Taiwan Aff Updates

AT: Alt Causes

The basis of US-China relations is Taiwan right now—there are no alt
causes
Oberoi 7-15 (7/14/19, Mohit Oberoi || Writer for Market Realist || Taiwan Is the Latest Flashpoint in US-China Relations,
Market Realist || https://marketrealist.com/2019/07/us-china-relations/)

US-China relations have taken a turn for the worse over the last year. While the trade relations between
the two countries have been getting all the limelight, behind the scenes, there is much more happening when it comes to US-China
relations. Trade is only a part of the bigger picture. Reuters reported that China “would impose sanctions on U.S. firms involved in a
deal to sell $2.2-billion worth of tanks, missiles and related equipment to Taiwan, saying it harmed China’s sovereignty and national
security.” Last week, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen was also in New York en route to her visit to the Caribbean. The visit has also not
gone down well with China.

China has warned the United States in no uncertain terms. China’s top diplomat Wang Yi said, “We urge the U.S. to fully recognize
China regards Taiwan as its
the gravity of the Taiwan question … (and) not to play with fire on the question of Taiwan.”
own territory. The country has historically opposed sales of any military equipment to Taiwan.
Taiwan, or for that matter, Tibet, has always been an emotional and sensitive issue in China . One China
policy has been the basis of Chinese diplomacy. In a nutshell, no country can have diplomatic
relations with China if it has official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Meanwhile, this is not the first
standoff in China-United States relations. Raytheon will be supplying the said military equipment to Taiwan. While China’s sanctions
wouldn’t mean much for the company, they reflect the uneasiness in US-China relations.

Taiwan’s importance is uniquely rising now as US-China relations

deteriorate—diplomatic meetings, 2020 elections, arms packages—that
overshadows everything else
Tay 6-11 (6/11/19, Shirley Tay || Tay was is a contributor for CNBC.com out of the Asia Pacific headquarters in Singapore ||
As US-China relations sour, Taiwan's value as a 'chess piece' may rise, CNBC || https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/11/as-us-china-
relations-sour-taiwans-value-as-a-chess-piece-may-rise.html)

As the United States and China remain deadlocked in a deepening dispute over trade and technology, some experts say Taiwan’s
value as a bargaining chip has increased.
The self-governed island — which Beijing deems to be a renegade Chinese province — is one of many flashpoints in the rivalry
between the world’s two superpowers.

Taiwan has always been a “chess piece” that Washington can play with in U.S.-China relations, said Zhiqun Zhu, a professor of
political science and international relations at Bucknell University.

“Taiwan’s value to the U.S. will only increase as tensions between the U.S. and China escalate,”
Zhu told CNBC.
Under the Chinese Communist Party’s “One China” policy, the self-ruled island is part of mainland China. Chinese President Xi Jinping
has said before that China “must be and will be” reunified with Taiwan — by force if necessary.

However, recent military and diplomatic actions from Washington have been seen by Beijing as U.S. support for Taiwan’s
independence movement.

At the Shangri-la dialogue defense summit in Singapore last weekend, Chinese Lieutenant General Shao Yuanming said Washington’s
support for Taipei has sent “terribly wrong signals to Taiwan’s independence forces, which could undermine regional peace and
stability.”

“If anyone wants to separate Taiwan from the country, the Chinese military will resolutely defend the unity of our motherland at all
costs,” Shao added.
‘Upgrade’ in US-Taiwan relations

The U.S. using Taiwan as a card is a new factor in the dynamic of the trilateral relationship that “really did not exist” before President
Donald Trump came into power, said Bonnie Glaser, senior advisor for Asia at Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS).

“Trump is a transactional president and he often seems to be willing to put anything on the table,” she told CNBC.

On the military front, the Trump administration has ramped up arms sales to Taipei over the
years, invoking the ire of Beijing. Washington is reportedly preparing a sale of more than $2
billion worth of tanks and weapons to Taiwan.

Diplomatic issues have also come to the fore. In May, high-level security officials from the U.S.
and Taiwan met for the first time in nearly four decades, drawing an angry response from
Beijing.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang said Beijing is “strongly dissatisfied” with and “resolutely opposed” to any official
meetings between the U.S. and Taiwan.

“I believe we’re inching closer & closer to Beijing’s redline on US-Taiwan senior official mtgs--those that are publicized at least,”
Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at California-based think tank Rand Corporation, said on Twitter after the U.S.-Taiwan
meeting.

Grossman told CNBC on email that his understanding is that such meetings “have been ongoing for some time in private.”

“My hunch is that it was publicized this time via intentional leak from one or both sides to signal to China that the upgrade in U.S.-
Taiwan relations is here to stay,” he added.

Taiwan’s next leader is key

Taiwan is set to have its presidential elections in January 2020 — and experts said the polls would likely determine the direction of
cross-strait ties.

if the incumbent Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-Wen is re-elected, which is “likely,”

Grossman said that
cross-strait tensions are likely to escalate further from 2020 to 2024.
China has ‘whole host of tools’ that can really hurt Taiwan: Professor Glaser from CSIS echoed that sentiment, adding that if a
candidate from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected, China would ratchet up military, diplomatic
and economic pressure.

“I think the Chinese would be worried that there’s always this potential for things to go in a very negative direction because the
combination of Trump being president and the possibility that Tsai gets re-elected … could really embolden Tsai to move toward the
direction of independence,” she added.

According to Grossman, the best hope for keeping tensions under wraps would be if a candidate from the opposition Kuomintang
(KMT) party wins the next Taiwan presidential race and recognizes the “One China” policy.

The Taiwanese have been observing how China’s ‘One Country, Two Systems’ approach has worked out in Hong Kong, and it isn’t
too inspiring.

That said, Grossman added, public opinion polling in Taiwan has shown that voters will not likely support the opposition KMT in
doing so.

“The Taiwanese have been observing how China’s ‘One Country, Two Systems’ approach has worked out in Hong Kong, and it isn’t
too inspiring,” Grossman added.

A public opinion survey conducted by the Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council in May also found that 83.6% of Taiwan opposes Xi’s
“one country, two systems” policy.

A ‘small’ risk of escalation

Asked if an armed conflict was a possibility, Grossman said: “Absolutely a risk — albeit a small one.”
However, he emphasized that he did not want to get anyone alarmed, and highlighted that “those out there saying the risk is very
high are probably wrong.”

“I would say the risk has escalated under Tsai from maybe a 1% to 5% chance of armed conflict,” Grossman added. “But that’s still
uncomfortably high considering that China has nuclear weapons and the U.S., also with nukes, would likely intervene to save Taiwan
were China to invade or attack the island.”

Similarly, Bucknell’s Zhu said that while the possibility of an escalation is always present, in reality, “neither side wants to face
military confrontation.” However, economic and diplomatic confrontations are “highly likely,” he added.

That may come in the form of Beijing poaching the island’s allies to ramp up pressure on Taiwan as cross-strait tensions escalate, he
said. “Economically, Taiwan is heavily dependent on the mainland market, so China could restrict Taiwan’s agricultural exports to the
mainland.”

Washington should “carefully deliberate” its exchanges with Taiwan and ensure the wrong
signals are not sent to Beijing, Glaser from CSIS pointed out.
“China could miscalculate and think the United States would get involved in a conflict, and that would really be a very dangerous
situation,” she added.

Taiwan is China’s most sensitive core issue—overshadows everything else

Xia 7-26 (7/26/19, Li Xia || Li Xia is a writer for Xinhua || Commentary: US arms sales to Taiwan a dangerous move to
aggravate cross-Strait situation, Xinhua Net || www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/17/c_137985601.htm)

The U.S. arms sale plan unveiled Monday is a dangerous move that will only aggravate the already complex and grim situation across
the Taiwan Strait.

The U.S. government has approved a possible 500-million-U.S. dollar military sale to Taiwan, claiming that the move will help to
improve the security and defensive capability of the recipient.

Subsequently, Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen expressed "gratitude," saying that the arms sale was "timely."

The situation across the Taiwan Strait, which is already complicated and grim, is worsening as the United States has been using
Taiwan to contain China while the Taiwan administration kept seeking foreign intervention.

The Taiwan question concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and is the most
important and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations.
The U.S. arms sales to Taiwan constitutes a serious violation of international law, the basic norms governing international relations,
the one-China principle and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques and undermine China's sovereignty and security interests.

China's firm opposition to such arms sales is consistent and firm.

Since the current U.S. administration took office, it has constantly played the "Taiwan card" to contain China, especially in arms sales
to Taiwan and military exchanges between the United States and Taiwan.

This has seriously damaged China-U.S. relations and jeopardized peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait.

The Taiwan question, which concerns China's core interests and the national bond of the
Chinese people, brooks no external interference.

Now is unique—diplomatic meetings and Taiwan visits escalate Taiwan’s

importance—China is not willing to bend on Taiwan
Tan 7-19 (7/19/19, Huileng Tan || Huileng covers China's global expansion as a reporter for CNBC || Taiwan's president is
planning another stopover in the US. China will be infuriated, CNBC || https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/19/taiwans-president-to-
stop-over-again-in-the-us-china-will-be-infuriated.html)
Taiwan’s president is expected to transit in the U.S . on Friday for the second time this month,
when she returns from visiting diplomatic allies in the Caribbean — a move that will make China
very angry.
Tsai Ing-wen, the island’s pro-independence leader, is due to make her second stopover in Denver on Friday.

“China opposes official exchange between the US and Taiwan. This position is firm and clear,” the
Chinese foreign ministry said on July 12. The U.S. should not to allow Tsai’s transit and must “stop the official exchange with
Taiwan,” said Geng Shuang, spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry.

The visit comes on the heels of the U.S. State Department recently approving a $2.2 billion sale of weapons to Taiwan— a self-ruled
island viewed by Beijing as a breakaway province that has no right to state-to-state ties.

