Rebuttal and Counter-Rebuttal in Argument

PATRICK BONDY DAVID GODDEN

Philosophy Philosophy
Wichita State University Michigan State University
patrick.bondy@wichita.edu dgodden@msu.edu
Presented February 5, 2021 -- Center for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation & Rhetoric, and the
Ph.D. Program in Argumentation Studies, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario

ABSTRACT: The standard forms of argument rebuttal are three: to argue against the truth of another argument’s
premises; to argue against the adequacy of the connection between another argument’s premises and its conclusion; and
to argue that there are better reasons for a contradictory conclusion. Defeasible arguments are uniquely susceptible to the
latter two kinds of rebuttal, as given by Pollock-Pinto defeaters: overriders and undercutters. In this talk we present a
model of rebuttal as counter-argument, understood as argumentation that somehow counts against some target argument.
On this model, counter-rebuttal can then be modeled as a counter-argument of a counter-argument, permitting an
exhaustive taxonomy of the kinds of rebuttal and counter-rebuttal. We close by speculating on how our model of rebuttal
and counter-rebuttal might inform an answer to the question of when counter-rebuttal has a strengthening or merely a
restorative effect on the strength of some initial, rebuttable, argument.

1 Introduction: Arguments, Rebuttals, & Defeaters

1.1 Arguments & Argument Strength
● Argument core: inference from premises to conclusion
● Cogent argument: satisfies the applicable standards
○ Depends on (i) standing of the premises and (ii) strength of the P-C support relation
○ Argument strength: measure of these factors

1.2 Rebuttals: Three Types of “Attack” [3]

For some initial argument [IA]:
● Type 1: targets IA premise acceptability
● Type 2: targets IA’s connection adequacy -- the argument claim, or warrant
○ Argument claim: a meta-argumentative claim to which an arguer is committed, to the
effect that the argument’s premise supports its conclusion [1], [7]
● Type 3: targets IA conclusion acceptability, despite IA premise acceptability

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 REBUTTAL AND COUNTER-REBUTTAL IN ARGUMENT
PATRICK BONDY & DAVID GODDEN CRRAR & ARG STUDIES PHD @ U WINDSOR
1.3 Inferential Strength & Defeasibility:
● Deductive validity: premise truth logically guarantees truth of conclusion
● Defeasible support: provides good reason to accept the conclusion, but further information,
consistent with IA premise truth, could come to light which defeats that support.
○ Stronger reason to deny the conclusion
○ Undermine the connection between the argument’s premise and conclusion

1.4 Reasons: Blair: “the smallest self-standing unit of support for a position [i.e., claim]” [2]
P is a reason for S to accept Q only if:
● positive relevance condition: P is positively relevant to Q
● epistemic priority condition: S’s acceptance of P is prior to S’s acceptance of Q

1.5 Defeaters as Rebuttals [8], [9]

● P is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q iff P is a reason for S to believe Q and there is an
R such that R is logically consistent with P but (P&R) is not a reason for S to believe Q.
● R is a rebutting defeater for P as a prima facie reason for Q if and only if R is a defeater and
R is a reason for believing ∼Q. -- rebutting defeater (Pollock) = overriding defeater (Pinto)
● R is an undercutting defeater for P as a prima facie reason for S to believe Q if and only if R
is a defeater and R is a reason for denying that P wouldn’t be true unless Q were true. --
undercutting defeater (Pollock) = undermining defeater (Pinto)

2. Modeling Rebuttals
2.1 Main Thesis (part I): Rebuttals Modeled as Counter-Arguments (cf: [10])
● Rebuttals (objections) can be modeled as counter-arguments, against some initial argument

● Counter-arguments offer reasons against accepting the adequacy or correctness of some aspect
of an initial argument (IA). Given some IA, P ∴ Q, they have the generic form:

Generic schema of rebuttal as counter-argument (or Rebutting Arguments [RA])

Premise/s: RC [rebuttal consideration]
∴ Conclusion: We may not (ought not to) accept Q on the grounds that P.
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PATRICK BONDY & DAVID GODDEN CRRAR & ARG STUDIES PHD @ U WINDSOR

2.2 Main Thesis (part II): Two Kinds of Rebuttals: Denying and No-Reason
Two importantly different ways in which RC can support that conclusion:
● Denying rebuttal: RC offers reason to think that a given aspect of IA is false
● No-reason rebuttal: RC shows that we lack reason to accept a given aspect of IA

2.3 A Typology of Rebutting Arguments (distinguished by their respective conclusions)

● Type 1 (Targets IA Premise Acceptability):
○ 1.a (No-Reason): We have no reason to accept P.
○ 1.b (Denying): Not-P.
● Type 2 (Targets IA Argument Claim)
○ 2.a (No-Reason): We have no reason to accept that P supports Q.
○ 2.b (Denying): P does not support Q.
● Type 3 (Targets IA Conclusion, despite its stated reasons, P)
○ 3.a (No-Reason): We have no reason to accept Q, even though P. *
○ 3.b (Denying): Not-Q, despite P.

* But, Type 3.a RAs reduce to Type 2 RAs: Two possible reasons why 3.a: (i) we have no reason
to accept that P supports Q (2.a), or (ii) P does not support Q (2.b). So, we have:

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PATRICK BONDY & DAVID GODDEN CRRAR & ARG STUDIES PHD @ U WINDSOR

2.4 Counter-rebuttal: rebuttal of rebutting argument (RA)

● The model of rebuttal presented here is recursive: arguments present reasons for accepting
claims; rebuttals are modelled as counter-arguments; and counter-rebuttals are also modelled
as counter-arguments -- arguments against rebuttal arguments. (And so on, with counter-
counter-rebuttals...)
● The types of counter-rebuttals will mirror the types of rebuttals. We can plug them into Figure
4, as in Figure 4b:

3. Argument Strength Revisited

Recall: The conclusion of any RA declines commitment to some aspect of a target IA.

