EXPOSING THE ROOTS OF EXTERNAL CONTROL PSYCHOLOGY:

ALTRUISM AS MORAL COMPULSION

One’s own path. – If we take the decisive step and enter upon the path which is called our
‘own path’, a secret is suddenly revealed to us: all those who have hitherto been our friends
and familiars have imagined themselves superior to us, and are now offended. The best of
them are lenient with us and wait patiently for us soon to find our way back to the ‘right path’
– they know, it seems, what the right path is! The others resort to mockery and act as though
one had become temporarily insane, or they make spiteful allusions to the person they
suppose has misled us. The more malicious declare us to be vain fools and seek to blacken
our motives, while the worst former friend of all sees in us his worst enemy …. What are we
to do? My advice is: to inaugurate our sovereignty by promising all our acquaintances a
year’s amnesty in advance for all their sins.

- Friedrich Nietzsche 1

1. Introduction: Our Present Psychology has Failed

In William Glasser’s book Choice Theory he boldly announces that our present

psychology has failed and we need a new psychological framework.2 The last three centuries

have brought mankind from working in fields to walking on the moon. It has brought the scope

of one’s vision from the next season for one’s crops to the next century for one’s company. But,

through all the advancements of our modern age, we are still not happy. We are not happy,

Glasser claims, because there is a whole facet of our lives that we have neglected and failed to

properly understand.

“Happiness,” Glasser says, “is enjoying the life you are choosing to live, getting along

well with the people near and dear to you, doing something with your life you believe is

worthwhile, and not doing anything to deprive anyone else of the same chance for happiness you

1
Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R.J.Hollingdale (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §484.
2
William Glasser, Choice Theory: A new psychology of personal freedom. (New York: HarperCollins,
1998).

1
have.”3 Looking at the five basic needs Glasser identifies in Choice Theory—Freedom, Survival,

Power, Fun, and Love/Belonging—Glasser reports that extraordinary progress has been made

historically in all areas but one. This, he says, is where we frustrate our capacity for happiness.

In fulfillment of our basic need for freedom, progress in political theory and economics

has given opportunity to more and more groups of people to earn a living, express themselves,

and live free of coercion. Regarding our need for survival, industrialization and economic

development has raised our standard of living and diminished our fear of disease, drought, and

natural disasters. Likewise, technological progress has serviced our need for power in

tremendous ways, bringing forth a multiplicity of ways to travel, communicate, create, explore,

and produce. And, finally, capitalism in recent times has made available copious amounts of fun

and enjoyment, from theme parks, to the internet, to multi-million dollar film productions.

The one aspect of our life which has not appreciably changed is the quality of our

relationships with others. It is in this realm where the masses have tried and overwhelmingly

failed at satisfying their need for love and belonging. Generations have attempted to fulfill this

need by rote, Glasser says, blindly following the customs of their parents—as their parents had

done with their parents; an endless unthinking routine repeated generation after generation. Each

new cycle brings offspring who are materially better off, but spiritually, equally impoverished. It

is in fulfillment of this need, love and belonging, where Glasser says our potential for happiness

is sabotaged. It is this “psychology of our ancestors, our parents and grandparents, of our

teachers and leaders, of almost all the people we know or know about” that he implores we must

change.4

3
William Glasser, Warning: Psychiatry can be Hazardous to Your Mental Health. (New York:
HarperCollins, 2004), p. 7.
4
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 5.

2
2. ECP: The Source of Our Misery and the Obstacle to Our Happiness

Where Glasser identifies love and belonging as the area of our life where we experience

the greatest frustration and misery, he identifies a particular psychological framework as the

cause of this deep discontentment. Glasser labels this framework external control psychology

[ECP] and he describes it as a pervasive, relationship-destroying mentality that leads us to treat

others as a means to an end, rather than as autonomous agents. “I use the term external control,”

Glasser explains, “because it is the direct opposite of self-control. People who use it spend all

their efforts trying to change others and very little effort trying to change themselves.”5 This

framework makes one see behavior like manipulation, coercion, control, threats, and punishment

as proper and even practical ways of dealing with others. Those who employ external control

psychology, Glasser says, “have discovered not only what is right for them – but also,

unfortunately, what is right for us…[and] these people feel obligated to try to force us to do what

they know is right.”6

According to Glasser, external control harms both the practitioner and the person upon

whom ECP is exercised. It is both in how we respond to the practitioners of ECP and how we

limit our own use of ECP behavior that we will improve our relationships, succeed in fulfilling

our need for love and belonging, and ultimately have a chance at deep and sustained happiness. It

is for this reason that Glasser describes choice theory as an “internal control psychology” and “a

new pro-relationship theory.”7

5
William Glasser, Unhappy Teenagers: A Way for Parents to Reach Them. (New York: HarperCollins,
2002), p. 12.
6
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 4.
7
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 7.

