The Moderating Effect of Knowledge and

Resources on the Persuasive Impact of

Analogies
MICHELLE L. ROEHM
BRIAN STERNTHAL*

Four experiments were conducted to examine the persuasive impact of new product
appeals containing an analogy. An analogy highlights the similarity in the benefits
offered by a familiar base product and an unfamiliar target product. This device is
found to be persuasive when (a) message recipients have the ability to map at-
tribute relations from some base category to understand the benefits of a target
product, and (b) they allocate the substantial resources needed to complete this
mapping. In the absence of either of these conditions, the persuasive impact of
an analogy is more limited. A variety of devices, including expertise with the base
product, training in how to process base information, and a positive mood, are
shown to improve the comprehension of an analogy and to enhance its
persuasiveness.

W hen personal digital assistants (PDAs) were intro-

duced in the mid-1990s, they offered an unusual
combination of characteristics. Although they resembled and
functioned like a conventional computer, one feature of
PDAs was uncharacteristic of traditional computers: they
could support wireless communication. A challenge in mar-
keting PDAs and other novel products is to help consumers
identify and appreciate their product benefits, particularly
those that might not be apparent from an inspection of a
product’s surface attributes.
An analogy may be useful in this regard. An analogy
compares a known base item to an unknown target item
with which it shares a relational structure among attributes,
but not surface features. For example, an analogy might be
drawn between a PDA and a cellular phone. These objects
have few surface features in common. A PDA has a key-
board, which a cellular phone does not, and a cellular phone
*Michelle L. Roehm is assistant professor of marketing, Babcock Grad-
uate School of Management, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC
27109 (Michelle.Roehm@mba.wfu.edu). Brian Sternthal is Kraft Professor
of Marketing, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern
University, 2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60208. The authors acknowl-
edge the helpful input of the editor, the associate editor, and the three
reviewers. In addition, the authors thank Alice Isen for drawing attention
to a connection between mood and analogy and Jennifer Gregan-Paxton,
Dedre Gentner, and Harper Roehm for insightful comments on earlier drafts
of the article. Funding for this research was provided by the Proctor &
Gamble Research Grant to the Marketing Department at the Kellogg Grad-
uate School of Management and by the Babcock Graduate School of Man-
agement Faculty Research Fund. Correspondence may be directed to the
first author.
has a dialing pad, which a PDA does not. However, they
do share relational structures among attributes. Input re-
ceived from the keyboard on a PDA can activate a wireless
modem and direct a transmission to a particular destination.
On a cellular phone, the dialing pad provides a parallel
function of directing information transmission.
To comprehend this analogy, surface attributes are set
aside and structural relations are transferred from base to
target. Because the cellular phone’s dialing pad attribute
cannot be mapped onto the PDA, it is disregarded. However,
the cellular phone’s wireless communication function does
map and thus can be applied to the target PDA.
The characteristic of allowing only relations to be mapped
from base to target distinguishes an analogy from other types
of comparison that have been described in the consumer
(see Gregan-Paxton and Roedder John 1997) and psycho-
logical literatures (see Gentner and Markman 1997). A lit-
eral similarity, for instance, is a comparison that differs from
an analogy in that both attributes and structural relations are
shared between a base and a target and thus can be mapped
from base to target (Gentner 1983; Gentner and Markman
1997).1 A comparison between a computer and a PDA rep-
resents a literal similarity. Both computers and PDAs have
attributes such as keyboards, screens, and memory. They
also share structural relations, such as using a keyboard to
input information to be stored in memory.
1
Related frameworks utilizing different terminologies have been sug-
gested by Gregan-Paxton and Roedder John (1997) and McQuarrie and
Mick (1996).

257

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258
In the current research, we examine the persuasive power
of an analogy. The goal is to identify conditions under which
an analogy’s effectiveness as a persuasion device may either
be facilitated or undermined. To assess the impact of an
analogy, we contrast its effects with those prompted by a
message that uses a literal similarity.
THE PERSUASIVENESS OF AN ANALOGY
The extant literature offers a starting point for analyzing
the persuasiveness of an analogy. Research reported by
McQuarrie and Mick (1999) suggests that comparisons such
as an analogy and a literal similarity prompt elaboration of
message information, that is, the association of message
content with information that is already in memory. The
distinction made in the psychological literature between an
analogy and a literal similarity (Gentner and Markman 1997)
extends this observation by suggesting that elaboration may
take different forms, depending on the type of comparison
made.
Analogies allow only structural relations to be mapped
from a base to a target. Thus, it seems likely that when
processing an analogy, elaboration would be devoted pri-
marily to structural relations of the target and not to surface
attributes. In contrast, a literal similarity allows mapping of
both structural relations and surface attributes. When pro-
cessing a literal similarity, elaboration is likely to be allo-
cated to both surface attributes and structural relations. For
a fixed level of cognitive resources, the elaboration of sur-
face attributes prompted by a literal similarity would come
at the expense of the elaboration of structural relations.
These observations suggest that the mapping of analogies
may generate more elaboration of structural relations than
does the mapping of literal similarities. Further, such a focus
should be advantageous because structural relations are
thought to be more informative about what benefits a product
offers than are attributes (Gregan-Paxton and Roedder John
1997). Support for this contention is found in studies show-
ing that comparisons involving shared relations rather than
shared attributes produce inferences that are generally per-
ceived to be more sound (Gentner, Rattermann, and Forbus
1993) and more goal-relevant (Read 1984). The implication
is that analogies, with their emphasis on structural relations,
should prompt more favorable elaboration about the advo-
cated product than a literal similarity with its divided focus
on attributes and relations. Because greater elaboration of
favorable information generally results in greater message
persuasion (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1981), our prediction
is that an analogy should stimulate greater persuasion than
a literal similarity.
To clarify why an analogy might have greater persuasive
power than a literal similarity, consider a message in which
an analogy compares a cellular phone to a PDA. The analogy
highlights common structural relations between base and
target, thereby focusing attention on the PDA’s utilities such
as wireless communication. In contrast, a literal similarity
comparing a computer and PDA would not only direct at-
tention to structural relations but also might call attention
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JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
to similarities in mere surface features. Thus, aspects of the
PDA such as display screens may be elaborated, leaving
less attention available for elaborating on its structural re-
lations and the associated functions such as information stor-
age. When this occurs, the consumer may learn less from
the literal similarity than from the analogy about what kinds
of tasks the PDA can actually help them to accomplish. As
a result, a literal similarity is likely to be less persuasive
than an analogy.
Although an analogy can be a highly persuasive device,
there are impediments to processing an analogy that might
compromise its impact. Finding common structural relations
between a base and target in the absence of attribute com-
monalities can be challenging. For instance, it might be
difficult to map the shared data-transmission function be-
tween a base cellular phone and a target PDA because sur-
face attributes such as a keyboard and a dialing pad do not
correspond. In this event, what one might learn about the
PDA from the comparison with a cellular phone may be
somewhat obscure and difficult to discover.
The difficulty in finding structural relations without as-
sociated attributes is highlighted by considering an alter-
native case where common surface features would help to
make common structural relations salient. For instance, in
processing a literal similarity between a computer and a
PDA, the presence of keyboards on both items may offer a
clue that data-storage functions are provided by both
products.
This analysis suggests that two factors are likely to mod-
erate the persuasive impact of an analogy. One factor is the
ability to detect and map common relations in the absence
of surface attributes. The other moderator is the resources
available for processing an analogy. Substantial cognitive
resources are needed for this task. It has been found that
comprehending the relations between a base and target takes
more time (Goldstone and Medin 1994) and a greater num-
ber of stimulus repetitions (Markman and Gentner 1993)
than does comprehending attributes. Apparently, in the ab-
sence of attribute cues, mapping the relations becomes more
effortful (Bassok 1990, p. 532).
A two-factor theory thus guides the present research.
When a person is capable of detecting common structural
relations in the absence of common attributes, and when
substantial cognitive resources are allocated to the pro-
cessing task, analogies will be highly persuasive and have
greater impact than other comparison types such as literal
similarities. When either of these conditions is absent, the
persuasive power of an analogy may be undermined. In such
cases, less demanding comparisons such as literal similar-
ities may be more persuasive than analogies. Each of these
factors is considered in greater detail.
The Moderating Effect of Expertise
Because analogies do not provide attribute cues regarding
the structural relations that are appropriate to map from a
base to a target, factors that facilitate the detection of these
relations should enhance the comprehension of an analogy.