The timing of both is significant and reflects a “much higher risk tolerance from the Donald
Trump administration when it comes to growing U.S.-Taiwan ties, ” said Kelsey Broderick, China analyst at
the Eurasia Group, a risk consultancy.

The U.S. State Department sought to downplay Tsai’s visit, describing it as “private and unofficial.”

Earlier in July, Tsai transited through New York — another major U.S. city — when she was on her way to the Caribbean. That visit
saw her meeting members of the U.S. Congress as well as representatives from Taiwan’s 17 remaining diplomatic allies, and
speaking at Columbia University. She also addressed a 1,000-strong crowd of supporters, according to the Taipei Times.

Her visits come at a low point in U.S.-China relations. In addition to sparring over trade, the world’s two biggest
economies are also at loggerheads over Taiwan.

Washington’s ties with the self-ruled island are technically unofficial. But under the Taiwan Relations Act, “the United States shall
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.”

The arms sale and Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s stopover trip to the United States this week are a challenge that Xi felt he needed
to respond to.

The U.S. is the main supplier of arms to Taiwan, which has its own democratically elected government and will be buying tanks,
missiles and other military equipment as part of the latest deal.

Beijing has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan and has been ramping up aggressive rhetoric toward the island in a
renewed push for reunification, since the two territories were split amid a civil war 70 years ago.

In a speech at the start of the year, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized the need for peaceful “reunification” between China
and Taiwan. He said the “one country, two systems” framework — with which Beijing governs Hong Kong, a Chinese special
administrative region — was the best way for Taiwan.

Xi’s comments triggered a strong response from Tsai, who vowed: “Taiwan absolutely will not accept ‘one country, two systems.’”

Tsai’s expressed defiance against that model of autonomy turned her waning popularity around and helped secure a win in her
party’s presidential primary.

Beijing’s response

Taiwan is the most significant and sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations, the Chinese foreign
ministry has previously said.
After the U.S. announced its arms deal, China issued a stern warning.

“We urge the US ... to cancel this arms sale immediately and stop military ties with Taiwan to prevent further damage to China-U.S.
relations and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” said Geng, the spokesman for the ministry, on July 9.

Beijing also threatened to retaliate, and vowed to impose sanctions on U.S. firms selling arms to Taiwan.

“If China follows through on sanctioning the US companies involved in the arms sale, it will be the first time it has taken this kind of
action,” the Eurasia Group said. “In the past, China has punished Taiwan for arms sales from the US, while threatening action against
the US but keeping actual penalties informal and discreet.”
Beijing needs Taiwan’s major semiconductor companies to continue supplying to Chinese companies.

The overall impact of sanctions on the U.S. corporate sector will probably be modest but “this is still a very significant action,” said
Broderick and her colleague, Michael Hirson.

“It shows the degree to which Taiwan is the most sensitive issue for Xi Jinping, ” Eurasia Group said. “The arms sale and Taiwan
president Tsai Ing-wen’s stopover trip to the United States this week are a challenge that Xi felt he needed to respond to.”

Importance of Taiwan

Beijing has so far withheld from harsher actions on Taiwan directly, perhaps out if fear that the move could backfire and instead,
bolster support for Tsai, who is seeking a second term in January elections.

The Taiwan market has also become increasingly important to China as it suffers from the ongoing U.S.-China trade conflict, wrote
Broderick in a separate note.

“Beijing needs Taiwan’s major semiconductor companies to continue supplying to Chinese companies and has stepped up its
offering of tax and other residential benefits to Taiwan entrepreneurs who shift operations to the mainland,” she added. This is
especially important since Chinese tech giant Huawei has been placed on a U.S. blacklist, a move that effectively blocks the company
from doing business with U.S. companies — even though the restrictions were eventually eased.

it is not so critical to Xi that he is willing to bend on

And while Beijing desires a trade deal with Washington,
sensitive issues such as Taiwan’s independence, said the Eurasia analysts.
“Trump’s tariff hikes and especially the U.S. export ban on Huawei has heightened nationalist sentiment in China and made Beijing
more skeptical that a deal will bring a lasting ebb in tensions,” they added.

Taiwan is the driver of China’s moves—other problems like expansionism

stem from the Taiwan issue
Carpenter 6-8 (6/8/19, Ted Galen Carpenter || Carpenter, a senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute and a
contributing editor at the National Interest, is the author of twelve books and more than eight hundred articles on international
affairs || Forget the US-China Trade war: Is a Conflict Over Taiwan the Real Threat?, The National Interest ||
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/forget-us-china-trade-war-conflict-over-taiwan-real-threat-61627)

Tensions between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are surging to an alarming
extent. The latest indicator is the recent exchange of heated rhetoric between Gen. Wei Fenghe, China’s Minister of National
Defense, and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, the Taiwanese government’s chief policymaking body dealing with cross-strait
relations. As Taiwan’s self-proclaimed protector, Washington should be extremely worried about these developments.

Wei warned
Speaking on June 1 at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual multilateral conference on Pacific security issues,
against efforts either in Taiwan or foreign countries to thwart China’s goal of reunification.
Moreover, “any underestimation of the PLA’s resolve and will is extremely dangerous.” Wei added
ominously that, “If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will have no choice but to fight at all costs, at all
costs, (sic.) for national unity. If the PLA cannot even safeguard the unity of our motherland, what do we need it for?”

The Mainland Affairs Council responded with equally harsh and uncompromising language. In a statement issued the following day,
the council reasserted that Taiwan has never been a part of the PRC and would never accept Beijing’s control or threats. It accused
China not only of “challenging international norms and order,” but added the gratuitous slap that Beijing’s claim to seek peaceful
development was “a lie of the ages.” Lest anyone not fully grasp the extent of Taipei’s hostility toward the PRC, the statement went
on: “We need to remind the public that the Chinese Communist Party is practicing anti-democracy, anti-peace between the two
sides of the strait and further resorting to war. This is the main cause of the tension in the Taiwan Strait and the region, and it is the
source of danger and provocation against peace and stability.”

The vitriolic exchange constituted a worrisome escalation of the animosity between Taipei and Beijing that has been roiling for the
past three years. The victory of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s 2016 elections dashed any
hopes Chinese leaders had that the burgeoning economic ties with the mainland would translate gradually into increased Taiwanese
popular support for political reunification. Anger at that strategy’s failure led Beijing to revive a campaign to increase Taiwan’s
diplomatic isolation by poaching the few small nations that still maintain formal relations with Taipei. The PRC’s menacing
military activities also increased . Chinese war games in and around the Taiwan Strait have
soared since 2016. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 report to Congress also concludes that Beijing is building up
its ground, air, and naval forces to achieve a more robust capability to invade Taiwan.

Anger at Beijing’s treatment of Taiwan has led to congressional and executive branch measures to strengthen Washington’s backing
for Taipei. A major step occurred in March 2018 when President Trump signed into law the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA), which
encouraged high-level U.S. officials to meet with their Taiwan counterparts. That legislation, which passed both houses of Congress,
ended Washington’s cautious practice under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of holding meetings only with relatively low-level
Taiwanese officials.

It was especially noticeable that the TTA specifically promoted interaction by “cabinet-level national security officials.” That
provision proved to be more than a symbolic gesture when National Security Adviser John Bolton met with Taiwan National Security
Council Secretary-General David Lee in May. Bolton’s intention to push for stronger security ties between the United States and
Taiwan cannot be overstated. Before his current stint in government service, he pushed for highly dangerous and provocative
policies. He urged the United States to establish formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and even advocated moving U.S. military
forces from Okinawa to Taiwan. Either measure would cross a bright red line as far as Beijing is concerned and would likely trigger
PRC military action to prevent Taiwan’s permanent political separation from the mainland. Having someone with those views
holding a crucial policy post and sitting just a few doors down from the Oval Office greatly increases the likelihood of a further boost
in U.S. support for Taiwan, despite the risk of war with China.

There are multiple signs from various sources of growing U.S. backing for Taiwan’s de facto independence. Congress certainly is
stepping up its support. By a unanimous voice vote in early May, the House of Representatives passed the Taiwan Assurance Act,
which expresses firm support for Taiwan while urging Taipei to increase its own defense spending. The legislation also recommends
that Washington continue “regular sales of defense articles” to Taiwan and back Taipei’s participation in international organizations
—something Beijing emphatically resists.

The Trump administration doesn’t seem to need much prodding. U.S. warships have transited the Taiwan Strait on several occasions
over the past year to demonstrate military support for Taipei. At the Shangri-La Dialogue session, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick
Shanahan stated that the United States would no longer “tiptoe around” destabilizing Chinese behavior regarding Taiwan or the
South China Sea.

While Americans are focused on the ongoing trade war between the United States and China, the danger is growing of an actual
shooting war that could involve Taiwan. The rhetoric coming out of both Beijing and Taipei is increasingly confrontational and shrill.
Taiwan’s governing party is firmly committed to resisting the PRC’s pressure for unification; indeed, incumbent president Tsai Ing-
Chinese
wen is being challenged by an even more hardline, pro-independence faction within the DPP. At the same time,
leaders seem intent on pushing their reunification agenda with greater insistence and urgency.
Those are not comforting trends. Washington has a vague but very real commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to protect the
island’s security. Both Congress and the Trump administration seem to be drifting toward boosting the traditional level of U.S.
support in response to Beijing’s escalating pressure on Taiwan. The danger is growing that the TRA’s paper security commitment
may be put to a real-world test. U.S. leaders and the American people need to ask themselves whether they are really willing to risk
war with a nuclear-armed power to protect Taiwan. The prudent answer clearly should be “no.”
 AT: No Spillover
Solving Taiwan is most important for the US-China relationship—our
sources are the most qualified analysts and diplomats—prefer these
warrants
Harner 15 (6/17/15, Stephen Harner || Harner is a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer who served in Beijing and Tokyo ||
How To Solve the 'Taiwan Problem' in US-China Relations, Forbes ||
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2015/06/17/how-to-solve-the-worsening-taiwan-problem-in-u-s-china-
relations/#1de98523672e)

“Successful management of the Taiwan problem is the key to a sound U.S.-China relationship.
And the door that key can open is one that leads to a better century than the last one for all
concerned.”
This quotation, written by Chas Freeman--along with Henry Kissinger, perhaps America’s most successful and respected diplomat-
scholar on the U.S.-China relationship--introduces a chapter entitled “Imagine--The Taiwan Question and U.S. China-Relations” in
U.S. Naval War College Assistant Professor Lyle J. Goldstein’s scintillating and titillating new book, Meeting China Halfway--How to
Defuse the Emerging U.S.-China Rivalry.