3
 In this article, what I would like to do is focus less on Glasser’s prescription for how we

are to manage our external control behavior and instead hone in on the possible philosophical

premises underlying ECP. It has been well established by the school of cognitive therapy that

human emotion and behavior are the products of a person’s thinking. As Aaron Beck explains,

cognitive therapy “suggests that the individual’s problems are derived largely from certain

distortions of reality based on erroneous premises and assumptions.”8 Long-term success in

therapy almost always requires that a client understand his problems and what motivates him to

perform the ineffective behaviors he or she believes are ‘solutions’. Long-term success in

eliminating External Control Psychology thus requires that we understand the fundamental roots

of ECP and why we erroneously believe it is an effective way of dealing with others. Glasser

seems to acknowledge this when he states: “Choice theory is about making better choices, but we

have to understand the reason for the bad choices before we can make good ones.”9

Further, if ECP is as pervasive and destructive as Glasser says it is—if it is “a terrible

plague that invades every part of our lives”— then we cannot treat it lightly.10 We cannot simply

tell ourselves to stop controlling and coercing others and we cannot just hope that one day we

“learn that what is right for me does not make it right for anyone else.”11 We must investigate

what particular intellectual premises led us (and continues to lead us) to coerce, control, and

disrespect others. We must, in a sense, follow the recommendation of Albert Ellis, who as far

back as 1956 said: “Assuming that emotionally disturbed individuals act in irrational and

illogical ways, the questions that are therapeutically relevant are: How do they originally get to

8
Aaron Beck, Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders (New York: Meridian, 1979), p. 2.
9
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 157
10
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 7.
11
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 53. I do not mean to suggest here that Glasser treats ECP lightly. I do think,
however, that he does not adequately explain the roots of ECP, which, I believe, is a crucially important
part to extricating it from our lives and society.

4
be illogical? How do they keep perpetuating their irrational thinking?”12 The same could apply

equally to a culture: How did we originally come to find ECP as an appropriate way for dealing

with one other? How do we keep perpetuating ECP?

3. Glasser’s Account of the Roots of ECP are Insufficient

Glasser introduces the concept of ECP with the following statement: “The seeds of

almost all our unhappiness are planted early in our lives when we begin to encounter people who

have discovered not only what is right for them – but also, unfortunately, what is right for

us….following a destructive tradition that has dominated our thinking for thousands of years,

these people feel obligated to try to force us to do what they know is right.”13 Glasser suggests

that the ECP framework originates from an innate drive for power: “[T]he child, driven by

power, is now exploring her controlling behaviors that have worked so well to find out if they

work well enough to get rid of every discomfort that comes along….The baby says to herself,

Why not find out how much I can get others to do for me.”14 But, because we are more than

animals motivated by drives and instincts, Glasser reports that we soon start to use external

control for other reasons.

One such reason Glasser suggests is thoughtless adherence to tradition: “It is the

psychology of our ancestors, our parents, and grandparents, of our teachers and leaders, of

almost all the people we know or know about. Coercion, to try and get our way, has been with us

so long that it is considered common sense…we neither care where it came from nor question its

12
Albert Ellis, The Albert Ellis Reader: A Guide to Well-Being Using Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy
(Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1998), p. 109.
13
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 4.
14
Glasser, Choice Theory, pp. 58-9

5
validity.”15 While this might be true for a great number of unscrupulous, uncritical individuals, it

does not explain why more thoughtful and seemingly moral people employ in ECP. Nor does this

explain how ECP originally came to be a part of our culture’s tradition.

This is likely why Glasser suggests that we embrace ECP for another reason, namely that

we believe it works: “It works for the powerful because it often gets them what they want. It

works for the powerless because they experience it working on them….”16 This may seem to

contradict Glasser’s view that ECP destroys personal freedom, disconnects us from those we

love, and drives us to harm ourselves and others but, what Glasser is saying here is that while

ECP subtly harms relationships, it generally gets observable results. An authoritative husband,

for example, sees his wife and child going along with what he vociferously demands and may

not be aware until a long while later of any negative thoughts harbored against him. Similarly, an

overbearing manager may witness his employees dutifully following his orders, but he may

never hear what is whispered behind his back or learn the real reason why he has such high

turnover with his employees.

Glasser’s point is that the visible, short-term gains of ECP are always easier to identify

than the long-term losses. Thus, the practitioner of ECP fails to make the connection that while

others are following his orders, abiding by his threats, and fearing his punishments, they are

simultaneously quietly disconnecting from him, losing respect for him, and finding ways to

avoid him.17 This problem is compounded, Glasser says, by the fact that even when we sense

there is something wrong with our controlling behavior, we do little to question it and much to

evade it, as, to us, it is common sense.

15
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 6.
16
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 6.
17
See: Glasser, Unhappy Teenagers, pp. 5, 11-21. Glasser discusses this ‘disconnecting process’ here.

6
 This explanation digs a little deeper into the motivation behind ECP and provides some

plausible reasons for how many well-intentioned individuals might unwittingly be engaging in

ECP. But, it seems hard to see how intelligent, scrupulous, and morally forthright individuals fail

to make the connection between their imperious behavior and the health of their relationships.

Perhaps sensing some inadequacy in his account of the source of ECP, Glasser offers

another explanation for ECP, namely that “[w]hat may also be involved here is ownership.”18

Glasser suggests that many of us believe on some level that we ‘own’ or have the right to control

our spouses, lovers, children, employees, students, or, in general, our subordinates. And, this

seems true enough. It is not unusual to see a boss micromanaging his or her employees, treating

them in a demeaning or disrespectful manner; or to see parents demanding total obedience from

their children, giving them little choice in their activities; or to see a husband treating his spouse

in a controlling, overbearing way. Therefore, I believe that this explanation of Glasser’s does

help to account for why some individuals embrace ECP, but it still does not go deep enough.

Where Glasser falls short in giving a full account of the roots of ECP is that he assumes

that ECP is only the result of ignorance, short-sightedness, or crude, irrational egoism. What I

contend is that while ECP can be motivated by the crude, ‘egoistic’ drive for power, far more

often, ECP is motivated by a certain moral perspective. This moral perspective is the morality of

altruism, which has been with us for nearly two millennia and which has given rise to such

common sense notions as ‘duty’, ‘service’, and ‘sacrifice’ with which we use to control and

influence one another. At root of this morality lies a general lack of respect for others’ autonomy

and a moral perspective that ‘we know what is best for every individual’. Specifically, what it

holds is best for every individual is — that which is not in his self-interest! In the next section, I

18
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 15.