KNOWLEDGE, RESOURCES, AND ANALOGIES
Expertise with the base is one factor that may help to over-
come the challenge of mapping the relations presented in
an analogy (Gregan-Paxton and Roedder John 1997).
McQuarrie and Mick (1999) offer support for this contention
with their observation that an analogy was more persuasive
than a control message for nationals who were knowledge-
able about base relations but not for foreigners who were
not.
The advantage afforded by base expertise may relate to
differences in base knowledge structures between experts
and novices. Experts have base knowledge that is richly
endowed with attribute information as well as abstract in-
formation about structural relations (Alba and Hutchinson
1987). Furthermore, experts are likely to use this knowledge
in making decisions. As Spence and Brucks (1997) have
noted, “experts use more efficient top-down strategies start-
ing with known quantities to deduce unknowns, as opposed
to the bottom-up strategies favored by novices” (p. 234).
When experts’ knowledge is activated in response to an
analogy, available attributes and/or structural relations
should become accessible, and the expert may thus be
prompted to search for these attributes and relations in the
target. Inspection of the target will indicate that only rela-
tions are to be mapped onto the target, and this mapping
can then be completed. Thus, using extensive base knowl-
edge to guide processing may help experts to recognize
common structural relations in the absence of surface at-
tribute cues.
Novices with regard to a base are likely to have knowl-
edge structures that may include some attribute information
but relatively little abstract information about underlying
concepts (Alba and Hutchinson 1987). Novices therefore
tend to rely on surface characteristics of the stimulus in
making a judgment (Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser 1981). This
description suggests that novices may find analogies difficult
to process. Lacking relational base information, they may
not seek the corresponding structural relations in the target.
Furthermore, examination of the target would indicate that
the attributes they do know about the base are not appro-
priate to map to the target. As a result, novices may learn
little from analogies.
Evidence reported by Novick (1988) is consistent with
these expectations. Her data indicate that experts can process
an analogy, whereas novices have limited ability to do so.
In particular, when faced with base attributes that do not
correspond to those in the target, novices are less likely than
experts to map relations from a base to a target (experiment
1).
The view emerging from this analysis is that base ex-
pertise moderates the persuasive impact of an analogy. An
analogy is likely to be more persuasive than a literal sim-
ilarity when a message recipient is an expert in the base
domain, but not when the recipient is a novice. A novice
may be less capable of mapping structural relations and may
thus learn relatively little from an analogy. These obser-
vations suggest the following two hypotheses.
H1a: Experts are more likely to comprehend and to be
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259
persuaded by an analogy than are novices.
H1b: Although experts are likely to comprehend both an
analogy and a literal similarity, an analogy is likely
to be more persuasive.
A different outcome is anticipated when novices are mes-
sage recipients. A literal similarity is less likely than an
analogy to elude novices, because it would allow them to
map the attributes that they do know about a base category.
Consider, for example, a literal similarity between a com-
puter and a PDA. In response to this comparison, a novice
may activate surface attributes that make up the bulk of their
computer knowledge. Inspection of the target PDA will re-
veal that attributes such as a keyboard, a screen, and the
like can be mapped from their knowledge of a computer.
It is also possible that mapping surface attributes may
facilitate novices’ relational mapping between the base and
target (Bassok 1990; Ross and Kilbane 1997). For example,
mapping a keyboard feature from a computer to a PDA may
focus attention on this attribute. This might stimulate a nov-
ice to consider the role it may play for the computer and
realize that there is a data-input relation between a keyboard
and memory in a computer. If the attribute mapping prompts
the generation of a structural relation for the base, the re-
lation can then be mapped to the target.
In sum, novices are likely to be able to comprehend and
make judgments on the basis of literal similarities. This
comprehension might be based on attribute similarities or
on the use of attributes to cue recognition of abstract rela-
tions between base and target. In either case, a literal sim-
ilarity should allow novices to learn more about the target
than they can derive from an analogy. Novices thus should
be more persuaded by a literal similarity than by an analogy.
H1c: Novices will be more likely to comprehend and to
be persuaded by a literal similarity than by an
analogy.
The Moderating Effect of Resources
The predictions made to this point assume that adequate
resources are available to complete the mapping tasks re-
quired to process an analogy. When substantial resources
are not allocated to processing, even experts may have dif-
ficulty in comprehending an analogy. This assertion follows
from the earlier observation that mapping relations in the
absence of attribute cues can be relatively effortful. It also
implies a qualification for our earlier prediction regarding
experts’ processing of analogies. Specifically, for experts,
analogies should be highly persuasive when substantial re-
sources are available, but not when resources are limited.
H2a: Experts are more likely to comprehend an analogy
and to be persuaded by it when resources are sub-
stantial than when resources are limited.
When resources are more limited, comparisons that ac-
commodate this resource limitation better than an analogy
260
are likely to be more persuasive. For example, if a com-
parison involves a literal similarity rather than an analogy,
both attributes and structural relations would be common to
the base and the target. The shared attributes could provide
cues about the structural relations that are appropriate to
map and thereby decrease the resources needed to learn
about the target.
H2b: Experts with limited resources are more likely to
comprehend and to be persuaded by a literal sim-
ilarity than by an analogy.
Emulating the Effect of Expertise: Training and
Positive Mood
The foregoing analysis underscores the utility of expertise
in comprehending analogies. This observation raises the is-
sue of how the processing of analogies might be enhanced
when expertise is lacking. Our earlier discussion of novices
and experts provides some insights.
Experts were portrayed as having knowledge of structural
relations about the base, which facilitates recognition of the
same relational structure in the target product. Novices lack
this knowledge. For example, a novice with regard to a
cellular phone may know that attributes of a cellular phone
include a dialing pad and a mouthpiece. However, a novice
is unlikely to have generated a relation between the two,
such as that the dialing pad directs the transmission of voice
information spoken into the mouthpiece. If a novice could
be prompted to recognize this relation, it could then be
mapped onto a PDA, and an analogy between a cellular
phone and a PDA could be understood.
We consider two ways in which such recognition might
be enhanced. One approach to facilitating novices’ pro-
cessing of an analogy is to provide a prompt that focuses
their attention on structural relations. Spence and Brucks
(1997) found that giving novices organizational prompts
enhanced the extent to which they responded like experts,
though this observation was not made in the context of a
variation in the type of comparison. Thompson, Gentner,
and Lowenstein (2000) reported that research participants
were more likely to transfer knowledge from a base to a
target in a negotiation context when they were given in-
structions that focused them on underlying principles rather
than on specific message content. However, whether novices
would benefit particularly from such prompts was not
examined.
In the present research, we assess this possibility by giving
novices instructions that either focus their attention on the
structural relations among attributes of the base object or
on other message details. The expectation is that directing
novices’ attention to structural relations in the base will
facilitate their recognition of base relations like wireless
communication. These relations can then be mapped to the
target, and the novice can learn about the target from the
analogy. However, as predicted for experts, novices’ pro-
cessing of an analogy should depend not only on enhancing
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their ability to comprehend structural relations, but also on
the presence of substantial resources to do so.
H3: Novices are more likely to comprehend and to be
persuaded by an analogy when they are given in-
structions to focus on the structural relations among
attributes and allocate substantial resources to the
processing task than when either of these conditions
is absent.
Another approach to facilitating novices’ recognition of
base relations is to induce them to be in a positive mood
when they are performing this task (see Isen 1993 for a
review). Identifying a relational structure between known
attributes entails generating relations between concepts, such
as dialing pads and mouthpieces, which were previously
viewed as unrelated. Numerous findings suggest that a pos-
itive mood fosters such processing. Isen, Daubman, and
Nowicki (1987) reported that significantly more respondents
were able to solve a problem requiring them to recognize
that an object could serve multiple purposes when they were
in a positive mood rather than in a neutral one. Lee and
Sternthal (1999) observed that those in a positive mood were
more likely than those in a neutral mood to associate brand
names with the categories in which they held membership
and to use this categorization as a retrieval cue to enhance
their brand name recall. Along similar lines, investigators
have noted that individuals in a positive mood are more
likely to relate atypical objects to a particular category than
are their neutral mood counterparts (e.g., Isen and Daubman
1984).
Applying these observations in the context of an analogy,
it is anticipated that like a focusing instruction, a positive
mood might facilitate the recognition of relations among
attributes in the base that would otherwise be perceived as
unrelated. This recognition, in turn, should facilitate the
mapping of structural relations between a base and a target.
