education

sciences
Article
Teacher Recruitment and Retention: A Critical
Review of International Evidence of Most
Promising Interventions
Beng Huat See 1, * , Rebecca Morris 2 , Stephen Gorard 1 , Dimitra Kokotsaki 1 and Sophia Abdi 3
1 School of Education, Durham University, Durham DH1 1TA, UK; s.a.c.gorard@durham.ac.uk (S.G.);
Dimitra.kokotsaki@durham.ac.uk (D.K.)
2 Department for Education Studies, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK;
rebecca.e.morris@warwick.ac.uk
3 School of Education, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; sophia46@hotmail.com
* Correspondence: b.h.see@durham.ac.uk




Received: 13 August 2020; Accepted: 17 September 2020; Published: 23 September 2020


Abstract: Background: A raft of initiatives and reforms have been introduced in many countries
to attract and recruit school teachers, many of which do not have a clear evidence base, so their
effectiveness remains unclear. Prior research has been largely correlational in design. This paper
describes a rigorous and comprehensive review of international evidence, synthesising the findings
of some of the strongest empirical work so far. Methods: The review synthesises a total of 120 pieces
of research from 13 electronic databases, Google/Google scholar and other sources. Each study is
weighted by strength of evidence. Results: The strongest evidence suggests that targeted money
can encourage people into teaching but does not necessarily keep them in the teaching profession.
The money needs to be large enough to compensate for the disadvantages of working in certain schools
and areas, and competitive enough to offset the opportunity costs of not being in more lucrative
occupations, and its effect is only short-term. Conclusions: Continuing professional development
(CPD) and early career support could be promising approaches for retaining teachers in the profession,
but the evidence for them is weak. There is no evidence that any other approaches work, largely
because of the lack of robust studies.

Keywords: teacher recruitment; teacher retention; systematic review; causal evidence; interventions

1. Introduction
This paper provides a comprehensive review of international evidence synthesising the findings
of some of the strongest empirical work on improving the recruitment and retention of school teachers.
Attracting and retaining qualified teachers is a persistent problem that has plagued many countries
for decades. The trends in recruitment to initial teacher training are often associated with the national
labour market condition and the relative attractiveness of other occupations. Shortages are more
severe in some subjects especially for maths and physics where there is a high demand for graduates
in these fields. Compounding this is the growing pupil population. In England, teacher demand has
consistently outstripped supply [1]. Reportedly, more people are leaving teaching than ever before.
Only 60% of teachers remained in state schools after five years and for ‘high-priority’ subjects like
physics and maths, this five-year retention dropped to just 50% [2].
An adequate supply of qualified teachers is important for the provision of an effective education
system. A shortage of teachers can have a detrimental effect on the life chances of children [3–7].
Many countries in Europe have reported a widespread shortage of teachers [8]. Teacher supply
continues to be a challenge in Australia and New Zealand and, in England and the US, the teacher

Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262; doi:10.3390/educsci10100262 www.mdpi.com/journal/education

Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 2 of 45

shortage is predicted to get worse as the pupil population rises. Across each of these contexts,
the extent of the shortages can vary depending on geographical region, subject area, age of student
and school types.
There are a number of factors which may influence a shortage of people being recruited into
the teaching profession. These predominantly relate to people recognising and opting for what
they perceive to be more favourable alternative career options. From an individual’s perspective,
these decisions may be influenced by the financial rewards available (e.g., salary, prospect of bonuses)
or by their understanding of what the role entails (e.g., required tasks, working conditions, level of
autonomy). Economic and employment cycles can have an impact on the number of people choosing
teaching as a career, with more people seeing it as an attractive option during times of economic
uncertainty [9–13]. It is also the case that government policies could influence teacher recruitment too,
e.g., through funding and allocation of training places, the development of training routes, or marketing
strategies [14].
The shortage of teachers is reportedly also partly the result of people leaving the profession
prematurely. Teaching has often been characterised as an occupation with a high level of turnover
especially among new teachers [15–17]. While all occupations experience some degree of turnover and
career change, turnover in teaching is considered high particularly in the first few years compared to
many other professions, such as lawyers, engineers, architects and professors [18,19]. In the US, it has
been reported that around 40 to 50 percent of new teachers leave within the first five years of entry into
teaching [20]. In England, the attrition rates are similar, particularly in maths, science and languages
subjects [21]. Among the secondary teachers who qualified in 2010–2012 around 66% stayed on in
state-funded schools in the fifth year [2] (Table 8). Government data show that the odds of leaving are
higher for newly qualified teachers (NQTs) and those with stronger academic backgrounds [22].
In countries experiencing teacher shortages, numerous policy initiatives have been introduced
in an attempt to address recruitment and retention issues and the factors which contribute to them.
Many strategies involve financial incentives such as increased pay for teachers (e.g., for those teaching
certain subjects or in particular areas) as well as bursaries or scholarships designed to attract more
people into the profession, or to keep them there once they have qualified. In England, for example,
there is a long history of providing tax-free bursaries and maintenance grants/loans for those entering
training, and additional ‘early career’ payments for those continuing in the role after completing their
NQT year. The amount available is, in theory, associated with the level of shortage. Similar approaches
can be found in other countries experiencing teacher shortages. In the US, there have also been more
widespread interest in variable salaries for those working in certain geographical areas, or in schools
with higher proportions of disadvantaged pupils, as well as some initiatives which seek to reward
teachers financially based upon their performance [23–25].
In more recent years, some policymakers have moved beyond financial incentives for retaining
teachers. A growing awareness of the often challenging working conditions associated with
teaching [26,27] has led to the development of strategies to try and improve these, and in turn make
teaching a more attractive profession. These include induction programmes, access to professional
development, enhancing leadership skills in schools, flexible working. In England, the Early Career
Framework (ECF) [28], introduced in 2020, is part of the wider Teacher Recruitment and Retention
Strategies [29] to support new teachers during the induction years via high-quality mentoring and
professional development, and a reduced teaching timetable.
An increasingly important issue is teachers’ workload. Correlational studies indicate that teachers’
perceptions of workload are strong predictors of their decision to leave teaching [30–32]. In England,
a report published by the DfE [27], based on interviews with 101 former teachers, suggested workload
as the most important factor influencing teachers’ decision to leave the profession. A recent survey
of teachers and those who have left the profession found that ‘workload’ and ‘improving work-life’
balance were the most cited reasons for exiting teaching [33]. An earlier report based on a survey of
over 1000 teachers also identified workload, policy changes and accountability pressure among the top
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 3 of 45

reasons for teacher attrition [34]. The DfE launched the Workload Strategy in 2014 to understand and
address ‘unnecessary’ tasks that teachers undertake in the course of their duty. There is no evidence
available on the extent to which schools have engaged with the recommendations put forward from
this consultation, but the Teacher Workload Survey carried out in 2019 showed a reduction in teachers’
reported working hours since 2016. However, the majority of teachers still reported workload as a
serious problem.

2. Background

2.1. Common Approaches Used to Improve Teacher Recruitment and Retention

2.1.1. Financial Incentives (Including Scholarships, Bursaries, Higher Wages)

Financial incentives are commonly used to try and improve recruitment and retention. These are
premised on the assumption that if sufficiently well compensated, people can be encouraged to go
into teaching or be persuaded to stay on in the profession. Identifying what a well-designed pay
incentive should be is difficult because of the numerous challenges and parameters that need to be
considered [35]. Some commentators have suggested that effective incentive plans must offer relatively
large awards to induce behavioural changes [36,37]. A number of American studies have pointed to
the level of financial incentives needed in different contexts. Goodnough and Kelly [38] suggested that
teacher salaries in New York be increased by up to 25% in the lowest-performing schools as the 15%
increase that was offered in 39 of those schools appeared to have little impact in terms of attracting
qualified teachers. Boyd et al. [39] and Hanushek et al. [40] estimated that considerable pay rises
(up to 50%) may be needed to induce more teachers to work in schools with high proportions of
ethnic minority or socioeconomically disadvantaged students. However, if working conditions and
the relative attractiveness of the schools can be improved, then the size of the pay increase may need
not be as large.
Others have argued that a single pay scale does not provide incentives for teachers with skills that
are in high demand in non-teaching fields. Successive governments in England have offered more
to trainees in certain subjects. However, once qualified, teachers then tend to enter the profession at
a similar pay level irrespective of subject area. Recent reports have recommended that teachers in
shortage subjects be paid a ‘salary supplement’ to encourage their retention, particularly in the early
years of their careers [41,42]. Increased flexibility of pay was also introduced in England in 2013–2014
meaning that schools no longer had to use the seniority-based national pay scale but instead could
determine annual pay awards by ‘performance’. Studies have suggested limited impact on teacher
mobility or retention in the same schools thus far [43–45]. There is very little evidence to indicate
whether performance-related pay works either in improving teachers’ performance or retaining them
within the profession [46].

2.1.2. Alternative Routes into Teaching

Another approach often used to address the critical shortage of teachers is alternative certification
or alternative pathways into teaching. These offer options different to the ‘standard’ or ‘traditional’
routes within a particular region or country and often provide ways into the profession for those
wishing to train ‘on the job’ or who are working in other careers or roles (e.g., Troops to Teachers in
England, or routes permitting teaching assistants to qualify as teachers). Traditional teacher-preparation
programmes tend to emphasise pre-service training on the assumption that the learning and practical
experiences that trainees engage with will give them the requisite skills and knowledge needed for
success in the classroom. Alternative programmes may try to reduce barriers to entry and/or aim to
enable teachers to enter the classroom more quickly (e.g., Teach First, School Centred Initial Teacher
Training programme in the UK; Teach for America, the Teacher Residency Programs and Peace Corps
Program in the US).
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 4 of 45

Many studies have been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of different teacher preparation
routes, but most focus on outcomes relating to teacher performance with mixed results [47,48]. Typically,
these studies assess the relationship between certain attributes and qualifications of teachers and
teacher performance (usually measured using students’ performance as a proxy). There has been less
research on the effects of teacher preparation for teacher recruitment or retention.

2.1.3. Induction Programmes and Mentoring

In recent years, there has been growing policy interest in induction and mentoring strategies.
These are designed to provide additional support and development for teachers, usually in the early
years of their career, with a view to retaining them within the profession [49,50]. While there is a large
body of research on mentoring/induction programmes that has purportedly examined the “impact” of
induction and mentoring on teacher retention, most are limited to single-group causal comparative
analysis, correlating teachers’ participation in these programmes with their self-reported intention
to stay in teaching [51]. A systematic review on the role of mentors on retention of newly qualified
teachers could not find conclusive evidence of a positive impact [52]. Only three studies within
the review reported positive effects, but all were correlational studies (not based on experimental
designs). The report called for closer scrutiny of the relationship between induction and retention and
highlighted the need for more robust and reliable research in this area. Moreover, given the often
complex or multi-faceted nature of induction/mentoring programmes, it can sometimes be difficult to
understand which of the mechanisms or ‘ingredients’ within them are likely to drive any impact on
retention. Further high-quality research focusing on these areas is particularly needed at present in
order to inform the development and implementation of new policies on induction and mentoring
(see e.g., the Early Career Framework in England [28]

2.1.4. Professional Development

Investing in high-quality professional development is widely believed to be an effective way of
improving both teachers’ and, in turn, students’ performance [53]. More recently, however, professional
development is also being considered as a method for improving teachers’ satisfaction with their
job and potentially reducing their workload. This, it is hoped, may lead to increased retention [54].
There are numerous professional development opportunities available to schools and teachers at
present. However, there is considerable variation in the aims and quality of such programmes and
teachers’ access and engagement with them. Further, there is very little robust evidence which
points towards an impact on retention [55,56]. A study by Allen and Sims [57] in England indicated
that high-quality subject-specific professional development may be beneficial for retaining teachers.
The study examined teachers’ engagement with the National STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering
and Mathematics) Learning Network development scheme, finding that while participants were no
more likely to stay at their current school, they were more likely to stay in the profession for the
first and second year after taking the courses. Recent analyses by Worth and van den Brande [58]
found an association between teachers’ reported autonomy over their professional development and
their intention to stay in teaching. While not established as a causal relationship, this finding does
suggest that some experimental work on this issue would be helpful for understanding whether
increasing teachers’ autonomy in relation to professional development might be a potential strategy
for improving retention.

2.1.5. Leadership Support

Some studies have highlighted the importance of school environment factors for teacher retention,
with school leadership often being viewed as influential in determining the ethos and working
conditions within a school. A series of observational studies point to teachers’ perceptions of
administrative support and leadership as being strong predictors of teachers’ intention to leave [59–61].
Johnson, Kraft and Papay [62] argue that while working conditions generally appear to be important to
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 5 of 45

teachers and their future career plans, it is the social conditions which form part of these—such as the
principal’s leadership, school culture and relationships with colleagues—which are most influential.
Analysis in England, based upon the international TALIS dataset, also highlights the importance of
good leadership. Sims [63] found that better school leadership is associated with higher job satisfaction
for teachers and a reduction in the odds that they would want to leave their school.

2.1.6. Additional Incentives

In addition to the financial incentives noted above and school working conditions, research has
looked at other incentives to encourage teacher recruitment and/or retention, including offering below
market rental rates, living allowances (e.g., London living allowances) and discounted housing in
certain areas. Examples from Australia and America include housing subsidies or offering rental
accommodation at below-market rate for teachers willing to work in rural areas [64]. Unfortunately,
the evidence on these kinds of incentives is limited and is often based on small-scale descriptive work
or tangential research about wider compensation. Unlike for more direct financial incentives and wage
compensation, there have been no rigorous evaluations of housing incentives to determine if they
work in improving recruitment and retention especially in hard-to-staff areas, as Anne Podolsky at the
Learning Policy Institute acknowledged [64].

2.2. Previous Reviews of the Literature

To the best of our knowledge, there have been no large-scale comprehensive reviews on teacher
recruitment and retention policies, with quality appraisal of individual studies included as a key feature.
Most have been narrative reviews of available literature [65,66] or focused on particular issues or
groups of teachers/schools. Przygocki [67], for example, looked specifically at teacher supply issues in
Catholic schools, while Fore et al. [68] and Billingsley [69] were concerned with the shortage of special
education teachers. Previous reviews have also tended not to be systematic, instead summarising a
collection of studies seeking the consensus view [70,71] or providing a discussion of a small number of
key articles [72–74]. Borman and Dowling’s [75] comprehensive review focused on the factors that
moderate attrition outcomes rather than examining policy initiatives or interventions designed to
improve retention.
A review by Guarino et al. [76] examined the individual and school characteristics linked to
teacher recruitment and retention, as well as synthesising the evidence for a range of policies and
initiatives aiming to reduce the shortage. The authors apply four quality criteria based on sample,
measurement procedures, model specification and interpretation to these studies. These quality
criteria, however, were used to determine whether studies would be included in the review or not.
They were not used to assess the weight that should be allocated to the findings in relation to each
intervention. More recently, Hanover Research’s review [77] examined both financial and workplace
incentives connected to teacher recruitment and retention. However, the study provides little critical
analysis nor consideration of the quality of each of the included evaluations. Gunther [78] examined
non-financial factors influencing teacher recruitment and retention, including a range of research
design and quality criteria used for rating of included studies. However, the study focused on personal,
school, community and job characteristics or factors, rather than examining the effectiveness of policy
interventions introduced to tackle the teacher shortage.
Where attempts have been made to consider the quality of the included studies the results have
been disappointing. Laurence et al.’s [79] review of programmes aimed at attracting and retaining
teachers in the US concluded that it was difficult to be certain about the evidence of effectiveness
as many of the programmes tended to be small and piecemeal and hence difficult to replicate on
a large-scale. Lonsdale and Ingvarson [80] reviewed recruitment strategies employed in Australia,
the US, UK, Canada and New Zealand and cautioned that many of the strategies have not been formally
evaluated, or where they have, evidence tended to be anecdotal and informal.
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 6 of 45

Our review exclusively includes studies that can contribute to answering causal questions on the
impact of strategies or policy initiatives to improve the recruitment and retention of teachers.

3. Methods
This review summarises the evidence of initiatives in addressing teacher recruitment and retention.
Knowing more about what ‘works’ and what does not will allow policymakers and schools to make
informed and targeted decisions on strategies to use or avoid, to attract and retain teachers. Given the
huge amount of research in this area, we have to be careful these decisions are supported by the
best available evidence. It is therefore imperative that the trustworthiness of each research finding is
evaluated. To do this we used a multi-factor method for judging the quality of evidence of each study
included in the review.
The research questions are:
1. What are the most promising approaches in attracting teachers into the profession?
2. What are the most promising approaches in retaining teachers into the profession?
3. What are the ‘best bets’ for schools, regions, and policymakers to improve the recruitment and
retention of school teachers?
In the context of this review, teachers refer to classroom teachers who deliver teaching in
state-funded schools from early years to post-secondary education. We have intentionally not limited
ourselves to teachers of any phase or subjects as attracting and retaining different types of teachers
may require different strategies. In any case, the majority of research conducted in this area focused on
teachers in state-funded schools, with a small number covering special education teachers. There was
also a disproportionate number about shortage subjects, such as maths and science or languages.
This is not surprising as recruiting and retaining shortage subject teachers has been a concern in most
education systems across the world.

3.1. Search Strategy

To search for relevant studies, a list of search terms was developed as follows:
Teacher supply OR teacher demand OR teacher retention OR teacher shortage OR teacher recruitment
AND initiative OR incentive* OR policy/scheme AND experiment OR quasi-experiment OR
randomised control* trial RCT OR regression discontinuity OR difference in difference OR time series
OR longitudinal OR systematic review OR review OR meta-analys* AND impact OR evaluation
OR effect.
These were applied to 13 educational, psychological and sociological electronic databases including:
• Education Resources Information Clearinghouse
• JSTOR
• The Scholarly Journal Archive
• Social Sciences and Education Full Text
• Web of Science
• Sage
• Science Direct
• Proquest Dissertations and Theses
• British Education Index
• ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center)
• IBSS (International Bibliography of the Social Sciences)
• Ingenta Journals (full text of a large number of journals)
• EBSCOhost (which covers the following databases: PsychINFO, BEI, PsycARTICLES, etc,
ProQuest, IBSS
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 7 of 45

• Plus Google and Google Scholar.

