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CHAPTER 6

Moving beyond Humiliation:

A New Role for the United States
in Post-Saddam Iraq

You have been ordered to Iraq (i—RAKH) as part of the worldwide

offensive to beat Hitler.
You will enter Iraq both as a soldier and as an individual, because
on our side a man can be both a soldier and an individual. This
can be our strength—if we are smart enough to use it. It can be our
weakness if we aren’t.
—U.S. Army, Instructions for American Servicemen
in Iraq during World War II

In March 1991, Colonel “Mohammed Fallujah” was on his way to drop

two heavy bombs onto civilian populations in the southern town of
Karbala.1 Because his MI-8 helicopter was not equipped to carry those
bombs, made for airplanes only, a special system had been put in place
for him to be able to carry out Saddam Hussein’s vengeance against
the Shiite population of Iraq.2 Their sin: to have taken advantage of
his momentary lapse of central authority in the immediate aftermath of
the Gulf War to rebel against his rule.3 This rebellion was originally
instigated and supported by the administration of U.S. President George
H. W. Bush, whose tactic was to favor an Iraqi-based regime implosion
instead of an outright regime change.4
As Mohammed was about to reach his target, he looked up and saw a
U.S. Air Force F-16 above him. As the plane approached, the pilot waived
at him. Panic-stricken, Mohammed called his base to ask permission to
abort the mission. He was certain that the F-16 would shoot him down if
he continued. To his astonishment, his commander ordered him to carry
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156 Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq

on and fulfill his mission. As the F-16 pilot flew idly by, Mohammed
dropped his two bombs, killing scores of unarmed civilians attempting to
flee the city as Saddam’s Revolutionary Guard was carrying out ground
attacks against all Iraqi Shiite cities. While the death toll of Mohammed’s
actions is impossible to know, the estimated toll of the 1991 repression
against the Shiites of Iraq ranges between 100,000 and 180,000 souls.5
Why would the U.S. government favor this rebellion on one hand and
let Mohammed Fallujah and his colleagues crush it on the other? The re-
sponse lies with Iran, whose influence in the rebellion was feared to have
become too great.6 While the Iraqi Shiites were supposed to rebel, they
were not supposed to have welcomed the help of their eastern neighbor,
Iran—not after years of U.S. financial support of the Saddam Hussein
regime against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.7 On this March 1991 day,
Mohammed Fallujah owed his life to realpolitik. The population of Kar-
bala, among others, lost theirs because of their Iranian cousins’ support
for the rebellion. On May 29, 2003, as I was witnessing the opening of
a mass grave in the Iraqi desert, near the town of Jufur-Safa, bordering
Karbala, I heard Iraqi Shiites cursing the man they believed responsible
for this tragedy, not Saddam Hussein as most of us were led to think by
the Western media, but U.S. President George H. Bush, who, according
to most, badly let down the Iraqi Shiites.8 This is what a woman who
had lost family members buried in this mass grave told me that day. She
stressed that after this tragedy, it was now her people’s turn to use the
United States for their political benefit. According to her, despite the fact
that the United States had gotten rid of Saddam, the Shiite population
would never trust the United States again for anything.9
Was this political interference and subsequent abandonment of the
Iraqi Shiites worth the long-term political damage? Can the U.S. have a
political future in Iraq, or should it just leave the country alone? Is any
effort to redress the political situation in Iraq doomed to fail? Or can
the United States learn from its past mistakes and leave a positive and
sustainable legacy to its Middle Eastern ally? More than seventeen years
after the 1991 disaster, Iran’s and Iraq’s future are more intertwined than
ever. Is this unavoidable? After looking into perceptions of humiliation
as a catalyst to sectarian and religious violence, this chapter will examine
current U.S. efforts to bring sustainable civil peace in post-Saddam Iraq.
It will examine how the United States could apply the lessons described
in this book to the future of Iraq.
First, the mechanisms and impacts of the Sunni Awakening initiative,
also known as the Sahwa movement, must be assessed. As the preceding
chapters have illustrated, the administration of U.S. President George
W. Bush has made many mistakes in relation to its occupation of Iraq,
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Moving beyond Humiliation 157

mostly due to a lack of sociopolitical and economic vision, both in the

short term and in the long term. An analysis of the Sahwa movement
will show how much the United States has learned from its past mistakes
in Iraq. It will also enable us to look toward the future to ascertain
whether the United States has a role in the future of Iraq, and whether
this role can be more effective for the sake of the Iraqi people. We will
also examine how this book’s findings and conclusions can contribute
to a more effective and positive role. From being part of the problem
to becoming part of the solution, a new role for the United States is
envisioned. Can and will it be up to the challenge?