If this analysis is correct, novices will be more persuaded
by an analogy when they are in a positive mood than when
they are in a neutral mood. However, because such pro-
cessing is resource demanding, this outcome is expected to
occur only when substantial resources are devoted to the
processing task.
H4: Novices are more likely to comprehend and to be
persuaded by an analogy when they are in a positive
mood and when they allocate substantial resources
to the processing task than when either of these con-
ditions is absent.
Testing the Effects of Analogies
The present research is based on the notion that the pro-
cessing and persuasive impact of an analogy depend on two
factors. One is message recipients’ ability to map abstract
relations between a base and a target. Variations in expertise,
instructions, and mood may moderate this ability. The other
KNOWLEDGE, RESOURCES, AND ANALOGIES
factor is the availability of the resources required for the
processing task.
Four experiments were conducted to test this theorizing.
Experiment 1 examines the ability to process structural re-
lations as a determinant of an analogy’s impact. This occurs
in a context where respondents allocate significant resources
to the processing task. Experts are expected to be more
persuaded by an analogy than by a literal similarity, but the
reverse is anticipated for novices (Hypotheses 1a–c). Ex-
periment 2 focuses on the importance of resource allocation
to the processing of an analogy. This entails investigating
the impact of varying resource allocation on experts’ eval-
uations of an analogy and a literal similarity. The prediction
is that when experts allocate substantial resources to mes-
sage processing, they will be more persuaded by an analogy
than when resource allocation is limited. In the latter case,
an analogy will be less persuasive than a literal similarity
(Hypotheses 2a, b). Finally, in experiments 3 and 4, we
assess whether novices’ processing of an analogy and its
persuasive impact are enhanced by the presence of sub-
stantial resources and the introduction of devices such as
instructions and positive mood to enhance their ability to
process structural relations (Hypotheses 3, 4).
In all experiments, two types of measures are of critical
interest. One is an indicator of comprehension. For this, we
examine base association measures for the target product.
These measures are intended to assess whether respondents
report associations to the target that are consistent with the
base and thus reflect a comprehension of a relationship be-
tween base and target. The other indicator is respondents’
evaluation of the target product. A series of bipolar adjective
items were used to assess responses on this criterion
measure.
EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECT OF
EXPERTISE ON PROCESSING AN
ANALOGY
In experiment 1, we examined the processing of an anal-
ogy by experts and novices in the base domain of high-tech
products. We chose a high-tech context because we antic-
ipated that research participants could be readily recruited
who would differ in their knowledge of this domain. Indi-
viduals who were likely to allocate substantial resources to
the processing task were selected for study so that the ab-
sence of resources would not account for the outcomes
observed.
Of central interest in this study was the role of the ability
to map structural relations in determining the impact of an
analogy. We measured experts’ and novices’ reactions to an
ad that presented a novel product via an analogy. As a
contrast condition, some respondents were given a message
featuring a literal similarity rather than an analogy. We an-
ticipated that experts would be more capable than novices
of mapping structural relations between base and target. If
this assumption were correct, experts would exhibit greater
comprehension of an analogy and would be more persuaded
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261
by it than would novices. It was also anticipated that experts
would be more persuaded by the analogy than by the literal
similarity because the analogy was expected to prompt
greater elaboration of the structural relations present in the
target. Finally, novices were predicted to be more persuaded
by a literal similarity than by an analogy. This follows from
the assumption that novices would be more capable of map-
ping attributes than structural relations from a base to a
target.
Method
Respondents. We recruited participants who were
likely to be highly motivated to process the information
presented. Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao’s (1984) 18-item Need
for Cognition (NFC) scale was administered to screen re-
spondents. Because NFC is thought to reflect an individual’s
predisposition toward effortful and elaborative processing,
only those with relatively high scores on the NFC scale
were invited to participate in the experiment. Fifty-seven
individuals took part in the study. The average NFC for this
group was relatively high (M p 2.60 on a scale ranging
from ⫺4 to ⫹4).
Stimuli. Two print ads were developed for fictitious new
software products. Both used Quicken financial management
software as a base for the comparison message. One ad
presented an analogy between Quicken and “NutriWatch
nutritional management software.” The other offered a literal
similarity between Quicken and “MoneyWatch financial
management software.”
Quicken literature was examined to generate a list of its
attributes and structural relations, such as that Quicken has
expense category labels (attribute) that are input into a sys-
tem for reporting expenditures on groceries, gas, and en-
tertainment (a structural relation among the category label
attributes). The analogy ad for NutriWatch was developed
by maintaining the structural relations but changing the as-
sociated attributes. For example, the ability to track trans-
actions by category was maintained as a relation, but the
category labels involved were related to food groups instead
of financial accounts. In the literal similarity ad for
MoneyWatch, both Quicken’s attributes and structural re-
lations were maintained (see App. A).
Procedure. After reading one of the comparison mes-
sages, respondents were asked to complete several measures.
First, they indicated their evaluations of the target brand on
a series of 10 semantic differential type items. These items
include like/dislike, useful/not useful, high-/not high-tech,
good/bad, high/low quality, practical/impractical, worth/not
worth owning, impressive/unimpressive, valuable/not val-
uable, and advanced/not advanced.
Message recipients next were asked to complete a base
associations measure for the target software in the ad. The
purpose of this measure was to assess the extent to which
associations that might be linked to the base (Quicken) were
being applied to the target product. The assumption is that
262 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

the greater the number of base associations that respondents FIGURE 1

attached to the target, the greater is the comprehension of
EXPERIMENT 1 MEANS BY TREATMENT
the comparison message in the ad.
Research participants were given six features that the ad-
vertised product might provide but that were not specifically
mentioned in the ad. They were asked to circle the two
features that seemed most likely to be offered by the ad-
vertised product. Three items on the list were characteristics
that a pretest had indicated were often associated with the
Quicken base product: generates reports, tracks gains, and
provides management guidelines. In the analogy condition,
these features were described in nutritional terms, such as
“generates reports on the vitamin values in the foods you
eat,” because the target software was NutriWatch. In the
literal similarity condition, where the target was financial
software, the features were described in financial terms. An
example is, “generates reports on interest paid to credit cards
last year.” The other three items on the list were generic
software features that might be associated with any software
product (e.g., has an on-line help function for troubleshoot-
ing) and that a pretest had indicated were not specifically
associated with Quicken.
Because experts were likely to comprehend the analogy
message more fully than novices, experts were expected to
circle more Quicken-related features than were novices in
the analogy condition. Further, because experts were capable
of processing both the analogy and the literal similarity, they
were expected to circle a similarly large number of Quicken- tern for these groups as was found on the factor analyses
related features in both the analogy and literal similarity for the entire sample. The scale created by combining the
conditions. Novices were expected to circle fewer Quicken- 10 evaluation items is reliable (a p .93 ). These items were
associated features in the analogy condition than the literal averaged to form an evaluation score for each respondent.
similarity condition if their comprehension of the analogy An ANOVA was performed to assess the effects of mes-
were poorer than their understanding of the literal similarity. sage recipients’ expertise (expert, novice) and the type of
Finally, research participants answered five questions de- comparison presented in the advertising message they read
signed to measure their knowledge about the Quicken base. (analogy, literal similarity) on their evaluations of the target
The questions pertained to how often they used Quicken, product. This analysis indicates the presence of the signif-
how familiar they were with it, and how expert they felt icant interaction between these factors depicted in Figure 1
they were with it. Answers to these questions were used to (F(1, 53) p 41.29, p ! .01). Means classified by treatments
categorize respondents as experts or novices. appear in Table 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, simple
effects tests reveal that this outcome obtained because ex-
Results and Discussion perts were more favorable toward the advertised software
than were novices when an analogy was used to describe
Measurement. The five items designed to assess the product (F(1, 53) p 14.60, p ! .01). Further, in accor-
knowledge about Quicken loaded on a single factor that is dance with Hypothesis 1b, experts exhibited more favorable
reliable (a p .89). An expertise scale was constructed by evaluations when the message included an analogy rather
summing each respondent’s score on the five items. A me- than literal similarity (F(1, 53) p 20.31, p ! .01). Finally,
dian split was used to classify respondents as experts or as predicted by Hypothesis 1c, novices were less favorable
novices. Findings indicate that experts (M p 4.72) had when the product was described by an analogy than when
greater knowledge of Quicken than did novices (M p it was described by a literal similarity (F(1, 53) p 20.99,
2.36, F(1, 55) p 128.74, p ! .01). p ! .01).2
Evaluations. An exploratory factor analysis was con- Base Associations. The number of Quicken-associated
ducted on the 10 items indicating respondents’ evaluations features chosen by respondents provides an indication of the
of the new software. Results indicated that the items loaded extent to which the ad messages were comprehended. The
on a single factor, and a confirmatory factor analysis was results indicate the presence of a significant interaction be-
consistent with this interpretation. These analyses were re-
peated within the expert segment of our sample and within 2
These findings were also replicated using a different context. Requests
the novice segment. Results indicated the same loading pat- for these data can be made from the senior author.