Anyone following current affairs in Taiwan will be aware that “successful management of the Taiwan problem”--from the
perspectives of the United States, China, and Taiwan itself--is about to become more difficult and fraught with danger than at any
time since 1995-96, and possibly since 1949.

The 1995-96 crisis erupted with Chinese protests at a visit to the U.S. by Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui, followed by Chinese missile
tests in the Taiwan Strait, followed by President Bill Clinton’s deployment to the Western Pacific of, as described by James Mann and
quoted by Goldstein, the “largest armada since the end of the Vietnam War.”

The source of the danger today is the utter failure of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) government of President Ma Ying-
jeou, in power since 2008, to earn the confidence and loyalty of Taiwan’s voters. Public disillusionment with Ma, with approval
ratings in the single digits, has been particularly acute on the issue of Taiwan’s relations with China.

To put it simply, the majority of people of Taiwan have concluded that Ma and his colleagues in the KMT, whose initial mandate
from Taiwan’s voters was to reduce tensions and improve cross-strait relations, have on a variety of issues and in a number of cross-
strait political and commercial projects “sold out” Taiwan’s interests to curry favor with and to exact corrupt rewards from both
Beijing and Washington.

Now, based on the KMT’s dismal performance, the goal of “improving cross-strait relations” as a policy has itself been discredited, or
at least is distrusted by most Taiwan voters.

The severity of the verdict against Ma’s government was delivered in local elections last November 29 when the opposition
Democratic Progressive Party (minjindang, DPP) swept virtually the entire country. The KMT, seeking to regroup, elected Eric Chu,
Taipei county leader (pictured with Xi Jinping), to replace Ma as chairman.

No one is more alarmed at this than China. Beijing must be observing--and hearing from its sources--that Taiwan’s “great political
divide” is no longer simply, or perhaps even mostly, between benshengren (locally born Taiwanese, majority supporters of the DPP)
and waishengren (descendants of mainlanders who accompanied Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan in 1947-49, almost all supporters of the
KMT). Rather, it is between proponents of eventual unification with the mainland (the KMT position, though often fudged and
obfuscated) and unification’s opponents--advocates a permanent “status quo” of de facto independence--the position (ditto) of the
DPP.

Every indication now is that, in the presidential election that will take place January of next year,
the DPP’s leader, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen (pictured above), will be elected president, and DPP candidates could--probably will--
capture majority control of the hitherto KMT controlled law-making Legislative Yuan. DPP control of both executive and
legislative government branches would present for Beijing--and for Washington--a potentially
explosive situation.
Goldstein’s book is a tour d’horizon of the many severely troubled and portentous aspects of U.S.-China relations, including the
Taiwan question, trade frictions, developing world rivalry, Korean denuclearization, the U.S.-Japan alliance, the South China Sea, and
the U.S. “rebalance” to Asia. Goldstein sets out specific sequential, reciprocal actions or “moves”--a “cooperation spiral”--that would
build confidence, enhance communications and trust, and lead to a positive common goal or mutually acceptable modus vivendi.

Goldstein addresses directly what the “Taiwan question” means and portends for the United
States and China (treating Taiwan itself, perhaps inevitably, as something less than an autonomous actor). His “cooperative
spiral” to resolve the Taiwan question the following:

Washington’s move #1: The United States should should significantly reduce the planned redeployment of 8,000 Marines from
Okinawa to Guam.

Beijing’s move #1: China should agree to initiate military confidence-building measures without political conditions.

Washington’s move #2: The United States should reveal the full extent of its defense ties with Taiwan and should close the office of
its military representative at the American Institute in Taiwan.

Beijing’s move #2: China should remove its short-range ballistic and cruise missiles from within a radius of 1,000 kilometers from
Taiwan.

Washington’s move #3: The United States should endorse and actively push for final status negotiations.

Beijing’s move #3: China should institutionalize a system for developing an expanded international presence for Taiwan.

Washington’s move #4: The United States should halt the sale of new types of weapons systems.

Beijing’s move #4: China should restrict the building of its amphibious fleet.

Washington’s move #5: The United States should cease all arms transfers for Taiwan.
Washington’s move #5: China should renounce the use of force as part of the peace treaty process that joins Taiwan and the
Mainland in a confederation.

Impossible? No. Improbable? Maybe. But here we observe thinking that rejects deadlock and demands progress, despite the
seeming intractability of the issues. Goldstein’s book is a treasure trove of bold and brilliant ideas, offering a uniquely promising
ways forward for currently deeply worrying U.S.-China relations.

History proves—giving up Taiwan to China under Deng Xiao Ping

normalized US-China relations in the 1900s
Bush and Rigger 1-16 (1/16/19, Richard C. Bush and Shelley Rigger || Rigger is a Brown Professor of Political
Science, with a BA from Princeton and a PhD from Harvard and studies the effects of cross-strait economic interactions on Taiwan
people's perceptions of mainland China. Bush is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and holds the Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in
Taiwan Studies in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAP) || The Taiwan issue and the normalization of US-China relations,
Brookings Institute || https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-taiwan-issue-and-the-normalization-of-us-china-relations/)

By the late 1960s, PRC and U.S. leaders recognized the strategic situation in Asia had changed, and that the geopolitical interests of
the two countries were not in fundamental conflict. Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping not only reaffirmed that assessment but also
recognized a basis for economic cooperation. Yet prior to normalization. The formal U.S. relationship with the ROC
continued. Deng Xiaoping insisted that it had to end before PRC-U.S. relations could become
normal across the board. In principle, the Carter administration agreed to meet that requirement.
The normalization agreement of December 15/16, 1978 addressed the “Taiwan obstacles” to
normalization in the following ways:

The United States recognized the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of
China, and by implication accepted the PRC as the government representing China in international governmental organizations.
That is, Washington forewent a “two-Chinas” or dual-representation approach. (In 1971, the United States had tried but failed to
preserve the ROC’s UN membership under a dual representation rubric.)
 The United States terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC and established them with
the PRC. It pledged to conduct relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis.

Over time, Washington has redefined how, in a

These are the key elements of the U.S.’s “one-China policy.”
practical sense, to operationalize the conduct of U.S.-Taiwan relations, based on changes in
circumstances. But the commitment to the essence of these two elements has been sustained. At the time of normalization,
there were a few ways in which U.S. relations with Taiwan appeared not to change fundamentally.

Taiwan is China’s core interest—only solving this will strengthen US-China

relations
Xie 14 (8/30/14, Hao Xie || Hao Xie is a researcher at Shanghai-Hongkong Development Institute, Fudan University, Shanghai,
China || The Impacts of the Taiwan Issue on Sino-US Relations, Open Journal of Political Science ||
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.946.766&rep=rep1&type=pdf)

The Taiwan issue is a historical problem which is left over by China’s civil war. Chinese government believes that the Taiwan issue is
Chinese internal affair, so it cannot brook direct or indirect interference by any foreign forces. Both Cairo Declaration issued by
China, the US and the United Kingdom in December 1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the US, the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union in 1945 announced that all territories, including Taiwan, occupied by Japan before the end of the
Second World War should be returned to China. On 25 October 1945, the Japanese government completed the returning of
sovereignty of Taiwan to China. Thus, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and it has been proven through history. However,
the political behavior will be
political behavior of states is not always dominated by rationality. In many cases,
irrational due to national interests. This is one of important reasons why the Taiwan issue can be
regarded as a barometer for Sino-US relations

the US seeks its national interests on a global scale, and

As the superpower in the world after the Cold War,
Taiwan becomes an important American agent which is able to help the US to obtain strategic
interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In the system of national interests, the status of various interests of countries is not
immutable. At different periods of history, the core interests of different countries keep changing due to changes in international
The Taiwan issue is the core interest of China, and Chinese leaders believe that
situations.
reunification of China is their historical mission. With constant enhancement of its comprehensive strength, China
should widely participate in international affairs, actively integrate into the international community and develop friendly and
cooperation relation with other countries in different fields. Thus, China is likely to continue to pursue its current external policy,
marked by overall caution, pragmatism and an emphasis on a peaceful regional environment so as to permit China’s modernization
program to succeed (Hieronymi, 2004). The Sino-US relations can be seen as one of the most important bilateral relations in the
world.If both sides intend to promote their relations, they should not challenge each other’s core
interests. If the government of the US continues to challenge China’s core interests, especially
about the Taiwan issue, and does not comply with the promise of one-China policy, the
relationship between China and the US is bound to inevitably face setback.
 Ext: Taiwan Key
Taiwan is Beijing’s first priority – 2020 is the brink
Yuwen ’18 (Deng Yuwen is an independent political commentator and international relations
scholar. He is currently a visiting scholar at the University of Nottingham, and also a member of
council at the Beijing Reform and Development Institute. Is China planning to take Taiwan by
force in 2020? https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2126541/china-
planning-take-taiwan-force-2020)

