of the role of

conflict in the early stages of human development. He asserts that conflict, both

intrapsychic and interpersonal, is unavoidable whereas the structural-hierarchical

model focuses at this stage on the development of basic structures, especially

cognitive, and gives little importance to the tension and conflict experienced by

the child. In full agreement with Washburn, Bailey clearly articulates the role of
118
conflict throughout the stages of human development. Bailey states that the

fourth ray of Harmony Through Conflict finds its main expression through the

human kingdom (1936, 162), and that this ray energy “gives us the clue to the

whole problem of pain and of suffering” (1942, 288). She further asserts that “it is

the dominant energy, always exerting pressure upon the fourth [i.e., human]

kingdom” and that this energy “is responsible for the strains and stresses, and for

the initial conflict between the major pair of opposites to which we give the name
119
of spirit-matter” (1960, 603–6).

70
Another major distinction between Washburn’s and Wilber’s models

revolves around the question as to whether potentials, developed in earlier stages,

are lost or retained. For example, the dynamic-dialectical model maintains that

psychic resources associated with the primary caregiver as the Great Mother are

repressed into the unconscious, or “lost,” when confronted with the oedipal father.

This is a positive development, a choice that leads the child onto a path of

independence and avoids the only alternative, regression. In contrast, the

structural-hierarchical model maintains that in this transition period, as the child

begins to develop an ego structure, psychic resources are not repressed but rather

are incorporated and restructured, thereby serving as an accessible foundation for

the development of new structures of consciousness.

The esoteric point of view embraces both perspectives. The “basic

structures of consciousness” (with respect to the structural-hierarchical model),

the physical, emotional, and lower mental bodies, are gradually constructed over
120
many life experiences. It is not a rigid, stair-step ascension completed in a

single life experience. Describing succeeding initiations in terms of light and of

succeeding points of tension and fusion, Bailey states that

each initiation dims the light already acquired and used and then
immerses the initiate in a higher light . . . [which eventually] becomes for
him a normal field of experience and activity . . . This involves no leaving
of the former field of activity in which he has worked and lived; it simply
means that new fields of responsibility and of opportunity confront him
because he is—through his own effort—able to see more light, to walk in
a greater light, to prove more adequately than heretofore his own
capacities within the greatly increased area of possibility. (1960, 539–40;
italics added)

71
This quote includes the perspectives of both Washburn and Wilber. It supports the

structural-hierarchical model in stating that no field of activity is left behind or

“lost.” On the other hand it supports the dynamic-dialectical model in asserting

that an achieved stage of consciousness, or process of “light recognition and

utilization” (Bailey 1960, 538), is “dimmed” (but not lost). This “dimming” of the

light already acquired refers to a process of polarization as explained below.

Washburn claims that the repression of previously experienced resources

is “warranted” and that “the ego legitimately chooses repression” over the only

apparent alternative—regression (1995, 40). The esoteric perspective supports


121
Washburn’s concept of “legitimate repression” with the idea of polarization.

Bailey asserts that the individual becomes “polarized” at each new major stage of

development, dimming the light of previous stages so as to be able to focus on,


122
and to develop, the newly entered stage of consciousness.

Initiation is essentially a penetration into areas of the divine consciousness


which are not within the normal field of consciousness of a human being
. . . This leads eventually to the stabilization of his consciousness in the
new field of awareness, so that he becomes polarised there and can work
intelligently from the attained point of awareness and of conscious vision.
Once he can do this and is aware of the new energies with which he may
now work, he enters the stage wherein he may precipitate these energies
into the three worlds of human service . . . These three stages of conscious
activity—penetration, polarisation and precipitation—are definite and
recognised stages in every initiation. (Bailey 1955, 431; italics in the
original)

In addressing another point of disagreement, Washburn contends that

“once ego development is complete, then, primal repression ceases being

necessary and loses its developmental warrant” (1995, 40). The ego may then

embark on a regressive return to preegoic potentials, a regression in the service of

72
transcendence, to reconnect with the powers of the Ground prior to a final ascent,
123
or regeneration in spirit. Esoterically, this process is understood as personality

integration. Once the mental body has been sufficiently developed through a

period of mental polarization over many life experiences, it is first necessary to

integrate the personality vehicles (physical, emotional, and mental) prior to

integration or fusion with the soul at the third initiation. Bailey states that it is the

soul that enters “a process of reversal” (1953, 514) and, like Washburn,

emphasizes the difficulties of this stage.

All these factors produce violent conflict upon the Probationary Path,
which increases as the man steps upon the Path of Discipleship . . . his
experience fluctuates between extremes . . . all the three deaths—physical,
astral, and mental—are carried out with a steadily awakening state of
awareness. (Bailey 1953, 514)

Similarly, Washburn describes the stage of regression as “a period of withdrawal

or ‘dying to the world’” characterized by interrelating existential difficulties such

as “alienation, meaninglessness, nothingness, guilt, anxiety, and despair”

(Washburn 1995, 172).

The final distinction Washburn makes between his model and Wilber’s

revolves around the question as to whether, at the transegoic stage, there are two

selves or none. He asserts that the mental or Cartesian ego, the small-s self, is “a

real thing . . . that must be transformed and reunited with a large-S self (the power
124
of Ground as spirit)” (Washburn 1995, 43). The structural-hierarchical model,

on the other hand, takes a position similar to the Hindu and Buddhist traditions in

asserting that the mental ego or small-s self is an illusion that needs to be

dispelled (Washburn 1995, 35, 44). Washburn is distinguishing between the idea

73
of a partial self and an illusory self. Bailey’s teachings regarding the transegoic

stage are complex and, depending on context and perspective, can be seen as
125
endorsing both points of view.

Comparisons with Bailey’s Model

The similarities between Washburn’s and Bailey’s models are often quite

remarkable. One of Bailey’s many descriptions of evolutionary stages presages

several of Washburn’s major concepts. This is shown in the following examples

(where Bailey’s stage descriptions are noted first and Washburn’s concepts are

shown in parentheses):

1. early identification with the form nature (egoic embedment in Ground);

2. a period wherein duality and a lack of control are realized (the ego is torn

between the Great Mother and the oedipal father);

3. a period wherein an assertion of self-control takes place (primal

repression);

4. a period wherein personality alignment is achieved (the Cartesian or

mental ego achieves independence);

5. an experience of “divine attraction,” reorientation, and entering upon the

Path of Return (the ego undergoes a “spiraling” movement, a return

toward Ground);

6. eventual uniting of personality and soul as personality becomes

“complementary” to the soul and an “instrument” for service (“the two

poles of the psyche become a true two-in-one;” the egoic pole becomes

74
“an instrument of the nonegoic pole”) (Bailey 1942, 342–45; Washburn

1995, 11–27).

However, it is important to note that the union depicted by Washburn of the ego

and Ground following a “spiraling movement” of the ego, is only the union of

personality and soul in Bailey’s esoteric philosophy. Bailey goes to great lengths

in explicating the second half of transpersonal development, the union of

personality and Spirit.

To conclude this brief analysis of Washburn’s criticisms of structural-

hierarchical models of human development, I suggest that, on the one hand, he

has provided an important interpretation of the Ageless Wisdom tradition,

particularly from the perspective of the fourth ray of Harmony though Conflict, as

one of his most important contributions has been his emphasis on duality and the

bipolar nature of development. Bailey encourages students to “constantly bear in

mind the essential duality of manifestation itself; the negative and positive poles

present within the consciousness of every form” (Bailey 1960, 541). Also of great
126
importance is Washburn’s focus on the bimodal structure of consciousness

wherein the mental ego switches back and forth between an active and receptive

mode (Washburn 1995, 14–15; 2003a, 48). This idea clearly reflects Bailey’s

teachings on polarity, although she describes this alternation of positive and

negative states as occurring at each stage of development, not just the mental
127
(Bailey 1922b, 13; 1957, 32; 1960, 541).

On the other hand, there are several major differences between

Washburn’s model and Bailey’s. In limiting his model to a single life experience,

75
Washburn is forced to admit “for reasons unknown . . . few people experience

spiritual awakenings of great power, and even fewer undergo spiritual


128
transformation all the way to transegoic integration” (1995, 7). Apparently

only prophets, saints, and mystical illuminati are able to somehow realize their

true identity with the ultimate Ground or deeper Self within one brief life

experience (1995, 244–48). Yet Washburn asserts in an egalitarian and simplistic

way that this opportunity is open to anyone, “the only requirement for attaining

integrated existence is that one have an ego that is strong enough to reunite with

the Ground” (1995, 248). He further asserts that this integration depends on

mysterious possibilities “so extraordinary that they must be considered special

gifts conferred upon only a few” (Washburn 1995, 244, 248).

This passivity of the ego, which can only hope to be “conferred” with

“special gifts” that will somehow provide the necessary strength to reunite with

the Ground, is a theme found throughout Washburn’s model. For example, in

explicating the bimodal nature of the ego, he asserts that the ego can either be

active within its own sphere of independence and exhibit typical ego functions

(reality testing, self-control, reflective self-awareness, operational cognition)

(1995, 11), or it can “surrender itself” to the nonegoic potentials of the Ground

(Spirit). By “opening itself” to nonegoic potentials, the ego “allows itself to be

affected in a variety of ways . . . [including being] entranced, absorbed, infused,

inflated, or inspired by the power of the Dynamic Ground” (Washburn 1995, 15).

The ego is seemingly helpless and at the mercy of the powerful Ground, even up

to the final stages of integration where “irrespective of human will, it is spiritual

76
power itself that elects the times and places at which it will bare itself to the ego”
129
(Washburn 1995, 248). This passivity of the mental ego in relation to the

Ground is in stark contrast to Bailey’s portrayal of the personality who steps onto

the Path of Discipleship and begins the most arduous task of developing the will
130
aspect and fulfilling the individual requirements for personality integration and

alignment with the soul—discrimination, detachment, and dispassion (Bailey

1944, 3).

A final major distinction I will note is that Washburn’s model is

geocentric. He claims that it is not possible to know whether the power of the

Ground is more than an intrapsychic human phenomena or whether it may also be

“an extrapsychic (metaphysical, cosmic) noumenon” (1995, 130). Yet he asserts

the following materialist assumption without any supporting evidence or theory,

an assumption which is totally at odds with Bailey’s esoteric philosophy:

Thus nurtured by both earth and heaven, we are mortals rather than
immortals, part of the growing, flourishing, and dying life of the earth. We
are natives of the earth who live for a short time on this planet rather than
immortal souls temporarily assigned here as a test for an otherworldly
131
destiny. (Washburn 2003a, 195)

Ferrer’s Criticisms of Transpersonal Psychology

Ferrer relates how his initial attraction to transpersonal studies shifted

dramatically as he became increasingly aware of serious, crippling assumptions

inherent in most presentations (Ferrer 2002, xvii–xxi; 9–12). His research project

transformed into a radical critique, deconstruction, and reconstruction, or

revisioning, of existing theory. Ferrer deconstructs three major interrelated

presuppositions which he finds permeating most transpersonal scholarship. He

77
identifies these presuppositions as: experientialism; inner empiricism; and

perennialism. I briefly analyze Ferrer’s critiques of these limiting assumptions

and attempt to demonstrate that, like Wilber’s and Washburn’s critiques of

“wisdom traditions” and “structural-hierarchical models” respectively, his

criticisms have little relevance for Bailey’s esoteric philosophy.

The Experiential Vision of Human Spirituality

Ferrer identifies the first problematic presupposition that underlies most

transpersonal theory as experientialism. He defines experientialism as the

“understanding of transpersonal and spiritual phenomena in terms of inner

individual experiences,” a limited, distorted, and reductionistic intrapersonal

perspective that ignores wider relationships to others and to the world (2002, 2).

Ferrer contends that experientialism exhibits four primary distortions, both

conceptual and practical. Conceptually, experientialism encourages both subtle

Cartesianism and intrasubjective reductionism. Practically, it promotes spiritual

narcissism and integrative arrestment.

Before looking at these distortions it is important to note both the central

role and ambiguity of “transpersonal and spiritual phenomena” or “transpersonal

experiences” in Ferrer’s analysis. He observes that such experiences, phenomena,

and states of consciousness have been the primary focus of transpersonal research

since its beginnings in the late 1960s (2002, 16). Transpersonal phenomena are

exceedingly difficult to define, however, and Ferrer actually valorizes the


132
heuristic value of this ambiguity (2002, 194–95n2). These phenomena are

apparently events that simply “emerge,” (Ferrer 2002, 116, 131) or that people

78
“have” (2002, 16), or “undergo” (2002, 187). Bailey makes a clear distinction

between “secondary occultism” that is concerned with phenomena, and the deeper

esoteric truths which they veil. She asserts that most spiritual phenomena are

merely physical effects of underlying causes and that attention given to such

phenomena has distorted esoteric truths (Bailey 1951b, 275).

Whereas Bailey’s entire corpus is focused on elucidating primary esoteric

teachings and practices that cultivate wisdom, liberating discrimination, and right

human relations, both Ferrer’s critique of existing transpersonal theory and his

own “participatory vision” are limited to the realm of secondary occultism as they

are focused almost entirely on transpersonal and spiritual phenomena (although

his participatory vision endeavors to formulate a wider perspective wherein

transpersonal phenomena are reconceptualized as multilocal participatory events)


133
(2002, 117–21). He leaves to future transpersonal research the “crucial task” of

developing “conceptual frameworks and practical injunctions that support the

translation of transient spiritual states into the stable transformation of self,

relationships, and the world” (2002, 37). I suggest Bailey has already

accomplished this task in great breadth and depth with her focus on primary

occultism and the deeper esoteric causes of outer phenomena. I also suggest that

the development of even more frameworks and injunctions by transpersonal

theorists, working for the most part on the plane of lower mind and despite their

dedication and sincere aspirations, will only contribute further to the spiritual

“confusion” that Ferrer contends characterizes our modern times (2002, xviii),

and will only produce more “highly simplistic” models as noted by Rothberg.

79
Like Washburn, what Ferrer does offer at this time is a passive spirituality
134
wherein participants simply “surrender to the Mystery” and “naturally and

spontaneously participate in the deeper, sacred dimensions of life” (Ferrer 2002,

xviii; italics added).

Returning to Ferrer’s critique of experientialism, I focus primarily on his

presentation of intrasubjective reductionism which he defines as “the reduction of

spiritual and transpersonal phenomena to individual inner experiences” (2002,

23; italics in the original). It is important to note that both his definition and his

resulting analysis are limited to the realm of phenomena. Therefore, while his

critique of intrasubjective reductionism may have application to some

transpersonal research efforts, it has virtually nothing to do with Bailey’s esoteric

teachings.

Following Weber and Habermas, Ferrer asserts that this narrowing

categorization of spiritual phenomena as subjective experiences has resulted

largely from the differentiation of a unified premodern worldview into three

spheres—the objective, social, and subjective worlds. With the rise of modernity,

religious beliefs were no longer collectively held but were instead consigned to
135
the private, subjective or interior, domain of the individual. Ferrer also points

out the anthropocentric nature of approaches that limit spiritual phenomena within

human domains of being and awareness, and he argues that transpersonal theorists

need to “extend . . . [their] vision of Spirit to the entire cosmos” (2002, 28).

In referencing an argument by Rothberg, Ferrer asserts that the

experiential tendency to confine spirituality to an inner quest

80
forces the individual to search for meaning and spiritual realization
essentially within, putting a tremendous pressure on the structures of
human subjectivity that can lead to a variety of excesses and distortions.
136
(Ferrer 2002, 26)

Ferrer fails, however, to thematize any explicit structures of human subjectivity

beyond his general references to the “body, heart, soul, and vital energies” (2002,

3, 121, 168–69). He also fails to provide any criteria for determining what

constitutes “tremendous pressure,” apparently preferring a gentler, more “natural”

and “spontaneous” approach to spiritual realization. In his argument, Rothberg

refers to “limited human forms,” portraying the human condition as seemingly

isolated and static. Apparently, neither he nor Ferrer considers the possibility that

with the rise of modernity and with the increasing development of both

intelligence and the ability to subjectively penetrate all dimensions, the individual

may be better able to control forces and to integrate “the energies of existence.”

Certainly there are great dangers of imbalance and insanity within human

subjectivity as Rothberg observes, especially for advanced, creative individuals

who are pushing the limits of human experience and expression. Esoterically

understood, this is because the structures and processes of subjectivity,

particularly the mind, are essentially expressions of Fire (Bailey 1925, 221–
137
1226). It is one of Bailey’s great accomplishments to have addressed these
138
dangers and psychological problems in depth (1942, 401–625), presaging the

inclusion of “Spiritual Emergencies” as a category in the DSM-IV published by

the American Psychiatric Association (1994).

81
In contrast to these calls for a dispersion of the “enormous” and

“tremendous” pressures on subjectivity, Bailey asserts that the initiatory process

is essentially defined by succeeding points of tension, crisis, and fusion (1960,

537–42). Points of tension are consciously invoked by the will of the disciple and

are the basis of spiritual growth (Bailey 1944, 734–35; 1960, 56). This work must

be done subjectively, a fundamental point that many modern and postmodern

theorists deny or ignore in their haste to move beyond “the philosophy of the
139
subject” to assume a “post-metaphysical” perspective. It is important to note,

however, that Bailey emphasizes the importance of being both engaged in the

world of form and simultaneously in the subjective world. This constant effort

produces a creative tension that Bailey often characterizes as the dual life of
140
discipleship.

Esoteric knowledge is not intended to drive your spiritual life into greater
and increasing subjectivity; the goal is not a more inward life and a
training which will make of you a true introspective and consequently a
pure mystic. Exactly the reverse is intended; all that the disciple
essentially is upon the inner planes has to become objective; thus his
spiritual livingness becomes an everyday affair. (Bailey 1955, 185)

Bailey asserts that at advanced stages of development the subjective state of the
141
initiate is exceedingly intense and isolated. However, in contrast to Rothberg’s

conception of “a single questing individual,” Bailey emphasizes that the

disciple/initiate becomes increasingly aware of, develops, and works with

subjective group relationships within one’s Ashram via the soul, and eventually
142
establishes direct subjective contact with the Hierarchy.

82
Ferrer’s analysis may help some in the community of transpersonal

scholars to liberate themselves from intrasubjective reductionism. However, I

suggest that Bailey’s esoteric philosophy is not in need of such liberation as she is

concerned with neither transpersonal and spiritual phenomena nor with multi-

local participatory events. Neither does she ignore wider relationships of the self

to the objective world, culture, society, or the cosmos. While Ferrer acknowledges

the need to extend the transpersonal vision of Spirit to the entire cosmos, he fails

to provide, or even refer to, any type of cosmology or way in which this extension

might occur. One of the most important aspects of Bailey’s esoteric philosophy,

on the other hand, is that she provides a comprehensive cosmological worldview


143
(1922b, 1925, 1951a, 1960).

With respect to the second alleged distortion of experientialism, Ferrer

defines subtle Cartesianism as “the understanding of transpersonal and spiritual

phenomena according to a subject-object model of knowledge and cognition”

(2002, 28; italics in the original). Again, his definition and analysis are entirely

concerned with the incorrect and correct way of understanding phenomena, and

therefore remain in the domain of secondary occultism. I will only make a few

brief comments on this second distortion. First, I suggest that the Cartesian ego,

so often degraded and attacked by modern, postmodern, and transpersonal

thinkers, represents both a personality polarized in the mental body and a

necessary and relatively advanced stage of human evolution. Second, despite


144
Ferrer’s efforts to avoid the problems of intentionality (2002, 25, 33),

essentialism (2002, 91–92, 100, 137–38, 182), the representational paradigm of

83
cognition (2002, 29, 59,139), and the Myth of the Given (passim), I suggest that

his exclusive concern with phenomena (or their transformation into participatory

events), demonstrates that a type of objectivity is still lurking in his theory, just as

he claimed of Wilber’s integral theory (Ferrer 2002, 212n11). Despite his call for

“a radical shift of emphasis from intrasubjective experiences to participatory

events,” this shift still refers exclusively to “our understanding of transpersonal

and spiritual phenomena” and his reconstructed paradigm remains within the
145
domain of secondary occultism (2002, 115; italics added).

Regarding Ferrer’s analysis of the practical distortions of experientialism,

spiritual narcissism and integrative arrestment, I suggest that these are merely the

typical distortions associated with the early stages of treading the Path of Return.

As Ferrer notes, the phenomenon of spiritual narcissism “is well documented in

the world religious literature” (2002, 35), and Bailey discusses all of these points

in some detail as well. Ferrer may be correct in asserting that the experiential

vision maintained by many transpersonal theorists contributes to spiritual

narcissism and integrative arrestment. I will simply note that the problem is much
146
more complex than his analysis reveals.

The Empiricist Colonization of Spirituality

Ferrer maintains that most forms of transpersonal inquiry are guided by


147
the methodology and epistemology of inner empiricism (2002, 42–44).

The main idea behind this term is that transpersonal and spiritual
knowledge claims are valid because they can be replicated and tested
through disciplined introspection, and can therefore be intersubjectively
verified or falsified. (Ferrer 2002, 42–43; italics in the original)

84
While insisting on the need for legitimizing spiritual understanding (2002, 184),

Ferrer argues that this narrow view of inner empiricism is misleading,

unnecessary and often self-defeating for transpersonal studies (2002, 41). Like

Ferrer, Bailey calls for a legitimizing approach to the world of spiritual realities

(Bailey 1942, 449; see also 1936, xxv), and she asserts that the union of science

and religion will result in the shattering of both materialism in the West and the

unthinking devotion of religious adherents of all faiths (1925, 678).

Like Ferrer (2002, 70), Bailey also suggests the need for alternative

methods of justification that are not limited to an empirical approach. As noted

earlier, she claims that esotericism has an extremely scientific and practical

nature, although it “has its own terminology, experiments, deductions, and laws”
148
(Bailey 1954, 64). Rather than importing the standards of empirical science to

spiritual inquiry, Bailey suggests the opposite, that science is importing the

standards of spiritual inquiry. She asserts that the scientific method has the same

function as meditation—bridging the world of form and the world of ideas—and

she claims that the scientific approach is in a process of transformation (1934, 15,

331).

In many places Bailey makes a clear distinction between mysticism and


149
esotericism. She asserts that the mystical path is typically an emotional longing

for a transcendent experience of “the Other,” and that the esoteric path is a

rigorous mental training that develops the capacities to consciously enter into and

work with knowledge on transcendent levels. While at times she valorizes the

achievements of the mystical approach and suggests that the mystical and esoteric

85
approaches should be blended, she asserts more generally that mysticism was

appropriate during the earlier Atlantean civilization when humanity was polarized

almost entirely on emotional levels. In our modern civilization, the ability to work

scientifically with forces and energies on the mental plane needs to be developed.

The Perennial Philosophy Revisited

Ferrer identifies the perennial philosophy as the most implicitly held

presupposition of contemporary transpersonal theory and suggests that this

unquestioned belief may be misleading (2002, 71–73). However, the ways in

which he delimits his understanding of the perennial philosophy shows that it is

quite different from the Ageless Wisdom tradition presented by Bailey. He

identifies three major principles of the perennial philosophy that are arguably

inherent principles of the Ageless Wisdom tradition as well—involutionary

cosmology, hierarchical ontology and axiology, and hierarchical epistemology

(Ferrer 2002, 75). However, he does not directly critique these principles; he

“briefly looks at them,” in a total of six sentences. What he does critique, in an

acknowledged “abbreviated and simplistic manner” are five critical points

presumably shared by all types of perennialism (Ferrer 2002, 86–95). He then

goes on to critique seven main problems with Wilber’s structuralist version of the

perennial philosophy (Ferrer 2002, 95–105). Space considerations do not allow

me to analyze Ferrer’s arguments grouped around these twelve themes. I suggest,

however, that they have little relevance with respect to Bailey’s teachings. In the

following, I indicate some problematic ways in which Ferrer restricts his analysis

86
of the perennial philosophy and thereby further distances his critique from any

application to Bailey’s esoteric philosophy.

Ferrer narrows the scope of the topic by referring to “the modern notion of

a perennial philosophy” as it has been articulated “throughout the history of

Western philosophy” (2002, 73; italics added). He identifies the “traditional”

perennial philosophers as Aldous Huxley, Huston Smith, Seyyed Nasr, René

Guénon, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, and Frithjof Schuon (2002, 74–75). What

apparently unites these thinkers is the idea of a “single Truth” underlying the

diversity of beliefs and interpretations, “a single ultimate reality that can be

apprehended by the human intellect under certain conditions” (2002, 73).

Ironically, he then immediately makes his only reference to Blavatsky by

incorrectly asserting that she reintroduced “this” perennial philosophy in the West

(Ferrer 2002, 74). Blavatsky’s first fundamental proposition, however, clearly

asserts that the “Omnipresent, Eternal, Boundless, and Immutable PRINCIPLE

. . . transcends the power of human conception . . . in the words of Mandukya,

‘unthinkable and unspeakable’” (Blavatsky [1888a] 1977, 14). Throughout his

analysis Ferrer continuously thematizes an ultimate reality which can be humanly

known, a concept that has nothing to do with the Esoteric Philosophy (Ferrer

2002, 73–75, 87, 90–91, 110).

Not only does Ferrer bias his argument by focusing on a “knowable

ultimate reality” interpreted by a group of scholars who are presumably working

for the most part on the level of the rational mind, but he also frames his entire

argument exclusively in terms of mystical experience. Despite his stated intention

87
to “critically examine the adhesion of transpersonal theory to a perennialist

metaphysics,” and to provide a historical overview “and a typology of the main

varieties of perennialism” (2002, 72), he slides into a discussion “of the mystical

version of the perennial philosophy” (2002, 75; italics added). In a paragraph

characterizing the nature of the perennial philosophy, Ferrer uses the words:

mystical teachings; mystical dimension; mystics of all ages; and mystical

experience, five times in the space of five sentences (2002, 74). His portrayal of
150
the perennial philosophy as a “family of interpretive models” is apparently

based only on mystical experiences and he refers to “mysticism,” “mystical

traditions,” “mystical core,” or “mystical paths” in each of the five types he


151
distinguishes (including the “esotericist”). Finally, Ferrer’s approach to the

perennial philosophy exclusively through the prism of mysticism is revealed in

his description of three fundamental and interrelated premises on which the

perennialist logic presumably rests. These three premises assert that “there is a

single referent for all mysticisms,” which corresponds to a single, ultimate divine

reality that can be directly accessed by mystics (Ferrer 2002, 135; italics added).

In contrast to Ferrer’s account of the perennial philosophy, what

distinguishes Bailey’s presentation of the Ageless Wisdom is: (1) it is ageless; it

predates modern notions; (2) it is articulated in the heritage of all humanity, not

only of Western philosophy; (3) it has little to do with mystical experiences or

spiritual phenomena; and (4) it is not founded on the interpretations of scholars.

According to the Esoteric Philosophy, the Ageless Wisdom has been revealed

throughout the ages to humanity by “initiated seers and prophets,” “great adepts,”

88
and “exalted beings, who watched over the childhood of Humanity” (Blavatsky

[1888a] 1977, 272–73). These guides work from a level of consciousness that
152
transcends the mental plane—the buddhic plane of Pure Reason or Intuition.

In the light of Bailey’s esoteric philosophy, the three transpersonal

theorists addressed in this chapter have made important, but limited advances in

our understanding of human development. Wilber’s contribution to the field of

transpersonal studies and his role in stimulating new ways of thinking about

spirituality among the general public are inestimable. His theories attract a great

deal of criticism, however, and their obvious limitations serve as the primary foils

for both Washburn and Ferrer in their efforts to establish their own models of
153
human development. My analysis of Wilber’s critique of wisdom traditions

reveals many questionable assumptions underlying his arguments and it shows

that his criticisms have little significance for Bailey’s esoteric philosophy.

Washburn makes valuable contributions to transpersonal studies with an

approach that emphasizes the roles of polarity, struggle, and synthesis. I suggest

that this dialectical approach is one that embodies qualities of the fourth ray of

Harmony through Conflict. Washburn’s ideas are often in agreement with

Bailey’s teachings and his criticisms of structural-hierarchical models have little

relevance for a critique of her esoteric philosophy as they are essentially

criticisms of Wilber’s distinctive model.

Ferrer’s research encourages a thorough reexamination of the assumptions

underlying transpersonal studies. His critique of universal philosophies has little

application for Bailey’s work, however, because his focus is restricted within the

89
realm of phenomena and his criticisms of the perennial philosophy are largely

preoccupied with various forms of mysticism or directed toward Wilber’s model.

I suggest that to most effectively further the development of transpersonal studies,

theorists in the field need to explore the teachings of the Esoteric Philosophy, and

then acknowledge its strengths and directly criticize its weaknesses.

90
PART 2

RECONSTRUCTING HABERMAS

CHAPTER 5

HABERMAS’ THEORY OF RATIONALITY

The Great Question

“What is the place of love in your system?” This is how Rothberg began a

question addressed to Habermas during a colloquium held at the University of San

Francisco in December of 1997. Rothberg went on to develop his question in the

context of the significant explorations of the depths of subjectivity in the latter

half of the 20th century and he challenged Habermas’ perceived preoccupation

with intersubjectivity. Rothberg observed that this subjective turning has been

brought about in part by a growing awareness of Asian and indigenous cultures

and by the development of new forms of psychological understanding and

therapy. He addressed the heart of the issue by asking,

What are the inner resources, you might say, the spiritual resources that
might be the basis for . . . [a] kind of expanded civic movement or . . .
supranational civic identity? . . . In spiritual traditions there’s an
emphasis on the cultivation of qualities of love and wisdom and
compassion that gives a kind of overcoming of the barriers. And so, to
what extent would some extension of the exploration of the depths of
154
subjectivity be the counterpart of what you’re asking for?

Habermas prefaced his lengthy response by acknowledging, “That’s a great

question, great in all its different meanings.”

91
Years earlier Habermas had written, “Talk of love as a medium remains

hopelessly metaphorical” (1987, 280). And in his response to Rothberg he

remarked, “Now, that ‘spiritual’ . . . [pause] . . . that is a bit California ringing in

my ears . . . [audience laughter] . . . but it probably means something different in

German.” Immediately following the question and answer session I asked

Rothberg if he thought Habermas had satisfactorily answered his question.

Rothberg’s answer was an emphatic “No.” Habermas was unable to answer the

question because the concepts of love, wisdom, and compassion have no

significant role in his theoretical system.

Rothberg’s “great question” guides my reconstructive analysis of

Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality. The structure of my inquiry

follows Habermas’ presentation in the opening sections of The Theory of

Communicative Action (TCA; Habermas 1984, 1–74). I begin each chapter with a

brief synopsis of the section under consideration and follow it with an esoteric

critique. I argue that Habermas’ inability or unwillingness to explore the

potentials of subjectivity, love, and wisdom severely limits the emancipatory

power of his theory. I further argue that these are precisely the potentials that

humanity needs for creating a new age characterized by mutual understanding and

right human relations, potentials which Bailey explicates so well.

Introduction to the Problem of Rationality

In his opening remarks to TCA, Habermas thematizes “the problematic of

societal rationalization” and suggests that contemporary philosophy is converging

toward a theory of rationality. He further claims that wherever coherent and

92
consistent argumentation has developed around key thematic areas in modern

philosophy, it seeks to establish the formal conditions of rationality. With these

two central ideas he gives the theory of argumentation a leading role in his

analysis of the rationality problematic and in his theory of communicative


155
action.

Although the theme of the rationality of beliefs and actions was

traditionally the object of philosophic inquiry, Habermas claims that since

philosophy is no longer capable of providing forms of totalizing knowledge, it is

no longer adequate as the exclusive approach to the problem of rationality. He

asserts that a “new constellation” is arising in the relationship of philosophy to the

sciences, resulting in a situation wherein sociology must take the leading role.

Both modern political science and political economy have abdicated the role of

providing a holistic perspective and they have abandoned moral-practical

questions of legitimacy. Habermas contends that only sociology “has retained its

relations to problems of society as a whole,” and states that “it is no accident—

rather a symptom—that the great social theorists I shall discuss are fundamentally

sociologists” (1984, 5). He further suggests that sociology is “the science of crisis

par excellence” and it alone is capable of addressing the anomic effects of

capitalist development and questions of rationalization pushed aside by other

social sciences.

It is quite remarkable that in an introduction of only a few pages,

Habermas has: (1) narrowly restricted his focus to the problem of modern

rationality; (2) made the claim that sociology is the science uniquely qualified to

93
undertake such an investigation; and (3) privileged the role of argumentation in

this endeavor. I briefly address the first two of these points from an esoteric

perspective in the following comments, and in Chapter 7 I critique Habermas’

theory of argumentation in some detail.

I suggest that Habermas’ focus on rationality severely limits his analysis

in two dimensions. Ontologically, by focusing on the level of the rational mind he

virtually ignores the physical and emotional domains, and the powerful and

arguably dominant action motivations of fear, anger, hatred, desire, and greed, as

well as love, compassion, and solidarity. He also ignores the trans-rational

domains of higher mind, intuition, and spirit despite his frequent references to

“intuitive understanding” and his youthful conviction “that a spiritual and moral

renewal was indispensable and inevitable” (Habermas 1992a, 43; italics added).

Qualitatively, his narrow focus on rationality (or the quality of the fifth ray of

Concrete Knowledge and Science) tends to devalue other qualities, especially

those associated with the fourth ray of Harmony, Beauty, and Art as they express

through myth, narrative, literature, rhetoric, irony, poetry, mimesis, and metaphor,

as well as those qualities associated with the second ray of Love-Wisdom, which I

suggest have the greatest potential for creating solidarity and resolving the

problems of modernity.

In contrast to Habermas’ privileging of sociology, Bailey does not


156
explicitly thematize this science in her work. Writing during the period 1919–

1949, she does give considerable attention to analyzing the esoteric causes of the
157 158
Great War (1914–1945) and to the problems confronting humanity, but

94
without invoking theories of Western social scientists. She does, however, suggest

that sociology and related sciences are revealing the nature of the soul.

The growing science of social relations, of social responsibility, or


coordinated civic life, of scientific economics and of human inter-
relations, the steadily developing sense of internationalism, of religious
unity, and of economic interdependence, are all of them indications of the
energies of soul life upon the physical plane, and within the human family.
159
(Bailey 1942, 86)

It is not surprising, therefore, that the social science that Bailey privileges is

psychology—literally, the science of the soul. She makes the claim that

“psychology is only just come into its own, and only now is its function beginning

to be understood; in one hundred years time, however, it will be the dominating

science” (1936, 293–94). She further suggests that not only will psychology shift

its emphasis from a study of the abnormal and subnormal states of consciousness

to the super-normal or divine states—states of consciousness expressed in the


160
many examples of artistic and scientific genius (1936, 99–101) —but also from

the individual psyche to the divine Psyche (1942, 227–28).

“Rationality”—A Preliminary Specification

Habermas attempts to unveil the essence of rationality by examining its

relation to the reliability of the knowledge embodied within it. The key idea he

develops is that this knowledge, whether expressed explicitly in linguistic

utterances or implicitly in goal-directed actions, makes a claim to the truth of an

assertion or to the success of an action respectively. The knowledge contained in

such symbolic expressions is fallible, and the associated claims can be criticized

by a hearer or an observer with respect to either an expression’s truth or an

95
actions effectiveness. Habermas suggests that the rationality of expressions,

whether linguistic or goal-directed actions, must be determined in light of the

internal relations between their semantic content, the associated facts or

conditions of validity, and the reasons that could be provided to defend their claim

to truth or effectiveness. In brief, the rationality of an expression or action can be

determined if it is susceptible to criticism and grounding through argumentative

discourse (Habermas 1984, 8–9). Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality

can therefore be seen as an extension of his earlier work on the public sphere

(Habermas [1962] 1989) that emphasized the important role of uncoerced

discourse among equals. Shelton Gunaratne summarizes this relationship between

Habermas’ theories of the public sphere and communicative rationality as

follows:

Habermas’s critical theory is an attempt to emancipate the lifeworld from


system “colonization” through the revival of an uncoerced and
unrestricted public sphere operating on the “universal” pragmatics of
communicative rationality. (Gunaratne 2006, 96)

The Criticizability of Actions and Assertions

The initial distinction Habermas wants to make derives from the potential

dual employment of knowledge—descriptive knowledge of the objective world

can be used rationally in either goal-directed actions or in making assertions to

another actor. He associates these two different forms of using propositional

knowledge with cognitive-instrumental rationality and communicative rationality

respectively. Cognitive-instrumental rationality concerns the use of propositional

knowledge in teleological actions undertaken in order to attain control over, or

adaptation to, a contingent environment. Such actions can be judged as rational if


96
the necessary conditions for achieving a successful intervention in the world are

satisfied or can be explained and defended. Communicative rationality, on the

other hand, refers to the use of propositional knowledge in order to attain

understanding among participants. Habermas describes the concept of

communicative rationality as being

based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying,


consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different
participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the
mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the
unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld.
161
(1984, 10)

A communicative utterance is rational if the speaker raises a criticizable validity

claim that can be either accepted or rejected (or deferred) by a hearer, a response

that is in turn based on rational arguments as well.

Habermas furthers this distinction between cognitive-instrumental and

communicative rationality by examining their ontological presuppositions. The

“realistic” approach associated with cognitive-instrumental rationality assumes

that the world is constituted by an unproblematic objective reality that is shared

among participants. Communicative rationality, on the other hand, is associated

with a “phenomenological” approach that assumes actors must first problematize

the concept of an objective world and seek the conditions under which its

perceived unity can be agreed upon before they can attempt to reach mutual

understanding with respect to what occurs in the world. Through this process, or

“communicative practice,” they “assure themselves . . . of an intersubjectively

shared lifeworld. This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of interpretations

97
presupposed by the members as background knowledge” (Habermas 1984, 13;

italics in the original).

Habermas asserts that there are internal relations between the realist and

phenomenological approaches and that the concept of cognitive-instrumental

rationality (associated with the former) “can be fit into this more comprehensive

concept of communicative rationality developed from the phenomenological

approach” (1984, 14). In light of these internal connections, he observes that

Piaget unites these two approaches in a model of social cooperation, a model that

incorporates both subject-object and subject-subject forms of reciprocal action.

Habermas claims that the differences between these two approaches become

apparent in examining concepts such as “responsibility” and “autonomy.” In cases

of teleological action, responsibility only requires a capacity to choose among

alternatives and to control factors in the environment. In the context of

communicative action, however, responsibility requires membership in a

communication community composed of individuals who “can orient their actions

to intersubjectively recognized validity claims” (Habermas 1984, 14). With

respect to autonomy, a greater degree of cognitive-instrumental rationality is

measured simply in terms of a greater independence from the constraints of the

contingent environment, that is, by the relative success of goal-directed

interventions. A greater degree of communicative rationality, on the other hand, is

characterized by an increased capacity for understanding, coordinating action, and

consensually resolving conflicts.

98
Esoteric Critique

In making this fundamental distinction between cognitive-instrumental

and the more comprehensive communicative rationality, Habermas does not yet

refer to different “levels” or “dimensions” as he does, for example, in discussing

the transformations of worldviews which appear “to be connected with socio-

evolutionary transitions to new levels of learning” (1984, 68). From an esoteric

perspective, I suggest that his primary distinction can be interpreted as distinct

levels in at least two ways. First, his distinction between cognitive-instrumental

and communicative rationality appears to reflect the distinction Bailey makes

between knowledge and understanding. She suggests that knowledge pertains to

that which has been ascertained by the human intellect regarding the world of

form (Habermas’ contingent environment), and it comprises “the compendium of

the arts and sciences.” Understanding, on the other hand, “may be defined as the

faculty of the Thinker [i.e., the Soul] in Time to appropriate knowledge as the

foundation for wisdom” (Bailey 1922b, 10–12). Understanding is the mediating

relation between the science of matter (knowledge) and the science of Spirit

(wisdom). Bailey introduces this triadic distinction (knowledge—understanding—

wisdom) in the context of defining the initiatory process. The gradual evolution of

consciousness over long periods of time (lifetimes) is implicit. Habermas, on the

other hand, does not suggest that the “more comprehensive concept of

communicative rationality” is a more advanced state of consciousness developed

over time, relative to cognitive-instrumental rationality. He simply asserts that

99
communicative rationality is a “wider” concept and entails a “transcendental

twist” (1984, 11).

Second, Habermas’ distinction between cognitive instrumental and

communicative rationality can be understood as a distinction between developed

capacities on the various levels of the mental plane. Cognitive-instrumental

rationality operates on the lowest subplanes of the mental plane whereas

communicative rationality implies the capability to operate on “higher” (or

“wider,” i.e., more comprehensive) subplanes of the mental plane and the

corresponding capacity to “overcome . . . [one’s] merely subjective views” and

become increasingly receptive to the soul, or group consciousness (Habermas


162
1984, 10). Habermas does not, however, contemplate a more comprehensive

dimension of mind that might extend beyond a communicative rationality whose

telos is merely an expanded “scope for unconstrained coordination of actions and


163
consensual resolution of conflicts” (Habermas 1984, 15). Observing this

limitation, Rothberg asserts,

[It is not] possible to identify the structures of communicative rationality


as the developmentally most advanced formal structures in terms of the
criteria of development that Habermas himself gives. In this sense, there
may be yet a more “adequate” framework that is able to integrate both the
achievements and structures of communicative rationality, as well as what
has been systematically excluded, lost, or forgotten by the modern world
view. (Rothberg 1983, 384)

My fundamental thesis is that Bailey’s esoteric philosophy provides a more

adequate and comprehensive framework that is capable of integrating a multitude

of achievements and structures, and that is capable of extending Habermas’

concept of communicative rationality as well.

100
CHAPTER 6

THE SPECTRUM OF CRITICIZABLE UTTERANCES

Three Forms of Rationality—Objective, Social, and Subjective

The assertion of beliefs and the efficacy of actions, tied respectively to

claims of truth and success in the objective world, are not the only forms of

rationality. Habermas expands his concept of communicative rationality by

suggesting that the ability to follow established social norms and to express

subjective states are also rational actions if they satisfy the central presupposition

of rationality—that is, if their associated validity claims of normative rightness

and subjective truthfulness can be defended against criticisms. The knowledge

embodied in normatively regulated actions and expressive self-presentations does

not refer to states of affairs in the objective world but rather to the domains of a
164
common social world and a private subjective world respectively.

These three modes of rational action thematized by Habermas together

form a rational communicative practice that serves to achieve, sustain, and renew

social consensus “when disagreements can no longer be repaired with everyday

routines” (Habermas 1984, 18). This communicative practice is rational in the

sense that the resulting consensus is based on reasons. Therefore, Habermas

concludes, the practice of argumentation is foundational for explicating his

concept of communicative rationality as it is the superior “force” of convincing

reasons, or the “force of the better argument,” that determines an achieved

consensus. The strength of an argument is presumably “measured” by the

soundness of its supporting reasons which is determined largely by the ability of

101
an argument to convince and to motivate participants (Habermas 1984, 18).

Further, the rationality of participants can be judged according to the degree that

they are “open to argument,” that is, to the degree that they are non-dogmatic and

willing to expose themselves to criticism. Habermas also asserts that argument

plays a crucial role in learning processes through which rational expressions can

be improved in each domain. These learning processes include the acquisition of

theoretical knowledge and moral insight in the objective and social worlds, and

the overcoming of self-deceptions in the subjective world.

Habermas theorizes that each of the three modes of expression has a

reflective medium (or form of argumentation) in which its claims are presented

and contested. In the cognitive-instrumental sphere, the medium for determining

the truth of a validity claim is theoretical discourse. In the moral-practical sphere,

the medium for determining the normative rightness of a validity claim is

practical discourse. When the goal of expressive self-presentation is to achieve

understanding, subjective expressions can be criticized with respect to their

authenticity. In Habermas’ prototypical case of psychotherapy, reasons and

arguments can be utilized to clarify systematic self-deception. However, because

the relationship between analyst and analysand is asymmetric, such arguments do

not qualify as discourse. Habermas instead uses the term therapeutic critique to
165
describe the reflective medium associated with expressive self-presentations.