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KNOWLEDGE, RESOURCES, AND ANALOGIES 263

TABLE 1 to map structural relations from base to target. This is sup-

EXPERIMENTS 1–4 TREATMENT MEANS
ported by evidence indicating that experts applied more
Quicken associations to the target than did novices. More-
over, although base association data suggest that experts
Dependent variable
Study and were able to comprehend both the analogy and the literal
treatment Evaluationsa Base associationsb similarity messages, experts found the analogy to be more
persuasive. We explain this outcome by noting that a map-
Experiment 1:c
Literal similarity:
ping of structural relations frequently offers more compel-
Novices 4.53 1.13 ling insights about a target than does a mapping of attributes.
Experts 2.52 1.23 Novices were more persuaded by a literal similarity than
Analogy: an analogy. Our view is that this outcome occurred because
Novices 2.81 .57 novices did not map structural relations from base to target
Experts 4.25 1.47
Experiment 2:d when processing the analogy, but they were able to use
Literal similarity: attribute commonalities to understand the literal similarity
Low NFC 6.03 3.71 ad. This assertion is supported by the greater tendency to
High NFC 5.08 4.13 apply Quicken-associated features to the target after expo-
Analogy:
Low NFC 4.69 1.57
sure to the literal similarity rather than the analogy.
High NFC 6.12 2.50 More broadly, the findings of experiment 1 suggest that
Experiment 3:e an analogy is a highly effective persuasive device when
No training: message recipients have the expertise to map relations. This
Low NFC 2.88 .75 outcome was observed for respondents who were likely to
High NFC 2.99 .64
Training: devote substantial resources to the processing task. However,
Low NFC 2.82 .47 because only high-NFC respondents served as research par-
High NFC 4.95 1.47 ticipants in experiment 1, the role of resources in processing
Experiment 4:e an analogy remains to be explored.
Neutral:
Low NFC 4.92 .50
High NFC 4.79 .33 EXPERIMENT 2: THE EFFECT OF
Story:
Low NFC 4.54 .67 RESOURCES ON EXPERTS’ PROCESSING
High NFC 6.32 1.86
Music: In experiment 2, experts’ responses to an analogy and a
Low NFC 4.66 .50 literal similarity were examined when the resources allo-
High NFC 5.85 1.83 cated to message processing were either substantial or lim-
a

b
Possible response range for all evaluations was 1–7.
Possible response range for experiments 1, 3, and 4 base associations was
0–2. Possible response range for experiment 2 base associations was 0–5.
c
Sample was composed of high NFCs.
d
Sample was composed of high-tech experts.
e
Sample was composed of high-tech novices.
tween expertise and type of comparison (F(1, 53) p 4.40,
p ! .04). Simple effects tests reveal that, in accordance with
Hypothesis 1a, experts chose more Quicken-related features
than did novices (F(1, 53) p 11.31, p ! .01) in the analogy
condition, indicating that experts had greater comprehension
of the analogy. Further, experts were equally likely to choose
Quicken-associated features in the analogy and literal sim-
ilarity conditions (F ! 1). Consistent with Hypothesis 1b,
these findings suggest that experts comprehend the com-
parison between Quicken and the advertised software,
whether this comparison involved an analogy or a literal
similarity. Novices selected fewer Quicken-associated fea-
tures in the analogy condition than in the literal similarity
condition (F(1, 53) p 4.46, p ! .04), implying that novices
comprehended less from the analogy than from the literal
similarity (Hypothesis 1c).
The results of experiment 1 are consistent with expec-
tations. Experts were more persuaded by the analogy than
were novices, presumably because of experts’ greater ability
ited. It was anticipated that when NFC was high, experts
would be more persuaded by an analogy than by a literal
similarity, replicating the result found in experiment 1 (Hy-
pothesis 1b) and suggesting that the availability of substan-
tial resources affected the outcomes reported in the previous
experiment. In addition, experts were expected to better
comprehend and be more persuaded by an analogy when
NFC was high rather than low (Hypothesis 2a). For low-
NFC experts, however, the analogy was likely to be less
well understood and less persuasive than the literal similarity
(Hypothesis 2b). These predictions were tested in a context
that differed from experiment 1 so as to assess the robustness
of our findings.
Method
Stimuli. Two new print ads were developed for a fic-
titious PDA product called the Voyager. Both the analogy
and literal similarity versions are presented in Appendix B.
In the analogy treatment, the ad began by comparing the
Voyager to a cellular phone and specifying Ameritech as its
producer. A structural relation associated with cellular
phones was then attributed to the Voyager by asserting that
it had “wireless technology that lets you record and send
voice messages at your convenience.”

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264
In the literal similarity treatment, Voyager was introduced
by comparing it to a computer and indicating that it was
made by IBM. A list of computer-like characteristics of the
Voyager was then provided. Attributes included a high-res-
olution screen, keyboard, calendar and address book, spread-
sheet software, RAM, a fax/data modem, a peripheral port
for a printer or external keyboard hookup, and a variety of
preinstalled on-line services. A computer-like relation was
also presented. It indicated that the “keyboard allows you
to input written messages that Voyager can transmit to any
Internet address.”
Procedure. Twenty-nine people who had substantial
expertise with regard to technological innovations partici-
pated in the experiment in small groups. As compensation
for their time, participants were entered into a lottery for
five cash prizes ranging from $50 to $250.
The study was represented as an opportunity to offer re-
actions to advertising copy for a new product. Respondents
read a print ad that presented the fictitious Voyager PDA.
The message included either an analogy to a cellular phone
or a literal similarity with a computer. After reading the ad
copy, respondents reported their evaluations of the Voyager
on 13 seven-point semantic differential items: like/dislike,
useful/not useful, low-/high-tech, good/bad, dependable/not
dependable, high/low quality, practical/impractical, worth/
not worth owning, impressive/not impressive, simple/com-
plex, valuable/not valuable, advanced/not advanced, and
convenient/inconvenient.
These measures were followed by two individual-differ-
ence scales. One was a definition task that was used to verify
our participants’ expertise in the base domain of high-tech
gadgetry. Eight terms such as “telnet” and “Fortran” were
listed, and participants were asked to define as many of the
terms as they could. The overall mean number of correct
definitions suggests a substantial level of expertise (M p
5.34). The other scale was the 18-item version of the NFC
scale.
The final measure was respondents’ base associations.
This measure is conceptually similar to the one used in
experiment 1. Again, the intention was to assess the extent
to which associations that might be linked to the base were
being applied to the target product and thereby infer the
degree to which the comparison was understood.
Participants were asked to respond true or false to 15
statements about the Voyager. Of these 15 statements, five
directly contradicted the information presented in the Voy-
ager message and thus were expected to be easily identified
as false.3 The remaining 10 statements concerned charac-
teristics that could plausibly be true of the Voyager, although
they were not specified in the message. Five of these char-
acteristics represented typical cellular phone properties, and
five represented typical computer properties. We reasoned
that the greater the comprehension of the analogy, the more
3
Examination of the answers to the five false statements indicates the
absence of significant treatment effects (F’s ! 1.10). These items are not
discussed further.
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JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
cellular phone associations a respondent would have applied
to the PDA, and thus the greater the number of phone items
that would be labeled “true.” Similarly, the more the literal
similarity was understood, the greater the number of com-
puter items that would be marked “true.”
We expected that high-NFC experts would have better
comprehension of the analogy than would low-NFC experts.
Therefore, in the analogy condition, we expected more
“true” responses to the cellular phone items among high
NFCs than low NFCs. Further, low-NFC experts were ex-
pected to be less able to comprehend the analogy than the
literal similarity. Hence, for these respondents we anticipated
fewer true responses to the cellular phone items in the anal-
ogy condition than to the computer items in the literal sim-
ilarity condition.