These searches were supplemented by studies known to us and snowballing of relevant studies
cited in the retrieved studies and from prior reviews of the literature.
The search terms were tested on well-known sociological, educational and psychological databases
to ensure that they picked up relevant pieces of literature, and pieces already known on this topic.
Following this, a very general and inclusive statement of search terms was generated for each database.
These were adjusted to suit the idiosyncrasies of each.
To determine the causal evidence of policies and initiatives on teacher recruitment and retention,
we included only studies using experimental (e.g., randomised control studies) or quasi-experimental
designs (e.g., regression discontinuity, matched comparison, difference-in-difference, longitudinal
time-series analysis and instrumental variables) and large-scale longitudinal studies, or similar.
The scoping review and previous reviews of literature suggested that there were few robust
experimental evaluations of policy initiatives or approaches for teacher recruitment and retention.
The decision was therefore made to include any empirical studies with at least some type of comparative
design, but would have low ratings for trustworthiness in terms of causal claims.
The search was limited to studies published or reported in the English language. We intentionally
did not set any date limits, to keep the search open. To avoid publication bias, the search included any
material published or unpublished that mentions both substantive and causal terms.
A total of 6731 potentially relevant records were identified from titles alone. An additional
347 were added from following studies in previous reviews, studies known to us from previous work
and from references in identified studies. These included 58 research reports from ProQuest Premium
which were specifically related to the effects of induction and mentoring on teacher retention. All were
exported to EndNote (a reference manager) for screening.

3.2. Screening
In any review, a broad search of the databases will invariably pick up huge numbers of irrelevant
materials. This is even more so in our case as we intentionally kept the search as broad and
comprehensive as necessary to ensure that we did not miss potentially relevant materials. A large
majority of records were not relevant but contained some of the keywords. To remove these,
we eyeballed the entries looking at the title and abstracts and removed those that were clearly not
relevant to the topic. We then screened for duplicates using the EndNote function. Some studies were
presented in different forms, or for different audiences, e.g., as a working paper or a report as well as
journal articles. These were treated as one study.
In the next stage of screening the full reports were skim-read by one researcher. Any studies
thought not to meet the inclusion criteria were then reviewed by other members of the research team
for consensus. Four members of the team independently reviewed 10 randomly selected reports to
agree on their inclusion or exclusion. The full texts of the included studies were screened by applying
pre-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria as presented below.

3.3. Inclusion Criteria

Inclusion and exclusion criteria were determined prior to completing the searches and were
applied after the initial screenings. Studies were included if they were:

1. Empirical research
2. About activities aimed at attracting people into teaching or about retaining teachers in teaching
3. Specifically about recruitment and/or retention of classroom teachers
4. About incentives/initiatives/policies or schemes on teacher recruitment and retention
5. About mainstream teachers in state-funded/government schools
6. Studies that had measurable outcomes (either retention or recruitment)
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 8 of 45

3.4. Exclusion Criteria

Studies were excluded if they were:

1. Not relevant to the research questions

2. Not primary research
3. Not reported in English
4. Not a report of research
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 49
5. Descriptions of programmes or initiatives with no evaluation of strategies or approaches used in
3.teacher
Not reported
recruitmentin English
and retention
6. 4.NotNot a report of research
about strategies or approaches to improve recruitment or retention of teachers (e.g.,
5.observational
Descriptionsor ofcorrelational
programmes or initiatives
studies with no
of factors evaluation recruitment
influencing of strategies or
andapproaches
retention)used
in teacher recruitment and retention
7. Studies that had no clear evaluation of outcomes
6. Not about strategies or approaches to improve recruitment or retention of teachers (e.g.,
8. Studies with non-tangible
observational or studies
or correlational measurable outcomes
of factors (e.g.,
influencing surveys about
recruitment teachers’ attitude or
and retention)
7.beliefs
Studiesor perceptions
that had no clear evaluation of outcomes
9. 8.Ethnographic
Studies withstudies,
non-tangible or measurable
narrative case studies,outcomes
opinion(e.g., surveys about teachers’ attitude or
pieces
10. beliefs or perceptions
Outcome is not teacher recruitment or retention
9. Ethnographic studies, narrative case studies, opinion pieces
11. Focus only on specific groups of teachers, e.g., special education teachers or ethnic
10. Outcome is not teacher recruitment or retention
minority teachers
11. Focus only on specific groups of teachers, e.g., special education teachers or ethnic minority
12. Notteachers
relevant to the context of English speaking developed countries
13. Recruitment
12. Not relevant and retention
to the contextof
ofschool
Englishleaders,
speakingteaching
developedassistants
countriesor school administrators
14. 13.
Anecdotal accounts from schools about successful strategies or school administrators
Recruitment and retention of school leaders, teaching assistants
15. 14. Anecdotal
Surveys accounts
collecting from
ideas schools
about theabout
best successful
way or most strategies
effective ways to attract and retain teachers
15. Surveys collecting ideas about the best way or most effective ways to attract and retain teachers
TheThe
PRISMA
PRISMA diagram (Figure
diagram 1) 1)
(Figure tracks the
tracks number
the numberofofstudies
studiesincluded
included and
and excluded at each
excluded at each stage
of the review process.
stage of the review process.

Figure1.1.PRISMA
Figure PRISMA Diagram
Diagramofofincluded/excluded studies
included/excluded studies

The majority of the studies that were excluded were because they were not relevant to the topic
(i.e., not about teacher recruitment and retention), not about impact evaluation, recruitment and
retention were not the outcomes, or were simply reports about best practices.
 Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 9 of 45

The majority of the studies that were excluded were because they were not relevant to the topic
(i.e., not about teacher recruitment and retention), not about impact evaluation, recruitment and
FOR PEER REVIEW retention were not the outcomes, or were simply reports about best
16 of 48 practices.

3.5. Data Extraction

ceived a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers
arge award were less likely than teachers
The included studies who
werereceived
assembled a small
andaward
considered to be for retained
synthesis. Key information from each of
erhaps teachers inthe receipt
included of astudies
large award are highand
was extracted performing
summarised teachers
using awho can (Appendix A). Such information
template
r paid jobs elsewhere.
included the research design, sample size, group allocation, outcome measures, missing data, methods
wain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated
of analysis and the results.the US$5000 retention bonus program for
s in Tennessee’s Priority We Schools
then judged (highthe poverty,
research high minority
evidence and schools).
reliability Theofstudythe finding for each piece of included
bonus incentive increased
study using thetheretention
“Gorard of Sieve”
teachers in tested
[81]. This uses subjects and grades,
five criteria but the trustworthiness of the research
to assess
n of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
(see Appendix B): the design (whether it includes a fair counterfactual), scale of study (size of smallest
udy using a regression discontinuity
cell, as small studies design
can beexploiting
volatile and thevulnerable
sharp cut-off in a teacher’s
to threats to validity), scale of missing data (missing
on rating that determines
data caneligibility for the retention
bias the findings), quality ofbonus in participating
data obtained (data obtainedschools.from standardized test instruments
sentative administrative data supplemented
or administrative by county-level
data are considered more economic
robust than datadata and data from participants’ self-report or
collected
S and Tennessee’sfrom online teacher evaluation
instruments aligned with platform, CODE (contains
the intervention) and other value-added
threats to validity (e.g., conflicts of interest).
achers) were utilised for the
All such analysis.
factors The sample
are important [82]included
for ensuringall teachers
that the working
evidence in that informs policy and practice can
in Tennessee during the 2012–2013
be relied upon. Each school
study year.
was then given a padlock rating ranging from 0 (no weight can be placed on
erately high evidence studiesto(3🔒)
the study) 4 (thefound most norobust
effect that
of financial
could beincentives
expected in onreality).
teacherThis is an indication of how secure
et al. [89] evaluated
thethe Governor’s
findings are. WeTeaching
use the termFellowship
“quality” (GTF) scheme,
to refer to the involving
security ofathe findings and not necessarily the
e to attract new teachers
qualityto oflow-performing
the research. Theschools. Teachers
ratings take had toof
no account repay
whether $5000 thefor
intervention was deemed successful
our year that they or
didnot,
not or meet the commitment.
whether There was
the report author no difference
claimed in retention
the intervention was effective. To ensure inter-rater
four years) between recipientfour
reliability, andmembers
non-recipients,
of the teamdespite the penalty
reviewed and rated clause. a sample of five papers. Team members were
fference-in-difference-in-difference
in constant consultations approach, withClotfelter
each otheretthroughout
al. [100,101] thecompared
process to ensure consistency.
ore and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible
We did not compute the average effect sizes for each of the approaches as the study designs were
same schools usingso varieda hybrid of a randomized
that averaging experiment
effect sizes across different and a regression
studies which use different scales (e.g., odds ratios,
sign. This is the North
hazard Carolina bonuseffect
risks, mean incentive aimed
sizes and at retainingfor
r-coefficients) qualified
measuring teachers
different aspects of similar intervention
cts in high poverty or academically
may not reflect thechallenging
real impactschools.
of eachUnder this scheme
individual type ofteachersprogramme. To illustrate, the studies in
an annual bonusthisof $1800
review if employ
they taught in an
a range ofeligible school, and
methodologies (e.g.,will continue tovariables, regression discontinuity,
instrumental
s as long as they stayed in theanalysis,
time-series same school and taught the sameand
difference-in-difference subjects.
randomised Overall, the trials) to estimate the effects of a
control
that the bonus incentive
wide spectrum did notofreducemeasures turnover
aimed rates. However,
at improving it is supply.
teacher not clear One of these is financial incentives.
ecause the $1800 bonus
This is was not largeterm
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ementation of the pension
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scholarship and bursaries and tuition fee waivers. These strategies are not
esponses from principals
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teachers. They suggested that administrative
may not reflect the impact ofsupport, improving
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professional development
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type of financial was made incentive with that meet our causal criteria. It was
ligible schools andtherefore
those in not schools that or
possible narrowly
desirable missed out based
to average on the
the effect sizethreshold
for each type of programme [83].
esults showed that teachers The key receiving
matteraisbonus whetherwere the15% lessislikely
effect positiveto leave
or not. at the
Theend size of the effect can be misleading as
ear compared to studies
other teachers
with small in the samethose
samples, school. This increased
without control groups, to 17% usedafter
non-randomised controls and those
ubject taught. A 10%that increase
are basedreduces the probabilityself-reports
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invariably show huge effect sizes [83].
r, this reflects a pattern already these
To overcome in place even before
problems, the programme
we examined was introduced.
the substantive and methodological features of each study
hool fixed effects in the regression
using the “sieve”. theTherefore,
effect was rather
negative. than reporting effect sizes, we present the direction of effect
randomised control trial, Fryer
(positive, negative[102] or examined
no change)a and school-wide
the strength performance
of the evidence bonus(i.e., how secure is the finding).
vided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report.
3.6. and
ntention-to-treat (ITT) Synthesising the Evidence
treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that
ormance bonus program To facilitate the synthesis, we sortedSome
had no effect on teacher retention. reasons suggested
the research reports by outcomes according to whether
included incentives theynotwerebeing largerecruitment,
about enough, incentive retentionscheme was A
or both. toobroad
complex and
classification of incentives/initiatives was
entives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive
created. These include financial incentives (e.g., signing bonuses, wage uplifts, scholarships and loans),
l union teacher. Schools
and other could decide to award
non-financial a subset
incentives (e.g.,ofalternative
teachers with routes the highest
into teaching, staff development, mentoring
divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools
& induction and workload reduction) or a combination. opted for group incentives.
s and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from
gh 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level
hese schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the
up. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
mately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that
the opportunity to participate.
 showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but
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performance
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The design retention. was unable Some reasons to take suggested account of changes in
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives.
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 12 of 45

circumstances within the schools (such as pupil intake), which could have affected teacher satisfaction
and thus the retention rates.
Glazerman et al. [87] examined the impact of the Talent Transfer Initiative, which offered bonuses
to the highest performing teachers for agreeing to move to and stay in low-performing schools.
The incentive was $20,000 paid in instalments over a two-year period. Teachers who were already
teaching in low-performing schools received a $10,000 retention stipend if they remained in the school
over the two-year period. The participants included 85 teacher pairs matched on school characteristics
and randomised to intervention or not, across 114 elementary and middle schools. Because the teacher
pairs changed their personnel between randomisation and the start of the school year, the two groups
were no longer equivalent at the beginning of the study. Of the vacancies assigned to the scheme, 88%
were filled, compared to 44% the year before, and 71% in the comparison group.
Hough and Loeb [88] used a difference-in-difference approach, comparing the recruitment and
retention of 1611 applicants in the San Francisco Unified School District. The district awards higher
salaries/bonuses for teachers teaching shortage subjects, and in schools with a high proportion of poor
and ethnic minority students. Teachers were also given a retention bonus if they stayed on after four
years and more after eight years. The results showed an increase in the proportion of shortage subject
teachers in hard-to-staff areas from 27% to 37%. There was also an increase in the proportion of new
hires in the targeted group (those that received the incentives) from 49% to 54%.
Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a $20,000
incentive to attract and retain new teachers to low-performing schools for four years. Teachers had to
repay $5000 for each year that they did not meet the commitment. An instrumental variable design
was used, based on 718 GTF teachers, excluding those who could not be tracked, were missing data, or
not enrolled at recognised institutions. GTF recipients were not randomly selected, and so may have
had a predisposition to teach in low-performing schools. Twice as many teachers were enrolled during
GTF as in the years before and after, and 28% more taught in low performing schools. It seemed that
money was an attractor.
A UK study suggested (indirectly) that monetary incentives may be effective only in attracting
those already intending to teach, not those who would not have considered teaching anyway [90].
This was an experiment with 1574 undergraduates (but data for 1496 was analysed) to test whether
financial incentives would attract high ability students into teaching. Instead of asking students
directly whether they would be motivated by financial incentives, which runs the risk of students
giving answers which they think are desirable or acceptable, the authors presented participants with a
hypothetical task for which they were rewarded for effort. In addition, they were offered an initial
up-front payment or “endowment” conditional on their subject and predicted degree classification.
This was to mimic the incentives offered for initial teacher training (ITT) bursaries. In England,
the government offered differentiated bursaries for different degree subjects and degree class with
high priority subjects attracting higher bursaries. Bursaries were found to be strongly and positively
associated with intentions to become a teacher and to do initial teacher training, although the causality
appears to be in the opposite direction. Those intending to be teachers were more likely to give greater
importance to bursaries, instead of (or as well as) the other way around. The effect was stronger for
women who were more likely to want to be primary school teachers than secondary. Those in the third
year of study were also less likely to express intention to teach. This study was based on hypotheticals
and on participants’ expression of intention to become a teacher which weakens its validity.
Using a difference-in-difference approach, Falch [91] compared the recruitment rate of teachers
within Norwegian public schools with variable wage premium using data from the 1990s when wages
were centralized. Treatment schools had a certain level of teacher shortage and were thus eligible for
wage premium. Of 79,135 teachers, 10,868 worked in one of the three counties with treatment schools,
and 2034 worked at a treatment school. Because control schools did not have recruitment issues,
comparisons were made with schools with persistent teacher shortages outside the three counties,
which were not eligible for the wage premium. The results showed that the recruitment rate was
 PEER REVIEW 16 of 48

ed a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 13 of 45
e award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained
aps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can
id jobs elsewhere.higher in treatment schools than non-treatment schools (effect size 0.13). A 10% increase in wage
n and Rodriquezincreased [99] evaluated recruitment the US$5000
by about 30%. retentionThe wage bonuspremium programappeared for to be more effective in attracting
Tennessee’s Priority young Schools
female (high
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teachers.
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f Level 5 (Diploma inInEducation a longitudinal and time-series
Training) teachers. analysis, This Zarkin was [92] a developed
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using a regressionresponsive discontinuity design exploiting
the “reserve pool” of teachers the sharp is tocut-off in a teacher’s
the teacher salary at the time. The reserve pool of teachers
ating that determines in one eligibility
year wasfor the retention
estimated as thebonus average in proportion
participating of schools.
certified teachers to the total certified over the
tative administrative data period,
20-year supplemented multiplied by county-level
by the total economic number meeting data andthe data minimum certification requirements in
d Tennessee’s online thatteacher
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explored Teaching
the effects Fellowshipa (GTF)
of ProComp, scheme, involving
performance-based a
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attract new
eceived a smallteachers
award torather
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er paid jobs elsewhere.
ence-in-difference-in-difference to teachers who approach,
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[100,101] servingcompared low-income population, high performing
Swain
and after andtheRodriquez schools[99]
implementation andevaluatedof the bonus
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 FOR PEER REVIEW 16 of 48
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Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 Table 6. Security rating of studies on retention. 15 of 45
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 Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 16 of 48

teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 16 of 45
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere.
Springer, Swain
Springer, Swainand and Rodriquez
Rodriquez [99][99] evaluated
evaluated the US$5000
the US$5000 retention retention
bonus programbonus program for
for effective
effective in
teachers teachers
Tennessee’sin Tennessee’s
Priority SchoolsPriority(high Schools (high high
poverty, poverty, high minority
minority schools). schools).
The study The study
showed
showed
that that theincentive
the bonus bonus incentive
increased increased
the retention the retention
of teachers of teachers
in testedinsubjects
tested subjects
and grades, and grades,
but not butthe
not the retention
retention of Level 5of(DiplomaLevel 5 in (Diploma
Education in andEducation
Training) andteachers.
Training) Thisteachers. This was a quasi-
was a quasi-experimental
experimental
study using astudy using adiscontinuity
regression regression discontinuitydesign exploiting design exploiting
the sharp the sharp
cut-off incut-off
a teacher’sin a teacher’s
overall
overall evaluation
evaluation rating that rating that determines
determines eligibilityeligibility for the bonus
for the retention retention bonus in participating
in participating schools.
schools. Nationally
Nationally representative
representative administrative administrative
data supplemented data supplemented
by county-level by county-level
economic economic data and data from and datathe
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation
TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added estimates for platform, CODE (contains value-added
estimateswere
teachers) for teachers)
utilised for were theutilised
analysis. forThethesample
analysis. The sample
included included
all teachers all teachers
working in Priority working
Schools in
Priority
in TennesseeSchools duringin Tennessee
the 2012–2013 during the 2012–2013
school year. school year.
Three moderately high evidence evidence studies studies (3🔒) found no
(3 ) found no effect
effect ofof financial
financial incentives
incentives on teacher
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for
each of the first four year that they did not meet meet thethe commitment.
commitment. There There was was no no difference
difference in retention
rates (75% over four years) between recipient recipient and and non-recipients,
non-recipients, despite despite the the penalty
penalty clause.clause.
Using aadifference-in-difference-in-difference
difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et
approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] comparedal. [100,101] compared
hazard
hazard
rates ratesand
before beforeafterandthe after the implementation
implementation of the bonus of the bonus programme;
programme; eligible andeligible ineligible andteachers
ineligible in
teachers
the in the same
same schools using aschools
hybrid using a hybrid experiment
of a randomized of a randomized experiment
and a regression and a regression
discontinuity design.
discontinuity
This is the North design. This bonus
Carolina is the North
incentive Carolina
aimedbonus incentive
at retaining aimedteachers
qualified at retaining qualified
in targeted teachers
subjects in
in targeted
high poverty subjects in high poverty
or academically or academically
challenging schools. Under challenging schools.teachers
this scheme Under this were scheme
eligible teachers
for an
were eligible
annual bonusfor an annual
of $1800 if they bonus
taught of in $1800 if they taught
an eligible school,in and anwill
eligible
continueschool, and willthe
to receive continue
bonus as to
receive
long the bonus
as they stayed asinlong
the assametheyschool
stayedand in the same
taught theschool
sameand taughtOverall,
subjects. the same thesubjects. Overall,that
results suggest the
results
the bonus suggest
incentivethatdid thenot bonus
reduce incentive
turnoverdid notHowever,
rates. reduce turnover rates.whether
it is not clear However, this itis is not clear
because the
whether
$1800 this was
bonus is because
not large theenough
$1800 bonus or is itwas not large
because thereenough
was a flaw or isinit the
becausedesign there
andwas a flaw in the
implementation
design
of and implementation
the program as not all teachers of the program
who wereaseligible not all teachers
actually who werethe
received eligible
bonus. actually
Survey received
responses the
bonus.
from Survey responses
principals and teachers from principals
indicated that andtheteachers
$1800 bonus indicated alonethatwasthe not$1800
enough bonus aloneteachers.
to retain was not
enough
They to retainthat
suggested teachers. They suggested
administrative support,that administrative
improving support, improving
school conditions and facilitating schoolprofessional
conditions
and facilitating
development might professional development
be better options. Comparison mightwas be better
made with options.
teachersComparison
across eligible was schools
made with and
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly
those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold eligibility. The results showed that missed out based on the threshold
eligibility.
teachers The results
receiving showed
a bonus werethat 15%teachers
less likely receiving
to leaveaatbonus the end were 15%school
of the less likely
year to leave at to
compared theother
end
of the school
teachers in the year
same compared
school. Thistoincreased other teachers to 17% in afterthecontrolling
same school. This increased
for subject taught. A to 10% 17% after
increase
controlling
reduces the for subject taught.
probability of teachers A 10% leavingincrease
by 1–4% reducespoints. theHowever,
probability thisofreflects
teachers leavingalready
a pattern by 1–4% in
points.
place
Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER However,
even
REVIEW before the thisprogramme
reflects a pattern already in place
was introduced. even the
Including before the fixed
school programme
16 of 48effects in wastheintroduced.
regression
Including
the effect was the negative.
school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative.
hers who received a small In aawardcluster
cluster randomised
rather than no control
randomised award. However,
trial, Fryerthis [102]
[102] examined
study found that
examined aa school-wide
school-wide
teachers performanceperformance bonus
received a large award scheme werethatless likely than
provided performance
teachers who
performance bonuses
bonusesreceivedto
to school
a small
school staff
award
staff based
based on retained
to be their
their schools’
schools’ progress
progress report.
report.
e district. PerhapsUsing teachers bothinanreceipt
intention-to-treat
of a large award (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated
are high performing teachersanalyses, who canthe results showed that
y find better paid the jobsteacher
elsewhere. performance bonus program had no effect effect on on teacher
teacher retention.
retention. Some reasons suggested
Springer, Swain for andthe Rodriquez [99] evaluated
nil effect included incentives the not US$5000
being largeretention enough, bonus program
incentive schemefor was too complex and
group-based incentives
tive teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, may not be effective.
effective. high minority schools). The study a lump sum incentive
Participating schools were given
wed that the bonuson incentive
$3000 per increased
full union the teacher.
retentionSchoolsof teachers could in decide to awardand
tested subjects grades,
a subset ofbut
teachers with the highest
the retention of Level 5 (Diploma
value-added or divide among teachers
in Education by lottery.teachers.
and Training) The majority Thisofwas schools opted
a quasi-
schools opted for for group
group incentives.
incentives.
rimental study using Data a regression and teachersdesign
on studentsdiscontinuity from 396 high-need
exploiting thepublic
sharp elementary, middle, and high schools from
cut-off in a teacher’s
all evaluation rating 2007–2008 through 2009–2010
that determines
through 2009–2010
eligibility for were
were analysed.
theanalysed.
retentionSchoolsbonus in wereparticipating
selected based schools.
on some criteria, e.g., level
onally representative of poverty.
poverty. Of these
administrative dataschools, 233 wereby
supplemented randomly
county-level assigned
economic to thedataintervention
and data group and 163 to the
comparison group.
the TVAAS and Tennessee’s
comparison group.teacher
online Retention
Retention outcomes
evaluation
outcomes inin schools
platform,
schools CODE
thatthat were
(contains
were offered
offered participation
value-added
participation in the inprogram—even
the program—
mates for teachers)if even
theyifutilised
were they ultimately
ultimately fordeclined declined
the analysis. Theto participate—were
sample included
to participate—were compared compared
all with thewith
teachers working
outcomesthe outcomes
inin schoolsinthat schools
werethatnot
were
ity Schools in Tennessee not offered
during the the opportunity
2012–2013
offered the opportunity to participate. school to participate.
year.
Three moderately highNine evidence
studies studies
rated(3🔒) found nopositive
2 reported effect ofoutcomes
financial of incentives
financialon teacher on teacher retention,
incentives
tion. Steele et al. [89]
but evaluated
the effects the were Governor’s TeachingorFellowship
either short-lived involved some (GTF)kind scheme, of a involving
tie-in. Bueno a and Sass [95] found
00 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for
of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention
(75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause.
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared
rd rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible
hers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 17 of 45

that salary compensation only had a short-term effect on the retention of teachers. They compared
teachers who were eligible with those who were not. The attrition rate for bonus recipients was lower
than non-recipients, but only in the first five years when they were receiving the bonus. Working and
living conditions, lack of community engagements were reported to be important factors in teachers’
decision to stay or leave.
Falch [103] used a natural experiment taking advantage of changes in the wage system in Norway
over a nine-year period (1993/94–2002/03) to look at whether giving teachers a higher salary would make
them more likely to stay in teaching. Over that time, teachers in schools with high teacher vacancies
were eligible to receive a wage premium of between 7.5% and 12%. In total, there were 161 treatment
schools. Of these 104 received wage premium for less than four years. The difference-in-difference
analysis comparing the turnover rates before and after wage premium was introduced showed that
wage premium reduced the probability of quitting a school by 4.8 percentage points. Taking into
account school district characteristics, the effect of the wage premium increased to 5.8 percentage points.
The wage effect was larger for males and for the married teachers than for females and unmarried.
Teachers’ age and whether they have children or not also affect the size of the effect. There was no
impact on the retention of younger teachers, and female teachers were less responsive to wage increases
than older and male teachers.
Another incentive scheme is the Florida Critical Shortage programme is a state-wide programme
to increase the supply of teachers in shortage subjects. Feng and Sass [104,105] evaluated the effects
of two components of the scheme. The loan forgiveness component of the programme was targeted
at beginning teachers teaching in shortage areas where teachers qualified in that subject were given
up to $10,000 to pay off their student loan if they continued to teach in shortage subjects for at
least 90 days. The other component was a one-off retention bonus for teachers teaching certain
subjects and grade levels. Retention bonus was capped at $1200 per teacher. To be eligible teachers
would have taught in a shortage area, agreed to continue teaching that subject the following year
and have had a favourable performance appraisal. Using difference-in-difference and instrumental
variable approaches, the authors compared the probability of attrition and recruitment of eligible
and non-eligible teachers for each shortage subject. The effect of loan forgiveness was estimated
by comparing changes in retention of eligible teachers when a subject was designated as a shortage
subject with those of non-eligible teachers over time. The results showed that loan forgiveness reduced
the probability of overall attrition by 12% (10% for maths and 9% for science teachers). The effect
disappeared when the funding was reduced. The one-off retention bonus resulted in a reduction of
likelihood of shortage subject teachers leaving Florida by 25%., but no effect on retention in the school
they were currently teaching.
Fitzgerald [86] also found that the impact of financial incentives is short-lived. The effect of the
High Priority Location Stipend Program was observed only in the first year after implementation. No
differences were found in the following years. Staff who left indicated that while they were appreciative
of the incentives, they did not think the stipend was high enough. Their main concerns were the
working conditions, discipline in school, management support and admin/teacher relations. Control
teachers also indicated that they would be happy to work in the high priority areas if student discipline,
working conditions and admin/teacher relations were improved.
Pension enhancements have also been used in states in the US to encourage teachers to stay until
their retirement. Koedel and Xiang [106] examined one such scheme in St Louis, Mississippi using
the six-year administrative panel data covering the school years 1994–1995 through 1999–2000. They
compared the likelihood of eligible teachers (i.e., those retiring after June 1999) with those not eligible
using a difference-in-difference analysis. This resulted in a 60% increase in pension wealth for the
eligible teachers, and had the effect of delaying the retirement only of teachers who were a year close
to retirement, but not for other groups.
Glazerman et al.’s [87] analysis of the Talent Transfer Initiative, described in the section on
recruitment, was also linked to increased retention. But this is because a condition of the incentive
 Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 18 of 45

is that teachers agree to move or stay in the low-performing school Retention in the first year was
93% (70% in the comparator group), but dropped to 60% after two years (compared to 51% in the
comparator group). This suggests that the effect of the incentive was not long lasting and loses its
effect once the payment stopped.
Murnane and Olsen [107] examined the career histories of 13,890 North Carolina teachers to
estimate the impact of salaries on teachers’ longevity in teaching. Regression models were developed
using a number of key explanatory variables to predict the length of stay in teaching. Results of the
analysis indicated that a $1000 increase in each step of the salary scale (measured in 1987 US Dollars) is
associated with an increase in median duration of two to three years for a teacher starting their career
in 1970. The findings suggest that a uniform salary scale may not work in retaining teachers in fields
such as chemistry and physics that are in demand in business and industry. This echoes the findings of
other studies which found that for financial compensation to be effective it has to be large enough to
cover the differential salary that teachers would get if they had not gone into teaching.
Springer et al. [108] evaluated the District Awards for Teaching Excellence (D.A.T.E), a state-funded
incentive pay award in Texas. All districts in the state were eligible to receive grants, but participation
was voluntary. The average award for teachers ranged from $1361 in districts with district-wide
plans to £3344 in districts with select school plans. The study showed that the likelihood of leaving
increased for teachers who did not receive the award, but the probability of leaving fell sharply for
those who did receive the award. The size of the award also matters. In districts with relatively small
maximum awards, turnover increased, but turnover fell as the awards increased until it exceeds $6000
beyond which it makes no difference. However, not all districts and not all schools were eligible for
participation, and it is not clear what the eligibility criteria were. Districts
020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 16 of 48 and schools that received
the award may be systematically different to those not eligible for the award. The factors that exclude
who received a small them award rather than
for eligibility maynobeaward.
relevant However,
to teacher this study found that teachers
turnover.
ived a large award were In less likely
a pilot than
study, teachers
Springer who
and received
Taylor [109]afound
small mixed
awardeffects
to be retained
on a pay-for-performance program
strict. Perhaps teachers in receipt
(Governor’s of a large
Educator award are
Excellence high performing
Grants/GEEG) teachers
in Texas. Thewho TexascanGEEG programme, was a
d better paid jobs three-year
elsewhere.programme involving 100 schools (analysis performed with 94 schools) identified as the
nger, Swain andhighest-poverty,
Rodriquez [99]high-performing
evaluated the US$5000 schools inretention
the state. bonus
Schoolsprogram
were awarded for non-competitive grants
teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The
ranging from $60,000 to $220,000 each year for three years. The individual award for each full-timestudy
hat the bonus incentive
teacherincreased
was between the retention
$3000 and of$10,000.
teachersUsing
in tested subjects and
a combination ofgrades,
data from butdifferent sources the author
retention of Levelanalysed
5 (Diplomateacher inturnover
Education for and Training)
six academic teachers.
years. This was
The results showed a quasi-
that turnover was higher among
ental study using abeginning
regressionteachers
discontinuity
in schoolsdesign withexploiting the sharp
only individual cut-off inthan
incentives a teacher’s
in schools with only schoolwide
valuation rating that determines
incentives, eligibility
but only in theforfirstthe retention
year. bonus inwere
No differences participating
detected schools.
in subsequent years. The opposite
ly representative administrative data supplemented
was true for experienced teachers by county-level
where turnovereconomic
was lowerdata and data
in schools with school-level incentives
TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher
than in schools evaluation platform,
with a combination of individualCODE and(contains value-added
school level incentives in the first year, but the
s for teachers) were utilised
pattern wasfor the analysis.
reversed The sample
in the second included
year. No all teachers
differences working
were detected in
between school and individual
Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year.
level incentives in the third year, suggesting the short-term effects of such incentive award.
ee moderately high evidence A furtherstudies
four(3🔒) found no
2 studies effect unclear
showed of financial incentives
or mixed on teacher
outcomes. Booker and Glazerman [110]
. Steele et al. [89] evaluated
evaluated the theGovernor’s
Missouri Career TeachingLadderFellowship
(CL) Program(GTF) scheme, involving
to test the effect ofa pay increases on teachers
ncentive to attractat new teachersstages
different to low-performing
of their career. schools.
Based Teachers
on their hadperformance-level
to repay $5000 for eligible teachers received
he first four year that they did not meet
supplementary the taking
pay for commitment.
on certainThere was no difference
responsibilities in retentiondevelopment outside their
or professional
% over four years)contracted
between recipient and non-recipients,
hours. Teachers were observed despite the penalty
and evaluated asclause.
they moved up the career ladder in three
ng a difference-in-difference-in-difference
stages. The amount of bonus approach,
was alsoClotfelter
related et to al.
the [100,101]
length of compared
teaching experience. For each stage
ates before and after the implementation
teachers of the bonus programme;
received more supplementary pay up to £1500 eligibleforand
Stage ineligible
1, £3000 for Stage 2 and £5000 for
in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression
Stage 3. The authors compared the retention rates of teachers in districts offering the Career Ladder
nuity design. This is the North
incentive Carolina
with similarbonus
teachersincentive aimed at Ladder
in non-Career retaining qualified
districts. teachers
There was no difference in retention
ed subjects in highrates
poverty or academically
between CL and non-CL challenging
districtsschools. Under this
after controlling forscheme
observableteachers
differences such as wealth, size
gible for an annualand bonus of $1800density
population if they taught in an eligible
in regression models.school, Usingand will continue
instrumental to
variables controlling for district
he bonus as long asselection
they stayedinto in
CLthe same schoolteachers
participation, and taught in CL thedistricts
same subjects.
were lessOverall,
likely the
to move to a different district.
uggest that the bonus The modelincentive did not
predicted thatreduce
after 10 turnover rates. However,
years teachers it is not
in CL districts wereclear
less likely to move compared
this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the
nd implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the
urvey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not
o retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions
itating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with
across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold
 Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 19 of 45

to similar teachers in non-CL districts (81% remain vs 77%). The oldest teachers (after 11 years and
receiving the biggest bonuses) were half as likely to move compared to their non-CL peers. It was more
effective in retaining younger teachers in the profession but not necessarily in the district. The authors
estimated that incentive payments need to exceed 25% of teacher salary to neutralise the effects of
turnover in hard-to-staff urban schools. One complication is that this programme also had an element
of enhancing teacher autonomy. Therefore, it is not clear how much of the effect was due to the
incentive and how much was the result of teachers’ enhanced autonomy.
In another study Fulbeck [111] used interrupted time-series and difference-in-difference regression
models to analyse the impact of Denver’s Professional Compensation for Teachers Program (ProComp),
a teacher incentive programme that awards salary increases and/or annual incentives to teachers
who meet a range of requirements, such as having advanced qualifications, complete professional
development, teach in a hard-to-staff school or shortage subject and work at a high-achieving
school. ProComp was championed by Barack Obama as a model for teacher compensation reform.
The ProComp hard-to-serve incentive initiative (HTS) is one of 10 financial incentives aimed at
retaining teachers in schools with a high proportion of poor students. The number of teachers under
the scheme was between 3900 and 4200 each year. Panel data, teacher interview data, and data on
school characteristics were taken from Denver Public School and ProComp school-level information.
The study compared the retention rates of teachers before and after ProComp. It reported that
participation in ProComp increased retention rates by 2.1 percentage points. Regression analysis
showed that ProComp accounted for 2.5% of the variation in changes in retention rates. ProComp is
reportedly more effective in challenging schools at or above average participation (ES = 0.30), but less
meaningful for non HTS schools (ES = 0.05). The findings, however, are really difficult to interpret
as the graphs seem to contradict the findings reported. Also the incentive came in at the time of the
economic recession, which may have affected individual’s propensity to move.
Using multinomial hierarchical regression modelling of data taken over a year, Fulbeck [112]
estimated the risk of teachers moving within district and moving out of the district by comparing the
hazard rates of teachers who received ProComp with those who did not, and also between teachers
0, x FOR PEER REVIEWwho taught in high poverty schools with those who did not. The results
16 of 48 of the analysis showed that
receipt of ProComp reduced the odds of teachers leaving the district, but not out of schools within
received a small award ratherThis
the district. thanrelates
no award.
onlyHowever,
to those who this study found to
volunteered that teachers in ProComp and received the
participate
a large award were less likely
$5000+ than teachers
incentive. There was whonoreceived
effect ona small
those award to be retained
who volunteered but did not receive the incentive.
. Perhaps teachersThese
in receipt of a to
are likely large award are
be teachers who high
didperforming
not meet the teachers who
eligibility can in terms of performance and
criteria
tter paid jobs elsewhere.
knowledge/skills. However, ProComp was not effective in high poverty schools. In other words,
, Swain and Rodriquez
ProComp [99]
didevaluated the US$5000
not compensate for poorretention bonus program
working conditions, schoolfor leadership and climate.
hers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools
Choi [113] (high positive
reported poverty,effects
high minority schools).
of the Quality The study program (Q Comp) on teacher
Compensation
he bonus incentiveretention
increased butthe retention
only of teachers
in schools that have in tested subjectsthe
implemented and grades,for
scheme butfive years—6.3 percentage points
tion of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
higher compared to schools with less than five years of implementation. There was no benefit for
study using a regression
charter discontinuity
schools (retention designrates
exploiting the sharp cut-off
10.5 percentage pointsinlower
a teacher’s
than other schools). Q Comp is an
ation rating that determines
alternativeeligibility for the retention
teacher compensation bonus (ACPs)
program in participating
under which schools.
teachers’ pay was based on their
presentative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data
performance, measured in terms of student achievement, leadership, professional knowledge and
AAS and Tennessee’s online
skills, and teacher evaluation
instructional platform,
behaviour. TheCODE (contains
study used value-added
a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach
teachers) were utilised for the
analysing dataanalysis.
for 12,708 The sampleand
teachers included all teachers
1734 schools over 8 working in
years. Teacher retention was calculated by
ols in Tennessee during the 2012–2013
comparing the list ofschool
teachers year.
in two subsequent years.
oderately high evidence studies
Four other(3🔒) found nothat
2 indicated effect of financial
financial incentives
incentives did noton teacherretention of teachers. A study in
improve
ele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme,
England looked at whether pay reforms in England where schools are involving a given the freedom to set pay
tive to attract newbased
teacherson to low-performing
performance ratherschools. Teachershave
than seniority had impacted
to repay $5000 for retention. Anders et al. [43]
on teacher
st four year that they did not three
compared meet groups
the commitment.
of schools—theTherepositive
was no difference in retention
adopters where pay progression on average was faster
er four years) between recipient and
than pre-reform non-recipients,
seniority-based despite
salary the penalty
schedule; negativeclause.
adopters where pay progression was slower
difference-in-difference-in-difference
than expected underapproach, pre-reform; Clotfelter et al. [100,101]
and mean-zero adopterscompared
where pay progression was as expected
before and after the implementation
under pre-reform pay of the bonusbased
schedule programme; eligible
on seniority. and aineligible
Using difference-in-difference framework the
he same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression
design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers
bjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers
for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to
nus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the
st that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear
 Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 20 of 45