Esoteric Critique

In this section I provide esoteric analyses of Habermas’ conceptions of

morality and subjectivity associated with his additional categories of normatively

102
regulated actions and expressive self-presentations. My analysis of subjectivity

here will focus on the problem of illusion, also characterized in traditional

philosophy as “ideological illusion,” “false consciousness,” and “distorted

communication.” In Chapter 9, where Habermas introduces the concept of a

subjective world, and in Chapter 11, where he discusses the nature of

decentration, I continue my esoteric critique of Habermas’ understanding of

subjectivity.

Morality

It is not possible to explore in-depth Habermas’ concept of a “moral point

of view” (1984, 19) or his theory of discourse ethics, especially as thematized

after the publication of TCA (Habermas 1990; 1991; 1993a). I here only make

some brief observations. First, it is important to note that Habermas is concerned

primarily with “a narrowly circumscribed conception of morality that focuses on

questions of justice” that can be addressed procedurally through argumentative

discourse, and that he tends to avoid abstract ethical questions of “the good life”

as they concern an individual (Habermas 1993a, 1–2). Habermas emphasizes this

distinction when he writes, “Cognitive ethics separates off problems of the good

life and concentrates on strictly deontological, universalizable aspects, so that


166
what remains from the Good is only the Just” (Habermas 1987, 397).

Bailey, on the other hand, asserts that right action is based not on

intersubjective dialogue and argumentation, or practical discourse, but rather on

subjective reflection.

One of the first things that every student has to learn, as he seeks to grasp
the nature and use of mind, is that public opinion has to give place to
103
individual consciousness of right, and that then that individual
consciousness has to be so employed and concentrated that it . . . leads
back into the realm of the Universal Mind. (Bailey 1934, 359; italics
added)

Habermas’ intersubjective and procedural approach to moral philosophy has not

gone uncontested among academics. Charles Taylor challenges the attempt to

separate ethics from morality, or questions of the good life from questions of

justice by asserting that the distinction is falsely construed.

It is the unhappy consequence of the underlying decision to opt for a


procedural ethics . . . It starkly contradicts our usual moral consciousness
. . . Practical reason does not in fact proceed formally by ascertaining what
our duties are on the basis of a procedural criterion. Rather . . . quite the
opposite is true: our deliberations on those purposes to which we should
accord recognition are inextricably linked to those considerations on what
we as humans are. (Taylor 1991, 32–33; italics in the original)

Similarly, Maeve Cooke is not so concerned that Habermas prioritizes questions

of right but rather that he neglects questions of the good. She contends that

Habermas’ linguistification of human experience renders his account of social

solidarity “unconvincing . . . It is so abstract that it is not recognizable as a

conception of solidarity” (Cooke 1994, 164).

Adopting a discursive, procedural approach to moral issues creates many

insurmountable problems. Richard J. Bernstein points out that there is rarely

agreement as to what constitutes “the force of the better argument,” particularly

with respect to moral/political issues.

Who decides what is and what is not an argument, by what criteria, and
what constitutes the force of the better argument? Who really believes that
philosophers can achieve a rational consensus, or even that this is
desirable? . . . When we turn to specific ethical and political disputes . . .
does it even make sense to think that there might even be a rational

104
consensus about the force of the better argument in the current debates
about abortion? (Richard J. Bernstein 1992, 220–21)

And Agnes Heller writes that in the Habermasian construct,

moral problems proper are circumvented, rather than solved . . . If moral


philosophy is reduced, in the final analysis, to a theory of a just procedure,
it ceases to be a moral philosophy at all. (Heller 1994, 274; italics in the
original)

Habermas’ theoretical exclusion of ethical concerns ignores primary

dimensions of human experience. Taylor argues that to ignore virtues that “belong

at the centre of moral life,” virtues such as selflessness, self-development,

authenticity, and thankfulness, is to construct a “completely arbitrary and

unfounded . . . false thesis” (Taylor 1991, 32). One result of this exclusion is that

Habermas fails to recognize the emancipatory potentials of care (Swindal 1999,

75). Developing the concept of an ethics of care has been an aspect of Carol

Gilligan’s critique (1982) of androcentric models of moral development,

especially the theory proposed by Lawrence Kohlberg on which Habermas relies

heavily (Kohlberg 1981). Seyla Benhabib emphasizes Gilligan’s concern for the

individual and for the needs of the “concrete other,” as opposed to the standpoint

of abstract participants and the “generalized other” adopted by Habermas in

following Mead’s theoretical analysis. Benhabib asserts that the norms of

interaction that have been “silenced” and “repressed” by traditional moral theory

relate to “inner nature” and include “the norms of solidarity, friendship, love, and

care.” She finds Habermas’ segregated, formal dimensions inadequate as

“aesthetic-expressive discourse . . . [cannot] accommodate the perspective of the

‘concrete other,’ for relations of solidarity, friendship, and love are not aesthetic

105
but profoundly moral ones” (Benhabib 1986, 340–42). An important aspect of

Bailey’s work, on the other hand, is focused on developing these relations of care,

compassion, love, and solidarity ignored by Habermas. These qualities are

acquired through learning processes that lead from the integration of the

personality vehicles (physical, emotional, and mental) to an ultimate decentration

and the development of soul, or group awareness.

Bailey does not address explicitly the categories of ethics or morality. I

suggest, however, that she addresses the nature of ethics through the concept of
167
alignment. There are many types and stages of alignment. The basic idea is that

when the structures of any system are brought into alignment, a channel is created

through which energy can flow. With respect to the personality, alignment is the

subjective task of bringing the physical brain, the emotions, and the lower mind

into a harmonious and stable relationship. Bailey suggests that the initial results of

an achieved alignment are demonstrated by great thinkers whose work is made

possible by the construction of an unimpeded channel which links the mind to the

brain (1922c, 1–2). At this point the integrated personality undergoes a process of

reorientation and becomes increasingly receptive to, and drawn into alignment

with, the influence of the soul (Bailey 1942, 350–51). The sense of duality is

intensified in this stage and ethical concerns take on increasing significance as the

personality endeavors to think and act in line with the impressions emanating

from the soul.

According to Bailey, alignment with the soul is achieved gradually

through cultivating detachment, discrimination, and self-reflection—subjective

106
practices that lead to identification with the soul, group consciousness, and

ultimately with divine Mind. Habermas, on the other hand, dismisses a reflective

relation to oneself in the process of moral argument as “mock monological

dialogue,” as he cannot imagine dimensions of subjectivity that might extend

beyond the rational mind (1987, 95). For Habermas, the only possible avenue for

attaining higher knowledge and advanced stages of moral reasoning is therefore

outwardly through intersubjective discourse. He therefore criticizes Kohlberg’s

“monological test” at stage six of moral reasoning for determining the

generalizability of a norm and asserts that his own concept of attaining a universal

ethic of speech through practical discourse constitutes a higher level of moral

development (Habermas 1979, 90; Lukes 1982, 147).

I suggest that Bailey addresses the nature of morality (justice) through her

extensive teachings on the necessity of establishing right human relations through

“the spirit of goodwill” (1947, 118). She asserts that the establishment of right

human relations “is an aspect of the divine will for humanity and the next facet of

the divine expression to manifest itself in human affairs—individual, communal,

national, and international” (Bailey 1948, 113). I suggest that the greatest

contribution to the establishment of right human relations may well be the

widespread adoption by rational agents of a theoretical attitude that embraces the

fundamental and interdependent spiritual tenets of karma and reincarnation. If

intelligent individuals who are awakening to the energies of the soul consider that

their actions (karma) will have definite and lasting effects, they may be more

likely to base their value decisions on judgments attained through reflection in the

107
light of their highest possible achieved alignment. Actions may then be based not

so much on egocentric, strategic considerations or on a hypothetical consensus

attained through intersubjective discourse, but perhaps more frequently on the

universal interests of the group revealed through alignment with the soul and a

transpersonal, subjective group consciousness. And if rational agents consider

that their evolutionary development may be continued in another life experience,

in another nation and culture, they may adopt a more compassionate and caring

attitude toward the “Other” as they realize that they will be (or realize that they
168
have been) the Other.

Subjectivity and the Problem of Illusion

Habermas makes several remarkable assertions regarding the nature of

subjectivity in his effort to establish therapeutic critique as the form of argument

associated with expressive self-presentations (1984, 20–21). First, he creates a

false dualism between the individual “who systematically deceives himself about

himself” and who is therefore considered irrational, and the individual “who is

capable of letting himself be enlightened about his irrationality” and who is

therefore considered rational. Second, this duality is based on the counterfactual

assumption that the rational individual can simply be “willing and able to free

himself from illusions” (Habermas 1984, 21; italics added). Third, psychoanalysis

serves as the primary example and means by which one is able to achieve such

freedom. These three assertions form the basis for my initial critique of

Habermas’ conception of subjectivity.

108
Rational/non-rational dualism. Habermas’ dualistic assumption that an

individual can be categorized as either irrational or rational according to whether

one is subject to illusions and self-deceptions, or is “willing and able” to free

herself from such illusions is not well supported. James Swindal writes,

“Habermas’s idea of rationality neither admits of degrees nor appeals to a higher


169
ground: a tertium non datur” (Swindal 1999, 268). Swindal is referring to a

passage from Raymond Geuss’ discussion of the positivist and Habermasian

acceptance of a dualistic (right and wrong) view of preferences. Geuss states, “In

a way the oddest thing about this whole discussion is the extent to which

Habermas is himself infected with the positivism against which he is struggling”


170
(Geuss 1981, 30). Geuss concludes that the only reasonable reply to such a

dualistic proposition is to reject it as falsely posed. I suggest that the “infection”

that dominates both Habermas and positivism is a dominant fifth-ray influence, a


171
quality that demands precise definition, differentiation, and logical clarity.

In contrast to Habermas’ dualistic, binary thinking, the Esoteric

Philosophy maintains that individuals range along a spectrum of developed

rationality (or intelligence) until their eventual at-one-ment with the soul and a

true “liberation” from illusion is achieved. At each point in this development,

everyone experiences and expresses irrational (or non-rational) forces emanating

from physical, emotional, and/or intuitive levels, except perhaps for the rare

individual valorized by Habermas who is completely dominated by rational

behavior and who is “polarized” on the lower mental plane. From the esoteric

perspective, however, this extreme form of rationalization does not confer

109
freedom from illusion but actually represents one’s deepest point of immersion in
172
the domain of limiting thoughtforms on the plane of lower mind.

Freeing oneself from illusion. Contrary to Habermas’ second questionable

assertion regarding subjectivity, Bailey insists that one cannot simply and easily

free oneself from illusion. According to the Esoteric Philosophy, it requires many

lifetimes of experience to develop the mind and the capacity to work with

thoughtforms. Additionally, it requires many more life experiences to recognize

the limiting and distorting nature of the lower mind and to develop the powers of

the higher mind and intuition which can dispel illusion. Bailey succinctly

describes the problem of illusion in the following:

Illusion is the mode whereby limited understanding and material


knowledge interpret truth, veiling and hiding it behind a cloud of
thoughtforms. Those thoughtforms become then more real than the truth
they veil, and consequently control man’s approach to Reality.” (Bailey
173
1950a, 240; italics in the original)

Habermas fails to see that the rational individual he valorizes, one who has

overcome what he terms “illusion” or self-deceptions concerning “one’s own

desires and inclinations, feelings and moods” (Habermas 1984, 21), is still

enmeshed in the limitations of the rational mind. This is evident in his description

of illusion as “desires, inclinations, feelings, and moods” which refer to glamour

on the emotional plane. He is therefore describing one who has achieved

emotional control, an important, but not final, stage in the process of liberation.

Habermas is so concerned with emotional and irrational limitations on linguistic

expressions that he is blind to rational limitations. In his schematic diagrams

Habermas depicts unconscious self-deception, or “systematically distorted

110
communication,” as only associated within strategic action, while communicative

action remains pure and undistorted, a cooperative search for consensus among

rational agents who are presumably free from illusions (1979, 208–210n2; 1984,

333).

The dilemma of rational limitations, or illusion, and the difficulty of

overcoming such limitations on the same level of rationality has long been an

important theme in philosophy. In the following I quote several critics who

address Habermas’ problematic approach to the issue. James Bohman challenges

Habermas’ idea of undistorted communication and poses the problem as follows:

What if communication itself becomes so restricted that it is no longer


cognitively reliable or normatively appropriate? What if it is “distorted” to
such an extent that it is no longer the intersubjective medium by which
agents could reflect upon how they use their rational capacities? Here we
seem to have reached a paradox, a paradox that has been noted in most
accounts of irrationality since Aristotle. If communication is the medium
of self-reflection, it may well be that such free self-reflection cannot take
place under the certain conditions of communication. What does the critic
do when communicative rationality fails? (Bohman 2000, 3)

Similarly, Rüdiger Bubner argues:

The problem of sophistry arises when language, which is merely a means


towards knowledge, becomes the one and only end. The perfection of the
means . . . surreptitiously produces a perversion of the alleged rationality.
Belief in the reliability of language or in perfect forms of communication
ends in rhetorical delusion. Perhaps that form of speech which appears so
entirely rational is only a new, enhanced form of deception [illusion], all
the more difficult to see through since it seems so dissimilar to manifest
power relations. This deception conceals a coercion of the most
dangerous kind, one which embraces everyone without exception, even
the most radical critics.
What criteria, however, are at one’s disposal to separate out true
reason in interhuman Praxis from that superficial appearance of rationality
which is present in refined forms of social intercourse and which charms
everyone but really satisfies no one? (Bubner 1982, 51)

111
In discussing Habermas’ “unsatisfactory” claims for self-reflection, McCarthy

repeats the question in a slightly different form:

To what standard does this materialist phenomenology appeal in


unmasking ideological world views and forms of life? To what perception
or theory of reality does it appeal in characterizing other perceptions and
theories as distorted? . . . [Habermas’] appeal to apriori insight,
reminiscent of idealism, seems to disregard the possibility that the insight
into and anticipation of ideals is itself subject to distortion. (McCarthy
1978, 108–9)

A final example of “the festering question that . . . goes utterly to the heart of

Habermas’ early theory of rationality,” is posed by Rothberg as follows:

How can critique, which reveals a false consciousness, avoid the


possibility that it, too, is vulnerable to the charge of illusion from another
critique? How can critique, without the premise of such immunity from
illusion, avoid the suspicion that it moves only under the cover of hidden
dogmatism or meaningless relativism? How, in sum, can critique preserve
a substantive concept of truth that would ensure that the movement of
critique leads to progressive “emancipation” rather than to an unconscious
affirmation of new or habitual delusion? What in the structure of critique
makes it “rational” in a “deep” and “ultimate” sense? (Rothberg 1983,
276)

According to the esoteric philosophy, the answer to these questions, and to the

dilemma in general, is not found in the structure of critique but rather in the

relation of critique to higher-level structures of consciousness. Ordinary critique

serves the particular beliefs and opinions of the personality and is focused on the

lower, rational levels of mind; critique that truly liberates one from illusion, on

the other hand, serves the universal interests of the soul and emanates from the
174
higher, abstract levels of mind.

The challenge of dissipating illusion can be viewed as the fundamental

purpose for critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. Raymond Geuss states that

the very heart of critical theory is the criticism of ideologies that prevent agents
112
from “correctly perceiving their true situation and real interests; if they are to free

themselves from social repression, the agents must rid themselves of ideological

illusion” (Geuss 1981, 2–3). In recognizing this problem David Ingram observes

that “the interest governing such [critical] theory is explicitly emancipatory in that

it aims to strip the social agent of deeply ingrained patterns of thought [i.e.,

thoughtforms] that constrain self-understanding” (Ingram 1987, 13). And

Habermas approvingly quotes the idea that “critical theory hopes to elicit a self-

reflection in which the addressee penetrates and dissolves . . . those false

preconceptions which are anchored in systematically distorted forms of

communication” (Mendelson 1979, 62–63; quoted in Habermas 1982, 313n23).

As noted below, however, by failing to provide a theory of mind and an adequate

theory of self-reflection, Habermas is unable to explain the nature of “false

preconceptions” or how they may be “penetrated” and “dissolved.”

Bailey, on the other hand, provides a comprehensive approach to the

problem and acknowledges the need for an emancipatory critical theory.

Illusion is rapidly growing as the mental power of the race develops, for
illusion is the succumbing to the powerful thoughtforms which the
thinkers of the time and of the immediately preceding age have
formulated . . . They [i.e., thoughtforms] embodied then the new and
emerging ideas by means of which the race was intended to progress.
These forms, when old and crystallised, become a menace and a hindrance
to the expanding life.” (1950a, 112)

According to Bailey, sustained self-reflection (understood as a form of

meditation) plays a fundamental role in dispelling illusion as it eventually leads to

the illumination of the lower mind by the soul. A primary goal of critical theory

has historically been to rehabilitate “‘reflection’ as a category of valid

113
knowledge,” a knowledge that is “inherently productive of enlightenment and

emancipation” (Geuss 1981, 2). Peter Dews notes Habermas’ suggestion that “the

noblest function of philosophy . . . to break down, through a process of reflection,

reifications and objectifications of all kinds” (Dews 1999, 11–12). Elsewhere,

Habermas appears to clearly endorse the esoteric position when he writes:

Self-reflection is at once intuition and emancipation, comprehension and


liberation from dogmatic dependence. The dogmatism that reason undoes
both analytically and practically is false consciousness: error and unfree
existence in particular. Only the ego that apprehends itself in intellectual
intuition as the self-positing subject obtains autonomy. (Habermas 1978,
175
208; italics in the original)

He further reflects an esoteric interpretation when he speaks of the individual who

strives for “self-realization,” and of “the resoluteness (Entschlußkraft) of an

individual who has committed himself to an authentic life” (1993a, 9; italics in the

original). He also states, “If illusions are playing a role, this hermeneutic self-

understanding can be raised to the level of a form of reflection that dissolves self-
176
deceptions . . . [and leads to] a more profound self-understanding” (1993a, 5).

The problems with Habermas’ position, however, are enormous. First and

foremost, he offers no theory of mind but relies instead on numerous academic

theories of rationality, linguistics, and argumentation. He claims that “thinking”

can be understood simply as the internalized “process of discourse-dependent

argumentation” (1973, 28) and he defines rationality as simply a “disposition”

(1984, 22). His ontology, limited primarily to the equiprimordial dimensions of

rationality in the objective, social, and subjective worlds, cannot explicitly state

what “level” “hermeneutic self-understanding” can be “raised to” or how this

114
“raising” can be accomplished (other than possibly through his tenuous example

of psychoanalysis). He acknowledges that self-reflection requires the “quite

paradoxical achievement” of splitting the self into two parts in order to “render

aid to itself” (Habermas 1973, 28). However, rather than positing this as the act of

the personality invoking the intelligence and wisdom of the higher self or soul,

Habermas claims that these two aspects of the self lie on the same “horizontal

level;” one takes on “the role of conferring enlightenment, the other seek[s] . . .

enlightenment about himself.” Habermas asserts that the relationship between

these two aspects of self is the internalization of “psychoanalytic dialogue” or


177
“therapeutic discourse” (1973, 28). He does not explain what it means for self-

understanding to become “more profound” or what complete “self-realization” or

“autonomy” would look like because of his extremely limited understanding of

subjectivity (see Chapter 9). Habermas cannot explain what “the resoluteness of

an individual who has committed himself to an authentic life” actually means

because he develops neither the idea of an individual will (Dallmayr 1987, 90;

Swindal 1999, 223), nor the existential and metaphysical concept of “an authentic

life.” (Presumably Bailey would define “the authentic life” as treading the Path of

Return whereon the personality (as aspirant and disciple) resolutely seeks

emancipation from the “inauthentic” three worlds of form and seeks identification

with one’s true self or soul). He cannot explain what it means for the ego to

“apprehend itself in intellectual intuition” for, despite his numerous references to

the concept of “intuition,” he provides no ontological or epistemological analysis

of the intuition or how it might be developed or simply experienced. Despite

115
Habermas’ understanding of the importance of self-reflection in achieving

emancipation, an understanding which reflects both Hegelian (Lukes 1982, 134)

and esoteric perspectives, his conceptualization of self-reflection is both “opaque”


178
and “simplistic” (Swindal 1999, 107). It was Habermas’ inability to

differentiate two fundamental types of reflection that contributed to his

abandoning a “quasi-transcendental” model of three deep-seated knowledge-

constitutive interests (technical, practical, and emancipatory [Habermas 1978])

and to his embracing the linguistic turn (Richard J. Bernstein 1985, 11–15;

McCarthy 1978, 91–110; Swindal 1999, 117–182). Finally, his assertion that self-

reflection leads to “a more profound self-understanding” apparently contradicts

his claim that “nothing can be learned in an objectivating attitude about inner

nature qua subjectivity” (1984, 237). This latter position, which results from his

strict separation and categorization of formal-pragmatic relations (presented as

“intuitive indications” [Habermas 1984, 236]), has been widely criticized (Dews
179
1995, 169–93; Halton 1995, 211–14; McCarthy 1991; Rothberg 1986a).

Habermas’ appropriation of psychoanalysis. With respect to Habermas’

third questionable assertion regarding subjectivity, given the prominent role of

Freud’s theories in the research efforts of members of the Frankfurt School (Jay

1973, 86–112), it is understandable that Habermas would utilize psychoanalysis

as a mode of self-reflection, as an “expanded hermeneutics . . . that takes into

account a new dimension” capable of revealing self-deceptions (Habermas 1978,

215; italics in the original; see also 1978, 214–45). He claims that his model of

communicative action provides a framework within which Freud’s ideas can be

116
updated to include structures of intersubjectivity (Habermas 1987, 388–89).

Despite Habermas’ constructive efforts to open a new dimension closed off by

positivism (Habermas 1978, 214), I suggest that these efforts fall short of

providing a sufficient theory capable of addressing the problem of self-deception

and its overcoming for several reasons.

First, several authors claim that Habermas misinterprets and

misappropriates Freud’s theories. Bernard Flynn questions Habermas’ motives

and asserts that “Freud’s notion of psychoanalysis is no longer recognizable” in

Habermas’ interpretation (Flynn 1992, 50). He further claims that Habermas is

consciously inventing an alternative form of psychoanalysis that actually says

“the exact opposite” of what Freud says in numerous places (Flynn 1992, 51).

Richard Lichtman states that “it is crucial to ask whether Habermas is providing

us with an accurate account of Freud, or whether he has in fact replaced the

psychoanalytic framework with his own” (Lichtman 1990, 363). And Rothberg

notes that many commentators have pointed out that Habermas’ interpretation of

Freud is biased in that it emphasizes a rationalist understanding of psychoanalysis

that ignores Freud’s insights regarding the power of the unconscious (Rothberg

1983, 274n24).

Second, aside from the possibility that Habermas misappropriates Freud’s

ideas, there remains the question as to whether psychoanalysis fulfills the claims

that Habermas makes for “successful” therapy. After noting that Habermas fails to

identify the actual procedures that lead to the reintegration of the analysand,

Lichtman insists that there is no evidence to support Habermas’ “grand claim”

117
that psychoanalysis actually leads to emancipatory self-transformation and that

such a claim has “been vigorously rejected by numerous critics” (Lichtman 1990,

368). Habermas’ strong claim is that the individual “who is capable of letting

himself be enlightened about his irrationality” through psychoanalysis

possesses not only the rationality of a subject who is competent to judge


facts and who acts in a purposive-rational way, who is morally judicious
and practically reliable, who evaluates with sensitivity and is aesthetically
open-minded; he also possesses the power to behave reflectively in
relation to his subjectivity and to see through the irrational limitations to
which his cognitive, moral-practical, and aesthetic-practical expressions
are subject. (Habermas 1984, 21)

From the esoteric perspective, a subject who “possesses” these ideal attributes has

achieved personality integration and is standing on the threshold of soul fusion;

she is one who has overcome distortions on physical, emotional, and mental

levels. According to the esoteric philosophy, these competencies and powers are

only achieved through lifetimes of experience and development, and not simply

through psychotherapy sessions that “train the analysand to adopt a reflective

attitude” (Habermas 1984, 20).

Third, Habermas’ narrow focus on psychoanalysis as the paramount

science of self-reflection ignores the reflective sciences of other traditions.

Gunaratne points out that Habermas does not make an effort to understand or

analyze non-Western approaches to action and rationality, but instead relies

heavily on Weber’s controversial interpretations of Asian philosophies

(Gunaratne 2006, 118, 126, 128). Rothberg also challenges Habermas’ “extremely

problematic” assertion that psychoanalysis is the only tangible example of a

science incorporating methodical self-reflection. He observes that many wisdom

118
traditions have developed systematic and discursive modes of self-inquiry that

rely on sustained reflection (Rothberg 1983, 274n24). Rothberg concludes that

Habermas’ limited rationality paradigm

provides a vision of the highest human intelligence and aspirations being


connected entirely with the human world structured by language . . . There
is no attempt to transcend the human condition, by gaining direct contact
with either a higher divine realm or a completely “objective” reality met
outside of language . . . For Habermas, this type of rationality is social,
entirely discursive and bound by language; it is distinctly cut off from
“nature,” divinity, and cosmology. (Rothberg 1983, 279)

I suggest that Habermas, regardless of how brilliantly he reconstructs and

weaves together thoughtforms of the Western academic tradition, suffers from

illusion, as do all great thinkers up until the moment of self-transcendence and the

attainment of the relative omniscience of the soul and the awakening of the

Intuition. According to Bailey’s esoteric philosophy, Habermas’ illusion

can be understood to signify the reaction of the undisciplined mind to the


newly contacted world of ideas . . . The idea, or ideas, which he has
contacted are, if he could realise, only a fragment of a far greater Whole.
That which he brings to their interpretation is inadequate. The idea which
has emerged in his consciousness, through the partial awakening of his
intuition, will be distorted in its descent to his brain consciousness in
several ways. That which he brings to the materialising of the idea and to
its transformation into a practical working scheme is as yet wholly
unsuitable. The equipment does not suffice for accuracy. (Bailey 1950a,
54–55)

I suggest that through his great intellect and highly developed abstract mind

Habermas does intuit transcendent ideas, but he distorts them for three primary

reasons. First, the ray quality of the soul “colors” the interpretation of the sensed

idea (Bailey 1950a, 56). I suggest that Habermas’ vision is filtered through the

prism of a fifth ray soul and his thought processes are therefore guided to a degree

by the qualities of the fifth ray of Concrete Knowledge and Science. Second,
119
“illusion varies from age to age” and Habermas is “swept into” the limiting

mental constructions and general trends of his era (Bailey 1950a, 65). Finally, I

suggest that Habermas is susceptible to a relatively advanced form of illusion,

“wrong embodiment.”

This refers primarily to the difficulties encountered by those developed


souls who do touch the world of the intuition, who do intuit the great
spiritual ideas, and whose responsibility it is to embody them in some
form, automatically and spontaneously, through a trained and rhythmic
activity of the soul and mind, working always in the closest collaboration.
The idea is contacted, but is wrongly clothed in mental matter and
therefore wrongly started on its way to materialisation. It finds itself, for
instance, integrated into a group thoughtform [e.g., analytic philosophy] of
a colouring, keynote and substance which is entirely unsuited to its right
expression. (Bailey 1950a, 63–64; italics in the original)

Habermas concludes this section by acknowledging that he has introduced

the concept of rationality “in a rather intuitive way” that demands elucidation “in

terms of a theory of argumentation” (1984, 22). I suggest that not only his

introduction of a concept of rationality, but also his process of conceiving the

concept, both employ energies emanating from the planes of higher mind and

intuition. However, I also suggest that he misconceives the Idea of rationality and

that he therefore brings it into concrete manifestation, or clothes it in mental

matter, in inappropriate ways. These errors would include his separation of forms

of rationality into distinct domains, his insistence that these various forms be

substantiated through argumentation, his separation of individual ethical concerns

from moral issues and from the rationality problematic as a whole, and his

limiting of subjectivity to a shallow interpretation that does not do justice to the

strivings of individuals toward “self-realization” and an “authentic life.”

120
CHAPTER 7

AN EXCURSUS ON ARGUMENTATION

The Role of Argumentation in Justifying Validity Claims

In light of the central role that argumentation plays in his theory of

communicative rationality, Habermas concludes his preliminary analysis of the

rationality problematic with a lengthy excursus on the newly emerging theory of

argumentation. He distinguishes three theoretical perspectives, analytical aspects,

or levels of argumentative speech—process, procedure, and production. The first

perspective, process, examines the underlying presupposed symmetry conditions

existing among participants. From these conditions Habermas has delineated “the

general pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation as specifications of an ideal


180
speech situation” (1984, 25). Primary among these are presuppositions

regarding a complete lack of coercion or force among participants (except for the

force of the better argument) and the exclusion of “all motives except that of a

cooperative search for the truth.” The second perspective, procedure, considers

argumentation as a form of interaction subject to special rules. Participants

holding opposing points of view thematize a specific problematic validity claim

and test them with reasons, “and only with reasons,” to determine their validity.

The third perspective, production, examines the construction of convincing

arguments that are capable of redeeming or rejecting validity claims. Every

argument has an identical structure and is composed of a conclusion (validity

claim), a ground (reason supporting the claim), a warrant (a rule of inference or

principle) and backing (evidence).

121
Habermas suggests that these three perspectives delimit the traditional

Aristotelian disciplines of rhetoric, dialectic, and logic. They each reveal a

fundamental intuition connected with argumentation that can be described

respectively as: the convincing of a universal audience; the attainment of a

rationally motivated agreement; and the discursive redemption of a validity claim.

Habermas asserts that arguments are the means whereby the intersubjective

recognition of validity claims can be brought about, a process that transforms

opinions into knowledge. He concludes by emphasizing the unity of these three

aspects and he argues that the attempt to develop a theory of argumentation at

only one of these analytical levels is misguided.

Esoteric Critique

Habermas reveals his Eurocentric limitations by asserting that the theory

of argumentation, “is still in its beginnings . . . notwithstanding a venerable

tradition going back to Aristotle” (1984, 22). He appears to be unaware that the

theory of argumentation has long been an important aspect of Eastern traditions as

well. For example, it constitutes one of the six philosophical systems of

Hinduism, Nyāya, “the science of discussion” or of “logical proof” (Diener,

Ehrhard, Fischer-Schreiber, and Friedrichs 1994, s.v. “Nyāya”). In his

introduction to ten papers on the nature and role of argumentation in Buddhist


181
thought, Tom J. F. Tillemans notes the high level of sophistication of non-

Western approaches to the subject and the interest they would generate for any

truly broad-based and informed discussion. He criticizes the “embarrassingly”

dismissive and denigrating remarks of philosopher Anthony Flew who asserts that

122
Eastern philosophy is not concerned with argumentation, implying that it is

therefore not really philosophy at all. Traditionally, such ignorance has not been

uncommon among Western philosophers but Tillemans observes that “such Flew-

style dismissal is fortunately no longer acceptable” (Tillemans 2008, 2).

I suggest that Habermas is among the last generation of Western

philosophers who can comfortably ignore the wisdom of Eastern traditions. His

“modern” theory is actually going over old ground. Debate manuals of early

Buddhism include aspects of the “ideal speech situation,” as they provide explicit

rules concerning procedures and fairness, and describe the ideal individual or

“‘judicious person’ . . . who [embodies] standards of rationality . . . [and] who

engages in debate in a purely cooperative, non-aggressive, effort to seek truth”

(Tillemans 2008, 8). Tillemans points out that 1,500 years before Habermas,

“justificatory issues of knowledge claims came to the fore” within Buddhist

thought. In statements that sound very much like Habermas, Tillemans observes

that Buddhist logic requires “that good reasons must be sound . . . that the

opponent must know they are sound, and that they must be convincing to the

opponent who has the appropriate ‘desire to know’ (jijñāsā) something he does

not already know” (2008, 6).

From this it can be seen that the first two analytical aspects of

argumentation, process and procedure, have been explored for centuries within

Eastern philosophy. Regarding the third aspect, Habermas states that

argumentation aims to produce cogent arguments that are convincing (1984, 25).

This seemingly circular statement says nothing at all regarding how arguments are

123
actually produced. He merely enumerates their components or general structure

(conclusion, ground, warrant, and backing) yet, having no philosophy of mind, he

cannot explain how one constructs an argument through language. He simply

assumes that individuals somehow have arguments at the ready “when

disagreements can no longer be repaired with everyday routines” (Habermas


182
1984, 18). In his lengthy excursus on argumentation, Habermas primarily

focuses on the perceived limitations of several modern theorists in a technical

discussion intended to support his theory of communicative rationality. However,

these academic debates avoid the most important issues and reveal a characteristic

weakness in Habermas’ prolific thinking. As Whitebook insists, “[Habermas’]

methodological sophistication must not be achieved in a way which precludes so

many of the most interesting questions” (Whitebook 1985, 156). In the following

I will indicate several important questions underlying Habermas’ theory of

argumentation, questions that he ignores.

Habermas’ limited concept of subjectivity has prompted Lukes to ask the

fundamental questions, “Who are the participants in the unconstrained discourse

that is held to offer the possibility of rational consensus?” and “What are they

supposed to agree about?” (Lukes 1982, 141; italics in the original). Habermas

makes the homogenizing assumption that “all competent speakers” who share a

generalizable interest are rational agents who have the right to participate in

argumentative discourse. As noted, however, he fails to discuss the development

of rationality (which he asserts is merely “a disposition” [1984, 22]) or of

intelligence, and his democratic idealism prevents him from acknowledging their

124
183
uneven distribution within society. Habermas asserts that “argument plays an

important role in learning processes” and that learning processes, “through which

we acquire theoretical knowledge and moral insight . . . and overcome self-

deceptions . . . rely on argumentation,” yet he does not elucidate the nature of

“learning processes” (1984, 18, 22; italics in the original). He also states that

“arguments are the means by which . . . opinion . . . [is] transformed into

knowledge” (1984, 25), yet again, he does not explain how this “transformation”

actually occurs because he offers no theory of mind.

Habermas makes the metaphysical claim that a hearer responds to a

validity claim “in light of reasons or grounds; such positions are the expression of

insight or understanding [Einsicht]” (1984, 38; italics in the original). He does

not, however, explain the meaning of such esoteric expressions as: “in light of;”

“bringing us to see” (1984, 20); “to open the eyes of participants” (1984, 42); or
184
simply of “insight” and “understanding.” With reference to “insight,”

Habermas elsewhere refers to what Peirce termed inductive imagination, an

inspiring “sudden insight,” or “realization,” that leads to “a quantum leap . . . a

shift of perspective,” and to “intuitions” that can be “clarified” with the tools of

logic (Habermas 2001, 47), but he does not elaborate on the nature of “sudden
185
insights,” how they may be cultivated, or how “intuitions” can be “clarified.”

All of these concepts, however, are elucidated in Bailey’s theory of mind which

conceives of “learning processes” as the construction of the antahkarana and the

causal body out of the “light of substance and of matter” with the “light of
186
mind.” From the esoteric perspective, the logical clarification of intuitive
125
insights referred to by Habermas is the mental process of bringing ideas contacted

on the buddhic or intuitive plane into greater manifestation as thoughtforms on the

plane of lower mind.

Whereas Habermas’ democratic idealism presumably maintains that all

rational agents are capable of achieving intuitive insights and quantum leaps in

perspective, Bailey makes a distinction between those agents who are utilizing the

“light of knowledge” (the light of lower mind), the “light of wisdom” (the light of
187
the soul), and the “light of intuition” (1950a, 191–92). Similarly, Tillemans

distinguishes three different types of agents who participate in argumentative

discourse within Buddhist ethical reasoning: ordinary beings who are still self-

centered; disciples in higher training who have attained some understanding of

selflessness; and liberated beings who have transcended the self (2008, 10). He

also makes the important observation that argumentation in the Buddhist tradition

refers to both public debate or intersubjective discourse (parārtha), and to

“internal reasoning processes” (svārtha) or subjective reflection (Tillemans, 1).

In Habermas’ model, argumentation primarily takes place

intersubjectively among rational participants confined within three equiprimordial


188
dimensions. Without being able to conceive of higher or transrational

dimensions of mind and subjectivity, Habermas’ theory is restricted to rational

agents arguing among themselves on the level of the lower rational mind with an

implicit assumption that an ideal consensus will somehow be achieved “in light
189
of” the better argument. Habermas fails, however, to specify what constitutes

“the force of the better argument.” However, he does assert that

126
the “strength” of an argument is measured in a given context by the
soundness of the reasons; that can be seen in, among other things, whether
or not an argument is able to convince the participants in a discourse, that
is, to motivate them to accept the validity claim in question. (1984, 18)

There are several problems with this statement. First, Habermas’

reification of language leads him to the unwarranted belief that arguments can be
190
objectively “measured.” Second, since he has no theory of mind, Habermas is

unable to specify what constitutes a “reason” or how it may be “seen,” let alone

“measured.” Third, the ability to simply “convince” or “motivate” participants in

a discourse makes the counterfactual assumption that all participants share a

similar level of attained rationality. This assumption ignores the issue of achieved

intelligence (or lack thereof) and implies that the rhetorical skills of a demagogue,

which can “convince” and “motivate” an emotionally-polarized public, produces

“sound reasons.” Fourth, Habermas fails to enumerate any “other things” (other

than the power to “convince” and “motivate”) that might possibly demonstrate the

soundness of reasons.

Several critics have pointed out the serious problems with Habermas’

concept of “the force of the better argument.” Richard Bernstein asks, “Who

decides what is and what is not an argument, by what criteria, and what

constitutes the force of the better argument?” (Bernstein, Richard J., 1992, 220–

21). Cynthia Kaufman writes, “In assessing Habermas’ claim it is important to

note here that he has not explicitly told us what it is that gives an argument

‘force’” (1999, 353). She asserts that his theory of communicative rationality is

founded on the assumption of Western superiority and that there is also a

127
circularity in his “explanation of why we must accept the ideal speech situation as

the legitimizing ground of any discourse” (1999, 350).

The problem with Habermas’ view here is that it seems as though the
elements of our own world view which we must hold as sacred are
precisely those required for Habermas’ own conclusions . . . In his casual
discussion of what we should take in actual discussions as the force of the
better argument, we can see that he appeals to dominant conceptions of
common sense . . . [His characterization of] the rational person is the one
who agrees with the expectations grounded in existing value systems . . .
The notion of the force of the better argument must always rely on the
interpretive framework out of which a person is operating and there
is no way to bridge the gap separating different positions using nothing but
argumentation . . . In real life, those who win arguments are often those
whose views accord with dominant preconceptions . . . Thus, part of the
power of the force of an argument comes from the inertia of preconceived
ideas. (Kaufman 1999, 356–57)

I suggest that the dominant preconceptions and preconceived ideas referred to by

Kaufman are the relatively illusory thoughtforms that influence the thinking of all

rational agents. Regarding their hypostatization, Kaufman can be seen to be

making here the same argument against Habermas that Habermas makes against

primitive worldviews—his conceptual understanding “exhibits a structure that

binds . . . [his] consciousness more or less blindly to inherited interpretations and

does not permit consciousness of the possibility of alternative interpretations to

arise”—particularly non-Western interpretations (Habermas 1984, 61). Although

Habermas asserts that rationality necessitates openness and a willingness to

expose oneself to criticism and, if necessary, to participate in argumentation

(1984, 18, 48–53), several authors have questioned whether he is actually willing

to so participate (Halton 1995, 195; Lalonde 1999, 26; Pensky 1999, 231–32).

In addition to being apparently unaware of non-Western theories of

argumentation, not being able to explain how arguments are actually produced or
128
how their “force” can be measured, and not being able to thematize the skill or

intelligence required to produce convincing arguments or how this capacity is

distributed among participants, Habermas’ claim that learning processes “rely on”

argumentation excludes other important forms of accessing knowledge. Christian

de Quincey states that “recognizing the difference between an ‘argumentative

universe of discourse’ and a ‘dialogical universe of discourse’ . . . is crucial” and

he offers Bohmian dialogue as one of the best examples of the latter (de Quincey

2000, 205n31). The form of dialogue that has been developed by Bohm and
191
others seeks to explore together as a group the nature of thought processes,

their distortions and their potentials. “It can . . . be seen as an arena in which

collective learning takes place, and out of which a sense of increased harmony,

fellowship and creativity can arise” (Bohm, Factor, and Garrett 1991). Bohmian

dialogue makes no attempt to convince others or to achieve any form of

consensus. Understood esoterically, Bohmian dialogue is an example of

participants endeavoring to work on higher mental levels, the level of the Soul or

group consciousness. From this perspective, distortions, illusions, and outworn

thoughtforms on lower mental levels can be recognized and dispelled more easily

through dialogue, and ideas on intuitive levels can be recognized and developed

more readily. Bailey makes the observation,

Frequently, when disciples meet together and thus stimulate each others’
minds and centralize each others’ focused attention, they can unitedly
make a contact with the world of ideas which would otherwise be
impossible, and bring through the newer concepts into being. Again,
certain great ideas are to be found existing as currents of energy upon the
mental plane, and can there be contacted and forced into embodiment
through the trained attention of disciples. (1950a, 61)

129
I suggest that Bohmian dialogue is an example of the construction of the group
192
antahkarana as explicated by Bailey.

Down the ages individuals have built their individual bridges between the
higher and the lower, but so successful has been the evolutionary process
that today the time has come for a group understanding of this emerging
technique, for a group bridging, leading to a consequent or subsequent
group revelation. This provides the modern opportunity in the field of
education. It indicates the responsibility of the educator and points out the
necessity for a new unfoldment in educational methods. The “group
aspirant” must be met and the group antahkarana must be built. (Bailey
1954, 29)

Habermasian argumentative discourse, on the other hand, takes place on the levels

of lower rational mind and is essentially the positing of claims and counterclaims

among monological agents who are seeking to convince others of their “better”

argument. I suggest that cooperative and creative work on all mental levels,

guided by goodwill and loving understanding among participants, constitutes the

true nature of intersubjectivity, an idea that Habermas faintly intuits but distorts in

his construction of a theory of communicative rationality founded upon the

practice of argumentation.

130
CHAPTER 8

MYTHICAL AND MODERN WORLDVIEWS

The Structures of Mythical Understanding

Habermas acknowledges that his preliminary remarks are limited by their

individualistic and unhistorical point of view and are not, therefore, adequate

from a sociological perspective to analyze societal rationalization. He endeavors

to correct this imbalance by asking the central question as to whether an

individual or group behaves rationally in general, across various domains of

interaction, thereby evincing a rational conduct of life. Habermas suggests that in

the sociocultural conditions for such rational behavior there is reflected a

collectively shared store of background knowledge, or rationalized lifeworld, that

conditions action orientations. However, as the concept of the lifeworld is too

complex to explicate directly at this point, Habermas begins by examining

cultural interpretive systems, or worldviews, that reflect this background

knowledge and that serve to coordinate various action orientations. His aim is to

address the empirical level of his theory and to explore the conditions that

structures of worldviews must satisfy in order to make possible a rational conduct

of life. In addition to shifting the focus from conceptual to empirical analysis, this

approach brings into question the generally presupposed universality of modern

Western rationality structures. Habermas proposes that a comparison of our

modern worldview with the sharpest possible contrast, as found in mythical

worldviews, should be undertaken in order to highlight previously unthematized

131
presuppositions of modern thought, and to determine the significance of such a

claim to universality.

Habermas prefaces his remarks by noting anthropological studies that

show members of primitive tribal societies have the capacity for logical

understanding and for acquiring the same formal operations as do members of

modern societies, although “higher level competences appear less frequently” in


193
primitive societies (Habermas 1984, 45). In light of this apparent universal

capacity, he concludes that the rationality of a worldview cannot be measured in

terms of logical and semantic properties, but rather must be measured in terms of

the formal-pragmatic basic concepts a worldview provides for interpretation.

These “formal-pragmatic basic concepts” are essentially the ontological

orientations, or “world-relations,” within any worldview which permit interpretive

understanding within various domains. While a cognitive relation or objectivating

attitude toward the material world is a primary example, Habermas asserts that

relations to both the social (norm-conformative) and subjective (expressive)

worlds are necessary as well. These attitudes will be discussed in Chapter 9.