Results
Measurement. The NFC scale items were subjected to
a factor analysis, which indicated that responses to the items
loaded on a single factor. The scale is reliable (a p .90).
Each participant’s responses were combined and averaged
to form an overall NFC score. A median split was used to
assign respondents to high (M p 2.96) and low NFC
(M p 1.09). These groups differed significantly in their
NFC score (F(1, 27) p 32.39, p ! .01).
Evaluations. An exploratory factor analysis was con-
ducted on the 13 items indicating respondents’ judgments
of the new software. Results indicate that the items loaded
together on one factor, and a confirmatory factor analysis
was consistent with this interpretation. These analyses were
then repeated within the high-NFC segment of our sample
and within the low-NFC segment. Results indicate the same
loading pattern as the factor analyses on the entire sample.
The scale created by combining the 13 evaluation items is
reliable (a p .93). Responses on the individual items were
combined to produce a single evaluation measure.
An analysis of variance on the evaluation scores reveals
the presence of a two-way interaction between the type of
comparison presented in the ad and NFC (F(1, 25) p
14.05, p ! .01). Means categorized by treatments appear in
Table 1. High-NFC respondents’ evaluations of the Voyager
were more favorable when they were exposed to an analogy
than to a literal similarity (F(1, 25) p 5.21 , p ! .03). This
outcome replicates the finding in experiment 1 and thus
offers testimony for the claim that respondents had signif-
icant expertise with regard to the base. In the analogy con-
dition, it was found that high-NFC respondents’ evaluations
of the Voyager were more favorable than those of low-NFC
respondents (F(1, 25) p 9.71, p ! .01), which is consistent
with Hypothesis 2a. Finally, as predicted by Hypothesis 2b,
the evaluations of low-NFC respondents were less favorable
when the ad contained an analogy than when it featured a
literal similarity (F(1, 25) p 9.22, p ! .01).
Base Associations. A base association score was cre-
ated for each respondent by counting the number of phone-
KNOWLEDGE, RESOURCES, AND ANALOGIES
associated items endorsed in the analogy condition, in which
a cellular phone provided the base, and the number of com-
puter-associated items endorsed in the literal similarity con-
dition, in which a computer served as the base. An ANOVA
on this measure reveals main effects for message condition
(F(1, 25) p 42.38, p ! .01) and NFC (F(1, 25) p 6.18,
p ! .02). As expected, in the analogy condition (Hypothesis
2a), high-NFC respondents exhibited higher base association
feature scores than did low-NFC respondents (F(1, 25) p
4.55, p ! .02). Also as predicted (Hypothesis 2b), experts
with low NFC exhibited lower base association scores for
the analogy condition than for the literal similarity condition
(F(1, 25) p 26.27, p ! .01).
Discussion
The results of experiment 2 offer evidence for the mod-
erating effect of resources in experts’ responses to an anal-
ogy. It appears that processing an analogy is a resource-
demanding task even for highly knowledgeable people.
Thus, when the Voyager PDA was advertised via an analogy,
high-NFC experts evaluated it more favorably than did those
low in NFC. Further, the base associations measure suggests
that these different evaluative responses were related to dif-
ferences in comprehension of the analogy. High-NFC ex-
perts also exhibited greater comprehension of the analogy
than did low-NFC experts.
When the resources allocated to processing were limited,
experts were more persuaded by a literal similarity than by
an analogy. This outcome appears to be attributable to dif-
ferences in comprehension. The base association measure
suggests that low-NFC experts had better comprehension of
the message presenting a literal similarity than one pre-
senting an analogy.
In sum, the outcomes of experiment 2 indicate that the
persuasiveness of an analogy is contingent upon resource
availability and that analogies are more resource demanding
to process than are literal similarities. This is because anal-
ogies rely on the mapping of structural relations that can be
difficult to detect and resource demanding to map. That said,
we do not wish to overstate the generality of this outcome.
Indeed, it should be possible to calibrate an experimental
task so that a literal similarity is more demanding than an
analogy. For example, encouraging individuals to focus on
every element that can be mapped from base to target might
make the demands of a literal similarity greater than those
of an analogy. This is because a literal similarity permits
the mapping of both attributes and structural relations,
whereas an analogy entails the mapping only of structural
relations. In most everyday circumstances, however, an anal-
ogy is expected to be more resource demanding than a literal
similarity.
Taken together, the results of experiments 1 and 2 suggest
that the persuasive impact of an analogy is moderated by
the ability to map structural relations and by the presence
of the substantial resources to accomplish this task. In our
subsequent experiments, we expand on these findings by
considering mechanisms that may facilitate the mapping of
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265
structural relations. The emphasis on strategies for enhanc-
ing the mapping of structural relations rather than on stim-
ulating resource allocation is warranted because vehicles for
enhancing resource availability, such as message repetition
and issue involvement, are well established, whereas it is
less apparent how novices’ ability to map structural relations
might be improved.
EXPERIMENT 3: USING TRAINING TO
ENHANCE NOVICES’ ABILITY TO
PROCESS ANALOGIES
The results of experiment 1 suggest that novices had dif-
ficulty in comprehending the implications of the analogy
and thus were not persuaded by it. If lacking the ability to
map relations from base to target underlies novices’ diffi-
culty with analogies, a device such as training, which
prompts them to recognize structural relations in the base,
might help them to map relations to the target and com-
prehend the analogy. In experiment 3, we investigate the
effectiveness of training in this regard. Our expectation is
that training will result in more favorable evaluations of
target products presented to novices via analogies.
We adapted our training intervention from an instructional
approach that was used by Thompson et al. (2000). These
investigators asked research participants to read two cases.
For some respondents, the goal was to give advice to the
protagonist in each case. For other respondents, the goal
was to derive a principle that was represented by the two
cases. Despite the fact that both groups processed the same
case information, those who were prompted to derive the
principle were significantly more likely to adopt it in a sub-
sequent face-to-face bargaining situation than were those
who offered advice for each case separately.
We reasoned that similar instructional procedures might
help novices to recognize base structural relations that can
be transferred to a target product to facilitate comprehension
of an analogy. Thus, in experiment 3, novices read the same
NutriWatch ad that was used in experiment 1, but prior to
receiving this message, some were given training about the
Quicken base product. All participants were exposed to a
description of Quicken. In the training condition, respon-
dents were asked to read the description and then list the
kinds of things they felt they could accomplish with
Quicken. As in Thompson et al.’s (2000) derivation con-
dition, this question was intended to prompt respondents to
consider the underlying structural relations among
Quicken’s attributes. In the no-training condition, respon-
dents were asked to identify any typos that appeared in the
Quicken description. Here, as in Thompson et al.’s advice
condition, the goal was to have respondents focus on mes-
sage content other than relations among attributes.
Although training has the possibility of enhancing nov-
ices’ use of an analogy, the results of experiment 2 suggest
that the ability to map structural relations is not sufficient
to process an analogy. The availability of substantial re-
sources also seems necessary. Thus, in experiment 3 we
266
examined the impact of the presence and absence of training
under conditions of low and high NFC. Our prediction was
that novices who were high in NFC and received training
would be persuaded by an analogy, whereas the persuasive
impact of an analogy would be more limited in the absence
of either of these conditions (Hypothesis 3).
Support for this prediction would provide further evidence
that the ability to map structural relations and the availability
of substantial resources help a person to comprehend an
analogy and use it in making a judgment. Further, such
results would indicate that training can compensate for a
lack of expertise in mapping relations and thereby can
prompt novices to act in the same manner as we had ob-
served for experts.
Method
Using the same screening questions as were used to detect
Quicken expertise in experiment 1, the 62 research partic-
ipants were identified as individuals who have limited
knowledge about Quicken. When these novices arrived at
the laboratory, they read an ad that described the types of
tasks that Quicken is helpful in carrying out. At the end of
this description, respondents were asked some questions. In
the training condition, the question was, “If you owned
Quicken software, what kinds of things would you do with
it?” Respondents recorded their answers on a lined sheet of
paper. In the no-training condition, the question was, “Were
there any typos in the ad? Please go back and circle any
that you identify, so that they can be corrected before the
ad runs.” There were three typos in the ad.