authors estimated the effect of pay reforms on teacher retention, using adopters as treatment groups.
The effect of the reform increased teachers’ pay at positive adopter schools by 4% while pay of teachers
in negative adopter schools fell by 3%. However, there were no effects on retention.
Dee and Wyckoff [114] reported a performance incentive programme (IMPACT) aimed at retaining
effective teachers in the District of Columbia. IMPACT had been successful in removing low performing
teachers and retaining high-performing teachers. Teachers were evaluated on a multifaceted measure
of teacher performance. Based on these evaluations low-performing teachers may be dismissed and
high performing teachers receive large financial incentives. The financial incentives included one-time
bonuses of up to $25,000 and permanent increases to base pay of up to $27,000 per year. Employing
a regression discontinuity design, they compared the retention and performance outcomes of 4000
low-performing teachers whose ratings placed them near the threshold at risk of strong dismissal threat.
The study also compared outcomes among 2000 teachers who had IMPACT scores just above and just
below the threshold between Effective and Highly Effective. The high stakes incentive programme
was successful in removing teachers at the threshold of being labelled minimally effective, but did not
improve the retention of high-performing teachers.
Hendricks [115] compared the attrition of teachers in districts which award teachers via pay for
year of experiences, with districts that do not. The study found no relationship between teacher pay
and turnover. Districts differ in terms of labour and market outcomes so those districts that award pay
increases by years of experience may already be experiencing high attrition of more senior teachers.
OR PEER REVIEW 16 of 48
Hough and Loeb [88], described under recruitment, found no difference in the retention rates of
OR PEER REVIEW targeted and non-targeted teachers for higher salaries/bonuses. Over 90% of teachers stayed on in the 16 of 48
ived a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers
district and over 85% stayed in their school, in both groups. The comparison is made difficult because
ge award
ived a small were
award lessrather
likely than than teachers
no downturn
award. who receivedthis
However, a small
study award
foundtothat be retained
teachers
of the
Educ. Sci. economic
2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW in 2008 when unemployment was high. 16 of 48
rhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are
ge award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained high performing teachers who can
ER REVIEW 16 of 48
paid
rhapsjobs elsewhere.
teachers inteachers
receipt of a large award areand high performing
4.2.2. Teacher who Development
received a small award rather thanteachers
Support no award. who can
However, this study found that teachers
ain jobs
paid and elsewhere.
Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for
a small award rather whothan receivedno award.
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that
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development, a small
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ainTennessee’s
and Priority Schools (high poverty, highretention
minority schools). The study
ward wereRodriquez ininexperienced
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than evaluated
district.
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tately
al. [89] evaluated
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ennessee’s onlineestimates
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The 1sample included all teachers - working in
oal.
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[89] new teachers
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Governor’s Teaching schools.
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scheme, $5000 fora
involving
utilised forPrioritythe analysis.Schools Thein Tennessee
sample included during all theteachers
2012–2013 school in
working year.
uro year
attractthat
new they did nottomeet
teachers the commitment.
low-performing schools. There was nohad
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nessee during the 2012–2013 Three school
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Although 10 studies of moderate quality 2 suggested positive studies (3🔒) found no effect financial theincentives on teacher
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erence-in-difference-in-difference
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89] evaluated the$20,000
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erence-in-difference-in-difference the bonusClotfelter programme; et al.eligible
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et al.’sdid[56]
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ineligible
r that they rates
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gn.
ameThis is the North
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ayears
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teaching profession compared
over the first four
s inThis
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Carolina bonus challenging
incentive schools.
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retaining thisqualified
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Clotfelter
careers. Thiset implementation
al. one
was [100,101] of the bonus
compared
of the strongest studies programme; eligible and
using a randomised ineligible
control design
n annual bonus ofor$1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to
ds in high
after thepoverty teachers
implementation academically
involving in1009
ofthe challenging
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bonusschools
theteachers schools.
programme;
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schools. aThe hybrid
eligible this
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a programme
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consists and a regression
of a year-long curriculum
as long as bonus
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school, Overall, the
using adiscontinuity
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to
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hadretaining qualifiedto
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as the
long bonus
as they incentive
stayed in did
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same reduce
school turnover
and taught rates.
the However,
same subjects. it is not
Overall, clear
the
his is the North Carolina inexperienced
targeted bonus subjects
incentive
teachers. in high aimed
In poverty
the or year,
at retaining
second academically
monthlychallenging
qualified teachers
Teaching and schools.
LearningUnder this schemewere
Communities teachers
held
cause
at the $1800incentive
bonus was notnot large enough or is it rates.
because there was aisflaw in the
ighthe bonus
poverty were
or academically
where
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eligible
mentors for andreduce
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challenging turnover
mentees bonus
schools. metUnder of $1800
for peer
However,
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support
itteachers
and
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to discussan eligible
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mentation
causebonus of thebonus
the $1800 program was as notlarge all teachers whoiswere eligible actually areceived the
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itstayed
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of same subjects.development.
professional Overall, the
ponses
mentation from principals
of the program andas notteachers
all indicated
teachers whothe that
were the $1800
eligible bonus alone was not
ng as they stayed results
in the same suggest school that and thetaught
bonus incentive
same didactually
subjects. not reduce
Overall, received
the the rates. However, it is not clear
turnover
eachers.
ponses Theyprincipals
suggestedand thatteachers
administrative support, improving school conditions
e bonusfrom incentive whether
did not thisreduce
is because indicated
turnover the $1800 thatbonus
rates. the $1800
However,was not bonus
it large alone
is not enough was not
clear or is it because there was a flaw in the
rofessional
eachers. They development
suggested thatmight be
administrative better options.
support, Comparison
improving was
school made
conditions with
the $1800 bonusdesign was not andlarge implementation
enough or is itofbecause the program there as was not all teachers
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gible schoolsdevelopment
rofessional and those in schools might that
be narrowly
better options. missed out based on
Comparison wasthemade threshold
tion of the program bonus. as not Survey responses
all teachers whofrom were principals
eligible and teachers
actually received the withthat the $1800 bonus alone was not
indicated
ults showed
gible schools that
and teachers
those in receiving
schools a bonus
that narrowly weremissed 15% less out likely
based toon leavethe at the end
threshold
es from principals enough to retain
and teachers teachers.that
indicated They thesuggested
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was not support, improving school conditions
r
ultscompared
showed to other
that andteachers teachers
receiving in the
a bonussame school.
were This
15% less likely increased to
to conditions
leave at theafter
17% end
rs. They suggested thatfacilitating
administrative professional
support, development
improving might
school be better options. Comparison was made with
 PEER REVIEW 16 of 48

ed a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 21 of 45
e award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained
aps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can
d jobs elsewhere. Another randomised control evaluation of an induction programme for beginning teachers in
n and Rodriquezthe [99] evaluated also
Netherlands the showed
US$5000no retention
clear effect bonus program
on teacher for
retention [116]. It involved 71 schools with
Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high
338 beginning poverty,
secondary high minority
education teachers schools).
who were The randomly
study allocated to receive the induction
us incentive increased the retention
arrangements or aofbusiness-as-usual
teachers in tested control subjectsgroup.and grades, Because but schools routinely provide beginning
f Level 5 (Diploma in Education
teachers extra support, and Training)
control teachersteachers. alsoThis was asome
received quasi-induction albeit only for a maximum of
using a regressionone discontinuity
year. Experimentaldesign exploiting
teachers,the onsharp cut-off
the other hand,in afollowed
teacher’s the programme for three years under
ating that determines eligibility
controlled for the retention
conditions arranged bonusby the in participating
schools, schools. workload reduction and professional
which included
tative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic
development. Both groups were similar in background characteristics. data and data The results showed that three
d Tennessee’s online yearsteacher
later, evaluation
14% of theplatform,control group CODEand (contains the experimental group had left. (ES = +0.076).
12% ofvalue-added
rs) were utilised for the analysis.
Importantly, The sample
the study found included
that it wasallthe teachers
lack of working
certification in and the low teaching skills that most
ennessee during the 2012–2013
explained school
teachers year. the profession.
leaving
ely high evidence studies The(3🔒) found mostly
2 studies no effect of financial
reported positiveincentives
outcomes. on Allen
teacher and Sims [57] evaluated STEM Learning
l. [89] evaluated the Governor’s
Network Teachingdevelopment
professional Fellowship (GTF) courses scheme,
intended involving
to improve a teachers’ subject, pedagogical and
attract new teachers to low-performing
career knowledge, confidence schools. Teachers
and motivation.had to repay They used$5000retention
for data of teachers from England’s
year that they did Department
not meet the commitment.
for EducationThere (DfE)was Schoolno difference
Workforce in Census.
retentionThis was matched with the National
years) between recipient
STEM Learningand non-recipients,
Network to despite identifythe penalty
teachers who clause.
participated in the CPD courses. The authors used
ence-in-difference-in-difference
propensity score approach,
matching, Clotfelter
matching et participants
al. [100,101] with compared non-participants by known characteristics.
and after the implementation
To control forofunobserved the bonus programme; eligible and were
differences, comparisons ineligible
made between those who participated in
me schools using2010 a hybrid
with those of a who randomized
participated experiment
later. Theand a regression
authors argued that these individuals were therefore
. This is the Northmore
Carolinalikely bonus
to beincentive
similar in aimed
termsatof retaining
motivation qualified teachers
and career plans. Further analyses were also made
n high poverty orcomparing
academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers
science departments in schools before and after the treatment. The study suggests that
annual bonus of $1800takingifpart theyintaughtNational in anSTEM
eligible school, Network
Learning and will continue
professional to development is associated with an
long as they stayed in the same
increase school in
in retention and taught
the the same
profession as asubjects.
whole. The Overall,
oddsthe that a participant stays in the profession
the bonus incentive did not
one year afterreduce
completing turnovertheserates.
courses However,
was around it is not160% clear
higher than for similar non-participants,
use the $1800 bonus and wasthenot large enough
positive associationor is is
it because
sustained there
twowas years a flaw
laterinfor therecently qualified teachers. Using the
ntation of the program
more as not all teachers
rigorous who wereand
double-difference eligible actually received
triple-difference models thethat takes into account factors that are
onses from principals not and
includedteachers in theindicated
demographicthat theand $1800 bonus alone
background was notthe positive association is maintained.
measures,
chers. They suggested that administrative
However, there is no evidence support, thatimproving
completingschool conditions
CPD courses improves retention within the schools that
fessional development might be better options.
teachers were working in at the time of participation.Comparison was made with
ble schools and those inCohen schools thatused
[117] narrowly missed out
administrative based
data for on the threshold
51,811 US public school beginning teachers comparing
ts showed that teachers
whether receiving
they had a bonus
received were 15% less
a formal likely to programme
induction leave at the end or not, and their perceptions of workload
compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after
and classroom support. They correlated these variables with whether teachers stayed on the following
ect taught. A 10% year.increase reduces
Analysis on the probability
teacher induction of teachers
was based leaving
on 3172 by new1–4%public school teachers. This indicated
is reflects a patternthat
already
teachers in placewhoeven left before
reported theless
programme
mentoring wasthanintroduced.
stayers (effect size 0.12) and less supportive
fixed effects in the regression the effect
communication (effectwas sizenegative.
−0.04) and less common planning (effect size 0.11). Higher workload
domised control trial,
reductionFryerlevels[102] did examined
not relate a school-wide
to turnover. performance bonus
ed performance bonuses to school staff
De Angelis, Wall and Che [118] based on theirfoundschools’
thatprogress
having more report.comprehensive mentoring and induction
ion-to-treat (ITT) support
and treatment-of-the-treated
significantly decreased analyses,
the oddsthe of results
new teachersshowed that
changing districts and leaving the profession
ance bonus program afterhadone noyear.
effect on teacher
Quality retention.
of teacher support Some was reasons
based suggested
on teachers’ self-report of their perceptions. It is
uded incentives not being large
therefore possible enough, incentivewho
that teachers schemewerewas more toolikely
complex andor had no intention to stay in teaching
to leave
ves may not be effective.
were more Participating
likely to report schools lesswere given a perceptions
favourable lump sum incentive of programme quality.
ion teacher. Schools could De Jong decide andto award [119]
Campoli a subset of teachers
analysed with the highest
the observational data from the 2007–2008 Schools and Staffing
de among teachersSurvey by lottery.(SASS) Theto majority
see if the of use
schools opted forcoaches
of curricular group incentives.
is associated with teacher retention. Curricular
d teachers from 396 high-need
coaching public elementary,
provides new teachers middle,
with the andtechniques
high schools tofrom
incorporate evidence-based instructional
009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level
methods in their local context. Using multinomial logistic regression analysis, they compared the
schools, 233 werelikelihood
randomlyofassigned to the intervention
teachers leaving profession, staying group and 163 to school
or moving the of those who had a curricular coach
Retention outcomes and inthose
schools who that
didwerenot. offered
They found participation
that earlyincareer the program—
teachers in a school with a curricular coach was
ely declined to participate—were
less likely to leave compared with the
the profession outcomes
(relative risk in = −0.52).
schools
ratio that The effect was stronger for first year
opportunity to participate.
teachers, but much less so for second and third year teachers. However, having a curricular coach did
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 22 of 45

not have an influence on early career teachers’ decision to move school. It is possible that this was the
period of economic recession when there is less incentive to change profession.
Glazerman and Seifullah [23] evaluated the Chicago Teacher Advancement Program (TAP),
a teacher development and compensation programme. The implementation of the programme was
staggered across all schools with schools randomly assigned to implement sooner or later, creating
comparison group for analysis. Teacher retention was measured by comparing the retention of a
matched sample of over 2600 teachers in Chicago TAP and conventional public schools. In this
programme teachers and mentors met weekly in their “cluster groups”. Teachers were also given
performance incentives and had the opportunity to assume leadership roles. The results showed
positive effects on school retention only for the first cohort but the effect was not consistent across
cohorts. More teachers from the first cohort returned to their same school three years later compared
to teachers in non-TAP schools, an impact of nearly 12 percentage points. In other words, teachers
in Chicago TAP schools were about 20% more likely than teachers in comparison schools to be in
those same schools three years later. For teachers in schools that started the Chicago TAP in later
years, the impact was not obvious. There was some evidence of impacts on retention for subgroups of
teachers, such as those with less experience, but there was no consistent pattern.
A correlational study using a nationally representative sample showed a positive correlation
between participation in induction/mentoring programmes and the likelihood of teachers leaving
or moving school. However, it is not just having mentors, but having same-subject mentors that
mattered [120]. Having mentors from different subject areas had no influence on beginning teachers’
decision to leave. The study analysed data from the School Staffing Survey (SASS) and the Teacher
Follow-up Survey (TFS) which included a sample of 3235 beginning teachers in their first year of
teaching. The survey asked teachers about their participation in any form of induction programme
including mentoring, CPD, collaboration with other teachers and support. The multiple kinds of
support included in these induction programmes meant that it was not possible to isolate which of
these were most effective. Although the authors controlled for school and teacher effects, they were
unable to control for unobserved differences between teachers and schools. Because those who received
mentoring and those who did not were not randomly allocated, there may be inherent differences
between these two groups. It could be that schools or districts that offer mentoring support are
generally more supportive of their teachers, or have better working environment.
Latham and Vogt [121] compared the retention propensity of 506 elementary education graduates
in Illinois who had opted to undertake teacher preparation in a professional development school (PDS)
with another group of 559 traditionally prepared graduates matched on demographic characteristics.
The authors claimed that those trained in PDSs (defined as having elements of field placement, onsite
coursework and professional development) were more likely to stay in teaching for longer (about 0.25
of SD more than those who did not). It is important to note that the PDS group were self-selected and
hence were likely to be different to those that were in the non-PDS group.
Papay et al. [122] found that graduates of the Boston Teacher Residency Programme were less
likely to leave teaching in the first year (12%) than other new Boston public school teachers (27%). By
the fifth year, retention rates among BTR teachers were still higher than other public school teachers in
Boston (49% vs 25%). However, it has to be mentioned that BTR teachers were committed to teach in
Boston for three years after their residency year or pay a penalty equivalent to the programme tuition
fees of up to $10,000. They were more likely to stay until their fifth year, and did not leave suddenly
after their third year when their commitment had been fulfilled.
Ronfeldt and McQueen [123] drew on the SASS, TFS and BTLS data to investigate whether
different kinds of induction supports predict teacher turnover among first-year teachers. To mitigate
against unobserved factors, the authors used propensity score matching of demographic characteristics
to link 1600 teachers receiving extensive induction (i.e., 4 to 6 induction supports) with 1130 teachers
not receiving extensive induction (i.e., 0 to 3 types of support). Unlike previous studies that focused
on only one cohort, this study looked at three recent cohorts of teachers. In total, there were 13,000
 Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 23 of 45