THE SAHWA INITIATIVE: A WIN-WIN SOLUTION

In the fall of 2007, upon realization that the security predicament of
post-Saddam Iraq could not be solved unless Iraqis themselves took part
in the rebuilding of their own country, the U.S.-led Coalition formed
groups of mostly former Sunni insurgents. Soon, these groups, compris-
ing local tribe leaders, Sunni clerics, former nationalist insurgents such as
the 1920 Brigades, former al-Qaeda militants, and so on, became active
in eight provinces, including Baghdad.10 The motivations for people to
join these groups varied greatly, although most people involved agree
that they joined for three main reasons: money, the desire to crush a
stifling al-Qaeda, and the prospect of being able to integrate into Iraqi
security forces in a near future.11 As of December 10, 2007, an unex-
pected 73,397 men had signed up, 65,000 of whom were receiving a
$300 monthly salary directly from the U.S. military.12 Among these men
were also Shiites, an estimated six thousand, mostly from religiously
mixed areas of Baghdad and Diyala Province. These groups, referred to
as Sunni Awakening Councils, or Sahwa, were in charge of maintaining
law and order, and, more important, rooting out al-Qaeda from Iraq.
Overnight, Iraqi insurgents became allied to the United States for the
sake of a common cause: to annihilate al-Qaeda. Were they successful?
It seems that they were. At the time of this writing in mid-2008, the
influence of al-Qaeda in Iraq seems to have been severely hampered.
Violence in all of Iraq is reportedly at its lowest since 2004.13 In com-
parison to optimistic past reports, these seem to match the reality on the
ground: al-Qaeda has been successfully booted out of all major cities
in Sunni areas of Iraq, including former caliphates such as Fallujah and
Doloyia.
The question remains, Did the councils win over al-Qaeda, or did
al-Qaeda lose the battle on its own? While the immediate results of
the Sahwa initiative are undoubtedly impressive, an analysis of its
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158 Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq

mechanisms will shed light as to how to design a more effective future

for the United States in post-Saddam Iraq.

MOLLAH NADHOM, THE HUMAN FACE OF AL-SAHWA

Mollah Nadhom is a thirty-year-old imam from Doloyia, north of
Baghdad.14 Born into a very influential religious family, he has man-
aged over the years to earn the respect of his peers through his personal
charisma as well as his sharp tongue against injustices of all kinds. A
devout religious figure, he is also a gregarious and amusing charac-
ter. He holds a passion for history, politics, and philosophy, which has
transformed him into an eloquent and electrifying orator whose listeners
would follow to the gates of hell. When the U.S.-led Coalition invaded
Iraq in March 2003, Mollah Nadhom claims that he did not imag-
ine himself as a potential insurgent. However, as he was observing the
United States in the early days of the invasion, he could not help but
wonder why the troops were making so many mistakes on the ground,
such as standing idly by during the looting of Baghdad or precipitat-
ing the collapse of all Iraqi state agencies through the de-Baathification
process.
On June 9, 2003, his status switched from that of a bystander to that
of an active player in the Iraqi insurgency. On that day, his town was
swept by U.S. troops in, according to him, a most brutal and humili-
ating manner that “reminded” him “of the Crusades.” Approximately
four hundred men, including many elderly men and well-respected vil-
lage leaders, were arrested. Two men were killed, including his “dear-
est” uncle Jassim Rmayiid Mohammed, who was sixty years old. He
recalls, “they kept kicking him until he died while the women [of my
family] were imprisoned in the house. . . . They punished the town be-
cause they were looking for individuals they considered enemies. They
killed many innocents in cold blood. They did not care about the fam-
ilies of their victims by saying ‘we are sorry,’ as if these victims were
animals.”
As a result of this humiliating murder, Mollah Nadhom first joined
the Islamic Army in Iraq. “As an imam of the biggest mosque in Doloyia,
I began motivating people to fight the insurgency, and I began register-
ing them. Within five months, there were about [nine hundred] fighters
in Doloyia alone and twice as many supporters.” According to him,
the reason for this large support was the humiliation felt by many as
a direct consequence of the behavior of U.S. troops in town and the
reckoning that because the Shiite community was being favored by the
United States, this insurgency would hopefully give the Sunnis of Iraq
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Moving beyond Humiliation 159