When respondents had finished this task, they were asked
to read the ad for NutriWatch and answer the same 10 ev-
aluative items as were used in experiment 1. This served as
the criterion measure. Research participants also were asked
to complete the same base associations measure as was used
in experiment 1. This involved selecting two of the six fea-
tures presented that they would expect the NutriWatch soft-
ware to possess. Choice of Quicken-associated items would
offer evidence that they comprehended the analogy. Finally,
individuals completed the 18-item NFC inventory, with re-
sponses ranging from 1 to 7.
Results and Discussion
Measurement. Responses on the five-item Quicken
knowledge measure indicate that research participants had
limited knowledge of this software (M p 2.55). This level
of performance is the same as that for novices in experiment
1 (M p 2.36, F(1, 89) p 1.01, p 1 .32). It is also signifi-
cantly weaker than the performance of experts in that study
(M p 4.72, F(1, 88) p 109.29, p ! .01). These data suggest
that the respondents were novices with regard to the Quicken
base used in the NutriWatch analogy ad.
Respondents’ scores on the NFC scale were computed.
They were categorized as high or low in NFC on the basis
of a median split. High-NFC respondents produced scores
(M p 4.97) that were significantly higher than those of low-
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JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
NFC respondents (M p 2.55, F(1, 60) p 221.17, p ! .01).
Finally, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were
conducted on the 10 evaluative items, using the full sample,
the high-NFC subsample, and the low-NFC subsample.
These analyses all indicate that the items form a unidimen-
sional scale that is reliable (a p .90 ). An evaluation score
was developed by averaging each respondent’s score on the
10 items.
Evaluations. The effect of the treatments on the eval-
uation measure indicates the presence of a significant train-
ing # NFC interaction (F(1, 58) p 53.84, p ! .01). Means
categorized by treatment appear in Table 1. As predicted by
Hypothesis 3, when NFC was high, those who received
training were more persuaded by the analogy than those
who were not trained (F(1, 58) p 95.49, p ! .01). When
NFC was low, the evaluations for training and no training
did not differ (F ! 1). Moreover, those who received training
were more persuaded when NFC was high than when it was
low (F(1, 58) p 123.79, p ! .01).
Base Associations. The number of Quicken-associated
features that were circled provides an indication of the extent
to which base associations were applied to the target and
thus the degree to which the analogy was comprehended.
The results indicate the presence of a significant interaction
between training and NFC (F(1, 58) p 12.27, p ! .01).
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, simple effects tests reveal that
when NFC was high, more Quicken-associated items were
circled by those who received training than by those who
did not (F(1, 58) p 12.85, p ! .01). When NFC was low,
there was no difference in the number of Quicken-associated
items circled by those in the training condition and those
in the no-training condition (F(1, 58) p 1.68, p 1 .20). Fi-
nally, those who were trained circled more Quicken-asso-
ciated items when NFC was high than when it was low
(F(1, 58) p 20.67, p ! .01).
Mediation Analysis. The pattern of responses to the
base associations measure thus resembles the pattern ob-
served for evaluations. This parallel is consistent with the
notion that increases in comprehension of the analogy led
to more favorable attitudes among high-NFC novices who
received training.
A mediation analysis was conducted to examine this ex-
planation, following the approach recommended by Baron
and Kenny (1986). These analyses indicate that training and
NFC significantly predict base associations (F(1, 58) p
7.76, p ! .01) and evaluations (F(1, 58) p 31.00, p ! .01).
In addition, base associations significantly affect evaluations
(F(1, 57) p 29.27, p ! .01), such that the effect of training
and NFC on evaluations is reduced (F(1, 57) p 20.42,
p ! .01). Thus, the results support the idea that differences
KNOWLEDGE, RESOURCES, AND ANALOGIES
in comprehension mediated differences in evaluations for
novices processing the analogy message.4
In sum, experiment 3 offers evidence that there are cir-
cumstances under which novices can process and are per-
suaded by an analogy. This outcome emerged when novices
allocated substantial resources to the processing task and
training led these resources to be directed toward an as-
sessment of the structural relations among attributes. In the
absence of either of these conditions, novices were less able
to comprehend the analogy and thus were less persuaded
by it. Thus, experiment 3 provides additional evidence that
the persuasive impact of an analogy requires the ability to
map relations and substantial resources to do so.
EXPERIMENT 4: USING POSITIVE MOOD
TO ENHANCE NOVICES’ ABILITY TO
PROCESS ANALOGIES
Experiment 4 tested the robustness of the finding reported
in experiment 3 by investigating an alternative mechanism
for helping novices to process an analogy. Rather than in-
troducing training to prompt novices to focus their resources
on the structural relations among attributes, a positive mood
was used for this purpose. Mood was selected because it
represents an induction that is likely to occur in everyday
contexts.
Positive mood was expected to have an effect on novices’
processing of an analogy that would be similar to that found
in response to training in experiment 3. Because positive
mood has been shown to promote the generation of inter-
concept relations (Isen 1993; Lee and Sternthal 1999), it
seems reasonable to suggest that it will draw attention to
relations that can be mapped to comprehend an analogy.
Thus, we predicted that when novices had ample resources
and were in a positive mood, they would better comprehend
and be more persuaded by an analogy than when either of
these conditions was absent (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Thirty-nine respondents participated in experiment 4.
They were asked to read advertising copy for a new product
that they would be asked to evaluate. The product was de-
scribed in a message that was similar to the Voyager analogy
ad used in experiment 2. However, the list of product fea-
tures was modified to make the Voyager seem contemporary
with Palm Pilot and other hand-held electronic products that
4
Mediation analyses were not reported for experiments 1 and 2, because
they would have been inappropriate. Although comprehension is expected
to be a mediator for novices and individuals with low NFC, it is not
purported to mediate differences in judgments for experts with high NFC.
High-NFC experts are anticipated to comprehend both analogy and literal
similarity but to be more persuaded by an analogy because the information
that analogies deliver is more compelling than that of literal similarity. We
thus present mediation analyses only for experiments 3 and 4, where com-
prehension is theorized to mediate evaluations of all subjects for which
data are reported.
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267
were introduced in the time between experiment 2 and the
present study.
At the outset of the study, those in the neutral mood
control condition were exposed to the message for Voyager
without any prior mood intervention. For the remaining par-
ticipants, a positive mood was introduced in one of two
ways. Some respondents were asked to create an autobio-
graphical story (hereafter referred to as the story condition).
This entailed asking respondents to “recall an episode in
your life that made you feel very happy and continues to
make you happy whenever you think about it even today.”
This induction was selected because it has successfully
prompted a positive mood in previous research (Lambert et
al. 1997).
Positive mood was also induced using music. Respon-
dents in the music condition listened to about one minute
of upbeat music at the outset of the experiment. Music was
chosen as a second means of inducing a positive mood
because it “has long been considered an efficient and ef-
fective means for triggering moods” (Bruner 1990, p. 94)
and has been shown to induce a positive mood (Gorn, Gold-
berg, and Basu 1993). More specifically, a positive mood
has been found to correlate with music that is played in a
major mode (Alpert and Alpert 1990), has consonant har-
monies (Wedin 1972), has a relatively high register (Rigg
1940), and has a brisk tempo (Alpert and Alpert 1990).
Following these criteria, the first author composed and re-
corded a short piece of disco-style music. An original com-
position was used to minimize the effects of song familiarity
on respondents’ reactions. As they listened to the taped mu-
sic, respondents were asked to consider the kinds of thoughts
or feelings that came to mind.
Research participants were given 10 items to help assess
their mood at the time of exposure to the message. These
items included happy, excited, positive, pleased, calm, alert,
tired, stimulated, gloomy, and irritated. End points for each
of these seven-point items were labeled “not at all” and
“extremely.” For participants in the story and music treat-
ments, these items were encountered immediately after the
mood induction, following the procedures frequently used
in previous mood studies (e.g., Wegener, Petty, and Smith
1995). For control respondents, the initial task was to com-
plete the mood manipulation checks.
At this point, all respondents read the information de-
scribing the Voyager and were asked to evaluate this product
on 10 attitudinal items that had been used in the previous
experiments. Of these, eight were subsequently found to load
on a single factor. These items included like/dislike, useful/
not useful, good/bad, impressive/not impressive, worth/not
worth owning, practical/impractical, valuable/not valuable,
and advanced/not advanced.
Respondents next completed a base associations measure.
