Right to livelihood:

The court in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip kumar Raghavendranath
Nandkarni,1983 came to hold that “the right to life” guaranteed by Article 21 includes “the
right to livelihood”.

SLUM DWELLERS Case : In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp,1985 the Supreme
Court has made a significant pronouncement on the impact of Art. 21 on urbanization. In this
case the Supreme Court accepted the plea that the right to life guaranteed by Art. 21 include
the right to livelihood. The Supreme Court ruled that the eviction of persons from pavement
or a slum not only results in deprivation of shelter but would also inevitably lead to
deprivation of their means of livelihood which means deprivation of their life.

Sentence of death –Rarest of rare cases

In Jagmohan v. State of U.P,1972 the Supreme Court had held that death penalty was not
violative of articles 14, 19 and 21, it was said that the judge was to make the choice between
death penalty and imprisonment for life on the basis of circumstances, facts and nature of
crime brought on record during trail. Therefore, the choice of awarding death sentence was
done in accordance with the procedure established by law as required under article 21.

However, in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 the leading case of on the question, a
constitution bench of the supreme court explained that article 21 recognized the right of the state
to deprive a person of his life in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure established
by a valid law .It was further held that death penalty for the offence of murder awarded under
section 302 of I.P.C did not violate the basic feature of the constitution.

Right to get Pollution Free Water and Air

In Subhas Kumar v. State of Bihar,1991 it has held that a Public Interest Litigation is
maintainable for insuring enjoyment of pollution free water and air which is included in
‘right to live’ under Art.21 of the constitution. The court observed:

“Right to live is a fundamental right under Art 21 of the Constitution and it includes the
right of enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment of life. If anything
endangers or impairs that quality of life in derogation of laws, a citizen has right to have
recourse to Art.32 of      the Constitution for removing the pollution of water or air which
may be detrimental to the quality of life.” 

Right to Clean Environment

In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India(1988), the Supreme Court ordered closure of tanneries
that were polluting water.

In  M.C. Mehta v. Union of India(1997), the Supreme Court issued several guideline and
directions for the protection of the Taj Mahal, an ancient monument, from environmental
degradation.

In Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India,1996 the Court took cognizance

of the environmental problems being caused by tanneries that were polluting the water
resources, rivers, canals, underground water and agricultural land. The Court issued several
directions to deal with the problem.

In  M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2006), the Court held that the blatant and large-scale
misuse of residential premises for commercial use in Delhi, violated the right to pollution
free environment. Taking note of the problem the Court issued directives to the Government
on the same.

In  Murli S. Deora v. Union of India,2001 the persons not indulging in smoking cannot be
compelled to or subjected to passive smoking on account of act of smokers. Right to Life
under Article 21 is affected as a non-smoker may become a victim of someone smoking in a
public place.

Right Against Noise Pollution

In Re: Noise Pollution, the case was regarding noise pollution caused by obnoxious levels
of noise due to bursting of crackers during Diwali.

(Public Nuicanse in Lawof Torts) –

KK Majestic Church v. welfare association

Mufti Sayid v st of Maharashtra - Azan on Loudspeakers is an essential part of the religion

but not on loudspeakers

Right to Privacy

Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. 1962 question whether the right to privacy could be implied
from the existing fundamental rights such as Art. 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e) and 21, came before the
court. “Surveillance” under Chapter XX of the U.P. Police Regulations constituted an
infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.
Regulation 236(b), which permitted surveillance by “domiciliary visits at night”, was held to
be in violation of Article 21.

Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 The Supreme Court took a more elaborate
appraisal of the right to privacy. In this case, the court was evaluating the constitutional
validity of Regulations 855 and 856 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations, which
provided for police surveillance of habitual offenders including domiciliary visits and
picketing of the suspects. The Supreme Court desisted from striking down these invasive
provisions holding that:

“It cannot be said that surveillance by domiciliary visit would always be an unreasonable
restriction upon the right of privacy. It is only persons who are suspected to be habitual
criminals and those who are determined to lead a criminal life that are subjected to
surveillance.”

The court accepted a limited fundamental right to privacy as an emanation from Arts.19(a),
(d) and 21. Mathew J. observed in the instant case,

“The right to privacy will, therefore, necessarily, have to go through a process of case by
case development.         Hence, assuming that the right to personal liberty. the right to        
move freely throughout India and       the freedom of speech create an independent
fundamental right of privacy as an emanation from them that one can characterize as a
fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute…..

…… Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral
zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right that fundamental right must
be subject             to restrictions on the basis of compelling public interest”

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India, 2017  is a resounding victory for
privacy. The ruling is the outcome of a petition challenging the constitutional validity of the
Indian biometric identity scheme Aadhaar. The Government of India defended the rule
stating that authentication through Aadhaar, by scanning one’s fingerprint or iris, enlivened
the Fundamental Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution. After all, to live with
dignity and privacy under Article 21, Indians ought to be able to access food, employment
and other welfare benefits, the State reasoned. No citizen could have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" over their fingerprints or iris-scans as they were not intimate aspects
an individual’s life, the State said. Once again, the question before the Court was whether the
State could attempt to ensure access to welfare benefits and subsidies to protect one’s
dignity, by overriding one’s right to privacy and dignity. Yet, the court upheld the rule
mandating Aadhaar for welfare benefits. In the court’s words, they were concerned with “...
the balancing of the two facets of dignity". (9 jugde bench- court overruled MP Sharma v. ,
Khadak Singh v. in this as they didn’t expressly accepted right to privacy)

PUCL v. Union of India, 1997: Telephone tapping case

Right against Handcuffing:Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration], the Supreme Court

struck down the Rules that provided that every under-trial who was accused of a non-bailable
offence punishable with more than three years prison term would be routinely handcuffed.
The Court ruled that handcuffing should be resorted to only when there was “clear
and present danger of escape” of the accused under  -trial, breaking out of police control.
 In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, 1979, the petitioner was sentenced to death by the
Delhi session court and his appeal against the decision was pending before the high court. He
was detained in Tihar Jail during the pendency of the appeal. He complained that since the
date of conviction by the session court, he was kept in solitary confinement. It was contended
that Section 30 of Prisoners Act does not authorize jail authorities to send him to solitary
confinement, which by itself was a substantive punishment under Sections 73 and 74 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and could be imposed by a court of law and it could not be left to
the whim and caprice of the prison authorities. The Supreme Court accepted the argument of
the petitioner and held that imposition of solitary confinement on the petitioner was violative
of Article 21.Right against Solitary Confinement,custodial violence

In the case of Ramleela Maidan Incident, 2012 Justice B.S. Chauhan in his opinion wrote
that when police disturbed the crowd at night at 1:00 a.m., their right to sleep was violated.
He held that right to sleep forms an essential part of Article 21 which guarantees personal
liberty and life to all. Sleep forms an essential part of living a peaceful life, hence it is a
fundamental right.

Landmark Latest Cases under Art.21:

 SC (Indian Young Lawyer Association Vs. State Of Kerala, 2018) allows women
entry to Sabarimala temple, says exclusionary practices violate right to worship
under Art. 25, 14, and 21. Rules disallowing women in Sabarimala are
unconstitutional and violative of Article 21,

 Supreme Court Struck down (Joseph Shine v UOI (2017))- Victorian era Section 497
(Adultery) of IPC as Unconstitutional, Plea filed in the Supreme Court challenging
the constitutional validity of Section 497 of IPC, by an NRI from Kerala, Joseph
Shine, who in his petition said Section 497 was "prima facie unconstitutional on the
ground that it discriminates against men and violates Article 14, 15 and 21 of the
Constitution".

 Naz Foundation v Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2009- 377 cannot be used to punish two
consenting adults as it violates privacy and personal liberty under art 21. Overruled in
Suresh Kumar Kaushal versus Naz Foundation, 2013