the necessary political leverage to be key stakeholders in the formation

of a future Iraqi government.
About his Friday sermons, Mollah Nadhom states, “My declarations
were based on what we had heard about U.S. democracy. We believed
that a human was free to say what he thinks and free in what he be-
lieves in, otherwise, the 2003 liberation was no different than Saddam’s
regime.” Freedom of speech was not to prevail in the immediate after-
math of the invasion, where vociferous public criticism of the U.S.-led
Coalition was equated to inciting terrorist violence against the United
States. As a result, Mollah Nadhom soon became a wanted man. After
many unsuccessful attempts on the part of U.S. troops, he was finally
arrested on February 27, 2005. Following a very rough first two weeks in
which he was subjected to harsh treatment bordering on torture; he was
taken to Abu Ghraib.15 There, he was reunited with one of his closest
friends, Muharib al-Jibouri, who happened to be al-Qaeda’s spokesper-
son in Iraq. This meeting changed Mollah Nadhom’s outlook on his
political struggle. He explains: “There was a foreigner with him, and he
explained to me the ideology of al-Qaeda. He said that they were here
to defend the country against the Crusades and the Iranian domination
of Iraq, a domination represented by the Shiite militias. That would end
with the establishment of an Islamic state, which would rule according to
the Koran. Their project was heroically acceptable to me.” This meeting
coincided with the aftermath of the January 2005 elections, which saw
a majority of Shiites with ties to Iran elected to the Iraqi government.
As soon as he was released from Abu Ghraib, Mollah Nadhom joined
al-Qaeda in Iraq and became its chief information officer. During the
following two and a half years, he produced videos aimed to recruit
foreign fighters and secure ransom payments for hostage releases. In the
fall of 2007, upon realizing that al-Qaeda in Iraq was terrorizing the
population of Doloyia, he decided to join the Sahwa movement.
Mollah Nadhom’s reasons for joining Sahwa are the direct result of
al-Qaeda’s actions in his town, and the subsequent loss of population
support they provoked: “I joined al-Sahwa because after the crimes of
al-Qaeda, many people asked me to find a solution to their unbearable
daily lives.” In addition, he deplores the way in which al-Qaeda func-
tioned internally: “their principles were implemented from the top-down
only, and their repressive actions would never have created a platform
from which people would feel empowered.” He also claims that when
he traveled outside Iraq to Syria in 2006, he discovered some links be-
tween al-Qaeda and both Syria and Iran, strange bedfellows in his eye.
While one, Syria, had always had notorious links with al-Qaeda, the
other, Iran, was ideologically and religiously remote, especially in light of
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160 Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq

al-Qaeda’s anti-Shiite bombings in Iraq aimed at stirring civil tensions.

To his dismay, Mollah Nadhom believes that Iran was also allegedly
providing tactical and financial support to al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was
too much to bear for Mollah Nadhom, who realized that the fate of
his country was being played at the expense of his own people, Sunni
and Shiites alike. On his return from this 2006 trip, the final blow to his
alliance with al-Qaeda came when he realized that “foreign fighters were
overwhelmingly in charge of every detail of daily operations, while Iraqi
members were marginalized.” On a more intellectual level, and with
hindsight, Mollah Nadhom came to realize that the Sunni community of
Iraq had made a tactical mistake. It had, on one hand, given its allegiance
to a group led by foreigners whose interests were not necessarily those of
the Iraqi people, and, on the other hand, it had chosen a violent path that
did not bring it the legitimacy and leverage that it expected, this mostly
due to al-Qaeda’s dishonesty and many mistakes over time. He explains:
“the battle through the poll centers is more effective than the battles to
which we persuaded our people to join.” After all, he continues: “the
politicians plan the wars while the brave men fight, and the cowards
cultivate the outcome.” He concludes: “the most important battle which
the Sunnis have lost was the battle that took place in polling stations in
January 2005.” For Mollah Nadhom, the Sahwa initiative represents an
opportunity for redemption for the Sunni community of Iraq in terms of
obtaining recognition as well as political equality. He advocates for all
the Sahwa men to be absorbed by the Iraqi security forces, both army and
police, and for its leadership to become key political players in the future
of Iraq. His question is, “Are the security institutions able to provide
jobs for about [one hundred thousand] recruits, most of them without
any acute professional training? Then there is another problem: “What
is the real goal of the government? It is obvious that the government is
against such a project simply because the Iranians are against it.” After
the 2005 self-imposed marginalization of the Iraqi Sunni community,
now is the time for the Sunni community to become an integral part
of the Iraqi political system. Is the United States ready to take on this
challenge with the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki?
Are Mollah Nadhom’s concerns shared by others? It seems to be the
case. The Irish journalist Patrick Cockburn, in an account of his inter-
view of Abu Marouf, commander of thirteen thousand warriors who
once were fighting Coalition troops, relates that if his troops do not
eventually join government security forces, they will turn against the
Coalition again, this within three months.16 Unfortunately, at present,
this potential move is highly contested by the Iraqi government, whose
Shiite and Kurd dominance would be jeopardized by any such initiative.
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Moving beyond Humiliation 161

