Aristotle and The Homonymy of The Good

Aristotle and the Homonymy of the Good
by Scott M a c D o n a l d (Iowa)
I want to examine in some detail a puzzling argument from Book I of

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (EN). The argument (from Chapter 6 of
Book 1) is part of a series of arguments directed against Plato's account
of the form of the good.1 I will call it the argument from homonymy
because it purports to show the falsity of Plato's account of the form of
the good by appealing to the alleged homonymy of the good.
The argument from homonymy deserves close attention for two
reasons. First, the argument is notoriously obscure. In particular, it is
difficult to see precisely how Aristotle's claim that good is spoken of in
different categories is supposed to contribute to the argument. I want to
lay out the precise nature of the argument and show why, in my view,
recent commentators have failed to provide a satisfactory interpretation
of it. Second, the argument from homonymy deserves attention because,
properly unterstood, it involves concepts which are fundamental to Aris-
totle's entire project in EN. Though Aristotle's primary concerns are to
discover what is the best and highest good for a human being and to
show how that good can be attained (concerns which properly fall within
ethics), several of the key arguments in Book I introduce or presuppose
considerations about the nature of goodness in general (considerations
which appear to be part of an account of the metaphysical foundations
of ethics). I will argue that an analysis of the argument from homonymy
reveals what Aristotle nowhere makes explicit, viz., the basic structure of
his metaphysics of goodness, and that the argument, rather than being
an inessential, enigmatic excursus, plays an integral role in Book I.
/. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato

Aristotle's method of inquiry in EN is dialectical; he begins with
what is better known to us and argues toward what is better known
Actually Aristotle presents two slightly different versions of the same argument
as two separate arguments against Plato's view. They occur in 1096a23 — 29 and
1096bl4-26.
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Aristotle and the Homonymy of the Good 151
2
by nature. The things better known to us in the field of ethics are
various common opinions held by most people or philosophical views
held by respected philosophers about what the human good, ευδαιμονία,
consists in. At the beginning of i.6 Aristotle turns from a consideration
of various common opinions about what the good life consists in -
the life of pleasure, the life of honor, the life of virtue - to a
philosophical theory about the good: "Presumably, though, we had
better examine the universal good, and puzzle out what is meant in
speaking of it" (1096all -12).3 The introduction of the notion of the
universal good at the beginning of EN i.6, though continuing the
discussion of various received views, marks a turn in the discussion;
whereas i.5 concerns the human good or the good in human affairs,
i.6 is a discussion of goodness taken generally.
Aristotle apparently has Plato's theory of forms in mind. He does not tell us the
details of the theory, but it is clear from the arguments he marshals against it that
he takes it to involve or imply the claims that (1) the form of the good is some one
nature common to good things (1096a23-29; 1096b21-26), (2) the form of the
good is separate from good things (1096a34 —b3), (3) the form of the good is eternal
(1096b3 — 5), (4) there is a single science corresponding to each form and so a single
science of the good corresponding to the form of the good (1096a29 —34), and (5)
the form of the good explains the goodness of good things (1096a34 — b3). I want
to focus on Aristotle's rejection of the first of these claims — that the existence of
the form of the good implies that there is some one nature common to good things.
There are two arguments in i.6 aimed explicitly at this claim: 1096a23 — 294 and
1096bl4 — 26. The first thing to notice about them is that they are not directed
exclusively at the Platonic view of the forms. The conclusion of the first is more
general: the good is not some universal and single common nature (κοινόν τι καθόλου
και εν). This conclusion is certainly sufficiently strong to count against the theory
of forms because, on Aristotle's understanding of the theory, it follows from there
being a form of the good that there is a common nature of good things. So in
rejecting the claim that there is a common nature of good things Aristotle is. by
implication, rejecting the claim that there is a form of the good. But the claim that
there is no form of the good does not imply that there is no common nature of
On Aristotle's method see G. E. L. Owen, "Τιθέναι τα φαινόμενα," in Arisioic cl

les Problemes de la Methode* ed. S. Mansion (Louvain, 1961), pp. 83-103.
reprinted in Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. J. M. H Monwesik
(Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 167-190; and T H Irwin.
"Aristotle's Method of Ethics" in Studies in Aristotle, cd. Dominic .!. O'Mcara
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981). pp. 193 2?*
Unless otherwise indicated, translations arc from Nicomuchcan Kthics. ir. 1 11
Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985).
The parallel argument in the Eudemian Ethics is at 1217b25 34.

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152 Scott M a c D o n u l d
» d things. Aristotle himself maintains that there is a common nature of men or

white things. Tor example, while denying that there is a Platonic form of man or
white
UK· same seems to be true of the argument at 1096M4 — 26, where the conclusion
"Hence the good is not something common which corresponds to a single idea"
UK ftTTiv άρα το αγαθόν κοινόν τι κατά μίαν ίδέαν). In this latter case Aristotle does
ioii the 'idea' m the conclusion, and so shows that the argument counts against
t o Platonic view in particular, hut the claim that the good is not something common
is stronger than the claim that there is no Platonic idea of the good.
Thus, if these two arguments succeed, they show not only that the
Platonic view is false but that the good is not a single Aristotelian
universal either. I will take it, then, that the importance of these
arguments is that they claim to show that there is no common nature
of good things, and that Aristotle himself sees this.5
Let us turn to the details of the two arguments. They are alike in
appealing — explicitly in the first argument, implicitly in the second —
to the view that the good is spoken of (λέγεται) in more than one way.6
Later in i.6 Aristotle makes the same claim in different terms: he
suggests that good is homonymous (though not homonymous by mere
chance) (1096b26 — 27).7 In Aristotle's view the fact that the good is
Consequently, I am not concerned with whether Aristotle has got Plato's view
straight.
In the first passage (at 1096a23 — 24) Aristotle claims that good is spoken of in
as many ways as being (τάγαθόν ϊσαχώς λέγεται τω δντι). He argues that being
is spoken of in more than one way in Metaphysics iv. 2, v. 7, and vi. 1, for
example. The claim that good is spoken of in as many ways as being recalls
passages such as these. I have something to say about why Aristotle claims that
good is spoken of in as many ways as being, rather than just in many ways, in
Section 5 below.
I use the term 'homonymy' throughout this paper without distinguishing
homonymy from multivocity or discussing whether good is a case of one or the
other or both. There is a dispute about whether, on Aristotle's view, multivocity is
a species of homonymy or a different thing altogether: seeT. H. Irwin, "Homonymy
in Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics 34 (March 1981), pp. 523—44; G. E. L. Owen,
"Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle" in Aristotle and Plato
in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. I. Duering and G. E. L. Owen (Goeteborg: Almqvist
and Wiksell, 1960), reprinted in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 3, ed. J. Barnes, M. Scho-
field, and R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1979); and G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle
on the Snares of Ontology" in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. Renford
Bambrough (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 69 — 96. EN i.6 is one
place where Aristotle seems to say that homonymy includes multivocity
(1096b26 — 28) and suggests that it does not matter for his purposes in EN I which
of the two characterizes good. Consequently, I do not need to decide the issue for
my purposes and will not distinguish them.
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homonymous shows that there cannot be one common nature of good

