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HB 08/17
HC 2997/16
X REF: HC 2986/16; HC 2528/15

HWANGE LOCAL BOARD

Versus

SIKHUMBUZO MKANDLA
t/a S. MKANDLA & ASSOCIATES PROFESSIONAL
SURVEYORS

And

THE SURVEYOR GENERAL

And

THE DEPUTY SHERIFF, HWANGE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

MAKONESE J
BULAWAYO 18 & 26 JANUARY 2017

Urgent Chamber Application

Advocate H. Moyo for applicant

Advocate L. Nkomo for 1st respondent

MAKONESE J: The applicant filed an urgent chamber application on the 28th

November 2016 seeking interim relief in the following terms:

“1. That 1st and 4th respondents be and are hereby ordered to stop execution of the court
order under HC 2528/15
2. That the 4th respondent should return to applicant all the goods attached in terms of
HC 2528/15”

I heard argument in this matter on the 18th January 2017 and undertook to promptly deliver
a ruling. I have perused the papers filed under case number HC 2528/15 and observe the
following:-

(a) On 15th January 2016 the parties appeared before TAKUVA J for the purposes of a pre-
trial conference.
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HB 08/17
HC 2997/16
X REF: HC 2986/16; HC 2528/15

(b) The issue for determination as set out in the pre-trial conference minute filed by the
applicant was whether it was liable to pay the survey fees claimed by the 1st respondent,
and whether applicant engaged 1st respondent to carry out a survey of stands 4063 –
4663 and stands 4664 – 6119.
(c) The parties filed a Deed of Settlement on 15th July 2016 wherein the applicant agreed
to pay the sum of US$88 846 together with interest at the prescribed rate calculated
from 1st June 2013 to date of final settlement in respect of survey fees.
(d) On the 8th September 2016 an order by consent was granted in terms of the Deed of
Settlement.
(e) On 16th September 2016 1st respondent issued a writ of execution to recover the
judgment debt. On 25th November 2016 applicant filed an application to set aside the
judgment obtained by consent under case number HC 2896/16. The applicant brought
the application in terms of Order 56 of the High Court Rules. Order 8 Rule 56 of the
rules provides as follows:

“A judgment given by consent under these rules may be set aside by the court and leave
may be given to the defendant to defend or to plaintiff to prosecute his action. Such leave
shall only be given a good and sufficient cause and upon such terms as to costs and
otherwise as the court deems fit.”

The applicant contends that it consented to judgment in case number HC 2528/15 as a result
of misrepresentation of facts by 1st respondent. Essentially the applicant argues that 1st respondent
did not disclose to applicant that the layout plan in respect of the survey fees that was claimed was
not approved. I need not delve into the merits of that application save to point out that the issue
before me at this stage is to determine whether the matter deserves to be determined on an urgent
basis. The real motivation for the filing of this urgent application is set out in paragraph 8 of the
applicant’s founding affidavit in the following terms:
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HB 08/17
HC 2997/16
X REF: HC 2986/16; HC 2528/15

“The matter is extremely urgent and cannot wait to be heard in the normal manner in that
1st respondent has instructed the Sheriff to execute on the court order which carried a
figure of US$425 984,80 which figure from 1st respondent’s own admission is wrong as it
covers payment of stands that are not developable at all. There are in excess of 899 stands
that are not developable. The figure on the affected stands will reduce the writ by almost
half should the matter proceed to trial and that aspect is proven. The court order was
premised on wrong layout plans which render the whole work done as well as the cause of
action null and void. The applicant is not in mora as the layout plans have not yet been
approved in fact 1st respondent is using wrong layout plans altogether.”

It has not escaped the court’s attention that before and after the writ of execution was issued
the applicant has made several promises to settle its indebtedness to 1 st respondent. Regrettably,
applicant has failed to pay for the survey fees for work done at its behest. It seems evident to me,
that the applicant is seeking to distort the factual background. From the time that 1st respondent
was contracted to carry out the survey, applicant has always been aware that the layout plan,
Approval Number AL 56 was being used by 1st respondent to conduct the survey. It is beyond
doubt that applicant became aware of the layout plan number AL 56 before 1 st respondent was
even engaged to carry out the survey. I do not understand the relationship between payment for
the survey fees and the stands that are developable. The fees were taxed by the office of the
Survey-General and are due and owing regardless of the undevelopable stands arising from the
survey.

