CONFLICT OF LAWS Although there was a proposal to lease the property with the
CASE DIGESTS provision to have buildings built at the expense of the lessee,
(Weeks 15 & 16 Coverage)
Based on Atty. Kristine Mae M. Quibod’s Syllabus
Jose Maria College – College of Law
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
a. Lex Rei Sitae
b. Issues covered by Lex Rei Sitae
c. Lex Situs
d. Issues covered by Lex Situs
e. Movable and Immovable Property
f. Choses
CASES
SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA
G.R. No. 92047 JULY 25, 1990
FACTS:
These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to enjoin
respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of
the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chrome
Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan. The latter case also, prays for a writ
of mandamus to fully disclose to the public the basis of their
decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi
property.
The Roppongi case is one of the four properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparation
Agreement entered into with Japan. The other three (3)
properties include Nampeidai Property (present site of the
Philippine Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial Property
(commercial lot being used as a warehouse and parking lot for
consulate staff) and Kobe Residential Property (resident lot
which is now vacant).
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued
at $550M would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance
with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the
Philippine and Japanese governments. The procurements are
to be divided into government sector and those for private
parties in projects, the latter shall be made available only to
Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in national
development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading
“Government Sector” for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeida due to
the need for major repairs. However, the Roppongi property
has remained underdeveloped since that time.
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
the same was not acted favorably upon by the government.
Instead, President Aquino issued EO No. 296 entitling non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations’ capital goods
and services in the event of sale, lease or dispositions.
Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various sectors, the
Executive branch of the government pushed for the sale of
reparation properties, starting with the Roppongi lot. The
property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor
price of $225M. The first was a failure, while the second has
been postponed and later restrained by the SC.
Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that the subject
property is not governed by our Civil Code, but rather by the
laws of Japan where the property is located. They relied upon
the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable
law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the
title to a property.
ISSUES:
1. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
2. Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be
alienated by the Philippine Government?
RULING:
1. Yes. We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply
when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law
situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title
or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take
and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the
same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The
issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title.
There is no question that the property belongs to the
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent
officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State.
And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale.
This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does
not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds
light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The
opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties
procured through reparations nor the existence in what body
of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of
acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the
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CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
foreign law which should determine who can acquire the
properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition
of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities
wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
2. NO. There can be no doubt that the property is of public
dominion and the respondents have failed to show that it has
become patrimonial.
The property is correctly classified under Art 420 of the Civil
Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some
public service. The fact that it has not been used for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Such conversion happens only if
property is withdrawn from public use, through an
abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property
for public service and to make it patrimonial property.
Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal premises.
The EO does not declare that the properties lost their public
character, merely intending the properties to be made
available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone, in case of
sale, lease or other disposition. Furthermore, it is based on the
wrong premise that the Japan properties can be sold to end-
users, when in fact it cannot.
Neither does the CARP Law re-classify the properties into
patrimonial properties, merely stating that sources of funds for
its implementation be sourced from proceeds of the
disposition of the Government in foreign countries, but not
that the Roppongi property be withdrawn from being classified
as a property of public dominion.
Furthermore, the respondents’ argument that the Japanese
law and not our Civil Code shall apply is incorrect. There is no
conflict of law in this situation. A conflict of law arises only
when:
- There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer
immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential
validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and
effect of a conveyance, are to be determined.
- A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is
asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters.
Hence, the need to determine which law should apply. Both
elements does not exist in the case. The issues are not
concerned with the validity of ownership or title. There is no
question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The
issue is the authority of the government officials to validly
dispose of property belonging to the state and the validity of
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
the procedures adopted to effect the sale, which should be
governed by Philippine law the rule of lex situs does not apply.
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. ANGLO CALIFORNIA
BANK
G.R. No. L-12476 JANUARY 29, 1960
FACTS:
Respondent Calamba Sugar Estate, Inc., herein represented by
its trustee, the Anglo California National Bank, is a foreign
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State
of California, U.S.A., duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines. It has consistently filed its income tax returns here
through its resident attorney-in-fact.
On May 14, 1956, the petitioners Collector of Internal Revenue
the corporation of an assessment for alleged deficiency
income taxes for the years 1953, 1954 and 1955 in the
respective amounts of P138,855.00, P131,759.00 and
P393,459.00, supposedly based upon capital again derived
from the respondent's sale to the Pasumil Planters, Inc., of
P250,000 shares of the capital stock of the Pampanga Sugar
Mills and of a promissory note, dated January 1, 1950,
executed by the Pampanga Sugar Mills in the sum of
$500,000.00.