Once again, this case illustrates the fact that what is of interest to one
segment of the Iraqi population, as well as to the Coalition, does not nec-
essarily represent the interests of the ruling government, democratically
elected undoubtedly, but catering only to its own people. Should the
Coalition press for an inclusion of these former insurgent groups into
Iraqi security forces, the subsequent balance of power emanating from
this initiative might ensure a short-term sustainable peace for Iraq as
a whole, at least until the United States withdraws. What will happen
afterward is anybody’s guess.
However, by allowing Sahwa men to become part of Iraqi government
institutions, the U.S. would not only address the country’s immediate se-
curity issues but also restore an ethno-religious balance within the gov-
ernment, a balance that would invariably and considerably reduce the
influence that the Iranian government enjoys in its relations with the
Iraqi government at present. In light of a potential Israeli bombardment
of Iran, this would at least reduce the risks of a regional escalation were
this to happen.17 One must hope, of course, that such a potentially dis-
astrous attack will not take place, as it would invariably destabilize the
entire Middle East region.

ABANDON THE PRACTICE OF QUICK FIXES

Of importance in relation to the Sunni Awakening scheme is that its
short-term success was built on two pillars that may well disappear in
the long term.
A first pillar was the financial support given to former insurgents to
join the Coalition ranks against al-Qaeda. On top of the $300 monthly
salary given to Sahwa combatants, Mollah Nadhom admitted to having
handed over more than $190,000 to recruiters alone. This Doloyia-
based scenario was replicated in all major cities of the eight provinces
where Sahwa is active: an amount of money much greater than the $300
monthly salaries reported in the U.S. media. In the long run, this type
of lavish spending is not sustainable for a country whose taxpayers are
increasingly uncomfortable about such large sums being handed out to
a foreign country.18
The second pillar, a precondition that could be reversed at any mo-
ment, was al-Qaeda’s loss of support among Sunni populations. Because
the business of hearts and minds is quite a volatile one, one or two mis-
takes made by U.S. troops on the ground could be fatal to this initiative.
While they used to happen on a daily basis, these mistakes are now few
and far between, though still present. Omar B., mentioned in Chapter 3
in connection to his detention in Camp Fallujah in January 2004, died
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162 Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq

in late 2007 as a result of one of these mistakes. As a Sahwa foot soldier,

he was manning a checkpoint at the entrance of the town of Abu Ghraib
for his group, the 1920 Brigades. In December 2007, a U.S. helicopter
patrol did not recognize this checkpoint as being “friendly” but mistak-
enly took it for an al-Qaeda checkpoint. As a result, the gunship opened
fire and killed Omar B. and all his other colleagues. While this was de-
plored as a regrettable mistake by both the 1920 Brigades and the U.S.
Army, a bigger event of the same kind could become the proverbial straw
on the camel’s back and lose the United States’ precious local support,
perhaps to the benefit of al-Qaeda.
The story of Mollah Nadhom in relation to the loss of popular support
for al-Qaeda is the crucial missing link when one refers to the al-Sahwa
success in post-Saddam Iraq. Al-Sahwa did not win over al-Qaeda; al-
Qaeda shot itself in the foot in relation to its gradual loss of support
among the Iraqi population. Sahwa did not win Sunni hearts and minds;
al-Qaeda lost them and left a void that Sahwa filled. Seen through the lens
of Mollah Nadhom’s testimony, the Sahwa initiative does not represent
the success of U.S. forces; it represents only the failure of al-Qaeda in
Iraq. It is a short-term U.S. victory by default; this time with the potential
to alienate the Shiite population of Iraq.
The next tour de force for the U.S.-led Coalition in Iraq will therefore
be to convince the Shiite-dominated government to integrate all Sunni
Sahwa militiamen into Iraqi security forces.
Similarly, as seen in Chapter 5, the voter turnout for the January 2005
elections does not represent the triumph of democracy in New Iraq; it
simply illustrates the strong popular following of Grand Ayatollah Ali
Sistani. While the international media focuses on only one side of the
coin, a holistic view of the Iraqi situation affords a different perspective of
what constitutes Coalition success or failure in post-Saddam Iraq. Above
all, such an outlook demonstrates that humiliation and alienation do not
pay off in the long term.
From favoring the Shiite majority at the expense of the Sunni minority
to favoring the Sunni minority to capitalize on al-Qaeda’s mistakes to
prepare for withdrawal, the human impact of U.S. policy shifts in the
region will make itself known for years to come.
One big question remains. In light of the 1991 fiasco that led to the
death of thousands of Iraqi civilians, as well as the eventual surrendering
of Iraqi sovereignty to the strong influence of its eastern neighbor in the
2005 elections, isn’t U.S. interference in Iraqi affairs always doomed to
backfire? Although it is difficult to ascertain how much understanding
exists on part of the U.S. administration in relation to the actual dy-
namics that led to the success of the Sahwa initiative, one can safely
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Moving beyond Humiliation 163