7
will explain why Glasser’s account of ECP is inadequate and why altruism is by and large the

primary source for the type of external control behavior we see in society today.

4. The Preponderance of External Control Behavior us Subtle

Selfishness is a dirty word. Today most people fear being labeled selfish and work hard

to be thought of as kind, giving, caring, selfless, compassionate, and altruistic. Altruism and

selflessness are words always found in accolades, compliments, and award ceremonies;

selfishness and egoism almost always accompany censures, angry tirades, or accounts of why

someone committed some heinous act. Examples of ‘selfish’ and ‘greedy’ behavior, we are told,

range from Bernie Madoff to Tiger Woods to the common criminal guilty of theft or assault.

These examples fill the headlines of our newspapers and the plot lines of our television shows.

When cast in this light it is easy to see why such ‘selfish’ behavior is wrong – it is

unprincipled and blatantly disregards the rights and property of others. Additionally, it is easy to

see how such behavior would stem from the ECP framework. Bernie Madoff obtained people’s

hard earned money for investment purposes and, under false pretenses, took the money for his

own. He worked hard to build his investors’ trust and hide from them the fact that the steady

returns they were seeing were entirely illusory. Tiger Woods deceived his wife, children, and

fans feigning moral rectitude, while engaging in lascivious and mendacious behavior. Like any

adulterer, Tiger likely worked hard to manipulate his wife’s emotions, suppress her inquiries, and

reassure her of his fidelity. His investments in his family were similarly, illusory. Finally, the

common criminal guilty of theft, assault, or fraud treats others coercively, as if they were mere

pawns in a game whose end it is to serve his needs. But, he works hard to hide his identity when

committing these acts.

8
 While all of these acts are clear examples of crude, irrationally selfish behavior motivated

by ECP, such examples, I believe, constitute a low overall percentage of the total external control

behavior we see in society. In a modern, civilized society such as we have today, most people

enjoy a relatively high degree of freedom and comfortable living standards. They generally

acquire what they have through merit, hard work, and cooperation/trade with others. Typically,

because people work hard for their possessions, they grasp the importance of following common

sense moral principles and developing a strong work ethic. Thus, in the type of society we have

today (at least in the developed nations), the unprincipled, short-ranged, crudely ‘selfish’ and

exploitative members of society are a minority. The wrongness and impracticality of ‘flying by

the seat of one’s pants’, ‘walking all over others’, ‘living on the edge’, ‘living for the moment’,

or ‘acting on impulse’ are well known to both victims and (usually once caught) perpetrators.

But, besides this, as Glasser points out, ECP is not meant to be a theory about the

criminal personality. ECP is a psychological framework that is pervasive. It is a psychology that

nearly all of us subscribe to (at least in some form) and it leads to problems that show up in

nearly all of our relationships. Most strikingly, and the reason why Glasser feels so inclined to

write about it, is that ECP shows up in our closest, most meaningful relationships, corroding

them and preventing us from living fruitful, happy lives.

So, while ECP can lead a person to harm, coerce, abuse, or defraud others, the lion’s

share of external control behavior is subtle, indirect, and covert. This is why Glasser states that

Choice Theory is for the “husband-wife, parent-child, teacher-student, and manager-worker,”

written with aim to repair “unsatisfying relationships.”19 It is why he says that external control

can be “as slight as a disapproving glance.”20 And, it is why his ‘seven deadly habits of external

19
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. ix.
20
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 5.

9
control’ encompass not coercive, but importantly, non-respectful behaviors: “Criticizing,

blaming, complaining, nagging, threatening, punishing, and rewarding to control.”21

If this is true, that external control behavior can be performed by genuinely well-

intentioned, scrupulous people, then it is a mistake to assume that all external control behavior is

the result of the causes Glasser cites, namely, thoughtless conventionalism, ignorance of the

destructiveness of external control behavior, or irrational egoism. These explanations are

inadequate and in most cases, far too shallow. As I will explain in the following section, the roots

of ECP run much deeper; they rest in the soil of morality.

5. Why Altruism has Escaped Recognition as a Cause of ECP

Glasser’s inadequate account of the roots of ECP is, I believe, not an accident. It is the

result of a deeper failure on his part and the part of most psychologists to recognize a pernicious

and intractable issue in morality, namely the true nature of altruism and how altruism is almost

universally misunderstood and conflated with kindness, generosity, or benevolence. Running

deeper than this, not only is altruism severely misunderstood, but it is often assumed to be

synonymous with ‘the good’ or moral behavior as such. In a sense analogous to how we think of

external control, belief in the goodness of altruism is something we accept almost unquestionably

as part of ‘common sense’.