across the three waves, but only 2340 were first year teachers that could be linked to both teacher and
0, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW school characteristics. The authors correlated the level of induction 16 ofsupport
48 with teacher outcomes
(leaving school and leaving profession). Multilevel regression analyses showed a negative correlation
ho received a small award rather
between the number than no ofaward.
combined However,
induction this supports
study found andthat teachers
teachers’ likelihood of leaving school or
ed a large award were teaching less in likely
theirthan second teachersyear who received
and across five a small
years.award Receiving to beextensive
retained induction supports reduced
ict. Perhaps teachers in receipt
migration by 5% of acompared
large award withare not high performing
receiving extensive teachers induction who can supports. Of all the induction
better paid jobs elsewhere. supports, supportive communication with school leadership had the biggest impact, reducing the
ger, Swain and Rodriquez odds by 55% [99] to evaluated
67%. Everythe US$5000
additional retention
induction bonuswas
support programassociated for with an average decrease in
achers in Tennessee’s the odds Priority Schools
of leaving (high poverty,
teaching by between high18% minority
and 22%. schools).
One major The studylimitation of this study is that the
at the bonus incentive measure increased the retention
of induction is based of teachers
on teacher in tested
self-reportsubjects andand this grades,
is pronebut to reporting biases.
tention of Level 5 (Diploma Speidel [124] in Education
evaluatedand Training)
a teacher developmentteachers. This was known
programme, a quasi- as the Skills, Tips, and Routines
tal study using a regression for Teacherdiscontinuity
Success (STARTS), designinexploiting
the Volusia the sharp Schools
County cut-off in a teacher’s
(Florida) designed for teachers of students
luation rating thatwith determines
special needs. eligibility Thefor the retention
study utilized data bonus onin the participating
employment schools.
histories of 771 new special needs
representative administrative teachers for data school supplemented
years 1998/99 byto county-level
2003/2004. economic The findings datasuggest and datathat the programme makes a
VAAS and Tennessee’s positive online teacher
difference in evaluation
the retention platform, CODE (contains
rate of teachers who tookvalue-added part in STARTS. However, there were no
or teachers) were controls utilised for differences
the analysis. The sample
between the two included
groupsall ofteachers
teachers.working There were in other variables that might
hools in Tennesseehave during been thein2012–2013
play with school respectyear. to teacher retention that were not accounted for.
moderately high evidence Further, studies one(3🔒) 2 showed found no effectoutcome.
mixed of financial incentives on
Weisbender [125]teacher
evaluated the California Mentor
Steele et al. [89] evaluated Teacher Program the Governor’s which Teaching
was developed Fellowship to retain (GTF) scheme, teachers
experienced involving anda to assist new teachers in the
entive to attract new teachers
transition
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW
to
into low-performing
teaching. Under schools.
this scheme,Teachers highly had to
talented repay $5000
classroom forteachers 16(mentors)
of 48 were given
first four year thatthe they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference
incentive to continue teaching and to use their instructional expertise to mentor their peers and in retention
over teachersfour years)
who received between
new teachersa recipient
small (mentees).
award andrather
non-recipients,
Thethan study despiteHowever,
noincluded
award. the mentors
336 penalty thisclause.
andstudy 638found
of their mentees
that teachersin 240 schools and
awho difference-in-difference-in-difference in the Priority approach,
Staffing Clotfelter
Program et
received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained questionnaires
46 retirees serving al. [100,101]
46 schools. compared
Personnel records and
esinbefore and after
the district. the aimplementation
over
Perhaps 5-year
teachers period
in receipt of the
were of bonus
a largeprogramme;
collected to assess
award arethe eligible
high length and
performingof time ineligible
each cohort
teachers whostayed
can in the district.
n easily
the same find betterschools using
Comparisons
paid a hybrid
jobs elsewhere. were made of abetween randomized mentors experiment
and a matched and group a regression
of non-mentors. Results varied from
ty design. Springer,This isSwain the
cohortNorth and Carolina
to cohort.
Rodriquez bonus
There was
[99] incentive
no effect
evaluated aimedonthe atUS$5000
retaining
retention qualified
forretention
the first cohort, teachers
bonus with non-mentees
program for being more
FOR
subjects PEER REVIEW 16 of 48
effectiveinteachershigh poverty likely toorstay
in Tennessee’s academically
within thechallenging
Priority school
Schools districtschools.
(high compared
poverty,Under tothis
high schemeWith
mentees.
minority teachers
the subsequent
schools). The studycohorts, mentees
leshowed
FOR forPEERan REVIEW
annual bonus
were of
more $1800
likely if they
to stay taught
compared in an toeligible
that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades,were school,
non-mentees. and
On will
the continue
other
16 of hand,
48 tomentors but also more likely
ceived a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers
bonus as long
not the retention as they
to of stayed
leave Level over in the
5 the same
(Diploma5-year in school
period and taught the
than non-mentors.
Education same
and Training)Althoughsubjects. Overall,
teachers.comparison the
This was amentors quasi- were matched,
arge award
ceived a small were lessrather likely than teachers who receivedthis a small award to be retained
gest that
experimental the award
bonus
study incentive
the using
selection athan did
of no
regression award.
highly However,
not discontinuity
reduce
effective turnover
teachers
design study
rates.
suggest found
exploiting thatthat
However, itteachers
thesharp
the two is notgroupsclearin
cut-off may not be equal. As Shifrer
a teacher’s
erhaps
arge awardteacherswere in
lessreceipt of a large award are high performing teachers be who can
is is because
overall the $1800
evaluation al.likely
et ratingbonus
[98]thatthan
was
noted, teachers
not large
it may
determines who
be received
enough
the
eligibilitycaseorforisaitthe
the small
because
high award there
performing
retention to was
bonus retained
ainflaw
teachers incanthefind jobs
participating more easily and are
schools.
rerhaps
paid jobs elsewhere.
teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can
implementation
Nationally representative of the program
therefore administrative as not all teachers who were eligible
more mobile. data supplemented by county-level economic data and data actually received the
wain
rvey paid and elsewhere.
jobs Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for
from responses
the TVAAS fromand principals
Tennessee’s and teachers
online teacher indicated that the platform,
evaluation $1800 bonus CODE alone was notvalue-added
(contains
s in Tennessee’s
wain and Rodriquez Priority
4.2.3. [99] Schools
Alternative
evaluated (high
Routes poverty,
the to highretention
Teaching
US$5000 minority bonus schools). The study
program for
retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support,
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in improving school conditions
sbonus
ating
incentive increased
in Tennessee’sSchools Priority
professional indevelopment
the retention
Schools (highthe of teachers
poverty, in tested
high minority subjects and grades,
schools). The made studybut
Priority Tennessee
There is during nomight be2012–2013
clear evidence betterthat options.
school
offering Comparison
alternative was
year. routes into with
teaching is beneficial in retaining
n bonus of Levelincentive 5 (Diploma
increased inthe Education
retention and
of Training)
teachers in teachers.
tested subjects Thisand was a quasi-
grades, but
ross eligible schools
Three moderately and
teachers. those
highTwo in schools
evidence studies that
studies narrowly
rated(3🔒) 2 that foundmissed out based
no effectalternative
examined on the
of financialroutes threshold
incentives into on teachershowed no clear
teaching
ndy
The ofusing
Level
results
retention.
a regression
5 (Diploma
showed
Steele etthat
discontinuity
al. [89] in evaluated
teachers Education design
receiving theand exploiting
Training)
a bonus
Governor’s were
the sharp cut-off
teachers.
15%
Teaching less This in a teacher’s
was
likelyteachers
Fellowship to leavea quasi-
(GTF) atscheme,
the end
advantages of any alternative pathways in retaining (Table 9). involving a
on dy rating
using that determines
a regression eligibility for
discontinuity design the retention
exploiting bonus
the sharp in participating
cut-off schools.
in a teacher’s
ool year incentive
$20,000 compared totoattract
othernew teachersteachers in to the same school.
low-performing This
schools.increased
Teachers to had 17%toafter repay $5000 for
onsentative
rating administrative
that determines data supplemented
eligibility for the by county-level
retention bonus economic
in participating data and schools. data
for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in and
Table 9. Number of studies with of teachers
security rating: leaving
Alternative by 1–4%routes retention.
retention
Ssentative
and Tennessee’s administrative online data teacher evaluation platform,
supplemented by county-level CODEeconomic (containsdata value-added
and data
wever, this reflects a pattern already in place even
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. before the programme was introduced.
Shechers)
and were utilised
Tennessee’s for the
online teacheranalysis.evaluationThe sample platform, includedCODEall teachersvalue-added
(contains working in Neutral or Negative
school
Using fixed effects inSecurity
the regression Rating
a difference-in-difference-in-difference the effect
Positive was negative.
Outcome
approach, Unclear/Mixed
Clotfelter et al. Outcome
[100,101] compared
in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. Outcome
chers)
uster
hazard were
ratesutilised
randomised before for
andthe
control analysis.
trial,
after Fryer
the The
[102]sample
implementation examined included
of athe all teachers
school-wide
bonus working
performance
programme; inbonus
eligible and ineligible
erately high evidence studies (3🔒)
3 found no effect of- financial incentives on- teacher -
atinteachers
Tennessee
provided during
inperformance
the same the 2012–2013
bonuses
schools toschool
using school a year.staff based
hybrid of aon their schools’
randomized progress report.
experiment and a regression
et al. [89]
erately high evaluated
evidence the Governor’s
studies Teaching Fellowship (GTF)incentives
scheme, involving a
an intention-to-treat
discontinuity design.(ITT) This and is (3🔒)
the found
North no effect
2treatment-of-the-treated
Carolina of- financial
bonus analyses,
incentive the results
aimed aton 1 teacher
showedqualified
retaining that teachers1
eettoal. attract new
[89] evaluated teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for
performance
in targeted bonus the
subjects program
in highGovernor’s had noTeaching
poverty effect
or onFellowship
academically teacherchallenging (GTF) scheme,
retention. Some
schools. involving
reasonsUnder a scheme teachers
suggested
this
eour to year
attract thatnew they did nottomeet
teachers the commitment.
low-performing schools.There was nohad
Teachers difference
to repay in $5000
retention for
effectwereincluded
eligible for incentives
an annual
Silva notetbonus
being
al. [126] large
of $1800 enough,
evaluated if they incentive
a taught
teacherin scheme wasprogramme
an eligible
residency too
school,complex and continue
and(known
will as thetoTeaching Quality
ouryear
our years) thatbetween
they did recipient
not meet and
the non-recipients,
commitment. despite
There was theno penalty
difference clause.
in retention
dreceive
incentives may not
the bonusPartnership be effective.
as long as they Grants Participating
stayed in the same
Program), schools
whichschool were
worksand given a lump
taught the same
in partnership sum incentive
withsubjects.
local school Overall, the and universities
districts
fference-in-difference-in-difference
our years) between recipient and approach, Clotfelter
non-recipients, despite et al.
the [100,101]
penalty clause. compared
er full
results union
suggest teacher.that
where Schools
the bonus
prospectivecould decide
teachersto
incentive didaward
not
complete a asubset
reduce of teachers
turnover
coursework with rates.with the highest
However,
supervised it is notexperience
fieldwork clear teaching in a
ore and after the implementation ofapproach,
fference-in-difference-in-difference the bonusClotfelter programme; et al. eligible
[100,101] andcompared
ineligible
dwhether
or divide among
this is becauseteachers the by
$1800lottery.bonus The was majority
not of
large schools
enough opted
or is for
it group
because
school for at least a year. The data shows that there is no difference in the retention rates of TRP and incentives.
there was a flaw in the
same
ore and schools
after theusing a hybrid ofof athe
implementation randomized
bonus experiment
programme; and and
eligible a regression
ineligible
udentsdesign and
and teachers from 396
implementation
non-TRP high-need
of the program
teachers within public aselementary,
district not andmiddle,
all teachers
(89% 87% who and
werehigh
respectively) eligibleschools
andactually fromschools
within received the for TRP and 79%
(77%
sign.
same This is
schools the North
using Carolina
a hybrid bonusof a incentive
randomized aimed at retaining
experiment qualified
and a teachers
regression
through
bonus. 2009–2010
Survey responses were analysed. from principals Schools were selectedindicated
and teachers based on some that the criteria,
$1800e.g., bonus level alone was not
cts inThis
sign. highispoverty
the North or academically challenging schools. Under thisqualified
scheme teachers teachers
Ofenoughtheseto schools,
retain 233 Carolina
teachers.wereThey bonus
randomly suggestedincentive
assigned thataimed
to theat retaining
intervention
administrative support,group and 163 to
improving the conditions
school
an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to
ncts in
group. high poverty
Retention or academically
outcomes in schools challenging
that were
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with schools.
offered Under this
participation scheme in theteachers
program—
s as annuallong as bonus they stayed in the sametaught school and taught the same subjects. will Overall, the
yan ultimately
teachers acrossdeclined of $1800
eligible to schoolsif they and thosein
participate—were an
incomparedeligible
schools school,
with
that theand
narrowly outcomes
missed continue
in
outschoolsbased to on that the threshold
that the
s eligibility.
as long bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear
ffered theas they
opportunity stayed toin the same
participate. school and taught the same
The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end subjects. Overall, the
ecause
that thethe $1800incentive
bonus bonus was did notnot large reduceenough or is it rates.
turnover because there was
However, it aisflawnotinclear the
 Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 24 of 45