conclude that the favoring of one side of a population against the other
is not a healthy, sustainable, or long-term solution to a given political
problem. In hindsight, and over the past five years, it seems that the
U.S. administration has had to come to terms with and overrule many
of its inaccurate decisions. It has done so in relation to its disastrous de-
Baathification policy, in relation to the alienation of local populations in
the Sunni populations of Iraq, and so on. However, it seems to have of-
ten acted rather late, and through the creation of potentially problematic
situations in the long term. The 2005 elections and the Sahwa initiative
are examples of two long-term solutions that could, and have, become
very awkward in the long term. Therefore, one first step toward a more
effective role for the United States in Iraq will be realizing that one can-
not play God or be a sorcerer’s apprentice with a people. One cannot
divide, conquer, and leave. This type of policy will only heighten the risk
of having people annihilate one another in the short or long term.
The Sahwa initiative is not necessarily doomed, as it is now an obvi-
ous success. The next challenge for the United States will be to trans-
form this short-term success into a long-term one. How could it achieve
this? Through understanding the real motivations that led people to
join Sahwa initiative: money, popular contempt for al-Qaeda, and the
prospect of an integrated future for all Iraqis as part of one just, equi-
table, and sovereign government.

REMEMBER THAT ON THEIR SIDE, A MAN CAN BE BOTH

A SOLDIER AND AN INDIVIDUAL
A recurring theme in this book has been how the perceived humilia-
tion of a self-perceived occupied people has led them to take up arms to
defend themselves. Given the plethora of Hollywood movies and popu-
lar novels relating to this theme, it would seem that the testimonies of
Iraqi people collected in this book should fall into the same category.
The basic right of a people to sovereignty, integrity, and dignity ought to
be a universal human right. The problem lies, of course, in the percep-
tion aspect of an occupation. While some people in post-Saddam Iraq
have seen themselves as having been liberated, others have interiorized
a feeling of being occupied and oppressed.
Can the U.S.-led Coalition move beyond the perception of occupation
felt by a large part of the population of Iraq? In doing so, can it transcend
the unnecessary truism that claims that “one man’s terrorist is another
man’s freedom fighter?”
The 1943 U.S. Army quote placed at the beginning of this chapter
seems to provide an answer to this question. It states, “A man can be
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164 Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq

both a soldier and an individual” but only “on our side.” This is the fun-
damental mistake that the U.S.-led Coalition has made in making itself
both judge and jury of the Sunni population of Iraq when it invaded the
country in 2003. On one hand, it empathized with the hitherto oppressed
Shiite and Kurdish populations of Iraq to the point of sympathizing with
them, their political interests, and their desire to take revenge on their
Sunni brothers; on the other hand, it vilified the Sunni community, as if
humanity could be found only in the chosen few.
As the Sahwa initiative shows, former terrorists have become soldiers
and individuals. Because the U.S. government claims it does not negoti-
ate with terrorists, why is it now allied to the 1920 Brigades, the Islamic
Army in Iraq, and former al-Qaeda operatives such as Mollah Nadhom?
Sahwa is the living proof that the U.S. government does negotiate with
terrorists. Moreover, it illustrates the idea that people who are labeled
terrorists can later be understood as soldiers and individuals. This dis-
tinction is crucial, as it eliminates all notion of terrorism as an evil and
irreconcilable ideology.
Could this have been possible all along? If yes, how many Coali-
tion soldiers’ lives, limbs, and spines could have been saved? Could the
United States have understood the plight of the Sunni community of
Iraq before some of them felt no option but to turn to al-Qaeda? Could
Mollah Nadhom have been prevented from joining al-Qaeda? Is there a
distinction to be made between terrorism and insurgency, and can this
distinction bring clues as to a more effective role for the United States in
post-Saddam Iraq? Could an acknowledgement of this distinction turn
the short-term aspect of the Sahwa initiative into a long-term success?

DO NOT CONFUSE PROPAGANDA WITH REALITY

Is the labeling of terrorism as a weapon instead of an ideology or
the way of life of people who “hate our freedom” only the radical be-
lief of a few Eurocentric opinionated scholars?19 No, it is also common
knowledge for parts of the U.S. government. In the same way that the
Iraqi honor system was well known to the U.S. Army as early as 1943,
and presumably earlier than that, the distinction between terrorism as
an ideology and the use of terrorism as an insurgency weapon has also
been mainstreamed in U.S. Army training since at least the 1960s. It
is Commanding General David H. Petraeus, a Princeton Ph.D. gradu-
ate in international relations, who managed to revive the integrality of
French veterans Roger Trinquier and David Galula’s theories on coun-
terinsurgency warfare.20 Trinquier and Galula, among others, developed
and refined a counterinsurgency theory euphemistically called “modern
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Moving beyond Humiliation 165