Suresh Kumar Kaushal versus Naz Foundation, 2013 which upheld the legalities of
Section 377. The judgment had struck down the Delhi High Court judgment
decriminalising homo sexuality. The Supreme Court on Sept,2018-pronounced that
Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code is unconstitutional. The five-judge bench read
out four judgments, all of which held that the law, which criminalises 'unnatural sex'
between consenting adults, and has been used to target the LGBTQI+ community in
India, has been struck down in so far as it criminalises same sex intercourse. LGBT
rights. On 6 September 2018, the court delivered its verdict, declaring portions of the
law relating to consensual sexual acts between adults unconstitutional in a unanimous
decision. This decision overturns the 2013 ruling in Suresh Kumar Koushal vs. Naz
Foundation in which the court upheld the law. However, other portions of Section
 377 relating to sex with minors, non-consensual sexual acts, and bestiality remain in
force. The court found that the criminalisation of sexual acts between consenting
adults violated the right to equality guaranteed by the Constitution of India. While
reading the judgment, Chief Justice Misra pronounced that the court found that
"criminalising carnal intercourse" to be "irrational, arbitrary and manifestly
unconstitutional".The court ruled that LGBT people in India are entitled to all
constitutional rights, including the liberties protected by the Constitution of
India. This included "the choice of whom to partner, the ability to find fulfilment in
sexual intimacies and the right not to be subjected to discriminatory behaviour are
intrinsic to the constitutional protection of sexual orientation". The judgement also
made note that LGBTs are entitled to an equal citizenship and protection under law,
without discrimination. While the statute criminalises all anal sex and oral sex,
including between opposite-sex couples, it has largely affected same-sex
relationships. As such, the verdict was hailed as a landmark decision for LGBT rights
in India, with campaigners waiting outside the court cheering after the verdict was
pronounced.

Navtej Singh Johar v UOI, 2018- criminalises sexual acts on animals,

decriminalises homosexuality(having intercourse btw same sex)

 Shayra Bano v UOI, 2016- Triple Talaq Case- Even if talking about religious
sentiments and Islamic religious practices, triple talaq is an essential religious
practice? Then why banned by other Islamic relaation? Merely because one
community practices doesn’t mean essential practice. Reas restrictions on FRs –
public morality. Also art 14 violative.

 Shakti Vahini v UOI, 2018- Right to choose life partner is FR as it is a facet of

liberty and dignity under art 21. Honor killing by khaab panchayat held illegal.

(VIDEO LECTURE – ART 21 PART 3)

 Anita Kushwaha v Pushap Sudan, 2016- court given expansive meaning of life
under art 21 by including access to justice as right to life under art 21. Held that there
is no prohibitions against use of power under art 142 to direct cases under j and k
court to another state and vice versa
 Common Cause v UOI, - legalising passive euthanasia and (living wills & advanced
directives) Right to refuse medical treatment is well recognized in law -concept
evolving. Organ donation opportunity by advocates. Family members are often seen
terminating lives of family members in the name of property
 Aruna Shanbaug v UOI, - active (mercy killing- actively induce some drug) and
passive euthanasia (passively doing an act of removing the life support sys because of
which someone is surviving)
 Live-in relationships

Badri Prasad v. Director of Consolidation,1978 gave legal validity to a 50-year live-in