Habermas begins his analysis by noting that myths serve to organize a

wealth of information regarding the natural and social worlds, but only in a single

dimension wherein every individual appearance resembles or contrasts with every

other appearance through a mode of analogical thinking. From a structuralist

perspective, this totalizing power of the “savage mind” operates concretistically,

as it weaves surface perceptions or appearances into a single network of

correspondence. Habermas asserts that both of these operations—the perceptually

132
based concretism of thought and the utilization of similarity and contrast

relations—“can be compared with ontogenetic stages of cognitive development”

(1984, 46). He concludes that the undifferentiated “mythical interrelation of

perspectives between man and world, between culture and nature” provides both

an explanatory narrative and a logical practice through which the world can be
194
controlled in an imaginary and magical way.

Esoteric Critique

Habermas’ analysis of mythical worldviews has led several critics to

charge him with distorting, suppressing, and/or ignoring important aspects of

mythical thought, acts which Paget Henry describes as a form of “discursive

violence . . . [which devalue] the explanatory and behavior-coordinating powers

of the ego/spirit relationship, which is central to myth” (Henry 2000, 90, 97–
195
98). Henry also argues that Habermas’ assumption that the mythological

worldviews of primitive societies provide “the sharpest contrast” and the

“antithesis” to modern understanding creates a false dichotomy or “binary

oppositional structure” of primitive vs. modern (Henry 2000, 89–90).

Habermas claims that the rationality of worldviews can be “measured” “in

terms of the formal-pragmatic basic concepts they place at the disposal of

individuals for interpreting their world” (1984, 45). He further claims that “in the

sociocultural conditions for such a [rational] conduct of life there is reflected

perhaps the rationality of a lifeworld shared not only by individuals but by

collectives as well” (1984, 43). However, his formulation of the central question

as being the determination of whether or not an individual or group “behaves

133
rationally in general” implies that most members of modern societies do

consciously utilize the full range of formal-pragmatic concepts “placed at their

disposal” and that they likewise collectively “share” a rationalized lifeworld,

whereas members of primitive societies do not. Habermas further reinforces this

dualistic or binary thinking when he speaks on behalf of all members of modern

societies: “What we find most astonishing . . . ” (1984, 47; italics in the original);

and, “What irritates us members of a modern lifeworld . . . ” (1984, 48; italics

added). While Habermas makes an apparently obvious contrast between modern

and mythical worldviews, such a distinction is not so simple when one considers
196
the prevalence of irrational and mythical beliefs within modern societies.

While affirming a developmental logic of consciousness, the esoteric

perspective does not make such a sharp contrast regarding the distribution of

mythical and modern rationality structures. Contrary to Habermas, the esoteric

perspective maintains that few members of modern societies are capable of

rational behavior in general, across all domains of thought and action as most

people are as yet emotionally polarized (Bailey 1925, 953–54; 1934, 293, 357;

1953, 25). While Habermas’ construction of a sharp contrast between mythical

and modern rationality structures largely precludes the perpetuation of pre-

modern beliefs within modern societies, he is also unable or unwilling to postulate

a form of life or structures of consciousness that will eventually supersede

modern rational worldviews, just as the latter have, to a degree, superseded

mythical worldviews. Rothberg addresses this point in observing,

One could construct a very similar argument in response to Habermas’


parallel claim that the modern world view has genuinely “overcome” the
134
religious or metaphysical world view . . . there may be a more
comprehensive totalizing framework that “overcomes” communicative
rationality, while incorporating what has been lost or excluded in the
modern world view. (Rothberg 1983, 385)

My claim is that the Esoteric Philosophy, which integrates Eastern and Western,

ancient and modern perspectives, provides such a comprehensive framework.

I suggest that what really “irritates” Habermas about primitive cultures is

not their inferior capacity to make fundamental differentiations, but is rather their

display of a different quality of thinking that is essentially foreign to his esoteric

constitution. I suggest that whereas Habermas is strongly influenced by the

separative fifth ray energy of Concrete Knowledge and Science with its primary

qualities of rational analysis, measurement, and differentiation, mythical

worldviews express holistic fourth ray mental qualities such as comparison,

analogical imagination, harmonization, and synthesis. Although scientific

thinking has dominated Western thought for several centuries, fourth ray

cognitive qualities are equally legitimate, and are becoming increasingly valorized
197
and empirically established.

In the following analysis I have two objectives. First, I attempt to

demonstrate that Habermas is deeply imbued with (most likely on the level of the

soul and/or personality) and strongly exhibits qualities of the fifth ray of Concrete

Knowledge and Science. Second, I interpret the operations of mythical thinking

esoterically, as constituting a complementary mode of thought or mental quality

(fourth ray), and in doing so I rely heavily on the arguments of Alexander

Bertland (2000). This analysis suggests that the initial colonization of the lower

mental plane by premodern, mythical, or primitive cultures was qualified by the


135
fourth ray of Harmony Through Conflict over eons of time, and that the deeper

penetration, or subsequent colonization of “higher” levels of the mental plane by

modern cultures as the result of evolutionary development, has been qualified by


198
the fifth ray of Concrete Knowledge and Science. I make extensive use of

quotations in this analysis to highlight the similarities between ray qualities as

they are described in the esoteric literature and as they are exemplified in both

Habermas’ writings and in Bertland’s presentation of mythical thought.

Habermas and the Fifth Ray

A cursory content analysis would reveal that throughout his writings and

speech, Habermas repeatedly utilizes terms and concepts that Robbins associates

with a fifth ray mind, terms such as: precise; keen; sharp; measured; accurate;

exact; correct; acutely analytical; discriminating; and separating (Robbins 1988a,

371; see also Appendix D). A few examples include (italics added): (1) “The goal

of reconstructive language analysis is an explicit description . . . would thus

describe exactly . . . ” (Habermas 1979, 26); (2) “Communications-theoretical

concepts which possess the analytic precision needed . . . ” (1992a, 105); (3) “We

. . . cannot with sufficient precision, make certain differentiations . . . categorial

distinction . . . specify explicitly . . . correct conceptual separations . . . deficient

differentiation . . . draw with sufficient precision . . . ” (1984, 48–49); (4) “Ethical

formalism is incisive in the literal sense: the universalization principle acts like a

knife that makes razor-sharp cuts . . . ” (1991, 104); (5) “A clear

demarcation . . . ” (1984, 51); (6) “If their rationality is measured by . . . ” (1984,

14); (7) “The ‘strength’ of an argument is measured . . . ” (1984, 18); (8) “The

136
rationality of worldviews is . . . measured . . . ” (1984, 45); (9) “Measured against
199
criticizable claims . . . ” (1984, 51).

While admirably demonstrating the strengths of fifth ray qualities,

Habermas expresses their weaknesses as well. The following is a list of the

primary “glamours” of the fifth ray, all of which I suggest Habermas exhibits to

some degree.

The glamour of materiality, or over-emphasis of form.


The glamour of the intellect.
The glamour of knowledge and of definition.
The glamour of assurance, based on a narrow point of view.
The glamour of the form which hides reality.
The glamour of the outer, which hides the inner.
The glamour of organisation. (Bailey 1950a, 122)

With respect to the latter glamour, Habermas’ obsession with organization,

categorization, and classification is well-known. Anthony Giddens describes this

glamour when he writes:

Habermas has a passion for tables and classification even where these
seem to obscure the process of rational argumentation rather than further
it. One table contains no fewer than thirty-two categories! A consequence
of this taxonomic fervor is that Habermas’s writing has something of a
puritanical formalism. Often where one would like to see evidence
presented to support a view that is proposed, a table is offered instead—as
if the way to overcome potential objections is to pulverize them into
conceptual fragments. (Giddens 1985, 112; italics in the original)

Regarding this “taxonomic fervor,” Robbins observes that

The fifth ray mind seeks to create in thought and language an ever more
exact “model” of reality. It closely examines a particular object or field of
study, and attempts to identify, classify and correlate all its “parts and
pieces.” (Robbins 1988a, 376)

The glamour of materiality or over-emphasis on form is revealed in

Habermas’ turn to linguistic analysis, in his development of a universal

137
pragmatics, and in his “hesitancy” or aversion to adopting a “transcendental”

pragmatics such as that proposed by his colleague Karl-Otto Apel (Habermas

1979, 21–26). Habermas claims that

the linguistic turn has placed philosophizing on a more secure


methodological basis and has led it out of the aporias of theories of
consciousness . . . World-constitutive accomplishments are transferred
from transcendental subjectivity to grammatical structures. The
reconstructive work of the linguist replaces a kind of introspection that
cannot be readily checked on. That is, the rules according to which signs
are linked, sentences are formed, and utterances are brought forth can be
read off from linguistic formations as if from something lying before one.
200
(Habermas 1992b, 7–8; italics added)

In adopting the linguistic turn, Habermas has something concrete to focus on, an

“ontological understanding of language” (Habermas 1992b, 8), through a

reconstructive empirical “science” that employs procedures that “are in many

ways like the procedures used in the nomological sciences” (Habermas 1979, 25).

I suggest, however, that by abandoning the philosophy of consciousness and

committing himself to the linguistic turn, Habermas has reified language and

remains trapped within the glamours and illusions of materiality and the outer

world of form (or “linguistic formations”) despite his reconstructive efforts to

discover the underlying “generative rules and cognitive schemata . . . which make

language, cognition and action possible” (Habermas 1978, 377).

While Habermas finds the leveling of the domains of nature and culture

within primitive societies to be “most astonishing” (1984, 47) he is apparently

oblivious to the possibility that the “equiprimordiality” of his own formal

pragmatic structures constitutes an even greater leveling of domains. Habermas

claims,

138
Speakers and hearers operate with a system of several equally primordial
worlds. That is, with propositionally differentiated speech they have
mastered not only a level on which they can describe states of affairs . . .
rather, all three functions—the “descriptive,” the “signaling” and the “self-
expressive”—lie in one and the same evolutionary plane.” (1984, 84;
italics in the original)

From the esoteric perspective, this “evolutionary plane” to which Habermas


201
restricts his theoretical model is the level of the lower rational mind.

Habermas’ strong fifth ray bias and his inability or unwillingness to

recognize “mythical thought’s unique power,” leads Bertland to question whether

Habermas avoids Vico’s concept of “the conceit of scholars.”

This conceit is the tendency of scholars to assume that all people think in
the same basic fashion that scholars do . . . Because of this conceit,
scholars have failed to understand mythical thought because they have
assumed that it was a weak form of modern thought. (Bertland 2000, 76)

I suggest that this conceit arises from the projection and universalization of fifth

ray qualities, a rational, scientific, analytical, “scholarly” perspective, onto other

individuals and groups. Habermas is so deeply imbued with these qualities that he

cannot help but project such a view and therefore he has difficulty recognizing the
202
legitimacy of other forms of acquiring and expressing knowledge.

As a final comment regarding the weaknesses of the fifth ray that may

well apply to Habermas, Bailey observes,

Fifth ray people suffer the least from glamour [distortions on emotional
levels] but are primarily the victims of illusion [distortions on mental
levels], and for them the Technique of the Presence is all-important
because it brings in a factor which the true fifth ray person is apt to negate
and refuse to admit, the fact of the Higher Self. He feels self-sufficient.
They respond so easily and with such satisfaction to the power of thought;
pride in their mental competence is their besetting sin and they are,
therefore, set in their purposes and preoccupied with the world of the
concrete and the intellectual. The moment that the Angel of the Presence

139
[i.e., the soul] is a reality to them, their response to illusion weakens and
disappears. Their major problem is not so much the negation of the astral
[emotional] body, for they are apt to despise its hold, but they have a
major difficulty in recognising that which the mind is intended to
reveal—the divine spiritual Self. Their lower concrete mind interposes
203
itself between them and the vision. (Bailey 1950a, 223)

Mythical Thought and the Fourth Ray

Bertland disputes Habermas’ claim that the distinction between mythical

thought and instrumental thought is communicative rather epistemological. In

describing the nature of mythical thought Bertland writes,

The eighteenth-century Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico would


question the way Habermas draws the distinction. In the New Science, he
claims that for philosophy to comprehend mythical thought, it must be
respected as a distinct form of non-reflective thought. It must further be
understood as having a unique poetic logic which is grounded in mimesis.
Vico draws the distinction epistemologically and would claim that the
communicative distinction follows from it. (Bertland 2000, 71)

My claim is that this “distinct form of non-reflective thought” described by Vico

is the expression of mental activity governed by the fourth ray of Harmony

through Conflict, whereas the reflective, discriminating, categorizing form of

rational thought championed by Habermas is the expression of mental activity

governed by the fifth ray of Concrete Knowledge and Science. These two

qualities appear to reflect seemingly opposite cognitive processes and Robbins

notes many fundamental contrasts between these two ray energies (Robbins
204
1988a, 215–18; see also Appendix C). Rather than being an inferior or

undeveloped type of thought, the esoteric philosophy maintains that fourth ray

cognitive processes are an equally legitimate and complementary form of thought

140
relative to the modern hegemony of fifth ray concrete rationality (see Appendix

D).

Rothberg makes this argument in his critique of Habermas’ understanding

of primitive worldviews. He quotes Levi-Strauss’ assertion that mythical thought

constitutes a parallel, not inferior, mode of thought and implies that Habermas has

misappropriated Levi-Strauss’ work.

Although Habermas bases his analysis on the work of Levi-Strauss and


Godelier, the developmental emphasis is quite foreign to Levi-Strauss’
account of the “savage mind;” primitive (or “magical”) thought is
understood as parallel to, rather than “overcome” by, the modern world
view and modern thought: “Magical thought [fourth ray mentality] is not
to be regarded as a beginning, a rudiment, a sketch, a part of a whole
which has not yet materialized. It forms a well-articulated system, and is
in this respect independent of that other system which constitutes science
[fifth ray mentality], except for the purely formal analogy which brings
them together and makes the former a sort of metaphorical expression of
the latter. It is therefore better, instead of contrasting magic and science, to
compare them as two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge.” (Rothberg
1983, 398n116; Lévi-Strauss 1966, 19)

Bertland makes a similar point by suggesting that Vico would assert the existence

of two distinct modes of thinking.

The real danger is believing that mythical thinkers think the same way
as moderns. Because Habermas states that mythical thought has the same
basic logical structure as modern thought, Habermas cannot recognize
mythical thought’s unique power. Instead, Habermas essentially reduces
mythical thought to nothing more than an inferior form of instrumental
thought since the closed nature of mythical thought prevents it from
having the same cognitive adequacy as instrumental thought. Habermas
does not recognize the possibility of a unique criterion for mythical
thought from which it may be judged on its own terms. Vico would
suggest another way out of the antinomy. Instead of arguing for many
forms of thought, as Winch does, or one form of thought, as Evans-
205
Pritchard does, Vico argues simply for the existence of two forms of
thought. Winch tried to make the negative argument that modern thought
could not comprehend other forms of thought. Vico, instead, tries to
demonstrate the existence of mythical thought positively by outlining its

141
structure. He tries to do this directly by showing the unique coherence and
criteria of mythical thought. (Bertland 2000, 76–77)

Through the use of numerous quotations, in the following I note aspects of

the structure of mythical thought as recognized by Vico and compare them with

Robbin’s descriptions of the fourth ray mind. This comparative analysis

demonstrates that many of the qualities Vico and Habermas use to describe

mythical thinking are seemingly exact descriptions of fourth ray qualities.

Bertland claims that Vico

would show that mythical thought has its own set of criteria. As a starting
point for explaining these criteria, he would suggest that Habermas was
correct to emphasize the fact that mythical thought is grounded in
comparison rather that categorization. Yet, he would say that Habermas
did not take that idea far enough. The imagination . . . creates through
finding similarities. Mythical thought is a powerful act of the imagination
rather than categorization.
Vico claims that people have a natural tendency to understand
what is unknown by comparing it with what is known. (Bertland 2000,
83; italics added)

Compare this description with Robbins’ account of the fourth ray mind:

The fourth ray is one of the primary rays of relationship. It inspires the
quest for harmony, which is based upon finding similarities,
resemblance’s or compatibilities between people or things which must be
related. When the fourth ray qualifies the mental field, it creates a mind
focused upon finding “points in common.” The entire aesthetic process is
dependent upon the ability to relate the elements within any whole in a
harmonious fashion. When identities, similarities, resemblances,
compatibilities, complementarities, supplementarities, resonances, etc., are
discovered between two such elements, and such avenues of potential
harmonization are cultivated, then a bridge or link between the elements is
created. Rather than attempt to separate elements on the basis of
differentiation, the fourth ray mind is attuned to discovering lines of
harmonious relationship between elements. (Robbins 1988a, 362; italics
in the original)

142
Referring to mythical thought Habermas states,

Information is organized in such a way that every individual appearance


in the world, in its typical aspects, resembles or contrast with every other
appearance. Through these contrast and similarity relations the
multiplicity of observations is united in a totality . . . Structuralists explain
this synthetic accomplishment through the fact that the “savage mind”
fastens in a concretistic way upon the perceptual surface of the world and
orders these perceptions by drawing analogies and contrasts. Domains of
phenomena are interrelated and classified from the vantage points of
homology and heterogeneity, equivalence and inequality, identity and
contrariety . . . Analogical thought weaves all appearances into a single
network of correspondence. (Habermas 1984, 45–46; italics in the
original)

Esotericists, on the other hand, would likely explain this “synthetic

accomplishment” as the result of a conditioning fourth ray mentality.

The fourth ray mind has a facility for “likening” one thing to another
through the use of simile. In addition, the capacity of the fourth ray mind
to create “mental fusion” is seen in its frequent use of metaphor . . .
Analogy is a faculty possessed by all minds, but by the fourth ray
mind particularly. Its analogies are not exact, technical or mechanistic; it
does not build analogical “models” as does the fifth ray mind, nor seek to
portray exact correspondences. Instead, fourth ray analogies are broad and
imagistic . . .
The fourth ray mind, while not irrational, is frequently “non-
rational.” The linearity so much associated with the reasoning process
holds no appeal. Because this type of mind is “holistic” and inclusive,
there is an innate realization of how inadequate and exclusive strict logic
and rationality can be. The fourth ray mind is sensitive to subtle
dimensions and nuances of thought which “rigorous thinking” can never
touch . . .
The fourth ray mind seeks, through the inventive power of the
creative imagination, to create new realities. It is the mind which
understands the magical “What if?” . . .
It is a mind which relates . . . the contents of consciousness . . .
on the basis of similarity and contrast, likeness and unlikeness. (Robbins
1988a, 367–69; italics in the original)

The fourth ray mind not only finds similarities and produces reconciliation

between objects, it is also a mind that is highly sensitive to conflict, struggle and

crisis. It can therefore be characterized as antagonistic, contradictory,


143
oppositional, and, perhaps less dramatically, paradoxical (Robbins 1988a, 363,

365, 369), qualities of mythical thinking that Habermas has described above as

“contrasting,” “contrariety,” and “heterogeneous.”

While finding similarities or dissimilarities between objects is typical of

mythical thinking, Vico also emphasizes its capacity for finding connections

between differences.

[Vico] suggests that the problem with modern philosophy and society is
that it recognizes the scientific problem solving ability of critique [fifth
ray] but does not recognize the inventive power of rhetoric [fourth ray].
Rhetoric does not solve problems by generating a method as instrumental
thought does. Rather, rhetoric generates ideas by locating the middle term
between disparate objects . . . Nothing new is being created, but ideas are
found that connect other ideas. This brings the speaker and the audience
together and makes ideas intelligible. (Bertland 2000, 82; italics added)

The criterion of mythical thought, for Vico, is its ability to persuade by


creating an effective common ground in which the members of the tribe
can live. (Bertland 2000, 84; italics added)

Robbins describes the same process as follows:

The fourth ray mind instinctively assumes (or works its way towards) the
middle position. From there, it can see the value of positions on either
side. This is a mind which can act as a “shuttle” between polarized points
of view, pointing out commonalities and promoting communication . . .
This type of mind will always work to find those points in
common through which the reconciliation of sharply dissonant thoughts
can be achieved. (Robbins 1988a, 363; italics in the original)

The fourth ray mind is intent upon “tuning up” its relationship with other
minds, so that there may be a “common understanding.” (Robbins 1988a,
366)

Bertland claims that his criticisms of Habermas’ interpretation of myth

point to the need for a paradigm shift (Bertland 2000, 72). Rothberg also argues

that Habermas’ account of primitive and modern cognitive and experiential modes

is “seriously defective” (Rothberg 1983, 383–84). As Bertland and Rothberg


144
agree, Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality is not adequate to the task

of understanding either mythical or modern thought. My claim is that Bailey’s

esoteric philosophy provides a paradigm that is adequate to the task as it

explicates the differences between mythical and modern modes of thinking not

only ontologically in developmental terms, but as differences between two

fundamental qualities of mental activity as well.

145
CHAPTER 9

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF FORMAL WORLDS

Basic Attitudes Toward the Objective, Social, and Subjective Worlds

The “irritation” expressed by Habermas regarding mythical worldviews

results not merely from their confusion or “mixing” of two object domains, nature

and culture, but from their more fundamental inability to differentiate between

“basic attitudes toward worlds” (1984, 48–49). In order to make more explicit

distinctions between nature and culture, or between the objective world and

legitimate interpersonal relations, it is necessary to postulate both an objectivating

attitude toward the world of existing states of affairs and a norm-conformative

attitude toward the social world. Prior to the development of these distinct

attitudes, language and world remain undifferentiated in mythical societies and


206
basic semiotic distinctions are not available. Without this differentiation,

Habermas claims, non-reflective mythical societies are unable to perceive their

closed worldview “as an interpretation of the world that is subject to error and

open to criticism” (1984, 50; italics in the original).

In modern societies, on the other hand, validity claims that are open to

criticism serve as a rational foundation for, and thereby legitimize, the modern

worldview. The explicit differentiation of formal world concepts reveals “formal

presuppositions of intersubjectivity,” or “presuppositions of commonality,” which

assure all observers of the truth of propositions in a common objective world, and

all members of the rightness of an action in a commonly shared social world of

existing norms. Habermas further contends that only as the formal concepts of an

146
external world and a social world develop and become differentiated can “the

complementary concept of the internal world or of subjectivity arise” (1984, 51;

italics in the original). The subjective world is distinct from both the objective and

social worlds as it confers privileged access to the individual and is not commonly

shared. Habermas suggests that the subjective world

delimits from the objective and social worlds a domain for each member
of what is not common . . . [and] can be analyzed with reference to an
additional basic attitude [expressive] and an additional validity claim
[truthfulness or sincerity]. (1984, 52; italics in the original)

Esoteric Critique

Habermas’ meager and problematic analysis of how the subjective world

comes into being, how this domain is constituted, and how expressive attitudes

are formed, provides an opportunity to note additional criticisms from several

authors regarding his understanding of subjectivity. These criticisms include the

assertions that: Habermas has not extricated himself from metaphysics and the

philosophy of consciousness with his turn to linguistics and his focus on

intersubjective communication; he is closed to exploring other dimensions of

subjectivity; and his theory fails to identify a concrete subject of transformative

social action. I note these criticisms to demonstrate a major weakness in

Habermas’ theory and to indicate the need for a logical and comprehensive theory

of subjectivity such as that provided by Bailey. I conclude this section by noting

the various stages of duality through which human consciousness progresses.

These stages will suggest a more complex distinction between primitive and

modern cultures than Habermas’ “binary oppositional structure” that is based on

formal world-concepts limited to the plane of mind.


147
Further Problems with Habermas’ Concept of Subjectivity

Despite his claim that the subjective world “arises” only after the objective

and social worlds have been differentiated, Habermas fails to make explicit how

the subjective world comes into being, or how it is uniquely “delimited” from the

objective and social worlds for each individual. Joel Whitebook observes that

Habermas is unable to explain this “transition from soma to psyche” and claims

that Habermas “attempts not so much to solve the problem [of inner nature] as to

dissolve it” because of his rigid and unbridgeable theoretical categories

(Whitebook 1985, 156).

Peter Dews points out that “Habermas has long relied on Mead’s

interactionism for his basic account of the genesis of the self” (Dews 1995,
207
175) but argues that Habermas’ shift to an intersubjective paradigm displaces

the primary role of subjectivity, a role which cannot be legitimately ignored.

Referring to the challenges to Habermas’ theory posed by Dieter Henrich, Dews

goes on to observe that “an over-easy recourse” to an intersubjective paradigm

shift “can readily become a historicist evasion of philosophical issues” (Dews

1995, 171). Habermas’ “facile evasions” of the problems of subjectivity and self-

consciousness only result in the reproduction of these problems in a “more

convoluted form” (Dews 1995, 178) as, for example, the transcendental functions

of the subject are replaced by the background structures of the lifeworld (Dews

1995, 187) Dews concludes that such evasions reveal that Habermas is still very

much immersed in metaphysics despite his claims to have achieved a

postmetaphysical position (Dews 1995, 186).

148
Dallmayr argues that Habermas’ “nonchalant” attitude toward

intersubjectivity “seems to regard the issue as settled due to his turn to language,”

while in fact the dilemmas besetting the linguistic turn make Habermas’ position

“hardly adequate or persuasive.” Dallmayr continues by observing that the

weaknesses of Habermas model are the result of a

persistent influence of the “philosophy of consciousness” (or subjectivity),


and more generally of the legacy of metaphysics. The influence is evident
in the pervasive emphasis on “basic dispositions” or “attitudes”
(Grundeinstellungen)—which can only be dispositions of consciousness.
(Dallmayr 1987, 96–97; italics added)

Dallmayr concludes by arguing that the distinct categories Habermas derives from

speech act theory “have come under serious attack in recent decades,” revealing

“the porousness of consciousness and the necessary interpenetration of subject

and world.” Rather than avoiding this problem Dallmayr asks of Habermas, “Why

should ‘critical theory’ (of all outlooks) be hardened into a barrier against

innovation and against a critical rethinking of the metaphysical tradition?”

(Dallmayr 1987, 98).

James L. Marsh questions “whether Habermas’ conception of

individuality is too thin and impoverished.” In noting Habermas’ use of Mead’s

distinction “between a socialized ‘Me’ and a creative, free ‘I,’” Marsh suggests

that this distinction offers

an opening into an existential phenomenological reflection on interiority,


which Habermas does not take. Such a path of reflection articulates a
domain of human experience that itself can plausibly be said to open up to
and be completed in a metaphysical-religious affirmation and
commitment . . . Not to make such an affirmation and commitment is to
short-circuit and arbitrarily limit the fundamental human drive to
208
intelligibility and value. (Marsh 1993, 524–25)

149
K. L. Afrasiabi makes a similar argument in exploring the possibilities for

a “postcommunication” theology.

Without, however, a more elaborate conception of the “inner world,”


which may imply a reconstruction of the theory of rationality from the
bottom up, Habermasian theory remains fundamentally inadequate and
without much seductive power for theology . . . The idea of self-
communication serves to highlight the non-intersubjective dimension of
inner life that, when theologically understood, underscores the primary
phenomenological perception and desire of deity. (Afrasiabi 1998, 83–85;
italics added)

An esoteric analysis of Habermas’ model of subjectivity would require a

separate study. The inadequacies appear to be so great that Whitebook claims,

“Habermas leaves the dimension of private subjective interiority completely

unplumbed” (Whitebook 1997, 186), and Henrich refers to Habermas’ “empty

concept of a ‘subjective world’” (Henrich 1999, 316).

The practical consequence of Habermas’ theoretical construction of

subjectivity is that he is unable to postulate a conscious, transformational agent

imbued with will and purpose. According to David Held, Habermas apparently

maintains an outmoded form of Marxist thought,

“contemplative materialism,” a materialism which neglect[s] the central


importance of human subjectivity . . . By underplaying human subjectivity
and consciousness Marxists missed the very factors which were so central
in preventing the emergence of a revolutionary agent. (Held 1980, 21)

J. M. Bernstein asserts that Habermas “tends to elide what is central to

transcendental argumentation, namely, self-consciousness.”

What it is for anyone to be a self-conscious agent is left unspecified . . .


Thus the conditions for subjectivity come to displace subjectivity itself,
and . . . subjectivity can be read out of the argument altogether. But this
strategy begs the question at issue: What is it to be a self-conscious agent?
And who is this agent? . . . Habermas’s subject of an undistorted

150
communication community is a logical fiction. (J. M. Bernstein 1995, 85–
209
86)

Bailey clearly asserts that the emancipatory agent is the New Group of

World Servers, and more generally, the women and men of goodwill throughout
210
the world. These are relatively advanced individuals who have not only

developed rational capacities but who have also developed to a significant degree

the powers of the soul, and who are working to blend will, love, and intelligence

as they become increasingly decentered and group conscious.

An Excursus on the Stages of Duality

Bailey states that the primary cause of all glamours results from a sense of

duality and that this false perception passes through several major stages in the

evolution of human consciousness until a relative unity is achieved (1950a, 94). In

the first stage “man, refusing to recognise the difference existing between him and

the material and natural world, seeks to identify himself with it” (1950a, 95). This

is in agreement with Habermas’ general understanding of primitive societies and

his reference to anthropological studies that reveal a confusion between nature

and culture within such societies (Habermas 1984, 48). However, Habermas treats

such confusion as occurring primarily on the plane of mind as he refers to the

“savage mind,” “savage thought,” “conceptual blending,” and to “analogical

thought” (1984, 45–49; italics added). In contrast, Bailey asserts that this initial

“confusion” exists essentially on the physical plane. This first major duality is

between the physical and etheric bodies, or between “the mechanism of contact

151
upon the physical plane,” and “the mechanism of contact with the inner forces,

energies and worlds of being” (Bailey 1950a, 96).

Once this duality has been resolved, the next major duality confronting

humanity arises on the emotional plane. The resolution of this duality requires the

development of discrimination which leads to a temporary sense of unity achieved

on mental levels. The third major duality, however, then arises on the plane of

mind between the lower and higher mind. This duality is resolved through the

process of decentration which leads eventually to union with the soul. Bailey

observes that these stages of duality are both phylogenetic and ontogenetic, and

that they succeed each other cyclically, although “with much overlapping.”

You will have noted how the career of the man has, therefore, proceeded
from a crisis of duality to one of a relative unity, only to have that sense of
unification disturbed by a renewed recognition of a higher and deeper
duality. This duality temporarily produces another cleavage in a man’s
life, and thus re-initiates a torturing process of bridging or of “occultly
healing” this break in the continuity of the spiritual consciousness. (Bailey
1950a, 101–3)

The final overcoming of each stage of duality on the physical, emotional,

and mental planes marks the achievement of the first three initiations. Viewing

human development from the esoteric perspective, as comprised of succeeding

stages of duality, reveals Habermas’ faith in the powers of the rational mind and

discursive argumentation to be only a temporary sense of achieved unity. The

associated feelings of empowerment and confidence will yield eventually to

uncertainty as a newly perceived sense of duality fosters decentration and leads

toward higher levels of mind, intuitive insights, wisdom, and eventual unity with

the transpersonal self, the soul.

152
CHAPTER 10

THE RATIONALITY DEBATES

Introduction

Habermas observes that the question remains as to whether modern forms

of rationality are merely particular features of a historically situated, scientifically

oriented culture, or whether they may rightfully raise a claim to universality. This

question was brought to the forefront of academic debate by Peter Winch who

challenged the pervasive ethnocentrism found in studies of primitive cultures

(Winch 1958; 1964). In response, many critics have accused Winch of endorsing

a position of cultural relativism that fails to appreciate the irreversible advances of

modernity. Habermas surveys the resulting controversy among social scientists,

cultural anthropologists, and philosophers, and frames the polarized positions in


211
terms of six pairs of arguments, both for and against a universalistic position.

He concludes that both positions are limited and contends that his theory of

communicative rationality offers a way out of the impasse. On the one hand, he

defends universal standards of rationality by judging Winch’s arguments as too

weak to maintain the thesis that every cultural form of life exhibits a unique and

incommensurable concept of rationality. On the other hand, he criticizes the

“rationalists” for adhering to a largely cognitive-instrumental understanding of

rationality “that is fixated on knowing and mastering external nature” (Habermas

1984, 66). Before providing an esoteric analysis I will first note some critical

observations of Habermas’ position made by Marie Fleming and McCarthy.

153
Substantive and Formal Standards of Rationality

Fleming’s analysis (1997) of Habermas’ arguments leads her to posit that

his ability to avoid either extreme in the rationality debates derives from a

fundamental distinction between substantive and formal standards of rationality,

or in other words, between cultural/historical forms of rationality and the

interpreters inherent, or intuitively mastered, “preunderstandings” of rationality

respectively. It is this distinction that allows Habermas to shift, or translate, the

focus of the rationality debates from substantive to formal levels. For Habermas,

the preunderstanding of rationality is the “immanent rationality” of all speech that

requires the redemption of implicit or explicit validity claims. This immanent

rationality is “always implicitly shared” and underlies the concept of

intersubjectivity. Fleming points out, however, the apparent contradiction in

assuming that all speech (including that found in primitive cultures) contains such

a preunderstanding of rationality and yet such a preunderstanding has only been

recently developed in modernity. As Habermas admits,

In attempting to elucidate the concept of rationality . . . we had to rely on a


preunderstanding anchored in modern orientations . . . We are implicitly
connecting a claim to universality with our Occidental understanding of
the world. (1984, 44; italics in the original)

Fleming notes that many questions arise from Habermas’ “intellectual

gymnastics,” but he does not address them and he “seems strangely untroubled by

suggestions that his theory might contain Eurocentric prejudices” (Fleming 1997,

48, 52–53).

154
Empirical and Systematic Arguments

In his analysis of Habermas’ position regarding the rationality debates,

McCarthy observes that the “rationalists” are correct in their assertion that

“certain basic elements of scientific thought” are inherent in all cultures.

However, they fail to demonstrate how these basic elements (or “protoscience”)

have been developed and expanded over time. Instead, their arguments generally

rely on a concept of rationality that is “restricted to the recognized canons of

scientific reasoning” (McCarthy 1978, 319). McCarthy argues that a more

comprehensive theory of rationality is required to demonstrate the universality of

modern standards of rationality. He suggests that Habermas’ discursive theory of

communicative rationality may provide such a comprehensive model if he can

sustain two interrelated arguments—one empirical and one systematic.

Habermas’ empirical argument must demonstrate that “the acquisition of

communicative competence . . . [or] the mastery of the ability to reason

argumentatively . . . represents a developmental-logically advanced stage of

species-wide cognitive and moral competences” (McCarthy 1978, 321). In

addition to the empirical argument that later, or “‘higher’ stages of thought and

action” follow upon earlier stages, the related systematic argument must be made

that such accomplishments are not merely different or the result of change but are
212
rather the result of “unfolding,” “growth,” and “development.” McCarthy

states, “What is at issue is not simply the empirical question of what comes later

but the systematic question of the relation of the later to the earlier” (1978, 322;

italics added; see also McCarthy 1982, 66). He adds that “this is precisely what is

155
intended by developmentalists” and notes the primary example of Piaget’s
213
work. However, Rothberg observes that Habermas fails to explicitly

demonstrate how the conditions of a developmental logic might be supported by

Habermas’ model of communicative rationality (Rothberg 1983, 398).

Habermas concludes his analysis of the rationality debates by supporting a

universalist position, and by asserting that “the modern understanding of the

world is indeed based on general structures of rationality” (1984, 66). However,

he finds it necessary to expand on the general structures of rationality that

emerged from these debates, as he claims they are limited to a hypostatized

scientific, or cognitive-instrumental rationality concerned only with the objective

world. He accomplishes this expansion by adding the formal concepts of the

social and subjective worlds and the associated processes of social integration and

socialization (Habermas 1984, 63–64, 71). Additionally, he emphasizes the

universal rationality standard of “closedness/ openness” or the degree to which

worldviews are free from dogmatism and capable of a self-reflecting attitude.

Most importantly, Habermas asserts that his more comprehensive model of

rationality is based on the redemption of implicit or explicit validity claims that

are inherent in all speech, a redemptive process guided by the “intuitive

knowledge” or “preunderstanding” that all competent speakers “already” have at

their disposal (McCarthy 1978, 323). McCarthy summarizes his analysis by

asserting that Habermas must demonstrate that the discursive redemption of

validity claims through processes of argumentation “represents the realization and

completion of competences that are universal to mankind” (McCarthy 1978, 322).

156
Esoteric Critique

Habermas’ claim that modern forms of rationality express a

developmental advance of universal rationality potentials relative to the

rationality exhibited in primitive cultures is in agreement with Bailey’s esoteric

philosophy. I argue, however, that Bailey’s model of rationality is far more

comprehensive and more adequately fulfills McCarthy’s demands for sustainable

empirical and systematic arguments. I first note some limitations of Habermas’

approach and then analyze the rationality debates from two primary esoteric

perspectives, the ontological and the epistemological, or with respect to levels of

consciousness and the ray qualities conditioning the lower mind. Finally, I re-

introduce a third esoteric perspective, the etheric body or subtle energy system of

a human being that serves as both a developing structure of consciousness and as

a network that connects all manifested life. An understanding of the etheric

energy system, both human and planetary, throws new light on the substantive

aspects and empirical nature of magical practices within primitive cultures that

were at the center of the rationality debates.

Rothberg notes the limitations of Habermas’ position by observing that

Habermas’ analysis of primitive worldviews is based on “a clear and systematic

exclusion of certain fundamental features” (Rothberg 1983, 399–400; italics in the

original). Therefore, the structures of communicative rationality advanced by


214
Habermas are themselves inadequate and need to be transformed. Rothberg

further claims,

The great weakness of the “rationality debate” is its inadequate


characterization both of the primitive and the modern (!) . . . [And] as
157
Habermas demonstrates, there is also among the participants in this debate
no clear theory of rationality, although there are bits and pieces. In this
sense, the rationality debate is best understood perhaps as an attempt to
generate a theory of rationality, and to reach a “Western” self-
understanding through comparison with distorted images of a primeval
“other” who necessarily remains unknown to the extent that rationality
itself is misunderstood. (1983, 399fn118; italics and exclamation point in
the original)

The great strength of Bailey’s esoteric philosophy is that it provides a

comprehensive and coherent account of rationality from several aspects and is

capable of explaining both primitive and modern understandings. In particular, the

esoteric teachings regarding subtle levels of energy make comprehensible

substantive aspects of primitive belief systems such as magical practices, as will

be discussed below.

Not only do the participants in the rationality debates (and Habermas) fail

to clearly define rationality as noted by Rothberg, they also fail to provide a

theory of mind. While Habermas bases his theory of communicative rationality on

“preunderstandings” inherent in all speech, he is unable to explain how this

“intuitive knowledge” is “always already” at one’s disposal. Dallmayr claims that

Habermas’ arguments “literally bristle with unresolved questions and ambiguities

precisely from the perspective of a rational understanding.” He goes on to suggest

that even the

distinction between myth and modernity itself is not covered or warranted


by any mode of reasoning available in Habermas’s theoretical scheme. In
fact, modernization or the emergence of reason out of unreason appears as
a mysterious or else dogmatic event—in violation of reasonable
expectations one might have of a “critical theory.” (Dallmayr 1988, 561)

158
Ontological and Epistemological Aspects of Rationality

Bailey takes some of the mystery out of understanding the emergence of

reason in her technical explication of manas, or the principle of mind, which

pervades the universe and antedates the origins of humanity (Bailey 1925, 308–

503). Rationality, as a form of reason, can be esoterically understood both

ontologically and epistemologically. Ontologically, Bailey views the domain of

rationality as the lowest four subplanes of the mental plane (levels of matter on

the cosmic physical plane). Developmentally, these levels, dimensions, or

domains have only been colonized (in the positive aspect of cultivating new
215
territory ) in recent centuries on a large scale primarily through the

institutionalization of educational practices. As previously noted, however,

according to Bailey even in modernity most people are not yet focused on the

plane of lower or rational mind.

Epistemologically, Bailey views rationality as one particular quality (fifth

ray) that manifests divine Reason or Intelligence and that conditions the mental
216
vehicle or lower mind of an individual. The fifth ray is of critical importance

for humanity at this time and Bailey provides an esoteric understanding of the

rationalization of modernity in terms of the growing influence of the fifth ray of

Concrete Knowledge and Science.

This ray energy operates always in connection with the Law of


217
Cleavages. Today [1942], tremendous cleavages between the past and
the present are in order. The importance of this statement is to be found in
the fact that—for the first time in human history—humanity is aware of
218
cleavage at the time it is being brought about. Hitherto cleavages have
been noted during an historical retrospect. Today, all men everywhere are
conscious of the fact that the old order, the old cultures and civilisations
159
are rapidly passing away . . . The inflow of this mental energy [i.e., the
fifth ray] into the world of men, the attainment in consciousness of mental
ability by many thousands, and the achievement of mental polarisation by
aspirants all the world over, are all due to the activity of this fifth ray
energy; this may be regarded as preparatory work for the first and the
second initiations. (Bailey 1960, 596–97; italics in the original)

The Etheric Body and the Chakras

In addition to her ontological and epistemological, or qualitative,

interpretations of rational development, Bailey emphasizes a quasi-empirical level

regarding structures of consciousness that I have not thematized—the


219
development of the physical-etheric body and the chakras. Bailey asserts that

the development of human consciousness passes through three major stages and

three conditioning centers of force, or chakras: psychic development, associated

with the solar plexus center; mental development, associated with the ajna (Skt.)

center; and soul control, associated with the head center (Bailey 1942, 581; see

also 1942, 338–40). She writes that in the earliest stages of human development,

before the existence of any form of “I-consciousness,” human awareness is


220
focused in the solar plexus chakra and

there is no mental reaction of any kind . . . [There is a] complete lack of


the interpretative sense and of the dramatic self-conscious attitude of the
man who is beginning to use his mind. (1942, 579; italics in the
221
original)

In this first stage the psychic powers (siddhis—Skt.) of clairaudience and

clairvoyance reveal the etheric levels of the physical plane and the lower levels of

the astral plane but there is neither the ability to control these faculties nor the

ability to interpret correctly the phenomena contacted. With the gradual

development of the mental principle in the second stage, the lower psychic

160
powers recede below the threshold of consciousness and a transference of forces
222
from the centers below the diaphragm to the higher centers is initiated. With

the attainment of soul knowledge in the third stage, the psychic faculties are

regained and utilized only as necessary with understanding and wisdom.

Typical accounts of the human chakra system refer only to the seven

major centers situated along the spinal column that Bailey claims are the
223
subjective aspects of the endocrine system. However, Bailey also notes (1942,

529, 592; 1953, 72–73, 465–66) that there are numerous minor centers created

where lines of force intersect within the human etheric body and she asserts,

Some day the entire etheric body will be charted and the general direction
of the lines of force will then be seen. The great sweep of the energies will
be apparent, the point in evolution [of the individual] more easily
established and the psychic situation infallibly indicated. The intricacy of
the subject is, however, very great. (Bailey 1942, 592)

Esotericist Malvin Artley has made a major contribution to this charting by

synthesizing known scientific and esoteric writings with a thorough knowledge of

the acupuncture meridian system of Chinese medicine, his own intuitions, and the

data resulting from the work of two clairvoyants (working independently) who

can “see” etheric lines of force. Regarding the immanent acknowledgement and

understanding of the human etheric body, including the minor centers or chakras,

he writes,

It has been prophesied that scientists will soon have the means at their
disposal to directly observe the entire human etheric anatomy. It has
therefore been deemed necessary to put forth knowledge of the workings
of the lesser known centers in order that some direction and guidance can
be given to those scientists, healers or esotericists who would begin
working at this level in the human energy system. (Artley 2001, 1)

161
Modern science recognizes that the dense physical body is only the outer

tangible appearance of molecular, atomic, subatomic, and quantum levels of

matter/energy. It is therefore not difficult to imagine that the more subtle levels of

matter/energy exhibit knowable structures (or “bodies of fire”) that will be

investigated scientifically. This will lead to an expanded understanding of great

importance for health and healing and it will also shed new light on what has

typically been perceived to be irrational practices within primitive cultures. Much

of the rationality debates focused on the magical belief system of the African

Azande tribe and their relationships with subtle levels of energy (Habermas 1984,

55–66). I suggest that now, nearly fifty years later, as a new generation of less

Eurocentric and hubristic anthropologists and philosophers has arisen, the time

has come to renew the rationality debates with a focus not on the magical

practices within the Azande tribe, but perhaps on the quite rational, quasi-

empirical and less easily dismissed nature of the human energy system.