Does Beijing have a timetable for seizing control of Taiwan ? This has been a hot topic for the
media and among experts on cross-strait relations. I believe such a timetable exists. If the
timeline was rather vague in the past, it has become clearer now. And the US security strategy
that President Donald Trump recently unveiled will hasten the pace of Beijing’s plan to take back
the island, probably in 2020. President Xi Jinping ’s report at the 19th Communist Party congress
offers some clues. In the address, he identified “one country, two systems” and the reunification
of the motherland as a fundamental strategy of a “new era” for China. This provides a clue to
Beijing’s timeline for resolving the Taiwan problem. According to the report , the new era refers
to a period from now until the middle of this century. By 2050, China is to achieve the “great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and become a modern socialist power. A list of 14 items
describe this new era, and one of them involves reunification with Taiwan. This means Beijing
must take control of Taiwan by 2050 at the latest. Plainly, as long as Taiwan remains outside the
Chinese fold, the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation cannot happen. No surprise, then,
to hear Xi say that Beijing would never allow “any individual, any organisation, any political
party, at any time or by any means, to split any single piece of the Chinese territory”. Last
month, a Chinese diplomat’s fighting words over the idea of the US sending navy ships to Taiwan
were also revealing. Li Kexin, a minister at the Chinese embassy in Washington, warned that
port-of-call exchanges between the US and Taiwan would not be tolerated. “The day a US Navy
vessel arrives in Kaohsiung is the day that our People’s Liberation Army unifies Taiwan with
military force,” he told mainland media. While it is unlikely the PLA would really start a war over
a US Navy visit to Taiwan, the words reflect a consistent belief of Chinese leaders: that Taiwan
has to be taken back by force. Since Xi came to power, the party has been open about its wish
for the PLA to be battle-ready. No doubt the army’s first target would be Taiwan. Also, Xi’s sense
of calling would never allow him to tolerate Taiwan’s indefinite separation from the mainland.
Whatever one may think of Xi, most people would agree that he is driven by a strong sense of
national pride . That is why, as soon as he came to power, he launched the “Chinese dream”
campaign and set out the goal of achieving national rejuvenation. In the party congress address,
he painted a picture of the new era that reflected his thinking and linguistic style . As a leader
who is bent on raising China’s global stature to a level that rivals the nation’s glory years in Han
and Tang times, Xi would surely not tolerate an indefinite split between Taiwan and the
mainland. Beijing warns of pro-independence turmoil in ties with Taipei in 2018 Nonetheless,
the points raised so far only signal that Beijing has a timetable in mind to unify Taiwan with
China, but they do not explain why the PLA could move to take Taiwan by force in 2020. A
combination of factors could point to a military confrontation. They include Trump’s labelling of
China as a strategic rival in his administration’s national security strategy; Beijing’s worry about
the pro-independence movement in Taiwan and its belief that it now has the ability to resolve
the Taiwan problem once and for all; a misjudgment by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen ; and
Xi’s sense of his own legacy. First of all, why would Beijing opt for unification by force, rather
than through the peaceful negotiation it has always championed? There are four reasons. First,
after extending economic help to the island for years, Beijing has still failed to win the hearts
and minds of its people. Instead, cross-strait relations have deteriorated . Second, as one
generation of Taiwanese replaces another, the “Chinese” identity among the people will only
grow weaker. Third, the influence of Taiwan’s political parties is waning. Even if the Kuomintang
wins back power, it would not be in a position to lead cross-strait unification. Fourth, more and
more Chinese are calling for unification by force. Thus, though on the surface Beijing has
continued to call for a peaceful reunification, it has in fact ditched the idea. Though on the
surface Beijing has continued to call for a peaceful reunification, it has in fact ditched the idea As
Beijing believes it has to use force to reunite with Taiwan, the next step would be to find a good
time to do so. The year 2020 offers such an opportunity . That’s the year when China would be
approaching the first of its “two centenary” goals – the establishment of a xiaokang, or
moderately prosperous, society by 2021, the 100th year of the founding of the Communist
Party. This would act as a driving force for China to take back Taiwan by force. If China becomes
a well-off nation with Taiwan in its fold, it would mean a historic achievement for Xi. Next,
Trump’s national security strategy not only labels China and Russia as America’s “strategic
rivals”, it also pledges to maintain strong ties with Taiwan. This will quicken Beijing’s plans to
take back Taiwan by force.

Taiwan is China’s first priority – arms sales make them desperate

AP 7-24-19 (Associated Press. Japan Today is an online newspaper based in Tokyo, Japan.
Launched in September 2000, Japan Today publishes wire articles, press releases, and
photographs, as well as opinion and contract pieces, such as company profiles, in English. China
says it won’t rule out using force to reunify Taiwan
https://japantoday.com/category/world/china-won%27t-rule-out-using-force-to-reunify-taiwan)

In a national defense white paper released Wednesday, China listed among its top priorities its
resolve to contain "Taiwan independence" and combat what it considers separatist forces in
Tibet and the far west region of Xinjiang. The paper, published every few years, is an outline of
China's national defense policy. Wednesday's report highlighted China's "defensive" approach ,
but also pledged to "surely counterattack if attacked." Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian
said the threat of Taiwan separatism is growing and warned that those who are seeking Taiwan
independence will meet a dead end. "It anyone dares to separate Taiwan from China, the
Chinese army will certainly fight, resolutely defending the country's sovereign unity and
territorial integrity," Wu said. Taiwan, a democratically-governed island, split from the
Communist Party-ruled mainland China amid civil war in 1949. China maintains that Taiwan is
part of its territory and seeks "complete reunification." The U.S. has repeatedly raised Beijing's
ire by selling arms to Taiwan . While the U.S. does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan,
U.S. law requires that it provide Taiwan with sufficient defense equipment and services for self-
defense. Earlier this month, the U.S. tentatively approved a sale of $2.2 billion in arms to Taiwan
- a proposal which had prompted China to threaten sanctions against the U.S. Taiwan's defense
ministry said it made the request in light of a growing military threat from China. The white
paper also pointed to U.S., Japanese and Australian moves to beef up their military presence
and alliances in the Asia-Pacific as bringing uncertainties to the region.
 AT: No Asia Prolif
No Asia prolif—countries are deterred by sanctions and dependence—
South Korea and Taiwan prove
Miller 14 (9/9/14, Nicholas L. Miller || Miller is an Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. He has
previously published articles in the American Political Science Review, Security Studies, International Organization, and International
Security || The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions, Cambridge University Press ||
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/secret-success-of-nonproliferation-
sanctions/D0090E1163F6962CAD93BFF45A0C7C62)

Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article incorporates the selection effects issue into the theoretical argument and systematically
tests its observational implications. I argue that economic and political sanctions are indeed a successful nonproliferation tool, but that selection effects
have rendered this success largely hidden. I provide evidence that since late 1970s—when the U.S. made clear through congressional legislation that
positive economic and security relations with the United States were contingent on nonproliferation and began regularly employing sanctions against
proliferating states—sanctions
have been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but have succeeded in
deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and have thus
contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit.9 The logic is simple: rational leaders assess the
risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program, which produces a selection effect
whereby states highly vulnerable to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons
programs in the first place, so long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state’s level of economic
and security dependence on the U.S.—states with greater dependence have more to lose from U.S. sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to
U.S.-sponsored norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the U.S. made the threat of sanctions credible in the late 1970s, only
insulated, inward-looking regimes with few ties to the U.S. have pursued nuclear weapons and become the 7 Most prominently, Hufbauer, Scott, and
Elliott 1990; and Pape 1997. 8 See Solingen 2012 for the most recent work in this tradition. 9 For a visualization of the decline, see Sagan 2011, c2.4
target of imposed sanctions, rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation sanctions low

Although U.S. officials had

Taiwan was undoubtedly surprised when the U.S. began threatening sanctions in 1976 and 1977.

opposed Taiwanese proliferation from the moment they recognized Taiwan was pursuing
nuclear weapons in 1972,79 sanctions were not clearly threatened until the introduction of the
Symington Amendment in 1976. Instead, the U.S. initially focused on supply-side measures. In early
1973, for example, the U.S. successfully pressured Germany to reject the Taiwanese purchase of reprocessing equipment.80 The first direct verbal
warnings to Taiwan were vague and did not threaten sanctions. In October 1973, for example, a U.S. study team warned Taiwanese officials, “Should
we have reason to believe that the ROC has moved from consideration of a nuclear weapons program to actual implementation, we would be forced to
react. That reaction would be based upon the circumstances at the time.”81

Despite the Taiwanese foreign minister’s promise to drop efforts to acquire a reprocessing facility, 82 the vague U.S. threats were insufficient to halt
the Taiwanese nuclear weapons program. In 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo came to power following his father’s death, and by early 1976, “the IAEA
suspected that Taiwan’s nuclear ambitions might stretch beyond power production.”83 Reacting to growing concerns about the Taiwanese nuclear
program, in September the State Department instructed the ambassador in Taipei to clearly threaten sanctions namely an end to nuclear cooperation
and “legislative efforts by the US congress, such as the Symington Amendment, to deny US military and economic assistance to any country that
acquires a national reprocessing capability. This reflects the growing sensitivity of congressional and public opinion 79 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
1972. 29 on the issue of nuclear proliferation and the implications seem clear to my government—should the ROC [Republic of China] or any other
government seek national reprocessing facilities, this would risk jeopardizing additional highly important relationships with the US.” 84

these threats appeared to be successful, as Chiang Ching-kuo reiterated that Taiwan’s

Superficially,

policy was “not to manufacture nuclear weapons” and that “all nuclear research on Taiwan
would be directed toward peaceful uses. ”85 He pledged that Taiwan would cease all reprocessing activity and end attempts to
purchase reprocessing technology abroad.86 Nonetheless, by December the ambassador was forced to admit, “we have rather compelling evidence
that in spite of solemn and public assurances given by the GROC and personally by Premier Chiang, the Chinese may not yet have given up their
intentions of acquiring a capability for reprocessing nuclear fuels.”