The applicant further contends in paragraph 11 of the founding affidavit as follows:-

“… The applicant will suffer severe prejudice and irreparable harm should the order not
be granted in that the applicant uses public funds to pay 1st respondent and has already
paid US$115,000. The figures as it stands are incorrect, as there is a reduction in the
stands actually surveyed, the survey work is incomplete and the working document being
the layout plan has not been approved …”

The applicant’s contentions in the founding affidavit show the applicant’s lack of candour
and a distortion of facts. It is clear that the reliance on the layout plan AL 56 in carrying out the
title survey that resulted in some stands being pegged on undevelopable areas such as steep slopes,
streams, rivers and hilltops has always been known to the applicant and is not a recent discovery.
As far back as 16th April 2013 the deponent to applicant’s founding affidavit, Ndumiso Mdlalose,
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HB 08/17
HC 2997/16
X REF: HC 2986/16; HC 2528/15

signed a certificate of receipt of Beacons from 1st respondent. It is therefore, clear that there is an
attempt by the applicant to misrepresent facts. The court will not take lightly the deliberate
distortion and misrepresentation of facts, moreso where it is designed to wood-wink the court into
granting an order based on such misrepresentation. A matter can never be urgent where all the
facts that are alleged to form the basis of the urgency were known to the applicant years before the
filing of such application. It is clear that the motivation for the filing of this urgent application for
stay of execution is the imminent removal and sale in execution of the applicant’s property. The
applicant has failed to comply with its proposed payment plan and has devised a strategy to delay
execution by purporting to seek the setting aside of the order granted by consent under case number
HC 2528/15. I entertain no doubt that the urgency in this matter is contrived and motivated by a
desire to delay payment. The applicant’s claims are predicated upon the misleading assertion that
1st respondent made a misrepresentation to the applicant that 1st respondent was using an
unapproved plan number AL 56. This averment is not only dishonest but mala fides. The
document trail placed on record by 1st respondent shows that applicant was the recipient of the
layout plan, AL 56 in October 2012. This was before 1st respondent was contracted by the
Surveyor General to conduct the title survey.

It is my view, therefore that this case typifies contrived urgency through a deliberate
distortion of facts calculated to sway the opinion of the court. The applicant is using court process
to delay payment due to 1st respondent.

For the aforegoing reasons, the matter is clearly not urgent because nothing unexpected has
occurred warranting this honourable court’s intervention. Applicant’s counsel argued that the need
to act arose on 18th November 2016. This can hardly be nearer to the true position. The need to
act was prompted by the issuance of the writ of execution. There is therefore no lawful justification
for the applicant approaching this court by way of an urgent application.

See the case of Gwarada v Johnson & Ors 2009 (2) ZLR 159 (H).
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HB 08/17
HC 2997/16
X REF: HC 2986/16; HC 2528/15

In Central Africa (Pvt) Ltd v Moyas & Another HH 57/12 at page 2 of the cyclostyled
judgment BERE J state as follows:

“It is the accepted position that courts detest or frown on those litigants or legal
practitioners who desire to derive the sympathy of the court by deliberately withholding
vital information which has a bearing on the very matter that the court is called upon to
determine …”

See also Chidawu and Ors v Shah & Ors SC-12-13.

As I have already indicated the urgency is founded on deliberate misrepresentation of facts

and untruthful dispositions meant to improperly sway the opinion of the court in favour of the
applicant. There is evidently serious lack of candour and mala fides on the part of the applicant.

In the result, I am inclined to dismiss the application and uphold the preliminary point.

Accordingly, it is ordered as follows:

1. The application be and is hereby dismissed.

2. The applicant is to bear the costs of suit.

Messrs Dube-Tachiona & Tsvangirai, applicant’s legal practitioners

Dube-Banda, Nzarayapenga & Partners, 1st respondent’s legal practitioners