As in the prior experiments, the base associations were in-
tended to detect treatment differences in comprehension of
the analogy. This entailed selecting two features that seemed
most appropriate for the Voyager from a list of six. The six
items included three phone-associated features (phone head-
268
set, local calling plan, calling card) and three computer-
associated features (printer, America Online trial member-
ship, external keyboard). If respondents comprehended the
analogy, they were expected to select more phone associ-
ations than if they did not.
Two individual-difference measures were then adminis-
tered. One was the 18-item NFC scale, which was used to
assess the likely level of resource allocation to the processing
task. Responses were given on scales with values ranging
from ⫺4 to ⫹4. Respondents also completed the same def-
inition task used in experiment 2 to assess knowledge about
high-tech products. In the present study, the word list was
updated with new terms such as “Perl” and “Java” in order
to enhance discriminative power between relative experts
and novices.
Results and Discussion
Measurement. Measurement issues were addressed
first. The 10 items designed to assess mood were factor
analyzed. Five items (happy, excited, positive, pleased, stim-
ulated) were found to load on one dimension and were there-
fore averaged to produce a single mood scale. This scale is
reliable (a p .85). The score on this scale was significantly
lower for those in a neutral mood (M p 4.77) than it was
for those in a positive mood, regardless of whether the pos-
itive mood induction involved the story (M p 5.74,
F(1, 23) p 8.10, p ! .01) or the music (M p 5.46,
F(1, 24) p 5.13, p ! .03). These outcomes are consistent
with the view that both interventions were successful in
varying respondents’ mood.
The NFC scale is unidimensional. The NFC scores were
computed by averaging across the 18 items for each re-
spondent. This scale is reliable (a p .87). A median split
was used to classify research participants as either high
(M p 2.92) or low (M p 1.57) in NFC. The differences
between these groups on NFC are significant (F(1, 37) p
61.00, p ! .01).
Performance on the definition task by those deemed nov-
ices (M p 3.54) supported their classification as such. Their
score is significantly lower than that found for experts in
experiment 2 on a similar measure of knowledge (M p
5.34, F(1, 66) p 13.69, p ! .01).
The effect of each of the mood inductions was examined
separately for novices who were high and low in NFC. Thus,
the story condition was contrasted with the neutral mood
control. In a replicate design, the story was replaced by
music as a positive mood induction, and the music treatment
was contrasted with the neutral mood control condition. This
approach was followed to simplify exposition and because
the story and music are intended to serve the same purpose
of prompting the activation of a positive mood.
Evaluations. Participants’ evaluations of Voyager were
examined first. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses
within the full sample, within the high NFCs, and within
the low NFCs indicate that the eight items compose a un-
idimensional evaluation scale. This scale is reliable (a p
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JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
.90). Means categorized by the independent variables are
reported in Table 1.
We conducted ANOVAs to examine the effects of NFC
and mood on novices’ attitudinal evaluations. When the
story intervention is used to operationalize mood, a signif-
icant two-way interaction is found (F(1, 21) p 21.81, p !
.01). Tests of simple effects reveal that this outcome occurs
because a positive mood prompted more favorable evalu-
ations than a neutral mood when NFC was high
(F(1, 21) p 29.22, p ! .01). When NFC was low, evalua-
tions were relatively unfavorable and not affected by mood
(F(1, 21) p 1.63, p 1 .22). Finally, those in a positive mood
were more persuaded when NFC was high rather than when
it was low (F(1, 21) p 39.56, p ! .01). These findings are
consistent with Hypothesis 4.
A similar pattern of outcomes emerged when a positive
mood was induced by music rather than a story. There is a
significant interaction between NFC and mood
(F(1, 22) p 9.46, p ! .01). A positive mood led to more
favorable evaluations than a neutral mood when NFC was
high (F(1, 22) p 11.44, p ! .01). Evaluations were rela-
tively unfavorable and unaffected by mood when NFC was
low (F ! 1). Respondents in a positive mood were more
persuaded when NFC was high than when it was low
(F(1, 22) p 16.61, p ! .01).
Base Associations. Particular interest centered on re-
spondents’ propensity to select phone-related features be-
cause the analogy message compared the Voyager to a cel-
lular phone. The greater the extent to which respondents
expected Voyager to have phone features, presumably the
greater the likelihood that they understood the analogy.
An interaction between NFC and mood is found when
the story was used to manipulate mood (F(1, 21) p 6.44,
p ! .02). Simple effects tests reveal that this outcome occurs
in part because high-NFC novices chose more phone-as-
sociated features when in a positive mood than when in a
neutral mood (F(1, 21) p 13.81, p ! .01). For low-NFC
novices, the number of phone-associated features chosen
was uniformly low, whether the novices were in the positive
or neutral condition (F ! 1). In addition, for respondents in
a positive mood, more phone-associated features were se-
lected when NFC was high rather than low (F(1, 21) p
12.97, p ! .01). These findings are consistent with Hypoth-
esis 4.
Results are similar when music was used to operationalize
mood. A significant two-way interaction between NFC and
mood is found (F(1, 22) p 10.80, p ! .01). This interaction
occurs because high-NFC novices had a greater propensity
to choose phone features when in a positive mood than when
in a neutral mood (F(1, 22) p 16.33, p ! .01), whereas low-
NFC novices did not significantly differ by mood condition
in the number of phone features chosen (F ! 1). Finally,
those in a positive mood chose more phone-associated fea-
tures when NFC was high rather than when it was low
(F(1, 22) p 23.16, p ! .01).
Mediation Analyses. Mediation analyses were con-
KNOWLEDGE, RESOURCES, AND ANALOGIES
ducted to examine the role of comprehension in persuasion
(Baron and Kenny 1986). For the story design, it was found
that mood and NFC significantly predict base associations
(F(1, 21) p 5.04, p ! .04) and evaluations (F(1, 21) p
15.37, p ! .01). In addition, base associations have a sig-
nificant effect on evaluations (F(1, 20) p 19.59, p ! .01),
such that the effect of mood and NFC on evaluations is
reduced (F(1, 20) p 3.40, p ! .08).
Findings were similar for the music design. Mood and
NFC significantly predict base associations (F(1, 22) p
6.82, p ! .02) and evaluations (F(1, 22) p 4.05, p ! .057).
Base associations significantly affect evaluations
(F(1, 21) p 26.42, p ! .01) such that the effect of mood
and NFC on evaluations becomes insignificant (F ! 1).
Thus, the results of both sets of mediation analyses support
the view that comprehension mediates evaluations for nov-
ices processing an analogy message.
The outcomes reported in experiment 4 reinforce the find-
ings of experiment 3. Both suggest that allocating substantial
resources does not in itself enhance novices’ processing of
an analogy. Also required is a prompt for novices to deploy
their resources in a manner that allows them to recognize
how base relations can be mapped onto the target. In ex-
periment 4, high- and low-NFC novices had similar and
relatively unfavorable evaluations in the neutral mood con-
dition. In contrast, a positive mood induced by a story or
by upbeat music facilitated high-NFC respondents’ mapping
of base relations to the target. This apparently enhanced
their ability to process the analogy and the extent to which
they were persuaded by it.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research suggests that analogies can be pow-
erful communication devices. They offer the prospect of
using existing product knowledge to acquire an in-depth
understanding of a target product’s benefits, particularly
those that might not be apparent otherwise. In the four ex-
periments reported here, it is shown that an analogy can be
highly persuasive, and experiments 1 and 2 suggest it can
be more persuasive than an appeal featuring a literal simi-
larity. However, it is also apparent that the effectiveness of
an analogy is moderated by the message recipient’s ability
to map structural relations and the availability of cognitive
resources to perform the comparison task.
A message containing an analogy is better comprehended
and is more persuasive when the recipient has expertise with
regard to the base product. Presumably, expertise facilitates
the mapping of structural relations from base to target and
thereby helps one to learn about the target product. Findings
from experiment 1 indicate that experts can more readily
map structural relations in this manner than can novices.
However, without expertise—even when substantial re-
sources are devoted—persuasiveness is lower for an analogy
than for a literal similarity.
Our data also indicate that expertise is not sufficient to
ensure the persuasiveness of an analogy. Substantial re-
sources must be allocated if the mapping of structural re-
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269
lations is to be successful. Consistent with this view, we
found that an analogy was more persuasive for experts when
they devoted substantial resources to its processing than
when resources were limited. Further, when experts allo-
cated few resources to message processing, an analogy was
less persuasive than an appeal featuring literal similarity
(experiment 2).