things, and hence that there can be no form of the good. These two
arguments, then, are versions of what I am calling the argument from
homonymy. Its most basic form might be represented as follows:
(1) If good were a single common nature, it would be spoken of in
only one way (it would not be homonymous).
(2) Good is spoken of in more than one way (is homonymous).
.'.(3) Good cannot be a single common nature.
This basic form corresponds most clearly to the structure of Aristotle's
first argument, so I will focus on it and leave the second aside. The
passage in which the first argument occurs is the following:
Further, good is spoken of in as many ways as being is spoken of. For it is
spoken of in [the category of] what-it-is, as god and mind; in quality, as the
virtues; in quantity, as the measured amount; in relative, as the useful; in time,
as the opportune moment; in place, as the [right] situation; and so on. Hence it
is clear that the good cannot be some common [nature of good things] that is
universal and single; for if it were, it would be spoken of in only one of the
categories, not in them all. (1096a23 — 29.)
At least three features of this passage require explanation. First,
what does Aristotle mean by the claim that good 'is spoken of in each
of the categories? More generally, what does it mean to say that good
is spoken of in more than one way or is homonymous? Second, how
are we to construe Aristotle's examples as examples of good spoken
of in particular categories? Are they examples of subjects of which
good is predicated — "god and mind are good," "the virtues arc
good" — predicates the predicating of which amounts to predicating
good — "Socrates is virtuous (and hence good)" — or something else0
Third, how might these puzzling examples, in whatever way they arc
construed, be taken to support the claim that good is spoken of in
many ways or is homonymous? A satisfactory interpretation will h;ivc
to explain how Aristotle could have thought that his examples of good
spoken of in different categories demonstrate the homonymy of the
good. First let's look at what Aristotle means by homonymy.
2. Aristotle's Notion of Homonymy: The Multiple-Senses interpretation

The notion of homonymy is important for Aristotle's thought Am-
orally. He introduces the notion at the beginning of the CalcR<>rie\ ;imi
For a bibliography ofthe literature on Aristotle's notion of homonvmv jrvm

see footnote 1 of T. H. Irwin's, "Homonymy in Aristotle." »φ eil

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154 Scott M a c D o n a l d
discusses it and makes use of it often in other works. In the Categories

he defines homonymy and synonymy as follows:
Those things are called homonymous of which the name alone is common, but
the account of being corresponding to the name is different ... Those things are
called synonymous of which the name is common and the account of being
corresponding to the name is the same, (lal —4, 6 —7.) 8
The Categories' definition of homonymy is not entirely clear. In the
first place, it takes homonymy and synonymy to be features of things,
whereas we are most likely tempted to take them to be features of
linguistic entities such as words and expressions.9 In the second place,
it is not at all clear what Aristotle means by the expression "the account
of being corresponding to the name" (ό δε κατά τουνομα λόγο$ τή$
ουσίας).
Several recent commentators have taken Aristotle to be defining a notion similar
to the notion we express in linguistic terms by saying that a word is ambiguous,
has many senses or meanings, or has different senses when applied to different
things. 10 This interpretation rests in part on taking Aristotle's term 'account' (Xoyos)
in his definition of homonymy as meaning something like 'sense,' 'meaning,' or
'lexical definition/ Thus, when Aristotle says that in the case of homonymous things
the account corresponding to the name is different, these commentators take him
to mean that homonymy occurs when the same word is used with different senses
or when a different (lexical) definition must be given for one word on different
occasions of its use. On this interpretation (I will call it the multiple-senses interpreta-
tion of homonymy), to say that a given word 'F' is homonymous is to say that 'F'
has more than one sense or is ambiguous, and to say that χ and y are homonymously
8
The translation is Τ. Η. Irwin's from "Homonymy in Aristotle," op. cit., p. 524.
9
Although Aristotle sometimes says that names are homonymous — see De
generatione et corruptione 322b29 —33, for instance.
10
See, for example, J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 71 f.: "Roughly, two things are homony-
mous if the same name applies to both but not in the same sense, synonymous
if the same name applies to both in the same sense." (p. 71); G. E. L. Owen,
"Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," op. cit.\ G. E. L.
Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology," op. cit.\ W. D. Ross's translation
of i.6 of the Nicomachean Ethics in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard
McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941): "Further, since 'good' has as many
senses as 'being' ..." (J. O. Urmson has revised Ross's translation of this passage
in the Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Princeton, 1984]); H. H.
Joachim, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1955), p. 42; and W. F. R. Hardie,
Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1968), pp. 56 — 58.
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F is to say that 'F' applies to both χ and y but has different senses or does not
mean the same when applied to χ and to y.11
Now, what sense can be made of the argument from homonymy in EN i.6
if we adopt the multiple-senses interpretation of homonymy? According to the
multiple-senses interpretation, the argument from homonymy should go as follows:
(Γ) If good were a single common nature, 'good' would have only one sense.
(2') 'Good' has more than one sense.
.". (3') Good cannot be a single common nature.
The problem with the argument construed in this way is that the first premiss is
extremely implausible. Why might Aristotle think that where there is one nature
there can be only one sense of the word corresponding to the nature? There is no
obvious connection between what common natures there are in the world and
whether or not a word can be used with more than one sense. There might be a
single nature common to all capes of land, for instance, though 'cape' has more
than one sense. Thus, even if Aristotle has good reasons for maintaining premiss
(2'), it is difficult to see how he might support premiss (!') and consequently how
he can get the conclusion which he thinks entails the falsity of the Platonic theory.
The multiple-senses interpretation of homonymy fails in another respect; it cannot
explain the details of the passage in EN i.6 under consideration. Aristotle supports
the second premiss of the argument from homonymy — that good is spoken of in
many ways (in as many ways as being is spoken of) — by offering examples of good
spoken of in several categories. On the multiple-senses interpretation of homonymy,
Aristotle's claim is that 'good' must have many senses if it is used with a different
sense in each of the categories. Accordingly, the examples must be taken as exemplify-
ing how 'good' is used with a different sense in each particular category. Can
Aristotle's examples be taken in this way?
The first question to ask is what it might mean to use a particular word, 'good*
in the case at hand, in a category. One possibility is that when we say that 'good*
is used in each of the categories we mean that 'good' can be predicated of items
which fall within the category of substance, items which fall within the category of
quality, etc.12 We might then take Aristotle's examples as examples of items of which
'good' is predicated. Aristotle's claim, then, is that 'good' is predicated in each of
the categories, and the predications exemplifying this claim are "god and mind arc
good" for the category of substance, "the virtues are good" for the category of
quality, and so on.
The problem for this reading of the passage is that there is no reason for
supposing that 'good' must have a different sense in each of these predications just
11
Of course, 'sense' can be a philosophical technical term with a more or less
precise meaning, but none of the commentators who make use of it in these
contexts introduce it as a technical term or appeal to any philosophical theory
about senses. My remarks about senses, meanings, and ambiguity here arc meant
* to suggest only a vague, intuitive sense of'sense* or 'meaning.'
12
Sec, for example, II. H. Joachim, op. r//., pp. 42 f., and Ross's translation of 1«N
i.6 in The liusic Works oj Arisloile, cd. Richard McKcon.