for non-TRP). Teachers who moved schools were more likely to move to higher performing schools
with a smaller proportion of ethnic minority children.
The second study by Boyd et al. [96] compared the Maths Immersion Programme with traditional
FOR PEER REVIEW
certification and Teach for America (TFA). Compared to their16traditionally of 48
prepared peers, immersion
FOR PEER REVIEW teachers were more likely to leave teaching in NYC (ES = −0.14) although less so than TFA teachers
16 of 48
ceived a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers
(ES = −0.3). They were also more likely than traditionally prepared teachers to transfer or leave their
arge award
ceived a small were
award lessrather
likely than teachers who receivedthis a small award tothat
be retained
school (ESthan no award.
= −0.2). However,
TFA teachers were more study found
likely to leave teachers
teaching after four years but less likely to
erhaps teachers
arge award were less in receipt
likely of
thana large award
teachers who are high
received performing
a small award teachers
to be who
retainedcan
leave their schools. This is a large study using administrative data.
rerhaps
paid jobs elsewhere.
teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can
wain and Rodriquez
r paid jobs elsewhere. 4.2.4. [99]
Teacherevaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for
Accountability
swainin Tennessee’s Priority Schools
and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the (high poverty,
US$5000 highretention
minority bonus schools). The study
program for
One commonly cited reasons for teachers leaving the profession is high stakes tests and
sbonus incentive increased
in Tennessee’s the retention
Priority Schools (high of teachers
poverty, in tested
high minoritysubjects and grades,
schools). The study but
accountability pressures [127–129]. However, our review found that removing or reducing teacher
n of Level
bonus 5 (Diploma
incentive increasedinthe Education
retention and Training)
of teachers teachers.
in tested subjects Thisand was a quasi-
grades, but
accountability does not seem to have a clear benefit on retention, although the evidence base is
dy using a regression discontinuity design exploiting
n of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi- the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s
particularly weak here (Table 10).
on dyrating
usingthat determines
a regression eligibility for
discontinuity designthe retention
exploitingbonus the sharpin participating
cut-off in a teacher’sschools.
sentative administrative
on rating that determines eligibility data supplemented
for10.the by county-level
retention bonuswith economic
in participating data and data
Table Number of studies security rating:schools. Accountability and retention.
Ssentative
and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform,
administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and dataCODE (contains value-added
chers) were
S and Tennessee’s utilised for the
online analysis.
teacher The sample
evaluation platform,included
CODEall teachersvalue-added
(contains working in Neutral or Negative
Security Rating Positive Outcome Unclear/Mixed Outcome
in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. Outcome
chers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in
erately
in Tennesseehigh evidence
during the studies (3🔒)
2012–2013 3 found
schoolno effect of- financial incentives on- teacher
year. -
et al. [89] evaluated
erately high evidence studies (3🔒) the Governor’s 2 Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme,
found no effect of- financial incentives on2 teacher involving a 1
eettoal. attract new teachers
[89] evaluated to low-performing
the Governor’s Teaching schools.
FellowshipTeachers
(GTF) had to repay
scheme, $5000 fora
involving
eour to year
attractthatnewthey did nottomeet
teachers the commitment.
Highlow-performing
stakes tests which
There
schools.
increase
was nohad
Teachers difference
to repay
teacher accountability
in $5000
retention
are afor
reported source of stress. Fuchsman,
our years) between
our year that they Sass recipient
did not and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause.
andmeet
Zamarrothe commitment. There wasof
[129] took advantage noadifference
policy change in retention
in Georgia, US in 2011 when testing was
fference-in-difference-in-difference
our years) between recipient approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared
removed forand non-recipients,
Grades one and two despite
and fromthe penalty
2017 onwards clause. when testing for science and social science
ore and after the implementation ofapproach,
fference-in-difference-in-difference the bonusClotfelter
programme; et eligible
al. [100,101] andcompared
ineligible
were removed for Grades 6 and 7. The study compared the attrition rates of teachers in grades one to
same
ore andschools
after theusing a hybrid ofof athe
implementation randomized
bonusand experiment
programme; and and
eligible a regression
ineligible
eight, before and after testing with teachers in other grades where testing had not been removed
sign.
sameThis is the North
schools using Carolina
a hybrid bonus
of aincentive
randomized aimedexperiment
at retaining and qualified
a teachers
regression
using a difference-in-difference approach. The study found no impact on teachers’ likelihood of
cts inThis
sign. highispoverty
the North or academically
Carolina bonus challenging
incentive schools.
aimed at Under
retaining thisqualified
scheme teachers
teachers
leaving teaching, changing schools within a district, or moving between districts. However, there is
an annual bonus
cts in high poverty of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to
a or academically
reduction in thechallenging
probability schools.
of teachers Underwiththis 0–4scheme
years of teachers
experience leaving the profession when
san as annual
long as bonus
they stayed of $1800in the sametaught
if they schoolin andantaught
eligible the same subjects.
school, and will Overall,
continuethe to
testing requirements were relaxed from 14 to 13 percentage points for teachers in grades 1 and 2 and
that the bonus
s as long as they stayed incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However,
in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the it is not clear
from 14 to 11 percentage points in grades 6 and 7. Although comparisons were made before and after
ecause
that thethe $1800incentive
bonus bonus was didnotnot large enough
reduce or is it rates.
turnover because there was
However, it aisflawnotinclear
the
testing, the comparisons were not between similar groups.
ementation
ecause the $1800 of thebonusprogram wasasnotnotlarge
all teachers
enoughwho or iswere eligible
it because actually
there was areceived
flaw in the the
Shirrell [130] estimated the impact of accountability under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)
esponses from principals and teachers indicated that
ementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the the $1800 bonus alone was not
where schools were held accountable for the performance of minority ethnic subgroups only if the
teachers.from
esponses Theyprincipals
suggestedand thatteachers
administrative
indicated support,
that the improving
$1800 bonus school
alone conditions
was not
number of students in those subgroups exceeded a minimum subgroup size. Using the minimum
professional development might be better options.
teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions Comparison was made with
subgroup size threshold of 40 for a regression discontinuity analysis, Shirrell compared schools on
ligible schools and those in schools that narrowly
professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with missed out based on the threshold
either side of the threshold before and after NCLB. A difference-in-difference analysis was also used
esults
ligibleshowed
schoolsthat andteachers
those in receiving
schools that a bonus weremissed
narrowly 15% less outlikely
based toonleave
the at the end
threshold
to compare teachers of different ethnic sub-groups. The study found that Black teachers in schools
esults showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at theafter
ear compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% end
that were held accountable for the performance of Black student subgroup were less likely to leave
ubject
ear taught. A
compared to 10%otherincrease
teachers reduces
in thethe sameprobability
school. Thisof teachers
increased leavingto 17% by 1–4%
after
than Black teachers in schools not accountable for the Black subgroup’s performance. There was no
, this reflects
ubject taught.a A pattern already reduces
10% increase in place even before the programme
the probability of teachers leaving was introduced.
by 1–4%
difference in attrition for the White subgroup. One reason suggested could be that Black teachers
hool fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative.
, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced.
were more likely to be paired with minority ethnic pupils and it is possible that these teachers were
hool randomised
fixed effectscontrol
in the trial, Fryer [102]
regression examined
the effect a school-wide performance bonus
was negative.
motivated to stay on in the school seeing that the schools were taking action to address the achievement
vided
randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined aon
performance bonuses to school staff based their schools’
school-wide progress report.
performance bonus
gap between Black and White students. Shirrell also surveyed student teachers before they began
tention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated
vided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress analyses, the results showed that
report.
teaching and after. The results showed that challenging working conditions generally do not predict
ormance bonus program
tention-to-treat (ITT) andhad no effect on teacher retention.
treatment-of-the-treated analyses,Some reasons
the results suggested
showed that
changes in student teachers’ career plans, although poor working conditions in training schools are
included incentives not being large enough, incentive
ormance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested scheme was too complex and
associated with decreases in the lengths of time they plan to teach during their careers. Overall, there
entives may not be effective. Participating schools
included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and were given a lump sum incentive
was no evidence that working conditions and accountability had any effect on attrition of ethnic
lentives
union teacher.
may not Schools
be effective.couldParticipating
decide to award schoolsa subset of teachers
were given a lump with
sum the highest
incentive
minority primary school teachers.
divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools
l union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest opted for group incentives.
s and teachers
divide from 396by
among teachers high-need
lottery. The public elementary,
majority of schoolsmiddle,
optedand forhighgroup schools from
incentives.
gh 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected
s and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from based on some criteria, e.g., level
hese schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention
gh 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level group and 163 to the
up. Retention
hese schools, 233 outcomes in schoolsassigned
were randomly that were tooffered participation
the intervention group in the
andprogram—
163 to the
mately declined to participate—were compared
up. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—with the outcomes in schools that
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 25 of 45

Jones [131] used an instrumental variable approach to estimate teacher turnover under performance
pay incentives for maths and English teachers (an accountability system), employing nationally
representative datasets. Teachers in performance pay districts earned a salary that was $2825 less
than their counterparts in non-performance pay districts and the performance pay may be used to
compensate for the difference. Data from Teacher Follow-up Survey showed that performance pay
was not considered the most important reason for teachers’ decision to leave. Since the performance
pay incentives were rewarded at the school level, this finding may also suggest that other teachers
were free-riding on the efforts of Math and English teachers. Because the sample consisted of only 64
teachers caution is urged in interpreting this result. Also, implementation of performance pay incentive
vary between districts. For example, performance pay was more effective in reducing turnover when it
was implemented on a school level than on an individual level, and male teachers also responded more
positively than female teachers to performance pay. In summary, the evidence on retention is not clear.

5. Discussion

5.1. The Evidence on Recruitment and Retention to the Teaching Profession

In summary, financial incentives seem promising for attracting new teachers into teaching,
and in increasing the number of teachers in challenging schools with a high proportion of poor or
disadvantaged children. However, the effect is stronger for high performing schools and schools with
lower proportions of disadvantaged children. The evidence suggests that for financial incentives to
work, they have to be large enough to compensate for the challenges of working in less desirable
schools and areas, or to compensate for the salary that teachers would receive if they had been in
comparable profession. This is especially so for shortage subject teachers like maths and science where
graduates from these subjects tend to command a higher salary in the labour market. In England,
bursaries are offered to trainees in secondary shortage subjects. The lower proportion of bursary
holders in state-funded schools compared to non-bursary holders, suggests that the bursaries are not
attracting shortage subject teachers to state-funded schools. This may be because the bursaries are
not large enough. It is also possible that individuals who were awarded bursaries do not eventually
enter teaching because, unlike in many states in the US, there are no bonds or tie-ins to commit bursary
recipients to teaching. The effect of financial incentives is also not consistent across genders and
age groups. Wage premiums, for example, are potentially more effective in attracting young female
teachers than older male teachers, but more effective in retaining older male teachers.
As for retention, financial incentives do not seem as be as effective. Although many studies do
show positive results, the more robust studies which control for context suggest that teachers only stay
while the incentive is available. Such short-term results are not useful in solving the chronic shortage
of teachers. In fact, the evidence suggests that the use of discriminatory incentives may even worsen
overall retention. Eligibility for an incentive, or a small incentive, seems to make little difference.
Where incentives are used, they need to be substantial.
In many cases, monetary incentives work only because teachers are required to commit to teach
for a specified period or certain subjects in specified schools or areas as part of the contract agreement.
These incentives often entail a penalty for breaking the contract, raising questions about the value of
such an approach and the potential for a kind of enforced retention where teachers feel ‘tied-in’ to a
role that they no longer wish to do.
In recent months, in England, the government have announced pay increases for teachers across
the board [132,133]. These are not specific incentives nor attached to particular individuals, subjects or
regions as we have examined in the section above. However, the plans do indicate that teachers new to
the profession will receive a higher increase than those who are more experienced. The link between
teacher pay and recruitment/retention is still fairly unclear but it will be important to examine whether
these reforms do appear to have any impact on the number or type of graduates entering teaching, or
the number of teachers choosing to continuing working in schools.
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 26 of 45

5.2. Beyond Financial Incentives—Implications for Policy, Practice and Research

Financial incentives have been used for decades to try and encourage increased numbers of
graduates to enter the teaching profession. Despite the evidence that they can have some positive
impacts, there is nothing to suggest that they are likely to ‘solve’ the recruitment challenges that
countries such as England and the US currently face on a longer term basis. Economists have argued
that the use of monetary incentives needs to consider how they interact with intrinsic and social
motivations and what happens when they are withdrawn [134].
Thus, it is important that policymakers and school leaders look to alternative or additional
approaches too. Relying primarily upon financial inducements is unlikely to be an effective and
sustainable strategy for recruitment and retention, and arguably it is not desirable either. It is not
clear, for example, whether the extrinsic motivation offered by financial incentives, leads to the best or
most-suited graduates entering teaching.
While monetary incentives may be potentially useful as a way to increase the supply of shortage
subject teachers and to attract teachers to challenging schools or areas, we question, for example,
whether they are necessarily the best approach to improving recruitment as it is quite clear that the
attraction is not lasting. Where prospective or qualified teachers are asked to report the factors that
influence their likelihood for entering or staying in teaching, or that might encourage those in the
profession to leave, money rarely features highly [27,32,33,94]. Instead there are other factors which
may offer more promise for recruitment and retention if addressed.
Support in schools for teachers in the early stages of their careers and continuing professional
development for established teachers appear to offer potential benefits for retention but are also
arguably important in their own right. The evidence for mentoring and professional development is
uniformly positive for mentees but the studies that we have to make these judgements are unfortunately
not of the strongest quality. The stronger studies do not show consistent positive effects [23,119]. There
is also little evidence on the effectiveness of specific induction programmes for retaining new teachers.
The few studies that have looked at this area are either methodologically fairly weak and/or report
mixed or unclear findings. The stronger studies find little or no impact. A consistent issue though is
the multi-faceted nature of these interventions which makes it difficult to identify, accurately measure
and understand the elements of the induction programmes. It is not always clear whether it is the
induction alone or a combination of other factors that makes a difference. Some of these studies also
use ‘intention’ to stay in the profession as an outcome rather than actual attrition figures. These are
issues which need to be factored into future design and evaluation of induction programmes.
In England, the government has recently introduced the Early Career Framework (ECF) with a
view to providing teachers with a strong induction programme, including early professional support,
mentoring and a reduced teaching timetable [28]. The potentially promising findings on some of
these areas in this review are therefore welcome news, but given the relative weakness of the studies,
it is not clear to what extent the ECF is an evidence-informed initiative, or how confident we can
be in its outcomes. Robust evaluations of the ECF in its early years, however, would provide some
much-needed evidence in this area and will be vital for informing ongoing iterations of the policy or
those like it.
Our review also tentatively points to the importance of improving school cultures and ethos for
recruitment and retention. While we found very few rigorous studies that evaluated interventions
related to areas such as accountability, teacher stress, working conditions, behaviour, workload or
levels of support from teachers/leaders, some of the correlational and survey-based studies indicate
that these could be valuable areas to explore further. As we note above, there are likely myriad other
reasons for improving some of these wider factors too, including pupil/teacher performance and
wellbeing. These could well be enough to justify the trialling of interventions that seek to achieve
such aims, with a view to also understanding their impact on recruitment and retention. While we
acknowledge that measuring and evaluating some of these school-level approaches at scale is arguably
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 27 of 45

more complex than the evaluation of government-administered financial incentives, we would contend
that such evaluations are vital and should form an integral part of any new policy initiative.
Many of the interventions also seemingly address the symptoms rather than the cause of teacher
shortages. As See and Gorard [14] have shown, government policies that aim to improve the quality
of teachers has led to a reduction in the number accepted into teacher training. Manipulating the
number of teachers that can be trained in higher education institutions and reducing school funding
all have ramifications on the number of teachers in schools. A more coherent and long-term approach
to policies is therefore needed.

5.3. Strengths and Limitations of the Review

This review systematically and rigorously synthesised approaches and interventions used for
improving the recruitment and retention of teachers. It is the only comprehensive single-study review
that we know of which includes robust appraisal of the research design and methods used within each
study. This quality-appraisal is key to the claims that we are able to make in terms of the most effective
approaches and the strength or amount of evidence available to support them. While our review
focuses on the inclusion of studies using experimental or quasi-experimental designs, we have also
sought to acknowledge where evidence from other types of study might be helpful for understanding
particular issues or highlighting where there are potential evidence gaps. Finally, although our review
had broad parameters, included over 7000 studies at the outset and a process of careful and rigorous
screening, the criteria that we applied do mean that it is of course possible that relevant and potentially
useful studies have been missed or excluded.

Author Contributions: Design and methodology of the review, S.G., B.H.S. and R.M.; Formal analysis, B.H.S. and
R.M.; Data extraction and evidence rating, B.H.S., R.M., S.G., S.A.; Original draft preparation and editing, D.K.;
Writing—review and editing, B.H.S., R.M., S.G. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of
the manuscript.
Funding: This research was funded by the Economic Social and Research Council, grant number ES/R007349/1.
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Nada El Soufi for assisting with the database searches and screening
of the data.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the
study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, or in the decision to
publish the results.

Appendix A
Template used for extracting data from each included study

Overview

Brief Description of the Intervention

- Aim and type of intervention: e.g., financial incentives (performance-related pay, scholarships,
bursaries, housing benefits, pension scheme)
- Phase: Primary/secondary/general
- Country:
- How the intervention works: There must be enough information to enable identification of key
features of a successful intervention, if it works.

Method

Research Design
- Does it have a control and comparison group?
- Does it have pre- and post- event comparison?
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 28 of 45

- How is randomisation or other allocation to groups carried out?

- Was there an intervention?

Sample
- Size of sample
- How were samples identified?
- School characteristics, e.g., primary, secondary, rural, urban, challenging schools
- How many cases were lost at each stage?

Outcome Measures
What are the outcomes and how were they collected?

- Is there a pre-defined primary outcome, or is there an element of ‘dredging’ for success?

Analysis (if Relevant)

- What kind of analysis was carried out?
- Are there pre- and post-test comparisons?
- Are effect sizes cited or calculable?
- How was the performance of treatment and comparison groups compared?

