CONFLICT OF LAWS It was clear and unassailable that is domicile of origin of record
CASE DIGESTS up to the time of filing of his most recent Certificate of
(Week 10 Coverage)
Based on Atty. Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod’s Syllabus
Jose Maria College – College of Law
DOMICILIARY THEORY
a. What is Domiciliary Theory
b. Defects of the theory
c. Citizenship vs Domicile
d. Residence vs Domicile
e. Definition of Domicile
f. Three Kinds of Domicile
g. Rules For Domicile of Choice
h. Fundamental Principles governing Domicile of
Choice
CASES
AQUINO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
FACTS:
The Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy
in the Second District of Makati City for the 1995 elections.
Agapito Aquino leased a condominium unit in the aarea. The
terms in the leasing agreement is 2 years but his intention was
really for only 1year, because he has other residences in
Manila and Quezon City.
A duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman
of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City,
filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground
that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate
for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987
the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.
After said petition for disqualification was filed, Agapito
Aquino filed another certificate of candidacy amending the
certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, Aquino stated that
he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be
elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days.
COMELEC en banc found in the Agapito Aquino Certificate of
Candidacy for 1992 elections that he was a resident of San
Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992, he was resident of the same
for 52 years immediately preceding that election, he was a
registered voter of the same district, and his birth certificate
places Conception, Tarlac as birthplace by his parents Benigno
and Aurora.
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
Candidacy was in Conception, Tarlac.
ISSUE:
WON the one year residency of Aquino in the Second District
of Makati enough to qualify him as a candidate for
Representative of the same.
HELD:
No. In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence
as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in
the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return.
Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary, and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
COMELEC states that, in order that Agapito Aquino could
qualify as candidate, he must prove that he has established not
just residence but domicile of choice. The Constitution
requires that a person seeking election to the House of
Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he
seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to
the elections.
The place "where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual
conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego
vs.Veraat is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar
with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong
with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats
1
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10
the essence of representation, which is to place through the
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the
needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the
period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That
purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have
either had actual residence in the area for a given period or
who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or
by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to
inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not
petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in
the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District
of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was
domiciled in the same.
The intention of the Agapito Aquino was not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing of a
condo unit instead of buying one.
The fact that Agapito Aquino himself claims that he has other
residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of
time he claims to be a resident of the condo in Makati, indicate
that the sole purpose of Aquino in transferring physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but
to only qualify as candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati.
The lease agreement (he entered into) was executed mainly to
support the one year residence requirement as a qualification
for his candidacy by establishing a commencement dated of
his residence.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Petition: Appeal by certiorari
Petitioner: Imelda Marcos
Respondent: Comelec and Cirilo Montejo
DOCTRINE: If a person retains his domicile of origin for
purposes of the residence requirement, the 1 year period is
irrelevant because wherever he is, he is a resident of his
domicile of origin. Second, if a person reestablishes a
previously abandoned domicile, the 1 year requirement must
be satisfied.
FACTS:
Imelda Marcos established her domicile in Tacloban City,
which was her father’s hometown, in 1938 when she was 8
years old. She pursued her studie in the aforementioned city
and subsequently taught in the Leyte Chinese School. In 1952,
she went to Manila to work in the House of Representatives.
Two years after, she married Pres. Ferdinand Marcos when he
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
was still a Congressman in Ilocos Norte and registered there as
a voter. In 1959, her husband was elected a Senator and they
lived in San Juan, Rizal where she again registered as a voter.
And in 1965, she lived in the Malacanang Palace when her
husband became the President. This time, she registered as a
voter in San Miguel, Manila. After their exile in Hawaii, she ran
for President in 1992 and indicated in her CoC that she was a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Marcos filed her COC for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte.
The incumbent Representative, Montejo, filed for her
disqualification alleging that she did not meet the 1 year
constitutional requirement for residency.
Apparently, she wrote down in her CoC in item no.8, which
asked for the number of years of residency, that she had been
a resident for 7 months.
Marcos filed an amended CoC changing “7 months” to “since
childhood”, claiming that it was an honest misinterpretation
that she thought she was being asked for her actual and
physical presence in Tolosa, and not her domicile.
The COMELEC found the petition for her disqualification
meritorious and cancelled her amended CoC. For them, it was
clear that Marcos has not complied with the 1 year residency
requirement.
- In election cases, the term residence has always been
considered synonymous with domicile. This is the intention to
reside in the place coupled with the personal presence.
- When she returned after her exile, she did not choose to go
back to Tacloban. Thus, her animus revertendi (intention to
return) #JudgePrincess points to Manila.
- Pure intention to reside in Tacloban is not sufficient, there
must be conduct indicative of such intention.
The COMELEC denied her motion for reconsideration but
issued a resolution allowing for her proclamation should she
obtain the highest number of votes. On the same day,
however, the COMELEC reversed itself and directed the
suspension of her proclamation.
Marcos found out that she was won by a landslide in the said
elections and prayed for her proclamation. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of
the First District of Leyte for a period of one year. (YES)
2
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10
RULING:
The case at hand reveals that there is confusion as to the
application of ‘Domicile’ and ‘Residence’ in election law.
Originally, the essential distinction between residence and
domicile lies in the fact that residence is the PHYSICAL
presence of a person in a given area and domicile is where a
person intends to remain or his permanent residence. A
person can only have a single domicile.
It was ascertained from the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution that residence for election purposes is
synonymous with domicile.
It cannot be contested that the petitioner held various
residences in her lifetime. The Courts reiterate that an
individual does not lose his domicile even if she has maintained
different residences for different purposes. None of these
purposes pointed to her intention of abandoning her domicile
of origin.
The Courts ruled in favor of Marcos because of the following
reasons:
- A minor follows the domicile of her parents. Tacloban
became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when
her father brought them to Leyte;
- Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence
of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept
her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.
3. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close
ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts
which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift
verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed
Resolution: 36
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old,
she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City).
She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938
to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School,
still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with
her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office
in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-
President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter.
When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal
where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband
was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she
lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter
in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November
1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate
of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by
COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades.
None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover,
while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban,
reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons.
Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the
Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or
by appointment, always with either her influence or consent.
These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of
the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in
our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did
not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner
Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement
mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of
3
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10
what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's
Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First
Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly
ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make
a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to
his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely
committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in
the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period
of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in
the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply
detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance,
when herein petitioner announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the
First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same,
claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban
City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence
in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she
subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy.
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
DOMINO V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 134015 JULY 19, 1999
FACTS:
DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province
of Sarangani for May 1998 elections asserting that he had
resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for
one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election.
Respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., et al, filed with the
COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy. Respondents alleged that DOMINO,
contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of
Sarangani where he seeks election.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with
the one-year residence requirement and that he has been
residing in Sarangani since January 1997.
ISSUE:
Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at
least one year immediately preceding the 11 May 1998
election as stated in his certificate of candidacy?
RULING:
No.It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as used in
the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,
pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances. In the
consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in
mind, namely:
(1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;
(2) when once established it remains until a new one is
acquired; and
(3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon,
Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in
the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had
effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has
established a new domicile of choice at the Province of
Sarangani.
A persons domicile once established is considered to continue
and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To
successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
4
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical
presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was
sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located
therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications
under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen
petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself
sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his
residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice,
personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. While residence simply requires
bodily presence in a given place, domicile requires not only
such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and
probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of
abode, ones home.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical
presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a
domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No
change of domicile will result if either of these elements is
absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of
domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without
intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997,