warfare,” based on their experience in Algeria and Indochina, the name

for Vietnam under French rule.21 These precepts were used by the U.S.
Army as early as the 1960s and all throughout the glory years of the
School of the Americas.22
Modern warfare is defined as “an interlocking system of actions—
political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow-
ing of the established authority in a country and its replacement by
another regime.”23 This definition of an insurgency, the basis onto which
the U.S. Army has worked since the 1960s, has unambiguous ramifica-
tions in relation to terrorism. It clearly states that terrorism is a weapon
of “clandestine organization devoted to manipulating the population”
toward “draw[ing it] to the side of terrorists, who alone are able to
protect [it].”24 Thus, the insinuation that terrorism is the evil deed of a
few psychopaths who hate freedom, a few renegades using these tactics
as a desperate means to make them heard, is not a vision that is shared
by at least part of the U.S. government. In this light, vilifying terrorism
as an irrational ideology can be viewed as nothing more than a state
propaganda tool. In the same way that the insurgent group is arguing to
be protecting the population from state repression, the state is also ar-
guing to be the guarantor of freedom, democracy, and security. No one
should expect any less of a state. However, no one, especially the media,
should take this propaganda at face value either. More important, the
state ought to also make sure that it does not internalize this propaganda
to its own understanding of a given situation. It should ensure that it
does not make it factual, and risk, according to basic principles of hyper-
reality, making it real to a point that it can never deviate from it without
losing face, in which case soldiers’ and civilians’ lives are needlessly lost.
True, moral righteousness and legitimacy is a role of the state, as a con-
tender of “new warfare”—no more, no less. In the play that opposes the
state to the insurgent, each contender will seek for the public to rally to its
cause through the news media, using different labels as communication
tools.25 Thus, the state—or Coalition, in Iraq—becomes the oppressor
while the insurgent becomes the terrorist. There is nothing radical about
acknowledging this plot, as this is in fact what U.S. counterinsurgency
practice has been based on since the 1960s. However, when the state
confuses its own public propaganda with reality, then it becomes its
aggressor, which in turn is placed in a strong position to win the contest.

DO NOT BECOME YOUR AGGRESSOR

While the Bush administration has assumed the public role of guaran-
tor of freedom and values since the inception of its war on terror, one
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166 Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq

very important lesson of new warfare seems to have been overlooked by

this administration, hence its past failure in Iraq. In his analysis of terror-
ism applied to counterinsurgency, Trinquier established a cardinal rule:
as soldiers are not held accountable for murder when they kill in war,
it is immoral to treat terrorists as criminals and to hold them criminally
liable for their acts. Because terrorism is a weapon, insurgents labeled
by the state as terrorists ought to be treated as soldiers, he explains. The
terrorist “fights within the framework of his own organization, without
a personal interest, for a cause he considers noble and for a respectable
ideal, the same as the soldiers in the armies confronting him,” in other
words, the same as any U.S. soldier.26
In other words, the state ought to stay fully aware of the difference
between its own propaganda and reality in terms of terrorism and in-
surgency. While the state can very well use terrorism terminology as
a propaganda tool of psychological counterinsurgency, it should never
forget reality: that on the other side of the fence, it is facing soldiers who
deserve to be treated as such. With its blatant disregard of the Geneva
Conventions and its treatment of insurgents both in Iraq and elsewhere as
“enemy combatants” or basic enemies, the Bush administration confused
its public role in the Iraq new warfare theater with reality: it has become
the oppressor that the insurgents have been denouncing. It therefore has
lost peace in Iraq.
While public humiliation can be expected in terms of the state’s label-
ing insurgents as terrorists, the colonial humiliation of suspected insur-
gents and populations in post-Saddam Iraq is the main reason the Bush
administration squandered its victory there. While the Bush administra-
tion has “gone native” in its own confusion between myth (propaganda)
and reality, it has taken with it thousands of soldiers who took this
terrorism myth at face value.
Jim O., the senior Special Forces officer referred to in Chapter 2, was
a complete stranger to Trinquier’s precepts in our conversations. Not
once did he come to realize that the people he had faced in Afghanistan
and Iraq were insurgents rather than bloodthirsty evil terrorists. This is
a frightening realization. The fact that many senior Bush administration
officials, and even President Bush himself, failed to make this distinction
is crucial in explaining the initial failure of the United States in post-
Saddam Iraq.
For one, it illustrates the main reason that Mollah Nadhom originally
switched from a nationalist insurgency group to al-Qaeda as soon as he
was released from the Abu Ghraib prison. Had he not been arrested,
treated inhumanely, and tortured, would he have defected to al-Qaeda?
Had he been subjected to due process in his interrogations, treated
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Moving beyond Humiliation 167