Regarding the magical belief system of the Azande tribe, the Esoteric

Philosophy can quite easily reveal the underlying logic as esotericism postulates

the natural world is constituted of knowable and manipulable energy, of Life and

Consciousness, as well as of Form. Although Habermas utilizes some aspects of

Durkheim’s work in the second volume of TCA, he does not thematize

Durkheim’s account of mana, which may be understood as the etheric energy of

esotericism. (Note that the meaning of mana (energy), which derives from the

Oceanic languages is distinct from the meaning of manas (mind) which derives

162
from Pali and Sanskrit.) Regarding this energy, Buddhist scholar Alan Wallace

writes:

As Durkheim develops the main theme of his classic work The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life, he addresses the issue of mana, a
transpersonal, universal force that is central to all religions . . . Durkheim
asserts that the concept of mana is the precursor of the scientific concept
of energy that was developed during the nineteenth century. Its essential
characteristic is that it is located nowhere definitely yet is everywhere
present, manifesting in a myriad of diverse forms. According to
Durkheim, mana is seen as the objective reality that underlies, empowers,
and regulates all physical phenomena. It is altogether distinct from
physical power and is in a way supernatural, but it shows itself in physical
force of any kind of power or excellence a person possesses . . . One chief
distinction between religious notions of mana and the scientific concept of
mass/energy is that the latter is regarded as purely physical, whereas the
former is not. Note, however, that according to [Nobel laureate] physicist
Richard Feynman, a staunch scientific materialist, the conservation of
energy is a mathematical principle, not a description of a mechanism or
anything concrete. “It is important to realize that in physics today,” he
writes, “we have no knowledge of what energy is.” There is certainly no
consensus among physicists that energy is some physical stuff existing in
the objective world, but if it is not, it is even less clear exactly what it is.
Nevertheless, like mana, it is still thought to underlie, empower, and
regulate all physical phenomena, and it manifests in physical force.
(Wallace 2000, 34–36; italics in the original)

Given that modern science does not clearly understand the nature of

matter/energy, I suggest that it would be wise for academics to adopt the

“charitable attitude” introduced into the rationality debates by Steven Lukes.

Lukes asks whether the interpreter should “begin from the assumption that what

appears . . . to be irrational may be interpreted as rational when fully understood

in its context?” (Lukes 1970, 194). I suggest that as science develops a deeper

understanding of matter/energy, the “context” surrounding research within

primitive cultures will expand so that magical practices that appeared previously

163
to be based on irrational superstitions will be understood as rational interactions

with subtle worlds and energies.

A direct connection with the immanent reality of subtle worlds has been

lost to modernity since humanity began the inevitable process of colonizing the

mental plane and transferring energies from the solar plexus center to the centers

above the diaphragm, a process that has resulted in the “disenchantment of


224
Nature” and a dysteleological worldview. Like Habermas, Bailey valorizes the

achievements of modernity and the development of rationality, although she

provides a much wider context for these achievements and their associated

problems, and for solutions to these problems. The development of the human

mind, beginning with the lower, rational mind, is an evolutionary and

intermediate stage, not an end in itself as Habermas portrays. Bailey writes, “The

development of the intellect in man marks his fitness for the work of treading the

Path, back to full soul consciousness” (Bailey 1934, 212). She is fully aware of

the accompanying difficulties of this process however. Regarding the individual,

Bailey analyzes the attendant difficulties as problems of cleavage, a sense of


225
duality, and as problems of integration (Bailey 1942, 401–520). I suggest that

Bailey’s esoteric philosophy has much to contribute to theoretical debates

concerning the nature of rationality, and to concrete practices that will heal the

cleavages between mind, body, soul, Nature, and Cosmos.

164
CHAPTER 11

DECENTRATION AND THE LIFEWORLD

Cognitive Development and Decentration

Habermas attempts to demonstrate that the transitions from magical-

mythical to religious-metaphysical worldviews, and from the latter to modern

worldviews, are transitions achieved through learning processes made possible by

the development of formal world concepts (the cognitive differentiation of the

objective, social, and subjective domains). Piaget’s studies in cognitive

development hypothesize that there are sequentially developed stages of learning

ability and Habermas suggests that the changing structures of worldviews may

follow a similar pattern. In this light, the socio-evolutionary transitions to new

levels of learning and interpretation lead to the dissolution of earlier modes of

thought. As a result, the older forms of thought or reasoning processes are

“categorially devalued” as the conditions for learning and the modes of

interpretation change in each of the formal categories or dimensions (Habermas

1984, 68).

Habermas quotes selected passages from Piaget’s findings to support his

thesis that cognitive development takes place through the simultaneous

differentiation of the objective, social, and subjective worlds. From this

perspective, cognitive development can no longer be viewed as an individual

subjective or egocentric event. In appropriating a concept from Piaget, Habermas

asserts, “Cognitive development signifies in general the decentration of an

egocentric understanding of the world” (Habermas 1984, 69; italics in the

165
original). The differentiation of formal world concepts (objective, social, and

subjective) makes possible commonly shared, or cooperative interpretive efforts.

Not only is an individual able to contrast her subjective experience with an

external objective or social world, but with another individual’s subjective world

as well. Habermas claims that the three formal world concepts and their

associated validity claims (objective truth, normative rightness, and subjective

truthfulness or sincerity) serve as the “scaffolding” or “commonly supposed

system of coordinates” through which participants can achieve mutual

understanding (1984, 69–70).

The Lifeworld as Background Knowledge

Habermas re-introduces the concept of the lifeworld as the “correlate of

processes of reaching understanding” (1984, 70). That is to say, the lifeworld pre-

exists as an “always unproblematic,” commonly shared stock of knowledge or

background convictions. It constitutes the horizon of “intuitively mastered . . .

pre-theoretical knowledge” (Habermas 1984, 110) within which subjects acting

communicatively are able to achieve mutual understanding. The lifeworld stores

the interpretive work of preceding generations, acting as a “counterweight to the

risk of disagreement that arises with every actual process of reaching

understanding” (Habermas 1984, 70). The important point here is that as the

authority of established, previously unproblematic traditions are brought into

question, worldviews become decentered and the burden of understanding is

shifted from the passive acceptance of presupposed lifeworld knowledge to the

active work of reaching understanding among participants in communication. The

166
relative balance between passively relying on the cultural store of background

knowledge and actively forging understanding among members of a lifeworld

changes with the decentration of worldviews . . . The more cultural


traditions predecide which validity claims, when, where, for what, from
whom, and to whom must be accepted, the less the participants themselves
have the possibility of making explicit and examining the potential
grounds on which their yes/no positions [argumentative claims] are
based . . . [On the other hand], the more the worldview that furnishes the
cultural stock of knowledge is decentered, the less the need for
understanding is covered in advance by an interpreted lifeworld immune
from critique, and the more this need has to be met by the interpretive
accomplishments of the participants themselves . . . [and] the more
frequently we can expect rational action orientations. (Habermas 1984,
70–71; italics in the original)

These interpretive accomplishments result from the active work of participants in

communication as they problematize and seek mutual understanding and

agreement regarding previously taken for granted assumptions, a process referred

to as “the rationalization of the lifeworld” (Habermas 1984, 340).

As a result of his empirical analysis and the sharp contrast evidenced

between modern and mythical worldviews, Habermas is able to describe the

limitations of mythical worldviews and to identify four formal properties that are

required of cultural traditions if they are to make possible rational action

orientations. Regarding the limitations of cultural traditions immersed within

mythical worldviews, he describes such traditions as being almost completely

reliant on established, traditional interpretations of the lifeworld. Such

worldviews remain undifferentiated with respect to the three formal worlds

(objective, social, and subjective) and are closed in the sense that they are

unreflective and therefore not subject to questioning and criticism. The four

formal properties claimed by Habermas to be characteristic of modern cultural


167
traditions that support rational action orientations are: (1) the differentiation of

formal world-concepts, criticizable validity claims, and basic attitudes; (2) a

reflective relation of the cultural tradition to itself that permits critical revision of

interpretations; (3) the establishment of feedback mechanisms with specialized

forms of argumentation which allows the social institutionalization of learning

processes associated with professionally secured cultural subsystems (e.g.,

science, law, art); and (4) interpreting the lifeworld in such a way as to allow for

the uncoupling of action oriented to success from the imperatives of action

oriented to understanding (Habermas 1984, 71–72). This latter property makes

possible the achievement of generalized goals (actions oriented to success)

through the institutionalization of subsystems (i.e., the capitalist economy and

public administration) that are controlled by the “steering media” of money and

power. Essentially, this “uncoupling” of basic purposive rational actions oriented

to success from lengthy and complex processes of achieving understanding allows

a society to function smoothly and autonomously without having to subject every

economic or bureaucratic decision to “the imperatives of an understanding that is

to be communicatively renewed over and over again” (Habermas 1984, 72). In the

second volume of TCA, Habermas explores how these subsystems of the economy

and the state become increasingly complex and not only become uncoupled from

the lifeworld but turn back upon it and inhibit its healthy reproduction in a process

he describes as “the colonization of the lifeworld.”

In summarizing these ideas, Habermas observes that he has utilized

Piaget’s concept of decentration as a guiding thread . . . in order to clarify


the internal connection between the structure of a worldview, the lifeworld
168
as the context of processes of understanding, and the possibilities of a
rational conduct of life. (Habermas 1984, 72)

What stands revealed, he claims, is the concept of communicative rationality, a

concept that “relates a decentered understanding of the world to the possibility of

discursively redeeming criticizable validity claims” (1984, 72).

Esoteric Critique

The “differently structured systems of interpretation” or worldviews

identified by Habermas, the magical-mythical, religious-metaphysical, and

modern-rational, the “learning processes” within them, and the transitions

between them can be esoterically understood in several interdependent ways.

These include: as phylogenetic developmental stages of consciousness on

physical, emotional, and mental levels; as points of crises and initiations (Bailey

1942, 51–52); as historical eras conditioned by shifting ray energies and

astrological influences; and as distinct stages in the awakening and development

of the centers of the human etheric body (the chakras), and in the unfolding of the

petals of the egoic lotus, or causal body (Bailey 1925, 161–213; 1942, 22–27,

306–8). While these are all important areas of esoteric research and analysis, my

critique focuses on two key concepts in Habermas’ theory. I first explore the

concept of decentration and note important aspects that Habermas fails to

consider. I then analyze Habermas’ appropriation of the concepts of the lifeworld

and system.

Decentration Interpreted Esoterically

The decentration of worldviews. Like Habermas, Bailey affirms the

necessary shifts of conceptual structures (rather than of specific content) that


169
occur with transitions to new levels of learning. She writes, “The ‘old order

changeth,’ but primarily it is a change of dimension and of aspect, and not of

material or of foundation” (Bailey 1936, 2; italics added). Contrary to Habermas,

however, she also affirms the necessity of maintaining the foundational truths of

previous traditions.

The fundamentals have always been true. To each generation is given the
part of conserving the essential features of the old and beloved form, but
also of wisely expanding and enriching it. Each cycle must add the gain of
further research and scientific endeavour, and subtract that which is worn
out and of no value. (Bailey 1936, 2)

Habermas assumes that forms of knowledge contained in magical-mythical and

religious-metaphysical traditions have been devalued with the increasingly

decentered understanding of modern worldviews and he is therefore unable to see

the possibility of their containing enduring truths. According to Flynn, Habermas

“views myths as implying rational validity claims; [however], they are simply

false or merely expressive.” He continues,

The most interesting studies of myth . . . are interesting precisely because


the authors approach the myths as being in some sense true, that is to say,
as revealing dimensions of human existence. They illuminate dimensions
that, according to Vico in The New Science, are lost to modern man . . . It
does imply a notion of truth as revelation, as illumination, and a dimension
of language that is not finalized toward consensus formed by
argumentative agreement. That is to say, it entails a notion of language
and truth which is absolutely excluded from Habermas’ thought. (Flynn
1992, 66–67)

There are at least three serious problems with Habermas’ tentative efforts

(“It might be a matter of something similar . . . These devaluative shifts appear to

be connected . . . ” [Habermas 1984, 68; italics added]) to utilize Piaget’s concept

of decentration to establish a developmental logic that leads to the four formal

170
properties characteristic of the modern worldview. First, lacking a precise theory

of mind, in a single paragraph Habermas conflates stages of cognitive

development, stages of interpretation, modes of thought, figures of thought,

systems of basic concepts, kinds of reason, levels of learning, and conditions of

possible learning (1984, 68). The esoteric perspective would agree with Habermas

that, ontologically, the modern worldview reflects a new and “higher” stage or

level of cognitive activity as humanity has been colonizing the rational

dimensions of the mental plane on a large scale for several centuries.

Qualitatively, however, while earlier modes of thought associated with the fourth

ray may have been temporarily devalued with the growing influence of the fifth

ray of Concrete Knowledge and Science in recent centuries, these earlier modes

have not been conclusively overcome or abandoned (see endnote 197). They will

likely return to preeminence in new forms as the influence of the fifth ray wanes

and the energies of the fourth ray again cycle into manifestation (Bailey 1936,

411).

Second, having established communicative rationality as the highest form

of reason, as “a conclusive ‘overcoming’ (or Aufhebung) of religious (and


226
metaphysical) worldviews” (Rothberg 1986a, 221; Marsh 1993, 521),

Habermas appears unable to imagine its inevitable devaluation as higher

structures of consciousness are developed (Rothberg 1986a, 221; Wilber 1995,

615n24). In defending the value of rationality he does not analyze the limitations

of rationality and he apparently cannot see modern forms of understanding

171
themselves as myths that will be eventually devalued or decentered. Bailey

acknowledges this fact as follows:

It should, however, be pointed out that a myth is the summarized belief


and knowledge of the past, handed down to us for our guidance and
forming the foundation of a newer revelation, and that it is a stepping-
stone to the next truth. A myth is a valid and proven truth which bridges,
step by step, the gap between the past gained knowledge, the present
formulated truth, and the infinite and divine possibilities of the future. The
ancient myths and the old mysteries give us a sequential presentation of
the divine message as it went forth from God in response to the need of
man, down the ages. The truth of one age becomes the myth of the next,
but its significance and its reality remain untouched, and require only re-
interpretation in the present. We are free to choose and reject; but let us
see to it that we choose with eyes opened by that sagacity and wisdom
which are the hall mark of those who have penetrated a considerable way
227
along the path of return. (Bailey 1937, 7–8)

Third, according to Kaufman, the four formal properties identified by

Habermas that characterize a rational worldview

do not grow out of decentering itself, rather they are characteristics of a


worldview that is taken to be decentered. Habermas does not explain why
it is that a worldview must have these characteristics. (Kaufman 1999,
358)

Rather than having demonstrated that “higher” stages of thought and action

follow upon earlier stages as a result of “unfolding,” “growth,” and

“development” through the process of decentration, Kaufman argues that there is

a circular logic in Habermas’ reasoning (Kaufman 1999, 350–51). In essence, she

asserts that Habermas has failed to sustain the “systematic argument” put forth by

McCarthy as noted earlier.

The decentration of self. Habermas not only fails to consider the inevitable

decentration of the modern worldview and the forms of rationality on which it is

based at the macro level, he also fails to analyze the concept of decentration at the

172
micro level, or the level of the individual. Although he appropriates Piaget’s

concept of decentration, his limited understanding of subjectivity does not allow

him to extend the concept to its logical conclusion—the complete overcoming or

transformation of the individual rational self, as a latent “higher self” supervenes.

At most, according to Habermas, the individual’s awareness can be expanded by

inter-subjective understanding in relation to another, not by trans-subjective

understanding in relation to another “higher” and more inclusive dimension of the

self. In contrast, the decentration of the self or personality, and the growth of soul

influence is the primary theme of Bailey’s writings. She speaks of the need for

decentralization at a relatively advanced stage upon the Path of Return and asserts

that disciples must recognize the fact that “the extent of their knowledge . . . [is]

dependent upon their decentralisation” (Bailey 1960, 27; italics in the original)

and that their “eventual great work . . . grows out of a steadily expanding

consciousness, [and] a steady decentralisation, demonstrating in a constant

outgoing in compassion and understanding” (Bailey 1944, 310).

Some writers do recognize this more inclusive, spiritual concept of

decentration. Rothberg questions the adequacy of Habermas’ developmental logic

of worldviews and speaks of a “wider identity” in the “transcendence of usual

structures of consciousness.”

In certain traditions . . . this moving from the usual structures, or


decentration . . . points not only to identification solely with awareness,
but finally to the lack of any center at all, to a lack of boundaries and
distinctions. In such far-reaching development, decentration seems closely
connected with (claims to) increased knowledge of kinds not normally
readily available, to increases in those qualities we identify with the terms
wisdom, compassion, and love. (Rothberg 1983, 408)

173
In his endeavor to develop a critical theory of religious insight, Marc P. Lalonde

utilizes the framework of Emmanuel Levinas, and especially the latter’s

“insistence on the ethical primacy of the Other over the self.” This framework

furthers

the reconstructive task evoked yet ultimately abandoned by Habermas’s


analysis . . . According to Levinas, “It is in laying down by the ego of its
sovereignty [ultimate decentration] . . . that we find ethics and also the
very spirituality of the soul.” (Lalonde 1999, 109–11; Levinas 1989,
228
85)

Yet Habermas favorably quotes Mead’s allusion to this “higher” or “larger” self-

understanding to support his (Habermas’) discursive theory of establishing moral

norms within an ideal communication community.

Faced with moral-practical questions, we are so caught up in our own


interests that the impartial consideration of all interests affected already
presupposes a moral standpoint on the part of anyone who wants to arrive
at an unbiased judgment . . . Mead puts the point as follows: “I think all of
us feel that one must be ready to recognize the interests of others even
when they run counter to our own, but that the person who does that does
not really sacrifice himself, but becomes a larger self.” Mead makes
methodological use of this insight to replace the categorical imperative
with a [rational] procedure of discursive will-formation. (Habermas 1987,
94; italics in the original; Mead [1934] 1962, 386; italics added)

This passage reveals Habermas’ democratic idealism in his apparent

assumption that “anyone” can achieve an impartial “moral standpoint” by simply

“wanting” to arrive at an unbiased judgment through a process of will-formation.

He fails to consider that such an achievement or “far-reaching development” of

decentration (Rothberg) may require an enormous amount of experience, learning,


229
and detachment that is not possible to achieve in a single lifetime. Habermas’

174
assumption of an agent’s willingness to impartially consider the interests of

another is challenged by Dallmayr.

Habermas’s own account . . . is deeply problematical . . . rationalization


and consensus are by no means readily compatible . . . It is entirely
unclear how and why ego (or individual agents) should seek consensus
rather than success in any and all areas of behavior, or try to curb
teleological-strategic impulses. (Dallmayr 1987, 95–96)

Bailey explains the discrepancy between strategic and consensual

motivations by asserting the existence of two general principles within humanity.

Two sets of principles are to be found controlling human life—the selfish


and the unselfish, the individual good and the group good, the objective
goal and the subjective goal, the material incentive and the spiritual
impulse, national patriotism and the world ideal, separative religious belief
and the federation of religions, and all the many massed dualities which
simply indicate the realism of people who are personalities (integrated and
separative) or of souls (aligned and group-conscious). (Bailey 1942, 86–
87)

There is no clear line of demarcation between these two groups as the soul

influences all individuals to some degree. Rather than existing as a static duality

these two principles (self-centered/strategic and decentered/consensual) unfold

dynamically along an evolutionary spectrum. Bailey posits that the individual

follows strategic impulses oriented toward success for many life experiences and

only re-orientates herself toward consensus on the Path of Return, as decentration,

soul contact, and group consciousness are cultivated (Mead’s “becoming a larger

self”).

The Lifeworld

There are two primary reasons why the concept of the lifeworld lies at the

heart of Habermas’ theory of communicative action. First, all communicative acts

necessarily arise and develop within the horizon of a culturally shared lifeworld.
175
Second, developing the system-lifeworld model to explain the pathologies of
230
modernity is one of Habermas’ central concerns in writing TCA (1984, vi, xl)

and he devotes an entire chapter to the topic in the second volume. However,

Habermas’ use of the lifeworld concept has been highly criticized. Bohman

observes that Habermas’ conception of the lifeworld

has been called, variously, “metaphysical,” a “non-place” and “a


mysterious fait accompli,” a “false substitute for a universal foundation”
and a retreat into transcendental idealism, or a synthetic subject on a par
with Hegel’s absolute spirit and Marx’s proletariat. (Bohman 1989, 382)

Regarding the system-lifeworld distinction he adds, “no other aspect of

Habermas’s latest work has been more controversial or more thoroughly rejected

by sympathetic and hostile critics alike” (Bohman 1989, 382).

Habermas describes the lifeworld metaphorically, as “a sprawling, deeply

set, and unshakable rock of background assumptions, loyalties, and skills” (1998,

22). It forms “a massive background consensus” or pre-understanding that is “all-

penetrating, yet latent and unnoticed” (1998, 22). The knowledge contained in the

lifeworld is “certain” and “unquestionable” and it requires “an earthquake” to

bring its solidity into question (1987, 400). However, once a particular area of the

lifeworld is thematized, “brought to consciousness” (1987, 400) or into the light

of analysis, it quickly “disintegrates” or “decomposes” in its role as background

knowledge and is somehow transformed into knowledge susceptible to criticism


231
as a potential validity claim (1998, 23).

This metaphoric and mysterious description reveals that ontologically,

Habermas has difficulty in locating the lifeworld and in explaining how it is

176
constituted. Henrich claims that Habermas’ “fundamental concepts remain

indeterminate” and describes his formulation of the lifeworld as “structureless”

(Henrich 1999, 315–16). He further contends that, in attempting to banish

metaphysics, Habermas falls prey to his own illusion and evades “simple but

fundamental philosophical questions,” leaving indeterminate, for example,

whether or not Habermas supports naturalism (Henrich 1999, 317). While

Habermas attempts to delineate the “structures” of the lifeworld in terms of

“culture, society, and personality,” Dallmayr observes that this differentiation is

obtained only “at the cost of tautology or definitional circularity.” He further

suggests that Habermas uncharacteristically “retreats to an ‘innatist’ position” in

his assertion that the lifeworld is “somehow ‘by nature’ (von Haus aus)

consensually constituted.” Dallmayr concludes that the ambiguities and

incoherence of Habermas’ concept of the lifeworld leave it in a precarious status

(Dallmayr 1987, 91–96).

Habermas has appropriated the concept of the lifeworld from Husserl and

the phenomenological tradition, but in order to make it useful for his own theory

he finds it necessary to cleanse the concept of any associations with the

philosophy of the subject (Habermas 1987, 113–35). This transition from the

philosophy of the subject to a philosophy of language is a major theme of TCA

and it can also be viewed as a renunciation of both epistemology (and the


232
knowing subject) and foundationalism (Rasmussen 1990, 7n16, 23). This

transition has been noted as a shift “from thinking to relating to another

[participant in communication]” which avoids the traditional metaphysical

177
233
categories “of thinking and willing” (Swindal 1999, 162, 167). This

renunciation of epistemology highlights the fundamental criticism of Habermas’

concept of the lifeworld from the esoteric perspective—Habermas is ideologically

unwilling and theoretically unable to thematize the role of mind.

In appropriating the idea of the lifeworld and removing any traces of the

philosophy of the subject, Habermas criticizes Husserl’s contention that language

is subordinate to thought (Swindal 1999, 172). Although Bailey has very little to
234
say about language, she supports Husserl’s position and claims that our current

mode of understanding thought impressions through the medium of language will

eventually be superseded by the mode “of supernormal subjective relations” and

immediate comprehension (Bailey 1950b, 33–34). Observing the limitations of

language she writes,

All impressions must necessarily be translated and interpreted in symbols,


in word forms or in pictorial representations; these the aspirant cannot
avoid; and it is in the word forms . . . that he is apt to go astray. They are
the media through which the registered impression is conveyed to the
brain consciousness, i.e., to the physical plane awareness of the disciple,
thus making possible his useful comprehension of abstract ideas. (Bailey
1950b, 106–7; italics in the original)

Regarding how language or “word forms” can distort interpretations of

impressions, Husserl claimed that “language seduces us into an objectification

that dims the clarity of objects of the lifeworld” (Swindal 1999, 172). From the

esoteric perspective, therefore, Habermas’ criticism of Husserl for asserting the

primacy of reason over language is unwarranted.

Habermas often describes mental activity in his discussion of the

lifeworld, but he does not provide a detailed theory of mind or explain how these

178
mental processes actually occur. For example, he states that relevant components

of the lifeworld are “torn out of their unquestioned familiarity and brought to

consciousness” (1987, 400) without explaining how this “tearing” is achieved or

how one “brings” something to “consciousness.” Similarly, he refers to “the

activities of the human mind” (1984, 83) and asserts that “symbolic formations

are, it is true, generated by the productive human mind” but their problematic

meaning “can be opened up only through intellectual labor . . . Theories . . . are

produced by us: they are the product of our critical and creative thinking” (1984,

77). However, just as Habermas is unable to explain how arguments are created,

he again fails to delineate the “activities” of the human mind or explain how

symbolic formations are concretely “generated” by the “productive human mind,”

what constitutes “intellectual labor,” and how “critical and creative thinking” can

“produce” theories. He appears content to allow the interactions of the three

worlds (objective, social, and subjective) to remain “a mystery” (1998, 13) and

admits that “it is hard to explain how sentence meanings and thoughts reflect

events in the world and how they enter persons’ minds” (1998, 13; italics added).

Offering no theory of mind or consciousness (which would presumably lead one

back into metaphysics and the philosophy of the subject), Habermas remains

committed to the supremacy of language as the source for all possible solutions.

He simply notes that “formal semantics has slaved away in vain on these

questions for decades” (1998, 13) without considering that other traditions,

particularly Hinduism and Buddhism, have provided extensive solutions and

models with respect to how meanings and thoughts “enter persons’ minds.”

179
If Habermas were open to the worldviews of Eastern philosophy he may

have learned that concepts similar to the lifeworld had already been established

centuries before Husserl. For example, while he asserts “the lifeworld also stores

the interpretive work of preceding generations” (1984, 70; italics added), in

Mahāyāna Buddhism, the term ālaya vijñāna refers to “store-house consciousness

. . . [which] contains the experiences of individual lives and the seeds of every

psychological phenomenon . . . whence they arise again to occasion thought

activity” (Diener et al. 1994, s.v. “Ālaya vijñāna”). Similarly, the fourth skandha

(Skt.—aggregate, bundle, or heap [of attributes]) comprises mental formations

acquired in previous experience which condition the building of one’s character

and personality. On the macrocosmic scale, Barborka explicates the various

meanings of Ākāśa (Skt.—generally defined as Space) and he emphasizes its

aspect as a permanent record, “as the cosmic storehouse . . . [of] every deed and
235
thought” which is described in many religious traditions (Barborka 1980, 31).

There are important similarities between Habermas’ understanding of the

lifeworld and Bailey’s description of the mental plane. From the esoteric

perspective, it seems clear that what Habermas conceptualizes as “the lifeworld”

is the relatively objective domain of lower mind constituted of thoughtforms.

It will, therefore, be apparent to you that the lower or concrete levels of


mental plane will have acquired or accumulated—down the ages—a vast
number of ideas, which have been formulated [i.e., concretized] as ideals.
(Bailey 1950a, 133)

Just as Habermas repeatedly emphasizes that one is immersed in the “all-

penetrating,” “intuitively familiar” yet “prereflective” and “unnoticed presence”

of the lifeworld, Bailey also asserts,


180
These forms of thought become objectives towards which the subjective
reality, man, reaches and with which he identifies himself for long periods
of time; into them, he projects himself, thus vitalizing them and giving
them life and persistence. They become part of him; they condition his
reactions and activities. (1950a, 133)

The similarities between Habermas’ description of the lifeworld and Bailey’s

explication of the lower mental plane are striking. Habermas states,

The lifeworld appears as a reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken


convictions that participants in communication draw upon in cooperative
processes of interpretation . . . we can think of the lifeworld as represented
by a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of
interpretive patterns” (1987, 124; italics added).

And Bailey writes, “The world structure emerges from and is built upon certain

inner thought patterns” (1936, 181; italics added). These concepts

exist already upon the concrete levels of the mental plane. They are your
mental and racial heritage and are ancient mental forms which you can
now employ in order to arrive at meaning and significance. (Bailey 1950a,
14)

The point which I seek to make here, however, is the fact of the existence
of a growing reservoir of thought . . . a reservoir or pool of thought-
substance which is the result of his own mental activity, of his innate
receptivity, and which provides the material for teaching and the “fount of
knowledge” upon which he can draw . . . (1950b, 94–95; italics added)

Despite the fact that there are many similarities between their

presentations and the possibility that Habermas is intuiting the structures and

functions of a more inclusive scheme, there are considerable differences between

Habermas’ conceptualization of the lifeworld and Bailey’s depiction of the lower

mental plane. For example, several critics have noted Habermas’ unwarranted

assumption that the lifeworld, as “a reservoir of intuitively certain

interpretations,” exists in a pure state (Habermas 1985, 166). Henrich asserts that

Habermas’ concept of the lifeworld avoids the nature of conflict by assuming “the
181
essential point of departure for all speech acts to be a totality which is in principle

harmonious” (Henrich 1999, 198). Referring to Henrich’s arguments, Swindal

adds, “Habermas’s lifeworld concept . . . avoids the problem of illusion and opts

for an immediacy in which the resources are always reliable” (Swindal 1999,

162). Honneth finds “theoretical errors” and “reifying tendencies” in Habermas’

“fictitious” assertion that the lifeworld is independent of forces of power and

domination (Honneth, 1991; see also Rasmussen 1990, 51–54). Halton points out

the apparent contradiction in the idea that “the life-world itself is the

incorporation of prior experience in human traditions and practices, yet

Habermas’s life-world seems to be formed out of pure innocence rather than

experience” (Halton 1995, 205). By avoiding a “phenomenology of life

experience” and choosing instead a linguistic analysis of the lifeworld, Crespi

claims that “Habermas does not avoid that sort of ‘idealism’ of communication

that he has himself attributed to hermeneutics” (Crespi 1992, 42). Habermas’ shift

from a theory of knowledge to a theory of language leads Garth Gillan to argue

that “Habermas has eliminated the recognition of the unavoidable role that evil

plays in the dialectic of truth” which results in “an impoverishment of the scope

of critical political theory” (Gillan 2000, 118).

Bailey, on the other hand, acknowledges the existence of evil and the

negative aspects of the “lifeworld.” She also asserts that most of humanity, being

emotionally polarized, cannot easily or “intuitively” access the pure interpretative

patterns idealized by Habermas.

The thought forms of the majority of human beings are energised from no
such high source [the higher head centers], but find their active impulse
182
emanating from either the solar plexus, or the still lower organs of
236
generation.
It is this constant stream of emotional or sexual energy which is
responsible for the chaotic conditions of the present . . . the myriads of
thought forms consequently produced of a low order and vibration are
producing a condition which is going to require all the efforts of mental
workers eventually to negate, offset, and transmute. These forms, which
scarce merit the prefix “thought,” being largely kamic [related to desire]
with an admixture of the lowest grade of mental matter, are responsible for
the heavy, slow vibrating or pulsating fog or cloak which envelops the
human family, and which produces much of the present evil, crime and
mental lethargy. (Bailey 1925, 973)

Much that is to be seen now of a distressing nature in the world


can be directly traced to the wrong manipulation of mental matter by
man . . .
One of the greatest impediments upon the Path of Return and one
for which man is distinctly responsible within occult limits are those
animated forms which he has produced ever since the middle of the
Atlantean root-race when the mind factor began slowly to assume
increasing importance. The selfishness, the sordid motives, the prompt
response to evil impulses for which the human race has been distinguished
has brought about a condition of affairs unparalleled in the system. A
gigantic thought form hovers over the entire human family, built by men
everywhere during the ages, energised by the insane desires and evil
inclinations of all that is worst in man’s nature, and kept alive by the
promptings of his lower desires. This thought form has to be broken up
and dissipated by man himself. (Bailey 1925, 947–48; italics in the
original)

Not only does Habermas conceptualize the lifeworld as existing in a

relatively pure state, he also assumes that individuals have an easy or “intuitive”

access to it. Ironically, Habermas uses a most esoteric phrase in describing how

lifeworld knowledge is accessed—he claims that “action oriented to reaching

understanding has the additional . . . advantage of throwing light on this


237
background of implicit knowledge” (1984, 335; italics added). Since he does

not have a theory of mind, Habermas must make the profoundly metaphysical

assumption that the “intuitively present” and “intuitively familiar” pretheoretical

183
knowledge of the lifeworld is somehow “intuitively mastered” and thereby lies

“intuitively at [one’s] disposal” (Habermas 1987, 131–32; 1984, 110, 112). His

claim that the pretheoretical knowledge of the lifeworld is “intuitively mastered”

(1984, 110) appears to be a contradiction in terms as “to master” something

generally implies the application of considerable conscious effort to develop a

capacity or skill.

Habermas assumes that the “uncontroversial” stock of lifeworld

knowledge is easily accessed and spontaneously “shared” among all “members”

who impute to everyone involved in communicative interaction this common

knowledge so that any achieved understanding is ultimately based on a “global

preunderstanding” (Habermas 1987, 126–35). The idea that all members of a

culture share an identical stock of interpretive patterns is highly idealistic.

Stephen Bronner notes that

Habermas never anchors his concept of the “lifeworld” . . . no categories


are provided for unlocking the historical character of development of this
“life-world” . . . it thus turns into little more than a vague anthropological
postulate for the understanding of the non-institutional features of
everyday life. (Bronner 1994, 304)

Bailey, on the other hand, emphasizes the creative and dynamic character

of the “reservoir of thought-substance” which is gradually registered and

expanded through long and persistent effort. Regarding this work on the mental

plane, she outlines a Science of Impression “which binds together the entire realm

of knowledge, of science and of religion” (1950b, 47). She states that the Science

of Impression “is in reality the science of thoughtform-making, thoughtform

vitalization and thoughtform direction” (Bailey 1950b, 87) and that “the essential

184
point to be grasped is that sensitivity to impression is a normal and natural
238
unfoldment” (Bailey 1950b, 95).

In contrast to Habermas, who assumes that commonly shared interpretive

patterns are easily and intuitively accessed, Bailey observes,

Today there is no training given upon the process of contacting the world
of patterns and upon the true interpretation of ideas, and hence the
problems. Later, when the race sees its problem with clarity, it will act
with wisdom and train with care its Observers and Communicators. These
will be men and women in whom the intuition has awakened at the behest
of an urgent intellect; they will be people whose minds are so subordinated
to the group good, and so free from all sense of separativeness, that their
minds present no impediment to the contact with the world of reality and
of inner truth. (Bailey 1936, 181)

The Trained Observers constitute one of the ten “seed groups” founded with the
239
objective of relating Hierarchy and humanity through esoteric group work. The

Trained Observers constitute that group whose task it is to

see clearly through all events, through space and time by means of the
cultivation and use of the intuition. They work . . . at the dissipation of
glamour, thus bringing in illumination to mankind . . . [Their]
communication is between the plane which is the plane of illumination
and pure reason (the buddhic plane) and the plane[s] of illusion and
glamour. (Bailey 1950a, 36)

I suggest that the work of this group is reflected in the guiding purpose of Critical

Theory and the Frankfurt School, although these thinkers have remained narrowly
240
circumscribed within the canons of the Western tradition. Recall that Geuss has

defined a critical theory as “a reflective theory which gives agents a kind of

knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation” (Geuss

1981, 2), and that Mendelson asserts that “critical theory hopes to elicit a self-

reflection in which the addressee penetrates and dissolves . . . systematically

185
distorted forms of communication” (Mendelson 1979, 62–63). It is to Bailey’s

great credit that she provides a comprehensive theory of mind and reflection, and

explicates how one can “penetrate” to the domains of higher mind and pure

reason (the buddhic plane) and thence dispel and dissipate illusion and glamour

on the lower mental and emotional planes. While Habermas frequently refers to

“learning processes” in abstract terms of his formal pragmatics, he fails to provide

any concrete approaches to training or education that might allow one to contact
241
“the world of patterns” and achieve “the true interpretation of ideas.”

Throughout her writings Bailey delineates numerous approaches to such

training and education, including: The Science of Meditation; The Science of the

Antahkarana; and the Science of Impression.

There is a history which today is slowly being formulated which is the


history of the seed of consciousness in nature and the growth of the power
to recognise ideas and to push forward towards their fulfillment. This is
the new history which—as might be expected—is carrying us steadily into
the world of meaning and revealing to us gradually the nature of those
impulses and tendencies which have led the race steadily forward from the
densest point of concrete, primitive life into the world of sensitive
perception . . . The power of ideas is only today beginning to be
understood. The potency of ideation, the forms which ideas must take, and
the promotion of the cult of right ideas is one of the major problems to be
tackled in the New Age. (Bailey 1942, 255)

I suggest that Habermas is intuitively an outstanding promoter of this “cult of

right ideas” as he interprets “ideas” as “validity claims” and he asserts the

fundamental importance of “right” ideas in terms of the force of the better

argument.

186
System and Lifeworld

The difficulties with Habermas’ conceptualization of the lifeworld are

compounded by the incorporation of systems theory into his model and by his

assertion that the “system” is somehow able to “colonize” the lifeworld. Bohman

notes that

the concept of system has been even more vigorously attacked,


especially by those whom one could count as Habermas’s usual allies. It
has been called “entirely metaphorical” and “a theoretical exaggeration”
of a “neo-Parsonianism.” (Bohman 1989, 382)

In acknowledging “the abstractness, vagueness, and empirical indeterminacy” of

systems concepts, one of these allies, Thomas McCarthy, asks, “Is biocybernetics

going to be any more fruitful a model of society than classical mechanics was?”

(McCarthy 1993, 173, 176). He further points out that Habermas’ earlier critiques

of functionalism still have merit and suggests that in his appropriation of systems

theory Habermas is “succumbing to the illusion of rigorous science” (McCarthy

1993, 180). In expressing his doubts Henrich states,

How a system functions, and how its emergence and eventual


“uncoupling” from the lifeworld and from communicative action are to be
made intelligible, remain just as unexplained as the constitution of the
lifeworld. (Henrich 1999, 317)

Rasmussen concludes that this approach “resolves itself in a series of

contradictions” (Rasmussen 1990, 55). Crespi argues that Habermas’ opposition

of system and lifeworld results from “an ideological choice rather than empirical

analysis,” and this distinction “appears only as the pale image of the deeper

tension existing between life experience and symbolic order” (Crespi 1992, 46).

187
I suggest that Habermas’ distinction between system and lifeworld, and

between the duality of material reproduction and symbolic reproduction on which

it is based, reflects the “deeper tension” existing between Bailey’s concept of

civilization and culture.

A civilisation is an expression of a mass level of consciousness as that


consciousness works out in physical plane awareness, physical plane
adjustments, relationships and methods of living. A culture is essentially
an expression of the intellectually and vitally mental significances and the
state of consciousness of the mentally polarised people of the race, of the
intelligentsia or of those who constitute the link between the inner world
of soul life and the outer world of tangible phenomena. (Bailey 1957, 32;
italics in the original)

Culture is esoterically related to those within any era of civilisation


who specifically, precisely and in full waking consciousness, through self-
initiated effort, penetrate into those inner realms of thought activity which
we call the creative world. These are the realms which are responsible for
242
the outer civilisation. (Bailey 1948, 129; italics added)

For Bailey, the question is not how to defend against a process of “lifeworld

colonization” but rather

how to fuse and blend these two distinct groups, attitudes or states of
consciousness . . . [in order to] function upon the outer plane of
appearances and, at the same time, be equally awake and active upon the
243
inner plane of reality and of spiritual living. (1957, 33)

A major weakness in Habermas’ theory of “colonization” is that he

portrays humanity (and the lifeworld) as an innocent and relatively helpless

victim of system imperatives. As Giddens observes, Habermas’ distinction

between system and lifeworld “seems to do scant justice to the active struggles of

individuals and groups out of which history is made” (Giddens 1985, 119).

Honneth notes similarly that “Habermas does not give acting groups a conceptual

role in his social theory” (Honneth 1991, 285). Bailey does acknowledge the

188
importance of group work, objective and subjective, and it is one of the primary

themes of her writings. She asserts that those agents who are seeking to bring

light into the world and to establish right human relations and new forms of

culture, are doing so (as noted above) “specifically, precisely and in full waking

consciousness, through self-initiated effort.”

With respect to Habermas’ identification of money as the “steering media”

of the “economic subsystem,” it is important to note that Bailey discusses at

length the nature and correct use of money. In brief, she defines it as “concretized

energy,” (1934, 412; 1957, 335, 646) and, as with all forms of energy, she

emphasizes its wise cultivation and distribution. Whereas Habermas identifies the

processes of anonymous economic and administrative subsystems in terms of an


244
ethically neutral functionalism, Bailey stresses the active role of human agents

in economic and political matters. She asserts that large numbers of people are

free from the desire for money and can therefore “think in terms of the higher

values,” although they remain “individually imprisoned in the system which,

spiritually, must end” (1947, 80; italics in the original). She further asserts that the

economists and financiers of the world who are receptive to soul influence have

the opportunity to make great contributions to the welfare of humanity, primarily

through developing “the principle of Sharing which must govern economic

relations in the future” (1944, 40). Despite indicating great possibilities for the

financial leaders of the world to contribute to the establishment of right human

relations, Bailey also makes the accusation that

the cause of all world unrest, of the world wars which have wrecked
humanity and the widespread misery upon our planet can largely be
189
attributed to a selfish group with materialistic purposes who have for
centuries exploited the masses and used the labor of mankind for their
selfish ends . . . This group of capitalists has cornered and exploited the
world’s resources and the staples required for civilized living; they have
been able to do this because they have owned and controlled the world’s
wealth through their interlocking directorates and have retained it in their
own hands. They have made possible the vast differences existing between
the very rich and the very poor; they love money and the power which
money gives; they have stood behind governments and politicians; they
have controlled the electorate; they have made possible the narrow
nationalistic aims of selfish politics; they have financed the world
businesses and controlled oil, coal, power, light and transportation; they
control publicly or sub rosa the world’s banking accounts.
The responsibility for the widespread misery to be found today
[1947] in every country in the world lies predominantly at the door of
certain major interrelated groups of business men, bankers, executives of
international cartels monopolies, trusts and organizations and directors of
huge corporations who work for corporate or personal gain. They are not
interested in benefitting the public . . .
They form an international group, closely interrelated, working in
complete unity of idea and intention . . . Today, in spite of the disaster
which they have brought upon the world, they are again organized and
renewing their methods; their goals remain unchanged; their international
relationships remain unbroken; they constitute the greatest menace
mankind faces today. (1947, 70–72)

Such an indictment appears to be undiminished today. Ex-U.S. Senator Russ

Feingold observes,

I don’t know how it could be more stark or clear: this entire society is
being dominated by corporate power in a way that may exceed what
happened in the late nineteenth century, early twentieth century . . . the
only real difference is that corporate power is even more extended. It’s the
Gilded Age on steroids . . . Washington—has become a corporate
playground. Since I’ve been here, this place has gone from a
government town to a giant corporate headquarters. (Feingold 2011, 25)

Habermas attributes the crises of modernity to the colonization of the

lifeworld by neutral and autonomous economic and administrative subsystems,

and to “conflicts . . . ignited by . . . the grammar of forms of life.” These are

extremely abstract processes for which, he asserts, “we can no longer take moral

190
responsibility—since their scale has put them beyond our control” (1987, 391–

96). Bailey, on the other hand, finds the source of humanity’s crises within

humanity itself, in self-interest and instinctual separative attitudes associated with

the early stages of personality development. And she asserts that the solutions to

these crises will be achieved by those agents who are aligned with, and integrated

in, an intuitive solidarity, advanced individuals and groups who do take moral

responsibility and who are endeavoring to establish right human relations through

the intelligence, love, and power of the Soul.