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because the subject terms pick out items from different categories. Aristotle's argu-
ment is hardly convincing if il rests on this claim; the examples will be at least as
pu//ling and require at least as much defense as the premiss they are intended to
support. 1 '
Λ second possibility is to take Aristotle's examples not as the subjects of predica-
tions involving "good* but as the predicates in what might be called disguised
predications of good.14 Perhaps Aristotle's point is that when we say that Socrates
is virtuous we are predicating goodness of him (even though we do not use the
predicate "good') in just the way we are predicating being of Socrates when we say
that Socrates walks (even though we do not use the verb 'to be'), since "Socrates
walks" can be rephrased as "Socrates is walking."15
This second way of taking Aristotle's examples encounters the same difficulty as
the first, viz., that the examples taken in this way do nothing to support the claim
which Aristotle intends them to support — that 'good' has more than one sense.16
If Aristotle's point is that "Socrates is virtuous" or "Courage is a virtue" are
disguised predications of good, then we can rephrase them in some appropriate way
which removes the disguise: "Socrates is good ..." and "Courage is good ..." But
in these rephrased predications 'good' appears as the predicate (or part of the
predicate), and the fact that 'good' can be predicated of different subjects, even
subjects falling under different categories, does nothing to show that 'good' has
more than one sense.17
13
W. F: R. Hardie makes a suggestion similar to the one I have just criticized:
"But the point can, perhaps, be put more sharply by saying that the statements
adduced by Aristotle are not simply propositions in which good is a predicate
asserted of various subjects; they are definitions. The predicate expresses the
essence, or part of the essence of the subject; and it is, therefore, inevitably in
the same category as the subject." (Op. cit., p. 57.)
Hardie's view, then, is that the examples are examples of items from different
categories of which good is predicated essentially. It is implausible, however, to
suppose that the good can be part of the real definition of anything. This
criticism is raised by J. L. Ackrill in "Aristotle on 'Good' and the Categories"
in Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: Essays Presented to Richard
Walzer, ed. S. M. Stern, Albert Hourani, and Vivian Brown (Columbia, S. C.:
University of South Carolina Press, 1972), pp. 18 — 20 (reprinted in Articles on
Aristotle, vol. 2, op. cit.) and by L. A. Kosman, "Predicating the Good," Phronesis
13 (1968), p. 172.
14
This view has been defended by L. A. Kosman, ibid., pp. 171 — 174.
15
This is Kosman's example.
16
I am supposing that Kosman accepts the multiple-senses interpretation of
homonymy. His way of posing the problem suggests that he accepts it: "What
does Aristotle mean by the claim that good is said in as many senses as being
...?" (Ibid., p. 171). Other of his expressions, however, are less clear: e.g., "\^hen
I say that Socrates is a man, this is to predicate of him a certain kind or sense
of being ..." (ibid., p. 173, emphasis added).
17
Ackrill presses this criticism against Kosman's view; see "Aristotle on 'Good'
and the Categories," op. cit., pp. 21 f.
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Another version of the multiple-senses interpretation has been defended by

Michael Woods.18 Woods suggests that Aristotle's thought may have been that "for
some things to be good is to be (a case of) justice, for others to be good is to be
the right amount, and similarly in the other cases."19 Aristotle's point, then, is that
being good consists in different things in different cases: some things are good in
virtue of being a certain sort of substance; other things are good in virtue of being
a certain sort of quality; and so on.
It follows from this that there can be no abstractable generic feature common to
all goods: giving a Aoyos or specification of what it is which constitutes an item
as a good will be essentially different in different cases ...20
But if this is Aristotle's point in the examples, they do not support the claim that
'good' has many senses. There is no reason why the Aoyos which specifies what it
is which constitutes an item as a good cannot be different in different cases while
the word 'good' has only one sense. Woods himself despairs of finding a satisfactory
argument to support the claim that 'good' has many senses:
Whatever may be the correct interpretation of this extremely puzzling passage,
it is doubtful if a satisfactory argument for the multivocity of 'good' can be
extracted: for Aristotle is plainly trying to show that 'good' cannot be univocal
by an entirely general argument which appeals only to the locutions in which
'good' occurs. But such linguistic phenomena are hardly by themselves inconsist-
ent with the word's having a constant meaning.21
J. L. Ackrill has argued that Aristotle's examples of good spoken of in each of
the categories are examples of the different criteria we use for commending things
as good.22 Sometimes we say that something is good because it is god and sometimes
we say that something is good because it is virtuous. Aristotle's examples, then, arc
examples of things we would appeal to in order to justify our commending some
entity (substance, quality, or whatever) as good. I commend bravery to you, for
instance, and when asked what I mean by calling it good, I might reply that I
commend bravery as good because bravery is a virtue.
Ackrill ties his interpretation of Aristotle's examples to the notion of homonymy
by examining the following passage from the Topics:
One should examine also the genera of the predications corresponding to the
word to see whether they are the same in all cases. For if they are not the same,
what is said is clearly homonymous. Thus, for example, the good in food is the
productive of pleasure but in medicine it is the productive of health; while for a
18
Cf. Michael Woods, Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 19X2).
pp. 70 — 74 (commentary on 1217b25-35). Although Woods says it is anachronis-
tic to suggest that Aristotle meant that 'good' has many senses by the claim that
it is spoken of in many ways, he says that it is convenient to think of the doctrine
in that way (p. 70).
iy
Ibid., p. 73.
^ Ibid.
21
22
Ibid., pp. 73 f.
Cf. J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on 'Good' and the Categories," op f i t .
11 Arch. OcM.li Philosophic lid 71