Findings Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW

- Reviewers’ analysis of the results (re-calculate effect sizeswho

teachers if not estimated
received a small or if inrather
award doubt).
than no award. However, this stu
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a sma
Commentary in the
Educ. Sci.district.
2020, 10, x Perhaps
FOR PEER teachers
REVIEW in receipt of a large award are high perform
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere.
Aspects of the study that might threaten or enhance teachersits who
validity.
Springer, SwainThis
received and could
a smallRodriquez
award include fidelity
[99] than
rather evaluated tothe US$5000
no award. However,retention
this stu
treatment, quality of counterfactual, extraneous/confounding effective
who receivedvariables,
teachers a large otherwere
in Tennessee’s
award programmes
Priority
less likely going
Schools
than on poverty,
(high
teachers who receivedhigh minori
a sma
that may have affected the results, and conflicts of interest. showed
in the
Educ. that10,
Sci.district.
2020, thexPerhaps
bonus
FOR PEERincentive
REVIEW increased
teachers in receipt the of aretention
large award of teachers
are high in tested
perform su
not
easilythefindretention
better paid of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teache
jobs elsewhere.
experimental
teachers who study
Springer, Swain
received usingand a regression
a smallRodriquez
award rather discontinuity
[99] than
evaluated design
no award.the exploiting
US$5000 the
thisshar
However,retention stu
Appendix B
overall
effective
who evaluation
teachers
received a large rating
in award that
Tennessee’s determines
were Priority
less likely eligibility
Schools for the
(high
than teachers retention
poverty,
who highbonus
received minori
a sma in
Educ. Sci.district.
2020, 10,
thexPerhaps
FOR PEER REVIEW
A ‘sieve for judging the trustworthiness of causal Nationally showed
research
in the that representative
studies bonus (Gorard,administrative
incentive
teachers increased
2017)
in receipt data
of supplemented
the aretention
large award by
arecounty-level
of teachers in tested
high perform e
su
from
not
easily the
thefind TVAAS
retention
better and Tennessee’s
of Level
paid jobs 5 (Diploma
elsewhere. online in teacher evaluation
Education and platform,
Training) CODE teache
Design Scale Dropout teachers Outcomes
who received a small Other Threats
award rather than Ratingno award. However, this stu
estimates
experimental
Springer,for study
teachers)
Swain using were
and utilised for
a regression
Rodriquez the evaluated
analysis.
discontinuity
[99] The
the sample
design exploiting
US$5000 included
the shar
retention a
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a sma
Standardised
Fair design for Large number of Priority
Minimal attrition, no overall Schools
teachersinin
effectiveevaluation Tennessee
rating Nothat
Tennessee’s during
determines
evidence of the 2012–2013
Priority eligibility
Schools (high school
for the year.
retention
poverty, highbonus
minori in
inpre-specified
the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high perform
comparison cases per comparison evidence of impact Nationally
showed Three that moderately
representative high
the bonus incentive evidence
administrative
diffusion orincreased
other studiesthe(3🔒)
data found
supplemented
retention
4 ofno effect
by
teachers of financia
county-level
in tested e
su
independent
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere.
(e.g., RCT) group on findings retention.
from
not the Steele etand
theretention
TVAAS al. [89]
of evaluated
Tennessee’s
threat
Level 5 (Diploma the Governor’s
online teacher
in Education Teaching
evaluation Fellowship
and platform,
Training) CODE (GT
teache
outcome
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention
$20,000 incentive
estimates
experimental for study to using
teachers) attract
wereanew teachers
utilised
regression for to
thelow-performing
analysis.
discontinuity schools.included
The sample
design exploiting Teachers
the shar a
effective teachers in Tennessee’s
Pre-specified Indication Priority Schools (high poverty, high minori
of
Balanced comparison Medium number of each
overallof
Priority the first
Schools
evaluation four
in year
Tennessee
rating that
that they
during did
determines not
the meet
2012–2013the
eligibility commitment.
school
for the year. There
retention was
bonus no
in
Some initial showed
outcome, thatnotthe bonus incentive
diffusion or increased
other the retention of teachers in tested su
(e.g., RDD, cases per comparison ratesThree
(75% over
Nationally four years)
moderately
representative high between
evidencerecipient
administrative studies and
3 non-recipients,
data (3🔒) found no by
supplemented effect despite theep
of financia
county-level
imbalance or attrition not
standardised
the retention or notof Level threat,5 unintended
(Diploma in Education and Training) teache
Difference-in-Difference) group from Using
retention.
the TVAAS a difference-in-difference-in-difference
Steele etand
al. [89] evaluated
Tennessee’s the Governor’s
online approach, Clotfelter
Teachingplatform,
teacher evaluation Fellowship CODE et a
(GT
independent study using
experimental variation in delivery
a regression discontinuity design exploiting the shar
hazard
$20,000 rates
estimates for before
incentive teachers) andwere
to attract after
new the implementation
teachers
utilised for to of the
thelow-performing
analysis. Thebonus
schools.
sample programme;
Teachersa
included
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in
Matched comparison Small number of teachers
each of the
Priority infirst
Schools thefour
insameyearEvidence
schools
Tennesseethat they of
using
during didthe a 2012–2013
not hybrid
meet theof a randomized
commitment.
school year. Thereexperimwas no
Initial imbalance or Nationally representative
Not pre-specified administrative
but experimenter effect,data supplemented by county-level e
(e.g., Propensity score cases per comparison discontinuity
ratesThree
(75% over design.
moderately This
four years) highisbetween
the North
evidence Carolina
recipient
studies 2 bonus
and
(3🔒) incentive
non-recipients,
found no effectaimed
despiteat retai
the p
of financia
moderate attrition from
validthe TVAAS and Tennessee’s
outcome online teacher evaluation platform, CODE
diffusion or variation
matching) group in targeted
UsingSteele
retention. subjects in [89]
highevaluated
poverty or
a difference-in-difference-in-difference
et al. theacademically
Governor’s challenging
approach, schools. Unde
Clotfelter
Teaching Fellowship et a
(GT
estimates for teachers) in delivery
were utilised for the analysis. The sample included a
were
hazard
$20,000 eligible
rates
incentive for an
before annual
and after
to attract bonus
new the of $1800
implementation
teachers if they taught inschools.
of the bonus
to low-performing an eligible
programme; schoo
Teachers
Comparison with poor Very small number Substantial Priority
Outcome Schoolsissues in Tennessee during theof2012–2013 school year.
receiveof theinwith
teachers
each bonus
thefour
first as year
samelong Strong
as they
schools
that indication
they stayed
using
did not ainmeet
the same
hybrid theof school and taught
a randomized
commitment. the
wassam
Thereexperim no
or no equivalence of cases per imbalance and/or Three moderately
of validity or high evidence
diffusion or poorly studies (3🔒) 1 found no effect of financia
results
rates (75% suggest
discontinuity over that years)
design.
four the
Thisbonus
isbetween incentive
the North didand
Carolina
recipient not
bonusreduce turnover
incentive
non-recipients, aimed rates.
despiteat retai
theHop
(e.g., volunteers) comparison group high attrition retention. Steele et al. [89]
appropriateness evaluated
specified approach the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GT
whether
in targeted
Using this a isdifference-in-difference-in-difference
because
subjects the $1800
in high poverty bonus was not large
or academically enough or
challenging
approach, is it because
schools.
Clotfelter Unde
et a
Attrition not $20,000 incentive
Too eligible
many outcomes, to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers
No report of A trivial scale of design
were
hazard and
rates implementation
for an annual
before and after of the program
bonus of $1800
implementationas not all
if they ofteachers
taught in an
the bonus who were eligibl
eligible
programme; schoo
each
reported or too high bonus. of the
weak measures, first four
or yearNo consideration
that they did not of meet the
0 of commitment. There was no
comparator study, or N unclear receive
teachers Survey
the theresponses
inbonus as long
same from
as
schools
threats toprincipals
they stayedainand
using
validity the teachers
hybrid same a indicated
school and taught
randomized that the
the$180
experim sam
rates
for any comparison enoughpoor(75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the p
reliability
results to retain
suggest
discontinuity teachers.
that
design. the They
Thisbonus
is suggested
incentive
the North that not
did
Carolina administrative
bonusreduce support,
turnover
incentive aimed atimpro
rates. Ho
retai
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et a
and
whetherfacilitating
in targeted thissubjects professional
is because the $1800
in high development
poverty bonus wasmight
or academicallynot largebe better options.
enough
challenging orschools. Compa
is it because
Unde
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme;
teachers
design and
were eligibleacross foreligible
implementation
an annual schools andprogram
of the
bonus those
of $1800 inasschools
if not all
they that narrowly
teachers
taught in an who missed out
were eligibl
eligible schoo
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experim
eligibility.
bonus. theThe
receive Survey bonus results
responses showed
as long from
as theythat teachers
principals
stayed inand receiving
the teachers a indicated
same school bonusandwere 15%
that
taught the
the less
$180
samlik
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retai
of the school
enough
results to retain
suggest year
that compared
teachers. Theyto
the bonus other teachers
suggested
incentive that not
did inreduce
the same
administrative school.
support,
turnover This
impro
rates. Hoin
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Unde
controlling
and
whether thisfor
facilitating subject
is because taught.
professional
the $1800 A 10%
development
bonus increase
wasmightnotreduces the probability
be enough
large better options. of teac
Compa
or is it because
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible schoo
points. and
teachers
design However,
across this reflects
eligible
implementation schoolsofathe
pattern
and those
program already
inas in all
schools
not place
that even before
narrowly
teachers the progra
who missed
were out
eligibl
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the sam
Including
eligibility.
bonus. Survey the
Theschool
results
responses fixed
showed effects
from that inteachers
the regression
principals andreceiving theaeffect
teachers bonuswas
indicated were negative.
15%
that theless$180lik
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. Ho
of the
enough In school
atocluster
retain yearrandomised
compared
teachers. They control
to other
suggested trial, Fryer
teachers
that [102]
in theexamined
administrativesame support,a school-wid
school. This
improin
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because
scheme
controlling
and thatfor
facilitating provided
subject performance
taught.development
professional A 10% bonuses
increase to reduces
mightschool staff based
the probability
be better on their
options. sch
of teac
Compa
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligibl
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262
Appendix C
The table summarises pieces that were reviewed and rated below 2. These tended to be small-scale,
have considerable attrition, no clear comparator, and/or rely on reports of intention to stay or leave.
Study Strategy Impact
Positive effect in keeping
Performance incentive high-performing teachers in
Adnot et al. 2017
(financial incentives) high-poverty schools but not in
low-poverty schools
Professional Positive effect
development Fewer treatment teachers left
Afolabi 2013
(Cross Career Learning teaching or moved from their
Communities) school than control teachers
TAP (Teacher and
Barnett and Hudgens
Student Advancement Small positive effect (ES = 0.05)
2014
Programme)
No difference between groups
but teachers receiving support
Beattie 2013 Mentoring from full-release mentors
reported more positive
experience
There is no clear impact of
mentoring on retention despite
the author’s claim that
Bemis 1999 Mentoring mentoring programs were found
to be most influential on new
teacher retention for elementary
level teachers.
+ Increase in number going into
teaching, 80% teaching in high
need areas (but no comparator).
Not enough data to calculate ES
Bobronnikov et al., 2013 Incentive grant Unclear retention
Majority indicated they’d stay
on. But of the 6 states, 2 states
showed negative impact (no
comparison groups)
29 of 45
Evidence
The analysis did not compare teacher
retention rates before and after IMPACT
nor did it evaluate whether IMPACT
improve retention of teachers in general.
The study was unable to identify
high-performing teachers who leave
DCPS because of IMPACT, the estimates
indicated that replacing
high-performing teachers who exit with
teachers who perform similarly is
difficult. Also leavers include both
voluntary and involuntary leavers.
QED
Groups were matched on individual
and school characteristics
Teachers participating in CCLC were
already in schools with a culture of
professional development (groups are
not equivalent)
The study period also coincided with
economic recession which may explain
the high retention and lower mobility
TAP schools are self-selected.
These schools are likely to be different
to the national average. Schools that
stopped TAP were not included in the
analysis. These maybe schools where
the programme had not worked. In
other words, only successful schools
were considered in the analysis.
Small sample (87)
Some teachers were selected to receive
full-release mentors and some to
school-based mentors
Evidence based on teachers’ report of
intention rather than actual attrition
Small sample
Retention based on teachers’ self-report
High attrition, therefore, those who did
not respond may be different to those
who did. The results are therefore not
reliable.
Districts with mentoring may be
different to disctricts with no mentoring.
Different attrition rate may be a
reflection of differences in the districts.
The study design was unable to test
whether recipients of the Noyce
programme would have gained teacher
certification in STEM subjects and go on
to teach in high needs areas in the
absence of the programme
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262
Study Strategy Impact
+ States where salary was
markedly lower than
similarly-education
Bond (2001) Salary professionals, there was higher
teacher turnover and reverse is
true (after controlling for family
background)
Negative impact on retention
Experimental teachers were
more aware of the career
Bowman 2007 Mentoring
commitment which negatively
affect their withdrawal
intention.
Positive effect of principal
Brown &Wynn 2009 Role of principal awareness of issues affecting
teachers on retention
Mixed results
• Positive effect in the first
Cheng and Brown 1992 Peer support/mentoring year (ES = +0.12) but no
effect in the second year
(ES = +0.03
Mentoring (full-time
Negative result of full-time
Chou 2015 release for mentors with
release mentoring
financial rewards)
Clamp 2011 Mentoring No effect
Impact on recruitment unclear
(more pathways graduates
completed (75% vs 60%) and
Clewell and Villegas ended up teaching in HTSS (84%
Alternative certification
2001 no comparison) than
traditionally certified teachers
+ on retention
ES = 0.1
Financial incentive + impact on retention
Colson and Satterfield (The Innovation 80% of teachers on the scheme
2018 Acceleration Fund grant, were retained compared to 70%
a compensation scheme) not on the scheme (ES = 0.07)
Positive effect
Administrative support and
workload were the strongest
Counts 2012 Induction
predictor of teachers’
commitment to stay in the
school (R2 = 0.19 for both).
30 of 45
Evidence
It is a correlational analysis and the
states being compared are not the same,
there are confounding factors that are
not accounted for.
Small sample (n = 30)
Comparison groups were not
equivalent.
Control teachers had more teaching
experience than experimental teachers.
No actual data on retention was
collected
Not an impact evaluation
Evidence was based on teachers’
self-report.
The sample was small and imbalance.
The 2 groups were not equivalent.
Comparison teachers were those that
were not eligible for the programme. In
the second year, comparison teachers
were randomly selected to be in the
experimental group. Experimental
teachers were also designed to include
those that did not have prior experience.
The 2 school districts being compared
are different and the sample size of only
23 is too small to make any sensible
judgements on effectiveness.
Comparison groups were self-selected,
coupled with the high attrition rates
and the self-report survey, the evidence
is weak.
Comparisons were made with national
average and traditionally certified
teachers. The 2 groups of people are
therefore likely to be different.
Paraprofessionals and
emergency-certified teachers,
for example, were already working in
the schools. It is therefore, hardly
surprising that they were more likely to
stay in the school or district where they
were trained. There was also no
comparison of before and after data.
The very small non-random sample,
and exclusion of teachers who did not
have TVAAS results meant that the
sample might be biased. Comparisons
were made with volunteers and
non-volunteers
Calculation of means was used for
categorical variables (e.g., strongly
agree to strongly disagree).
Only 22% of teachers responded to the
survey. The views of the majority 78%
of new teachers were not captured.
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 31 of 45

Study Strategy Impact Evidence

Unclear results
But looks like mentoring did not
influence retention
All programs had relatively high
rates of retention;
ACP had the highest retention
Record of attrition may not be accurate.
(96.81%), followed by ECP (90%)
Teachers who are still teaching but have
and then CPDT (89.9%).
left the state of Texas are treated as
CPDT teachers reported
teachers who have left the profession
receiving the most support as
Cowman 2004 Alternative certification because their employment histories are
they were paired with
no longer trackable.
experienced teachers during the
Those who left temporarily (e.g.,
internship, they have the highest
maternity) sare treated as having left
attrition. This suggests that
teaching.
factors other than mentoring
and support could determine
teachers’ decision to leave.
ACP had the highest retention
rates likely because of their
selective process.
High level of missing data (only 29%
No effect responded to survey). Therefore
Turnover rate of beginning responses could be from self-selected
teachers in the district decreased individuals.
by 1 percentage point between Evidence of bias in reporting
2012–2014 and 2014–2015. Despite the data showing no effect,
Comparing teachers’ self-report the author concluded “While there is no
Croffut 2015 Mentoring and Induction
intention to stay or not, showed statistically significant difference,
no difference between expected the data reveal the district is
and actual response rate. In fact, maintaining the beginning teacher
actual response rate was 88% turnover rate which would indicate the
compared to the expected rate of district’s beginning teacher program is
90%. positively impacting the teacher
retention rate”
Based on interviews with
superintendents and principals with
Alternative certification
Dwinal 2012 No effect low response rates (under 20%). Poor
(Teach For America)
reporting. Based on vacancies not
placements.
+ effect of mentoring (compared
to no mentoring) The groups were no randomly selected
+ effect of alternative and as the authors reported, this may be
Eberhard,
Mentoring and certification (compared to reflective of the kind of pre-service
Reinhardt-Mondragon
Alternative Certification standard certification) students who would sign up for the
and Stottlemyer 2000
Negative effect of emergency more intensive one-year programme.
certification compared to fully No actual retention data presented.
certified teachers
No pure control
No difference in retention rates
Comparison was with Peer Mentors
although retention of teachers
and Mentor Teacher Consultants
using MTC continued to
Elmore 2003 Mentoring Schools were selected for MTC based on
increase over 2 years while those
high turnover rates and low
using peer mentors continued to
performance. Schools are therefore
decrease
different
The 2 groups are self-selected so may be
different in terms of motivation and
Positive effect
commitment. Also a large number who
for field-based training (2.1%
Fleener 1998 Alternative certification did not end up in state-funded teaching
attrition) compared to
were excluded. This may have already
university-based training (6.7%)
excluded those who would be likely to
leave teaching anyway
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 32 of 45

Study Strategy Impact Evidence

- No effect on recruiting to
high need districts (no There was no comparison group. It was
Massachussets Signing
Fowler 2003 comparator, so cannot simply an analysis of the data on bonus
Bonus
calculate ES) recipients and their outcomes.

Participants were self-selected or

+ effect on retention “qualified” for inclusion. Therefore
Although differences in groups being compared were different.
retention rates of participants The programme had a lot of
Fuller (2003) Mentoring and non-participants are components, so it was difficult to isolate
“significant” effect sizes the effects of mentoring
calculated by reviewer are small In some all beginning teachers had a
(around 0.05 for all the 3 years) mentor, in others there were few or no
mentoring for new teachers
Evidence based on teachers’ report of
their intention to stay.
Professional
Experimental teachers were those who
Gaikhorst et al., 2015 development for No effect on retention
volunteered to take part. These were
beginning teachers
compared with those who did not take
part
This was a small-scale RCT. Although
Mentoring (New York principals were asked to assign mentors
Lowers attrition rates among
City retired at random, it was not clear how this was
Gold 1987 mentored teachers compared to
teachers-as-mentors done. In some cases teachers rejected
non-mentored, but tiny numbers
programme) the offer of a mentor. Assignment was
therefore no longer random
+ effect
Additional $5790 needed for a
50% increase in number of
teachers teaching in schools
Goldhaber, Destler and Not focused on recruitment and
Financial incentives with high proportion of minority
Player 2010 retention specifically
children, but only $706 extra for
a 50% increase in number of
teachers teaching in high
poverty schools
Not relevant to English context
Increase in number of teachers
(funding reform in Brazil).
FUNDEF (Financial in poorer regions but no effect
Gordon and Vegas 2004 The analyses are correlational and did
incentives) on proportion of secondary
not take into account other confounding
teachers with higher degrees
factors
Mentoring and induction did
not predict likelihood of attrition
Parent and administrative
The evidence is based on a large sample
support reduced the risk of
External support, of participants based on administrative
attrition
Hancock 2008 mentoring and induction data. But because the evidence is based
Salary is also significant. For
and financial incentives on self-report of intention to stay or
every I unit increase in salary
leave, the evidence is not strong
bracket (c. $10,000), there is a
38% reduction in risk
(OR = 0.62).
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 33 of 45

Study Strategy Impact Evidence

Effects are mixed.
Clustering has a positive effect
on retention of teachers in
schools in the district.
The higher the density of TFA
This study can only establish correlation
corps members in a school
but not causality. It also cannot
increases, they are less likely to
Alternative certification determine the direction of causation.
Hansen et al., 2016 move schools within district
(Teach for America) It is possible that schools with high
However, it has a negative effect
out-of-district exits are more likely to
on retention of teachers within
rely on TFA staffing.
district. A 1 percentage point
increase in TFA density in the
school is associated with a 1.5%
greater likelihood of exiting the
district
The two groups of teachers were not
Hardie 2008 randomly allocated and no controls
Alternative preparation No effect on retention
[full paper not available) were made of teacher background
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW characteristics 16 of 48