191
CHAPTER 12

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Bailey’s esoteric philosophy is based on the premise that the universe is

composed of vital Matter permeated with Life and Consciousness. Human beings

have the opportunity to live, experience, and work in material substance, to

develop their innate consciousness, and to identify eventually with their spirit or

Life aspect. This constitutes true enlightenment and emancipation and it has been

achieved by individuals throughout human history. It is natural to assume that

those who have progressed further along this path will share their gained

knowledge to help those in the earlier stages. It is also natural to assume that those

who have achieved emancipation from ordinary human limitations will serve to

guide humanity by providing contemporary forms of ageless wisdom.

In this view, our modern scientific understanding is not the highest

expression of intelligence in the universe or even in the history of our planet.

Despite the great advances and benefits of scientific achievements, the associated

worldview has in turn created a myopic and hegemonic perspective. This

worldview has been unable to integrate the wisdom found in magical, mythical,

metaphysical, religious, and other forms of non-rational understanding. These

alternative forms of understanding are therefore generally ignored, dismissed, or

safely relegated to isolated academic departments. Bailey’s esoteric philosophy

has the power to integrate all of these various forms of understanding—magical,

mythical, metaphysical, religious—and the scientific. The intelligent power,

coherent logic, and comprehensive scope of her writings support the claim that

192
her teachings were conveyed by One who possesses transcendent knowledge and

that these teachings constitute a modern revelation of the Ageless Wisdom

tradition.

The Ageless Wisdom tradition asserts that the achievement of true

enlightenment and emancipation results from following a most difficult subjective

path while living, working, and serving in the objective world. The individual self

must become decentered and aligned with the soul and group consciousness

before a true intersubjectivity based on loving understanding can be achieved.

Bailey has outlined many sciences that govern the subjective forces and energies

encountered on this path. Perhaps most important among these is the science of

meditation which has the potential to unite the lower rational mind with all

aspects of one’s being—the body, emotions, soul, higher mind, intuition, and

spirit.

Bailey’s teachings offer a vital alternative perspective to Western

metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of time with respect to human

development, as her teachings assert that consciousness is developed over many

incarnated experiences. This doctrine of reincarnation challenges the assumption

that individual learning processes are limited to the physical brain and it has

important implications for ethics and morality.

Her elucidation of the three primary qualities of will-power, love-wisdom,

and active intelligence, and of four secondary qualities, provides a valuable

interpretive typology. Understanding the nature of, and the distinction between,

the fourth ray of Harmony through Conflict and the fifth ray of Concrete

193
Knowledge and Science helps to clarify the role of rationality and science, and at

the same time supports and promotes alternative forms of cognition and

expression. Understanding the nature of, and the distinction between, the sixth ray

of Idealism and Devotion and the seventh ray of Ceremonial Order (as well as

between Piscean and Aquarian energies) brings to light the source of conservative

ideologies and movements that are tied to separative outworn ideals such as

individualism and nationalism. The qualities of the incoming seventh ray (and the

energies associated with the sign of Aquarius) can be seen as underlying the

activism and progressive social movements working for justice and the group

good. This distinction reveals the conflict between conservative and progressive

forces to be a conflict between the values of an outmoded culture and the values

that will establish a new culture as humanity progresses into a New Age.

With respect to philosophy, Bailey’s worldview integrates Eastern and

Western, as well as indigenous and modern perspectives. In this New Age and

interdependent world, Western scholars can no longer limit themselves to a

Eurocentric position and fail to integrate other forms of knowledge and wisdom.

With respect to science, Bailey’s esoteric philosophy supports a scientific

approach to subjective realities and provides a solid foundation of knowledge for

future scientific discovery and investigation. For example, it is most likely that in

the near future science will further expand our knowledge of subtle forces and

energies. As the subtle energy system of the human being is better understood and

becomes more tangible and amenable to empirical investigation and control,

Bailey’s extensive teachings may well provide valuable guidance.

194
In comparison with Jürgen Habermas’ theory of human development and

communicative action, Bailey’s esoteric philosophy is arguably more

comprehensive, logically coherent, and practically emancipatory. Despite his

brilliant mind and eclectic research, Habermas’ ideas are narrowly Eurocentric.

Faced with the apparent aporias of subjectivity, he abandons prospects regarding

its possible depths and attempts instead to discover meaning intersubjectively,

between two egos engaged in argumentation within the limited domain of the

rational mind. He restricts his focus to the world of form, to tangible, quantifiable,

and “measureable” aspects of language. His theory has no place for ethics or for

subjective confrontation with difficult problems and choices, and he offers little in

the way of motivating forces, practical resources, or strategies for individuals who

remain merely passive victims of an anonymous “System.”

While many transpersonal theorists are adopting more integral

perspectives that move beyond Western prejudices and the fixation on rational

analysis of tangible forms, their speculations have brought little light to

understanding the depths of subjectivity or the problems confronting humanity

today. In their desire to create new models of human development, the leading

theorists I have engaged in this dissertation have largely abandoned the wisdom of

ancient traditions. As a result, their criticisms of “wisdom traditions,” “structural-

hierarchical models of human development,” and “universal philosophies” do not

begin to refute the ideas in Bailey’s model. I suggest that in comparison with

Bailey’s esoteric philosophy their own theories of human development are

“highly simplistic,” as Rothberg has noted.

195
In the last years of her writing, Bailey was optimistic that humanity would

learn from the tragedies of the great war (1914–1945) and move forward with a

united spirit to build a new culture based on right human relations. The forces of

separation were too deeply ingrained, however, and the world was soon divided

into spheres of influence and engaged in a cold war. Desire, greed, corruption,

and many forms of violence and oppression have created a state of continuing

crises—economic, political, military, and ecological. In facing our current crises,

it may serve well to consider that humanity is also facing the crisis of the second

initiation. At this time we have the opportunity to utilize the powers of the

rational mind and to demonstrate the intelligent love of the Soul to overcome the

desires of the emotional plane and the deprivations on the physical plane. This is

being evidenced throughout the world in the actions of many individuals and

groups who are demonstrating Soul consciousness through sacrifice and service as

they dedicate their lives to establishing justice and right human relations. Bailey’s

esoteric philosophy offers a profound understanding of the human condition, of

our current crises, and of the illusions and glamours in which we are immersed. It

also provides a valuable guide for invoking the greatest powers available, the light

and love of the Soul, to triumph over the forces of separation and desire. Bailey’s

teachings constitute a new form of critical theory that will help humanity move

forward toward a true enlightenment and emancipation in the New Age that is

rapidly coming into being.

196
NOTES

1. William Blake used the expression in 1809 and a periodical titled New
Age, edited by A. R. Orage, was established in 1907 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
New_age [accessed April 2, 2011]).

2. In Bailey’s esoteric philosophy, our current transition into a new age is


associated with two major energy shifts. Astrologically, it is associated with the
transitioning of the planet Earth into the sign of Aquarius from the sign of Pisces.
Although the science of astrology is a fundamental esoteric science in Bailey’s
worldview (1951a), it will play no significant role in this dissertation. The second
major energy shift is associated with the waning influence of the sixth ray of
Idealism and Devotion and the waxing influence of the seventh ray of Ceremonial
Order or Magic. The nature of the ray energies will be introduced in Chapter 2.

3. M. Temple Richmond (1999, 16–17) endeavors to demonstrate the


influence of Bailey’s teachings.

4. See for example, Harris (2005); Dennett (2006); Dawkins (2006); and
Hitchens (2007).

5. Bailey asserts that the members of the spiritual Hierarchy of the planet,
the Masters of Wisdom, have achieved a true enlightenment and emancipation
from the three worlds of human endeavor (the physical, emotional and mental
domains) and that this planetary center constitutes the Kingdom of God, the next
stage of evolutionary unfoldment beyond the human kingdom. In the Buddhist
tradition of the Bodhisattva, they are enlightened Beings who remain with
humanity to teach and guide. The Tibetan provides one definition of the
Hierarchy as, “the ‘society of organised and illumined minds’—illumined by love
and understanding, by deep compassion and inclusiveness, illumined by a
knowledge of the plan [of God] and aiming to comprehend the purpose,
sacrificing their own immediate progress in order to help humanity. This is a
Master” (Bailey 1951b, 256).

6. Bailey also relates, “A strong phase of psychism was sweeping through


the society due to the psychic pronouncements of Mr. Leadbeater and his
extraordinary control over Mrs. Besant [president of the Theosophical Society].
The aftermath of the Leadbeater scandal [charges of pedophilia] was still causing
much talk. Mrs. Besant’s pronouncements about Krishnamurti [becoming the next
World Teacher] were splitting the society wide open . . . Owing to all these
various causes many people were leaving the Theosophical Society in disgust and
bewilderment” (Bailey 1951b, 170–71).

197
7. Masters work with aspirants, disciples, and initiates within an Ashram,
a subjective center that has been defined as “essentially a reservoir of thought”
(Bailey 1944, 697). Bailey is a disciple within the Ashram of the Master K. H.
However, because of his (K. H.’s) senior status and great responsibilities (Bailey
1936, 108), it was the Master D. K. who worked closely with Bailey to produce
the teachings given out under her name. Information regarding the relationships
between Masters and disciples within an Ashram is provided throughout Bailey’s
writings. See especially, Bailey (1922b; 1944, 673–790).

8. Details of their telepathic process can be found in Bailey (1951b, 161–


69; 259–61) and more general teachings on the Science of Telepathy can be found
in Bailey (1950b).

9. Another book on the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali (Bailey 1927) was a


collaborative effort. The Tibetan translated the sutras into modern English and
Bailey wrote the commentaries herself.

10. For detailed information regarding the nature of an esoteric school and
the Arcane School in particular, see Bailey (1951b, 262–304).

11. The objectives of the Theosophical Society are: “(1) To form a nucleus
of a universal brotherhood of humanity without distinction of race, creed, sex,
caste, or color; (2) The study of ancient and modern religions, philosophies, and
sciences, and the demonstration of the importance of such study; and (3) The
investigation of the unexplained laws of nature and the psychical powers latent in
man” (Cranston 1993, xviii).

12. In her biography, Sylvia Cranston devotes at least four chapters


(Cranston 1993, 430–98) to demonstrating Blavatsky’s influence, including a
direct influence on, among others, Albert Einstein, Thomas Edison, Rupert
Sheldrake, Æ (George William Russell), William Butler Yeats, James Joyce, D.
H. Lawrence, T. S. Eliot, Wassily Kandinsky, Piet Mondrian, Gustav Mahler,
Jean Sibelius, and Alexander Scriabin. See also Hutton and Joseph (1998) for an
analysis of Blavatsky’s impact on modern linguistics.

13. Cranston’s biography (1993) counters these accusations and provides


valuable insight into the life of a very powerful, influential, and “extraordinary”
leader of the 19th century.

14. One partial critique of Blavatsky’s work can be found in Guénon


([1921] 2001).

15. These are the three primary levels of consciousness (human, planetary,
and solar systemic) that Bailey’s teachings explicate. The two great Beings who

198
brought the planet Earth and our solar system into existence are both referred to
by Bailey as God. She uses the term God interchangeably with the term Logos on
each of these two levels: the planetary Logos (of our Earth scheme; see for
example [1934, 531; 1950b, 43; 1953, 393]); and the more inclusive solar Logos
(of our solar system; see for example [1922a, 55–57; 1922c, 4; 1925, 5, 7; 1934,
18]). Generally, one must rely on her context to determine which level she is
referring to when she uses the term God. For Bailey, the term Logos essentially
refers to divine reason or mind embodied in the Word which leads to
manifestation. She states, “The basis of all manifested phenomena is the
enunciated sound, or the Word spoken with power, that is, with the full purpose of
the will behind it . . . Seven Great Words [enunciated by the solar Logos], again
based on the sacred three sounds A U M . . . produced creation, or the
manifestation of the seven planes of our solar system” (1922b, 150, 153; see also
1927, 333–38). The bringing forth of worlds through the creative power of sound
is described in several spiritual traditions, for example: “The ancient Hindu
scriptures describe in their poetic language how the universe was sung into
existence by Brahmās divine thoughts, which streamed forth from him through
Vāk (Skt.), the divine voice” (Diener et al. 1994, s.v. “Vāk”); and, “In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He
was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him, and without
him was not anything made that was made” (Jn 1:1–3 [Revised Standard
Version]). For a comprehensive account of divine manifestation and the complex
cycles of planetary existence, the “field” of evolution, and the “streams of life” as
found in the Esoteric Philosophy—schemes, chains, rounds, globes, root-races
and sub-races—see Powell ([1930] 1971). See also Barborka (1980, 339–82), and
Bailey (1925, 342–95).

16. Jean Gebser’s research popularized the idea that structures of human
consciousness transform through distinct stages (Gebser [1949] 1985).

17. The Esoteric Philosophy maintains that humanity is evolving through


seven major racial types over eons of time. The first two root-races were on the
involutionary arc and did not manifest in dense physical form. The first
manifested root-race (the third root-race) is the Lemurian and development during
this period is associated almost entirely with the physical body. The fourth root-
race is the Atlantean, wherein the emotional body is the focus of development.
The fifth, our current root-race, is the Aryan, wherein the mental body is
developed. The racial theories of the Esoteric Philosophy may be a primary
source of criticism and a thorough analysis of the teachings on this subject is
required. I here briefly note a few of Bailey’s statements to counter the simplistic
accusation that she is a racist. Bailey defines the root-races as the seven-fold
expression of the planetary Logos just as a human being evolves through seven
stages of consciousness beginning with the physical, emotional, and mental levels
(Bailey 1925, 383). Being well aware of potential criticisms of racial theories she

199
writes: “When I use the word ‘race’ I deal not with man-made or pseudo-
scientific differentiations of nations and races or types. I deal with a state of
consciousness . . . the Aryan or mental consciousness or state of thinking . . . finds
its exponents and its ‘race members’ in every nation, without any distinction or
omissions . . . This state of consciousness will find its expression in people as far
apart racially as the Japanese and the American or the Negro and the Russian”
(Bailey 1960, 593–94); and, “I speak not in terms of the Aryan race as it is
generally understood today or in its Nordic implications” (Bailey 1950a, 114).
Bailey sounded a clear note for racial equality in the first half of the 20th
century. I will quote her at some length as she provides an eloquent and practical
account of her moral theory as well as of horrible world conditions, which
unfortunately remain much the same despite areas of great progress. She writes,
“As we face the world picture today, we must see it in its true colors and must
realize that if the best possible steps, spiritual and material, were to be taken for
the smallest and least important of the minorities, it would create a situation
which would completely reverse world politics and usher in an entirely new and
more enlightened cultural and civilized age. This, however, is not likely to
happen; so close are the interlocking selfish interests that the use of a system of
perfect justice and fairness in any one case would upset major material interests,
infringe the so-called rights of powerful nations, encroach on settled boundaries
and outrage powerful groups” (Bailey 1947, 93).
“The innate endowment of the Negro is very rich in content. He is
creative, artistic and capable of the highest mental development . . . as capable as
is the white man” (Bailey 1947,110).
“The problem of the Negro in the western hemisphere constitutes a very
ugly story, seriously implicates the white man and provides an outstanding
disgrace . . . A few corrupt and ignorant senators consistently outrage the good
intentions of the mass of American people by perpetuating these evil conditions
and fighting by every possible means to prevent their being changed; they play
upon the fears of their constituents . . . For their attitude and conduct there is
today no possible excuse” (Bailey 1947,111–12).
“The Negro cannot be discriminated against for all time; he cannot be
asked to defend his country and then have his country refuse him the ordinary
rights of citizenship. Public opinion is on the side of the Negro and there is a
steadily growing determination among the white citizens of the western
hemisphere that he be given his constitutional rights, equal commercial and
business opportunities, equal educational facilities and equally good living
conditions. It is for the people of America to speak with a clear voice and demand
that Negroes be given their just rights. Every white American should shoulder his
responsibility for this minority and study the Negro problem; he should learn to
know the Negro personally as a friend and a brother; he should see to it that he
plays his part in changing the present condition” (Bailey 1947, 113).

200
18. See Cranston and Williams (1984), Cranston and Head (1991), and
Fisher (1985). Fisher references a 1982 Gallup Poll that shows approximately
one-fourth of Americans believe in reincarnation and another poll showing belief
at nearly 30 percent among British adults.

19. Bailey’s teachings on the nature of the soul are found throughout her
writings. See especially, Bailey (1934, 33–41; 1936, 36–137). It is important to
note that the Buddhist doctrine of anātman (Skt.) is often incorrectly understood
as denying the existence of the soul. The Encyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy and
Religion acknowledges that this is one of the central tenets of Buddhism and
states, “[This doctrine] says that no self exists in the sense of a permanent, eternal,
integral, and independent substance within an individual existent.” (Bailey
acknowledges the impermanence of the soul as well, since its role as the
mediating agent between spirit and personality is completed at the fourth
initiation when the causal body, the vehicle of the soul, is destroyed [1925, 315,
470, 490, 514, 764]). The entry continues, “Buddha himself, in answer to the
question whether a self exists or not, never put forward a definite position so as
not to cause new concepts to arise that would be irrelevant and obstructive for
spiritual practice . . . Nevertheless in the course of the development of the
Buddhist system of thought, this came more and more to be an unequivocal denial
of the existence of the self” (Diener et al. 1994, s.v. “Anātman”).

20. See Lovejoy ([1936] 1964). Rothberg has provided an excellent


contemporary analysis of hierarchical ontologies and has made strong arguments
defending the concept from possible criticisms that might arise from the traditions
of philosophical empiricism, radical hermeneutics, and critical social theory “that
includes not only the Frankfurt School members (particularly Habermas . . . ), but
also Marxism, feminism, and ecologically–minded social theory” (Rothberg
1986b, 8).

21. Similarly, Bailey writes, “He has to add a growing capacity to work on
the levels of consciousness involved, remembering always that a plane and a state
of consciousness are synonymous terms” (Bailey 1960, 435). See also, Wilber
(2000a, 236–38n2).

22. Information regarding the personality is found throughout Bailey’s


writings. See especially, Bailey (1942, 259–625).

23. The assumption that matter is composed of insentient particles goes to


the heart of the mind-body problem which has challenged philosophers for
centuries. David Ray Griffin (1997) confronts this assumption by exploring the
ideas of Kant (who questioned the assumed heterogeneity of the objects of the
inner and outer senses), Leibniz (who posited “‘petite perceptions’ in nature’s
elementary units”) and quantum theorists (who claim that “the behaviour of the

201
elementary units of nature can only be explained by attributing to elementary
particles something analogous to our own mentality”). Cranston references
several prominent scientists at Princeton, Harvard, and Cambridge who endorse
the idea that mind permeates matter (Cranston 1993, 430–62). According to
Bailey, the “infinitesimal and sentient lives” are devic (Skt.) and elemental lives
which will be discussed in Chapter 3. Bailey asserts that all the planes of our solar
system can be viewed as deva substance (Bailey 1925, 693).

24. In the second half of the dissertation I attempt to demonstrate that


theoretical knowledge corresponds to Habermas’ understanding of the implicit
knowledge contained in the “lifeworld” and discriminative knowledge
corresponds to that knowledge derived through argumentative discourse or the
procedures of communicative rationality. I go on to suggest that one of
Habermas’ greatest limitations is his unwillingness or inability to thematize
intuitive knowledge despite his frequent use of such as terms “intuition” and
“light.”

25. Barborka acknowledges that the term monad gives rise to a great deal
of confusion and he carefully elaborates its various meanings (Barborka 1980, 9–
12). Bailey defines the monad as the spirit aspect of a human being (in
relationship with the soul or consciousness aspect and the personality or form
aspect) that expresses through the spiritual triad or the trinity of atma, buddhi,
and manas (Skt.), or spiritual will, intuition and higher mind (Bailey 1922b, 221–
22).

26. The primary vehicle of consciousness is the causal body or egoic lotus,
the vehicle of the soul, which is developed through experience in the three worlds
of human endeavor (physical, emotional, and mental). In Hinduism the causal
body is described by the Sanskrit terms, karana sarira and anandamaya-kosha.
Bailey suggests (1927, 331–32; 380–81; 393) that in Christian theology it is
referred to as both the Temple of Solomon and as the “building from God, a house
not made with hands, eternal in the heavens” (2 Cor 5.1 [RSV]). She further
suggests (1925, 542) that the fiery petals of the egoic lotus are the “wheels”
visioned by Ezekiel (“For the spirit of the living creatures was in the wheels” (Ez
1:15–21 [RSV]). It may also be of interest to study the Taoist classic, The Secret
of the Golden Flower, as a meditation manual on developing the egoic lotus
(Wilhelm [1931] 1962). For extended esoteric analyses of the causal body, see
Bailey (1925, 504–49; 807–86).

27. Bailey introduces the Science of the Antahkarana in Education in the


New Age (1954, 143–49) and provides advanced teachings on the subject in The
Rays and the Initiations (1960, 441–530). Extensive teachings on meditation can
be found in her Letters on Occult Meditation (1922c); The Light of the Soul: The

202
Yoga Sutras of Patanjali (1927); and Discipleship in the New Age Vol. 2 (1955,
111–239).

28. Bailey describes the permanent atoms as follows: “The permanent


atoms are not really atoms at all, but simply focal points of energy, which are of
sufficient power to attract and hold coherently together the substance required by
the soul with which to create a form of expression” (Bailey 1942, 314); and, “In
these atoms the past memory of the personal self is stored; these are in the nature
of ‘memory cells’ and are the repositories of past experience, of gained quality,
and of the particular note which the body of which it is the nucleus has achieved”
(Bailey 1951a, 303). See also, Bailey (1925, 507–35). Bailey’s teachings on the
permanent atoms likely have a correspondence to the Buddhist concept of
skandhas (Skt.—literally “group,” “aggregate,” or “heap”). For an esoteric
account of the skandhas, see Barborka (1980, 416–24).

29. The seven rays are a theme referenced throughout Bailey’s writings
and also constitute the basis of the five volume series A Treatise on the Seven
Rays (Bailey 1936; 1942; 1951a; 1953; 1960). Regarding the rays Bailey states,
“The seven rays are the first differentiation of the divine triplicity of Spirit-
Consciousness-Form, and they provide the entire field of expression for the
manifested Deity” (1936, 17). She also claims (1925, 233, 628–30; 1950b, 161;
1953, 583) that the seven rays correspond to the “seven spirits before the throne
of God” in the Christian Bible (Rev 1:4, 3:1, 4:5 [RSV]). The septenary structure
of the universe can be traced back to the earliest Hindu scriptures of the Rig-
Veda—“The seven wise ones fashion seven paths. To one of these may the
distressed mortal come” ([10: 5–6], quoted in Barborka 1980, 161). For those
familiar with Jewish mysticism, a correspondence may be found between the
seven rays and the Sephiroth of the Kabbala—“The system of the descent of the
Sephiroth . . . has been given somewhat in detail for the reason that it so well
presents one of the cardinal tenets of the [i.e., Blavatsky’s] Esoteric Philosophy,
that of emanational emergence. It provides a key for understanding the
unfoldment of the seven Element-Principles, the seven Loka-Talas, as well as the
Seven Principles of Man” (Barborka 1980, 49n‡). “Further, from this manifested
Logos will proceed the Seven Rays, which in the Zohar are called the lower
Sephiroth and in Eastern occultism the primordial seven rays” (Transactions of
the Blavatsky Lodge, 68, quoted in Barborka 1980, 515). See also, Bailey (1925,
692).

30. An historical account of various presentations of teachings regarding


the seven rays since the 19th century has been provided by John Nash (2007).

31. Bailey also asserts that all forms, including groups and nations, are
governed by specific ray energies. See especially, Bailey (1949).

203
32. See also, Bailey (1936, 200–212; 1942, 36–49).

33. Nietzsche exhibits first ray qualities in his trenchant, often aphoristic
writing style; in his penchant for “doing philosophy with a hammer”; and in his
role as destroyer of glamours, particularly religious ones, as evidenced in his
famous assertion that “God is dead.”

34. Bailey notes that the fourth ray “is not the ray, per se, of the creative
artist. The creative artist is found equally on all rays, without exception” (Bailey
1942, 41; italics in the original).

35. Bailey asserts that the personality ray of the United States is the sixth
ray of Idealism and Devotion. She notes, “There is a potent determination to stick
one-pointedly to any decision made. Thus its sixth ray personality enforces at
times almost to the point of a fanatical blindness and to the detriment of the long
range vision which is needed at such times as these” (Bailey 1949, 89). The strong
religious impulse in the U. S. relative to European countries and the widespread
display of patriotism following the events of 9/11 can be interpreted esoterically
as national expressions of a strong sixth ray conditioning influence. Hendon
(2005) has provided a thorough analysis of the sixth ray as it expresses through
the religious impulse.

36. A concise definition of esotericism can be found in Bailey’s assertion,


“There is naught in manifestation except organized energy. Energy follows or
conforms itself to thought. The occultist [i.e., esotericist] works in energy and
with energies” (1957, 674).

37. These criteria are: (1) The Principle of Correspondences; (2) All of
Nature is a Living, Intelligent Organism; (3) The Imagination, Symbols and Other
Techniques are Used to Bridge or Mediate Between Seen and Unseen Worlds;
(4) A Focus on Individual Transformation; (5) The Practice of Concordance; and
(6) The Transmission of Spiritual Information from Master to Pupil.

38. Physicist David Bohm’s work on the “implicate order” is an


outstanding example (Bohm 1973).

39. This law reflects the well-known dictum found in the Emerald Tablet
of Hermes Trismegistus, stated by Isaac Newton as, “That wch is below is like
that wch is above and that wch is above is like yt wch is below to do ye miracles
of one only thing” (Webb 2009). The “essential similarity” between a human
being and Deity is also asserted in the Book of Genesis, “So God created man in
his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created
them” (Gn 1:27 [RSV]). Bailey outlines “certain broad basic correspondences . . .
between the development of a [solar] system, a planet, a man and an atom”

204
(Bailey 1925, 245–59) and she quotes Blavatsky’s assertion that “Everything is
atomic—God, Monads, atoms . . . It is on the illusive nature of matter and the
infinite divisibility of the atom that the whole Science of Occultism is built”
(Bailey 1925, 1040).

40. See also, Bailey (1942, 77–79; 325–41). Bailey notes in several places
that the universal human cycle of appropriation and renunciation is related in the
biblical story of the Prodigal Son (Lk 15:11–32 [RSV]). See Bailey (1927, 173;
1934, 303, 533; 1942, 77, 79, 96–97, 165–66; 1951a, 208).

41. See Bailey (1922b; 1937; 1944, 671–773; 1955, 241–439; 1960, 321–
738).

42. Wilber opposes the idea that “some sort of angels must have walked
the earth prior to the . . . emergence of the ego” (Wilber 1997, 368–69n11).

43. According to Bailey, Shamballa is the head center of the planetary


Logos and Humanity is the throat center (1950b, 125; 1957, 89, 92). Throughout
her writings she explicates the nature and importance of Shamballa as the
expression of divine purpose on our planet. However, I will not emphasize this
aspect of the macrocosm in the dissertation. It is not clear why Bailey’s spelling
deviates from Blavatsky’s and other traditional forms—Śambhala (Blavatsky
1892, s.v. “Śambhala”) or Shambhala (Diener et al. 1994, s.v. “Shambhala”).

44. “According to the Vedas, the Manus represent the earliest divine
lawgivers . . . In the Purānas the name Manu is used particularly to refer to
fourteen successive rulers who inhabit the ethereal realms, from where they guide
the conscious life of human beings” (Diener et al. 1994, s.v. “Manu”).

45. Regarding the Christological debates, it should be noted that according


to Bailey, the Master Jesus (associated with the sixth ray of Idealism and
Devotion) is understood to have been overshadowed by the Christ (associated
with the second aspect of Divinity and the second ray of Love and Wisdom) and
that they are distinct Beings (Bailey 1925, 1193; 1927, 193, 328; 1948, 74; 1955,
405–6; 1957, 10, 307–8, 397; 1960, 83, 192–93, 198, 290, 386, 523–24, 697).

46. See “The Six Stages of Discipleship” (Bailey 1944, 671–773).

47. See especially, Bailey (1934, 398–433)

48. David Held asserts that this is one of the two primary unresolved
problems for the Frankfurt School and Habermas, and constitutes a “particularly
embarrassing . . . paradox” (Held 1980, 399; see also Held 1980, 376).

205
49. See Chapter 5 for the reference and context for this statement which
was contained in a question posed to Habermas during a public forum.

50. Bailey writes, “Philosophers have, of course, always been with us, but
they have been for the most part isolated units who have founded schools
characterised by partisanship and separativeness. Now there are no outstanding
figures as in the past, but groups who represent certain ideas” (Bailey 1934, 406).
She declines to enumerate groups in other fields, leaving this task to “some
illumined student[s] of history,” but she does provide some further general
examples (1934, 408–10).

51. Group work focused on service has increased dramatically over the
decades. Examples today of such groups would include non-profit organizations,
non-governmental organizations or NGOs, and social benefit organizations or
SBOs. There are millions of NGOs and over 40,000 internationally operating
NGOs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-governmental_organization (accessed
April 7, 2011).

52. Overcoming the paradigm of “the philosophy of the subject” or “the


philosophy of consciousness” and developing a “postmetaphysical” paradigm of
communicative action based on intersubjectivity has been the focus of Habermas’
work since the 1980s. Intersubjectivity is also an important theme among many
transpersonal theorists. For a lively debate of such views see, de Quincey (2000),
and a response from Hargens (2001).

53. While even recently such words may have been deemed wildly
idealistic, the possibilities of such political unselfishness can be perceived in the
radical hope and vision that gave life to Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential
campaign, a most welcome change from the politics of separation, suspicion,
competition and confrontation. With respect to such global leaders Bailey writes
that, despite “passing depressions, war and bloodshed . . . [that] may lead the
unthinking into the depths of pessimism . . . those who know and who sense the
inner guiding hand of the Hierarchy are aware that the heart of humanity is sound
and that out of the present chaos and perhaps largely because of it, there will
emerge those competent to deal with the situation and adequate to the task of
unification and synthesis” (Bailey 1934, 409).

54. Bailey writes, “Students must at this juncture remember that all dense
physical forms, whether of a tree, an animal, a mineral, a drop of water, or a
precious stone, are in themselves elemental lives constructed of living substance
by the aid of living manipulators, acting under the direction of intelligent
architects . . . [They] are but devas after all. It is the recognition of this essential
livingness which constitutes the basic fact in all occult investigation, and is the
secret of all beneficent magic” (Bailey 1925, 892). The nature of devic and

206
elemental lives, and of “beneficent magic” will be elucidated in following
sections.

55. Bailey suggests that these “Ideas” constitute the “Raincloud of


Knowable Things” referred to by Patanjali in The Yoga Sutras (Bailey 1934, 456).
Relating Bailey’s concept of Ideas to Plato’s concept of Ideas or Forms is an
important area of esoteric research, but one that is beyond the scope of this
dissertation.

56. Bailey writes: “All great ideas come forth from the world of divinity
through the medium of the great Intuitives, and the history of humanity is
essentially the history of ideas—their coming forth through the medium of some
intuitive thinker, their recognition by the few, their growth in popularity, and their
eventual integration in the thought world, the pattern world of the thinkers of the
race. Then their fate is determined, and eventually the new and unique idea
becomes the popularly and publicly accepted model of human conduct” (Bailey
1937, 167–68); and “Ideas . . . deal primarily with that which will eventually be,
and are those formative new spiritual and creative impulses which will supersede
the old and build the ‘new house’ in which humanity will live; cycle after cycle
and civilisation after civilisation, the fresh stream of inflowing ideas have
conditioned the dwelling places of man and his mode of life and expression;
through the medium of these ever-living and ever-appearing ideas, humanity
passes on to something better and greater and more appropriate to the life of the
slowly manifesting divinity” (Bailey 1955, 280–81).

57. Bailey writes, “It will be seen how this work is consequently and
essentially group work, and is therefore only truly possible for those who have
somewhat mastered the meditation process, and can ‘hold the mind steady in the
light . . . ’ There is a truly occult significance to the words ‘to throw the light’
upon a problem, a condition, or a situation. In its essential meaning it connotes the
revelation of the presented idea, of the principle which underlies the outer
manifestation. It is the recognition of the inner and spiritual reality which
produces the outer and visible form. This is the keynote of all work in symbolism
. . . Aspirants, group leaders and thinkers in all parts of the globe can be available
for this work, provided their minds are open and focused. According to the
simplicity of their approach to truth, according to the clarity of their thought,
according to their group influence and state of inclusive awareness, and according
also to their power for long sustained effort will be the approximation of the outer
form to the inner idea and the spiritual subjective reality” (Bailey 1934, 459–60;
italics in the original).

58. Francis Heylighen and Klass Chielens assert: “Cultural traits are
transmitted from person to person, similarly to genes or viruses. Cultural
evolution therefore can be understood through the same basic mechanisms of

207
reproduction, spread, variation, and natural selection that underlie biological
evolution. This implies a shift from genes as units of biological information to a
new type of units of cultural information: memes. The concept of meme can be
defined as an information pattern, held in an individual’s memory, which is
capable of being copied to another individual’s memory. Memetics can then be
defined as the theoretical and empirical science that studies the replication, spread
and evolution of memes. Memes differ in their degree of fitness, i.e., adaptedness
to the socio-cultural environment in which they propagate. Fitter memes will be
more successful in being communicated, ‘infecting’ more individuals and thus
spreading over a larger population. This biological analogy allows us to apply
Darwinian concepts and theories to model cultural evolution.” They also describe
cultural traits as analogous to “mind viruses,” “idea viruses,” or “thought
contagions” (Heylighen and Chielens 2008). While meme theorists have struggled
to develop an adequate theory due to the absence of mutually accepted theories of
mind, ideas, thoughts, and memories, Bailey has provided a comprehensive theory
of mind that demonstrates how thoughtforms are developed and culturally
transmitted.

59. “[Benjamin’s] notion of ‘ideas’ is complicated and often difficult to


comprehend. Aspects of its meanings are drawn from the ideas of Plato, Leibniz,
and the Cabbala” (Held 1980, 446n28). “[Benjamin] argued that discrete and
disparate phenomena could be grasped only through the recovery of the ‘Ideas’—
the symbolic representations—they embody. Crudely put, ‘ideas’ can be
represented by concepts of particular configurations of concrete elements
[thoughtforms]. Ideas are timeless [as they exist on the buddhic or intuitive
plane]. They represent the objective interpretation of ‘historical crystallizations’
which emerge from the ‘process of becoming and decay’ in history. Benjamin
compared ideas to monads . . . [He] stressed the difficulty involved in all efforts to
comprehend unique concrete elements and ideas” (Held 1980, 206).

60. Bailey writes, “Agni is Fohat, the threefold Energy (emanating from
the logoic Ego) which produces the solar system, the physical vehicle of the
Logos, and animates the atoms of substance. He is the basis of the evolutionary
process, or the cause of the psychic unfoldment of the Logos, and He is that
vitality which ultimately brings about a divine synthesis in which the form
approximates subjective demand, and after being consciously directed, and
manipulated, is finally discarded. This is the goal for the Logos as it is for man;
this marks the final liberation of a human being, of a Heavenly Man [i.e., a
planetary Logos (Bailey 1925, 62)] and of a solar Logos” (Bailey 1925, 610). On
the central role of Agni as “the Lord of the mental plane . . . the animating life of
the solar system,” see Bailey (1925, 601–12).

208
61. Bailey notes, “The utter impossibility of cataloguing the forms and
aspects of deva substance, or of tabulating the myriad groups and classes will be
borne in on our comprehension” (Bailey 1925, 650).

62. The solar Logos manifests as a Trinity of Electric Fire, Solar Fire, and
Fire by Friction, or Life, Consciousness, and Matter. “As fire by friction He
manifests as the seven Sons of Fohat, the seven great fires, or the active heat of
intelligent substance . . . [They are] the seven manifestations of electricity, or of
electrical phenomena. These are the seven Raja-Lords or Devas of the seven
planes; they are the seven Fires, or those seven states of activity through which
consciousness is expressing itself” (Bailey 1925, 628–29; italics in the original).

63. These “effects” include what Habermas refers to as the illocutionary


and perlocutionary effects of speech acts, concepts he derives from the work of J.
L. Austin. Like Bailey, Habermas emphasizes the power of speech (although he
does not emphasize the power of thoughts). “What the speaker does in performing
a speech act is enter into a relationship of obligation with the hearer . . . The
illocutionary force of an utterance . . . [is] a coordinating power . . . For
Habermas, the illocutionary force is a binding force (in the twin senses of bonding
and compelling)” Cooke (1994, 58; italics original). Whereas Bailey emphasizes
the “beneficent or maleficent” nature of the created thoughtform according to the
underlying desire, motive, or purpose” of the speaker (Bailey 1925, 888–89),
Habermas is “wary of [any] such . . . attempt [to utilize “either an intentionalist
semantics or a phenomenological notion of intentionality”], considering it a return
to epistemological orientations which characterized the philosophy of
consciousness” (Rasmussen 1990, 39).

64. Daniel Dennett notes that Sir John Eccles shares a similar
understanding. “Eccles has proposed that the nonphysical mind is composed of
millions of ‘psychons’ [devas or elementals], which interact with millions of
‘dendrons’ . . . in the cortex” (Dennett 1991, 37n4).

65. In addition to agreeing on the necessity for a “radical new approach,”


David Ray Griffin notes that the solution to the mind-body problem “is either
relatively easy or completely intractable, depending upon the philosophical
assumptions with which it is approached” and he makes several points conducive
to an esoteric solution. He notes that the mind-body “problem” (as opposed to
“relation”) may arise from the typical way in which it is formulated: “How could
(conscious) experience conceivably arise out of that which is totally devoid of
experience [the brain]? . . . [which] has been understood to be composed of
insentient (non-experiencing) entities.” The esoteric answer is that the devic lives
which give rise to conscious experience and which constitute “physical matter”
such as the brain, are themselves not “devoid of experience” and are not insentient
entities. Griffin suggests seven reasons to be suspicious of the “realist”

209
perspective which strictly separates the physical world from our perceptions and
conceptions of it. He continues, “Quantum physics . . . has shown entities at this
level not to be analogous to billiard balls, and, as Seager has stressed, quantum
theory implies that the behaviour of the elementary units of nature can only be
explained by attributing to elementary particles something analogous to our own
mentality” (Griffin 1997; italics in the original).

66. Nobel-winner Brian Josephson, professor of physics at Cambridge


states, “There may be elements of intelligence in every atom of matter . . .
Physicists tend to think of matter as something lifeless and mechanical and are
conceptually on the wrong track. At the tiniest level, matter seems to behave
much more like something biological and living. There may be an underlying life
and intelligence below the phenomenon we ordinarily see and even beyond the
phenomenon being studied by physics . . . Similarly, there appears to be a
mysterious wholeness or unity to all matter that scientists can’t explain but which
is frequently described in Eastern religions” (Josephson 1983).

67. See Bailey (1925, 908, 929–30). For discussions of the dangers
associated with prematurely contacting the devic kingdom and elemental lives,
see Bailey (1922c, 126, 128-30, 135, 176–77, 181-82; 1925, 450, 455, 472-73,
480-82, 489, 621-22, 656). An outstanding example of this need for intelligent
understanding of the forces of matter was expressed by J. Robert Oppenheimer,
“father of the atomic bomb,” as he witnessed the Trinity test of the first
detonation of an atomic bomb in New Mexico. He famously recalled two
quotations from the Hindu tradition: “If the radiance of a thousand suns were to
burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendor of the mighty one;” and
“Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds” (Jungk 1958, 201).

68. Bailey provides one definition of a “magician” as, “It is in the


realisation of these facts anent deva substance, the power of sound, the law of
vibration, and the ability to produce forms in conformity with law, that the true
magician can be seen” (1925, 930).

69. Bailey’s teachings on prana and the etheric body—human, planetary,


and solar systemic—are presented throughout her writings. See especially, Bailey
(1925, 77–133; 1950b, 139–97). For eight concise statements regarding the
etheric body, see Bailey (1925, 81–87), and for six concise propositions, see
Bailey (1950b,142–44).

70. For Bailey’s teachings on health and healing, see Bailey (1953).

71. “Because man goes to his eternal home, and the mourners go about the
streets; before the silver cord is snapped, or the golden bowl is broken, or the
pitcher is broken at the fountain, or the wheel broken at the cistern, and the dust

210
returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it” (Eccl 12:
5–7 [RSV]). Bailey here discusses “Death and the Etheric Body” (Bailey 1925,
128–33) and notes that the “silver cord” of the Judeo-Christian tradition is the
sutratma (Skt.) of the Hindu tradition, the life thread which links spirit and soul
with the physical body and “which is snapped or broken after the withdrawal of
the etheric body from the dense physical body at the time of death” (Bailey 1925,
98). For Bailey’s extensive teachings on the nature of death, see Chapters 5and 6
of Esoteric Healing—“The Process of Restitution,” and “The Art of Elimination”
(Bailey 1953, 424–504), and the compilation, Death: The Great Adventure
(Bailey, 1985).

72. See for example, Merali (2006); Zlosnik, Ferreira, and Starkman
(2007).

73. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Maddox (accessed April 7, 2011).

74. The skeptic’s dictionary, s.v. “Morphic resonance” (by Robert T.


Carroll), http://skepdic.com/morphicres.html (accessed April 3, 2011). For a
thorough discussion of the reception of Sheldrake’s work in the scientific
community, see Stevens (2009).

75. Bailey suggests that these ten experimental “seed groups” are guided
by the planetary Hierarchy. They are intended to serve as channels for certain
types of energies and to inaugurate new techniques in work that will awaken
human consciousness (Bailey 1944, 1957).

76. For a discussion of the role of magic, science, and the growing
influence of the seventh ray, see Bailey (1949, 118–36). In this section she writes:
“The task of the new age workers is to . . . demonstrate that spirit and matter are
not antagonistic to each other and that throughout the universe there is only
spiritual substance, working on and producing the outer tangible forms” (Bailey
1949, 127); and, “We are entering a scientific age, but it will be a science which
passes out of the impasse which it has now reached and which—having
penetrated as it has into the realm of the intangible—will begin to work far more
subjectively than heretofore. It will recognise the existence of senses which are
super-sensory and which are extensions of the five physical senses, and this will
be forced upon science because of the multitude of reliable people who will
possess them and who can work and live in the worlds of the tangible and the
intangible simultaneously. The mass of reputable testimony will prove
incontrovertible. The moment that the subjective world of causes is proven to
exist . . . science will enter a new era; its focus of attention will change; the
possibilities of discovery will be immense and materialism (as that word is now
understood) will vanish. Even the word ‘materialism’ will become obsolete and
men in the future will be amused at the limited vision of our modern world and

211
wonder why we thought and felt as we did” (Bailey 1949, 134–35). Along these
lines see, for example, Tart (2009) and Berman (1981). Lee Smolin describes the
current impasse in theoretical physics as a historic thirty-year period in which no
real advances have been achieved in extending our knowledge of the laws of
nature. Like Bailey, he argues, “The lesson of the last thirty years is that the
problems we’re up against today cannot be solved by this pragmatic way of doing
science. To continue the progress of science, we have to again confront deep
questions about space and time, quantum theory, and cosmology” (Smolin 2006,
xi–xii). He insists that progress will be achieved only by a return to the reflective,
“deep thought . . . as part of the philosophical tradition” which characterized the
work of the revolutionary physicists a century ago (2006, xxii–xxiii). In esoteric
terms this “deep thought” refers, ontologically, to the penetration of the intuitive
or buddhic plane by the higher abstract mind, as opposed to the “pragmatic and
hard-nosed . . . virtuosity in calculat[ions]” characteristic of the lower rational
mind and the approach which came to dominate physics in the 1940s (Smolin
2006, xxii). Qualitatively, this “deep thought” can be understood as the theoretical
and abstract functioning of a third ray mind (the ray of Active Intelligence) as
opposed to the rational, calculating functioning of the fifth ray mind (the ray of
Concrete Knowledge and Science).