The parties stipulated that (a) the negotiations leading to the
execution and conclusion of the agreement of sale, dated
January 16, 1953, between the respondent corporation and
the Pasumil Planters, Inc., took place in San Francico,
California; (b) the payment on account of the sale were made
by the Pasumil Planters, Inc., at the same foreign city; and (c)
the sale was made under and in accordance with the laws of
that State. From the evidence presented, it also appears that
on December 16, 1955, the Securities and Exchange
Commission cancelled respondent's license to transact
business in the Philippines, and on December 30, 1955, the
corporation was dissolved in accordance with the California
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the capital gains obtained from the sale
constituted income sources without the Philippines.
RULING:
YES. Construing the same provision of law (which is section 119
(e) of the 1934 Act, U.S.I.R.C.), Unites States courts are in
accord in disallowing the imposition of income taxes by its
government on capital gains where the sale takes place
outside its territorial jurisdiction. It is likewise the prevailing
view that in ascertaining the place of sale, the determination
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CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
of when and where title to the goods passes from the seller to
the buyer is decisive.
In this case, it is admitted that the negotiation, perfection and
consummation of the contract of sale were all done in
California, U.S.A. It follows that title to the shares of stock
passed from the vendor to the vendee at said place, from
which time the incidents of ownership vested on the buyer.
TAYAG V. BENGUET CONSILIDATED, INC.
G.R. NO. L-23145, NOVEMBER 29, 1968
FACTS:
Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York
City, left two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the certificates being in the
possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which
as noted, is the domiciliary administrator of the estate of the
deceased.
The CFI of Manila appointed several persons to be ancillary
administration of the property and subsequently substituted
by Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose between the domiciary
administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in
the Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the
possession of the stock certificates in question. The CFI
ordered County Trust Company, to "produce and deposit"
them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court
which they did not comply.
Renato Tayag petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring
the certificate or certificates of stocksbe declared considered
as lost.
ISSUE:
Whether our Courts can issue orders of administration to the
properties even there was already an administrator appointed
by another foreign court.
RULING:
YES. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of
the appellee ancillary administrator to gain control and
possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction
of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his
duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local
creditors. it is a "general rule universally recognized" that
administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly
"extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or
country where it was granted," the corollary being "that an
administrator appointed in one state or country has no power
over property in another state or country."
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
"It is often necessary to have more than one administration of
an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the
country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted
in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the
principal administration, while any other administration is
termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter
is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore
have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is
granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state
has no authority in the Philippines. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of his last domicile, property to be
administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for
his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to
require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock
certificates covering the 33,002 shares standing in her name in
the books of Benguet Consolidated, Inc be respected is equally
beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation
owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted
jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore
be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA
PALACIOS vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL
G.R. No. L-27952 FEBRUARY 15, 1982
FACTS:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the
testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal
beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de
Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez;
and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski. The widow Marcelle
is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is
an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator
provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir.
His will was admitted to probate. Maria Luisa Palacios was
appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of
partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be
divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion"
shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, one third
(1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct
and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda.
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CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the
grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor
of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct
and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez,
with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first
heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the
provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid
because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or
substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863
of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real
property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who
is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the
testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between
the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's
express win to give this property to them. Nonetheless, the
lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated
May 3, 1967.
ISSUE:
Was the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien,
violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution?
RULING
NO. The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as
follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire
private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.
Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by
paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a
devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor
of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest
title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title
to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.
GREGORIO LLANTINO and BELINDA LLANTINO vs. CO LIONG
CHONG alias JUAN MOLINA
G.R. No. L-29663 AUGUST 20, 1990
FACTS:
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
The Llantinos aver that they are the owners of a commercial-
residential land situated in the municipality of Virac,
Catanduanes, which they leased to Juan Molina who was then
a Chinese national and went by the name of Co Liong Chong
for a period of thirteen (13) years for the sum of P6,150.00 for
the whole period.
Chong was placed in possession of the property but knowing
that the period of the lease would end, the Llantinos requested
Chong for a conference but the latter did not honor the
request and instead he informed the Llantinos that he had
already constructed a commercial building on the land worth
P50,000.00; that the lease contract was for a period of sixty
(60) years; and that he is already a Filipino citizen.
The claim of Chong came as a surprise to the Llantinos because
they did not remember having agreed to a sixty-year lease
agreement as that would virtually make Chong the owner of
the realty which, as a Chinese national, he had no right to own
and neither could he have acquired such ownership after
naturalization.