Because of self-selection into

teachers who received a small award rather than no award.candidates
programmes However,who thissigned
studyup found that teachers
who received a large award were less likely than forteachers
traditional who received are
programmes a small
likelyaward
to to be retained
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of abelarge award
different are high
to those performing
who signed up for teachers who can
easily find better + effect
paid onjobs elsewhere.
recruiting males the online programme. The groups are
Springer, (ES = 0.2)and
Swain and Rodriquez
minority [99] evaluated thebalanced.
therefore not US$5000 retention bonus program for
Alternativeeffective
certification candidates
teachers (ES = 0.19)
in Tennessee’s Also(high
Priority Schools comparison
poverty, is made
highfor only oneschools). The study
minority
(Online showed that the + bonus
effect onincentive
recruitingincreased
maths andthe retention
year, it is not
of possible
teacherstoinrule out other
tested subjects and grades, but
Harrell and Harris 2006 post-baccalaureate
not the retention science
of Level 5 (Diploma in Educationexogenousand factors (e.g., economic
Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
teacher certification teachers (ES = 0.2) performance) which may have affected
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s
programme) + effect on recruiting career a larger number of people who change
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools.
changers (no comparison for ES career
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data
calculation) Data was taken from one faculty in one
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation
institution platform,
and for CODEyear
one academic (contains value-added
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The may
only. Sample sample included
not be generalisedall teachers
to working in
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 other school
years and year.
institutions. Hence the
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher
1 rating.
retention. SteeleNo etclear
al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a
effect
$20,000 incentive to attract
No evidence thatnewalternative
teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for
each of the first(on-the-job
four year that
training asdid
they not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention
in Teach
rates (75% overFirst
fourinyears) between
England) recipient and
has been The non-recipients, despite
teachers were neither the penalty clause.
randomised
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference
effective in retaining teachers in approach,
nor matched Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared
by background
Harris-McIntyre 2014 Induction hazard rates before
the district.
and after the implementation characteristics.
of the bonusThereprogramme;
are likely to beeligible and ineligible
teachers in theHowever, non lateral
same schools teachers
using unobservable
a hybrid differences experiment
of a randomized which have and a regression
were over
discontinuity design. Thistwice more
is the likely
North to
Carolinanot beenincentive
bonus controlledaimed
for in the analysis. qualified teachers
at retaining
stay in teaching in the first and
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers
second year, but no difference in
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to
the 3rd year
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4%
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced.
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative.
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report.
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives.
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262
Study Strategy Impact
+ effect on retention (15% left
Henke, Chen and compared to 26% not on
Induction
Geis 2000 induction programme,
ES = 0.27)
+ recruitment of high quality
graduates (SAT scores of high
school scholars 113 points
higher than traditionally
prepared teachers and GPA
scores are 0.6 points higher
Henry, Bastian and Financial
non-teaching fellows; ranked
Adrienne 2012 Merit-based scholarships
among the top 10% of graduates)
+ retention (scholarship
recipients more than 1.1 times
more likely to stay on for 5 years
than other in-state prepared
teachers)
No effect on retention (Effect
Hopkins 1997 Induction
size = 0.03)
Behaviour management No impact on teacher retention
Humphrey et al., 2018
as CPD (ES = −0.01)
Positive effect
Those that have more pedagogy
Ingersoll, Merrill and in their training were less likely
Teacher preparation
May 2014 to leave
Training in teaching strategies
and methods made no difference
+ recruitment (positive
correlation between entry-level
salary ranking and recruitment
of highly qualified teachers
Jacobson 1988 Salary differentials
+ retention (positive correlation
between salary ranking of
mid-career teachers and
retention of mid-career teachers)
34 of 45
Evidence
Used data from the Baccalaureate and
Beyond Longitudinal Survey (n = 7294)
It is not clear how many missing cases
there were that had not been accounted
for. Also the two groups may be
different as teachers participating in
induction programmes may be in more
supportive schools with better working
conditions etc. So it is not possible to
attribute the lower attrition rate simply
to induction alone.
• The analysis is based on bivariate
correlations between two factors.
It could not account for
unobserved factors.
Comparisons were not made with
similar teachers
Scholarship recipients were high-flying
graduates who applied and were
therefore self-selected. Unobserved
confounders such as scholars’
motivations and intentions could not be
controlled for.
Groups not equivalent
Missing cases and non-response meant
that the groups were no longer balanced
Retention based on reported intention
A lot of missing data
Low compliance
No actual retention data (based on
teachers’ expression of intention)
The study could not control for
unobserved differences.
Those who chose the traditional teacher
preparation route may view teaching as
a career to which they are committed.
Those with an education degree may be
more committed to teaching because
they have fewer alternative career
options than those with a maths or
science degree.
It is correlational in design, it is not able
to control for other confounding factors
such as the economic and political
differences in the districts
 who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere.
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 35 of 45
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools.
Study Strategy Impact Evidence
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data
from the TVAAS Noand effectTennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added
No difference
estimates for teachers) werebetween
utilisedthefor the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in
in-house and full-time
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year.
mentoring in terms of teachers’
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) 1 found no effect of financial incentives on teacher
reported intention to stay
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s SchoolsTeaching Fellowship
offering Full-Time (GTF) scheme, involving a
mentoring
(Cramer’s V effect size = 0.0067)
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to programme were
low-performing selected
schools. based onhad to repay $5000 for
Teachers
Jones 2004 Mentoring No differences between the two
each of the firstgroups
four year that they did not certain criteria, not randomised.
in terms of reasons formeet the commitment. There was no difference in retention
rates (75% overleaving
four years) between recipient and Measure of retention was
non-recipients, based
despite onpenalty clause.
the
participants’ self-report.
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference
Lack of collaboration with approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared
hazard rates before
colleaguesand andafteradministrative
the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible
teachers in theandsame mentor supportusing
schools as top a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression
reasonsThis
discontinuity design. for leaving
is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically Compare challenging
10 cohortsschools. Under this scheme teachers
of new teachers
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they with taught
nationalin an eligible
average. Theseschool,
teachersand will continue to
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and based
were self-selected taught onthe same subjects. Overall, the
their
results suggest that the bonus incentive did qualifications
not reduce and also they
turnover received
rates. However, it is not clear
Kelley 2004 Induction and mentoring Positive effect on retention
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not higher
largesalaries
enough after
or completion
is it because than
there was a flaw in the
design and implementation of the program as not mostallnovice
teachersteachers.
who were eligible actually received the
The number involved in each year is
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not
small (under 50)
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions
Teachers from less selective
and facilitating professional development might Thosebe better
from highly options.
selectiveComparison
colleges was made with
teachers acrosstraining
eligiblecolleges
schoolsare and less likelyin schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold
those may have greater job opportunities.
Kelly and Northrop Teacher preparation to leave their school (including
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus
Large amount of were
missing 15% lessVery
data. likely to leave at the end
moving school and leaving
of the school year compared to other teachers smallinsample
the same from school.
selectiveThis increased to 17% after
colleges.
profession
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4%
points. However, this reflects a pattern alreadyResults in place collected from surveys
even before of
the programme was introduced.
Including the school fixed effects in the participants’ reported intention
Some positive responses butregression the effect was negative.
Lawrason 2008 Teacher induction (compared with other induction
In a cluster
weakrandomised
links control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus
programmes)
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report.
Small sample of 54
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that
+ effect
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested
for the nil effect• included
Beginning teachersnot
incentives whobeing large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and
group-based incentives were may exposednot to This study was
bealleffective. Participating based on
schools werea comparison
given a lump sum incentive
Induction programme programme types (i.e., of observed and predicted rates of
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest
Lyons 2007 (known as left X better prepared) wereby retention using logistic regression
lesslottery.
value-added or divide among teachers The majority of schools opted for group incentives.
programme) likely to leave classroom analysis to control for observable
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from
teaching or education than characteristics.
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level
those who were not.
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
Positive effect
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that
Association between induction
were not offered the opportunity to participate.Uses 3 admin datasets looking at the
and mentoring variables,
McBride 2012 Induction and mentoring outcomes of those involved in induction
and likelihood of teacher
and mentoring.
remaining in teaching for the
following year
Positive effect
Compared with national sample
McGlamery and Teacher induction 153 1st and 2nd year CADRE teachers
(40% attrition rate), retention of
Edick 2004 The CADRE project Risk of selection bias
CADRE participants was 89%
over 5 years
Uses 3 admin datasets (SASS, TFS and
Positive effect on retention. BTLS)
Mentoring of beginning Beginning CTE teachers Weak comparisons
Mordan 2012 Career and Technical assigned a mentor were 6.64 Small target group (N = 110)
Education teachers times more likely to remain in Focus of study was on teachers’
teaching experience rather than retention
outcomes
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 36 of 45

Study Strategy Impact Evidence

Claims that it was successful in
Morrell and Salomon assisting undergraduates with a STEM
Scholarship scheme Inconclusive
(2017) background into teaching, but not
supported by the data
Grow Your Own
Positive effect
(A collaborative
Large percentage of participants Weak causal evidence
partnership with local
who have received Consortium Focus on participants in the Consortium
Murphy 2004 education agencies,
services have remained in programmes
community colleges,
continuous employment in No comparison with non participants
private and public
North Carolina’s schools
schools)
There was no control group and the
groups were not matched nor was there
an attempt to find similar, or matched
districts to serve as the comparison.
Odell and Ferraro 1992 Mentoring + effect on retention
This is important since the districts in
question might have already been
higher-retaining districts (or at least
higher than the state average.
Some claims about perceived
Self-report, no comparison group and
Ogunyemi 2013 Mentoring impact of mentoring on
high attrition
retention
Ethnographic accounts based on
Suggests that the use of social
participant observations and field
media platform increases
Oliver 2016 Mentoring notes—not a study which aims to find
retention of induction year
causal/correlational outcomes linked to
maths teachers
retention
Sample included 8838 beginning
Positive effect of same subject
Parker, Ndoye and teachers being mentored for 2 years.
Mentoring and grade level mentors on
Imig 2009 Outcome was teachers’ intention to stay
retention
not actual retention
Survey based on 71 teachers (only 12
were assigned a mentor). The data was
delimited to information provided by a
portion of elementary teachers in one
No effect of mentoring on
Partridge 2008 Mentoring public school district so might not
participants’ intention to stay
reflect the opinion of all members of the
included population. Responses were
subject to the validity of
self-perceptions regarding mentoring.
Small sample (n = 22). No clear data
Perry 2008 Induction Minority teachers presented to make judgements about
the validity of the findings
0
No comparison so not possible to say
Protik et al., 2015 Cash transfer incentive No effect—uptake was low
what the uptake would be in the
absence of the incentive
Positive effect Comparison with national figures
Induction and ongoing Over 5 years 70% of left X Participants were self-selected (bias
Quartz 2003 professional graduates remain in classroom selection)
development in left X compared to 61% nationally The focus of the study is on the reason
based on SASS (ES = 0.69) why teachers stay or leave
The teachers reported that the
mentors had no effect on their
Randall 2009 Mentoring Not impact evaluation.
decision to remain in the
classroom.
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 37 of 45

Study Strategy Impact Evidence

Positive effect
PDS graduates less likely to Compared PDS with non-PDS
Professional
Reynolds and Wang 2005 leave teaching (20%) than graduates
development
non-PDS graduates (17%) High attrition/nonresponse
ES = 0.26
No effect Small sample (N = 191)
Reynolds, Ross and Professional
No retention differences Attrition 58%
Rakow 2002 development
between PDS and non-PDS route No data on retention presented
Comparison was between 2 types of
induction programme. No
Compare two models of
counterfactual. So cannot rule out other
induction. Suggests that
differences between the 2 districts who
Ridgely 2016 Induction dual-role induction was more
could have explained the different
effective in keeping teachers
retention rates. There was also a huge
thana site-based induction.
disparity in numbers between the two
districts being compared.
Quicker turnover rates in Schools are not randomly allocated
Robertson-Kraft Teacher performance INVEST pilot schools High non-response
2014/2018 management Paperwork relating to INVEST No report of actual retention data
contributed to wanting to leave (based on teacher’s self-report)
Compared RIMS/BTSA teachers with
Teacher induction
No effect on retention intern teachers
Beginning Teacher
Robertson-Phillips 2010 Retention of BTSA teachers Groups not randomly assigned
Support and Assessment
similar to the intern programme Data based on perceptions of
Program
participants
No impact on supply. Bonus
contract is less effective than the
The models are based on a number of
tenure contract in increasing the
caveats which are not possible in reality.
number of high ability teachers
It assumes that teacher performance
(ES +0.004 and +0.033
Types of contract assessment is unbiased and that new
respectively).
Rothstein (2015) (permanent vs teachers are recruited from the same
Retention policies are effective
temporary population as current teachers ignoring
only if there is substantial
the fact that there are potentially high
increase in salary. If budget is
ability teachers who would not consider
fixed, may need to increase class
teaching at all.
sizes to offset the higher salary
of teachers
Online survey, very low response (34%),
Found no link between
no clear comparator. Evidence based on
Rogers 2015 Induction induction programme and
school leaders’ and administrators’
retention
report. No actual retention data
+ effect on recruitment (an
increase of over 100% from in 37
There is no comparison group, so it is
1st year to 80 in the 3rd year). In
not possible to attribute the increase in
the 4th year 100 enrolled
the number of students enrolled on the
80% indicated that they would
Scholarship, tuition fee teacher certification course solely to the
Scott et al. (2006) stay on.
remission and mentoring MASS programme. The retention rate is
(no comparison group).
the retention on the programme and is
Retention is based on
based on students’ report of their
participants’ self-report of
intention rather than actual staying on
intention to stay on the course,
not teaching in general.
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 38 of 45

Study Strategy Impact Evidence

Successful in recruiting minority
and shortage subject teachers
and increasing supply of
teachers in urban areas
However, AC teachers tend to
have lower qualifications Given that AC and TC teachers were
AC less successful in attracting not randomised there are important
experience personnel from other differences between them. Those who
occupations chose the AC route may have different
Alternative route to
Shen, J. 1997 Most new college graduates motivations from those who chose the
teaching
opted for the AC to avoid the TC route. It’s also possible that those
traditional teacher education who entered via the AC route were not
programme eligible for the TC programme because
AC teachers less likely to treat of their lower academic qualifications.
teaching as a lifelong career
No impact on retention
(retention not measured but
based on participants’ report of
intention to stay)
Claimed that the Induction Data gathered from stakeholders
program had a positive effect, through surveys, focus group
Shepherd 2009 but given the data presented, it discussions and interviews. No
is not possible to know if this causal/correlational evidence clearly
can be attributed to the program. presented. Poor reporting of samples.
The model made a number of
assumptions, e.g., Teachers missing in
+ effect on recruitment and
the School Workforce are taken to have
retention
left teaching, the reduction in
Increase in the total supply of
Sims (2017) Salary compensation probability of leaving the profession is
teachers (recruitment deficit ES
evenly spread across each year of the
= 1.3 for science and 1.4 for
policy, Increased pay does not
maths
incentivize more people to train in
each cohort
Positive effect on retention. In
the second year 92% of
mentored teachers compared to
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 16 of 48
73% of non-mentored teachers
The small sample size meant that the
were still teaching. Effect size is
Spuhler and Zetler teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However,
results could not be this study found that teachers
generalised.
Mentoring 0.12.
1993–1995 who received a large In award were less likely than The comparison
teachers who teachers
received a wereaward
small not to be retained
the 3rd year all the mentored
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a largematched
award in
areany way.performing teachers who can
high
teachers continued teaching but
easily find better paidonly jobs70%
elsewhere.
of non-mentored
Springer, Swainteachersand Rodriquez
remained in[99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for
teaching
effective teachers in (ES = 0.12)
Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention The of teachers
data is poor in tested
with only subjects
30% of and grades, but
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
teachers being tracked. We are therefore
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design not sureexploiting
how different thethe
sharp cut-off
results wouldin a teacher’s
+ impact on retention
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for be ifthe retention
data for all thebonus
teachersin were
participating schools.
Teachers paid higher salary 9%
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented available.by county-level
Those that did noteconomic
respond data and data
more likely to stay on in
from the TVAAS andteaching
Tennessee’s online are likely to be different to those who
Stinebrickner 1998 Wages for more than teacher
5 years evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added
estimates for teachers) were utilised did. Also the survey asked all
teachers to working in
than teachers paid for
the the
mean analysis. The sample included teachers
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 recall their
school year. teaching experience.
wage
This can be subjective depending on
Three moderately high evidence
Attrition was 70%, studies
hence the(3🔒)
1 found no effect of financial incentives on teacher
their experience at the time of the
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a
survey and may not accurately reflect
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for
what actually happened.
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention
Used admin data (SASSand TFS)
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause.
Alternative certification No difference between Missing data
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared
Tai, Liu and Fan (2006) of maths and science alternative and traditionally Lapse time between SASS and TFS is
hazard rates before and
teachers
after the implementation ofonly
certified teachers
theone
bonus programme; eligible and ineligible
year. Longer evaluation
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of needed a randomized experiment
to test sustained effect and a regression
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 39 of 45

Study Strategy Impact Evidence

Not impact evaluation. Limited focus
on retention or attempts to measure this
Toterdell, Heilbronn, Focused on the positive in a coherent way. Looks at perceptions
Induction
Bubb and Jones 2002 experience of NQTs of new programme and some
implementation but little in the way of
actual outcomes.
No pre- post comparison. Made
conclusions based on comparison of a
high retention and low retention school.
The schools may be systematically
different in terms of pupil intake,
Professional Learning
Troutt 2014 Claims PLCs improve retention location etc, which could have
Communities (PLCs)
influenced retention. Therefore, not
possible to attribute success to the
programme. Used school-level rather
than individual teacher retention Poor
reporting.
Evidence based on survey of teachers’
perceptions about the effectiveness of
Uttley 2006 Mentoring Suggests positive effect
the programme, collected at one time
point. Non response was 45%.
Professional Positive effect
development 85% of Texas State University’s
Comparison institutions not randomly
Van Overschelde, programme graduates teaching after 5 years
allocated. Did not control for teacher
Saunders and Ash 2017 Texas State University compared to 71% for average
and institutional characteristics.
teacher preparation state retention rate (ES =0.9)
programme Retention also higher.
Difference-in-difference approach
comparing retention before, during
Financial incentives
Wells 2011 No effect in the 1st and 2nd year implementation and a year later
Team performance pay
Teachers’ report of retention and the
district data not consistent
Comparisons were made with 7
different cohorts of students, who were
lumped together as one despite possible
Induction for alternative differences in contexts/backgrounds.
Wilkinson 2009 certification programme Evidence based on survey collecting
students respondents’ report of satisfaction with
the programme and correlation analysis
of their responses with their intention
to stay
Two types of teacher preparation not
CPDT (field-based training)
Alternative certification randomly assigned. So not sure how
Zavala 2002 appears to impact retention
vs field-based training field-base training is compared to
positively
traditional teacher preparation.
Small sample (58 teachers were tracked
Long-term retention rates are
over 7 years. 22 regular, 20 lateral entry
Alternative routes into greater for traditional
Zhang and Zeller 2016 and 18 NC teachers.
teaching certification programme than
Groups self-selected not randomly
ACP
assigned.

• Positive results for The evidence is weak as these measures

recruitment but weak
evidence as not comparison
Alternative route to
Zumwalt et al., 2017 group data available.
teaching
• Negative results for
retention of maths teachers
were largely based on correlation and
pre-post comparisons without any
control. e.g., the increase in the
proportion of qualified primary
teachers coincided with the legislation
that teachers should be qualified.
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 40 of 45

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