We Do Need a Philosophy of Library and Information Science -- We're Not Confused Enough:

A Response to Zwadlo
Author(s): Gary P. Radford and John M. Budd
Source: The Library Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 315-321
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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 COMMENT

WE DO NEED A PHILOSOPHYOF LIBRARYAND INFORMATION

SCIENCE- WE'RENOT CONFUSED ENOUGH:
A RESPONSETO ZWADLO

GaryP. Radford1and John M. Budd2

Is there a philosophy of libraryscience? The thesis presented

here is that there is not, and we do not need one. That is,
we do not need, nor do we have, one single philosophy.
(JamesZwadlo [1] )
The title of Jim Zwadlo's recent essay,"We Don't Need a Philosophyof Library
Science- We'reConfusedEnoughAlready"[1] is intriguing.There is, no doubt,a
need for thoughtful,reflexiveexplorationsof the natureof libraryand information
science as a discipline.The paper's abstract,which states that "we do not need,
nor do we have,one single philosophy,to either fill a philosophicalvacuum,or to
replace an existingphilosophy,"is a provocativethesis.However,the questionre-
mains as to whetheror not Zwadlohas managedin this paper to offer a new way
of thinking about the intellectualchallenges confronting the discipline. On the
whole we have to answerin the negative,for a number of reasonsthat we discuss
below.
Firstof all, the title and the paper'sstated purpose are misleading.Despite his
centralthesisthatwe do not need a philosophyof libraryscience, Zwadloneeds to
(indeed, he must) invoke a particularphilosophicalfoundationto make his argu-
ment. In otherwords,Zwadloneeds philosophyto arguethatwe do not need philos-
ophy. Zwadlorecognizesthis in his abstract,where he statesthat "we need to find
a wayto manage a confusion, 'fused together' mass of many contradictoryideas,
in order to do useful things,and to be helpful to our patrons.This searchamounts
to a philosophicaldiscussionaboutwhylibrariansand informationscientistsdo not
need a philosophy"[1, p. 103].
Whilewe agree with the thesis that libraryand informationscience (LIS) could
certainlybenefitfromphilosophicaldiscussionof "contradictoryideas"in the field
"in order to do usefulthings,"Zwadlodoes not make the case for whya discussion
of "whylibrariansand informationscientistsdo not need a philosophy"would be

1. Department of Communication, William Paterson College of New Jersey, Wayne, New Jer-
sey 07470; E-mail: radford@frontier.wilpaterson.edu.
2. School of Libraryand Information Science, University of Missouri at Columbia, 104 Stewart
Hall, Columbia, Missouri 65211; E-mail: libsjmb@showme.missouri.edu.

[LibraryQuarterly,vol. 67, no. 3, pp. 315-321]

© 1997 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0024-2519/97/6703-0005 $02.00

315

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316 THE LIBRARYQUARTERLY

useful to anybody,whether they be practicinglibrarians,libraryusers, or philoso-

phers.Howwould thisbelief be usefulto a libraryuser?Or a librarianassistingthat
user? Or an LIS scholar empiricallyinvestigatingthe librarian-userrelationship?
Moreuseful,in our view,wouldbe a considerationof the philosophies,paradigms,
and frameworksthat do (and must) guide the day-to-daypracticesof libraryprac-
titioners,users, and researchers.
A majorproblemwithZwadlo'sargumentis the particularwayin whichhe charac-
terizesthe term"philosophy"as a strawman and inaccuratelyattributesthischarac-
terizationto the recent philosophicaldiscussionsof John Budd [2], GaryRadford
[3], and Archie Dick [4]. Zwadloportraysphilosophyas a kind of verbalmission
statementor creed that is articulated,presumablyby some form of authority,and
then "followed"on a rationalbasisby its adherents.This characterizationevokes
imagesof acolytesfollowinga religion. For example, Zwadlowritesthat "we seem
not to agree on which one [philosophy]we follow now, assumingwe even have
one, or which philosophyto choose to replace it" [1, p. 104] and that "even if
positivismwere the philosophyof LIS, it was not reallyfollowed, and was not an
appropriateone to follow" [1, p. 105]. The continued use of the word "follow"
characterizesphilosophyas a conscious,articulableset of rulesfor the rationaland
deliberateguidanceof thoughtand action.This is an easystrawman to knockdown
because it allowsZwadloto argue that no such consciousand articulablephiloso-
phies, including that positivism,can be found in the everydaypracticesand dis-
coursesof librariansand libraryscholarsand that, by extension, they do not need
one. Thus Zwadlospeculatesthat "perhapsone reasonwhymanylibrariansdo not
miss a philosophyof LIS is that writerson libraryand informationscience rarely
discussphilosophy" [1, p. 104]. But by placing philosophyat the level of formal
discourseand of clearand articulablecodes providedby LISphilosophers,Zwadlo
missesthe point of philosophizingabout issues germane to LIS.
The fact is thatlibraryinstitutionsand the people who workwithinand use them
are operatingwithinepistemologicalframeworksor normativesystemsthat enable
people to understandwhatthe libraryis, whatit does, and how one behaveswithin
its systems.For example, librarybuildingsand the location of the stacksand the
reference desk are somethingthat most people take for granted.But AbigailVan
Slyck[5] has recentlydescribed,througha historicaland architecturalanalysisof
the Carnegielibrariesfrom 1890 to 1920, how particularnorms, ideologies, and
power relationshipswere actualizedinto the architectureof librarybuildingsand
the layoutof their interiors.Zwadloarguesthat "This paper is about the missing
philosophyof libraryand informationscience (LIS). It is also about why so few
librariansseem to missit" [1, p. 103]. But it is not that philosophyis "missing"or
librariansmiss it, but that such practices and perspectivesbecome, in Thomas
Kuhn'sterms, "invisible"[6, pp. 136-43]. With respect to science, Kuhnwrites:
'
'Thoughmanyscientiststalkeasilyand well aboutthe particularindividualhypoth-
eses that underlie a concrete piece of currentresearch,they are little better than
laymenat characterizingthe establishedbasesof theirfield, its legitimateproblems
and methods. If they have learned such abstractionsat all, they show it mainly
throughtheir abilityto do successfulresearch.That abilitycan, however,be under-
stood withoutrecourseto hypotheticalrules of the game" [6, p. 47].
Zwadlomakesa similarpoint with respectto practitionersand scholarsof library
and informationscience:of course they can carryout their occupationalpractices
or researchwithoutbeing able to explicitlyarticulatethe underlyingparadigmatic
bases of their acts. However,this does not mean that such a basisis "missing,"in
Zwadlo'sterms. Indeed, it should be and is an object of great interest to library