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158 Scott M a c O o n a l d
soul it is its being qualified (e.g., temperate or brave or just), and similarly for a
man. But in some cases it is the when, i.e., the opportune; for the opportune is
called good. And often the quantity* as with the moderate; for the moderate too
is called good. It follows that the good is homonymous. (Topics i.15,107a3 —12.)23
Aekrill says:
This passage [Topics (107a3—12)] exhibits the diversity of meaning of 'good' by
drawing attention to the categorial diversity of the features one would mention
in explaining one's predicating 'good' of various items. This is precisely the line
of thought which [AckriH's own interpretation] finds in the Ethics passage.
[Emphasis added.]24
This last passage might suggest that Ackrill thinks that (a) for 'good' to be homony-
mous is for it to have more than one sense or meaning and (b) the fact that in
explaining one's predicating 'good' of different items, one would appeal to features
from different categories shows that 'good' has more than one sense or meaning.
Whether or not Ackrill accepts (a) — a version of the multiple-senses interpreta-
tion of homonymy — and (b), it is worth noticing that (b) is false.25 It does not
follow from the fact that we may give different reasons or appeal to categorially
different criteria in different cases for predicating a certain word that the word
means something different in such cases. 'Hot,' for instance, might well have a single
sense or meaning despite the fact that I appeal to radically diverse criteria in
explaining my predicating 'hot' of various items. I might explain my calling the
vapor hot by pointing out that it is steam (a substance); I might explain my calling
the molten iron hot by pointing out that it is red (a quality); I might explain my
23
AckriH's translation (and emphasis) from "Aristotle on 'Good' and the Cat-
egories," ibid., pp. 22 f.
24
Ibid., p. 23.
25
In fact I think that AckriH's interpretation is not properly construed in this way
despite the fact that the italicized portion of the last quotation suggests the
multiple-senses interpretation. There are two senses of 'meaning' which must be
kept apart in this context. There is the sense according to which the meaning of
a word is distinct from the criteria of its application. This is roughly the sense
in which I have been using it (and the word 'sense,' see above) throughout.
There is also the sense according to which to ask for the meaning of a word in
one of its applications is to ask for the criteria of its application. (For this
distinction, see, for example, R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals [Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1973], pp. 109 f.) Ackrill seems to be concerned primarily
with this second sense of 'meaning':
If I say that Callias is good and am asked "how do you mean 'good'?" or
"why do you call him good?", I answer "he is brave and honest", (p. 22).
Someone who holds that for 'good' to be homonymous is for it to have more
than one meaning in this second sense of 'meaning' does not thereby hold the
multiple-senses interpretation of homonymy. But even if (a) and (b) do not
represent Ackrill's view, it is important to make them explicit and to distinguish
them from claims (c) and (d) below, which I think express AckriH's view more
accurately.
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calling the liquid hot by pointing out that it is boiling (an action); and so on. Thus,
if Aristotle's point in the examples is that different criteria, which fall into different
categories, may be cited to justify predicating 'good' of different things, then the
examples he gives do nothing to support the second premiss of the argument, the
claim that 'good' has many senses.26
In other passages, however, Ackrill's view appears to be different from that
expressed by (a) and (b). For example:
The criteria for commending different things as good are diverse and fall into
different categories; and this is enough to show that 'good' does not stand for
some single common quality. [Emphasis added.]27
and:
... the main point is to show against Plato that there are a number of different
senses, or, better, that 'good' is not always applied for the same reason —
goodness is not a single uniform property. [Emphasis added.]28
These passages suggest that Ackrill's view is that (c) for 'good' to be homonymous
is for it not to stand for some single common quality (but for more than one quality)
and (d) the fact that in explaining one's predicating 'good' of different items, one
would appeal to features from different categories shows that 'good' does not stand
for some single common quality.
If Ackrill maintains (c), his position does not rely on the multiple-senses interpre-
tation of homonymy.29 But whatever merits an account of homonymy along the
lines of (c) has (I will consider this question in the next section), (d) is false. My
argument against (b) above is equally effective against (d). The fact that I may
appeal to the fact that the vapor is steam, the iron red, and the liquid boiling to
explain various predications of 4hot' does not show that 'hot' cannot stand for a
single common quality. On neither interpretation of Ackrill's views, then, would
Aristotle's examples support his claim that good is homonymous.
26
'Criteria' is ambiguous in at least two ways: it has an epistemological and a
metaphysical sense. One might want to know the criteria by which I know that
χ is F or which would justify my claim that χ is F (this is the epistemological
sense); or one might want to know the criteria by which χ is F (this is the
metaphysical sense). My argument involving the word 'hot' depends on the
epistemological sense since the criteria I cite would justify my belief that the
things in question are hot. I take the argument to count against Ackrill because
it seems to me that his way of putting his point presupposes that sense. A similar
argument can be constructed against a view such as Ackrill's if it presupposes
the metaphysical sense of'criteria': the fact that my criteria for applying 'pleasing'
to a meal might be its savory taste, its moderate size, or the opportune time at
which it is served does nothing to show that 'pleasing' has more than one sense
In this case the properties appealed to are plausibly viewed as constitutive of a
pleasing meal.
27
Ibid., p. 22.
2«
29
ibid., p. 25.
(c) expresses something like what I will call (in Section 3 below) the multi
pie-natures interpretation of homonymy.

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160 Scott M u c D o n a l d
.?. Aristotle's Notion of Homonymy: The Multiple-Natures

Interpretation3"
I have argued that none of the interpretations of EN i.6 that rely on

the multiple-senses interpretation of homonymy provides a satisfactory
account of the argument from homonymy or the examples Aristotle
uses to support its second premiss. If we reject the multiple-senses
interpretation of homonymy — the view that "good is homonymous"
should be interpreted as " 'good' has many senses" — I think we can
make better sense of Aristotle's argument.
It is clear from the argument from homonymy that Aristotle thinks that
homonymy is closely tied to what common natures there are in the world. In premiss
(1) he claims that if there is a common nature of good, good is not homonymous.
(I argued that premiss (1), which appears to assert the connection between
homonymy and what common natures there are, constitutes a problem for any
reading of the argument which adopts the multiple-senses interpretation of
homonymy.) What, then, is the connection between real natures and homonymy?
Unless Aristotle has in mind some complex theory of the relation of the senses of
words to reality (which he does not reveal in EN), the most straightforward
suggestion is that homonymy involves not difference of the senses of words but
difference of real natures corresponding to the word. If the claim that good is
homonymous is the claim that there is no one nature corresponding to the name
'good.' then there is nothing objectionable about premiss (1); it is a straightforward
(indeed analytic) claim which simply displays the link between the claim at issue in
EN i.6 — that good is some common nature — and Aristotle's own doctrine of
homonymy and synonymy. Premiss (1) simply points out that if good is some single
nature common to good things, then it is not the case that good things share the
same name but have different natures corresponding to the name. Aristotle's second
premiss, then — that good is homonymous — is just the denial of the claim that
there is one common nature in the world corresponding to the name 'good.' The
argument from homonymy is valid and to the point. (Of course, there remains the
question of the grounds on which Aristotle can assert premiss (2); I will return to
that question in Sections 4 and 5 below.)
There is evidence outside EN i.6 for taking the notion of homonymy to involve
difference of real natures. The definition of homonymy in the Categories is that
things are homonymous when they have the same name, but the account of being
corresponding to the name is different for each. The 'account of being' (λόγος τή$
ουσίας) in this definition should be taken to refer to the strict account or definition
30
I owe much in this section to Τ. Η. Irwin's two related articles, "Homonymy in
Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics 34 (1981), pp. 523 —44 and "Aristotle's Concept
of Signification" in Language and Logos^ ed. M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 241—66.
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of what it is to be a thing of a given sort. Since, on Aristotle's view, an account or

definition of what it is to be a thing of a certain sort signifies the essence of that
sort of thing, and an essence is a real nature or property, the account mentioned in
the definition of homonymy should be taken as signifying a real nature, one of the
entities Aristotle takes to be explanatorily fundamental.31
If the 'account of being' Aristotle has in mind signifies a real nature
rather than the meaning or sense of a word, then homonymy occurs
when two things have the same name, but the name applies to each in
virtue of their having different natures or properties. Two things are
homonymously F, then, if and only if they are both F and the accounts
of their Fness are different; that is, if the real property signified by the
account is different in each.32 To say that good is homonymous, then,
is to say that there are at least two good things, χ and y, such that the
account of x's goodness and the account of y's goodness are different:
that is, a different real nature or property is signified by the two
accounts. I will call this the multiple-natures interpretation of homony-
my.
Aristotle's point about the good in claiming that good is homony-
mous, then, is that there is no one real nature or property in the world
corresponding to the name 'good.' Being good might be one property
for one thing and an altogether different property for another thing;
different things may share the name 'good' though the account of what3
it is which constitutes their being good is different for each of them. '
31
Aristotle says that the definition of a thing signifies its essence in 7ίγ>/«·.ν
101b37 — 102al. The discussion in Metaphysics vii.4 —6 is also relevant. I say
that an essence is a 'real nature or property/ and the adjective 'real' is important.
Aristotle thinks that not every grammatical predicate signifies a (single) nature
or property and much of his work in metaphysics is an attempt to determine
what natures there actually are: there are blind people but there is no real
property of being blind and, if the argument from homonymy is successful, there
are good things but no (single) real property of being good. The argument fioni
homonymy, then, is part of Aristotle's project of deciding what natures there
are and what grammatical predicates actually do have a single nature correspond-
ing to them. See Τ. Η. irwin, "Aristotle's Concept of Signification," op. <it I use
the terms 'nature' and 'property' ('real nature,' 'real property") in this narrowei
sense according to which not every expression of the form "being ..." signifies
12
a nature or property.
For an account of Aristotle's understanding of signification which fits with ihiv
view of homonymy, and with which I agree, sec T. H. Irwin. "Aristotle's ( omvpi
of Signification,*' op. (it. in general, signifying is the same as neither me;minf
nor referring since significatcs arc Aristotelian real natures.
'·* This point, I think, is similar to the one Woods ascribes to Aristotle (see Section ?
above), but his interpretation of Aristotle's argument is unsatisfactory because

