Answer to question no.

According to Human Rights Watch, the Congolese government should convey a strong

message to its military and civilian officials that any collaboration with the FDLR is totally

illegal and that those participating will face disciplinary action or prosecution. After the

defeat of the M23, a Rwandan-backed armed organization in eastern Congo, in late 2013, the

Congolese government and UN forces were under greater pressure to begin new military

operations against the FDLR. Their planned operations were pushed back after the FDLR's

political leadership stated that its fighters would willingly surrender beginning May 30, 2014.

Only an estimated 300 FDLR fighters surrendered in the months that followed, most of

whom were low-level operatives. In February, the Congolese army launched “Sokola 2,” a

military campaign against the FDLR (sokola means “clean-up” in Lingala and Swahili). UN

peacekeepers were heavily involved in the planning of the military campaign and were

expected to join the operations, but they withdrew their support after the army's commander

for the operation, Gen. Bruno Mandevu, and the army's regional commander for North Kivu

province, Gen. Sikabwe Fall, were appointed at the last minute. Because of Mandevu and

Fall's suspected participation in previous human rights crimes, UN forces have refused to

provide any assistance to an operation in which the two commanders are participating. The

Congolese government made a formal promise to dissolve the FDLR and assist its members'

return to Rwanda as part of the 2003 peace accord, but its efforts were often half-hearted and

met with minimal success. When the Congolese army required military assistance in fighting

ethnic Tutsi-led armed organizations in eastern Congo, such as the National Congress for the

Defense of the People (CNDP), and subsequently the M23, it continued to turn to the FDLR.

This backing for the FDLR has been a major cause of conflict between Congo and Rwanda

(Larmer, Laudati and Clark, 2013).

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Answer to question no.2

Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statutes offers a reflection of the sources of international law, while it

is not exact, and Article 38 does not specifically mention "sources," but it is commonly

claimed as a source of international law. Sources of international law can be classified as

'formal' or ‘material,' though the distinction is made for clarity rather than hierarchy. As a

result, Article 38(1) (a-c), that is, conventions or treaties, custom, and general principles, are

formal sources, whereas Article 38(1)(d), that is, judicial decisions and juristic teachings, are

‘material sources.'

Article 38 (1) International Conventions

States that are originally not party to the treaty are bound by the treaty because they are

"rooted in customary law," and states who are not parties to a treaty that codified existing

customary law into a code of conduct to order state future acts are nevertheless obligated by

the treaty. This means that customary law can become treaty and vice versa if there is not

enough ratification for such a treaty. Even after ratification, they can still overtake each other

in terms of overriding preferences regardless of which is older.

Article 38 (1) (C)-General Principle of Law:

According to the ICJ, national law can be a signpost to the sort of norms that may be useful in

international law, such as the "idea of limited responsibility" in the Barcelona Traction case.

It does not, however, require any treaty or tradition to be legitimate. The ICJ made no

mention of the basic concept of law that is shared by the "major legal systems of member

states."

Article 38 (1) (D) Judicial Decisions:

Dixon believes that the International Court of Justice's efforts to safeguard state sovereignty

by restricting its mandate to “simple adjudication” have failed. Judicial decisions are a major

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source of 'international maritime law,' and 'it is apparent that the ICJ pays significant

attention to both the actual decisions reached in prior instances and the law stated therein.'

All of the sources mentioned above can be found in UN practice, and when they cannot be

located, they grovel and bend to Security Council decisions. It is argued that the UN has

given a genuine supplement to what is intended to be an accurate representation of other

sources of international law (Besson and d’Aspremont, 2018).

Answer to question no.3

Regardless of how far the current trade formalization and state capacity-building efforts in

the mining sector in eastern DRC have progressed, some steps are required to address the

risks and potential pitfalls outlined above, which could, in turn, enable meaningful

implementation of due diligence and certification schemes. The policy proposals provided

below are based on the ideas that resource governance should be utilized as a starting point

for improving security, and that security sector reform should focus more on demilitarization

of mines and trading networks. To address the challenges of managing the mineral trade,

notably the gold trade, as well as the presence of armed organizations and high-ranking state

security officials:

1. Specialized intelligence and anti-fraud agencies should be professionalized and

equipped to examine the financing methods of armed organizations as well as the

unlawful involvement of regular military personnel in mining and mineral commerce.

2. Military and civil courts should be prepared to punish state and non-state armed

actors, as well as intermediary dealers who do business with them, for violating the

Mining Code, the military criminal code, and other applicable national law.

3. National laws should be examined and changed to clearly prohibit a wide range of

direct and indirect involvement in the mining commodity chain by armed groups and

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 state security components, as outlined in the UN Group of Experts due diligence

guidelines. The security component of the Centres de négoce initiative should be

increased by stationing more police officers at the new centers and assigning them the

responsibility of providing protection to merchants traveling from mine sites and

comptoirs in larger cities. Following initiatives should permanently extend security

measures to mines around the centers, provided that police forces are adequately

educated, paid, and monitored (Eckhardt, 2013).

Answer to question no.4

In the mid-twentieth century, a new form of violence emerged in all of the region's states.

Following the reformulation of Cold War security notions as well as French

counterinsurgency teachings in relation to the ways of managing social conflict, a wave of

terror swept through Latin America, this time directed by its own armed forces, security

forces, and related sectors against the population as a whole. This new outbreak of violence,

based on what became known as the “Doctrine of National Security,” took the shape of three

different though frequently crossing and overlapping modes: civil war, state terrorism, and

genocide.