The story of U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis the South Korean nuclear program starts in early 1975, when U.S. officials ramped up nuclear intelligence gathering
efforts following the 1974Indian nuclear test and obtained evidence of the South Korean nuclear weapons efforts.98 This evidence included a South
Korean deal to purchase a nuclear reprocessing facility from a French firm—although this did not violate South Korea’s commitments under the NPT,
the U.S. worried the facility could be used to extract weapons grade plutonium.99 Despite their serious concern over the matter, U.S. officials initially
decided to tread lightly to avoid another public crisis in Asia following the fall of Saigon and America’s ongoing diplomatic focus on improving relations
with China.100 Rather than explicitly confronting South Korea about ending its nuclear weapons program and canceling the reprocessing deal, the U.S.
“first focused on South Korea’s NPT membership.”101 As part of this effort, in March 1975 Congress delayed US Export-Import Bank loans totaling $236
million to South Korea’s nuclear energy industry; the
U.S. informed South Korea that the loan was under review
because of the Indian nuclear test and that “Korea’s very timely ratification of the NPT will be an
important factor in Ex-Im eventually gaining congressional agreement to finance Kori-2.”102 This
veiled threat was shortly followed by South Korea ratifying the NPT in March, 103 but it did not end the
South Korean nuclear program. In the summer of 1975, the U.S. finally confronted South Korea about the reprocessing deal; nonetheless, “despite
possessing significant evidence that the South was indeed pursuing a weapons program, the Americans refrained from any direct accusation. Nor did
they reveal the extent of their intelligence. Instead, the US vigorously objected to the reprocessing deal on the grounds of ‘the appearances of things’
and the ‘difficulties it would cause.’”104 Starting in August 1975, however, “The Americans’ threats became progressively costlier and increasingly
explicit.”105 The U.S. reportedly threatened to cut off $275 million in annual military assistance.106 Even more broadly, according to the U.S.
ambassador in Seoul, South Korean leaders were asked, “whether Korea (is) prepared (to) jeopardize availability of best technology and largest
financing capability which only US could offer, as well as vital partnership with US, not only in nuclear and scientific areas but in broad political and
security areas.”107By the end of the year, “the US had threatened to cease civilian nuclear
cooperation, including the training of scientists, and to withdraw US security guarantees, including
the nuclear umbrella.”108 In January 1976, South Korea canceled the reprocessing deal under the

mounting pressure, and by December 1976 the broader nuclear weapons program was canceled, a decision
“based both on U.S. threats and the failure of the program to make any significant technical progress.”109 Although the U.S. Congress
had not yet passed the Symington Amendment, these threats were credible due to a variety of signals the U.S. government had sent in recent years,
including the U.S. rapprochement with China and withdrawal from Vietnam, both of which communicated to South Korea that anti-Communism was no
longer sufficient to merit unwavering military and political support from the U.S.110 Bringing matters closer to home, in 1973 the U.S. withdrew 24,000
of the 70,000 American troops from Korea and was subsequently late in delivering a promised $1.5 billion military aid package.111 In 1974, Congress
reduced the level of military aid to South Korea due to human rights concerns.112 Taken
together, these signals made clear to
South Korea that the U.S. was willing and able to withdraw its military and economic support.

Like Taiwan, South Korea conceded to U.S. threats only because of its high dependence on the
U.S. Both security and economic considerations played a role in the success of the sanctions threats. The U.S. was South Korea’s
largest trading partner,122 purchasing 26% of South Korean exports at the time, and the U.S.
held much of South Korea’s $20 billion foreign debt.123 Drezner observes that, “the threat to suspend all trade in nuclear
materials would have completely devastated ROK plans for energy autonomy,”124 while Solingen notes, “without U.S. equipment and fuel supplies for
South Korea’s first nuclear plant, still under construction in 1975, the economy might have stalled at an already critical period following the oil
crisis.”125 Meyer similarly observes that, “The United States government took advantage of South Korea’s political, military, and economic dependence
In
to compel the South Korean government to cancel its nuclear weapons project…the threat of an economic cutoff was particularly potent.”126

terms of security, as Reiss notes, South Korea was simply unwilling to take the risk of placing
itself “in a position where it had neither nuclear arms nor the American commitment,”127 an
eventuality that would have been realized—at least for several years—had the U.S. acted on its threats. In other words, even though part of South
Korea’s motivation for pursuing nuclear weapons was uncertainty about the long-term American security commitment,128 the short-term loss of
American support was simply too costly, both in economic and security terms. Overall, then, the South Korean case is in line with theoretical
expectations. South Korea conceded to U.S. threats after miscalculating, but only because of its high dependence on the U.S.
politically, economically, and militarily.
 AT: No Chinese Invasion
The only way to subjugate Taiwan is through invasion, and the US would
still defend due to foreign policy – even still Taiwan would win anyways
Roy 18 [Denny Roy, senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, 7-22-2018,
"What would the US do if Beijing decided to take Taiwan by force?," South China Morning Post,
accessed 7-26-2019, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2156237/what-
would-us-do-if-beijing-decided-take-taiwan-force ]
Despite the perception that Beijing may be committed to politically reunifying Taiwan – by force if necessary – before Xi Jinping
retires as paramount leader, US
analysts continue to see an attempted invasion of Taiwan as
prohibitively risky for China.
As China’s soft power proves ineffective, Beijing relies more heavily on coercion to force political unification on Taipei. China will
continue in the coming years to enlarge the gap between its total military power and that of Taiwan, but this observation does not
get at the heart of the problem Beijing faces.

Beijing might attempt unification through military means other than invading Taiwan, such as
capturing smaller islands claimed by Taipei, imposing a blockade of its ports and main airport,
launching cyberattacks against its information and communications infrastructure, and cratering
parts of the island with missile attacks.

The problem for China is that these methods still rely on the Taipei government choosing to surrender .
Historically, governments and societies under attack become more defiant rather than submissive. Judging from the reaction of
Taiwan’s people to Japanese colonisation beginning in 1895 and to the imposition of Kuomintang rule beginning in 1945, Taiwan
would not be an exception.

The only sure way to compel Taiwan’s surrender would be for PLA soldiers to occupy Taiwan’s
major cities . But even as China’s military capabilities improve, the chances of success in an all-out invasion of Taiwan are low –
even if the United States did not intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. China would need to ferry its troops, most of them packed into slow-
moving and highly visible ships, across the 160km wide Taiwan Strait, where they would be highly vulnerable to attack, and then
unload them and huge amounts of ammunition and other supplies while trudging through sand or mud and under heavy fire. China
has the capacity to transport only a few tens of thousands of troops at a time. Much of this force would not make it across the strait.
Awaiting the survivors would be 180,000 active duty Taiwanese soldiers plus 1.5 million reservists.

If the United States chose to intervene, US aircraft from bases in the region could begin flying
missions within hours. China might try to impede this by firing missiles to temporarily knock out
runways used by US aircraft, but this would reduce the number of missiles available to hit
Taiwan, and also bring Japan’s military forces fully into a war .
Even if it won the military campaign, Beijing would face the daunting prospect of trying to rule a society that was accustomed to
democratic governance and would be inveterately hostile towards China for generations to come. Tibet would appear quiescent by
comparison.

An important part of the calculation, of course, is the likely US reaction.

The US government still has strong incentives to prevent China’s invasion of Taiwan . US President
Donald Trump has made public statements questioning the value of US alliances in Asia. During the
summit with Kim Jong-un in Singapore, Trump revealed a hope that US troops would eventually leave South Korea. But 18 months
into his presidency, the administration has not taken steps to disengage from US alliances or to reduce US military forward
deployment.
Trump’s senior advisers seem committed not only to maintaining US strategic leadership in the western Pacific Rim, but also taking a
more confrontational posture with China, as reflected in the recently published policies on security and defence.

These characterised China as more adversary than partner, a reverse of the Obama administration rhetoric. As a concrete example,
US “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea have increased relative to the Obama administration.

Polls in the United States show only a minority of Americans would favour US military personnel fighting to defend Taiwan.
Members of Congress, however, are more supportive. They realise America’s leadership position in the
region would be severely if not fatally compromised if the United States stood aside while a
large authoritarian state and opponent of the US-sponsored regional order gobbled up a small
democracy that has strong historical ties to America .
They believe in the “democratic peace theory”: democracies don’t fight against each other, so democratisation throughout the
world increases the space within which no serious threats to US security will arise. They understand that Taiwan is the
“unsinkable aircraft carrier” that anchors the first island chain , limiting the geostrategic
platform from which China might otherwise attempt to dominate eastern Asia .

A decision by Washington not to intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict in which China appeared to
be the aggressor would represent a dramatic shift in US strategy. The overt attempts to politically distance
the island from China while Chen Shui-bian was Taiwan’s president from 2000 to 2008 prompted Washington to say it would not
necessarily intervene if Taiwan seemed to provoke an attack. US policymakers, however, do not see President Tsai Ing-wen as a
provocateur.

The Communist Party’s recent position on Taiwan is counterproductive. Reunifying Taiwan is not necessary for China to be secure
and prosperous, as is manifestly obvious. Worse, an obsession with the Taiwan issue could work against other important goals,
beginning with successfully managing the difficult but necessary project of economic restructuring. Clearly, Beijing needs a
better approach than threatening Taiwan with attack.