Take the following quotes from well-known sources in the field of psychology as

representative:

1) “Leaving the world a better place to live in, serving others, participation in charity (the

greatest virtue of all) – these activities are right and good and have provided life meaning

21
Glasser, Unhappy Teenagers, p. 13.

10
 for many humans….Camus’s Dr. Rieux…fulfilled [him]self through service…by nursing

plague victims.”22

2) “Altruism, especially when it extends beyond biological relations (kin altruism) and

beyond “tit-for-tat” calculations grounded in self-interest (reciprocal altruism), is widely

lauded and is commonly considered a foundation of moral life…[i]n its fullest expression,

which may include significant self-sacrifice in the aid of strangers or even enemies,

altruism is a source of perennial fascination across cultures.”23

3) “The healthy person…clearly understands self-other boundaries. He or she can choose

to be of egoistic help to others …[or] he or she can also proceed further developmentally

and deliberately choose the blurred ego boundaries of the transcendent state. Help

rendered then becomes altruistic.”24

4) “In the altruistic mode, the person is concerned about the welfare of others [and] gets

gratification from subordinating his interests to the needs of other people…[such] [p]eople

perform many different acts of helpfulness and generosity without expecting praise or

commendation. The altruistic act is its own reward.”25

Our belief in and commitment to altruism may seem harmless, but I believe this is a

mistake with grave consequences. It has led individuals for millennia to pursue ‘the good’ at the

expense of their happiness and it has led individuals to manipulate, harass, and even coerce

others in the name of ‘the good’—self-sacrifice. What I hope to show in the remainder of this

22
Irving Yalom, Existential Psychotherapy, (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 431.
23
Dame C. Saunders, “Kindness” in Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification,
ed. Martin E. Seligman and Christopher Peterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 327.
24
Penelope Thrasher, “On Altruism: Comment on Batson.” American Psychologist, 46, no. 2 (February
1991), p. 163.
25
Aaron Beck, Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders (New York: Meridian, 1979), pp. 244-5.

11
article is that it is largely because this morality has gone unchallenged that external control

behavior has, in all its varieties, also gone unchallenged.

6. Altruism in Historical Context

The first thing to note about altruism is that it is distinctly different from “the network of

closely related terms indicating a common orientation of the self toward the other,” such as

helping behavior, generosity, kindness, benevolence, empathy, politeness, care, and

compassion.26 There is almost a neurotic inattention when it comes to precisely defining altruism

in discussion. In the opening chapter of the book Altruism and Helping Behavior, for instance, a

book bringing together experts on the topic, Rushton and Sorentino fail to give even the hint of a

definition of the term ‘altruism’.27 Many, if not most, theorists make this mistake either assuming

that one ‘just knows’ what altruism means or proceeding in a way that conflates altruism with

roughly related concepts. This error is the source of much of our confusion over the concept and

it is important that we be aware of the efforts made by Friedrich Nietzsche and Ayn Rand (and

more recently by Smith28 and Locke and Kenner29), who have pointed out that altruism is a

moral theory which demands much more of a person than the simple performance of random acts

of kindness, tithing ten percent, or helping one’s neighbor in need. Altruism is an ethical theory

that demands that one sacrifice oneself to others and live one’s life in the service of others.

26
Saunders, “Kindness,” p. 326. Unfortunately, this is something that Saunders does not recognize,
despite setting out to differentiate and discuss these terms.
27
Jean P. Rushton and Richard M. Sorrentino, ed., Altruism and Helping Behavior (Hillsdale, N.J:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981).
28
Tara Smith, Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007).
29
Edwin A. Locke and Ellen Kenner. “How Altruism Undermines Mental Health and Happiness.” in
Handbook of Managerial Behavior And Occupational Health, ed. A. Antoniou, C. Cooper, G. Chrousos,
C. Spielberger, and M. Eysenck. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 2009), pp. 179-92.

12
 We can trace the roots of altruism at least as far back as the inception of Christianity.

Service to others is held to be the second highest moral commandment, second only to the

commandment to love God with all thy heart: “To love [God] … and to love your neighbor as

yourself is more important than all burnt offerings and sacrifices," the Gospel of Mark teaches.

In Matthew 25:31 it is explained that because we cannot ever actually help God, but only offer

him sacrifices and offerings, we must help each other. And, in 1 Corinthians 10: 23, we are told

that “No one should seek his own welfare, but rather his neighbor's… whether you eat or drink,

or whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God. Don’t become a stumbling block… [but]

try to please everybody in every way.”

In the Enlightenment period, as religion declined in significance in people’s lives, the

morality of sacrifice and altruism became secularized. Immanuel Kant taught that only actions

completely devoid of self-interest could count as moral actions. Incentives destroy the possibility

of an action being considered moral, because they “undermine it and destroy all its sublimity.”30

Later philosophers, like Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Marx diverged from Kant in

significant ways, but each seemed to retain this moral outlook that selflessness was a

necessary criterion for an action to be considered moral. Kant’s influence on those who

followed him stands out, for instance, in the writing of Schopenhauer some 60 years later

when he states: “If a self-interested motive is the only one, its discovery entirely destroys the

moral worth of an action; and if such a motive acts as an accessory, the moral worth of the action

is reduced by its discovery. The absence of all egoistic motivation is, therefore, the criterion of

an action of moral worth.”31

30
Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2d. ed., trans. L.W. Beck (Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1990), § 442.
31
Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub Co
Inc, 1995), pp. 139-40.

13
 It is with Auguste Comte, however, that we see the first explicit appearance of the term

“altruism.” The term’s literal meaning is ‘other-ism’, derived from the latin alter. Following in

this long tradition of ethicists who promoted ‘disinterestedness’, ‘self-sacrifice’, and

‘selflessness’, Comte diverges slightly. He deemed Christianity’s selfless service to God to be

illusory, viewed Kant’s morality of selflessly “follow[ing] the moral law because it is the moral

law”32 as empty, and saw Hegel’s “social ethics,” i.e. service to the State, as too narrow and

problematic.