ISSUE:
Is the contract of lease entered into by the Llantinos and Chong
for a period of sixty (60) years valid?
RULING:
YES. The lower court correctly ruled that Chong had at the time
of the execution of the contract, the right to hold by lease the
property involved in the case although at the time of the
execution of the contract, he was still a Chinese national.
In the present case, it has been established that there is only
one contract and there is no option to buy the leased property
in favor of Chong. There is nothing in the record, either in the
lease contract or in the complaint itself, to indicate any scheme
to circumvent the constitutional prohibition. On the contrary,
the Llantinos themselves admit openly that right from the start
and before entering into the contract, Chong had merely asked
them for a lease of the premises to which they agreed.
Admittedly under the terms of the contract there is nothing to
prevent the Llantinos from disposing of their title to the land
to any qualified party but subject to the rights of the lessee
Chong. Neither is there under the terms of the said contract to
indicate that the ownership of the Llantinos of the leased
premises has been virtually transferred to the lessee.
Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a reasonable
period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy
real property on condition that he is granted Philippine
citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the
Constitution from use of lands for residential purposes. Since
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CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not
forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain
here forever and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered
invalid is, if there are circumstances attendant to its execution,
which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition.
If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy,
a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot
sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50
years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual
transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in
stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi,
jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi) — rights, the sum of
which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession
is transferred, tomorrow the use, the next day the disposition,
and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is
made up are consolidated in an alien.
Coming back to the case at bar, even assuming, arguendo, that
the subject contract is prohibited, the same can no longer be
questioned presently upon the acquisition by Chong of Filipino
citizenship. It was held that sale of a residential land to an alien
which is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino citizen is
valid.
ORION SAVINGS BANK vs. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI
GR. No. 205487 NOVEMBER 12, 2014
FACTS:
Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms.
Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit
and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City,
allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that a condominium
and a parking lot were for sale for ₱3,000,000.00. Soneja
likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the
parking slot were clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties
agreed to reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. Suzuki and Kang
then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale after the payment of
the purchase price. Soon after, Suzuki took possession of the
condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the
renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to
deliver the titles to the properties. Kang failed to deliver the
documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties
with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
ISSUE:
Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki
is null and void on the ground that under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the
consent of both spouses.
RULING:
No. It is a universal principle that real or immovable property
is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where
it is located. Thus, all matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property are determined by what is known
as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by
which a title can pass from one person to another, or by which
an interest therein can be gained or lost.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making
a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its
nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to
transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by
the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile
and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually
made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are
governed principally by the national law of the spouses.
However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law
has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the
South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It
merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the
conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it
was properly authenticated by the seal of his office.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-
identity approach or processual presumption comes into play.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to'
Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Kang. In other words, the import from the certificates of title
is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun
Sook Jung.
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CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held
that registration of the property in the name of only one
spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or
community property. In those cases, however, there was proof
that the properties, though registered in the name of only one
spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties.
Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s
conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal
consent.
WILLS AND SUCCESSION
a. Intrinsic Validity of a Will
b. Conflict Rules on Extrinsic Validity
c. Rule 77 Section 3 Rules of Court
d. Probate of a Will
e. Interpretation of Wills
f. Joint Wills
g. Revocation of Wills
h. Change of Nationality of Testator
i. Rules of Administration
CASES
TESTATE ESTATE OF C.O. BOHANAN vs. MAGDALENA C.
BOHANAN.
G.R. No. L-12105 JANUARY 30, 1960
FACTS:
C. O. Bohanan, a citizen the United States and of the State of
Nevada executed a last will and testament in accordance with
the laws of the state of Nevada on April 23, 1944 in Manila.
The testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on
January 30, 1909. He secured a divorce which was granted to
him on May 20, 1922. Sometime in 1925, Magdalena C.
Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting
at the time of the death of the testator in 1944.
On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon.
Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate the last will and
testament of C. O. Bohanan. The Philippine Trust Company was
named as the executor of the will.
The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24,
1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the
following adjudications:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and
Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in
trust only for the benefit of testator’s grandson Edward
George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies;
(2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator’s
brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith,
share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to
testator’s grandson;
(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert
Bohanan, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in
three yearly installments;
(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00;
Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and
Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000.
Claiming having been deprived of the legitime, the
respondents, the wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two
children questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner that:
out of the total estate (after deducting administration
expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his
grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of
several mining companies and to his brother and sister the
same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000
each, or a total of P12,000.