3.1 Strength of a Rebuttal

● Strength of a rebuttal argument (RA) depends on:
○ Standing of the rebuttal claim (RC)
○ Strength of the connection between RC and RA’s conclusion

3.2 Strength of a Counter-Rebuttal

● Strength of a counter-rebuttal argument (CRA) depends on:
○ Standing of the counter-rebuttal claim (CRC)
○ Strength of the connection between CRC and the CRA ’s conclusion

3.3 Effects of successful counter-rebuttal

● Motivating question for our model: In what way does a successful counter-rebuttal argument
(CRA) affect the strength of some initial argument (IA)?

Two answers in the literature:

3.3.1 Restorative Models: Successful counter-rebuttal has a restorative effect on an IA

“In a case where the respondent asks any … [of the critical questions matching the scheme],
the initiative [burden of proof] automatically shifts back to the proponent’s side to provide an
answer, and if she fails to do so, the argument defaults (is defeated). In other words, if the
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PATRICK BONDY & DAVID GODDEN CRRAR & ARG STUDIES PHD @ U WINDSOR
proponent provides some appropriate answer to the question, the argument regains its status.
On this theory, only if the proponent does provide an appropriate answer is the plausibility of
the original argument … restored” [11], p. 4.

● Prima facie case: Given an IA of some specified strength, and a rebutting consideration, RC,
that goes to show that IA’s strength is (partially or completely) reduced, offering a CRC goes
to show that RC does not in fact reduce the strength of IA. So, because of the CRC, the strength
of IA is unaffected by RC.

3.3.2 Strengthening Models: Successful counter-rebuttal has a strengthening effect on an IA

“What do counterrebuttals do? They strengthen … the case for the conclusion by showing that
certain potential rebuttals do not operate in this particular case or that they are overridden by
further considerations.” [4], p. 245

● Prima facie case: On the principle of total evidence, consideration of potential rebutting claims
should be “baked in” to any assessment of IA’s strength. So, ruling out potential rebuttals
(RCs), shows that IA’s strength is greater than it was before the rebuttals were ruled out.

3.4 Strengthening or restoration?

Our hypothesis (tentative): Denying counter-rebuttals strengthen IA; no-reason counter-rebuttals
restore IA’s strength.

Illustration of restoration: No-reason Type-1 counter-rebuttal (Figure 4b: CRC1a)

● S1 argues:
P: The table looks red.
∴ C: The table is red.

● S2 rebuts:
R: There is a red light pointing at the table.

● S1 counter-rebuts:
CR: S2 is not in position to have knowledge of the presence of a red light.
[Perhaps S1 offers a further argument for that CRC: S2 forgot that he was wearing
red glasses when he looked at the light.]

Notice: CR does not give us any reason to think that R is false; S1’s initial argument
remains just as susceptible to potential defeat by R as it was to begin with. But what CR
tells us is that R does not in fact weaken the initial argument, as it stands.
→ Restoration!

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PATRICK BONDY & DAVID GODDEN CRRAR & ARG STUDIES PHD @ U WINDSOR
Illustration of strengthening: Denying Type-1 counter-rebuttal (Figure 4b: CRC1b)

● S1 argues as before

● S2 rebuts as before

● S1 counter-rebuts:
CR: The light that is pointed at the table did have a red bulb, but I replaced that bulb with
a white one just now.

Notice: CR here gives us a reason to think that R is false.

So: S1’s initial argument was susceptible to defeat by R; but CR gives us reason to think
that R is false; and so CR gives us a reason to think that S1’s initial argument is no longer
susceptible to defeat by R.
→ Strengthening!

References

[1] Bermejo-Luque, L. 2011. Giving reasons: A linguistic-pragmatic approach to argumentation theory. Dordrecht: Springer.
[2] Blair, J.A. 2012: Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Papers of J. Anthony Blair. Dordrecht: Springer.
[3] Dung, P.M. 1995. On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and
n-person games. Artificial Intelligence 77(2): 321–358.
[4] Freeman, J. 1991. Dialectics and the macrostructure of arguments: A theory of argument structure. New York: Foris.
[5] Freeman, J. 2011. Argument structure: Representation and theory. Dordrecht: Springer.
[6] Harrell, M. 2016. What is the argument?: An introduction to philosophical argument and analysis. Cambridge: MIT Press.
[7] Hitchcock, D. 2011. Inference claims. Informal Logic 31: 191-228.
[8] Pinto, R. 2001: Argument, inference, and dialectic. Dordrecht: Springer.
[9] Pollock, J. 1987. Defeasible reasoning. Cognitive Science 11: 481–518.
[10] Verheij, B. (2009). The Toulmin argument model in artificial intelligence. Or: how semi-formal, defeasible argumentation schemes
creep into logic. In I. Rahwan and G. Simari (Eds.), Argumentation in artificial intelligence (pp. 219-238) Dordrecht: Springer.
[11] Walton, D. & Gordon, T. (2011). Modeling critical questions as additional premises. In F. Zenker et al. (Eds.) Argumentation:
Cognition & community: Proceedings of the 9th international conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 18-21, 2011, CD ROM (pp. 1-13). Windsor, ON: OSSA.