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 COMMENT 317

and informationscholarsand philosophersto try to articulatethe natureof these

underlyingsystemsof knowledgeand power.It is this problematicthatis addressed
in the recent articlesby Budd [2], Radford[3], and Dick [4]. It is in this context
that Budd and Radfordequate this invisibleguiding paradigmwith the tenets of
positivism.They viewpositivismas a relevantproblematicfor LISscholarship,not
because it representsa frameworkthat needs to be overthrown,but ratheras an
"invisible"epistemologicalfoundation whose contours and structureshave not
been recognizedas such in the practicesof LIS practitionersand scholars.
The value of writerssuch as Budd, Radford,and Dick is that they attempt to
generatean awarenesswithinLISthat such an epistemologicalfoundationis pres-
ent at all, and that there are alternatives.As John Budd writes, "It is true that
method, data, evidence, and analysiscontributeto understanding,but something
is antecedentto all these.The keyto study,research,and discourseis a more funda-
mental understanding.This is achievedby delving into the nature of knowledge
and knowingin the field" [2, p. 315]. Thus Budd'sgoal is "to shift, firstthought,
then discourse,then research,by initiatinga questioningof assumptionsand pur-
pose" [2, p. 315]. Similarly,Radford's[3] objectiveis to questiona prevailingposi-
tivistorientationtowardknowledgein orderto foregrounddifferentviewsof knowl-
edge thathavethe potentialof providingalternativeframesof referencefromwhich
to re-createthe perceivedrealityof the libraryexperience.To articulatesuch alter-
nativeframeworks,one has to identifywhatthese frameworksare an alternativeto.
Thus, the critiqueof positivismis necessaryfirst in order to raise awarenessthat
alternativesexist, and, more important,that the idea of an alternativeworldview
even makessense. If the tenets of positivismremainimplicitand takenfor granted,
then discussionceases.
What Zwadloclaims to be the objectivesof these writersis quite differentand
misrepresentativeof their work.Zwadlowritesthat Budd, Radford,and Dick seek
to "implythata powerstruggleis the wayto choose philosophies,witha newphilos-
ophy adopted through a kind of culturalcoup" [1, p. 117], and that "perhaps
Budd and Radfordsee the confusion of LIS as a powervacuum,and thereforeas
an opportunityfor a moveto takepower.Theyproposenewphilosophiesthatwould
justifythe seizureof power,althoughit seems doubtfulthat the libraryhas the kind
of power that is seizeable" [1, p. 118].
WhatZwadlomeansby "seizureof power"is not made clear.Is it personalpower
thatBuddand Radfordseek?Or the powerto imposea particularmode of thought
and action?Who would be subjectto this power?Librarians?Users?Libraryschol-
ars?ClearlyZwadlo'suse of the term "power"is totallyinconsistentwith Budd's
and Radford'suse of the term. Budd and Radforddo not seek powerof any kind,
but only a discussionof power/ knowledgestructuresinherent in prevailinglibrary
discoursesand institutions.The misreadingof Budd's,Radford's,and Dick'swork
is clearin the followingstatementby Zwadlo:" [They] conveythe idea that for LIS,
obtaininga philosophyis somethinglike borrowinga book from our libraries.But
like the borrowedbooks, the borrowedphilosophiesdo not reallybelong to us,
alwaysseem to need to be renewed,and we end up returningthem, only to borrow
others" [1, p. 105]. The epistemologicalinvestigationand philosophicaldiscussion
found in Budd, Radford,and Dick is not about seizureof "power"or the mixing
and matchingof philosophicalfashions.Theyare the firststepson a road to greater
clarityaboutthe natureof the LISenterprise,not only in termsof whatframeworks
LISmight investigatein the futurebut also in termsof a greaterunderstandingof
the positivistfoundationof LIS at the present.
Zwadlospendsmuch of his paper discussingpositivismand whether"positivism