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162 Scott MacDonald
l Γ the multiple-natures interpretation of homonymy is correct, the

whole weight of the argument from homonymy rests on premiss (2),
the claim that good is homonymous. What does the multiple-natures
interpretation of Aristotle's notion of homonymy make of the examples
Aristotle uses to support premiss (2)?
4. Aristotle's Reasons for Thinking that Good is Homonymous
Before taking up Aristotle's puzzling examples, I want to sketch the

general view which I think underlies his appeal to the doctrine of the
categories in support of premiss (2). The general metaphysical view
which underlies the argument from homonymy in EN i.6 seems to me
to be the same as that which emerges more clearly in EN i.7. My
strategy in this section, then, will be to explain the puzzling passage
from i.6 in light of the less opaque discussion in i.7.
Aristotle begins EN i.7 with the following passage:
But let us return once again to the good we are looking for, and consider just
what it could be, since it is apparently one thing in one action or craft, and
another thing in another; for it is one thing in medicine, another in generalship,
and so on for the rest.
What, then, is the good in each of these cases? Surely it is that for the sake
of which the other things are done; and in medicine this is health, in generalship
victory, ... in another case something else, but in every action and decision it is
the end, since it is for the sake of the end that everyone does the other things.
(1097al5-22.)
he cannot explain how making this point about the good justifies the claim that
'good' has many senses. If Aristotle is not making this latter claim, that is, if
the multiple-senses interpretation of homonymy is incorrect, then we need not
worry about how Aristotle might justify it.
Notice that this rejection of the multiple-senses interpretation of homonymy in
favor of the multiple-natures interpretation does not entail the denial of the
claim that Aristotle thinks that 'good' has many senses. The multiple-natures
interpretation leaves open the question of whether 'good' has more than one
sense; it merely denies that Aristotle's claim that the good is homonymous is
equivalent to the claim that 'good' has many senses. Some Aristotelian
homonyms — 'cape,' for instance — are clear cases of words with more than
one sense; the multiple-natures interpretaton does not deny that they have mpre
than one sense but only that their being homonymous consists in this fact. One
might accept the multiple-natures interpretation of homonymy and then go on
to argue that words which are homonymous on this interpretation must have
more than one sense, but I think Aristotle neither offers such an argument nor
needs to, and I don't know how such an argument would go.
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Aristotle tells us that the good is that for the sake of which, the end
for which, someone acts or some craft does what it does. Aristotle
seems to take the notion of an end (that for the sake of which) and
the notion of the good to be equivalent.34
In this passage Aristotle is talking about actions and crafts, which
are human activities. He may think that all human actions aim at an
end because human actions properly so 35called are manifestations of
reason and hence are purposive actions. Or he may think that the
claim that all human actions aim at an end is established by common
observation; if one looks around, one will notice that each human
activity can be understood as aiming at some goal. In EN i.l, where
Aristotle makes a claim similar to the one I have quoted above, it
appears as if he takes it as a sort of common opinion or straightforward
observation (ενδοξον) from which his dialectical inquiry can begin. In
any case, Aristotle believes that each action or activity has its own end
or aims at its own goal; thus, there will be a different end and, since
the end of an action or activity is its good, a different good for each.
Aristotle is on fairly safe ground in claiming that human actions
and activities have ends. We are willing to ascribe ends to human
actions and activities by virtue of the fact that the agents engaged in
such actions or activities have purposes. But it is well known that
Aristotle takes the scope of things that can be said to have ends to be
much broader. Before following him down that path, however, I want
to take note of a particular expression which occurs in the passage
which begins i.7, quoted just above, and in other places where Aristotle
is discussing the good.
In the above passage he says that the good is different in different cases: health
is the good in medicine (τοΰτο δ' εν ιατρική μεν Ογίεια), victory in generalship (εν
στρατηγική δε νίκη), etc. The expression "the good in A is x" seems to be Aristotle's
preferred way of saying that action or activity A aims at some end (good) x. He
uses the same expression in the Topics' passage to which Ackrill refers: "Thus, for
example, the good in food is the productive of pleasure but in medicine is the
productive of health ..." (οΐον το αγαθόν εν έδέσματι μεν το ττοιητικόν ηδονής, εν
Ιατρική δε το ττοιητικόν ύγιεία$, 107a5 — 7).
The passage from EN i.6 in which the argument from homonymy occurs is
strikingly similar. Aristotle says that good is spoken of in the category of whai-it-is
(iv τω τί λέγεται), in quality (εν τω ττοιω), etc. Of course, this passage uses "spoken
M
Other places where Aristotle appears to identify the end and the good arc Phvaics
35
J95a23, Metaphysics 928b5 and 996b11, and Emlcmian Ethics 1218MO.
This seems to be the argument in Metaphysics ii.2 (994a9- 15) CT. l·'N
1094a18-22.