77. Smolin notes that string theory is so popular because it describes both
“the big and the small—both gravity and the elementary particles [general
relativity and quantum mechanics—Bailey’s macrocosmic and microcosmic].” He
continues, “It posits that the world contains as yet unseen dimensions and many
more particles than are presently known [as does the Esoteric Philosophy]. At the
same time, it proposes that all the elementary particles arise from the vibrations of
a single entity—a string—that obeys simple and beautiful laws” (Smolin 2006,
xiii–xiv). Similarly, in a few places Bailey describes the nature of the
mathematics that underlies the manifested universe and foretells of the role of
string theorists or “divine mathematicians.” For example, she writes, “It would
interest men much if they could see and interpret some of the records in the
hierarchical records, for in them men and angels, minerals and elements, animals
and vegetables, kingdoms and groups, Gods and ants are specified in terms of
energy formulas and by a scrutiny of these records the approximated increase of
vibration in any form of any kind can be found out at any time . . . Another series
of files in the records give—under a different formula—information as to what is
esoterically called ‘the heat content’ of any unit, ‘the radiating light’ of any form,
and the ‘magnetic force’ of every life. It is through this knowledge that the
Lipikas control the bringing in, and the passing out, of every Life, divine,
superhuman, solar and human, and it is through a consideration of that formula
which is the basic formula for a solar system that the physical plane appearance of
a solar Logos is controlled, and the length of a cosmic pralaya [Skt.—literally
“dissolution”] settled. We must not forget that the Lipika Lords of the solar
system have Their cosmic prototypes, and that These have Their feeble and

212
groping human reflections in the great astronomical scientists who endeavour to
ascertain facts anent the heavenly bodies, being subconsciously aware of the
existence of these cosmic formulas conveying information as the specific gravity,
constitution, radiation, magnetic pull, heat and light of any sun, solar system, or
constellation. Many of them in future and remote ages will pass to a full
comprehension, and will have the formulas committed to their care, thus joining
the ranks of the Lipikas. It is a peculiar line, requiring cycles of careful training in
divine mathematics” (Bailey 1925, 1141–42; italics in the original). The Lipika
(Skt., from lip—to write) Lords are the divine Beings who record every event in
the Ākāśa (Skt.; the term has many meanings including “shining substance,”
“Primordial Light,” and “undifferentiated noumenal and abstract Space”
[Barborka 1980, 29–37]). In Judaic, Christian and Islamic angelology, They are
known as the Recording Angels.

78. For similar arguments see (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clarke%27s


_three_laws [accessed 8/21/2011]).

79. In explicating the meaning of mantra (Skt.), Jones and Ryan state,
“Behind the power and significance of mantra in India is the understanding that
the universe itself is constituted of nothing but sound” (Jones and Ryan 2007, s.v.
“Mantra”). See also “The Occult Significance of Speech” (Bailey 1925, 977–82).

80. Jn 1:1–3 (no version of the Bible is specified).

81. Bailey fails to provide a reference for this quote but Hutton and Joseph
(1998), in their research showing the influence of Theosophy on modern
linguistics, quote it as well. They identify the source as Blavatsky ([1888a] 1977,
93). Note also the similarity of the quoted phrase to the description of “Vach” (or
Vāk), the Hindu goddess of speech (often identified with Sarasvatī, the goddess of
learning): “In the Vedic tradition the words of Sanskrit have a divine character.
Words are not arbitrary or mere names, but are the essential truth of the object
they represent . . . All of reality can be seen as mere congealed speech” (Jones and
Ryan 2007, s.v. “Vach”).

82. See also Chapter 15, “The Giving of the Word” (Bailey 1922b, 150–
62).

83. Bailey uses such terms as “white” and “black magic,” and “right” and
“left-hand paths” to distinguish between forces used for group good in the light of
the soul and forces used for selfish or destructive interests that impede soul
influence. She also employs less problematic language for the same concepts with
the terms “forces of light” and “forces of materialism.”

213
84. Bailey states that the theme of A Treatise on White Magic is “the
Magic of the Soul” and that the key thought “is to be found in the words of the
Bhagavad Gita . . . ‘Though I am Unborn, the Soul that passes not away, though I
am the Lord of Beings, yet as Lord over My nature I become manifest, through
the magical power of the Soul.’ Gita IV.6” (Bailey 1934, 4).

85. See, for example, Bailey (1934, 447–58).

86. Patanjali is the great sage to whom is attributed both the writing of the
Hindu classic meditation manual the Yoga-Sūtra and the founding of the school of
Rāja-Yoga.

87. Bailey writes, “Fortunately for the human race, few people as yet work
in mental matter . . . Lacking the one-pointedness of the mental plane matter as it
is influenced by a concentrated mind, these desire forms fail to do the damage
they otherwise might . . . The moment that the mind factor enters in and becomes
dominant, that moment a man becomes dangerous or useful as the case may be”
(Bailey 1934, 447–48).

88. For historical accounts of the development of transpersonal


psychology, see Sutich (1969, 1976); Vich (1990); and Walsh and Vaughan
(1993).

89. For a diverse sample of perspectives on the nature of transpersonal


psychology see Caplan, Hartelius, and Rardin (2003).

90. Ken Wilber stopped identifying as a transpersonal psychologist in


1983 citing “major internal divisions” and “warring ideologies” that he believes
have left the transpersonal movement in “an irreversible, terminal decline”
(Wilber 2002). He has redirected his efforts toward the development of an
integral theory that he believes is more inclusive than the various schools of
thought he identifies within transpersonal psychology. However, for simplicity, I
will not continue to make this distinction and will refer to Wilber as a
transpersonal theorist.

91. To my knowledge Arthur Hastings (1991) is the only academic who


has provided a substantial account of Bailey’s work. His two chapters on Bailey
serve as a balanced introduction to her work although he doesn’t appear to have
studied her teachings in depth, having apparently relied heavily on Sir John
Sinclair’s study (1984). He makes a few errors (such as confusing Bailey’s Master
[Koot Hoomi or K. H.], who appeared to Bailey when she was 15 years old, with
the Tibetan Master Djwhal Khul who would ask Bailey to collaborate with him
many years later [see Bailey 1951b, 34–38]) and he makes some questionable
assertions such as, “In metaphysical terms, the system described by A.A.B. is at

214
the astral and subtle levels” (Hastings 1991, 88). In her dissertation, Kate Hendon
(Hendon 2005, 4–8) provides a good overview of the “scarce” secondary
literature on Bailey which she characterizes as generally overtly emic in
perspective. She notes two dissertations subsequently published as books: one
from the Roman Catholic tradition (Pennesi 1999) critical of Bailey’s “‘new age’
views of Christianity;” and one on Bailey’s psychological model (Bakula 1978).
She further notes one of Zachary Lansdowne’s books (1986) was originally
published as a master’s thesis at the California Institute of Integral Studies. More
recently, two scholarly studies of Bailey’s work have been completed—Isobel
Wightman (2006) has published a PhD thesis at University of Western Sydney in
Australia, and Harvey M. Cheatham (2010) has published a master’s thesis at
Saybrook Graduate School and Research Center in California. Finally, Kathy
Newburn (2007) has provided a valuable introduction to Bailey’s esoteric
philosophy.

92. Assagioli was one of the few personal students of the Tibetan.
Correspondence from the Tibetan addressed specifically to Assagioli can be found
in two of Bailey’s volumes (1944, 138–56; 1955, 459–73). Although
transpersonal scholars Firman and Gila acknowledge the relationship between
Bailey and Assagioli, and the “wall of silence” he erected between himself and
her writings, they dismiss the significance of any influence these writings may
have had on him (Firman and Gila 2002, 14–16). For a detailed explanation of
this influence and Assagioli’s self-imposed “wall of silence,” see Mankoff (2011).

93. An Avatāra “appears in order to establish new pathways for religious


realization and to adapt them to the age in which he is born; he is able to confer
divine knowledge upon his fellow human beings” (Diener et al. 1994, s.v.
“Avatāra”). For a technical exposition of the Doctrine of Avatāras and their
relation to the Nirmanakayas, Buddhas of Compassion, and the Christ, see
Barborka (1980, 453–65).

94. The distinction between fluid states of consciousness and stable


structures of consciousness is an important aspect of Wilber’s recent work. See,
for example, Wilber (2000a, 12–16; 2006, 3–6).

95. For a comparison of koshas and upādhis, or “veils of Spirit,” see


Barborka (1980, 10, 127–28, 198). For a classic esoteric account of the cosmic
process of involution, see Annie Besant’s A Study in Consciousness (1918),
especially the Introduction.

96. Space considerations do not allow me to explore the major


contradiction between Wilber’s characterization of this “brilliant and beautiful”
involutionary/evolutionary model wherein higher levels are “sleeping,” and
Wilber’s later contention that levels of Spirit, although dormant and existing in

215
potential through the involutionary process, somehow do not pre-exist, they are
not waiting to “drop down,” and they “are simply no longer needed,” yet
somehow they “emerge” (Wilber 2006, 231–48).

97. The Encyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy and Religion defines the


nadis as follows: “Skt., lit. ‘tube, vessel, vein’; the nadīs are the energy channels
through which prāna, which is necessary for life, passes to all parts of the body”
(Diener et al. 1994, s.v. “Nadī”). According to Bailey the nadis “constitute an
intricate and most extensive network of fluid energies which are an intangible,
interior, paralleling system to that of the bodily nerves, which latter system is in
fact an externalization of the inner pattern of energies. There is as yet no word in
the English language or in any European tongue for the ancient word ‘nadi,’
because the existence of this subjective system is not yet recognised, and only the
materialistic concept of the nerves as a system built up in response to a tangible
environment yet holds sway in the West. The idea of these nerves being the dense
physical result of an inner sensitive response apparatus is still undefined and
unrecognized by modern science. When recognition is accorded to this subtle
substance (composed of threads of energy) underlying the more tangible nerves,
we shall have moved forward in our approach to the entire problem of health and
disease, and the world of causes will be that much nearer” (Bailey 1953, 195–96).
Modern science may now actually recognize the existence of the nadis and may
have provided a word for them: microtubules. Theoretical physicist Sir Roger
Penrose and anesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff have collaborated on a theory of
Orchestrated Objective Reduction which suggests that microtubules, an important
component of the cytoskeleton which provides an internal supportive structure for
neurons, may support the process of quantum tunneling (see Penrose 1994).

98. It is interesting to note that Wilber makes a nearly identical argument


in explaining why he has given the least attention to the domain of analytic-
empiric inquiry (Wilber 2000b, 166n20).

99. Bailey writes that the etheric body must be considered “as the
mechanism which externalizes itself through the nadis, or that fine system of
related lines of force which, in their turn, externalize themselves through the
physical system of nerves . . . These substances . . . create a network of channels;
they produce fine tubes [microtubules] (if I may use so inappropriate a word)
which take the general form of the dense material or tangible form with which
they may be associated. This form underlies every part of the physical body . . .
The mass of the smaller channels or the channeling tubes of energy eventually
create in all forms that layer of corresponding nerves which are not yet recognized
by medical science but which are like an intermediary web or network . . . It is
this system underlying the nerves which is the true response apparatus and
which—via the brain—telegraphs information to the mind or, via the brain and
the mind, keeps the soul informed. It is this system of nadis which is used in full

216
consciousness by the initiate who has related the Spiritual Triad and the soul-
infused personality . . . There is a peculiar and at present inexplicable relation
between this system of nadis and the antahkarana when it is in process of creation
or is created” (Bailey 1950b, 145–62; see also 1953).

100. Understanding the distinction between divine intelligence and


knowledge of the evolving world of form throws into question Wilber’s
speculations regarding the nature of “enlightenment” (Wilber 2006a, 94–95, 235–
48).

101. Bailey writes, “We must remember also that beyond a certain point it
is not safe nor wise to carry the communication of the facts of the solar system.
Much must remain esoteric and veiled. The risks of too much knowledge are far
greater than the menace of too little. With knowledge comes responsibility and
power,—two things for which the race is not yet ready” (Bailey 1922b, 6).

102. Bailey often uses the word “Life” to refer to Spirit, the first aspect of
Divinity, the “dynamic electric Fire which produces all that is, and is the
sustaining, originating Cause and Source of all manifestation” (1936, 18).
Following Blavatsky ([1888a] 1977, 49), however, she also defines Life in
broader terms, as That which synthesizes and permeates Spirit, Soul, and Matter.
Bailey suggests that the concept “is hinted at in the Bhagavad Gita in the words,
‘Having pervaded this whole universe with a fragment of Myself, I remain’”
(Bailey 1951a, 592). Regarding the omnipresence of life, Blavatsky writes, “Thus
Occultism disposes of the so-called Azoic age of Science, for it shows that there
never was a time when the Earth was without life upon it. Wherever there is an
atom of matter, a particle or a molecule, even in its most gaseous condition, there
is life in it, however latent and unconscious” (Blavatsky [1888a] 1977, 258).
Despite his repeated statements that Spirit permeates everything (Wilber 1995,
289; 1997, 281–82; 2006, 217, 232), Wilber maintains a distinction between
matter and “life,” between the physiosphere (“insentient, dead, lifeless matter”)
and the biosphere in which “life” has somehow “emerged” (Wilber 2000a, 47;
2006, 217). In his efforts to avoid any traces of metaphysics and to incorporate the
latest findings of science, modernism, and postmodernism in his theories, Wilber
attempts to link the physiosphere and the biosphere via “the sciences of
complexity” (which include General System Theory, nonequilibrium
thermodynamics, autopoietic system theory, chaos theory, etc.). Relying on these
theories, he claims that insentient matter “winds itself up,” and that “hidden
aspects of the material realm [?] . . . propel themselves into states of higher order
. . . long before the appearance of life” (1995, 13–14; italics in the original). De
Quincey notes Wilber’s ambiguous position with respect to panpyschism and
asserts that Wilber “faces the ‘miracle of emergence’ problem” (de Quincey,
2000, 198–205). Wilber’s simplistic presentation of the evolutionary process has
been severely criticized (see for example, Lane 2011; Visser 2011). For an

217
esoteric account of “The Law of ‘Coming into Being’” and “How the One
Becomes the Many,” see Barborka (1980, 469–519).

103. Meyerhoff (2007) notes that Wilber’s repetitiveness in Sex, Ecology,


Spirituality “is quite striking. This is not the repetitiveness that sometimes occurs
over the course of a long book. This is a repetitiveness which occurs within single
sections in which a single point is being made. Wilber simply repeats the point he
is making over and over. His tone of absolute conclusiveness is belied by his
inability to conclude.”

104. The Tibetan emphasizes that “these Instructions are intended to be


practical and to convey the teaching needed to those students who can read
between the lines and who are developing the capacity to see the esoteric meaning
behind the outer blinds and exoteric forms” (Bailey 1934, 568). He further states,
“All that is possible for me is to grope for those feeble words which will
somewhat clothe the thought. As they clothe it they limit it and I am guilty of
creating new prisoners who must ultimately be released. All books are prison
houses of ideas . . . I talk now in symbols; I manipulate words in order to create a
certain impression; I construct a thought-form which, when dynamic enough, can
impress the brain of a transmitting agent, such as yourself. But as I do so, I know
well how much must be left unrelated and how seldom it is possible to do more
than point out a cosmology, macrocosmic or microcosmic, which will suffice to
convey a temporary picture of divine reality” (Bailey 1934, 523).

105. Bailey emphasizes that scientists are among the greatest esotericists
and that their work is essentially an expression of the meditative process (1934,
15, 327, 331–33; 1936, 51–52; 1954, 59–60; 1955, 220–21).

106. In the chapter “Science and The Secret Doctrine” in her biography of
H. P. Blavatsky, Cranston observes that in 1888 Blavatsky offered three teachings
regarding the nature of matter that preceded modern scientific discovery: 1) atoms
are divisible; 2) atoms are perpetually in motion; and 3) matter and energy are
convertible (Cranston 1993, 435–38).

107. Wilber contends that “the traditions” simplistically portray energy


fields as “hovering metaphysically beyond matter,” but he does not provide a
single reference for this assertion (2003a). In contrast, much of Bailey’s
teachings, particularly her teachings on the causal body and its relations to both
the chakras and endocrine system (1925), are so detailed that they appear to be
exegeses on human, planetary, and solar electrical engineering.

108. In his effort to unravel the mind-body problem, Wilber claims that
the “body” is both exterior and interior, since “body” can mean both the dense
physical organism (Body, uppercase), and “can also mean, and for the average

218
person does mean, the subjective feelings, emotions, and sensations of the felt
body . . . I have labeled this as ‘body’ . . . which simply means the feelings and
emotions of the felt body” (Wilber 2000a, 178). In challenging Wilber’s
“idiosyncratic definition of ‘body,’” and his semantic sleight of hand or “‘now-
you-see-it-now-you-don’t’ mind-body shuffle,” de Quincey concludes that Wilber
“doesn’t even begin to offer a solution” and that his “claim to have ‘resolved’ the
[mind-body] problem will be dismissed, at best, as naïve, or, worse, as a case of
hubris” (de Quincey 2000, 192–98; see also Angel 2006, 80–84).

109. This section of the dissertation on Wilber’s work originally


incorporated the language of his “quadrant model,” a relatively recent form of his
evolving theory (Helfrich, 2008), but space considerations prevent me from
analyzing this model in detail and from using the associated quadrant
terminology. In brief, his quadrant model vertically bisects Reality and analytical
perspectives into Interior (left) and Exterior (right) dimensions, and horizontally
into Individual (upper) and Collective (lower) dimensions, yielding a quadratic
scheme which includes interior/individual (consciousness), exterior/individual
(form), interior collective (culture), and exterior collective (society) dimensions.
While the quadratic divisions of Wilber’s latest model may have some heuristic
value I suggest that they are ultimately untenable as they generate inconsistencies
and obscure the underlying synthetic nature of all events. I suggest that Wilber’s
quadrant model is less tenable than the model of the Trinity whose aspects are
distinct yet interpenetrating. Transpersonal scholar Sean Kelly makes a similar
argument in stating, “Just as Jung’s predilection for the spatially intuited image of
the quaternity sometimes blinded him to the virtues of the trinity as a temporally
inflected symbol of the Self, so can Wilber’s Kosmic Mandala . . . obscure certain
subtleties and complexities to which any truly integral approach must give heed”
(Kelly 2002, 94; see also Kelly 2002, 83–84; 1993, 137–45). Kelly goes on to
describe some of the inconsistencies with Wilber’s quadratic divisions and
suggests, “If the Left Hand quadrants, as the ‘within’ of things, together
correspond to ‘Mind,’ while the Right hand quadrants correspond to ‘Matter’ . . .
then what we have is a kind of psychophysical parallelism” (Kelly 2002, 94).

110. For example, Wilber merely asserts that “etheric energies” only
“emerge” when “life” somehow arises from the evolution of complex material
forms—“these etheric energy fields are said to surround the physical energy
fields” although he again fails to reference who actually says this. Next, he claims
that “with the emergence of a brain stem and a paleomammalian limbic system,
an even subtler energy—called ‘astral’—also begins to emerge. ‘Astral’ can mean
many things, but it particularly means a powerful emotional energy field—subtler
than physical and etheric—that pervades the living organism.” And finally he
states, “At the point where the evolution of increasingly complex gross form
produces a triune brain, a yet subtler energy—known as ‘psychic’—emerges.
‘Psychic,’ in this case, simply means ‘thought fields,’ which are said to be

219
produced by sustained mental activity” (Wilber 2003a). Wilber fails to explain
how mental activity could be sustained prior to the emergence of “thought-fields.”
He also fails to explain precisely how these fields (etheric, astral, mental, and
“life”) “emerge” from material forms or what the various stages of emergence
may be (e.g., astral energy “begins” to emerge). In addition to pointing out the
extreme simplicity of his descriptions of subtle energies (etheric, astral, mental), it
is important to note that his “natural history of subtle energies” ends with
“psychic” or mental energy and he does not attempt to explain (or “carefully
correlate”) how higher “causal” or “non-dual” energies might be correlated with
gross forms as he initially proposes (Wilber 2006, 229). He does, however,
provide a diagram (2006, 228) that purportedly shows the “correlation” of causal
energies with SF1, SF2, and SF3 “structure-functions of the human brain” but he
fails to clearly identify what these “structure-functions” actually are, beyond
stating that they “correspond with concrete operational, formal operational, and
vision-logic” and “are currently being mapped using PET and other sophisticated
instruments” (Wilber 1995, 192).

111. It is important to note that Washburn acknowledges that his criticisms


of “structural-hierarchical models” are virtually criticisms of only Wilber’s
problematic model (Washburn 1995, 9).

112. It is unclear as to why Washburn characterizes this “double reversal”


as a “spiral loop” or “spiral movement” (Washburn 1995, 41–42) when it depicts,
mathematically, a two-dimensional solitary sine wave, which is very different
from a “spiral.”

113. In addition to the dynamic-dialectical and structural-hierarchical


perspectives, Washburn also identifies Jorge Ferrer’s participatory perspective,
feminist perspectives, and ecological perspectives as comprising major
approaches within transpersonal inquiry (Washburn 2003b).

114. Dramatic, mythical, and expressive modes of communication are


clear examples of fourth ray qualities (see Appendices and Robbins [1988a]).
Robbins notes that the fourth ray mind “is the truly appreciative mind: the mind
which understands with intuitive depth, and which is often sensitive to ‘a sense
sublime of something far more deeply interfused’” (Robbins 1988a, 368; italics in
the original). Other descriptions of the fourth ray mind which reflect Jung’s
preferred mode of thinking include: “Accuracy is not a major concern, and is
often sacrificed to exaggeration for the sake of dramatic emphasis. It is capable of
drawing sharp contrasts between differing mental contents for the sake of
arresting illustration” (Robbins 1988a, 391); and, “The fourth ray mind is,
perhaps, the most richly creative type of mind. Its power to free associate, to
imagine, to symbolize, and to express subtle impressions, feelings and sensations

220
in aesthetically pleasing forms makes it a fertile source of the significantly new”
(Robbins 1988a, 402).

115. The theme of contrasting perspectives which derive from the


apparent opposition of fourth and fifth ray qualities will be explored at length in
the second half of the dissertation. In this analysis, Habermas’ theory of
communicative rationality will serve as an archetypal representation of fifth ray
qualities.

116. I suggest that other transpersonal and archetypal thinkers who are
strongly influenced by Jung (including for example, James Hillman, Sean Kelly,
Richard Tarnas, and Bryan Wittine) are also strongly influenced by the fourth ray,
most likely on the level of the mind, personality, and/or soul.

117. However, the esoteric view also provides at least two explanations as
to why scientific, rational discourse has attained such a dominant position. The
first explanation is that the ray energies are in continual flux, waxing and waning
in influence. Bailey states that a major expression of the fifth ray has been in
manifestation since 1775 C.E. while a major expression of the fourth ray will not
begin to come into manifestation until 2025 C.E. (Bailey 1936, 411). From the
esoteric perspective, the Age of Enlightenment and the rise of science in recent
centuries are the outward effects of the increasing subjective influence of the fifth
ray of Knowledge and Concrete Science. A second esoteric explanation for the
dominance of the fifth ray at this time is that as humanity increasingly develops
the power to work on the mental plane it comes under the influence of the fifth
ray because this ray energy “is pre-eminently the substance of the mental plane”
(Bailey 1960, 590; italics in the original). Bailey further asserts that “the
outstanding expression of this fifth ray energy can be seen in the rapid
formulating of the many ideologies which have taken place since 1900 . . . today
they are the common talk and phrases of the man in the street [Habermas’ “public
sphere”]. The inflow of this mental energy into the world of men, the attainment
in consciousness of mental ability by many thousands, and the achievement of
mental polarisation by aspirants all the world over, are all due to the activity of
this fifth ray energy” (Bailey 1960, 596).

118. Bailey devotes little space to analyzing preegoic development in a


particular life experience. She does often address issues regarding the early stages
of human development (but almost entirely in a phylogenetic sense, not
ontogenetic) through her many teachings on the Lemurian and Atlantean
civilizations and forms of consciousness (with their respective focuses on
developing the physical and emotional body) that preceded our modern Aryan
civilization and its focus on the development of mind.

221
119. If, as I’ve suggested, Washburn is himself deeply influenced by the
fourth ray of Harmony Through Conflict it would be expected that he would
emphasize the role of conflict and tension in the preegoic, or any, stage of
development. I suggest that Wilber, on the other hand, is more influenced by the
fifth ray of Knowledge and Concrete Science and would therefore naturally
emphasize the building of basic structures, cognitive structures in particular.

120. The idea that development occurs in an undeviatingly linear manner


has been perhaps the central focus of Washburn’s criticisms of Wilber. See for
example Washburn (1995, 41). It is important to note, however, that Washburn is
providing his own interpretation of Wilber’s model, and that this is an
interpretation that Wilber finds “rather disappointing” as it “tends to misrepresent
my overall model” (Wilber 1998, 306). In numerous places Bailey is emphatic in
stating that human development is not a linear process. For example she writes:
“It is necessary here to warn the student against the error of making any hard or
fast rule anent the sequential order of . . . development . . . Nature, in all
departments of her corporate life, parallels her efforts, and overlaps her various
processes, and it takes a seer of vast wisdom and experience to state exactly the
stage at which any particular unit of the human family may be” (Bailey 1925,
967–68); “One point you all need to grasp is that the progressing disciple does not
move into new fields or areas of awareness, like a steady marching forward from
one plane to another (as the visual symbols of the theosophical literature would
indicate)” (Bailey 1950b, 53); and “Students usually think in terms of sequence.
The effects of penetration are simultaneous . . . the initiate works outside of time
and space” (Bailey 1955, 312).

121. In response to an unpublished paper of mine which attempted to


reconcile the early differences between Washburn and Wilber, Washburn wrote,
“You offer an intriguing synthesis of spiral [i.e., dynamic-dialectical] and
hierarchical approaches . . . Of the many ideas you introduce, I am especially
attracted to the notion of polarization, for reasons you can well guess. It is a
helpful notion which could be adapted for use in many systems” (Washburn,
personal communication).

122. A widely known description of mental polarization is what L. L.


Whyte has called the “European dissociation” between mind and body (Whyte
1950; see also Wilber 1996, 199–209; 215–19). Ontologically and esoterically,
this means that the individual (or groups—e.g., “Europeans”) becomes polarized
on the lower mental plane for numerous life experiences in order to develop the
mental body and its capacities. This entails a dimming of awareness of the
physical and emotional bodies and the individual loses touch with them as active
resources. A person with a fifth ray mind is especially susceptible to mental
detachment or isolation in their quest for truth and clarity (Robbins 1988a, 374–
75). The esoteric perspective asserts that humanity is entering into the stage of

222
mental polarization and this is the rational stage of human development valorized
by Habermas. Of course there are innumerable difficulties associated with an
isolated expression of the lower rational mind. Earlier critical theorists Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno referred to this restricted expression as
instrumental reason, and its critique “became the principal task of critical theory”
(McCarthy 1978, 20). Bailey, on the other hand, speaks of this stage of
development as an imperative and as an unprecedented opportunity in human
history (Bailey 1955, 428).

123. Wilber has criticized Washburn’s lack of clarity on this point (Wilber
1998, 318).

124. Wilber challenges Washburn’s “very slippery definition of ‘Ground’”


which, he asserts, Washburn variously interprets as libido, psyche, or spirit to suit
his needs (Wilber 1998, 317–18).

125. See, for example, The Elimination of the Personality Thoughtform


(Bailey 1953, 515–20).

126. Washburn attributes this concept to Arthur Deikman (1971).

127. Regarding the importance of electrical phenomena and polarity


Bailey writes, “If this treatise serves no other purpose than to direct the attention
of the scientific and philosophic students to the study of force or energy in man
. . . in terms of electrical phenomena . . . [and] polarity . . . [on all levels of the
cosmos], the scientific application of the laws of electricity to the totality of
existence on the physical plane will bring about a revolution upon the planet”
(Bailey 1925, 714). See also Bailey (1922c, 23–29; 1934, 112–13; 1942, 81–83;
1955, 310–22, 428–39).

128. Regarding the hypothesis of reincarnation, Washburn wrote to me,


“As you are well aware, the two of us differ on the metaphysics and, especially,
on the issue of reincarnation. I try to suspend metaphysical commitments and,
therefore, confine my observations within the limits of a single lifetime. Your
metaphysical commitments allow you to construct a view extending over many
lifetimes. I think well of your project as an intellectual achievement, however,
even if our perspectives are remote from each other” (Washburn, personal
communication). Washburn seems to be unconcerned that in confining oneself to
the perspective, or assumption, of a single life experience, one is also making a
metaphysical commitment. Similar to my quote of Cynthia Kaufman’s criticism
of Habermas in the second half of the dissertation, Washburn’s assumption of a
single life experience merely adopts “the more familiar argument,” not
necessarily the better argument. Washburn, like Wilber and others, prefers to
adopt the mainstream, scientifically acceptable, and largely materialist

223
metaphysical assumption regarding a single life experience. It is important to note
that Wilber, despite his professed belief in reincarnation, does not include the
concept in his theory of human development except for the mere adoption of a
single sentence which allegedly makes the hypothesis completely amenable to his
model. He writes, “My own belief is that reincarnation does occur . . . one simply
chooses to decide whether reincarnation exists or not. [If] . . . you believe in
reincarnation, then an integral theory needs to be able to incorporate that
occurrence. It can do so if it adds one hypothesis, as follows: . . . Complexity of
gross form is necessary for the expression or manifestation of both higher
consciousness and subtler energy” (Wilber 2003b, Reincarnation, para. 4; italics
in the original).

129. It is interesting to note Robbins’ observation that the fourth ray mind
is a “receptive mind,” dependent upon activation from without. “There is,
therefore, associated with the fourth ray mind a kind of passivity, or dependency
upon sources of animation external to the mental field, and also external to the
individual’s energy system” (Robbins 1988a, 365–66).

130. The aspect of will is a major theme in Bailey’s writings, being a part
of the essential triad of will, love, and intelligence or atma, buddhi, and manas. I
have not, however, emphasized this aspect in the dissertation. The Tibetan
requested of Assagioli that he write an article on the Dedicated Will (Bailey 1944,
141). The result was the book, The Act of Will (Assagioli 1974).

131. “Heaven” is not a concept elucidated in Washburn’s theory.


Apparently “heaven” is yet another term for his multi-faceted Ground. Washburn
also does not clearly incorporate the concept of “soul” into his theory yet he
asserts that “the power of the Ground . . . is not merely a theoretical postulate. It is
rather the very life of the soul;” and equally inexplicably he asserts, “spirit is of
necessity something that expresses itself within the boundaries of the soul”
(Washburn 1995, 130).

132. Ferrer suggests (2002, 194–95n2) that the ambiguous definition of


transpersonal phenomena provided by Roger Walsh and Francis Vaughan is the
most generally accepted and widely used definition in the field of transpersonal
studies. They define transpersonal phenomena as “experiences in which the sense
of identity or self extends beyond (trans) the individual or personal to encompass
wider aspects of humankind, life, psyche or cosmos” (Walsh and Vaughan 1993,
203).

133. In the concluding chapter Ferrer states that the thesis of his book is
that his participatory vision “is both more consistent with the goals of world
spiritual traditions, and a more fruitful way to think and live spiritual and
transpersonal phenomena today” (Ferrer 2002, 188; italics added).

224
134. Ferrer “adopts” the definition of spirituality provided by Donald
Evans which states, “spirituality consists primarily of a basic transformative
process in which we uncover and let go of our narcissism so as to surrender into
the Mystery out of which everything continually arises” (Evans 1993, 4).
Compare this with two of Bailey’s many definitions of spirituality which express
a more active, practical, and moral dimension: “The word ‘spiritual’ does not
belong to the churches or to the world religions . . . That is truly spiritual which
properly relates man to man and man to God and which demonstrates in a better
world and the expression of the Four Freedoms throughout the planet [as
enunciated by Franklin D. Roosevelt—freedom of speech and expression;
freedom of worship; freedom from want; and freedom from fear]. For these the
spiritual man must work” [rather than passively “surrender”] (Bailey 1947, 169;
italics added); and, “This group [the New Group of World Servers] gives to the
word ‘spiritual’ a wide significance; they believe it to mean an inclusive
endeavour towards human betterment, uplift and understanding; they give it the
connotation of tolerance, international synthetic communion, religious
inclusiveness, and all trends of thought which concern the esoteric development
of the human being” (Bailey 1934, 414).

135. Ferrer utilizes Wilber’s four quadrant model to illustrate that


intrasubjective reductionism is “the reduction of spiritual and transpersonal
phenomena to the Upper Left Quadrant, the realm of the interior and individual”
(Ferrer 2002, 26). While commending Wilber for offering a more inclusive
conceptual model, Ferrer also states that “the practical ways in which these
conceptual equivalencies can actually help us to integrate the . . . [four quadrants]
in our culture and lived experience remain, in my opinion, obscure in Wilber’s
work” (Ferrer 2002, 25–26).

136. Rothberg’s original argument appears as follows: “In modernity, it is


too much to attempt to have the life and creations of a single questing individual
or single relationship or family hold the energies of existence, energies which
were previously integrated in many much wider and more complex sets of
relationships. This attempt puts enormous pressure on these limited human forms”
(Rothberg 1993, 111). The impetus for this warning is the “large number of
casualties” that have resulted from the attempt “to squeeze meaning out of
subjectivity alone,” and Rothberg cites such modern individuals as Hölderlin,
Rimbaud, Nietzsche, and Plath as examples. Rothberg may in turn have originally
discerned this argument in Habermas who, in referencing Arnold Gehlen, writes,
“The consequences of this rationalization of the lifeworld are ambivalent: What
some celebrate . . . others abhor as a subjectivism that undermines traditionally
anchored institutions, overloads the individual’s capacity for decision making,
gives rise to a consciousness of crisis, and thereby endangers social integration”
(Habermas 1984, 341).

225
137. Bailey writes, “Many of the difficulties of mystics and occultists
today are due to the fact that they are literally ‘playing with fire’ and are not
aware of it; that they are not preserving the right or ordered sequence of
development . . . that they are following practices for which they are not ready . . .
and which they blindly follow without any understanding of the process or
results” (Bailey 1942, 596–97).

138. Bailey’s writings in this section include such topics as: Problems of
Cleavage, Integration, and Stimulation; Diseases and Problems of Disciples and
Mystics; Problems Arising Out of the Awakening and Stimulation of the Centers;
Unfoldment of Psychic Powers and Mystical Vision; and Revelation of Light and
Power and Attendant Difficulties (Bailey 1942, 401–625).

139. Nietzsche captures this esoteric truth well (as I suggest he was
himself an Initiate) in describing “human beings who know how to be silent,
lonely, resolute, and content and constant in invisible [i.e., esoteric] activities;
human beings who are bent on seeking in all things for what in them must be
overcome” (Nietzsche [1882] 1974, 228; italics in the original). As noted by
Rothberg, it is regrettable to acknowledge that Nietzsche’s creative life of intense
subjective work ended with the onset of insanity which lasted a decade.

140. See Bailey (1960, 434–37; 535–36). I suggest that the striving to lead
a “dual life of discipleship” corresponds to the efforts made in following the
Eightfold Path of Buddhism, the essence of Buddha’s Fourth Noble Truth that
leads to the cessation of suffering. In cultivating the skill to traverse this Path one
must create a tension between the many dualities so as to avoid extremes and to
discern the “right,” “perfect,” or Middle Way. Bailey frequently refers to the Path
of Return as the “Razor-Edged Path.”

141. Bailey writes: “Be prepared for loneliness. It is the law. As a man
dissociates himself from all that concerns his physical, astral and mental bodies,
and centres himself in the Ego [i.e., Soul], it produces a temporary separation.
This must be endured and passed, leading to a closer link at a later period”
(1922b, 76); and, “Therefore—under the law—there comes always to the striver
after the Mysteries and the manipulator of the law, a period of aloneness and of
sorrow when no man stands by and isolation is his lot. In lesser degree this comes
to all, and to the arhat (or initiate of the fourth degree) this complete isolation is a
characteristic feature. He stands midway between life in the three worlds and that
in the world of adepts. His vibration does not synchronise, prior to initiation, with
the vibrations of either group. Under the law he is alone. But this is only
temporary” (1934, 263; italics in the original). This intense subjective isolation,
through which all must eventually pass, is demonstrated most clearly in the
anguished cry of Jesus during the fourth initiation, the Crucifixion, “My God, my
God, why hast Thou forsaken me?” (Mt 27:46 [RSV]). According to Bailey, at

226
this moment the causal body, the vehicle of the soul and of consciousness, was
destroyed and the monadic state of pure Being not yet entered. Regarding the
fourth initiation, The Great Renunciation or Crucifixion, symbolized by the cross
which depicts a human being’s greatest point of spiritual tension, see Bailey
(1937, 175–228; 1960, 602–41, 692–703). For a discussion of the dual roles of
Jesus and the Christ at the moment of crucifixion see Bailey (1960, 523–24).

142. See for example, The Six Stages of Discipleship (Bailey 1944, 673–
773).

143. Bailey provides an enormous amount of information regarding


holonic structures and relationships greater than humanity, a topic that few
transpersonal or integral scholars are able to address with the notable exception of
Richard Tarnas (see in particular his Cosmos and Psyche [2006]). She writes, “[In
A Treatise on Cosmic Fire (Bailey 1925)] the great creative Plan, its laws and
technique of unfoldment, and the work of the Builders of the Universe was dealt
with; emerging out of the mass of imparted facts, and underlying all the teaching,
was the idea of a great Life with Its own psychology and ideas. It was an attempt
to give a synthetic picture of the unfolding Mind of God as It works out Its plans
through the lesser Sons of Mind. In symbolism and archaic phrases it veiled the
truths and principles which lie at the root of the creative process, and in its
entirety is beyond the grasp of the advanced student. At the same time, it is a most
valuable compendium of information, and will serve to convey truth and to
develop the intuition” (Bailey 1936, xxi). Elsewhere she asserts, “Astrology is
essentially the purest presentation of occult truth in the world at this time, because
it is the science which deals with those conditioning and governing energies and
forces which play through and upon the whole field of space and all that is found
within that field” (Bailey 1951a, 5; italics in the original). Skeptics may
unreflectively consider astrology to be irrational but it can be understood as a
science of energy relationships, or systems theory, on a cosmic scale. One former
skeptic, theoretical-astrophysicist Percy Seymour, well exemplifies the
appreciative understanding that derives from patiently studying the science of
astrology rather than simply relying on unfounded prejudices (Seymour 1990).

144. Ferrer asserts that it is “imperative . . . to reframe our understanding


of transpersonal phenomena in a way that does not connote intentionality (Ferrer
2002, 16; italics added). See also Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1993).

145. Ferrer does make a subtle shift in his argument as he stresses the
importance of integrating “spiritual openings” and “spiritual states,” which I
suggest are more inclusive categories than “spiritual phenomena.” He fails,
however, to elaborate on these categories and merely asserts the need to
“integrate” and “stabilize” spiritual “openings” and “states” without explicating
how this could be achieved (Ferrer 2002, 37).

227
146. The simplicity of Ferrer’s analysis can be seen in his definition of
integrative arrestment as “the hindrance of the natural integrative process that
translates spiritual realizations into everyday life towards the transformation of
self, relationships, and world” (Ferrer 2002, 37; italics in the original). However,
he leaves completely unanalyzed what these “events” or “spiritual realizations”
actually are (a dream? an altered state of consciousness? transformative
“realizations or insights?”); who it is that has them (everyone? anyone?); what the
conditions are for having them (do they simply “spontaneously and naturally”
“emerge?” Are they simply “undergone?”); and perhaps most importantly, what
his idea of the “‘natural’ integrative process” actually is, an analysis that would
lead him into the realm of primary occultism.

147. Ferrer credits the use of this term to Renee Weber (1986, 7).

148. In the Master Index to Bailey’s writings (Bailey 1974) are listed
approximately fifty esoteric sciences. I suggest some of the major esoteric
sciences are: The Science of Astrology; The Science of the Centers (Chakras);
The Science of Healing; The Science of Death; The Science of Light; The Science
of Meditation; the Science of the Antahkarana; The Science of Impression; The
Science of Invocation and Evocation; The Science of Service; and The Science of
Right Human Relations. Like Ferrer and Bailey, Rothberg also calls for
alternatives to the “privileged position . . . [of] contemporary, established Western
concepts of science and inquiry . . . Might not a profound encounter with practices
of spiritual inquiry lead to considering carefully the meaning of other comparable
categories (e.g., dhyana, vichara, theoria, gnosis, or contemplatio) and perhaps to
developing understandings of inquiry in which such spiritual categories are
primary or central when we speak of knowledge?” (Rothberg 1994, 8).

149. See Bailey (1922c, 147–48, 151–53, 1934, 34, 109–10, 120, 337;
1942, 543–44, 574–75, 584–85; 1944, 715; 1948, 35–36; 1954, 34, 113–14; 1955,
85–86, 158, 175).

150. This typology is extremely problematic and Ferrer acknowledges “the


admittedly somewhat artificial character of this classification” (Ferrer 2002, 80).

151. Ferrer also apparently conflates the “mystical” dimension of religious


traditions with their “esoteric” dimension but he fails to elucidate the nature of
these “dimensions” (Ferrer 2002, 74).

152. Ferrer asserts: “No human being can claim access to a God’s eye that
can judge from above” (Ferrer 2002, 167) yet he fails to address the possibility of
Beings who may have evolved beyond the human stage of development who
might reveal aspects of the mind of God (the planetary Logos) to humanity. While
Ferrer acknowledges that “to postulate intuitive forms of knowing beyond the

228
structures of ordinary subject-centered and communicative reason is a bold and
salutary move,” he limits his discussion to criticizing any claims regarding “a
perennialist metaphysic” that might be made through this intuitive capacity, as
they presumably only serve to support a justificatory circular argument (Ferrer
2002, 87). Despite the bold and salutary nature of postulating this “Eye of the
Heart” which “participates in the Divine reality,” Ferrer fails to discuss its
development or to consider that Those who have attained such insight might share
the resultant knowledge with ordinary humanity to teach and guide rather than to
merely validate and justify “a priori metaphysical commitments.” Blavatsky
clearly states the timeless and universal revelatory nature of the Ageless Wisdom
in her introduction to The Secret Doctrine when she writes, “Is it a new religion,
we are asked? By no means; it is not a religion, nor is its philosophy new; for, as
already stated, it is as old as thinking man . . . More than one great scholar has
stated that there never was a religious founder . . . who had invented a new
religion, or revealed a new truth. These founders were all transmitters, not
original teachers. They were the authors of new forms and interpretations, while
the truths upon which the latter were based were as old as mankind . . . Thus
every nation received in its turn some of the said truths, under the veil of its own
local and special symbolism; which, as time went on, developed into a more or
less philosophical cultus, a Pantheon in mythical disguise” (Blavatsky [1888a]
1977, xxxvi; italics in the original).

153. Angel (2006) has provided an analysis of the tenets underlying


Wilber’s theory which shows them to be logically untenable, and Meyerhoff
(2010) has written a fairly comprehensive critique of Wilber’s claims. Many other
criticisms of Wilber’s thinking can be found on the website Integral World
(www.integralworld.net/ [accessed July 24, 2011]).

154. Quotation transcribed from a videotape recording of the colloquium.

155. For one who holds broad expectations to holistically reconstruct a


critical social theory, this narrow focus on the rationality problem and the theory
of argumentation may seem questionable. Axel Honneth pursued this question in
asking Habermas, “Why a theory of rationalization? There would seem to be
other ways to a critical social theory . . . Why do you take up the motif of
rationality? Why is rationality the key to a critical social theory?” (in Habermas
1992a, 105).