China won’t invade – deterred by Taiwanese resilience and warplanning

Sands '18 (Gary Sands is a Senior Analyst at Wikistrat, a crowdsourced consultancy, and a
Director at Highway West Capital Advisors, a venture capital, project finance and political risk
advisory. A former diplomat with the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, he has
contributed a number of op-eds for Forbes, U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek,
Washington Times, The Diplomat, Asia Times, National Interest, EurasiaNet, and the South China
Morning Post. He spent four years in Ho Chi Minh City from 2014 to 2018 and now lives in
Taipei. Why a Chinse Invasion of Taiwan Won’t be Easy
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-chinese-invasion-taiwan-wont-be-easy-25682)

A local population fighting for the survival of its values and lifestyle is not to be taken lightly, as
made clear by Ian Easton. In his 2017 book, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and
American Strategy in Asia, Easton believes the cohesive spirit of 2.5 million registered men of
military age, fighting on difficult yet familiar terrain, gives Taiwan the advantage . Moreover,
Easton contradicts the views of those Taiwanese recently polled who believe their military is not
up to the task of defending the nation, arguing “There are few nations on the planet more
resilient and ready for an enemy first strike than Taiwan.” He points to Taiwanese fighter jets,
which could inflict a loss ratio of two or three to one against inferior Chinese pilots , and the
possibility Taiwan’s military could force the Chinese to de-escalate without American military
support. U.S. military assistance The poll also asked Taiwanese their views on whether or not
the United States would send troops to help defend Taiwan. While 47.4 percent of Taiwanese
were confident of support, some 41 percent of those polled expressed doubts America would
come to the rescue. The high turnover within the Trump administration, along with the U.S.
President’s still evolving foreign policy stances (e.g. Taiwan’s flag was deleted on off all
government websites in January), may have played into the doubts of those Taiwanese polled.
And for those familiar with the history and language of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA),
its origins and ambiguous wording may have added to their doubt. Prior to 1979, Taiwanese
could rely on the protection of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, enacted after Chinese
mainland forces began shelling Kinmen and Matsu in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954. The
treaty was in effect until 1979, when U.S. President Jimmy Carter formally recognized the
communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) and severed official relations with Taiwan. With the
loss of a formal defense treaty, the TRA was a unique effort by Congress to limit the damage to
U.S.-Taiwan relations by President Carter, and reassure Taipei of continued relations and U.S.
military assistance. A domestic law passed by Congress, the TRA made it the policy of the United
States “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms
of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people
on Taiwan.” While the Act calls for the United States to be prepared to deter an invasion, it
leaves the question of whether or not to respond, and how to respond, to the President and
Congress, who “shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action
by the United States in response to any such danger.” In this respect, however, the language of
the Act is similar to that found in many U.S. mutual defense treaties, and leaves any decision to
respond militarily more dependent on political will than law. The threat of invasion While the
Taiwanese may not be confident of their military’s ability to fend off such an attack, or are
skeptical over U.S. military support, many are not losing sleep over fear of an invasion. Some
64.5 percent do not believe China's military will invade Taiwan, while only 25.7 percent think an
attack is likely. The poll did not ask Taiwanese why they thought an attack may or may not occur,
or provide varying time frames for an invasion, so we can only speculate as to their reasoning.
One possible reason is those polled concur with Easton’s view that Beijing is ready yet—despite
China’s much-heralded military prowess and the threat it brings. Easton calls China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) is a “dangerous fighting force,” though adding it “is not a finely honed
instrument of war.” According to Easton, “if the invasion was attempted today, it would
probably turn into a debacle” adding further, “no invasion of Taiwan is going to be seriously
contemplated as a viable option for many years to come.” So despite recent heated rhetoric
from Beijing and live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait, it would appear from the polling that
Taiwanese are taking the threats in stride, and will continue to carry on their daily lives without
too much worry.

China won’t invade – Taiwan would win

Greer ’18 (T. Greer is a writer and analyst formerly based out of Beijing. His research focuses
on the evolution of East Asian strategic thought from the time of Sunzi to today. Taiwan Can Win
a War With China https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/taiwan-can-win-a-war-with-china/)
Chinese commanders fear they may be forced into armed contest with an enemy that is better
trained, better motivated, and better prepared for the rigors of warfare than troops the PLA
could throw against them.

A cross-strait war looks far less like an inevitable victory for China than it does a staggeringly
risky gamble.

Chinese army documents imagine that this gamble will begin with missiles. For months, the
PLA’s Rocket Force will have been preparing this opening salvo; from the second war begins
until the day the invasion commences, these missiles will scream toward the Taiwanese coast,
with airfields, communication hubs, radar equipment, transportation nodes, and government
offices in their sights. Concurrently, party sleeper agents or special forces discreetly ferried
across the strait will begin an assassination campaign targeting the president and her Cabinet,
other leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party, officials at key bureaucracies, prominent
media personalities, important scientists or engineers, and their families.

The goal of all this is twofold. In the narrower tactical sense, the PLA hopes to destroy as much
of the Taiwanese Air Force on the ground as it can and from that point forward keep things
chaotic enough on the ground that the Taiwan’s Air Force cannot sortie fast enough to challenge
China’s control of the air. The missile campaign’s second aim is simpler: paralysis. With the
president dead, leadership mute, communications down, and transportation impossible, the
Taiwanese forces will be left rudderless, demoralized, and disoriented. This “shock and awe”
campaign will pave the way for the invasion proper.

This invasion will be the largest amphibious operation in human history. Tens of thousands of
vessels will be assembled—mostly commandeered from the Chinese merchant marine—to ferry
1 million Chinese troops across the strait, who will arrive in two waves. Their landing will be
preceded by a fury of missiles and rockets, launched from the Rocket Force units in Fujian,
Chinese Air Force fighter bombers flying in the strait, and the escort fleet itself.

Confused, cut off, and overwhelmed, the Taiwanese forces who have survived thus far will soon
run out of supplies and be forced to abandon the beaches. Once the beachhead is secured, the
process will begin again: With full air superiority, the PLA will have the pick of their targets,
Taiwanese command and control will be destroyed, and isolated Taiwanese units will be swept
aside by the Chinese army’s advance. Within a week, they will have marched into Taipei; within
two weeks they will have implemented a draconian martial law intended to convert the island
into the pliant forward operating base the PLA will need to defend against the anticipated
Japanese and American counter-campaigns.

This is the best-case scenario for the PLA. But an island docile and defeated two weeks after D-
Day is not a guaranteed outcome. One of the central hurdles facing the offensive is surprise. The
PLA simply will not have it. The invasion will happen in April or October . Because of the
challenges posed by the strait’s weather, a transport fleet can only make it across the strait in
one of these two four-week windows. The scale of the invasion will be so large that strategic
surprise will not be possible , especially given the extensive mutual penetration of each side by
the other’s intelligence agencies.
Easton estimates that Taiwanese, American, and Japanese leaders will know that the PLA is
preparing for a cross-strait war more than 60 days before hostilities begin. They will know for
certain that an invasion will happen more than 30 days before the first missiles are fired. This
will give the Taiwanese ample time to move much of their command and control infrastructure
into hardened mountain tunnels, move their fleet out of vulnerable ports, detain suspected
agents and intelligence operatives, litter the ocean with sea mines, disperse and camouflage
army units across the country, put the economy on war footing, and distribute weapons to
Taiwan’s 2.5 million reservists.

There are only 13 beaches on Taiwan’s western coast that the PLA could possibly land at. Each
of these has already been prepared for a potential conflict. Long underground tunnels—
complete with hardened, subterranean supply depots—crisscross the landing sites. The berm of
each beach has been covered with razor-leaf plants. Chemical treatment plants are common in
many beach towns—meaning that invaders must prepare for the clouds of toxic gas any
indiscriminate saturation bombing on their part will release. This is how things stand in times of
peace.

As war approaches, each beach will be turned into a workshop of horrors. The path from these
beaches to the capital has been painstakingly mapped; once a state of emergency has been
declared, each step of the journey will be complicated or booby-trapped. PLA war manuals warn
soldiers that skyscrapers and rock outcrops will have steel cords strung between them to
entangle helicopters; tunnels, bridges, and overpasses will be rigged with munitions (to be
destroyed only at the last possible moment); and building after building in Taiwan’s dense urban
core will be transformed into small redoubts meant to drag Chinese units into drawn-out fights
over each city street.

China won’t invade – they’ll focus on coercion

Roggeveen ’18 (Sam Roggeveen is Director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security
Program, and a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National
University. Before joining the Lowy Institute, Sam was a senior strategic analyst in Australia’s
peak intelligence agency, the Office of National Assessments, where his work dealt mainly with
nuclear strategy and arms control, ballistic-missile defence, North Asian strategic affairs, and
WMD terrorism. Sam also worked on arms control policy in Australia’s Department of Foreign
Affairs, and as an analyst in the Defence Intelligence Organisation. Why China isn’t planning to
storm Taiwan’s beaches https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-china-isnt-
planning-storm-taiwans-beaches)