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164 Scott M a c D o n a k l
of in ..." where I he other two passages omit "spoken of," but this difference appears
lo he unimportant. We can recast the other two passages so as to bring them into
line w i t h the mode of expression in the EN i.6 passage without altering their senses.
In I· N i.7 Aristotle might have said that good is spoken of in medicine, where it is
health; in generalship, where it is victory; and in housebuilding, where it is a house.
Similarly, in the Topics passage he might have said that good is spoken of in food,
where it is the productive of pleasure; and in medicine, where it is the productive
of health. Thus, for Aristotle, the expressions "the good in A is x" and "good is
spoken of in A, where it is x" seem to be interchangeable.
The similarity in the mode of expression in these passages suggests that Aristotle
is making the same point in each of them. The claim in EN i.7 is that there is an
end or good corresponding to activities such as medicine and generalship, and these
goods are, respectively, health and victory. By analogy, then, Aristotle's claim in
EN i.6 appears to be that there is an end or good corresponding to each of the
categories, and these goods are god and mind corresponding to substance, the
virtues corresponding to quality, and so on. But whereas the claim in EN i.7 is clear
and plausible, its analogue in EN i.6, at least at first blush, seems bizarre and
perhaps unintelligible. I think it is intelligible and perhaps even plausible, but we
will have to follow Aristotle's argument in EN i.7 further before I can show why.
The claim in the passage from i.7 quoted above is restricted to
human actions and activities, but Aristotle in fact believes that more
than just human actions have ends or goods. His reasons for thinking
that other things — natural organisms, for instance — have ends or
goods emerge later in i.7 in what has been called the function argument
(1097b22ff.). Aristotle suggests that we try to find the function of a
human being if we want to know the good of a human being.
Well, perhaps we shall find the best good if we first find the function of a human
being. For just as the good, i.e. [doing] well, ... for whatever has a function and
[characteristic] action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true
for a human being, if a human being has some function. (1097b24—28.)
The reason we ought to look for the function of a human being,
then, is that the good for whatever has a function depends on its
function; the good in such cases is performing the function well. The
function of a carpenter or sculptor is to build or to sculpt, and the
good for these is to do these activities well.
Now the function of F, e.g. of a harpist, is the same in kind, so we say, as the
function of an excellent F, e.g. an excellent harpist. ... for a harpist's function,
e.g. is to play the harp, and a good harpist's is to do it well. (1098a8 —12.)
^
So, on Aristotle's view, once one knows a thing's function one knows
the good for that thing: performing its function well.
Aristotle has moved from the claim that human activities have
goods — the good of carpentry is a house — to the claim that the
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human beings who perform those activities have goods (qua performers
of those activities) — the carpenter's good is building well. The carpen-
ter has a function because to be a carpenter is to perform a particular
activity, and the function determines the good.
Aristotle's willingness to ascribe goods or ends to things which have
functions sheds some light on his conception of an end. In his first
examples, cases of human activities, crafts, sciences, etc., the end can
be viewed as the goal or aim which the agent performing such activities
(ultimately) intends. But I do not think those examples are meant to
suggest that determining what end to ascribe to something (or some
craft) is a matter of empirical investigation into the actual intentions
of that thing (or of the craftsman). If a thing's end depends on its
actual intentions, only some carpenters and harpists could be said to
have the ends Aristotle ascribes to them.
The important concept in Aristotle's conception of an end or good,
however, is the concept of completeness rather than intention. 36 Aris-
totle's notorious extension of the application of the concept of an end
to cases beyond those involving intention seems less worrisome when
one recognizes that he does not, as we often do, take intention as
central to the concept of an end. For Aristotle, cases involving intention
are just one specific kind of case to which the concept of an end can
be applied; the ends of intentional processes are just one sort of
completion, completion being the central notion for understanding
Aristotle's conception of an end.37
In cases such as human actions and activities the end is the state of
affairs intended, the state of affairs the obtaining of which would bring
the action or activity to an end (not just to a stop but to completion
or fulfillment; i.e., any further action would necessarily involve some
further intention). In other cases, cases of things which have functions,
the end is complete performance of the function. Aristotle calls (his
sort of completeness the "achievement which expresses the virtue" (της
κατά την άρετήν υπεροχής) (1098a11).38 Things which have functions
are complete when they perform that function as completely as possible.
The Greek word for 'completeness' (reAeiov) is cognate to the word lot Yiul
(τέλος). Sec Aristotle's discussion in 1()97a25 - b21.
Sec Aristotle's discussion of completeness in Metaphysics ν 1(>
In order to understand this expression one must remember that 'viriur* (Λρπή)
is a generic term meaning something like 'excellence* ot (again) 'completion
where 'complete' means 'not lacking any relevant feature/ 'not tailing shot t «>l
full development.' To be fully developed as an l· or complete as an I is to
possess the virtue associated with I s . Moral virtue is just one soft «>f vnltu·

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106 Scott Mac Donald
when their functioning is fully developed. Λ carpenter is a complete

carpenter, performs his function completely, when he builds well; and
his building well is an expression of the virtue associated with being a
carpenter. Thus, the end for a carpenter is completeness (as a carpen-
ter), and to be complete as a carpenter is to build well.39 Analogously,
the end for an intentional action is to be complete, i.e., for the intended
state of affairs to obtain. 40
Aristotle himself points out that the notion of completeness is at the heart of his
conception of an end (1097a25 — b21). He says that the best human good, the good
we are looking for in EN, is the most complete end and is self-sufficient. The most
complete end is the one which is always choiceworthy, choiceworthy for its own
sake, and not choiceworthy because of something else. That end is self-sufficient
which alone makes a life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing. For Aristotle, then,
in the context of human beings' constructing a rational plan by which to guide their
lives, the good is the (comprehensive, all-inclusive) end in which their rational desires
and choices are fulfilled, the end in which their courses of action aimed at happiness
are brought to completion. Nothing further is choiceworthy; no good is lacking. In
EN Aristotle discusses the notion of completeness only in regard to human ends,
but since he is willing to ascribe ends quite generally to things having a function,
it is reasonable to suppose that the notion of completeness sketched in EN i.7 is
central to his concept of an end generally.
The move from talking about the goods of various human activities
to the goods of things which have functions is important in i.7 because
it allows Aristotle to claim that there is an end or a good for human
beings. But it is important also for understanding the argument from
homonymy. Aristotle's claim about things with functions having ends
or goods is general: "For just as the good ... for whatever has a function
and [characteristic] action, seems to depend on its function, the same
seems to be true for a human being ..." (1097b26 — 28). He says
elsewhere that all natural organisms have functions and he associates
39
This claim should not be read as the claim that a carpenter's goal or intention
is to become a complete carpenter and therefore to build well. On the view I am
sketching, a complete carpenter is one who builds well regardless of whether any
carpenter ever frames the intention to build well (though, of course, carpenters
often will frame such an intention).
40
There is a disanalogy here insofar as in the former case the completion is the
way in which the action is (being) done (i.e., well), whereas in the latter case the
completion is the result of the action. Aristotle himself points out the distinction
between ends which are activities and ends which are products beyond the
activities that produce them (EN i.l, 1094a3 — 5).
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a thing's function with its form or nature.41 Things are the sorts of
beings they are in virtue of the functions they have; what it is to be a
being of a certain sort is to have the function beings of that sort have.
Thus, since on Aristotle's view many sorts of things besides human
beings and human beings filling certain functional roles have functions,
many sorts of things have ends or goods. And since a thing's function
determines what kind of thing it is, what the good of each kind of
thing is depends on the kind of thing it is. And since the good in each
case is the end or completion of that kind of thing, the 42good of one
kind of thing will be different from the good of another.
The discussion in EN i.7 which I have been following is not an
explicit account of the nature of goodness in general but it seems to
rely on one. The central claims I have highlighted are the following:
(a) the notion of good is equivalent to the notion of an end and (b)
the thing, state, or activity which constitutes something's end is what
it is for the thing in question to be complete, lacking in nothing, as a
thing of its kind. It is a corollary of (b) that (c) the end or completed
state for a thing whose kind is determined by its function is its
functioning well. And it is perhaps worth making explicit that (d)
necessarily, ends are ends only relative to some activity or state, ends
are always ends for something or other (and so, by (a), goods are
always goods relative to something or other).
It follows from theses (a) and (b) (plus the claim that the functions
of things differing in kind are themselves different) that the real nature
or property which constitutes the good for some particular kind of
activity or thing will be different from the nature or property which
constitutes the good for some different kind of activity or thing.43 The
41
Aristotle claims that natural organisms and processes act for the sake of some-
thing (for an end) in the Physics, e.g., 196b19-23, I98b32-199a33, and in the
Metaphysics, e.g., 982b5-10, 983a24-32, 994a9-15, 1013b24-28.
42
For a discussion of the relations between form, function, and end in Aristotle's
thought see T. H. Irwin, "The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle's
Ethics" in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of
43
California Press, 1980), pp. 35-54.
An anonymous reader suggested that the premiss contained within parentheses
be made explicit. It seems to me clearly to be a claim Aristotle would accept,
primarily because I take his classification of things into kinds to be based on their
functions or characteristic activities; hence difference in kind entails difference in
function (see above). The reader pointed out that Aristotle's commitmcnl in
Metaphysics \ to the so-called synonymy principle of causation would also
support attributing the premiss to Aristotle: we might suppose that the c;»uses
of things differing in kind (in this case their functions) must themselves differ in