humanely, listened to, and apologized to for the brutal death of his
uncle, would he have turned to the dark side?
In its blatant denial of the basic human rights principles of the Geneva
Conventions, the Bush administration has turned U.S. service members
into henchmen at the expense of their personal morals, dignity, and
souls.27 The distinction between terrorism and insurgency does not ex-
onerate insurgents from the rule of law of the state or international law
and covenants; it simply disarms the self-fulfilling prophecy that turns
authority into what its aggressor claims it is. By treating an insurgent
as a criminal, trying him or her for the murder, destruction of property,
or abduction that he or she carried out, the state keeps its end of the
social contract that allowed it to be the bearer of authority in the first
place. In treating an insurgent as a terrorist undeserving of basic human
rights, the state debases itself to the level of those it claims to combat. In
a context of occupation, perhaps the state does not have the capacity to
ensure law and order, but the occupying power should.
As the U.S. and al-Qaeda experience in post-Saddam Iraq shows,
hearts and minds are at the heart of terrorism. While the constant referral
to terrorism becomes a media weapon to elicit popular support toward
a cause on part of an insurgency, it can also be used by the state or
Coalition to retain unconditional support. By referring to all insurgent
activity in post-Saddam Iraq as terrorism, through the humiliation of na-
tionalist political aspirations, the Bush administration ensured that U.S.
soldiers and much of the population of the United States at the beginning
of the Iraq War and beyond supported the war effort unconditionally.
In doing so, however, it lost the support of the Sunni population of Iraq.
In effect, the United States became its own worst enemy in terrorizing
the local Iraqi populations, holding their sons and daughters in the Abu
Ghraib detention facility, and sexually and physically humiliating them.
It organized rendition flights into destinations where torture was widely
practiced; it used water boarding in Guantánamo.
Throughout this time, the U.S. news media did not dare speak out
for the rights of both Iraqi citizens and human rights in general. It was
only in the middle of 2005 that a shift occurred in U.S. media language
in relation to the Iraqi insurgency, referring to nationalist groups as
insurgent groups, while keeping its terrorist terminology when referring
to al-Qaeda.28 In not distancing itself from the terrorism rhetoric, the
U.S. mainstream news media indirectly participated in the humiliation of
the Iraqi nationalist insurgency and all the individuals who dared refer
to it as such.29
A more effective role for the United States in post-Saddam Iraq
will therefore come from the reestablishment of a healthy separation
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168 Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq

between propaganda, politics, and warfare. More important, it will need

to abide by the rules that it itself invoked in its invasion of the coun-
try, that is, the promotion of democracy and the upholding of basic
human rights for all. Humiliation awareness can help in this regard at
grassroots levels. By respecting the people as individuals who deserve
due process at all times and under all circumstances, U.S.-led Coalition
soldiers can prevent heart and minds from being lost to other groups.
While al-Qaeda is now suffering from a distinct disadvantage in relation
to the hearts and minds of Sunni Iraqis, Coalition soldiers must be made
to realize that they are only evolving in a relatively calm environment
because al-Qaeda lost people’s support—in the same way the Coalition
too had lost support in the early stages of the invasion. Not reverting
to the same pattern of victimization will be one of the most difficult
challenges that the Coalition will face in the next few months and pos-
sibly years. Are U.S. soldiers and their government ready to face this
challenge?

DO NOT ABANDON IRAQ

It is very difficult, from a peace studies perspective, to acknowledge
that an effective future for the United States in Iraq will be to actu-
ally maintain its presence in the country until the Iraqi government is
running to the basic satisfaction of all Iraqis. This book has demon-
strated that in the early years of the occupation of Iraq, the Bush ad-
ministration created many of the problems now seen in the country.
Its callousness, hubris, and misinformed policies are undeniably the pri-
mary cause of Iraq’s current insecurity, economic hardship, and political
instability.
Many observers are now advocating for a prompt withdrawal. After
all, if the United States was part of the problem, then it seems natural
that its immediate withdrawal would enable Iraq to rebuild itself. Such
thinking, however, highlights the root of the issue, that is, the lack of a
holistic understanding of the Iraq conflict, the swift jump to conclusions
without even measuring potential adverse consequences in the long term,
the need to please a public opinion at all costs.
As much as an extreme makeover of Iraq was foolish and unrealistic,
despite any good intentions that might have motivated it, leaving it to
face its current situation on its own is just as unviable and could well be
criminal, once again. Indeed, in light of the ethno-religious tensions ex-
isting in the country, the dormant presence of al-Qaeda, and Iran’s heavy
influence on the Iraqi government, a prompt United States withdrawal
might trigger an instantaneous civil war.
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Moving beyond Humiliation 169