Although our evidence suggests that expertise and sub-
stantial resources are sufficient conditions for an analogy to
produce superior evaluations, expertise is not necessary for
an analogy to be an effective persuasive device. There are
circumstances in which novices are capable of processing
an analogy and being persuaded by it. This outcome occurs
when devices are presented that prompt recognition of struc-
tural relations among attributes of a base product. Specifi-
cally, training respondents to engage in such processing (ex-
periment 3) or prompting them to be in a positive mood
while performing the comparison task (experiment 4) are
shown to enhance novices’ ability to process analogies and
be persuaded by them, provided that substantial resources
are allocated to the task. In effect, these outcomes suggest
that expertise, training instructions, and a positive mood
represent the same construct: all facilitate the mapping of
structural relations between a base and target.
Contributions
The primary contribution of this research is to identify
factors that affect the processing and persuasive impact of
messages that contain analogies. We theorize that an ability
to map structural relations and the availability of resources
to perform this task moderate the impact of analogies. Al-
though we have focused on literal similarity as an alternative
comparison mechanism to test our view, our theorizing pro-
vides a starting point for examining other types of com-
parison or juxtaposition. Thus, future work might further
compare comprehension and persuasion between analogies
and, say, mere appearances, metaphors, puns, and the like
(Gentner 1983; Gentner and Markman 1997; McQuarrie and
Mick 1996, 1999), on the basis of mapping requirements
and resource demands.
The present work also contributes to an understanding of
how novices might become more expert. Spence and Brucks
(1997) found that providing respondents with an aid that
helped organize information for making a decision enhanced
novices’ ability to operate like experts. When this finding
is considered along with our evidence that training and pos-
itive mood can enhance the processing of an analogy, the
emerging view is that any device stimulating the processing
of structural relations has the potential to help novices be-
come experts.
Further, the observations that training and positive mood
helped novices suggest that a deficit novices must overcome
in becoming more expert may often relate to a lack of pro-
cedural knowledge rather than simply a lack of semantic
knowledge. That is, novices appear able to comprehend anal-
ogies when given guidance about how to manipulate attrib-
ute knowledge they already hold, whether this is achieved
270
through training or the presence of a positive mood while
processing an analogy. This suggests that helping novices
to focus on how various bits of information are related may
sometimes be a more viable strategy for promoting their
understanding of persuasive messages than adding infor-
mation to their existing and limited knowledge structure. At
the same time, there are likely to be situations in which
novices are so lacking in attribute knowledge that they will
be unable to process an analogy, even with the prompts we
have suggested.
Finally, the present research adds to the growing literature
documenting the impact of positive mood on message per-
suasion. A positive mood has been found to promote the
accessibility of associations that relate different individual
objects (Isen et al. 1987; Lee and Sternthal 1999). The pre-
sent research suggests that this property extends to the struc-
tural relations among attributes of a single base object. In
experiment 4, a positive mood appears to have facilitated
the generation of relations between surface attributes of a
base product. This in turn seems to have helped respondents
to process an analogy when substantial resources were al-
located to the processing task. However, as promising as
positive mood appears to be in facilitating the processing
of persuasive messages, to date, demonstrations of this mood
effect have focused on contexts requiring the generation of
relations. Whether a positive mood has a similar effect in
other contexts, say, those that involve learning of unrelated
details, awaits investigation.
Managerial Implications
Although the use of analogy messages by advertisers ap-
pears to have become widespread, our findings suggest that
caution is warranted in using analogies in advertising. Anal-
ogies are likely to be effective devices when the target au-
dience is composed of consumers who have substantial
knowledge of the base product (for a similar position on the
importance of background knowledge in interpreting visual
metaphors, see McQuarrie and Mick 1999). Further, given
our evidence that even experts can experience difficulty in
processing an analogy when resource availability is lacking,
efforts to ensure ample resource availability are warranted.
This latter observation implies that marketers should be
cautious about the media placement of ads featuring an anal-
ogy. The presentation of ads that include an analogy by
several advertisers within the same medium may tax con-
sumers’ resources and thus undermine persuasion. This sug-
gestion appears to be at odds with current practice. For
example, many consulting services and high-tech firms that
advertise in Business Week and Fortune often describe their
brands’ benefits in analogical terms. Although this practice
may be justified because of the abstract and complex nature
of their work, it may impose resource demands that com-
promise the persuasive impact of analogical messages.
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JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
APPENDIX A
STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1
NEW NUTRIWATCH PERSONAL
NUTRITIONAL MANAGEMENT
SOFTWARE [NEW MONEYWATCH
PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
SOFTWARE]5
NutriWatch is a new nutrition management [MoneyWatch
is a new financial management] software package that is
like the popular Quicken financial management software
package.
Research shows that many people are bad at managing
their personal nutrition [finances], simply because they don’t
realize what they eat and drink [spend] on a daily basis.
NutriWatch [MoneyWatch] remedies this by helping you
keep track of your diet [money].
NutriWatch [MoneyWatch] offers an impressive array of
attributes and benefits, including:
• An electronic register for recording calories taken in and
exercised away [recording regular checking account
transactions].
• A nutrition labeling system for tracking food eaten from
the basic food groups [recurrent expenses such as gro-
ceries, gas, and entertainment].
• Periodic reports of your nutrition intake by food group
category [expenditures in your expense categories].
• Comparisons of eating [spending] habits to stated goals.
• Online access to your doctors’ offices [bank].
• Online access to a nutrition counseling web site [to your
broker].
• Free technical software support, 24 hours a day.
• NutriWatch [MoneyWatch] helps you to better manage
your physical [financial] health.
APPENDIX B
STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 2
ANALOGY CONDITION MESSAGE
For many years, Ameritech has produced a wide variety
of business and personal telephone products and services.
In fact, Ameritech is one of the leading phone companies
in the world. Now Ameritech is introducing a new product
that is like a cellular phone—but for people who have a
variety of communication needs. It is called Voyager.
What makes the Ameritech Voyager different from ex-
isting products is the wireless technology that lets you record
and send voice messages at your convenience without plug-
ging into a phone line or an electrical outlet. Do it from the
car, a park, the airport, a taxi, or wherever. The 4-inch-square
5
Analogy condition wording [literal similarity condition wording].
KNOWLEDGE, RESOURCES, AND ANALOGIES
Voyager helps you to stay in touch when you’re away from
your home or office.
Ameritech’s new Voyager has a special high-resolution
screen. Its on-screen keyboard allows you to input written
messages that Voyager can transmit to any Internet ad-
dress, fax machine, or pager in the world. Several on-
line services are pre-installed, including America Online,
AT&T Magic Mail, OAG’s Flightline, Radio Mail, Eu-
dora, and e-shop.
Additional Voyager features include 1 MB of RAM, a
fax/data modem that transmits at about half the speed (4800-
bps) of most desktop modems, a peripheral port for printer
or keyboard connection, a rechargeable nickel cadmium bat-
tery, and a carrying weight of only 1.5 lbs. Priced at only
$1,000, the Voyager also provides a calendar, an address
book, and spreadsheet capabilities.
LITERAL SIMILARITY CONDITION
MESSAGE
For many years, IBM has produced a wide variety of
business and personal computers. In fact, IBM is one of the
leading computer manufacturers in the world. Now IBM is
introducing a new product that is like a laptop com-
puter—but for people who have a variety of communication
needs. It is called Voyager.
IBM’s new Voyager has a special high-resolution screen.
Its on-screen keyboard allows you to input written messages
that Voyager can transmit to any Internet address, fax ma-
chine, or pager in the world. Several on-line services are
pre-installed, including America Online, AT&T Magic Mail,
OAG’s Flightline, Radio Mail, Eudora, and e-shop.
Additional Voyager features include 1 MB of RAM, a
fax/data modem that transmits at about half the speed (4800
bps) of most desktop modems, a peripheral port for printer
or keyboard connection, a rechargeable nickel cadmium bat-
tery, and a carrying weight of only 1.5 lbs. Priced at only
$1,000, the Voyager also provides a calendar, an address
book, and spreadsheet capabilities.
What makes the IBM Voyager different from existing
products is the wireless technology that lets you record and
send voice messages at your convenience without plugging
into a phone line or an electrical outlet. Do it from the car,
a park, the airport, a taxi, or wherever. The 4-inch-square
Voyager helps you to stay in touch when you’re away from
your home or office.
[Received August 2000. Revised January 2001. David
Glen Mick served as editor, and Punam Anand Keller
served as associate editor for this article.]
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