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name "good/ ihen, signifies many different real properties when it is

applied to various kinds of things and activities. The property of being
good is no single real property, no single Aristotelian universal; which
real property constitutes goodness for a given case depends on the
kind of thing under consideration: goodness consists in health (for
medicine) and in building well (for carpenters). Of course, the claim
that the property of being good consists in no single real property is
just the claim that the good is homonymous, according to the multi-
ple-natures interpretation of homonymy. The claim that the good is
homonymous, then, is a corollary of the metaphysics of goodness I
have attributed to Aristotle.
5. Good Spoken of in Each of the Categories

I am now in a position to say more precisely what Aristotle means
by the expression I flagged above: "the good in (or for an) A is x"
(where fcA' ranges over human actions and activities and things having
a function).44 In such expressions 'x' stands for the real nature or
property in which goodness consists relative to A, i.e., 'x' specifies the
nature which 'good' signifies in the case of A(s). Thus, the expression
"the good in (or for an) A is x" is equivalent to "as far as A(s) is (are)
concerned, goodness consists in x." Aristotle's common examples, then,
should be read as claiming that as far as medicine is concerned goodness
consists in health, as far as generalship is concerned goodness consists
in victory, and as far as carpenters are concerned goodness consists in
building well. On my interpretation, Aristotle is claiming not only that
the predications "health is good," "victory is good," and "building well
is good" are true, but that goodness consists in health, victory, and
building well (for medicine, generalship, and carpenters, respectively).
Now, my suggestion is that the puzzling claims in the passage in EN
i.6 can be made to fit into the general conception of the good I have
attributed to Aristotle in the way his more mundane examples —
medicine, generalship, and carpenters — fit the general scheme. On my
kind since, according to the principle, the cause of something's having a certain
property must itself have that property.
44
When A* stands for an activity such as medicine or generalship, it is grammatical
to use the preposition 'in': "the good in medicine is health." But when Ά' stands
for a thing having a function, proper grammar requires Tor': "the good for a
carpenter is building well." I take this to be no more than a requirement of
grammar.
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interpretation, when Aristotle says that the good in medicine is health,

he is saying that as far as medicine is concerned goodness consists in
health. Analogously, then, in the EN i.6 passage he is saying that as
far as substance is concerned goodness consists in (being) god and
mind, as far as qualities are concerned it consists in the virtues, and
so on. Aristotle's examples are examples of various real natures or
properties in which goodness consists. The argument for premiss (2),
then, is that the real natures or properties in which the good consists
fall under different categories: some are substances, some are qualities,
some are quantities, etc.; and since substances, qualities, quantities,
etc. are irreducibly different kinds of things, the good does not consist
in some one nature. Of course, I still need to say what it means to say
that as far as substance is concerned goodness consists in (being) god
and mind, as far as quality is concerned goodness consists in the virtues,
etc. I'll take up the example from the category of substance first.
Aristotle thinks that a single entity, Socrates, say, can be said to
have several different ends or goods insofar as he can be considered
under different descriptions. Thus, for example, the good for Socrates
qua carpenter is building well, the good for Socrates qua harpist is
playing the harp well, and (as we learn later in Book I) the good for
Socrates qua human being is activity of the soul in accordance with
virtue. Presumably, we can consider Socrates not only qua carpenter,
qua harpist, and qua human being but also qua substance; we can
consider Socrates's paleness not only qua color but also qua quality;
and so on for things falling in the other categories. Is it intelligible to
ask not only what the good for Socrates qua carpenter is but what
the good for Socrates qua substance is? It is intelligible, on the view I
have been attributing to Aristotle, if substances are either human
actions or activities or things having functions, because these are the
sorts of things to which Aristotle is willing to attribute ends.
Are substances (qua substances) things which have a function? I
think there is a sense in which Aristotle's answer is "yes." According
to him, one of the distinguishing marks of substance is that it be capable
of independent existence.45 Existing independently can be construed as
performing a function, analogous to the way in which building and
playing the harp are functions. On analogy with the carpenter and the
' See, e.g., Metaphysics 1019a1-4 together with 1028a33-34, 1071a1. and
1077b2ff. For a detailed discussion of independent existence as a mark of
substance in Aristotle see Gail Fine, "Plato and Aristotle on Form and Sub-
stance," Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 19X3, pp. ?3 -47

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harpist, then, the good for substances (qua substances) will be to exist
independently well, i.e., to exist as independently as possible. The good
harpist is the one who plays well or most completely; the good sub-
stance will be the one the existence of which is most independent or
complete.
According to Aristotle substances exist independently in virtue of
the fact that they can exist independently of nonsubstance particulars
(particular accidents) while nonsubstance particulars cannot exist inde-
pendently of substances. The being of substances generally, then, is
more complete than the being of accidents. But this sort of independent
existence seems to be a necessary condition of substance for Aristotle,
and god and mind do not appear to exist any more independently in
this respect than other substances. But Aristotle also recognizes at least
one other sort of independent existence. In his discussion in Metaphy-
sics XII of the first mover Aristotle claims that there is a substance
which exists independently of sensible things (1073a3 — 5). Clearly, not
all substances exemplify this sort of independent existence; god and
mind, and perhaps only god and mind, do.46 I suggest, then, that the
view Aristotle is relying on in EN i.6 is that god and mind exist more
independently than other substances in virtue of being independent in
more respects; they are most truly independent and complete. If god
and mind are the most complete substances, then they will be the end
or good for substance.
One might object that it makes no sense to speak of God and mind as the end
or good for Socrates or a tree qua substances since neither Socrates nor the tree can
attain divinity or become separable minds.47 I think it is a mistake, however, to take
attainability as a necessary condition for something's being the end or good for
something else. We can understand the notion of a complete carpenter, for example,
and the claim that the good for a carpenter is to be a complete carpenter while
acknowledging that Jones, the carpenter down the street, will never, and cannot,
attain the good for him qua carpenter. Jones can be considered a carpenter because
he performs the function of a carpenter — he builds; but Jones, let us suppose,
builds in a mediocre way and does not have the ability to develop the skills necessary
for building well. Thus, the good for a thing which has a function is to perform the
function as it would be performed by a paradigm instance of a thing having that
function; but a particular thing may be said to have the relevant function, and so
46
In addition to Metaphysics XII, see Aristotle's discussion of mind in De anima
iii.5. Aristotle considers whether mathematical entities exist separate from sensi-
ble things in Metaphysics xiii.l —2.
47
Though Aristotle may think that human beings are unique among substances in
their ability to attain divinity; see EN X.
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the relevant good, even though it cannot itself become a paradigm instance of a
thing having that function.
So it seems to me that good sense can be made of the claim that
there is a good for substances qua substances. God and mind are
paradigm substances in that they exemplify what it is to exist indepen-
dently.
Now, what about Aristotle's examples from the other categories —
the virtues for quality, the measured amount for quantity, the useful
for relation, the opportune moment for time, and the right situation
for place? It seems to me that these examples cannot be explained in
precisely the same way as the example from the category of substance.
The reason is that qualities, quantities, places, and times are not entities
which can be said to have functions as substances can, and there do
not seem to be paradigm instances of qualities, quantities, places, and
times in the way there are paradigm substances. One time is just as
much a time as any other, and the same seems to hold for qualities,
quantities and so on.
An interesting (and important) feature of Aristotle's examples, other
than the example from the category of substance, is that they are in
some sense uninformative. It is uninformative to say that the good
qualities are virtues, the good quantities the measured (or appropriate)
amounts, the good places the right situations because 'virtuous,' 'meas-
ured,' and 'right' are just different ways of saying 'good.' We can know
that the good place is the right situation and still want to know which
situation is the right one. But this is because which situation is the
right one, which qualities are the virtuous ones, which quantity is the
appropriate one, etc. will depend on what we are talking about. Which
quantity constitutes the appropriate amount, for instance, will depend
on whether we are talking about meals or missiles and, if meals,
whether meals for a heavyweight wrestler or a ballerina. In all cases
of meals the good quantity will be the appropriate amount relative ίο
the person whose meal it is.48
Thus, in an extended sense we can say that there are paradigm
instances of qualities, quantities, etc., relative to actions, activities, and
things which do have functions. The paradigm qualities for a thing which
has a function are those which enable that thing to perform its function
well — the virtues (relative to that function);49 the paradigm quantity
48
As Aristotle points out in EN ii.6, 1106bl ff.
49
One should take 'virtue' (αρετή) in its generic sense - sec note 38 above