Instead, to Comte, the point of morality is to “teach us to live for others. Its aim being to

fit us for the unintermitting service of Humanity….”33 To “Live for Others is the simplest

summary of the whole moral code of Positivism [Comte’s philosophy],” Comte said.34 Comte

had high hopes for his new philosophy, or, as he called it, his ‘religion of Humanity’, believing it

would eventually replace religious supernaturalism. With it, he believed, he could achieve the

“substitution of Love of Humanity for Love of God,”35 which might finally bring us to a point

where “actions of a self-regarding kind…have to give way.”36

Unlike his predecessors Kant and Hegel, Comte was not the least bit obscure in his

message and the practical aims of his philosophy. Morality means altruism, and altruism means

‘living for others’ in a profoundly religious, emotional, and self-sacrificial way. As Gould notes,

though Comte was critical of religion, he admired it for its ability to attract steadfast and faithful

32
Edward J. Bond, “Theories of the Good.” in Encyclopedia of Ethics, Vol. 1, ed. Lawrence C. Becker,
(New York: Garland, 1992) p. 411.
33
Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity: Or Treatise on Sociology Instituting the Religion of
Humanity, Volume Four, trans. Richard Congreve (New York: Burt Franklin, 1973), p. 228. Available
online at: http://www.archive.org/details/systempositivep01comtgoog
34
Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity: Or Treatise on Sociology Instituting the Religion of
Humanity, Volume One, trans. J.H. Bridges (New York: Burt Franklin, 1973), p. 566. Available online at:
http://www.archive.org/details/systempositivep00comtgoog
35
Auguste Comte, A General View of Positivism, trans. J.H. Bridges (Dubuque, IA: Brown Reprints,
1971), p. 378. See also p. 349.
36
Comte, A General View of Positivism, p. 382.

14
devotion. For the last ten years of his life, in fact, Comte began a tradition of a daily reading of

the Imitation of Christ and Dante’s Divine Comedy. “He esteemed the Imitation…as in a relative

sense a noble mirror of devotion…,”37 Gould reports. In reading these medieval religious texts

Comte would systematically substitute the word ‘Humanity’ for the word ‘God’ wherever it

appeared. Gould provides us with an example: “The noble love of Humanity impelleth us to do

great things, and exciteth us always to desire that which is more perfect. Make no great account

of who may be for thee or against thee; but mind and take care that Humanity be with thee in

everything thou doest.”38 In Comte’s mind, ‘others’ had replaced God, and, he believed, we

ought now think of ‘Humanity’ as the entity to whom we should kneel, serve, and sacrifice.

What stands out from Comte’s ‘religion of Humanity’ for our purposes though is his

perspective on human nature and man’s moral purpose. He views man as primarily a dependent

being with pre-established social moral obligations. As a member of ‘Humanity’, Comte believes

that we are born into fundamental moral obligations to serve Humanity, i.e. others, much in the

way that Matthew 25: 31-46 declares. The problem is that too often we fail to recognize and live

up to these social moral obligations.

Comte, in fact, thought this to be “the great human problem.”39 The problem is that

despite us being social creatures with social purposes, we fail to recognize our social essence and

greater responsibilities because our innate and selfish drives restrict our outlook to no wider than

our own benefit. We fail to see the ‘value’ of being altruistic, in other words, because we cannot

even get past the point of asking for reasons why we should be selfless—i.e. we cannot see that

37
Floyd J. Gould, (1984). The Life Story of Auguste Comte: With a Digest Review of Ancient, Religious,
and ‘Modern’ Philosophy (Austin, TX: American Atheist Press, 1984), p.54.
38
Gould, p. 54.
39
Comte, A General View of Positivism, p. 396.

15
the very act of demanding reasons is itself a selfish act! Thus, he pondered, how was he to bring

about an altruistic society when ‘selfish man’ was the material one he had to work with?

Hegel, Marx, and Comte all concluded they could get around this problem by reshaping

human nature. While Marx thought he could do this by changing the economic structure of

society, Comte thought he could do this by means of moral education. Such education, he said,

would “raise social feeling by artificial effort to the position which, in the natural condition, is

held by selfish feeling.”40 Education could help us “to become incorporate with Humanity”41

through the “atrophy by prolonged inaction…[of] the selfish propensities.”42

But, lest we think of these efforts as downright despotic or indoctrinating, these thinkers

also provide important reasons for why we should strive to create an altruistic society. For one,

they insisted that acting altruistically is the only way to act in accordance with one’s true nature

as a social being. Since man’s essence is “social,” we in fact cannot achieve moral character or

even be truly human until we are acting in a socially appropriate way. Indeed, it made sense to

these thinkers to force us to live for others and participate in the community, as doing so would

enable us to live a truly human existence. W.T. Stace explains Hegel’s view on this matter as

follows:

[T]he State is the true self of the individual. His very individuality only finds its perfect

expression in the State. For the State is simply his true self, i.e. his universality,

objectified. The interests of the State are, therefore, the true and essential interests of the

40
Comte, A General View of Positivism, p. 98.
41
Comte, System of Positive Polity, Vol.One, p. 282.
42
Comte, A General View of Positivism, p. 98.

16
 individual, and the sacrifice of the latter to the State is only his sacrifice to his own higher

self, not to some external and alien authority….43

But, beyond this claim that we can only achieve true fulfillment by living for Humanity,

Hegel, Marx, and Comte also put forth a line of reasoning that stresses the debts or obligations

one has to his society. Take language or even consciousness, the argument goes, and ask yourself

‘How did man acquire these?’ Straightaway one will see that no individual developed these

characteristics on his own, acquiring these them by his own thought or effort, he did so by virtue

of ‘Society’, or the social nexus (i.e. ‘Humanity’). Hence, we owe this social nexus a significant

debt, which we are morally oblige to repay.