ISSUE:
1. Is the wife entitled to a legitime?
2. Are the testator’s children entitled to a legitime in
accordance with the laws of the forum?
RULING:
1. No. The laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen,
allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring
him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905
of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind,
may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and
personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the
testator’s debts.
Moreover, in an order dated June 19, 1955 – the court found
that there existed no community property owned by the
decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce
was issued. This order was already final and executory and she
had not appealed therefrom.
2. No. In accordance with Par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which
is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, New Civil Code legal and
testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession
as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property and the country
in which it is found. It is therefore the Law of Nevada which will
govern the disposition of the properties of the testator but this
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CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
foreign law must first be proved as our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws. However, the laws of Nevada
were not introduced in evidence by the executor’s at the
hearing of the project of partition. It is Magdalena C. Bohanan,
upon her motion for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, who
introduced in evidence the foreign law, especially Section
9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. Said laws presented by the
counsel for the executor was admitted by the Court. Also the
children of the testator, did not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.
Under these circumstances, the Court held that the pertinent
law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice by the court,
without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing
of the project of partition.
The order of the court approving the project of partition was
affirmed.
Repeated Case
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS,
ET AL.
G.R. No. L-23678 JUNE 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time
of his death. Amos Bellis had two wives. Mary Mallen, the first
wife whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (predeceased him in infancy),
Henry Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Alsman.
The second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and
Dorothy Bellis; and also he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
Before Amos Bellis died, he made two wills, one disposing his
Texas properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties.
Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00
to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the
foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall
go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives.
On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of
First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The People's
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration,
the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition".
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.
The lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling
the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of
the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court.
Oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue
of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In both wills, the recognized illegitimate children were not
given any share. Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of Private
International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore,
under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas Law or Philippine Law should apply or
Renvoi Doctrine is applicable on this case?
RULING:
No, the parties do not submit the case on the doctrine of
renvoi, said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent
is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
7
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule
of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.
Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article
17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph
three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed
two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine
law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing
a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision
in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
The parties admit that, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Repeated Case
AZNAR vs. CHRISTENSEN-GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
FACTS:
This case is an appeal on the executor’s partition of the estate
of Edward Christensen. The will is executed in Manila and
contained the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and
no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen
years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in
trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the
rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which
may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and
estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be
8
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
possessed at my death and which may have come to me from
any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ...
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed
by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen)
of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child. The legal
grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order
of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-
half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the
above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern
the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof
because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum
is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable.
ISSUE:
What law should be applied regarding in settling Edward
Christensen’s will?
RULING:
The Philippine law. The national law mentioned in Article 16 of
our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California; such action
would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of which the decedent
was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws
rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine
law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.
The Court therefore finds that as the domicile of the deceased
Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ vs. HON. ZOTICO A.
TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC,
Bulacan
G.R. No. 76714 JUNE 2, 1994
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who
became American citizens and residents of New York, each
executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on
presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known
which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be
presumed to have predeceased his wife). He appointed his
wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael
G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor.
“If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under
such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to
determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed
that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered
and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such
presumption” (Rollo, p. 41).
Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their
home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed
for separate probate proceedings of the wills with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. These
two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary
were issued in his favor.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for
reprobate in Bulacan for the reprobate of the two wills
ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also
asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the
estate of the deceased couple. Letters of administration were
issued in her favor.
Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to
set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as
special administratrix of the estates. They alleged that that
being the “brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving
heirs” of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been “deliberately
excluded” in the petition for the probate of the separate wills
of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court
to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that
such “misrepresentation” deprived them of their right to “due
process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter,
Evelyn, to the exclusion of the “Cunanan collaterals;” hence
they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not
entitled to notice. She further argued that the rule applicable
9
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the
allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that
nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice
being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should
himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country;
ISSUE:
WON petitioner complied with all the evidences necessary for
the reprobate or allowance of wills outside the Philippines
(NO)
RULING:
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were
American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in
the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is
imperative.
The effect of the reprobate is it is as if the will is probated here
in the Philippines.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the
Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
follows:
- the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
laws;
- the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in
the Philippines;
- the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
- the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and
- the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of
wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed.,
pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v.
Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]).
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled
by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she
moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and
substantive New York laws but which request respondent
Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special
proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence,
the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is
susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied
probate
On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching
on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself
the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she
does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she
noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose
order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party
(Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate
of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original
will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76,
which require publication and notice by mail or personally to
the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the
petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to
petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place
for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice
of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed
to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent
Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to
submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of
the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and
sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies
of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
10
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16

SO ORDERED.