does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease
contract may be indicative of DOMINOs intention to reside in
Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The
mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no
matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not
result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of
Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the
absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the
one-year residence requirement.
Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in
Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as
voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not
conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong
presumption of residence especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the
right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the
fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance is
a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or
believes to be, his residence. The fact that a party continuously
voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to
determine the status of his domicile.
While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani
can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was
renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
his previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997,
and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon
City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30
August 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency
requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both
intent and actual presence in the district one intends to
represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. Dominos failure to do so rendered him
ineligible and his election to office null and void.
JAO vs. CA
G.R. No. 128314 / May 29, 2002
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses
Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in
1988 and 1989, respectively. Perico instituted a petition for
issuance of letters of administration over the estate of his
parents. Pending the appointment of a regular administrator,
Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator.
He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating
the assets of the estate. Rodolfo was receiving rentals from
real properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly
opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and
disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
of improper venue. He argued that the deceased spouses did
not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the
time of their deaths. The decedent’s actual residence was in
Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run
and operate a bakery. In his opposition, Perico countered that
their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in
Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it
was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their
last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street,
Quezon City.
The Trial Court Ruled:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued
separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact
that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the
decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death
certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo
V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant,
therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an
inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx
xxx.
5
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10
The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Where is the Proper Venue of the Settlement Proceedings?
RULING:
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death …
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be
settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court
located in the province where the decedent resides at the time
of his death.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents
have transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence.
Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion
that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to
four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates
state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the time
of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who
filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To our mind, this
unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner
recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon
City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in
Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by
respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in
evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be
correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate court’s
observation that since the death certificates were
accomplished even before petitioner and respondent
quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to
reflect the true situation at the time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the
decedents’ residence at the time of death, over the numerous
documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure,
the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to
residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of
Court, but to permanent residence or domicile.
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that
the decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of
their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A
close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary
to petitioner’s assertion, the court below considered not only
the decedents’ physical presence in Quezon City, but also
other factors indicating that the decedents’ stay therein was
more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial
showing that the lower courts’ factual findings stemmed from
an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the
same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue
provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,18 on ordinary civil
actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to
settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the
former understandably refers to actual physical residence for
the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence
of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1.
Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can
only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the
place where the records of the properties are kept and where
most of the decedents’ properties are located.
Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held
that venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate
estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ vs RTC
G.R. 104960 September 14, 1993
FACTS:
Philip Romualdez, the petitioner, is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, the son of the former Governor of Leyte, Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in
consonance with his decision to establish his legal residence at
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, caused the construction of his
residential house therein. He soon thereafter also served as
Barangay Captain of the place where he voted. After the
people power, petitioner left the country and fled to America
for asylum. When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines in
December 1991, he did not delay his return to his residence at
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters
conducted by the COMELEC on February 1, 1992 for the
Synchronized National and Local Election scheduled for May
11, 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at
Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. On February 21, 1992,
Donato Advincula, respondent, filed a petition with the MTC of
6
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10
Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded from the
list of voters in Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under
BP 881 and RA 7166 alleging that Romualdez was a resident of
Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was
in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the
Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year
residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in
Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte. Romualdez contends that he has been a resident
of Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that he has not
abandoned his said residence by his physical absence
therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the third week of
December 1991. After due hearing, the Municipal Court of
Tolosa, Leyte held in favor of the petitioner Advincula then
appealed the case to the respondent court then it rendered
the assailed decision that the petitioner is disqualified to
register as a voter for the 1992 elections and hereby reverses
the decision of the lower court in toto.
ISSUE:
Did Romualdez voluntarily left the country and abandoned his
residence in Malbog, Leyte?
RULING:
No. In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence
as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in
the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. That residence, in the case of
the petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired,
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile.
In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention
to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power
Revolution" must have truly caused great apprehension to the
Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and
welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-
exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow
stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure
from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
"abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these
terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice."
The Court have closely examined the records, and found not
that much to convince us that the petitioner had, in fact,
abandoned his residence in the Philippines and established his
domicile elsewhere.
It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious
political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen,
enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of
government so as to ensure that the government can truly be
said to derive its power solely from the consent of the
governed.
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and DAN
ERASMO, SR.
G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012
Domicile is classified into: (a) domicile of origin, which is
acquired by every person at birth; (b) domicile of choice, which
is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and
(c) domicile by operation of law, which attributes to a person
independently of his residence or intention
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He
Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On
November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines
and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then
renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied
for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His
application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans
Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list
was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was
denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the
lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy
for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a
petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to
comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement
of the local government code.
7
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the
residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed
to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the
position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province
for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the
election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous
with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal
presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where
once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a
new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents
applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement
for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his
birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed
his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated
there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and
lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live
with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He
left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he
reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal
right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in
Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of
law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man
must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle
his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his
brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support
such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a
candidate is not required to have a house in a community to
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented
house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the
candidate own the house where he lives would make property
a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos
has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot
in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro,
Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with
political leaders, including local and national party-mates,
from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter
of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of
administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent
it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable
misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to
establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010
gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will
respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve
all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life
to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC.
MATEO CAASI and ANECITO CASCANTE vs. COMELEC and
MERITO MIGUEL
G.R. NO. 88831 November 8, 1990
FACTS:
The petition in the case at bar sought for the disqualification
of Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan under SEction 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Petitioners alleged that Miguel is a green card holder,
and thus a permanent resident of the United States of
America, not of Bolinao.
8
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10