”Consciousness is… a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all,” Marx

said, and he did not mean for this to be just a scientific statement about the evolutionary

development of mankind.44 He thought that society was responsible for all aspects of

consciousness—our basic drives and genetic features, as well as our fundamental personality,

intelligence, and deepest values. This is because as human beings we live in a social community,

which Marx believes, has significantly shaped our character, education, and well-being.

Accordingly, Marx thought that we shouldn’t even consider ourselves independent beings,

because:

“A being only considers himself independent when he stands on his own feet; and he

only stands on his own feet when he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by

the grace of another regards himself as a dependent being. But I live completely by the

43
Walter T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel (New York, Dover Publications, 1955), p. 407. See also C.
Bradley Thompson, “Why Marxism: Evil Laid Bare,” The Objective Standard, 7, no. 2 (Summer 2012),
pp. 13-16 for a discussion of Marx’s related view of man as a species-being.
44
Karl Marx, “The Germany Ideology,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 167.

17
 grace of another if I owe him not only the maintenance of my life, but if he has,

moreover, created my life – if he is the source of my life.”45

Comte echoes this sentiment in almost identical fashion stating, “The man who dares to

think himself independent of others… cannot even put the blasphemous conception into words

without immediate self-contradiction, since the very language he uses is not his own.”46 What

Marx and Comte conclude here then is that because ‘Humanity’ or ‘Society’ is responsible for

the development of our identity, our character, and our well-being, we owe it a moral debt and

ought to repay this debt by serving and sacrificing to it. By seeing altruism in its historical

context we should now be better able to interpret it correctly. In the following sections, we will

seek a clearer understanding of the concept ‘altruism’ and see how it motivates ECP.

7. Altruism and Conventional Morality

Separate and distinct from terms such as kindness, generosity, or even charity, altruism is

a philosophic term meant to describe more than some particular, isolated action performed for

the sake of others. Altruism is an ethical theory urging one to act for the sake of others as a

matter of moral principle. Far from isolated actions like casting a sympathetic smile in a person’s

direction, giving a coworker a ride to work, or giving a portion of one’s earnings to charity,

altruism demands that one serve others and deny oneself throughout the whole of one’s life.

Charity may be a part of altruism, but altruism is more; altruism means charity—as way of life,

with no interest in compensation or hope for reward.

While not everyone would be inclined to follow such a strict interpretation of altruism in

their daily life, this does not mean it is not commonly thought of in this way. In fact, a number of

45
Karl Marx, “Private Property and Communism,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker
(New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1972), p. 77.
46
Comte, A General View of Positivism, p. 236.

18
scholars follow this interpretation of altruism. E.J. Bond accepts this definition when he states:

“The altruist view is that being morally good consists in always denying oneself for the sake of

others.”47 Maclagan similarly states that altruism means “assuming a duty to relieve the distress

and promote the happiness of our fellows… discount[ing] altogether his own pleasure or

happiness as such when he is deciding what course of action to pursue.”48 Hoffman suggests that

at a minimum altruistic behavior requires one to act “without conscious regard for one's own

self-interest.”49 And, Nancy McWilliams states that for an action to qualify as altruistic, “[t]he

helping acts must have been costly to the doer, according to conventional ideas of what is

rewarding (e.g., the person risked opprobrium, physical injury or illness, or gave up a good job

or reputation to do the altruistic deeds)”50

Furthermore, while it is true that most people would not be inclined to practice altruism

in this way, this does not mean that they would be willing to eschew it either. In all likelihood,

such a person would show deference to those strong enough to commit to a profoundly altruistic

life. This is why the bulk of those in our society still regard Jesus Christ, St. Francis of Assisi,

and Mother Teresa as paragons of virtue and venerate maxims like John F. Kennedy’s “Ask not

what your country should do for you, but what you should do for your country.” Conversely, it is

also why most individuals in society strive to avoid being called selfish, self-centered, or

egotistical and view it as a black mark on one’s social character to be thought of in this way.

This is precisely why the morality of altruism is such an effective tool to control and

manipulate people. For 2,000 years it has been taught that sacrifice, self-denial, and the

47
Bond, “Theories of the Good,” p. 410
48
W.G. Maclagan., “Self and Others: A Defense of Altruism,” Philosophical Quarterly 4, 15 (April
1954), pp. 109-110.
49
Martin L. Hoffman, “Is Altruism Part of Human Nature?” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 40 (1981) p. 124.
50
Nancy McWilliams, “The Psychology of the Altruist.” Psychoanalytic Psychology 1 (1984), p. 195

19
subordination of one’s desires to those of the group is what is good and this perspective has

instilled itself in our culture to the point where we find very hard to question. It seems to most

people common sense that to be selfish is to be bad and to be selfless is to be good. Yet, when

we do question this inherited moral code, we should find that it is not only not common sense,

but that it is the root cause of much of our personal unhappiness and social discontent.

8. Morality Today: The Tension between Altruism and Happiness

Morality is a code of values and principles a person chooses to adopt in order to guide his

life and direct his actions. Unfortunately, most people today do not give deep thought to the

moral principles they adopt and they generally absorb their moral values from their social

surroundings. The problem with this is not just that society can be wrong, but also that society

does not always emanate one unified, coherent moral message. In fact, the two most prevalent

moral messages we hear in society today as to how we should live our lives are: 1) We should

devote our lives to helping others (altruism), and 2) we should strive to be successful and happy

(egoism). The first message, that we should devote our lives to others, is almost indisputably

deemed to be the ‘moral path’. But what of the second? Is it moral? Can one live altruistically

and happily at the same time?