OHANNES vs. HARVEY
G.R. NO. 18600 MARCH 9, 1922
FACTS:
Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes nee Carmen D'Almeida, died
intestate in Singapore, Straits Settlements, on August 31, 1921.
Of her immediate family there remained the husband, B. E.
Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida and
Alfred D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida D'Almeida Johannes. Of
these, the husband, the brother Frederick, and the sister Ida,
were residents of Singapore, while the brother Alfred was in
Manila.
The Singapore heirs apparently joined in asking that letters of
administration be granted by the Supreme Court of the Straits
Settlements to B. E. Johannes, the lawful husband of the
deceased.
On September 19, 1921, the husband was named the
administrator of the property of the deceased wife, which was
locally situate within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the Straits Settlements. (Under the British law, it would seem
that the husband is entitled to the whole of the estate of his
wife if she die intestate to the exclusive of any other next of
kin.) On October 1, 1921, the brother Alfred D' Almeida was,
on his petition, appointed administrator of the Manila estate
of the deceased consisting of P109,732.55.
The burden of the relator's contention is that the Honorable
George R. Harvey, as judge of First Instance of the City of
Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing
Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the estate on
deposit in the Philippines, and that an administration in the
jurisdiction is unnecessary. Accordingly, relators pray the court
to annul the appointment of Alfred D'Almeida and to issue an
order directing the Judge of First Instance to have placed to the
credit of B. E. Johannes as administrator of the estate of
Carmen Theodora Johannes all of the funds of the late Carmen
D'Almeida Johannes, now on deposit and subject to the order
of the court, with P5,000 as damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
appointing Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the
estate on deposit in the Philippines.
RULING:
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
No. It is often necessary to have more than one administration
of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in
the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted
in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the
principal administration, while any other administration is
termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter
is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore
have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is
granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state
has no authority in the United States. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of his las domicile, property to be
administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for
his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
The principal administration in this instance is that at the
domicile of the late Carmen Theodora Johannes in Singapore,
Straits Settlements. What is sought in the Philippine Islands is
an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary
administration, conformable to the provisions of sections 601,
602, and 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proper course
of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to pay
the claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and
remit the surplus to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for
distribution among the next of kin. Such administration
appears to be required in this jurisdiction since the provisions
of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permit of
the settlement of certain estates without legal proceedings,
have not been met.
It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a
preference when an administrator is to be appointed, unless
for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name someone
else. This preference has particular force under Spanish law
precedents. However, the Code of Civil Procedure, in section
642, while naming the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, as one to whom administration can be granted, leaves
this to the discretion of the court to determine, for it may be
found that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the
responsibility. Moreover, nonresidence is a factor to be
considered in determining the propriety of the appointment,
and in this connection, it is to be noted that the husband of the
deceased, the administrator of the principal administration,
resides in Singapore. Undoubtedly, if the husband should
come into this jurisdiction, the court would give consideration
to this petition that he be named the ancillary administrator
for local purposes. Ancillary letters should ordinarily be
granted to the domicilliary representative, if he applies
therefor, or to his nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of
express statutory requirement the court may in its discretion
appoint some other person.
11
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
The Court of First Instance has not acted in excess of its notice thereof to be given. If it appears at the hearing that the
jurisdiction, and as there in an appeal, certiorari will not lie. will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so
Accordingly, the writ prayed for cannot be granted. allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge
and attested by the seal of the court, to which shall be
Repeated Case attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the
IN RE: TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED JOSE B. SUNTAY; clerk. Thus, the will shall have the same effect as if originally
SILVINO SUNTAY vs. IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE proved and allowed in such court.
DECEASED JOSE B. SUNTAY; FEDERICO C. SUNTAY
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954 In the case at bar, The fact that the municipal district court of
Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of
China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must
FACTS:
also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a
valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The
Philippines, died in Amoy, China. He left real and personal
unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel
properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy. During his
for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of
lifetime, he married twice, the first wife was Manuela Cruz,
China objected to by counsel for the appellee, are
with whom he had several children. The second marriage was
inadmissible, because the office of Consul General does not
with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son,
qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the
Silvino Suntay. Intestate proceedings were instituted by the
Chinese law on procedure in probate matters. Consuls are
heirs from the first marriage. While the second wife, the
appointed to attend to trade matters.
surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition
for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the
which was claimed to have been executed and signed in the
municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking
Philippines on November, 1929.