China’s navy has grown dramatically over the past two decades, but with one surprising
exception: its amphibious forces. On Monday, the Australian National University’s Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre published my contribution to its Centre of Gravity essay series. The
paper is titled China’s New Navy: A Short Guide for Australian Policy-Makers, and describes the
massive capability leaps China has made. But the same isn’t really true of China’s ability to put
troops and equipment onto land from the sea. There wasn’t space to go into the subject of
amphibious forces in my paper, so here I want to suggest why the PLA Navy seems to have left a
gap in its capability development. The reason this gap is so puzzling is that reclaiming Taiwan is
such an important part of the Communist Party’s identity, and a core mission for the PLA. Some
analysts also argue that Taiwan is the key to China’s broader naval ambitions because it would
give the PLA Navy unobstructed access to the Pacific (see Richard Fisher’s Congressional
testimony at this link). So why, in the midst of a massive modernisation drive, has the PLA Navy
not built the forces to conquer Taiwan if it is ordered to? Check out this lecture from Dr
Christopher Yung of the US Marine Corps University, specifically the section from 18:00 to 20:00
where he discusses this apparent anomaly. Note, when Yang refers to “LSTs” he means medium-
sized ships that could cross the Taiwan Strait, beach themselves, and then disgorge a couple of
hundred troops or a half-dozen tanks. China’s shipyards have been turning out small naval
vessels by the bushel in recent years; including, for example, the Type 022 missile boat and the
Type 056 corvette. The kind of vessel Yang is talking about is less complex than those, so it’s not
as if China lacks shipbuilding capacity. Nor is this just a question of ships. China also hasn’t built
the Marine forces required to take on a task such as invading Taiwan. In fact, the decision to
expand the Marines from 20,000 to 100,000 was only announced in 2017. It is true that China
has built larger amphibious vessels, and might be building helicopter carriers similar to
Australia’s Canberra class. But the Type 071 class only numbers six vessels, and both it and the
mooted Type 075 are bigger than what is needed for a Taiwan scenario, so are probably
intended for more distant deployments, such as to the South China Sea. It seems, then, that
China has made a deliberate choice not to build amphibious forces dedicated to retaking
Taiwan. Why? My guess is that the PLA has decided that, even with a massive amphibious
fleet, retaking Taiwan by force would be incredibly costly in lives and resources . Instead, as I
discuss in my Centre of Gravity paper, China has made efforts over the past 20 years to improve
all aspects of its anti-ship capability, in order to make it increasingly difficult for the US and its
allies to operate near China’s shores. Of course, other countries can adopt the same strategy (in
fact, my paper recommends that Australia take a leaf from China’s book), and Taiwan could
make it really hard for Chinese forces to cross the Strait at an acceptable cost (think the opening
scene of Saving Private Ryan). Rather than build a force to undertake such an expensive mission,
China has chosen to focus on its strengths. Again, China has become really good at attacking
enemy ships, so one thing it could do to coerce Taiwan is to isolate it by preventing US naval
forces coming to Taiwan’s aid. China also has strong ballitic-missile forces and an air force that
far outnumbers Taiwan’s and can match it for quality. These capabilities could be used to coerce
Taiwan into meeting Beijing’s demands, rather than physically invading it.
 AT: Relations CP
FONOPs good – they deter China and prevent SCS escalation
Lan '18 (Ngo Di Lan is a PhD student in Politics at Brandeis University, where he focuses on U.S
foreign policy and U.S-China relations. He is also a research associate at the Saigon Center for
International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh
City. The usefulness of "Redundant" Freedom of Natigation Operations
https://amti.csis.org/usefulness-redundant-fonops/)

Critics of the FONOPs program argue that it is unwise for the United States to conduct repeated
FONOPs in the South China Sea because it risks provoking Chinese hostility and antagonism. This
assertion rests on shaky grounds for several reasons. First, even though China has reacted
angrily to U.S. FONOPs, its responses have been mostly limited to diplomatic statements of
protest. China has not taken any substantive retributive action in response to these FONOPs . In
fact, China recently backed the U.S. led Security Council resolution , which authorizes a new
round of harsh sanctions on North Korea. While this is merely one example, it does show that
U.S.-China relations are robust and therefore unlikely to be harmed by U.S. FONOPs in the South
China Sea. The broader implication of the argument against FONOPs, however, is that the
United States should generally avoid irking China as much as possible. This lack of resolve,
however, is exactly why the United States has failed to counter China’s low-intensity “salami-
slicing” strategy. While both the U.S and China should exercise restraint and avoid excessively
challenging the other’s core interests lest it lead to an unwanted war, it should be clear that in
any “game of chicken”, the side demonstrating stronger resolve will have the upper hand .
China’s coercive actions against its neighbors and the unparalleled land reclamation program in
the South China Sea surely harm U.S. interests and risk of provoking a Sino-U.S. conflict, but
China has persisted. If the United States is to stop China from engaging in these unwanted
actions, always erring “on the side of comity rather than that of hostility and antagonism” is not
a good idea. In fact, excessive deference to Beijing can embolden rather than deter Chinese
leaders from adventurous actions. It is in U.S. interests to make it clear to all parties that the
United States is constantly monitoring the situation and remains deeply engaged in the region’s
affairs. Conducting FONOPs is not the only way of sending this signal, but it is one clear way of
doing so. By executing repeated and regular FONOPs at different locations and at different
points in time, Washington underscores its rejection of Beijing’s excessive territorial claims and
its commitment to upholding the region’s rules-based order. It is therefore critical that the
United States makes repeated FONOPs, and not just irregular, ad hoc ones. Suddenly ending
these supposedly “redundant” FONOPs could be calamitous, as the United States might
inadvertently send the wrong signal to Beijing. After all, no one at the time knew that
Acheson’s speech at the National Press Club would encourage North Korean aggression. This is
why U.S. officials have repeatedly and publicly emphasized U.S. security commitments to allies,
rather than letting the mutual defense treaties speak for themselves. If repeating one’s defense
commitment is not considered a redundant behavior, it is unclear why conducting repeated
FONOPs should be considered redundant. By the same logic, when it comes to FONOPs,
conducting one too many is surely better than conducting one too few.
The trade war is functionally over – Trump and Xi came to a consensus
Gold 7-6-19 (Howard Gold is a columnist for MarketWatch and founder and editor of
GoldenEgg Investing, which offers simple, low-cost, low-risk retirement investing plans. A
popular speaker at MoneyShows, he was executive editor for MoneyShow.com and founding
editor of Barrons.com. Mr. Gold was a Knight-Bagehot Fellow in Business and Financial
Journalism at Columbia University, where he received an MBA in finance. A winner of the Gerald
Loeb Awards for Distinguished Business and Financial Journalism, he has written for Forbes,
Barron's, Money, and USAToday. https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-trade-war-is-over-
and-china-won-2019-07-01)

The great U.S.-China trade war is all over but the shouting.

In a meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan, President Donald Trump and
Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to resume trade talks that had broken down in May.

Trump will lift some restrictions on Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.’s ability to do business with
U.S. companies and will postpone tariffs he threatened to impose on an additional $300 billion
annually in Chinese imports. In exchange, Xi agreed China will buy more U.S. agricultural
products. Details will be spelled out later.

This deal — the second time President Trump gave in to China’s demands and ended restrictions
on a major Chinese technology company that had been accused of threatening U.S. national
interests — effectively marks the end of Trump’s trade war with China.

Why? Because it shows the president won’t go to the wall to fundamentally change the U.S.’s
trade relationship with the world’s second-biggest economy. The Chinese president has clearly
calculated his American counterpart is unwilling to do anything that would threaten his support
among key constituencies, like farmers, as the 2020 election looms. (President Trump also has
backed down big time from his bellicose talk on North Korea and now appears ready to tacitly
accept Pyongyang as a nuclear power.)

That means, I believe, that the current tariffs will continue but no new ones will be imposed.
China will buy more U.S. agricultural products — although some U.S. farmers will find other
countries already have muscled them out of the Chinese market. We may well see a bigger deal
in coming months, which the Dealmaker-in-Chief will undoubtedly proclaim a great victory,
cheered on by his hard-core supporters

China and the US are working together on Counternarcotics already

Zhang ‘12 (Yong-an Zhang is Professor and Director at Shanghai University's David F. Musto
Center for Drug Policy Studies. His previous positions include visiting fellow at the Center for
Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) at the Brookings Institution, and visiting associate
professor of History of Medicine at Yale University’s School of Medicine. His research interests
include the social history of health and medicine, international drug control policy, China’s drug
control strategy, and global health diplomacy. Asia, International Drug Trafficking, and U.S.-
China Counternarcotics Cooperation https://www.brookings.edu/research/asia-international-
drug-trafficking-and-u-s-china-counternarcotics-cooperation/)

The international community first took an interest in the Asian drug trade at the beginning of
the 20th century. The Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909 was the first attempt at regulating
drug trade in the region, as countries including the United States, Great Britain, China, Japan,
and Russia convened to discuss the growing trafficking of opium. Since then, numerous
measures have been adopted by individual countries and collectively to curb the illegal drug
trade. This has been especially true since the launch of the “war on drugs.” In spite of these
enhanced efforts, the global opiate market has nevertheless exhibited increased growth since
1980. Data gathered by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicate global
opium production increased by close to 80 percent between 1998 and 2009. The UNODC reports
that nearly all of the world’s illicit opium and heroin production is concentrated in “Afghanistan,
South-East Asia (mostly Myanmar) and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia). Afghanistan
stands out among this group, accounting for around 90 percent of global illicit opium production
in recent years.” Upwards of 90 percent of the global heroin and morphine production is
provided by Afghanistan and Myanmar. Clearly, the global opiate market has neither been
eliminated nor significantly reduced since 1998.[3]

Asian drug trafficking remains a serious threat to both China and the United States. In order to
confront this common threat, since 1985 China and the United States have taken numerous
steps to cooperate in the interdiction of cross-border drug trafficking . Together, they have
made outstanding achievements in the prevention of Asian drug trafficking and in the
eradication of opium poppy cultivation in the Golden Triangle region that comprises parts of
Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. Bilateral cooperation, however, has not been wholly
successful, and Beijing and Washington face a daunting set of challenges regarding cross-border
drug trafficking. The two nations must reconsider both new and old challenges in both regional
and global contexts in their efforts to promote counternarcotics cooperation.
 Elections UQ – Han wins
Han will win the 2020 elections – younger Taiwanese voters are pro-China
Jennings '19 (Ralph Jennings is a foreign correspondent and staff writer for Business insider and
Voa. https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/how-china-will-dominate-taiwans-2020-
presidential-election-campaign)