In his answer, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but
he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States.
He allegedly obtained such for convenience in order that he
may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that
possession of a green card did not sufficiently establish that
Miguel had abandoned his residence in the Philippines. In spite
of his possession of such, Miguel has sufficiently indicated his
intention to continuously reside in Bolinao, having voted in
successive elections therein; he also meets the basic
requirement of citizenship and residence in the Local
GOvernment Code. As such, there is no legal obastacle to his
candidacy for mayor of Bolinao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a green card is roof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the United States.
RULING:
YES. In Miguel’s Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration, his answer to the question of “Length of intended
stay” was “Permanently”. On the upper back portion of his
card, the following information is printed: “Person identified
by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the
United States.”
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the
United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to
the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor
there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have
there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the
requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines,
the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder
must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a
certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines,
did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he
was "disqualified to run for any elective office"
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card,
which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly
bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he
ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18,
1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become
a candidate for that office.
SAN LUIS vs SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel.
On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five
years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October
15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody
on December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children
with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time
of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters
of administration before the Regional Trial Court.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters
of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior
to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
9
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10
Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo
was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province
of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It found that the decree
of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry
Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo
who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because
it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate
children.
CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering
that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June
20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death." For
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency. While
petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of
his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the
law already established through judicial precedent. The
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. With
regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. Therefore,
this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
JULIET B. DANO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 210200, September 13, 2016
SERENO, C.J.
FACTS:
Juliet Dano natural-born Filipino who hailed from the
Municipality of Sevilla, Province of Bohol (Sevilla). She worked
as a nurse in the US and thereafter acquired American
citizenship. On 2 February 2012, she obtained a Community
Tax Certificate (CTC) from the municipal treasurer of Sevilla.
On March 2012, she took her Oath of Allegiance before the
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles,
California. May 2012, petitioner went to Sevilla to apply for
voter's registration. 8 days later, she went back to the US and
stayed there until 28 September 2012. She claims that she
went there to wind up her affairs, particularly to sell her house
in Stockton, California, as well as her shares of stock in various
companies. Upon returning to the Philippines, petitioner
executed a Sworn Renunciation of Any and All Foreign
Citizenship on 30 September 2012. October 2012, she filed her
COC for mayor of Sevilla. She represented herself therein as
one who had been a resident of Sevilla for 1 year and 11 days
prior to the elections of 13 May 2013, or from 2 May 2012.
Marie Digal filed a petition with the COMELEC for the
cancellation of petitioner's COC. She was the daughter of
Ernesita Digal, whom, Dano would later best for the mayoralty
position in the 2013 elections by a margin of 668 votes. Marie
alleged that Dano had made material misrepresentations of
fact in the latter's COC and likewise failed to comply with the
one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the LGC.
COMELEC rendered the assailed decision, that even if Dano
had reacquired her Filipino citizenship, registered as a voter in
Sevilla, and executed her sworn renunciation, her prolonged
absence resulted in her failure to reestablish her domicile in
her hometown for the purpose of abiding by the one-year
residence requirement. Here, respondent had executed an
10
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10
Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines on March 30, 2012.
However, she executed her sworn Renunciation of Allegiance
on a much later date, or on September 30, 2012. During the
intervening six (6) month period between taking the oath of
allegiance and the renunciation under oath, no concrete acts
have been done by respondent to clearly establish that she has
categorically chosen Sevilla, Bohol as her domicile of choice.
Meaning, physical presence and not mere intent is required to
establish domicile which connotes actual, factual and bona
fide residence in a given locality.
Dano filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, assailing COMELEC's
Resolutions
3. She applied for voter's registration in Sevilla.
4. She went back to the US to dispose of her properties
located there.
COMELEC's grave abuse of discretion lay in its failure to fully
appreciate petitioner's evidence and fully explained absence
from Sevilla. Instead, it made a legal conclusion that a
candidate who has been physically absent from a locality for
four out of the twelve months preceding the elections can
never fulfil the residence requirement under Section 39 of the
LGC. In addition, COMELEC cancelled petitioner's COC without
any prior determination of whether or not she had intended to
deceive or mislead the electorate. The omission also
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Hence, Dano proved compliance with the residency