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172 Scotl M a c D o n u U I
fi>r an action is the right amount (relative to the circumstances);

the paradigm place for an action, an activity, or a thing having a
function is the right situation (relative to the circumstances or
function). Thus, it is actions, activities, and things with functions
which have ends or goods, and qualities, quantities, relations, times,
and places are good relative to the goods of actions, activities, and
things with functions. 50
My suggestion, then, is that Aristotle conceives of the good as the
end, fulfillment, or completion of some action, activity, or thing and
that, when he speaks of the good of some particular activity or thing,
he is referring to that end or completed state which constitutes its
being good. When he says in EN i.6 that good is spoken of in each of
the categories, he means that goodness consists in various real proper-
ties, and the examples he lists in i.6 — some of which are substances,
some of which are qualities, etc. — are some of those real properties
(or abbreviations for them). Since god and mind are substances, the
virtues qualities, measured amounts quantities, etc. — it follows, given
Aristotle's view of the categories, that the good is not some common
nature.
Thus, the puzzling examples from EN i.6 can be interpreted in such
a way that they cohere with Aristotle's views about goodness in general
and support his claim that the good is homonymous.
One might object, however, that if Aristotle had intended to make
the point I have ascribed to him, why did he not use his well-worn
and much less confusing examples in the EN i.6 passage; why not show
that good is not some single common nature by citing health as the
good in medicine and victory as the good in generalship, as he does
at the beginning of EN i.7 and in the Topics passage we have examined?
Why the obscure appeal to the doctrine of the categories when much
less controversial examples would suffice?
On my interpretation, Aristotle is making a general point which
follows from his conception of good and certain metaphysical views
about classifying things according to function. The point is that the
good for each thing is its end, and the end corresponds to what it
is to be the kind of thing it is. It is no mere coincidence that an
example can be found for every category; it follows from what the
50
The disanalogy I have sketched between how good is spoken of in the substance
and non-substance categories is just what we might expect given the ontological
priority of substance.
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Aristotle and the Homonymy of the Good 1 73
good is and the fact that the categories mark off the fundamentally
different kinds of things there are. Since it is this conceptual
connection which lies behind the argument from homonymy, Aristotle
states it in the most general terms possible — in terms of the
categories. Aristotle's claim that good is spoken of in as many ways
us being is not just an obscure way of saying that it is spoken of
in more ways than one; good is spoken of in as many ways as
being precisely because in any given case the property in which
goodness consists depends on the kind of being under consideration.
6. The Importance of the Homonymy of the Good for EN I
If my interpretation of the argument from homonymy is correct,

Aristotle has a coherent argument against the claim that there is a
single nature common to all good things. My interpretation also
shows how the argument from homonymy is essentially tied to some
of the other prominent ideas Aristotle introduces in EN I, e.g., his
notions of function, completeness, and ends. But why should Aristotle
introduce Plato's view and considerations of homonymy at this point
in Book I?
One reason, of course, is simply that Plato's view is one of the
received views, one of the ένδοξα, which must be taken into account.
What seems to me a strategically more important reason, however,
has to do specifically with homonymy. Aristotle thinks that inquiry
in general needs to be governed by sensitivity to homonymy. 51 The
attempt to answer the Socratic "What is F?" question, i.e., the
inquiry into Fs, aims at an account (in Aristotle's strict sense) which
specifies the real essence of Fs. But the fact that there is a single
name 'F' is no guarantee that there is just one real essence of Fs;
and where there is more than one real essence, a single account or
sufficiently informative answer to the Socratic question will not be
possible. An inquiry, then, will be misdirected if it seeks a single
account of F when in fact Fs are homonymously F.
If the good is homonymous, the investigation in EN should begin
by searching not for some single account of the good but for an
account of the particular sort of good at issue: the human good.
And the metaphysical considerations Aristotle relies on to support
S1
See, for instance, /'oMerior Analytics 97b28 - 37, 9Ka13 - 1^.
12 Aich. (icscli I'hilosoplnc «l»d 71

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his claim that the good is homonymous suggest a definite strategy

for carrying out the investigation into this particular good: find the
function of those things whose good we arc trying to provide an
account of. EN i.7 shows Aristotle setting out in the direction
indicated by the immediately preceding discussion of the homonymy
of the good.52
52
I am grateful to Norman Kretzmann and Christopher Shields for comments on
earlier versions of this paper, to my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy
at the University of Iowa for their comments on the version I read to them, and
to the editor and referees of this journal for their helpful suggestions.

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Aristotle and the Homonymy of the Good

I want to examine in some detail a puzzling argument from Book I of

/. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato

On Aristotle's method see G. E. L. Owen, "Τιθέναι τα φαινόμενα," in Arisioic cl

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» d things. Aristotle himself maintains that there is a common nature of men or

homonymous shows that there cannot be one common nature of good

2. Aristotle's Notion of Homonymy: The Multiple-Senses interpretation

For a bibliography ofthe literature on Aristotle's notion of homonvmv jrvm

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discusses it and makes use of it often in other works. In the Categories

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Another version of the multiple-senses interpretation has been defended by

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.?. Aristotle's Notion of Homonymy: The Multiple-Natures

I have argued that none of the interpretations of EN i.6 that rely on

of what it is to be a thing of a given sort. Since, on Aristotle's view, an account or

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l Γ the multiple-natures interpretation of homonymy is correct, the

4. Aristotle's Reasons for Thinking that Good is Homonymous

Before taking up Aristotle's puzzling examples, I want to sketch the

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when their functioning is fully developed. Λ carpenter is a complete

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name "good/ ihen, signifies many different real properties when it is

5. Good Spoken of in Each of the Categories

interpretation, when Aristotle says that the good in medicine is health,

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fi>r an action is the right amount (relative to the circumstances);

6. The Importance of the Homonymy of the Good for EN I

If my interpretation of the argument from homonymy is correct,

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his claim that the good is homonymous suggest a definite strategy

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