What type of presence could the United States sustain in Iraq in the
long term? Because the Iraq conflict has already cost U.S. taxpayers
an estimated $3 trillion, are these taxpayers ready to sustain a long-
term occupation of Iraq?30 This is highly unlikely, given the present
unpopularity of the Iraq War among U.S. citizens. Is there a way out of
this dilemma?
Apart from the need for humiliation awareness, a crucial finding of
this book is the realization that time and again, the Bush administration
played its own taxpayers’ perceptions against the reality of the Iraqi sit-
uation on the ground. To put it simply, while the January 2005 elections
were organized to show the U.S. population that their administration had
brought democracy to Iraq, hence demonstrating the validity of the inva-
sion, this was done at the expense of the Sunni population, because they
did not consider the process legitimate. In a similar fashion, the rushing
of the constitution-drafting process created havoc in the Iraqi political
sphere.
In this light, could a U.S. Iraq policy centered on the needs of the
Iraqi people as a whole be of benefit to them in the long run? To this
question, Mollah Nadhom replies: “I will never put my money on the
U.S. horse, because they consider their interests and their interests only.”
Can Mollah Nadhom be proved wrong? Will the United States do what
is best for Iraq as a nation? Only time will tell.
While it is understandable that the Iraq issue has invited itself to the
2008 U.S. presidential race, the future of Iraq should not be played
on a demagogic stint. The U.S. owes Iraq much more than another
quick fix to honor a populist campaign promise. Should the United
States wash its hands of the Iraq problem without helping to create a
sustainable solution, then the level of confidence in the United States that
is left in Middle East region, already very meager and in places almost
nonexistent, will vanish for years to come. As a consequence, relatively
moderate political and clerical figures such as Mollah Nadhom, who
after all disavowed himself from al-Qaeda, will be left exposed to the
benefit of extremists whose appeal will derive from the disenchanted.
While al-Qaeda in Iraq has been driven out of major cities, it is far from
being eradicated and could well return in force should the U.S. continue
to betray, disappoint, and alienate one segment of the Iraqi people after
the other. So far, the U.S. has alienated the Sunnis and part of the Shiite
population. Who is next? More important, will Iran take advantage of
this?
What do Iraqis think of this? According to Mollah Nadhom, “The
U.S. existence in Iraq depends on many factors: the first is a successful
reconstruction effort and the abolition of double standards in carrying
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170 Voices from Post-Saddam Iraq

it out; a second one is the real and strict U.S. policy against Iranian
intervention in Iraq, not only a media-conveyed one; the third is to force
the Iraqi government to attain an ethnic and sectarian balance in the
government. It is unacceptable that the number one superpower on the
planet cannot implement the necessary rule to stop the financial and
governmental deterioration of a country that is now one of the worst to
live in worldwide.”

REFLECTING ON A MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE FOR

A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
In light of the considerations developed in this chapter, a more effective
role for the United States in Iraq can be found in employing a principled
and systemic approach to all aspects relating to its Iraq policy, whether it
be on the ground while running its day-to-day operations, in its relations
with the Iraqi government, while making policy decisions back home
across the Atlantic, and so on. Of importance here is the realization
that if certain principles and lessons learned are to be mainstreamed in
the U.S. policy in Iraq for the forthcoming years, then this policy will
have a better chance to succeed. These principles are not new. One can
even say that they represent the idea that most U.S. citizens have of their
own nation: ideals of a nation striving for universal freedom, democracy,
and economic prosperity; an overall ideal of justice, equality, and strong
moral values.
While most U.S. citizens are convinced that their nation represents
these ideals, many in the rest of the world beg to differ, and contend that
since the inception of its war on terror, the United States has lost most
of these values, and worse, that it is applying double standards in its
upholding of those values.31 It is now up to the post-Bush president and
his administration to restore these great American values and principles.
In Iraq, the new administration must do so using humiliation awareness
in its day-to-day activities as well as policy planning. It must also avoid
playing part of the Iraqi population against the other, thus planting the
seeds for future political problems.
Above all, and in its worldwide war on terror, it must reestablish basic
human rights and the Geneva Conventions at the center of its policies.
Despite national political interests, it must learn to place the needs of Iraq
above those of Washington, DC–based squabbles. Because it came into
Iraq, it must finish the job it started. Above all, it must never allow itself
to be swept away by its own propaganda. It is only when guided by these
very basic, although crucial principles, that the president of the United
States and his administration will succeed in post-Saddam Iraq, as well
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Moving beyond Humiliation 171

as the region as a whole. As a dignified, equitable and just commander in

chief, the president of the United States must act according to the ideals
that his country represents.
Incredible damage has been done to the Iraqi people, and the United
States owes it to them to put things right. After all, as Mollah Nadhom
stressed in his account of the June 2003 raid of Doloyia, all the local
population wanted was a “We are sorry.” In the U.S. Army’s own words:
“It may not be that simple. But then again it could.”32
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