156. Bailey briefly mentions a Science of Social Evolution which


essentially refers to the construction of the group antahkarana, to the uniting of
the various levels of mind for humanity as a whole, and to the invocation of the
Soul, all of which can be interpreted as a higher correspondence to Habermas’
concept of the “rationalization of the lifeworld” (Bailey 1960, 470).

229
157. See especially, Bailey (1957). For a comparison with the empirical
studies and conclusions of earlier critical theorists of the Institute of Social
Research see Jay (1973, 113–72).

158. See especially, Bailey (1942, 629–751; 1947). In the latter volume
her six chapters concern: “The psychological rehabilitation of the nations;” “The
problem of the children of the world;” “The problem of capital, labor and
employment;” “The problem of the racial minorities;” “The problem of the
churches;” and “The problem of international unity.”

159. I suggest that the ideas of “social responsibility, or coordinated civic


life” as “indications of the energies of soul life” are precisely the concepts that
communitarians are attempting to establish in the field of political philosophy. I
also suggest that their confrontation with the ideology of liberalism and its
emphasis on individual rights and personal freedom reflects our current transition
from the Piscean to the Aquarian Age, and from the conditioning energies of the
sixth ray to the incoming energies of the seventh ray. In manifestation, I suggest
that these two major transitions underlie the confrontation between progressive
activists and entrenched conservatives.

160. This shift has been initiated by the Humanistic and Transpersonal
movements within the field of psychology.

161. The concept of the “lifeworld,” which is central to Habermas’ theory


of communicative rationality, will be elucidated and critiqued in Chapter 11.

162. The various “concepts of rationality” analyzed by Habermas (and


Weber) (Habermas 1973, 270–76; 1984, 168–85) can be interpreted esoterically
as sequential gradations (and interpenetrations and blendings) of the lower,
“concrete-rational,” subplanes of the mental plane. Habermas asserts that these
various, complex, and confusing concepts, “are not very clear” in Weber’s at
times “misleading” analysis which takes place on the level of “structures of
consciousness.” These concepts range from technical, instrumental, practical,
purposive, formal, substantive, and value-rationality to the rationalization of
worldviews, cultural and social rationalization, and the culminating “methodical-
rational conduct of life” associated with Calvinism. Habermas only analyzes these
concepts as different “levels” of rationality without emphasizing their ontogenetic
development. Bailey, on the other hand, would contend that an individual
constructs the various levels of the mental body on the lower, concrete-rational
subplanes of the mental plane over many life experiences. Habermas suggests that
at the “level” of the methodical-rational conduct of life, three forms of rationality
combine in a “mutually stabilizing” way (Habermas 1984, 173). This reflects,
from the esoteric perspective, the gradual integration of the personality and is
associated with increasing soul contact, what Weber, I suggest, referred to (with

230
respect to one’s vocation) as the “calling.” Bailey makes several references to the
role and importance of one’s vocation in the light, or “calling,” of the soul (1942,
359, 438–39; 1954, 10–11, 70, 83, 89, 93). Whereas Weber referred to “that
irrational element which lies in this . . . conception of a ‘calling’” (Weber 1958a,
78), the esotericist would refer to it as a trans-rational element emanating from
the soul via the higher mental subplanes. And whereas Habermas then speaks of
the self-imposed psychic repression that “corresponds to the blindness of
obedience to the quite irrational decrees of God concerning the salvation of his
soul” (1984, 184), Bailey would speak less dramatically of the willing obedience
of the personality to the higher self, or soul, as an inevitable stage of decentration
on the Path of Return.

163. It is unclear how Habermas would characterize wisdom, other than


perhaps as a proclivity for making better arguments. Bailey defines wisdom as
“the intuitive apprehension of truth apart from the reasoning faculty . . . [and] it is
also the growing capacity of the Thinker [i.e., the Soul] to enter increasingly into
the mind of the Logos [i.e., God]” (1922b, 11). Contrarily, Habermas asserts that
“a tacit return to objective idealism can scarcely be possible anymore” and he
proclaims to understand the limits of human understanding by making the
metaphysical assertion that “a ‘God’s-eye view’ is denied us” (Habermas 2005,
159–60; italics in the original), an assertion that claims implicitly to also
understand what constitutes a “God’s-eye view.”

164. The objective, social, and subjective worlds constitute what


Habermas refers to as “formal world-concepts” (Habermas 1984, 49–52). Arie
Brand clarifies the idea by observing, “These ‘worlds’ do not constitute separate
domains, like geographical territories with clearly marked boundaries, but rather
forms under which we organise our attempts to reach a common definition of the
situation via language . . . for each of these worlds . . . [Habermas] specifies a
different subject-subject relation” (Brand 1990, 16–17).

165. Habermas adds a fourth form of rationality, evaluative, which is


based on cultural standards of value or appreciation. Such expressions are rational
in that they can be defended with arguments related to the justificatory force of
cultural values, but such values do not appear with a claim to universality.
Therefore they do not technically constitute criticizable validity claims. Their
supporting arguments cannot claim to establish a common interest that would
meet with general or universal agreement through argumentative discourse and
therefore they are thematized through aesthetic criticism.

166. For a critical perspective on this approach see Cameron (2000).

167. See especially, Bailey (1922c, 1–7; 1960, 470–74).

231
168. Weber claimed that the “Karma doctrine transformed the world into a
strictly rational, ethically-determined cosmos; it represents the most consistent
theodicy ever produced by history” (Weber 1958b, 121; italics in the original). I
suggest that the potential shift in moral attitudes accompanying the acceptance of
the doctrine of reincarnation has been intuited by John Rawls (1971). He asserts
that moral agents would make decisions based on fairness if they were to adopt an
“original position” where they were detached from, or unaware of, their own
interests and preferences. This “veil of ignorance” corresponds to not knowing the
conditions of one’s future life experiences (e.g., race, nationality, social-economic
standing). Hence, one would be more inclined to make decisions based on the
long-term general welfare as opposed to basing decisions on short-term individual
preferences or desires. It is important to note that in my suggesting that a new and
widespread adherence by individuals to the doctrines of karma and reincarnation
may contribute significantly to the establishment of right human relations (a
widespread adherence that would likely follow scientific confirmation of
consciousness surviving the death of the physical body, for example), I am
referring to an adherence by rational individuals who have achieved some degree
of personality integration and who are awakening to the energies of the soul and
to group consciousness. There are certainly many examples of recrimination,
vengeance, and warfare conducted by those who live within cultures where the
concepts of karma and reincarnation are established norms. I suggest, however,
that these individuals are still largely focused on emotional levels, and are easily
susceptible to the forces of anger and hatred.

169. “There is no third. This is a way of saying, in Latin, that two


alternatives exhaust what is possible” (Mautner 1997, s.v. “Tertium non datur”).

170. Richard Lichtman makes the same argument when he states, “Despite
the profound anti-positivist thrust of Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas
seems to me to have fallen paradoxically into a positivist self-misunderstanding”
(Lichtman 1990, 365).

171. In his analysis of fifth-ray qualities, Robbins includes the following


relevant points: “Fifth ray people are, by nature, positivists. A positivist is one
who believes that theology and metaphysics are earlier imperfect modes of
knowledge, and that authentic knowledge can only be based upon an exact
understanding of phenomena which can be apprehended by the five senses and
their instrumental extensions. There is, of course, much value in this approach, as
it has destroyed the worst excesses of superstition and irrationality, and led to the
cultivation of the mind as a reliable instrument of cognition. But it has also
promoted a materialistic mentality which denies reality to the intangible and
spiritual dimensions of human living. Within a narrow range of perception . . .
positivism has produced a strong sense of mental assurance, but the price of
positive assurance has been aridity, and the largely unchallenged supposition that

232
the ‘world process’ is mechanistic and devoid of intelligent, spiritual animation”
(Robbins 1988a, 104; italics in the original); “The fifth ray is an energy which
helps humanity eliminate vagueness and imprecision from thought and action.
Under the focused scrutiny inspired by the fifth ray, approximations are gradually
eliminated” (Robbins 1988a, 95); “Advanced fifth ray individuals are the avowed
enemies of confusion. Their task is to determine what things are and what they
are not. This is done through the power of precise definition” (Robbins 1988a, 92;
italics in the original).

172. Robbins notes, “The ultrarationalistic fifth ray type, who subjects his
entire thought life to the tyranny of strict rationality and logic, may think he is
penetrating ever more deeply into an understanding of reality but, in fact, he is
imposing a severe limitation upon his understanding” (Robbins 1988a, 103; italics
in the original).

173. For a nearly identical description of the “illusions . . . [that] lie deep
within the very nature of our thinking” and the problematic nature of “ideas,”
“thoughtforms,” and the “permanent possibilities of fallacious and deceptive
reasoning,” see McCarthy (1993, 1).

174. The esoteric philosophy is obviously at odds with Rorty’s defense of


“the currently widespread view that ‘truth and knowledge can only be judged by
the standards of the inquirers of our own day. Nothing counts as justification
except by reference to what we already accept . . . There is no way to get outside
our beliefs and our language so as to find some other test than coherence’ . . . We
can’t get outside our own skins, we have to start from where we are, we have to
judge things by our own lights—in short, we have to make do without a God’s-
eye view” (McCarthy 1993, 14–15; quotation of Rorty [1979, 178]). The esoteric
philosophy asserts that we can “get outside our beliefs and our language;” we can
“get outside our own skins;” and we can obtain “a God’s-eye view” because there
is a continuity between human reason and divine Reason, between “our own
lights” and divine Light. We are not isolated beings separated from planetary,
solar, and cosmic processes but rather participants.

175. Habermas also writes, “Self-reflection leads to insight due to the fact
that what has previously been unconscious is made conscious in a manner rich in
practical consequences: analytic insights intervene in life, if I may borrow this
dramatic phrase from Wittgenstein” (Habermas 1973, 23). This is similar to
Bailey’s claim, “I wonder if the students have any idea how the ideals I seek to
bring to their attention could illumine their lives if they took them into their
‘brooding consciousness’ for the space even of a month. This aspect of
consciousness is the correspondence in the soul body to the mother aspect, as it
broods over, guards and eventually brings to the birth the Christ aspect. Lives are
changed primarily by reflection; qualities are developed by directed conscious

233
thought; characteristics are unfolded by brooding consideration. To all this I call
your attention” (Bailey 1942, 303–4).

176. See also Habermas (1993b, 299–301) for his theoretical attempt to
achieve “the analytic dissolution of hypostatizations, of self-engendered objective
illusions . . . due to an experience of reflection” while avoiding the limitations of
the philosophy of consciousness. One can compare Bailey’s teachings on the
elimination of glamour and illusion with Habermas’ assertion that self-critique
can eliminate “pseudo-nature, that is, the pseudo-aprioris made up of
unconsciously motivated perceptual barriers [i.e., illusions] and compulsions to
action [i.e., glamours]” (Habermas 1993b, 299).

177. Regarding the dual nature of self, I suggest that Henrich’s efforts to
outline a form of philosophical thinking which provide a more “comprehensive
account of human existence” support the esoteric worldview. His distinction
between “person” and “subject” reflects the esoteric distinction between
personality and soul. Dews observes, “Henrich’s central term for the contradictory
relations between ‘subject’ and ‘person’, self and world, is ‘Grundverhältnis’, or
fundamental relation . . . He argues that the effort to reconcile the conflicting
tendencies of this relation can be seen as one of the deepest motivations of human
culture, and in particular of the great religions . . . As persons, we are in the
world; as subjects we transcend it as a whole . . . Oriental conceptions of a
transpersonal consciousness encourage us to transcend our mundane individuality
towards an anonymous universality . . . Henrich writes, ‘The human being can
grasp that what is in itself unlimited [i.e., the Soul] is also at work in him [the
“Christ in you, the hope of Glory” (Col 1:27 [RSV])]’” (Dews 1995, 179–82;
Henrich 1982, 24).

178. Marie Fleming observes the “strangeness” in that Habermas’ theory


of communicative action “says virtually nothing about emancipation” (Fleming
1997, 37).

179. Habermas charts his concept of “formal pragmatic relations” by


creating a table that relates three basic attitudes (objectivating, norm-
conformative, and expressive) to three worlds (objective, social, and subjective).
He asserts, however, that of the nine possible resulting relations (or “areas” or
boxes in his chart), “only six of the classified actor-world relations can be
‘rationalized and consciously sublimated’” and associated with “a typical form of
argumentation” (Habermas 1984, 237, 239). The other three areas remain
“empty” (e.g., an objectivating attitude toward the subjective world). Elsewhere
he states, “My conjecture, however, is that only a few of these formal-pragmatic
relations are suitable for the accumulation of knowledge” (Habermas 1982, 245;
italics in the original).

234
180. Habermas has since revised his understanding of the concept of an
ideal speech situation and now utilizes the term “unrestricted communication
community” as developed by Karl-Otto Apel (Habermas 1991, 88; Edgar 2006,
64–65; Fleming 1997, 73).

181. The papers were originally presented at the conference of the


International Association for the Study of Argumentation in Amsterdam in 2006.
They were subsequently published in Argumentation 22(1) (Tillemans 2008).

182. Habermas also fails to elucidate the nature of the “everyday routines”
that are utilized in resolving disagreements prior to the need for his formal
practice of argumentation. This creates another false dichotomy as it apparently
excludes any form of argumentative reasoning, either subjective or
intersubjective, from “everyday routines.”

183. Derrick Phillips observes that the ability to argue is a power that
cannot be conceived as being equally distributed (Phillips 1986, 85). Hutton and
Joseph refer to the obvious but unmentionable implications of cognitive
differences as “implications we usually prefer to keep hidden behind a façade of
pseudo-liberal pieties” (Hutton and Joseph 1998, 202).

184. Habermas (and/or his translators) frequently uses colloquial


expressions related to “light” without examining their esoteric depths. Examples
include (italics added): “In the light of the newly introduced system . . . a few
strategic indications, present themselves to me in a different light than previously”
1973, 19); “From here light falls retrospectively on the rational interpretations of
the first-level types of action” (1984, 119); “But also a—by our lights—deficient
differentiation . . .” (1984, 49); “It has merely been placed in a new light” (1984,
110); “The test case for a theory of rationality . . . would certainly include
throwing light on . . . ” (1987, 400); “Motives and ends . . . are always interpreted
in the light of a cultural tradition” (1987, 95); “There comes to light a
communicative rationality opening onto several dimensions” (1992b, 50);
“Postmetaphysical thinking continues to coexist with religious practice . . . This
ongoing coexistence even throws light on . . . ” (1992b, 51); “ . . . if social theory
could not develop the focusing power of a kind of magnifying glass, and throw a
bright spotlight on the present” (1992a, 115).

185. “In Mahāyāna Buddhism, vipashyanā is seen as analytical


examination of the nature of things that leads to insight into the true nature of the
world” (Diener et al. 1994, s.v. “Vipashyanā”).

186. The concept of light is elucidated throughout Bailey’s teachings (see


especially the section “The Technique of Light” [1950a, 190–241]). She writes,
“This theme is so vast and there is so much literature to be found in all the world

235
Scriptures, commentaries and theological dissertations on the subject of Light that
the simple truth and a few basic principles are lost to sight in a welter of words”
(1950a, 190–91). Her interpretation of The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali (Bailey 1927)
was an effort “made to indicate the nature of the light of the soul. The key to this
technique is to be found in the words: In that Light shall we see LIGHT. A simple
paraphrase of these apparently abstract and symbolic words could be given as
follows: When the disciple has found that lighted centre with himself and can
walk in its radiating light, he is then in a position (or in a state of consciousness, if
you prefer) wherein he becomes aware of the light within all forms and atoms.
The inner world of reality stands visible to him as light-substance” (Bailey 1950a,
191). I would like to emphasize that finding this lighted center within oneself is a
difficult, lengthy, and primarily subjective process, not an intersubjective one.
Bailey also refers to a Science of Light (1954, 96, 139, 143–44). While such ideas
and statements may be dismissed by some as “metaphysics,” I would like to again
emphasize that the theory of the interaction of light and matter, or quantum
electrodynamics, is “the jewel” of modern physics despite the fact that it is a
“strange theory” that “nobody” understands and that describes “Nature as absurd”
(Feynman 1985, 4–10).

187. These distinctions are not strict, however, as Bailey cautions, “These
stages and their corresponding techniques are apt to be misunderstood if the
student fails to remember that between them lie no real lines of demarcation but
only a constant overlapping, a cyclic development and a process of fusion which
is most confusing to beginners” (Bailey 1950a, 192).

188. Recall from Chapter 6 that Habermas conceives of thinking as


internalized argumentation and self-reflection as an internalized therapeutic
discourse.

189. Halton notes that Habermas’ “transition from subjective to


intersubjective is insufficient, in the sense that ‘intersubjective’ still carries a
sense of isolate subjects in communication” (Halton 1995, 195). Flynn poses the
obvious question as to “whether or not the paradigm of mutual understanding
finalized toward valid consensus—the ‘we argue’ that he has substituted for the
ego-centered individual theory of consciousness, the ‘I think’—has, as Habermas
contends, put him outside of metaphysics?” (Flynn 1992, 69).

190. See Chapter 8 regarding Habermas’ fixation on “measurement.”

191. Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Paulo Freire are considered
among those who have developed the concept of dialogue. Many accounts of
Bohmian dialogue inexplicably do not acknowledge Bohm’s friendship with J.
Krishnamurti and the latter’s profound influence on Bohm’s understanding of
dialogue and thought processes. Krishnamurti (1895–1986) was raised in the

236
Theosophical tradition and heralded by Annie Besant and Charles Leadbeater to
be the Coming World Teacher. Krishnamurti later famously rejected Theosophy
and went on to develop his own teachings regarding self-transformation. See
Jones and Ryan (2007, s.v. “Krishnamurti, Jiddu”).

192. Individuals do not need to meet together on physical levels to


participate in constructing the group antahkarana. This work is accomplished
subjectively by anyone working on higher mental levels and through meditation
practices in particular.

193. The Esoteric Philosophy would agree that within all societies there is
some capacity, exhibited by some members, to operate on the plane of lower mind
although, as Habermas acknowledges, such “competences appear less frequently
and more selectively” in primitive societies (Habermas 1984, 45). Additionally,
however, within all societies certain members have the capacity to work not only
on rational but “transrational” levels as well. Rothberg writes, “The shaman is the
cognitive specialist of primitive society, the master of all forms of cognition,
especially of those regarded as the ‘highest;’ the shaman, in Eliade’s words, is a
‘technician of the sacred.’ Hence, it is fitting to take the shaman as a prime
example when comparing types and levels of development of primitive modes of
cognition and thought; it is extremely unfortunate that this has not been done,
both in Habermas’ discussion, and in the ‘rationality debate’” (Rothberg 1983,
404). The rationality debate will be the focus of Chapter 10.

194. The Esoteric Philosophy maintains that the magical powers utilized
within premodern cultures are not imaginary but derive from the close relations
between these cultures and the devic and elemental kingdoms, relations that were
especially common during the fourth, or Atlantean root-race, but which have
receded below the threshold of conscious awareness with the development of
mind in the fifth, or Aryan root-race. Bailey emphasizes that with the incoming
“seventh Ray of Ceremonial Magic, a tentative approximation of the two evolving
groups is to be somewhat permitted . . . The deva and human evolution will,
during the next five hundred years, become somewhat more conscious of each
other, and be able therefore more freely to co-operate” (Bailey 1922c, 182).

195. It is important to emphasize the narrow body of research on which


Habermas bases his “empirical analysis.” Anthony Giddens states that Habermas’
treatment of myth “is cursory in the extreme” (Giddens 1985, 100) and Eugene
Halton observes, “‘For the sake of simplicity,’ he confines himself to the results
of two structuralists, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Maurice Godelier. He uses these
two exemplars of twentieth-century French rationalism as the sole representatives
of mythic thought, and assiduously avoids any concrete discussion of a single
myth in his ‘empirical’ review” (Halton 1995, 196).

237
196. “According to a Newsweek Poll, 76 percent of Americans believe in
heaven, and, of those, 71 percent think it’s an ‘actual place’” (Miller 2002, 47).
Opinions are somewhat divided as to whether heaven looks like a city or a garden.
This poll indicates that approximately 54 percent of the members of the “modern”
American worldview believe that heaven is an actual place. It is not clear how
Habermas would judge the rational behavior of this group “in general” or how he
categorizes the nature of “belief.” And the question arises as to how such
apparently mythical views of heaven interact with a modern shared rationalized
lifeworld.

197. I suggest that the long-standing dichotomy between science and the
humanities, between philosophy and rhetoric, or between philosophy and
literature, what C. P. Snow has described as The Two Cultures (1960), is
fundamentally a distinction between fourth and fifth ray cognitive functioning.
Examples of this apparent conflict would include the divergent perspectives of
Goethe and Newton, and the perspectives of some postmodernists (e.g., Derrida
and Lyotard) and Habermas. (See Appendices for comparisons of fourth and fifth
ray qualities.) For example, while Habermas valorizes the persuasive force of
logical, rational argumentative discourse that leads to clarity and consensus,
Lyotard valorizes dissension, paralogy, rhetorical force, narrative knowledge and
an “agonistic” view (McPhail 1996, 119–29; Rorty 1985, 163–64; Van Niekerk
1995, 180–81). I suggest that this cognitive distinction also underlies
transpersonal scholar Sean Kelly’s encouragement of “a more mindful
engagement” with “the analogical or mythopoetic imagination” to balance the
dominant “grid-like intelligibility” of “perspectival consciousness” (Kelly 2002).
Recent examples of fourth ray cognitive functioning postulated in cognitive
linguistics would include the idea of “conceptual metaphors” proposed by Lakoff
and Johnson (1980), as well as the ideas of “embodied cognition,” “conceptual
blending,” “analogical reasoning,” and “lateral thinking.” Social psychologist
Richard Nisbett (2003) and fellow researchers have provided empirical data to
support the idea of two distinct modes of cognitive functioning, leading Nisbett to
declare, “I do feel that there are universals. I just don’t know where they are”
(quoted in Shea 2001, 49). The esotericist would immediately recognise the
“location” of these universals as the distinction between fourth and fifth ray
modes of mental cognition. It is important to note that Bailey maintains there are
at least three basic forms of mental activity, not a simple dichotomy between the
fourth and fifth ray mental qualities. She asserts that the lower concrete mind is
generally governed by the qualities of either the first, fourth, or fifth rays, and in
some instances, by the third ray of Active Intelligence (Bailey 1936, 320; 1942,
290–93). The research of Kurt Abraham (1983) has made an important
contribution to the esoteric literature by demonstrating how the three ray types
that generally govern the lower mind (the direct, unembellished, and practical first
ray, the metaphoric, comparative, and holistic fourth ray, and the analytical,
rational, and categorizing fifth ray) are distinctly exemplified in six historical

238
figures: Jane Addams and Mahatma Gandhi (first ray mind); Vincent van Gogh
and Henry David Thoreau (fourth ray mind); and Charles Darwin and Thomas
Henry Huxley (fifth ray mind). Space considerations prevent me from including
esoteric analyses of Wilber’s and Habermas’ thought processes which would
attempt to demonstrate that they both have brilliant theoretical minds governed by
the creative energies of the third ray. See Appendix C for a list of qualities
describing the third ray mind.

198. While Bailey indicates the increasing influence of the fifth ray since
1775 C.E. (Bailey 1936, 411) and makes fairly extensive commentaries on how
this energy is conditioning modernity (see, for example, 1936, 51–52, 350, 355–
56), she does not explicitly describe the mental activity of primitive cultures as
being conditioned by the fourth ray. However, in places she does note a more
general relation between the fourth ray and the fourth root-race (Atlantean)
(Bailey 1925, 573–74; 1936, 316–17).

199. Robbins notes that the fifth ray mind is a “mathematical, quantifying
. . . measuring mind . . . [which] attempts to ‘take the exact measure’ of things”
(1988a, 376–77). A good “measure” of the degree to which Habermas has reified
language can be found in the extent to which he thinks language usage can be
“measured.”

200. Robbins notes the need for fifth ray investigators to bring an object of
study, whether material or more subtle, “before the eyes,” to make them objective,
tangible, and concrete (Robbins 1988a, 372).

201. Many critics have pointed out this leveling aspect of Habermas’ work
as he ignores or devalues sub-rational levels of the body and emotions, as well as
trans-rational levels of higher mind and Spirit. Examples of the former include:
“[Habermas] . . . never allows for a phenomenology of life experience” (Crespi
1992, 42); “Habermas’s account of solidarity . . . is unconvincing . . . It is so
abstract . . . [in that it ignores “feeling” and “affective” dimensions]” (Cooke
1994, 164); “Habermas completely neglects the ‘romantic’ features of Marx . . .
[He] has to give up the theory of alienation . . . [and Marx’s understanding of]
human progress as suffering . . . The lack of the sensuous experiences of hope and
despair, of venture and humiliation, is discernable in the structure of his theory:
the creature-like aspects of human beings are missing . . . Habermasian man has
. . . no body, no feelings; the ‘structure of personality’ is identified with cognition,
language and interaction” (Heller 1982, 21–23); “Shalin points out that in
Habermas’s communicative action theory, reason appears primarily as thinking
. . . with no obvious relation to the human body and the noncognitive processes
(emotion, feeling, sentiment) . . . He ‘inadvertently devalues human experience as
merely private and intellectually mute’” (Gunaratne 2006, 123); “And worse,
once the level at which communicative rationality manifests itself is attained its

239
form of transcendence entails a virtual silencing of the claims of local reason and
its objects, the others of universalist reason—nature, the human body, desire, the
feelings, sensuous particularity” (J. M. Bernstein 1997, 256); “Habermas’s TCA
may involve ‘subjects,’ but it says nothing about persons” (Halton 1995, 215;
italics in the original). “Far from being an antidote to the self-destructive
tendencies in modern life, The Theory of Communicative Action is an ideal
document of the escape from life in the late twentieth century under the dead hand
of ethereal rationality” (Halton 1995, 217).

202. Eugene Halton makes this point in asserting, “In TCA the canonical
theorists appear to have their say, but, as I hope to show, Habermas’s Kantian and
Hegelian filters only allow through that which fits his rationalist presuppositions.
This suggests that the structure informing his work is that of a projection of, and
attraction to, his own unexamined assumptions rather than a genuine
communicative dialogue in which a genuinely other view might be allowed its say
against Habermas’s wishes. Could it be that his own arguments are not rooted in
the process of communicative action he calls for, that the apparent dialogue of
theories masks an underlying ‘merely subjective’ Kantian quest for synthetic
system rather than objective consensus?” (Halton 1995, 195).

203. Habermas clearly acknowledges his intellectual preoccupation and


his confined experience within a “theoretical ivory tower.” Of particular interest is
his statement, “In the sense of the psychology of research . . . the tense German
political situation [in 1977, and taking seriously neo-conservative ideologies] . . .
drove me out of the theoretical ivory tower to take a political stand” (Habermas
1992a, 106). From the perspective of esoteric psychology (as a “psychology of
research”) I suggest that what drove Habermas “to take a political stand” was an
intuitive connection with his soul, the Angel of the Presence, which his rational
mind is most likely “apt to negate and refuse to admit.” I suggest it is far more
likely that his felt sense of a moral imperative derived subjectively from contact
with his higher self rather than intersubjectively as a consensual result of a
process of argumentative moral discourse. I also suggest that when Habermas, as
a youth, “ran out on the spur of the moment . . . ” during a national-conservative
German Party election-campaign meeting “when they sang the first stanza of
Deutschland über Alles,” it was an immediate subjective reaction to his
conscience or soul, and not an action resulting from intersubjective moral
discourse (Habermas 1992a, 43).

204. Christopher Norris’ analysis appears to include some of these


contrasts and he suggests that Derrida has overturned “the age-old prejudice that
elevates philosophy over rhetoric, or right reason over the dissimulating arts of
language.” Norris writes, “One reason why . . . [Habermas’ Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity] seems blind to certain aspects of Derrida’s work is that it
more or less identifies deconstruction with the Rortyan-postmodern-pragmatist

240
reading [as opposed to Gasché’s more Kantian-influenced reading], and thus
tends to perpetuate the view of it as a species of literary-critical activity, an
attempt to colonize philosophy by leveling the genre distinction between those
disciplines . . . One result of such [Rortyan] readings is undoubtedly to challenge
the commonplace assumptions that philosophy has to do with concepts, truth
claims, logical arguments, ‘clear and distinct ideas,’ etc. [fifth ray qualities], while
literary criticism deals with language only in its rhetorical, poetic or non-truth-
functional aspects [fourth ray qualities]. What Derrida has achieved—on this view
at least—is a striking reversal of the age-old prejudice that elevates philosophy
over rhetoric, or right reason over the dissimulating arts of language” (Norris
1997, 102). Norris furthers the distinction between fourth and fifth ray qualities
when he summarizes Habermas’ criticism of Derrida, “Where Derrida has gone
wrong . . . [Habermas argues] is in failing to perceive the constitutive difference
[or qualitative difference] between speech acts engaged in the normative activities
of problem-solving, theorizing, giving information, etc., and speech acts that are
not so engaged and can therefore be construed as fictive, non-serious, parodic or
whatever” (Norris 1997, 105–6).

205. Bertland is here referring to the rationality debates stimulated by


Peter Winch and analyzed by Habermas which will be discussed in Chapter 10.

206. Bailey provides an extended model of semiotics in locating the world


of meaning between the world of form (or symbols) and the world of significance.
Some of her statements regarding this model include: “Students would do well to
remember the following sequence of words, embodying ideas: Symbol, Meaning,
Significance, Light . . . I would ask you also to bear in mind that the world of
symbols is that of the personal life, of the phenomenal world as that phrase covers
the three worlds of human evolution [physical, emotional, mental]; the world of
meaning is the world in which the soul lives and moves with intention and
understanding [on the higher mental plane]; the world of significance is the world
of the Spiritual Triad [on the higher mental, buddhic, and atmic planes], which
only confers its freedom fully after the third initiation” (Bailey 1960, 285–86;
italics in the original); “The objective of the first two initiations is to enable the
initiate to live in the world of meaning” (Bailey 1955, 420); and, “May I urge
upon all to live more continuously in the world of meaning and less in the world
of appearances? It is a truer world and less full of illusion. When the
understanding is developed, when men have learnt to see below the surface and
have cultivated true vision, then we shall have the steady emergence of the quality
of the soul in all forms and the relative subsiding into the background of the
power of the form nature. It is this world of meaning which it is the privilege of
humanity to reveal, and all true esoteric students should be pioneers in this field”
(Bailey 1934, 137).

241
207. See especially, Habermas (1987) and “Individuation through
Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity,” Habermas
(1992b, 149–204). Dews suggests a “need for caution with regard to Habermas’s
Meadian attempts to reconstruct a purely social and evolutionary genesis of the
self” (Dews 1995, 271), and Halton notes that Habermas’ “turn to Mead is
understandable, but merely gluing a patch of Mead over a faulty language theory
is insufficient” (Halton 1995, 232).

208. Regarding this “domain of human experience,” Marsh raises “the


hypothesis of a fourth domain, perhaps most adequately conceived not as running
alongside normal constative, expressive, and regulative sentences indicating three
different worlds, objective, subjective, and social, but as grounding, surrounding,
and rendering completely intelligible these three worlds” (Marsh 1993, 524). This
fourth domain could be conceived of as Bailey’s world of meaning, the level of
soul consciousness, which “grounds, surrounds, and renders intelligible” the
physical, emotional, and lower mental worlds of form.

209. See “The Problem of Self-Reflection,” which includes an analysis of


the debate between Habermas and Dieter Henrich, in Swindal (1999, 150–67).

210. Despite Habermas’ egalitarian and democratic intent to confer


rationality upon nearly all speakers and hearers in modern society (Richard J.
Bernstein 1992, 207) he alludes to the possibility of a developmental spectrum of
consciousness in admitting: “Not all individuals are equally representative of the
developmental stage of their society” (Habermas 1979, 102); and, “an
autonomous ego organization is by no means a regular occurrence, the result, say,
of naturelike processes of maturation; in fact it is usually not attained” (Habermas
1979, 70). Of course Bailey makes the metaphysical assumption that it requires
many life experiences to develop rational and transrational capacities, whereas
Habermas and most academics apparently make the metaphysical assumption that
the highest known human capacities can be developed in a single lifetime, and, in
the case of childhood genius, in only a few years.

211. For analyses of Habermas’ arguments see Fleming (1997, 55–67);


McCarthy (1978, 162–69, 317–25); and Rothberg (1983, 394ff).

212. Habermas is careful to assert that the development or rationalization


of worldviews through learning processes “by no means implies that . . . [it] must
have taken place in a continuous or linear way, or that it was necessary in the
sense of an idealistic causality” (Habermas 1984, 66–67).

213. Habermas admits that “the very concept of a developmental logic


requires additional sharpening” yet he is intuitively “convinced” of its value “in

242
spite of the (for the time being) unsatisfactory degree of explication” (Habermas
1979, 117).

214. See also Rothberg (1986a).

215. Most accounts of “colonization,” particularly Habermas’ concept of


“the colonization of the lifeworld” by anonymous social processes, refer to an
oppressive force that restricts human freedom.

216. For a brief and technical exposition of the intellect, mind principle, or
manas, as it relates to humanity, see Barborka (1980, 132–37).

217. The relation between the fifth ray of Concrete Science and the Law of
Cleavages can be more easily observed by noting etymological roots of “science”
as chyati (Skt.) “he cuts off,” and scindere (L.) “to split” (Merriam-Webster’s
New Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed., s.v. “Science.”

218. Compare this statement with Habermas’ assertion, “The root of the
irrationality of history is that we ‘make’ it without, however, having been able
until now to make it consciously. A rationalization of history cannot therefore be
furthered by an extended power of control on the part of manipulative human
beings, but only by a higher stage of reflection, a consciousness of acting human
beings moving forward in the direction of emancipation” (Habermas 1973, 276;
italics added). This “higher stage of reflection” is understood esoterically as the
mind working under the increasing influence of the soul and group consciousness.

219. The Sanskrit word “chakra” literally means “wheel” or “circle” and
describes the seven major energy centers within the human etheric body when
they are viewed clairvoyantly. The chakras “concentrate, transform, and distribute
the energy that streams through them . . . Mediumistically gifted persons . . .
describe the chakras as ‘lotus blossoms’ with varying numbers of petals . . . These
‘lotus blossoms’ are in circular motion, hence the impression of a wheel (for
example, a whirling wheel of fire) and the name chakra” (Diener et al. 1994, s.v.
“Chakra”). Bailey states, “The centres, therefore, when functioning properly, form
the ‘body of fire’ . . . ‘the body incorruptible’ or indestructible, spoken of by St.
Paul’ (1 Cor. 15:53) . . . When the form is destroyed there is left this intangible
spiritual body of fire, one pure flame, distinguished by seven brilliant centres of
intenser burning . . . We must disabuse our minds of the idea that these centres are
physical things. They are whirlpools of force . . . Because the action is rotary, the
result produced in matter is a circular effect that can be seen by the clairvoyant as
fiery wheels” (Bailey 1925, 166–67; italics in the original). For specific teachings
on the chakras or centers see Bailey (1922b, 134–41; 1922c, 70–86; 1925, 55–
220; 1950b, 139–97).

243
220. Bailey states that the solar plexus center (chakra) is the seat of the
emotions and governs the psychic nature (Bailey 1942, 339, 574). She also asserts
that this center directs and controls certain aspects of the nervous system, and “is
in large part the instinctual or animal brain” (Bailey 1942, 434). The idea that
awareness could be focused in the solar plexus center may seem
incomprehensible if it were not for the fact that the enteric nervous system, which
is embedded in the lining of the gastrointestinal system, is commonly referred to
as the “second brain.” The enteric nervous system contains more nerve cells
(efferent neurons, afferent neurons, and interneurons) than the entire spinal cord
and can operate autonomously. Michael Gershon, Department Chair in Pathology
and Cell Biology at Columbia University, states, “The enteric nervous system is
now recognized as a complex, integrative brain in its own right” (Gershon 1999;
see also Gershon 1998). According to Bailey, the solar plexus center was active
during the Atlantean root-race when human consciousness was largely psychic
and emotionally focused (Bailey 1936, 317–19; 1942, 339). From the standpoint
of evolutionary development, therefore, it may be more accurate to speak of the
enteric nervous system as the “first brain.”

221. With respect to this early form of human awareness, Joel Whitebook
observes that Habermas “is compelled for systematic reasons simply to dismiss
the notion of a prelinguistic unconscious ex cathedra. Such a thicket of non-
linguisticality at the centre of the subject would be an anathema to his entire
philosophy.” He further asserts that Habermas’ commitment to the linguistic
position is so strong that it results in a strategy “so inaccurate as to be almost
bizarre” (Whitebook 1997, 174).

222. Regarding the dangers of prematurely reawakening psychic powers,


Bailey claims that “the mind nature has reached a stage of protective usefulness
and some of the great guarding barriers which are flung up around humanity at
this time are the spirit of scepticism, and the refusal to recognise the existence or
the usefulness of the psychic powers” (Bailey 1942, 579). Two of the major
transferences occurring at this time within humanity are the transference of forces
from the solar plexus center (the seat of the emotions), to the heart center (the
center of loving-understanding), and from the sacral center (associated with the
sex organs and physical creation), to the throat center (the focal point of creative
intelligence). Bailey’s teachings on the chakras or centers and the etheric body
permeate all of her writings. Regarding the transference of forces from the centers
below the diaphragm to the higher centers specifically, see Bailey (1950b; 1953;
1955, 114–25).

223. The relationships (and Sanskrit names) are: Base of the spine
(Mūlādhāra)—adrenals; Sacral center (Svādhishthana)—gonads; Solar plexus
(Manipūra)—pancreas; Heart center (Anāhata)—thymus; Throat center
(Vishuddha)—thyroid; Center between the eyebrows (Ājñā)—pituitary body; and

244
the Head center (Sahasrāra, the thousand-petalled lotus)—pineal gland (Bailey
1953, 45; Diener et al. 1994, s.v. “Chakra”).

224. In the social sciences, Weber used the term “disenchantment” to refer
to the effects of processes of cultural rationalization. See “Max Weber’s theory of
rationalization,” in Habermas (1984, 143–271).

225. Bailey warns, “When mind becomes unduly developed and ceases to
unite the higher and the lower, it forms a sphere of its own. This is the greatest
disaster that can overtake the human unit” (Bailey 1925, 261).

226. Rothberg notes, “Several commentators have pointed out some major
problems with this argument, ranging from questions of the misreading of non-
modern traditions, to the suspicion of ethnocentrism, to obscurities in the concept
of a ‘developmental-logical’ argument” (Rothberg 1986a, 221).

227. I would like to emphasize that Bailey offers “sagacity and wisdom”
as the determinants for accepting or rejecting various forms of truth or validity
claims. I suggest that these are more evolved forms of Reason than the rational
arguments proposed by Habermas characteristic of those who have only
developed the capacity to work on the level of lower mind.

228. Lalonde contends that Habermas’ “religio-ethical” predicament “is


not simply redressed but transformed by Levinas’s notion of the ethical. Indeed,
the prospect that meaning, individuation, and subjectivity are crucial derivations
from the religio-ethical preeminence of the Other over the Self constitutes a
profound inversion of Habermas’s central theoretical goal” (Lalonde 1999, 112).

229. Thelma Lavine challenges Habermas’ “intersubjective radical


democracy” and his suggestion that Hegel could have developed the concept. To
the contrary, Lavine quotes Hegel to demonstrate that will-formation is a “far
reaching development” unattainable by just anyone: “If people means a section of
the citizens, it is precisely that section which does not know what it wills. To
know what one wills, and still more, to know what the absolute wills, is the fruit
of profound knowledge and insight, precisely the things which the public does not
know” (Lavine 2000, 144–45). Of course the Esoteric Philosophy maintains that
the development of “profound knowledge and insight” and the ability to decenter
oneself (let alone align oneself with the divine Will) requires many lifetimes of
experience and learning and is unattainable for average humanity in a single life
experience, subjects who remain for the most part emotionally polarized and self-
centered.

245
230. Habermas’ “colonization of the lifeworld” thesis can be seen as an
effort to transform Georg Lukács’ theory of reification (Baxter 1987, 39;
Rasmussen 1990, 46–47; White 1990, 104).

231. Habermas fails to elucidate how something can be “brought to


consciousness” (or what the term “consciousness” means), and how it may then
“disintegrate” or “decompose.”

232. Hans Joas is skeptical of Habermas’ insistence that the lifeworld


“must be ‘objectivated’” to remove it from “the same analytical level as the
transcendental lifeworld of phenomenology” and from any associations with
epistemology (Joas 1991, 114–15).

233. Habermas’ linguistic turn and his ability to thereby avoid the
metaphysics of subjectivity has been questioned by many critics. Dallmayr notes
“the dilemmas besetting this ‘turn’” and “the persistent influence of the
‘philosophy of consciousness’ (or subjectivity), and more generally . . . the legacy
of metaphysics [in Habermas’ work]. The influence is evident in the pervasive
emphasis on ‘basic dispositions’ or ‘attitudes’ (Grundeinstellungen)—which can
only be dispositions of consciousness” (Dallmayr 1987, 97). Similarly Whitebook
observes, “In general, the move from the philosophy of consciousness to the
philosophy of language . . . does not prove to be the all-encompassing
philosophical panacea that Habermas and his followers often hope it will be;
much of the old, that is to say, perennial baggage comes along in the transition”
(Whitebook 1997, 174; italics in the original). Regarding the science of language
more generally, Jerrold J. Katz comments, “It is even quite plausible to think that
the problems become worse for being obscured by philosophically unilluminating
formalisms and technicalities . . . Linguistic theories . . . despite [their] technical
sophistication, embody . . . central metaphysical assumptions” (Katz 1990, vii–
viii). Giddens finds Habermas’ connection between language and rationality
“unconvincing” and questions, “Is it anything other than the last gasp of a critical
theory which, dissatisfied with the uncertainties of immanent critique, and
suspicious of philosophical anthropology, pins its hopes upon the ‘linguistic
turn’?” (Giddens 1985, 116).

234. Bailey asserts that “language . . . hides truth and does not reveal it”
(1934, 32). Her few remarks have more to do with speech rather than language.
She emphasizes the need to control speech and to learn to use it in its creative
aspect and eventually to transcend it. See “The occult significance of speech”
(Bailey 1925, 977–82; see also 1925, 192–93n80; 1922b, 74, 156–57; 1927, 101;
1934, 141–44; 1942, 188–89; 1950b, 33).

235. Barborka writes, “This aspect is prominent in religions, especially the


Hindu and the Egyptian, in connection with the judgment which takes place after

246
death. The theme is present in the West, too, in the idea of the Recording Angel—
which doubtless had its origin in the Kabbala, in the description of four Recording
Angels . . . [and in] the account in the Book of Revelation, of the Book of Life
and of the judgment [Rv 20:12]” (Barborka 1980, 31).

236. To understand how thoughtforms could possibly be “energized” from


the solar plexus chakra, recall the complexity of the enteric nervous system as
discussed in endnote 220.

237. Recall the many examples of Habermas appropriating the concept of


“light” given in endnote 184.

238. I suggest that all academic thinkers, Habermas in particular, are


intuitively engaged in “The Science of Impression” as they “intellectually work”
with ideas and thoughtforms on the plane of mind and attempt to develop and
transmit knowledge and understanding.

239. The Tibetan states: “I have said that these groups constitute an
experiment. This experiment is fourfold in nature and a concise statement about it
may prove helpful: (1) They are an experiment in founding or starting focal
points of energy in the human family through which certain energies can flow into
the entire race of men; (2) They are an experiment in inaugurating certain new
techniques in work and in modes of communication. I would point out that in
these last three words are summed up the whole story . . . ; (3) These groups are
also an externalisation of an inner existing condition. They are an effect and not a
cause . . . ; (4) These groups are also an experiment which has for its objective the
manifestation of certain types of energy which will, when effectively functioning,
produce cohesion or at-one-ment upon earth” (Bailey 1944, 35–42; italics in the
original). After ten years of effort the Tibetan determined the experiment to be a
failure and disbanded the groups giving clear reasons for doing so (see Bailey,
1955, 73–110). For further descriptions of the ten seed groups and for suggestions
regarding all forms of group work see Bailey (1944, 3–102; 1957).