When the requirements of the Genocide Convention are translated into domestic criminal

legislation, there is some indication of creativity by national legislators. For example, the

French Code pénal defines genocide as the annihilation of any group whose identity is based

on arbitrary grounds. The Canadian implementing legislation for the Rome Statute states that

"genocide" is defined as "an act or omission committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or

in part, an identifiable group of persons, as such, that, at the time and place of its commission,

constitutes genocide according to customary international law," explaining that the definition

in the Rome Statute, which is identical to that in the Canadian implementing legislation, is

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identical to that in the Rome Statute. In anticipation, the Act states, “This does not limit or

prejudice in any manner the implementation of current or developing international law rules.”

The European Court of Human Rights has accepted some of this variance at the national

level, declaring that German courts' wide view of the concept of genocide was not

inconsistent with the ban on retroactive crime. At the international level, however, a

somewhat stringent interpretation of the Convention term remains the rule (Charles K and

Achki, 2004).

Answer to question no.5

Armed forces are not only called upon to fight the enemy directly in armed conflict scenarios,

but they may also be asked to undertake a variety of additional jobs, such as manning

checkpoints, preventing access to forbidden areas, or defending military property. Armed

forces may encounter challenging situations when fulfilling these tasks, such as when an

unidentified individual arrives at a checkpoint in a vehicle traveling at high speed and refuses

to stop. Because this individual does not respond to military instructions, authorities may

believe he or she is a combatant or a civilian participating in hostilities. Similarly, if an

anonymous individual attempts to enter a forbidden military location, a tough scenario may

emerge. The major difficulty in these situations is that there will frequently be a factual

question as to the person's position, functions, or actions. In such cases, state practice tends to

employ procedures/rules of engagement that are typical of the law enforcement paradigm

(although they are not necessarily conceived by States as a de jure application of the law

enforcement paradigm). Many nations, for example, allow for the use of “escalation of force”

tactics, with the underlying concept being that the use of force should be the last choice and

that other non-lethal measures, if feasible, should be used first (Gaggioli, 2018).

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Answer to question no.6

Although nations are the major producers of international law, multinational corporations

(MNCs) have a number of tools at their disposal to influence the law-making process. They

can contribute to the ILO's activities through the "tripartism" mechanism and pursue their

interests in international investment arbitration or WTO dispute settlement (through WTO

Members). Above all, they may utilize their political, social, and economic power to

influence the legislative process by lobbying at the national, EU, and international levels, or

by engaging in discussion and consultation. However, MNCs' power can be limited by

competing policy agendas of governments or international organizations, as well as NGO

action.

MNCs can contribute to economic and technical growth, improving societal wealth and living

standards. MNCs, on the other hand, can have a negative influence on human rights or the

environment, and they may even conduct crimes for which they should be held accountable.

However, the shift to international law has not been without its challenges. Long discussions

regarding MNCs' international legal subjectivity have prohibited participation with the

substantive topic of corporations' rights and responsibilities under international law.

Subjectivity has been employed as a stopgap measure while nations give positive rights and

responsibilities. This, however, cannot obscure the fact that MNCs already have significant

rights under international investment law and international human rights law. They can

defend their assets in domestic courts and through arbitration proceedings and they can file

complaints with the ECTHR about abuses of their rights. MNCs, on the other hand, do not

have legally enforceable duties under international law. Most significantly, despite a variety

of activities aiming to develop both voluntary and no voluntary instruments, they are not

bound by international human rights legislation (Wouters and Chann, 2013).

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Answer to question no.7

A state has unrestricted prescriptive jurisdiction, which implies that the legislature can enact,

modify, or repeal law covering any subject or person, regardless of nationality or location.

According to the ICJ, “under these circumstances, all that may be expected of a State is that it

does not exceed the limitations that international law sets on its jurisdiction; within these

limitations, its claim to exercise jurisdiction lies in its sovereignty” (para 47 of the Lotus

case). At the same hand, international law prohibits a state from enforcing its legislation

outside its borders unless it is authorized to do so by an international agreement or a norm of

customary international law.

For example, under state A's legislation, adultery is a capital offense punishable by death.

This legislation is enforceable in state A's territory; but, state A cannot enforce it in state B,

even against a citizen of state A. This means that state A cannot, for example, investigate the

crime or arrest the accused in state B's territory without the agreement of state B (Deen-

Racsmany, 2001).

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Reference List

Besson, S. and d’Aspremont, J. eds., (2018). The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of

International Law. Oxford Handbooks Online. Oxford University Press.

Charles K, Dr. and Achki, B.J. (2004). Crimes against humanity and civilization : the

genocide of the Armenians. Brookline, Mass: Facing History And Ourselves.

Deen-Racsmany, Z. (2001). The Nationality of the Offender and the Jurisdiction of the

International Criminal Court. The American Journal of International Law, 95(3), p.606.

Eckhardt, J. (2013). EU Unilateral Trade Policy-Making: What Role for Import-Dependent

Firms? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(6), pp.989–1005.

Gaggioli, G. (2018). The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts Conduct of Hostilities, Law

Enforcement, and Self-Defense. Complex Battlespaces, pp.61–108.

Larmer, M., Laudati, A. and Clark, J.F. (2013). Neither war nor peace in the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC): profiting and coping amid violence and disorder. Review of

African Political Economy, 40(135), pp.1–12.

Wouters, J. and Chann, A.-L. (2013). Multinational Corporations in International Law. SSRN

Electronic Journal.

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