If one were to consider the viability of happiness in the context we have established, one

should see that altruism is not a moral theory aimed at personal happiness. Leo Rosten suggests

this when he says, "I cannot believe that the sole purpose of life is to be happy. Rather, I think

the purpose of life is to be useful, to be responsible, to be compassionate."51 On the altruist’s

terms, happiness takes a backseat to the needs of others. If one really takes altruism seriously,

51
Patrizia Porrini, Gina Poncini, and Lorene Hiris, Above the Board. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), p.
146.

20
one’s happiness ought not be thought of at all because, on principle, one’s own interests should

not be thought about. One’s ‘ego’, i.e. one’s ‘self’, should be relegated to the very bottom of the

moral scale. And, this means that any long-term goal should properly stand as an affront to

altruism because it signifies that one is not putting oneself last in all affairs.

Beyond this, happiness requires a course of action markedly different from what altruism

demands. We all toss around the cliché that ‘money can’t buy happiness’ and this is because we

recognize on some level that ‘being happy’, at least over the long-run, is a very demanding

pursuit. Happiness requires that one acquire discipline, integrity, a strong work ethic, a basic

level of education, a certain degree of health, clearly defined values, the acquisition of certain

skills, the cultivation of meaningful relationships, etc. Achieving long-term happiness is a

challenging endeavor. It “must be nurtured if it is to be strong,” Glasser says.52 Yet, in this

difficult, life-long enterprise, one is supposed to, under the dictates of altruism, be prepared to

drop all such self-interested concerns and satisfy the standing claims of others in need.

How can happiness be possible under such a moral code? It cannot be. Altruism thus does

not simply regard happiness as unimportant—it makes the achievement of happiness impossible.

Granted, this is not a severe criticism for the committed altruist, as he believes the

purpose of being moral is not to be happy, but is to fulfill the dictates of morality. But, it is

important to point out that when practiced fully and consistently, altruism will bring about

personal unhappiness since will drain person of his time, energy, values, and independence.

Nietzsche warned of this when he said, “[t]he praise of [selfless] virtue is the praise of something

52
Glasser, Unhappy Teenagers, p. 112.

21
that is privately harmful—the praise of instincts that deprive a human being of his noblest

selfishness and the strength for the highest autonomy.”53

Nietzsche was keen in this regard to point out that altruism does not just ask that we serve

others, it asks that we sacrifice ourselves. He recognized that this meant placing the interests of

others above one’s own, placing their values above ours, and placing their well-being above our

own well-being. Valuing creativity, independence, courage, and vitality, Nietzsche saw altruism

as a ‘decadent’ morality, a morality that makes one want to “lose one’s way in order to come to

the assistance of a neighbor.”54 And, this is why Nietzsche referred to altruism as an anti-natural

morality,55 since it goes against our instincts of self-preservation. It is similarly why Ayn Rand

called altruism the morality of death.56 While both of these characterizations may seem harsh,

they are actually not far off the mark. If one understands that the central tenet of altruism is the

call for self-sacrifice and self-denial, one should recognize that this essentially demands that one

deny the importance of one’s life. And, if altruism is practiced fervently enough, it could literally

lead to one’s death.

9. How Accepting Altruism Leads To ECP

Regardless of what one thinks of these characterizations of altruism, for our purposes

here, we should be able to make two noncontroversial statements about it, namely that, 1) it

53
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), §21.
See also see: §116, §119, and Daybreak §132.
54
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §338.
55
See Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. J. Norman (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), “Morality as Anti-Nature” 4; Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §327,328.
56
See Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism. (New York: Penguin
Books, 1998); Ayn Rand, “Altruism” in Objectively Speaking. ed. Peter Schwartz and Marlene
Podritske. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), pp. 143-52; Craig Biddle, “Atlas Shrugged
and Ayn Rand’s Morality of Egoism,” The Objective Standard, 7, no. 2 (Summer 2012), pp. 31-
56.

22
holds a fundamentally collectivist perspective, a perspective of people not as individuals, but as

members of a group, and 2) it encourages dependency, maintaining that we should rely on one

another not just in thought (‘we are our brother’s keeper’), but in practice too (‘from each

according to his ability, to each according to his need’). This collectivist perspective and

consequent dependency are two structural pillars that help support and give rise to external

control.

Looking at this first pillar, consider how viewing an individual not as an autonomous

being, but as a mere member of some ‘collective’, might provide moral justification for external

control behavior, encouraging others to treat him in a controlling or demeaning way. Consider

the implications of seeing a person not as an end-in-himself, but as a means to the ends of others.

And, consider the implications of conceiving of a person not as an entity born with rights to life,

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but as an entity born into a network of pre-established social

moral obligations. Add in the fact that most people do not arrive at their moral views based on

reason, but rather by some other non-rational means (faith, emotion, or tradition), and it is not

hard to see why external control is such a pervasive problem in society. Under such a moral

framework, should one member fail to live up to his alleged ‘social obligations’, it seems clear

that others (the ‘responsible’ members) would feel more than justified in correcting him and

steering him in the ‘right’ direction, whether this should require subtle manipulation, moral

censure, or coercion.