the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that
the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not
The petition was denied due to the loss of the will before the
purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the
hearing thereof. After the war, Silvino filed a petition in the
municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the
intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will
Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be
executed in the Philippines in November 1929 or of the will
presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or
executed in Amoy, China in January 1931. He claimed that he
allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to
had found among the files, records and documents of his late
a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not
father, a will and testament in Chinese characters executed
measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject.
and signed by the deceased in January 1931, and that the same
It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such
was filed, recorded, and probated in the Amoy District Court in
proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all
China. The CFI disallowed the alleged last will and testament
interested parties must be made.
executed in November 1929 and the alleged last will and
testament executed in Amoy, China.
The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was
ISSUE:
received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines.
The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy,
May the will executed in Amoy, China still be validly probated
China, may be likened to or come up to the standard of such
in the Philippines?
proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all
interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back
RULING:
of such interested parties.
No. it should not be allowed because certain facts as to the due
execution of the China Will were not established. Sections 1, 2, CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS
and 3 of Rule 78 provide that wills proved and allowed in a GR NO. L-54919 MAY 30, 1984
foreign country according to the laws of such country maybe
allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper CFI in the FACTS:
Philippines provided that a copy of such will and the allowance
thereof be duly authenticated and filed with a petition for This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the
allowance in the Philippines in the court having jurisdiction. order of the respondent judge of the CFI of Manila, which
Such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and

DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN 12
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16
testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte
presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondents as
the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only
compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication
under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he
adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of
the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which
was allegedly executed in the United States and for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
testatrix.
Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the
time of her death and that her last will and testament was
presented, probated, allowed, and registered in Philadelphia.
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
petitioner alleging that the will in question is a forgery; that
the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that
even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are
invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would
work injustice and injury to him.
The respondent judge issued an order stating that the Last Will
and Testament of the late Adoracion is admitted to and
allowed probate in the Philippines, and appointed Nenita
Campos Paguia as Administratrix of the estate of said
decedent.
Petitioner died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the
executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, filed a
motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case
which was granted by the court.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will.
RULING:
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge.
As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only
to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue.
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the
respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will,
Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was
reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied
its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her
death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code
which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campos’ will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039
of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of
jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1,
of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
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letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the CFI of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA vs. CANDELERIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON
G.R. 139868 June 8, 2006
FACTS:
American citizens, spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard
Guersey, were residents in the Philippines for 30 years. They
have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey
died in 1979 leaving a will wherein she bequeathed her entire
estate to Richard consisting of her conjugal share in real estate
in Forbes Park, a bank account, cash balance and shares of
stock in A/G Interiors.
Two years later, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will
wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to Candelaria, except
for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.
Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory
was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the
administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife’s estate. The
will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where
Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of
partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of
partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator
with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition,
leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes
property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5
thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent
opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of
Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to
the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property
subject to the legacy.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed
by the law where the property is situated
2.) Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be
annulled.
DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN
RULING:
1.) Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law
where the property is situated. However, since the first wife is
a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed
by her national law. The national law of the person who made
the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration
whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first
wife’s properties may be found in the Philippines, however the
successional rights over those properties are governed by the
national law of the testator.
2.) A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person
vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees,
which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once
it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in
rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of
the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as
dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Repeated Case
MICIANO vs. BRIMO
50 PHIL 867, NOVEMBER 1, 1927
DOCTRINE: The national law of the testator shall govern in the
disposition of the testator’s properties; impossible conditions
in the will shall be considered as not imposed.
FACTS:
Juan Miciano was the judicial administrator of the estate of
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen. Miciano filed a scheme of
partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased
(Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the
inheritance and that said scheme of partition was not in
accordance in the Turkish laws. However, in the second part of
the will of Joseph Brimo, he specifically indicated that the
distribution of his properties shall be in accordance with the
Philippine laws and not his national law, which is Turkish.
ISSUE:
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WON the Philippine law should apply

RUILING:

NO. Though the last part of the second clause of the will
expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance
with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition,
described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those
contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

Further, Andre Brimo failed to prove that the scheme of

partition being filed violated the Turkish law. Hence, the court
approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as
one of the legatees.

DIGESTED BY: DAHIROC, ERUM, FUENTES, OLACO, PANIZA, RIVERA, SALVANA, TAN, UNAS, VILLAHERMOSA & VILLARIN 15
CASE DIGESTS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS – WEEKS 15 & 16