requirement and the assailed resolution of the COMELEC is
Did Dano fail to prove compliance with the one-year residency reversed.
requirement for local elective officials?

RULING:

NO. Physical presence, along with animus manendi et

revertendi, is an essential requirement for the acquisition of a
domicile of choice. However, the law does not require that
physical presence be unbroken. In Japzon v. Comelec, this
Court ruled that to be considered a resident of a municipality,
the candidate is not required to stay and never leave the place
for a full one-year period prior to the date of the election. In
Sabili v. Comelec, this Court reiterated that the law does not
require a candidate to be at home 24 hours a day 7 days a week
to fulfill the residency requirement. Dano sufficiently
established that she had already reacquired her Philippine
citizenship when she started residing in Sevilla on 2 May 2012.
It must be noted that the starting point from which her
residence should be counted was not material to the
deliberations before COMELEC or in any of the pleadings
submitted before this Court. The only controverted issue was
whether her absence from the locality for four months out of
the 1 year and 11 days she had stated in her COC rendered her
unable to fulfill the residence requirement.

Considering that the only material issue before COMELEC was

the completeness of the period of residence, it should not have
disregarded the following evidence showing specific acts
performed by Dano one year before the elections, or by 13
May 2012, which clearly demonstrated her animus manendi et
revertendi:

1. She made public her intention to run for the

mayoralty position. In preparation for this aspiration, and in
order to qualify for the position, she went through the
reacquisition process under Republic Act No. 9225.
2. She started to reside in her ancestral home, and even
obtained a CTC, during the first quarter of 2012.

DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN 11
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEK 10