Take the Nietzsche quote found at the top of this article.57 Many people can relate to the

situation Nietzsche describes. Many individuals brace themselves whenever they make important

decisions in their life for how many people they might offend in the process, even when such

decisions are seemingly innocuous and have little effect on others. Whether it’s deciding where
57
Nietzsche, Daybreak,, §484

23
one might live, what career one might pursue, or whom one might choose to date, those who

operate on ECP do not believe such decisions should be made independently. They believe such

decisions should be made collectively, based on the consideration of others’ needs. Thus, the

altruist perspective squelches one’s independence and ultimately makes one’s life subject to the

democracy of the community, a ‘democracy’ in which one does not even have a vote in how one

may conduct his life.

Turning to the other pillar, one can see too that dependency, whether psychological or

existential, encourages external control behavior. A dependent relationship is one where one

must rely on others for one’s basic needs, as one is not capable or willing to satisfy them on his

own. Though dependency is romanticized by advocates of altruism, it is actually an unfortunate

and unhealthy condition to be in.58 Glasser does not seem to be in favor of dependency as he

states the purpose of Choice Theory is to give us more control of our lives and to help us answer

the ‘all-important question’, “How can I figure out how to be free to live my life the way I want

to live it and still get along well with the people I need?”59

Yet, altruism encourages dependence at its very core by demanding that we think not of

ourselves, but of others in any and all situations. Just as we saw that one cannot obtain happiness

by living under the altruist’s moral code, one equally cannot achieve independence under this

system either. Becoming self-sufficient, productive, and knowledgeable requires a great deal of

hard work and perseverance. It requires time spent working by oneself on oneself. But, again, as

altruism enters the picture, this morality tells us that our life is not our own and that we must live

and act for the sake of others. It is hard to see how a strong, efficacious, self-sufficient person

could emerge from such a moral framework.

58
See: Locke and Kenner. “How Altruism Undermines Mental Health and Happiness.” This assumes, of
course, that one’s dependency is self-caused and not the result of accident or illness.
59
Glasser, Choice Theory, p. 5.

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 Still there exists an argument which some altruists claim belies the view that self-

sacrifice leads to self-impoverishment. This is the view that, ‘if one sacrifices for others, others

will in turn do the same for them’. This is not really an argument, so much as it is an unfounded

assertion, claiming counter-intuitively that one can benefit oneself by denying one’s self-interest.

In Luke 6:38, for example, the Bible tells us: “Give to others, and you will receive. […] You will

be given so much that it will spill into your lap.” Similarly, Marx claimed that communism

would not just be a more ‘humane system’, but with self-interest and profit eliminated, it would

be a more productive system too, outpacing capitalism economically. This line of reasoning in

altruism has a remarkably weak foundation, yet is frequently accepted. And when it is, it

succeeds in establishing in people’s minds a sort of mystical moral law of exchange whereby if

one only gives up his priceless pennies, he will receive untold treasures in return.

What this ‘moral law’ actually results in is individuals giving up their self-reliance,

ceasing to deal with others by voluntary means, and resort to faith that others will provide for

him once stripped of his means of self-support. Ayn Rand described the reality of this situation

as follows: “He may hope that others might occasionally sacrifice themselves for his benefit, as

he grudgingly sacrifices himself for theirs, but he knows that the relationship will bring mutual

resentment, not pleasure— and that, morally, their pursuit of values will be like an exchange of

unwanted, unchosen Christmas presents, which neither is morally permitted to buy for

himself.”60

The consequence of holding this fictitious view then is that altruists soon come to realize

that their moral law is precisely just that, a moral law, not a political one. And, in so being, one

has no judicial court to appeal to if others are being ‘immoral’ and not sacrificing their reputed

60 Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness, p. ix.

25
fair share. Thus, the altruist will turn to external control as a means of gaining control and

influence over others. As external control is the dependent person’s best tool to make others do

‘what he knows is right’ and sacrifice for his sake when they are disinclined to do so, it is no

surprise that we see altruism encouraging dependency and dependency, in turn, encouraging the

use of external control behavior.

10. Conclusion

In this article we began with William Glasser’s identification of a particular facet of our

society that is dysfunctional and in need of repair. This facet, he said, is our social sphere where

we satisfy our need of love and belonging. The malignancy affecting our social relationships,

Glasser identifies, is a certain type of psychological framework, which he calls external control

psychology. This framework drives us to control and manipulate, rather than to deal with others

in a supportive, encouraging manner, giving them the respect they are due as autonomous,

rational beings. In evaluating Glasser’s account of the roots of external control psychology, we

judged his account to be deficient and proposed instead a somewhat counterintuitive explanation

for why the bulk of society operates on an external control framework. We suggested that

external control psychology was merely an outgrowth of the widespread acceptance of the

morality of altruism.

After clarifying what altruism is, with historical references to philosophic systems

extolling altruism, we determined that altruism is an ethical system that places moral value on

selfless service to others or the group. It is a moral system that espouses collectivism and

mutually dependency, as opposed to individualism and the pursuit happiness. Through its

conception of others as duty-bound members of society and its encouragement of dependency,

26
we concluded that altruism plays a significant role in generating the framework for external

control psychology and in encouraging the use of external control behavior.

It should be clear from the preceding analysis that while altruism may seem like an

innocent theory applying simply to how we should treat others, it is much more. Though it may

run counter to our moral sensibilities to characterize altruism in such a negative light, holding it

responsible for much of our personal unhappiness, this is no reason to dismiss it. As Locke and

Kenner have noted, “Altruism has had an intellectual 'free ride' going unchallenged for too

long.”61 Altruism is responsible for the lion’s share of external control and it generates much of

our personal unhappiness. If we value personal happiness and respectful relationships with one

another, we ought to reject the unrealistic moral demands of altruism and replace it with a life-

affirming alternative.

61
Locke & Kenner, p. 191.

27