240. This group may also be represented by the “communication


community” (Kommunikationsgemeinschaft) presupposed by Apel (following
Charles Peirce and John Dewey) that is “ideally predisposed to illuminate
instrumental and illegitimate forms of domination” (Bronner 1994, 295).

241. He does, however, suggest the potential importance of education for


“enlightenment” in stating, “In the face of various sectarian enterprises, one might
point out today that in advanced capitalism changing the structure of the general
system of education [Bildungssystem] might possibly be more important for the
organization of enlightenment than the ineffectual training cadres or the building

247
of impotent parties” (Habermas 1973, 31–32). For Bailey’s ideas on “changing
the general system of education” see Education in the New Age (Bailey 1954).

242. Compare this presentation of civilization and culture with Braaten’s


presentation of Habermas’ distinction between material and symbolic
reproduction: “Developments in material reproduction [Bailey’s “material life,”
“material living,” and “material effect”] follow the ‘logic’ of functional rationality
and are achieved in modern societies by systems—specifically, the economic and
administrative systems . . . Symbolic reproduction, on the other hand, follows the
logic of communicative rationality and is achieved by building and maintaining
consensus about acceptable needs and interests, social and ethical norms, and
cultural traditions within the lifeworld [domain of mind]. Symbolic reproduction
is . . . to be explained . . . as an evolving interpretive [mental] framework. The
domain of symbolic reproduction is the source of ‘meaning’—the significance
and value that actions, traits, objects, and events possess for the members of a
community” (Braaten 1991, 78; italics in the original).

243. Habermas doesn’t allow for this possibility as he offers no coherent


theory of mind or reflection, his understanding of subjectivity is limited, he
purposefully distances himself from the philosophy of consciousness, and he fails
to thematize any concept of spiritual living.

244. Habermas (1987); see also, for example, Braaten (1991, 79–88).

248
REFERENCES

Abraham, Kurt B. 1983. Psychological types and the seven rays. Vol. 1. Cape
May, NJ: Lampus.

Afrasiabi, K. L. 1998. Communicative theory and theology: A reconsideration.


Harvard Theological Review 91 (1): 75–87.

American Psychiatric Association. 1994. Diagnostic and statistical manual of


mental disorders: DSM–IV. 4th ed. Washington DC: Author.

Angel, Leonard. 2006. Two questions for Ken Wilber and the wider transpersonal
audience: A philosophical perspective. Journal of Transpersonal
Psychology 38 (1): 73–94.

Artley, Malvin, Jr. 2001. A thousand points of light: An introduction to the lesser
chakra system. http://www.sevenray.net/PDF/ATHOUSANDPOINTS
OFLIGHT.pdf. (See http://www.sevenray.net/sri_authors_artley.html for
password.)

Assagioli, Roberto. 1974. The act of will. New York: Penguin.

———. 1981. Psychosynthesis: A manual of principles and techniques. New


York: Penguin.

Aune, Bruce. 1985. Metaphysics: The elements. Minneapolis: University of


Minnesota Press.

Bailey, Alice A. 1922a. The consciousness of the atom. New York: Lucis.

———. 1922b. Initiation: Human and solar. New York: Lucis.

———. 1922c. Letters on occult meditation. New York: Lucis.

———. 1925. A treatise on cosmic fire. New York: Lucis.

———. 1927. The light of the soul: Its science and effect—A paraphrase of The
Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. New York: Lucis.

———. 1932. From intellect to intuition. New York: Lucis.

249
———. 1934. A treatise on white magic or The way of the disciple. New York:
Lucis.

———. 1936. Esoteric psychology. Vol. 1 of A treatise on the seven rays. New
York: Lucis.

———. 1937. From Bethlehem to Calvary. New York: Lucis.

———. 1942. Esoteric psychology. Vol. 2 of A treatise on the seven rays. New
York: Lucis.

———. 1944. Discipleship in the new age. Vol. 1. New York: Lucis.

———. 1947. Problems of humanity. New York: Lucis.

———. 1948. The reappearance of the Christ. New York: Lucis.

———. 1949. The destiny of the nations. New York: Lucis.

———. 1950a. Glamour: A world problem. New York: Lucis.

———. 1950b. Telepathy and the etheric vehicle. New York: Lucis.

———. 1951a. Esoteric astrology. Vol. 3 of A treatise on the seven rays. New
York: Lucis.

———. 1951b. The unfinished autobiography. New York: Lucis.

———. 1953. Esoteric healing. Vol. 4 of A treatise on the seven rays. New York:
Lucis.

———. 1954. Education in the new age. New York: Lucis.

———. 1955. Discipleship in the new age. Vol. 2. New York: Lucis.

———. 1957. The externalisation of the hierarchy. New York: Lucis.

———. 1960. The rays and the initiations. Vol. 5 of A treatise on the seven rays.
New York: Lucis.

———. 1974. Master index of the books of Alice A. Bailey. New York: Lucis.

———. 1985. Death: The great adventure. New York: Lucis.

250
Bakula, Joann S. 1978. Esoteric psychology: A model for the development of
human consciousness. Seattle: United Focus.

Barber, Benjamin. 2010. America’s knowledge deficit. The Nation 29 November:


21–22.

Barborka, Geoffrey A. 1980. The divine plan: Written in the form of a


commentary on H. P. Blavatsky’s Secret doctrine. Adyar, Madras:
Theosophical Publishing House.

Baxter, Hugh. 1987. System and life-world in Habermas’s Theory of


communicative action. Theory and Society 16:39–86.

Benhabib, Seyla. 1986. Critique, norm, and utopia: A study of the foundations of
critical theory. New York: Columbia University Press.

Berman, Morris. 1981. The reenchantment of the world. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.

Bernstein, J. M. 1995. Recovering ethical life: Jürgen Habermas and the future of
critical theory. London: Routledge.

———. 1997. The causality of fate: Modernity and modernism in Habermas. In


Habermas and the unfinished project of modernity: Critical essays on
The philosophical discourse of modernity, ed. Maurizio Passerin
d’Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib, 245–68. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bernstein, Richard J., ed. 1985. Habermas and modernity. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.

———. 1992. The new constellation: The ethical-political horizons of


modernity/postmodernity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bertland, Alexander. 2000. Habermas and Vico on mythical thought. In


Perspectives on Habermas, ed. L. E. Hahn, 71–87. Chicago: Open Court.

Besant, Annie. 1918. A study in consciousness: A contribution to the study of


psychology. 2nd ed. Hollywood, CA: Theosophical Publishing House.

Blavatsky, H. P. [1888a] 1977. The secret doctrine: The synthesis of science,


religion, and philosophy. Vol. 1, Cosmogenesis. A facsimile of the
original edition of 1888. Pasadena, CA: Theosophical University Press.

251
———. [1888b] 1977. The secret doctrine: The synthesis of science, religion, and
philosophy. Vol. 2, Anthropogenesis. A facsimile of the original edition of
1888. Pasadena, CA: Theosophical University Press.

———. [1892] 1918. The theosophical glossary. Krotona, CA: Theosophical


Publishing House.

Bohm, David. 1973. Wholeness and the implicate order. London: Routledge.

Bohm, David, Donald Factor, and Peter Garrett. 1991. Dialogue—a proposal.
http://www.infed.org/archives/e-texts/bohm_dialogue.htm (accessed
March 30, 2011).

Bohman, James. 1989. “System and lifeworld”: Habermas and the problem of
holism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 15:381–401.

———. 2000. Distorted communication: Formal pragmatics as a critical theory.


In Perspectives on Habermas, ed. L. E. Hahn, 3–20. Chicago: Open Court.

Braaten, Jane. 1991. Habermas’s critical theory of society. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press.

Brand, Arie. 1990. The force of reason. An introduction to the work of Jürgen
Habermas. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Bronner, Stephen Eric. 1994. Of critical theory and its theorists. Cambridge,
MA: Blackwell.

Bubner, Rüdiger. 1982. Habermas’s concept of critical theory. Trans. Richard


Humphrey. In Habermas: Critical debates, ed. John B. Thompson and
David Held, 42–56. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cameron, W. S. K. 2000. Fallibilism, rational reconstruction, and the distinction


between moral theory and ethical life. In Perspectives on Habermas, ed.
L. E. Hahn, 175–93. Chicago: Open Court.

Caplan, Mariana, Glenn Hartelius, and Mary Anne Rardin. 2003. Contemporary
viewpoints on transpersonal psychology. The Journal of Transpersonal
Psychology 35 (2): 143–62.

Cheatham, Harvey M. 2010. Alice Bailey’s esoteric explanation of the creative


process. Master’s thesis, Saybrook Graduate School and Research Center.

252
Clarke, Arthur C. 1984. Profiles of the future: An inquiry into the limits of the
possible. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Cooke, Maeve. 1994. Language and reason: A study of Habermas’ pragmatics.


Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cranston, Sylvia. 1993. H. P. B. The extraordinary life and influence of Helena


Petrovna Blavatsky, founder of the modern theosophical movement. New
York: Tarcher/Putnam.

Cranston, Sylvia, and Joseph Head. 1991. Reincarnation: The phoenix fire
mystery. San Diego, CA: Point Loma.

Cranston, Sylvia, and Carey Williams. 1984. Reincarnation: A new horizon in


science, religion and society. New York: Julian Press.

Crespi, Franco. 1992. Social action and power. Oxford: Blackwell.

Dallmayr, Fred. 1987. Critical encounters: Between philosophy and politics.


Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

———. 1988. Habermas and rationality. Political Theory 16 (4): 553–79.

Dawkins, Richard. 1976. The selfish gene. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2006. The God delusion. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

de Quincey, Christian. 2000. The promise of integralism: A critical appreciation


of Ken Wilber’s Integral psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7
(11–12): 177–208.

Deikman, Arthur. 1971. Bimodal consciousness. Archives of General Psychiatry


25:481–89.

Dennett, Daniel C. 1991. Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown.

———. 2006. Breaking the spell: Religion as a natural phenomenon. New York:
Viking.

Dews, Peter. 1995. The limits of disenchantment: Essays on contemporary


European philosophy. London: Verso.

———, ed. 1999. Habermas: A critical reader. Oxford: Blackwell.

253
Diener, Michael S., Franz-Karl Ehrhard, Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, and Kurt
Friedrichs. 1994. The encyclopedia of Eastern philosophy and religion.
Boston: Shambhala.

Duff, Michael J. 1998. The theory formerly known as strings. Scientific American,
February, 64–69.

Edgar, Andrew. 2006. Habermas: The key concepts. New York: Routledge.

Evans, Donald. 1993. Spirituality and human nature. Albany: State University of
New York Press. Quoted in Ferrer 2002, 34.

Feingold, Russ, interview by John Nichols. 2011. Russ Feingold speaks out. The
Nation, January 31, 24–26.

Ferrer, Jorge. 2002. Revisioning transpersonal theory: A participatory vision of


human spirituality. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Feynman, Richard. 1985. QED: The strange theory of light and matter. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.

Firman, John, and Ann Gila. 2002. Psychosynthesis: A psychology of the spirit.
Albany: State University of New York Press.

Fisher, Joe. 1985. The case for reincarnation. New York: Bantam Books.

Fleming, Marie. 1997. Emancipation and illusion: Rationality and gender in


Habermas's theory of modernity. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press.

Flynn, Bernard. 1992. Political philosophy at the closure of metaphysics. Atlantic


Highlands, NJ: Humanities.

Gebser, Jean. [1949] 1985. The ever-present origin. Trans. Noel Barstad with
Algis Mickunas. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Gershon, Michael D. 1998. The second brain. New York: Harper Collins.

———. 1999. The enteric nervous system: A second brain. Hospital Practice
(Minneapolis, July 15) 34 (7): 31–42. www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
10418549 (accessed July 28, 2011).

Geuss, Raymond. 1981. The idea of a critical theory: Habermas and the
Frankfurt school. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

254
Giddens, Anthony. 1985. Reason without revolution? Habermas’s Theorie des
kommunikativen Handelns. In Habermas and modernity, ed. Richard J.
Bernstein, 95–121. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gillan, Garth. 2000. Communicative action theory and the possibility of theology.
In Perspectives on Habermas, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, 113–22. Chicago:
Open Court.

Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s


development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Griffin, David Ray. 1997. Panexperientialist physicalism and the mind-body


problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3): 248–68.

Guénon, René. [1921] 2001. Theosophy: History of a pseudo-religion. Trans.


Alvin Moore, Jr., Cecil Bethell, Hubert and Rohini Schiff. Hillsdale, NY:
Sophia Perennis.

Gunaratne, Shelton A. 2006. Public sphere and communicative rationality:


Interrogating Habermas’s Eurocentrism. Journalism and Communication
Monographs 8 (2): 95–156.

Habermas, Jürgen. [1962] 1989. The structural transformation of the public


sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. Trans. Thomas
Burger and Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1973. Theory and practice. Trans. John Viertel. Boston: Beacon.

———. 1978. Knowledge and human interests. 2nd ed. Trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro.
London: Heinemann.

———. 1979. Communication and the evolution of society. Trans. Thomas


McCarthy. Boston: Beacon.

———. 1982. A reply to my critics. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. In Habermas:


Critical debates, ed. John B. Thompson and David Held, 219–83.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1984. The theory of communicative action. Vol. 1, Reason and the
rationalization of society. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon.

———. 1985. Remarks on the concept of communicative action. Trans. Ruth


Stanley. In Social action, ed. Gottfried Seebass and Raimo Tuomela, 151–
78. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel.

255
———. 1987. The theory of communicative action. Vol. 2, Lifeworld and system:
A critique of functionalist reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston:
Beacon.

———. 1990. Discourse ethics: Notes on a program of philosophical


justification. Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Christian Lenhardt. In
The communicative ethics controversy, ed. Seyla Benhabib and Fred
Dallmayr, 60–110. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1991. Moral consciousness and communicative action. Trans. Christian


Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1992a. Autonomy and solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas. Ed.
Peter Dews. Rev. ed. London: Verso.

———. 1992b. Postmetaphysical thinking: Philosophical essays. Trans. William


Mark Hohengarten. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1992c. Transcendence from within, transcendence in this world. Trans.


Eric Crump and Peter P. Kenny. In Habermas, modernity, and public
theology, ed. Don S. Browning and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, 226–50.
New York: Crossroad.

———. 1993a. Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics. Trans.


Ciaran P. Cronin. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1993b. The philosophical discourse of modernity: Twelve lectures. Trans.


Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1998. Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of


law and democracy. Trans. William Rehg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 2001. The liberating power of symbols: Philosophical essays. Trans.


Peter Dews. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 2005. Truth and justification. Trans. and ed. Barbara Fultner. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.

———. 2009. Between naturalism and religion: Philosophical essays. Trans.


Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

———. 2010. An awareness of what is missing. Trans. Ciaran Cronin. In An


awareness of what is missing: Faith and reason in a post-secular age,
Habermas et al. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

256
Hacking, Ian. 1990. Why does language matter to philosophy? Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Halton, Eugene. 1995. Bereft of reason: On the decline of social thought and
prospects for its renewal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hammer, Olav. 2004. Claiming knowledge: Strategies of epistemology from


theosophy to the new age. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.

Hanegraaff, Wouter. 1998. New age religion and Western culture: Esotericism in
the mirror of secular thought. Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press.

Hargens, Sean. 2001. Intersubjective musings: A response to Christian de


Quincey’s “The promise of integralism.” Journal of Consciousness
Studies 8 (12): 35–78.

Harris, Sam. 2005. The end of faith: Religion, terror, and the future of reason.
New York: W. W. Norton.

Hastings, Arthur. 1991. With the tongues of men and angels. Fort Worth, TX:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Held, David. 1980. Introduction to critical theory: Horkheimer to Habermas.


Berkeley: University of California Press.

Helfrich, Paul M. 2008. Ken Wilber’s AQAL metatheory: An overview.


http://integralworld.net/helfrich.html (accessed March 30, 2011).

Heller, Agnes. 1982. Habermas and Marxism. In Habermas: Critical debates, ed.
John B. Thompson and David Held, 21–41. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1994. The discourse ethics of Habermas: Critique and appraisal. In The
Frankfurt School: Critical assessments, vol. 6. Ed. Jay Bernstein, 273–84.
New York: Routledge.

Hendon, Kate. 2005. Devotion, idealism, and abstraction: Perspectives on the


religious impulse from the work of Alice A. Bailey. PhD diss., California
Institute of Integral Studies.

Henrich, Dieter. 1982. Fluchtlinien, Trans. Peter Dews. Frankfurt am Main:


Suhrkamp. Quoted in Dews 1995, 181–82.

257
———. 1999. What is metaphysics—What is modernity? Twelve theses against
Jürgen Habermas. In Habermas: A critical reader, ed. Peter Dews, 291–
319. Oxford: Blackwell.

Henry, Paget. 2000. Myth, language, and Habermasian rationality: Another


Africana contribution. In Perspectives on Habermas, ed. Lewis Edwin
Hahn, 89–111. Chicago: Open Court.

Heylighen, Francis, and K. Chielens. 2008. “Cultural evolution and memetics.” A


paper prepared for the Encyclopedia of complexity and system science,
Springer. http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Papers/Memetics-Springer.pdf
(accessed April 6, 2011).

Hitchens, Christopher. 2007. God is not great: How religion poisons everything.
New York: Twelve Books.

Honneth, Axel. 1991. The critique of power: Reflective stages in a critical social
theory. Trans. Kenneth Baynes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hutton, Christopher M., and John E. Joseph. 1998. Back to Blavatsky: The impact
of theosophy on modern linguistics. Language and Communication 18:
181–204.

Ingram, David. 1987. Habermas and the dialectic of reason. New Haven: Yale
University Press.

Jay, Martin. 1973. The dialectical imagination. Boston: Little, Brown.

Joas, Hans. 1991. The unhappy marriage of hermeneutics and functionalism. In


Communicative action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas’s The Theory of
communicative action, ed. Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, trans. Jeremy
Gaines and Doris L. Jones, 97–118. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Jones, Constance A., and James Ryan. 2007. Encyclopedia of Hinduism. New
York: Facts on File.

Josephson, Brian. 1983. Interview by Barry Rohan, Detroit Free Press, October
25, 1983. Quoted in Cranston 1993, 457.

Jung, C. G. 1948. The syzygy: Anima and animus. In Aion: Researches into the
phenomenology of the self, Collected Works, vol. 9. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press. Quoted in Tarnas 2006, 85.

258
Jungk, Robert. 1958. Brighter than a thousands suns: A personal history of the
atomics scientists. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Katz, Jerrold J. 1990. The metaphysics of meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kaufman, Cynthia. 1999. The unforced force of the more familiar argument: A
critique of Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality. Philosophy
Today 43 (4): 348–60.

Kelly, Sean. 1993. Individuation and the absolute: Hegel, Jung and the path
toward wholeness. New York: Paulist Press.

———. 2002. Space, time, and spirit: The analogical imagination and the
evolution of transpersonal theory. The Journal of Transpersonal
Psychology 34 (2): 73–99.

Kim, Jaegwon, and Ernest Sosa, eds. 1995. A companion to metaphysics. Oxford:
Blackwell.

Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1981. Essays on moral development. Vol. 1 of The


philosophy of moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

Lalonde, Marc P. 1999. Critical theology and the challenge of Jürgen Habermas:
Toward a critical theory of religious insight. New York: Peter Lang.

Lane, David. 2011. Frisky dirt: Why Ken Wilber’s new creationism is pseudo-
science. http://integralworld.net/lane19.html (accessed July 28, 2011).

Lansdowne, Zachary F. 1986. The chakras and esoteric healing. York Beach,
ME: Samuel Weiser.

Lavine, Thelma Z. 2000. Philosophy and the dialectic of modernity. In


Perspectives on Habermas, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, 139–56. Chicago:
Open Court.

Levinas, Emmanuel. 1989. Ethics as first philosophy. In The Levinas Reader, ed.
Seán Hand. Oxford: Blackwell. Quoted in Lalonde 1999, 111.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1966. The savage mind. Chicago: University of Chicago


Press. Quoted in Rothberg 1983, 398n116.

259
Lichtman, Richard. 1990. Psychoanalysis: Critique of Habermas’ prototype of
critical social sciences. New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3): 357–74.

Lovejoy, Arthur O. [1936] 1964. The great chain of being. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.

Lukes, Steven. 1970. Some problems about rationality. In Rationality, ed. Bryan
Wilson. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Quoted in Habermas 1984, 54.

———. 1982. Of Gods and demons: Habermas and practical reason. In


Habermas: Critical debates, ed. John B. Thompson and David Held, 134–
48. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Maclean, Dorothy. 1980. To hear the angels sing: An odyssey of co-creation with
the devic kingdom. Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne.

Maddox, John. 1981. A book for burning? Nature 293 (September 24): 245–46.

Mankoff, Al. 2011. Roberto Assagioli, psychosynthesis, and the esoteric roots
of transpersonal psychology. http://www.desarrollo-integral.org/assagioli-
esoteric.pdf (accessed November 7, 2011).

Marsh, James L. 1993. The religious significance of Habermas. Faith and


Philosophy 10 (4): 521–38.

Mautner, Thomas, ed. 1997. The Penguin dictionary of philosophy. New York:
Penguin.

McCarthy, Thomas. 1978. The critical theory of Jürgen Habermas. Cambridge,


MA: MIT Press.

———. 1982. Rationality and relativism: Habermas’s “Overcoming” of


hermeneutics. In Habermas: Critical debates, ed. John B. Thompson and
David Held, 57–78. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1984. Trans. introd. to The theory of communicative action, vol. 1,


Reason and the rationalization of society, by Jürgen Habermas. Boston:
Beacon.

———. 1991. Reflections on rationalization in The Theory of Communicative


Action. In Habermas and modernity, ed. Richard J. Bernstein, 176–91.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

260
———. 1993. Ideals and illusions: On reconstruction and deconstruction in
contemporary critical theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

McPhail, Mark Lawrence. 1996. Zen in the art of rhetoric: An inquiry into
coherence. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Mead, George Herbert. [1934] 1962. Mind, self, and society, ed. C. Morris.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Quoted in Habermas 1987, 94.

Mendelson, Jack. 1979. The Habermas-Gadamer debate. New German Critique


18:62–63. Quoted in Habermas 1982, 313n23.

Merali, Zeeya. 2006. “Ether” returns in a bid to oust dark matter. New Scientist
(August 25, issue 2566).

Meyerhoff, Jeff. 2007. Psychological analysis of Wilber’s beliefs.


http://www.integralworld.net/meyerhoff-ba-10.html (accessed March 30,
2011).

———. 2010. Bald ambition: A critique of Ken Wilber’s theory of everything.


Minneapolis, MN: Inside the Curtain Press.

Miller, Lisa. 2002. Why we need heaven. Newsweek, August 12.

Nagel, Alexandra. 1997. Are plants conscious? Journal of Consciousness Studies


4 (3): 215–30.

Nash, John. 2007. The seven rays: A case study in the dissemination of esoteric
knowledge. The Esoteric Quarterly: A Publication of the School for
Esoteric Studies 3 (1). http://www.esotericstudies.net/quarterly
/Files030107/EQ030107--Nash.pdf (accessed March 30, 2011).

Newburn, Kathy. 2007. A planetary awakening: Reflections on the teachings of


the Tibetan in the works of Alice A. Bailey. Nevada City, CA: Blue
Dolphin.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. [1882] 1974. The gay science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Vintage Books.

Nisbett, Richard. 2003. The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners
think differently . . . and why. New York: Free Press.

261
Norris, Christopher. 1997. Deconstruction, postmodernism and philosophy:
Habermas on Derrida. In Habermas and the unfinished project of
modernity: Critical essays on The philosophical discourse of modernity,
ed. Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib, 97–123.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Pennesi, Alessandro Olivieri. 1999. Il Christo del new age: Indagine critica. PhD
diss., Libreria Editrice Vaticana.

Penrose, Roger. 1994. Shadows of the mind: A search for the missing science of
Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pensky, Max. 1999. Jürgen Habermas and the antinomies of the intellectual. In
Habermas: A critical reader, ed. Peter Dews, 211–37. Oxford: Blackwell.

Phillips, Derrick. 1986. Toward a just social order. Princeton: Princeton


University Press.

Powell, Arthur E. [1930] 1971. The solar system. Wheaton, IL: Theosophical
Publishing House.

Rasmussen, David M. 1990. Reading Habermas. Cambridge, MA: Basil


Blackwell.

Rawls, John. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University


Press.

Ray, Paul H., and Sherry Ruth Anderson, ed. 2000. The cultural creatives: How
50 million people are changing the world. New York: Three Rivers.

Richmond, M. Temple. 1999. The central doctrines of the Alice A. Bailey


writings and their roots in the theosophy of H.P. Blavatsky with response
to Faivre’s six criteria for the definition of western esotericism. Paper
presented at the Convention of the American Academy of Religion
Western Esotericism Consultation, Boston.

Robbins, Michael D. 1988a. Tapestry of the Gods. Vol. 1, The seven rays: An
esoteric key to understanding human nature. Jersey City Heights, NJ:
University of the Seven Rays.

Robbins, Michael D. 1988b. Tapestry of the Gods. Vol. 2, Psychospiritual


transformation and the seven rays. Jersey City Heights, NJ: University of
the Seven Rays.

262
Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press. Quoted in McCarthy 1993, 15.

———. 1985. Habermas and Lyotard on postmodernity. In Habermas and


modernity, ed. Richard J. Bernstein, 161–75. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rothberg, Donald. 1983. Meta-critique of rationality: Studies in Nietzsche, Quine,


and Habermas. PhD diss., Boston University.

———. 1986a. Rationality and religion in Habermas’ recent work: Some remarks
on the relation between critical theory and the phenomenology of religion.
Philosophy and Social Criticism 11 (3): 221–43.

———. 1986b. Philosophical foundations of transpersonal psychology: An


introduction to some basic issues. The Journal of Transpersonal
Psychology 18 (1): 1–34.

———. 1993. The crisis of modernity and the emergence of socially engaged
spirituality. ReVision 15 (3): 105–14.

———. 1994. Spiritual inquiry. ReVision 17 (2): 2–12.

———. 1999. Transpersonal issues at the millennium. ReVision 31 (1): 41–67.

Seymour, Percy. 1990. Astrology: The evidence of science. London: Penguin.

Shea, Christopher. 2001. White men can't contextualize. Linguafranca: The


Review of Academic Life 11 (6): 44–51.

Sheldrake, Rupert. 1989. The presence of the past: Morphic resonance and the
habits of nature. New York: Viking.

———. 1995. A new science of life: The hypothesis of morphic resonance.


Rochester, VT: Park Street Press.

Sinclair, Sir John R. 1984. The Alice Bailey inheritance. Wellingborough, United
Kingdom: Turnstone.

Smolin, Lee. 2006. The trouble with physics: The rise of string theory, the fall of
a science, and what comes next. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Snow, C. P. 1960. The two cultures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

263
Stevens, Philip. 2009. Rupert Sheldrake and the wider scientific community.
http://www.skeptiko.com/upload/skeptiko-Philip%20Stevens-dissertation
-Sheldrake (accessed April 7, 2011).

Sutich, A. J. 1969. Some considerations regarding transpersonal psychology.


Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 1 (1): 11–20.

———. 1976. The emergence of the transpersonal orientation. Journal of


Transpersonal Psychology 8 (1): 5–19.

Swindal, James. 1999. Reflection revisited: Jürgen Habermas’s discursive theory


of truth. New York: Fordham University Press.

Tarnas, Richard. 2006. Cosmos and psyche: Intimations of a new world view.
New York: Viking.

Tart, Charles T. 2009. The end of materialism: How evidence of the paranormal is
bringing science and spirit together. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger and
Noetic Books.

Taylor, Charles. 1991. Language and society. In Communicative action: Essays


on Jürgen Habermas’s The theory of communicative action, ed. Axel
Honneth and Hans Joas, 23–35. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tillemans, Tom J. F. 2008. Introduction: Buddhist argumentation. Argumentation


22 (1): 1–14.

Van Niekerk, Anton A. 1995. Postmetaphysical versus postmodern thinking:


Retaining the baby without the bathwater. Philosophy Today 39 (2): 171–
84.

Varela, Francisco J., Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. 1993. The embodied
mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge MA: MIT
Press.

Versluis, Arthur. 2000. Western esotericism and consciousness. Journal of


Consciousness Studies 7 (6): 20–33.

Vich, M. A. 1990. The origins and growth of transpersonal psychology. Journal


of Humanistic Psychology 30 (2): 47–50.

Visser, Frank. 2011. Arguments from ignorance: The “Frisky Dirt” discussion so
far. http://integralworld.net/visser41.html (accessed July 28, 2011).

264
Wallace, B. Allan. 2000. The taboo of subjectivity: Toward a new science of
consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Walsh, Roger, and Frances Vaughan. 1993. On transpersonal definitions. Journal


of Transpersonal Psychology 25 (2): 199–207.

Washburn, Michael. 1990. Two patterns of transcendence. Journal of Humanistic


Psychology 30 (3): 84–112.

———. 1994. Transpersonal psychology in psychoanalytic perspective.


Albany: State University of New York Press.

———. 1995. The ego and the dynamic ground: A transpersonal theory of human
development. 2nd, rev. ed. Albany: State University of New York Press.

———. 1996a. The pre/trans fallacy reconsidered. In Ken Wilber in dialogue:


Conversations with leading transpersonal thinkers, ed. Donald Rothberg
and Sean Kelly, 62–87.

———. 1996b. Linearity, theoretical economy, and the pre/trans fallacy. In Ken
Wilber in dialogue: Conversations with leading transpersonal thinkers,
ed. Donald Rothberg and Sean Kelly, 374–76.

———. 2003a. Embodied spirituality in a sacred world. Albany: State University


of New York Press.

———. 2003b. Transpersonal dialogue: A new direction. Journal of


Transpersonal Psychology 35 (1): 1–19.

Webb, John Charles, Jr. 2009. The emerald tablet. http://www.templeofsolomon


.org/Etablet.htg/emerald _tablet.htm (accessed April 2, 2011).

Weber, Max. 1958a. The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons. Quoted in Habermas 1984, 184.

———. 1958b. The religion of India. Trans. and ed. Haas H. Gerth and Don
Martindale. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Weber, Renee. 1986. The search for unity. In Dialogues with saints and sages:
The search for unity, ed. Renee Weber, 1–19. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.

White, Stephen K. 1990. The recent work of Jürgen Habermas. Reason, justice
and modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

265
Whitebook, Joel. 1985. Reason and happiness: Some psychoanalytic themes in
critical theory. In Habermas and modernity, ed. Richard J. Bernstein, 140–
60. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. 1997. Intersubjectivity and the monadic core of the psyche: Habermas
and Castoriadis on the unconscious. In Habermas and the unfinished
project of modernity: Critical essays on The philosophical discourse of
modernity, ed. Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib, 172–93.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Whyte, L. L. 1950. The next development in man. New York: Mentor.

Wightman, Isobel. 2006. The texts of Alice A. Bailey: An inquiry into the role of
esotericism in transforming consciousness. PhD diss., University of
Western Sydney.

Wilber, Ken. 1977. The spectrum of consciousness. Wheaton, IL: Theosophical


Publishing House, Quest.

———. 1995. Sex, ecology, spirituality: The spirit of evolution. Boston:


Shambhala.

———. 1996. Up from Eden: A transpersonal view of human evolution. Wheaton


IL: Theosophical Publishing House, Quest.

———. 1997. The eye of spirit: An integral vision for a world gone slightly mad.
Boston: Shambhala.

———. 1998. A more integral approach. In Ken Wilber in dialogue:


Conversations with leading transpersonal thinkers, ed. Donald Rothberg
and Sean Kelly, 306–67.

———. 2000a. Integral psychology: Consciousness, spirit, psychology, therapy.


Boston: Shambhala.

———. 2000b. Waves, streams, states and self. Journal of Consciousness Studies
7 (11–12): 145–76.

———. 2002. On critics, Integral Institute, my recent writing, and other matters
of little consequence: A Shambhala interview with Ken Wilber.
http://wilber .shambhala.com/html/interviews/interview1220.cfm
(accessed March 30, 2011).

266
———. 2003a. Excerpt G: Toward a comprehensive theory of subtle energies:
Part 2. An integral theory of subtle energies. http://wilber.shambhala
.com/html/books/kosmos/excerptG/part2.cfm (accessed March 30, 2011).

———. 2003b. Excerpt G: Toward a comprehensive theory of subtle energies:


Part 3. Some specifics of an integral theory of subtle energies.
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/books/kosmos/excerptG/part3.cfm
(accessed March 30, 2011).

———. 2006. Integral spirituality: A startling new role for religion in the
modern and postmodern world. Boston: Integral Books.

Wilhelm, Richard, trans. [1931] 1962. The secret of the golden flower: A Chinese
book of life. English ed. trans. Cary F. Baynes (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World.

Winch, Peter. 1958. The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy.
London: Routledge and Paul.

———. 1964. Understanding a primitive society. American Philosophical


Quarterly 1 (4): 307–24.

Zlosnik, T. G., P. G. Ferreira, and G. D. Starkman. 2007. Modifying gravity with


the aether: An alternative to dark matter. Physical Review D 75 (4).
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevD.75.044017 (accessed March 30,
2011).

267
APPENDIX A

FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES OF THE AGELESS WISDOM

Adapted with minor changes from Bailey (1951b, 294–95; italics in the original)

1. The Kingdom of God, the Spiritual Hierarchy of our planet, can and will be
materialised on earth. We believe that it is already present and will later be
recognised as the culminating kingdom in nature.

2. There has been a continuity of revelation down the ages and from cycle to cycle
God has revealed Himself to humanity.

3. God Transcendent is equally God Immanent, and through human beings, who
are in truth the sons of God (if the words of Christ and all the world Teachers
mean anything) the three divine aspects—knowledge, love and will—can be
expressed.

4. There is only one divine Life, expressing itself through the multiplicity of
forms in all the kingdoms of nature, and the sons of men are, therefore ONE.

5. Within each human being is a point of light, a spark of the one Flame. This, we
believe, is the soul, the second aspect of divinity and that of which Paul spoke
when he referred to “Christ in you, the hope of glory.” It is the demonstration of
the divine livingness in each person which is our goal, and discipleship is a step
upon the way to that attainment.

6. An ultimate perfection (though relative in nature) is possible for the individual


aspirant and for humanity as a whole through the action of the evolutionary
process. This process we seek to study and to recognise the myriad of developing
lives, each with its place within the scheme, from the humblest atom up through
the fifth kingdom (of which the Christ is the supreme Head) to those exalted
spheres where the Lord of the World works out the divine Plan.

7. There are certain immutable laws governing the universe; man becomes
progressively aware of these as he evolves. These laws are expressions of the will
of God.

8. The basic law of our universe is to be seen in the manifestation of God as Love.

268
APPENDIX B

RAY CHARACTERISTICS: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Adapted from Robbins (1988a, 5–149)

Strengths Weaknesses

Ray One—Will and Power

Strength of will Egotism


Dynamic power Excessive Pride
Power to synthesize Separativeness
Strong sense of purpose Arrogance
Power of beneficent destruction Willfulness
Power to preserve values Power-hungriness
Power to lead Domination
Fearlessness Destructiveness
Independence Anger and violence
Power to liberate Unrelenting Ambition
Keen understanding of principles and priorities Hardness and cruelty

Ray Two—Love-Wisdom

Loving wisdom Fearfulness


Magnetic, attractive love Self-pity
Power to understand through love Over-sensitivity
Empathy, sympathy, and compassion Tendency towards an
inferiority complex
Exquisite sensitivity Over-attachment
Receptivity and impressionability Over-protectiveness
Inclusiveness Love of being loved
Power to teach and illumine Non-assertiveness
Patience Over-absorption in study
Tolerance Over-inclusiveness
Power to heal through love Contempt for mental
limitation of others

269
Appendix B (continued)

Ray Characteristics: Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths Weaknesses

Ray Three—Active Intelligence

Capacity for abstract thinking Intellectual pride


Capacity to theorize or speculate Excessive criticism
Wide views on all abstract questions Vague and overly-complex
Capacity for rigorous analysis and reasoning Perplexity and confusion
Absentmindedness
Great mental fertility and creativity Excessive thinking without
practical action
Skillful communication Inaccuracy in practical detail;
carelessness
Power to manipulate Manipulative and
calculating
Ability to plan and strategize Opportunism
Great activity and adaptability Deviousness, deceitfulness,
untruth
Facility for understanding and handling money Hyperactivity, restlessness,
wasted motion
Executive and business aptitudes Disorder and chaos

Ray Four—Harmony Through Conflict

Facility for bringing harmony out of conflict Embroiled in constant


conflict and turmoil
Capacity to reconcile Self-absorption in suffering
Facility for compromise, mediation, and bridging Lack of confidence and
composure
Love of beauty and the capacity to create it Worry and agitation
Refinement of artistic and aesthetic sensibilities Excessive moodiness
Strong imagination and intuition Exaggeration: overly
dramatic expression
Love of color Unpredictability and
unreliability
Strong sense of drama Confused combativeness

270
Appendix B (continued)

Ray Characteristics: Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths Weaknesses

Ray Four—Harmony Through Conflict

Ability to amuse, delight, and entertain Ambivalence, indecisiveness,


vacillation
Musicality Over-eagerness for
compromise
Literary abilities via creative imagination Moral cowardice
Spontaneity and improvisation Inertia, indolence and
procrastination

Ray Five—Concrete Knowledge and Science

Capacity to think and act scientifically Excessive mentalism


Keen and focused intellect yielding knowledge Over-analysis; ultra-
Power to define rationalism; linearity
Power to create thoughtforms “Sense-boundedness”
Highly developed powers of analysis Excessive doubt, skepticism,
and discrimination irreverence
Detached objectivity Excessive objectivity
Accuracy and precision in thought and action Rigid and set thought patterns
Acquisition of knowledge and the mastery Narrowness and prejudice
of factual detail Harsh criticism
Power to verify through experimentation; Lack of emotional
the discrimination of truth from error responsiveness and
magnetism
Technical expertise Socially awkward
Common sense and the rejection of “non-sense” Lack of intuitive sensitivity

Ray Six—Devotion and Abstract Idealism

Transcendent idealism Rigid idealism


Intense devotion Unreasoning devotion; ill-
considered loyalty
Self-sacrificial ardor Idealistic impracticality
Unshakeable faith and optimism Blind faith
One-pointedness; single-mindedness Excess; extremism;

271
Appendix B (continued)

Ray Characteristics: Strengths and Weaknesses

Strengths Weaknesses

Ray Six—Idealism and Devotion

Utter loyalty and adherence Fanaticism and militarism


Earnestness and sincerity Emotionalism
Profound humility Selfish and jealous love;
dependency
Receptivity to spiritual guidance Unwise susceptibility to
guidance
Unflagging persistence Superstition and gullibility;
lack of realism
Power to arouse, inspire and persuade Self-abasement; masochism;
the martyr complex
Ability to achieve ecstasy and rapture Unnatural suppression of the
Purity, goodness, sainthood instinctual nature

Ray Seven—Order and Ceremonial Magic

Power to create order Rigid orderliness; formalism


Power to manifest and work on the material Over-concern with rules and
plane regulations
Power to plan and organize Rigid routinization;
subservience to habit
Ritualism and ceremonialism Meaningless ritualism;
pompous
ceremonialism
Power to perfect form Materialism;
earthboundedness
Power to manage detail Intolerance of individuality;
lack of originality
Keen sense of rhythm and timing
Power to coordinate groups Excessive conformity
Power to understand and implement the law Excessive perfectionism
Power to build Bigotry and sectarianism
Power to renovate and transform Sex-magic
Power to synthesize Addiction to occult
phenomena;
spiritualism

272
APPENDIX C

GENERAL CONTRASTS BETWEEN RAY 4 AND RAY 5

Adapted from Robbins (1988a, 215–16)

Ray 4 Ray 5

the artist the scientist


the aesthete the technician
qualitative orientation quantitative orientation
beauty as the focus of consciousness fact as the focus of
consciousness
given to evocative description given to strictly factual
description
highly intuitive highly analytical
tends to “liken” one thing to another tends to define a thing
exactly
embodies ideas in picturesque symbols explains ideas (minutely) in
words and formulas
unitive separative
bridging detaching
reconciling mentality critical mentality
suppleness, pliability concreteness and fixity
subjective understanding objective understanding
very interested in people very interested in “things”
seeks to harmonize seeks exact justice
fertile imagination, imagistic less imaginative; oriented
more towards
objective focus upon
the physical senses
metaphoric factually descriptive and
“down-to-earth”
tells a good story relates things as they are
poetic pragmatic
dramatic undramatic
emotionally expressive and vivacious emotionally inactive and
unresponsive
given to colorful conversation given to informative
conversation
free-associative thinking linear, cause-and-effect
thinking

273
Appendix C (continued)

General Contrasts Between Ray 4 and Ray 5

indulges in non sequitur thinks and speaks rationally


and logically
self-contradictory seeks to eliminate all
contradiction
inaccuracy high degree of accuracy
personally magnetic personally rather
nonmagnetic
exaggerative precise

274
APPENDIX D

QUALITIES OF THE RAYS CONDITIONING THE MIND

Adapted from Robbins (1988a, 339–78) Note: Very rarely would an individual’s
mental vehicle be governed by rays two, six, or seven.

Ray One Mind


Firmness in thought and opinion
A dominating and “impressive” mind
Decisive mind
One-pointed mind
Affirmative mind
A mind for principles—not details
Synthesizing mind
Critical mind
Mental endurance
Independence of mind
Intensely active mind
Power to “leap to conclusions”
Detached, impersonal thinking
Outspokenness
Unembellished thought and speech
Brief and trenchant thought and speech
Realistic mind

Ray Three Mind


Incessantly active mind
Reasoning mind
Concatenating mind
Highly analytical mind
Deductive, non-empirical mind
Manipulative mind
Qualifying mind
Complex, involved thought process
“Intellectual” mind
Critical mind
Highly verbal, communicative mind
Creative, “fabricating” mind
Weaving mind
Abstract, generalizing, “absent” mind
Planning, strategic, calculating mind
Fluid, flexible, versatile mind

275
Appendix D (continued)

Qualities of the Rays Conditioning the Mind

Ray Three Mind


Wide, eclectic mind
Resourceful, option-generating mind
Circuitous, tangential, ramifying mind
Divergent thought process (“brain-storming”)

Ray Four Mind


Bridging, linking mind
Mediating mind
Harmonizing, peace-making mind
Reconciling, resolving mind
Conflicted, struggle-filled, crisis-stressed mind
Unifying, integrating, synthesizing, “non-separative” mind
Weighing and balancing mind
Vacillating, ambivalent, indecisive mind
Antagonistic, contradicting mind: presenting the opposing point of view
Intuitive, non-rationalistic mind
Imagistic mind
Fictive mind
Aesthetic, beauty-sensitive mind-artistic, musical, poetic and literary
Expressive, colorful, picturesque mind
Analogic, metaphoric mind
“Mixing” mind
Poetic mind
Dramatic, exaggerative mind
Quick, spontaneous, improvisatory, playful mind
Free-associative, non-linear, “non-sequitured ” mind
Paradoxical mind

276
Appendix D (continued)

Qualities of the Rays Conditioning the Mind

Ray Five Mind


Scientific mind
Precise, accurate, exact, correct mind
Highly focused, concentrated mind; convergent thought process
Concrete-mindedness; form-focused mind
Keen, sharp, defining mind
Detailed thought process—focus on minutiae
Literal mind
Lucid (light-bestowing), truthful mind
Fact-ascertaining mind
Empirical, inductive mind
Objective, clinical, descriptive mind
Mental detachment
Impartial, unbiased mind
Questioning, curious, inquiring, investigative, probing mind
Mind sensitive to cause and effect relationships
Technical mind
Mathematical, quantifying, enumerating, measuring mind.
Rational, “patient” mind

277

View publication stats

You might also like