relationship. 
In Payal Sharma v. Nari Niketan,2001, court held, “In our opinion, a man and a woman, even
without getting married, can live together if they wish to. This may be regarded as immoral by
society, but it is not illegal. There is a difference between law and morality.”
In Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, 2010, the Court held that, the live-in relationship if
continued for long time, cannot be termed as a “walk-in and walk-out” relationship and that there
is a presumption of marriage between the parties.
In landmark case of S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal 2010, the Supreme Court held that a living
relationship comes within the ambit of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The Court further held that live-in relationships are permissible and the act of two major living
together cannot be considered illegal or unlawful. (Court dropped all the charges against a south
Indian actress under the indecent representation of women act, many complaints filed against her
interview in which she favoured about pre marital sexual and live in relations- right to life and
not illegal- intentions not bad)
Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, 2013: Ms. Indra Sarma, an unmarried woman, left her job and
began a “live-in” relationship with Mr. V.K.V. Sarma for a period as long as 18 years, despite
knowing that he was married. Mr. Sarma abandoned Ms. Sarma in a state where she could not
maintain herself. Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, failure to
maintain a woman involved in a “domestic relationship” amounts to “domestic violence.” Two
lower courts held that Mr. V.K.V. committed domestic violence by not maintaining Ms. Sarma,
and directed Mr. Sarma to pay a maintenance amount of Rs.18,000 per month. Thereafter, on
appeal, the High Court of Karnataka set aside the orders of the lower courts on the ground that
Ms. Sarma was aware that Mr. Sarma was married and thus her relationship with him would fall
outside the protected ambit of “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. On further appeal, the Supreme Court, while
affirming the High Court’s order, created an exception to the general rule. The Supreme Court
clarified that a woman who begins to live with a man who is already married to someone else,
without knowing that he is married, will still be considered to be in a “domestic relationship”
under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; thus, the man’s failure to
maintain her will amount to “domestic violence” within the meaning of the Act and she will be
eligible to claim reliefs such as maintenance and compensation. Court held that, “when the
woman is aware of the fact that the man with whom she is in a live-in relationship and who
already has a legally wedded wife and two children, is not entitled to various reliefs available to
a legally wedded wife and also to those who enter into a relationship in the nature of marriage” 
Supreme Court emphasised that there is a great need to extend Section 2(f) which defines
“domestic relationships” in Pwdva, 2005 so as to include victims of illegal relationships who are
poor, illiterate along with their children who are born out of such relationships and who do not
have any source of income. Further, Supreme Court requested Parliament to enact a new
legislation based on certain guidelines given by it so that the victims can be given protection
from any societal wrong caused from such relationships.
Following are the guidelines given by Supreme Court:
“(1) Duration of Period of Relationship
Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence (DV) Act has used the expression ‘at any point of time’,
which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary
from case to case, depending upon the fact situation.
(2) Shared Household
The expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act and, hence, need no further
elaboration.
(3) Pooling of Resources and Financial Arrangements
Supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring
immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long-term investments in
business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long-standing relationship, may be a
guiding factor.
(4) Domestic Arrangements
Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household
activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or upkeeping the house, etc. is an indication of a
relationship in the nature of marriage.
(5) Sexual Relationship
Marriage like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for emotional
and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional support,
companionship and also material affection, caring, etc.
(6) Children
Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage.
Parties, therefore, intend to have a long-standing relationship. Sharing the
responsibility for bringing-up and supporting them is also a strong indication.
(7) Socialisation in Public
Holding out to the public and socialising with friends, relations and others, as if they are husband
and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature of marriage.
(8) Intention and Conduct of the Parties
Common intention of parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their
respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship.”
Section 125 CrPC was incorporated in order to avoid vagrancy and destitution for a wife/minor
children/old age parents, and the same has now been extended by judicial interpretation to
partners of a live-in relationship (held in Ajay Bhardwaj v. Jyotsna, 2016)
In Dhannulal v. Ganeshram, 2015, Supreme Court decided out that couples living in live-in
relationship will be presumed legally married. The Bench also added that the woman in the
relationship would be eligible to inherit the property after the death of her partne
Supreme Court in Tulsa v. Durghatiya, 2008  has held that a child born out of such relationship
will no longer be considered as an illegitimate child. The important precondition for the same
should be that the parents must have lived under one roof and cohabited for a significantly long
time for the society to recognise them as husband and wife and it should not be a “walk-in and
walk-out” relationship (Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, 2010- if cohabitation continued
for a long time, there is a presumption of marriage) 
In Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan2010, the Supreme Court held that a child born out
of a live-in relationship may be allowed to inherit the property of the parents (if any) and
therefore be given legitimacy in the eyes of law.
Asok Kumar Ganguly in Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun, 2011 remarked that irrespective of the
relationship between parents, birth of a child out of such relationship has to be viewed
independently of the relationship of the parents. It is as plain and clear as sunshine that a child
born out of such relationship is innocent and is entitled to all the rights and privileges available
to children born out of valid marriages. Court held, “With changing social norms of legitimacy in
every society, including ours, what was illegitimate in the past may be legitimate today.”

Conclusion: Article 21 of the Constitution says, No person shall be deprived of his

life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Maneka
Gandhi's case is not only a landmark case for the interpretation of Article 21 but it
also gave an entirely new viewpoint to look at the Chapter III of the Constitution.
Prior to Maneka Gandhi's decision, Article 21 guaranteed the right to life and
personal liberty only against the arbitrary action of the executive and not from the
legislative action. Broadly speaking, what this case did was extend this protection
against legislative action too. In Maneka Gandhi's case, the meaning and content of
the words 'personal liberty' again came up for the consideration of the Supreme Court.
In this case the Supreme Court not only overruled A.K. Gopalan's case but also
widened the scope of words 'personal liberty'. After that the meaning Art. 21 right to
life & personal liberty has changed multidimensional approaches and reached the new
horizon