TAIPEI, TAIWAN - Taiwan’s presidential race kicked off Monday with China the top issue as a
Beijing-friendly mayor won the chief opposition party’s primary to face an incumbent who
wants Beijing to keep a distance. The opposition Nationalists announced that Han Kuo-yu, now
mayor of the Taiwanese port city Kaohsiung, had won the presidential primary Monday against
four other candidates, including the founder of consumer electronics assembler Foxconn
Technology. Han will go up against incumbent Tsai Ing-wen in the January 2020 general election.
China is expected to define the late-year campaign because the two contenders differ on how to
handle it, reflecting divisions among Taiwanese people. Taiwan and China have been separately
ruled since the Chinese civil war of the 1940s, but Beijing still claims sovereignty over the island.
Opinion surveys as recent as January show most Taiwanese oppose rule by China, and protests
in Hong Kong since June against the territory’s own rule by Beijing have solidified that
sentiment. “Now, incidents in Hong Kong actually are having an effect on youth,” said George
Hou, mass communications lecturer at Taiwan-based I-Shou University who regularly talks to
young people. “The Nationalist Party’s policies toward China and China’s policies make younger
people feel discontent.” But many Taiwanese say they hope their government can keep peaceful
economic ties with China while holding it off politically. They complain of low salaries and high
housing costs at home. Some see China in turn as a source of investment or as a place to find
work. “The Hong Kong matter will make people feel on guard, but when they vote for a
president, they’ll hope to change their own lives, and voting will take that direction,” said Ku
Chung-hua, standing board member with the Taiwan advocacy group Citizens’ Congress Watch.
Han, 62, has vowed to make peace with China. In March he signed deals with four Chinese cities
including Hong Kong to sell $167 million worth of Taiwanese agricultural products. He won the
mayoral race in November partly on an economic improvement platform.Taiwan’s ruling
Democratic Progressive Party and the opposition Kuomintang have begun selecting their
presidential candidates, setting the stage for a showdown between the self-ruled island’s pro-
independence and pro-unification camps.

The independence-leaning DPP on Monday announced the start of its primaries to choose
between President Tsai Ing-wen and former premier William Lai Ching-te to contest the January
election.

Han wins – he’s pro-China and favors reunification

Chung 6-10-19 (Lawrence Chung covers major news in Taiwan, ranging from presidential
and parliament elections to killer earthquakes and typhoons. Most of his reports focus on
Taiwan’s relations with China, specifically on the impact and possible developments of cross-
strait relations under the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party and mainland-friendly
Kuomintang governments. Before starting work at the South China Morning Post in 2006, he
wrote for Reuters and AFP for more than 12 years. Taiwan's DPP and KMT launch primaries for
2020 presidential elections
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3013924/taiwans-dpp-and-kmt-launch-
primaries-2020-presidential)

“Whoever wins the primaries being held from Monday to Friday will represent the party and run
in the 2020 presidential poll,” DPP spokesman Chou Chiang-che said, adding the primaries
would be based on public opinion surveys and the results would be announced on June 19. The
mainland-friendly KMT meanwhile announced five candidates for its primaries, based on public
opinion surveys to be held between July 5 and July 15, with the results to be made public on July
16. The KMT candidates are Kaohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu, Foxconn billionaire chairman Terry
Gou Tai-ming, former New Taipei mayor Eric Chu Li-luan, former Taipei county magistrate Chou
Hsi-wei and Chang Ya-chung, president of the Sun Yat-sen School in Taipei. “The five candidates
are required to attend a KMT meeting on Tuesday to discuss the rules and other details
concerning the primaries,” said Huang Hsin-hua, a spokesman for the KMT. Former legislative
speaker Wang Jing-pyng withdrew his interest late last week, saying he believed the KMT was
unfairly favouring another presidential hopeful, without naming that person. Local media
reports said the person was believed to be Han, a former businessman who won the seat of
Kaohsiung, a traditional pro-independence stronghold, in a landslide in November’s local
polls. His popularity was seen by many as the catalyst for the KMT’s winning 15 of the 22 city
and county seats up for grabs in the elections. In most opinion polls, Han is ahead of other
potential candidates, including Tsai, by a wide margin . He is also leading against the four other
KMT contenders, including Gou and Chu. Han’s huge support was seen in two mass rallies early
this month – in Taipei and Hualien – that drew tens of thousands of supporters, calling on him to
run for president. Analysts said given Han’s support for the 1992 consensus and his calls for
friendly relations with Beijing, if he emerged as the KMT candidate to run against Tsai or Lai, the
election would become a face-off between pro-unification and pro-independence politicians.
Taiwan put on US defence department list of ‘countries’ in latest move likely to goad China The
consensus refers to an understanding that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can continue
official exchanges as long as they recognise that there is only “one China”. The KMT has insisted
that each side could have its own interpretation of what constitutes “China”, and for the KMT it
represents the Republic of China, Taiwan’s official title. Beijing tolerated this ambiguity until Tsai
took office in 2016 and refused to accept the one-China principle, after which relations
deteriorated. Presidential candidates would have to be clear about their cross-strait stance and
show how they would manage affairs with Beijing, according to analysts. “It now appears voters
will have to take sides in next year’s presidential elections as there is no more grey area or
ambiguity when it comes to cross-strait policy during the polls,” said Yu Chen-hua, a political
science professor at National Chengchi University in Taipei. Yu said Beijing was no longer willing
to compromise on the one-China issue. US releases photo of Taiwanese major general at Indo-
Pacific military talks “This means both camps have to be specific when it comes to cross-strait
policy, and voters will have to choose from independence or unification rather than maintaining
the status quo,” Yu said. Next year’s poll is also a battle between the US and Beijing, according
to analysts, with Washington favouring Tsai for a second four-year term given her support for its
Indo-Pacific strategy that views Beijing as a threat militarily and economically. Meanwhile, Han
appears to have strong support from Beijing, after meeting the directors of Beijing’s liaison
offices in Hong Kong and Macau in February, and the Communist Party chief in Shenzhen. He
has also said he sees only the economy but not politics, in relation to the suppression of pro-
democracy movements in Hong Kong and the mainland.
 Elections UQ – Tsai wins
Tsai wins now
Fang and Li 19 [Cheng Ting-Fang and Lauly Li are Nikkei staff writers, 7-23-2019, "Taiwan's
Tsai gains momentum for reelection on US trip," Nikkei Asian Review, accessed 7-26-2019,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Taiwan-s-Tsai-gains-momentum-for-reelection-on-US-trip]

TAIPEI -- Buoyed by tacit U.S. backing and China's stance on the Hong Kong unrest, Taiwanese
President Tsai Ing-wen arrived
home from a trip to the Americas on Monday to a poll that made her the favorite to retain the
presidency in January's election.

On her 12-day trip, Tsai

spent four nights in the U.S. -- the longest ever "transit" for a Taiwanese
president. She met with congressmen, senators, the governor of Colorado, and -- for the first time -- was permitted by U.S. authorities to hold a
press briefing.

"For the 2020 presidential election, I

think the voters will focus on whether our democratic ways of life with
freedom could continue," Tsai said in Denver over the weekend. "The election will be a choice of values,
political systems and people's ways of life."

In a straight race against her main rival, Han Kuo-yu, Tsai would gain 45% support compared with the Beijing-
friendly Kaohsiung mayor's 40%, according to a Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation poll released on Monday.

"Tsai's clearly the current front-runner given Beijing's overbearing policies and Hong Kong's
extradition bill fiasco," said Sean King, a scholar at the University of Notre Dame Liu Institute for Asia & Asian Affairs. "But six months could
be several lifetimes in politics. Anything can happen between now and January 2020. This race is far from over."

Tsai knows this firsthand, having reversed the race's momentum during the past half year.

At the end of 2018, her popularity fell to its lowest level, according to a TPOF survey in which 24% of the respondents said they were happy with her
administration. But by the end of June, she had an approval rate of 47.7%.

This has much to do with the trade and tech spat between Beijing and Washington.

HP, Dell, Google, Nintendo and other companies are seeking to diversify production out of China to avoid possible tariffs. Taiwan is one potential
destination.

As of Friday, the Tsai

administration this year had lured some 452 billion New Taiwan dollars ($14.55
billion) worth of investment, which has the potential to create 42,100 jobs, according to Invest Taiwan, an agency affiliated with the
Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Such results are helping Tsai win over Taiwan's business community , which has long favored the China-friendly
Kuomintang.

Tsai's tough stance against Beijing also has also boosted her popularity in the wake of ongoing protests in Hong Kong.

"Tsai has been playing the U.S. card and the Hong Kong card very well to boost her reelection
bid," Pan Chao-min, a professor at Tunghai University's Graduate Institute of Political Science in Taiwan, told Nikkei. "Tsai and her DPP have the upper
hand when tackling the issues of Taiwan's sovereignty and safety, compared with economic issues."

While the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman demanded the U.S. drop its approval for Tsai's exchanges with U.S. officials, Pan said Beijing's criticism
of Tsai's trip stateside was more muted than normal.

"A stronger objection from China against Tsai could have benefited her election bid," Pan said. "Right now China's bigger headache is to stop Hong
Kong's anti-China sentiment from continuing to spread in Taiwan."

Relations between Beijing and Taipei have soured significantly since Tsai took office in May 2016. China has poached five of Taiwan's diplomatic allies as
part of an ongoing aggressive campaign to isolate the self-ruled democratic island.
But even as China tones down its rhetoric, King of Notre Dame warns that the Trump administration could dial back support for Taiwan in exchange for
a trade deal [with Beijing]. But this was unlikely, he said, because the current U.S. government has so far done more for Taipei than any other U.S.
administration since 1979 when the Jimmy Carter administration cut ties with the island.

But all bets remain off for the upcoming election.

Foxconn's billionaire founder Terry Gou, who lost to Han in the KMT primary, has not ruled out an independent run. And Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je, who
has long been viewed as an independent rival to Tsai, has attacked both candidates.

"It's still the most unpredictable and uncertain presidential election since Taiwan first directly voted for our leader in 1996," said Tsai Tung-Chieh, dean
and distinguished professor at the College of Law and Politics at National Chung Hsing University. "The election is approaching but we do not yet know
how many [candidates] are running to be the next Taiwanese President."