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318 THE LIBRARYQUARTERLY

ever reallywas the philosophyof LIS" [1, p. 105]. The heart of the matteris not
whetheror not positivismhasworkedor is overduefor replacement.Indeed,positiv-
ism has a historyof successon a numberof fronts.As an epistemologyit has allowed
for the establishmentand growthof some of the social sciences,has given a basis
for knowledgeclaims,and has been useful in enablingresearchinitiativesto grow.
Further,it has afforded a rationalefor objectivityand value neutralitythat have
been mainstaysof social science practiceand inquiryfor manyyears.One of the
problemswith positivismin the social sciencesin general, and LISin particular,is
that its functioningas an epistemologicalfoundationhas not been recognized.It
has remainedlatent, assumed,and taken for granted,and, as such, has not been
subjectedto much criticalscrutiny.What Budd, Radford,and Dick have done is
generate an awarenessthat there is indeed an epistemologypresent in LIS, and
that there are alternativesto the tacitlyaccepted one- positivism.Partof the au-
thor'sintent is to makejust such a point. Zwadlostates,"The advantageof begin-
ning withoutthe assertionthatpositivismis the philosophyof LISis that it obviates
the need to specifyan alternativeto positivism"[1, p. 106]. Whilethis maybe true
on the surface,the taskof examiningthe foundationsof knowledgeand knowledge
growthin LISremainsthe same- exploringalternativewaysto envisionthe struc-
ture, methods, and validityof knowledge.
Statementssuch as the foregoingrenderit verydifficultto discernZwadlo's cen-
tral points. There appear to be some contradictionsand apparent misunder-
standingsregardingwhatpositivismis and whatBudd, Radford,and Dick observe.
Forinstance,Zwadlowritesthatpositivism,when found wanting,is changedby phi-
losophers,scientists,and others;Zwadlothen infersfrom the alterationsto positiv-
ism that it is too variablea philosophicalstanceto critique.For instance,in a note
Zwadloclaimsthat the variancesin expressionsof positivismnegate any possibility
of identifyingsome commonpreceptsamongthe severalstances.Thereis a seeming
rejectionof the premisethattherearesome consistentclaimsinherentin a positivist
epistemology,but there is no accompanyingexplanationof the rejection,save to
differingversionsof what has been called positivismover the years.Zwadlothen
almostwillfullymisreadsBudd and Radford,who illustratethat adherence to the
common claimsof positivismis not necessarilyconsciousin the minds of those in
LIS.At one point he cites Budd as makinga statementthat is actuallya reference
toJamesFaulconerand RichardWilliams[7]. He then assertsthat "attackingposi-
tivismactuallyis a positivistthing to do" [1, p. 108].
These and other misunderstandings demonstratea particularshortcomingof the
assumedepistemologythat has been dominantin LIS.SteveFuller [8] recognizes
that Comte and Millwere epistemologicalpioneers and that they were concerned
with the social constructionof knowledge.Not only do Budd, Radford,and Dick
not dispute such an assertionbut they too recognize the inevitablyof the social
aspectof knowledgeand knowledgegrowth.Fullergoes on to saythat "the continu-
ityof this concern [for the socialconstructionof knowledge]is nowadayslost, how-
ever, mainlybecauselogical positivism'slegacyhas been greaterin the techniques
it introducedfor doing epistemologythan in the actual project for which those
techniqueswere introduced"[8, p. 149]. It might be even more appropriateto say
that the legacyof positivismis the persistenceof its claims.If there is a quest,stated
or not, for underlyinglaws,alongwithan accompanyingreductionismand phenom-
enalism,the socialbecomeslost in the individual.Zwadloappearsto missthispoint.
Zwadlofurthermissesthe point of the socialin HansVaihingerand the philoso-
phy of "As If" [9]. If we were to accept Vaihinger'sthesis that knowledgegrows
by the use of fictions,we wouldhave to reach the conclusionthat some fictionsare

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 COMMENT 319

only effectiveif they are shared;that is, certain fictions that are constructedfor,
say,disciplinarypurposesto proposetheoriesor offerexplanationswouldfailunless
theyaresharedbyothersin the discipline.If, to use Zwadlo'sexample,classification
in librariesis a fiction thatworks,it can only workif most of us in LISagree to the
premisesof the fiction. That much is requiredto assurethat the fiction is main-
tainedand maintainedin a workableform.Whilesuch socialacceptanceis implied
by Vaihinger,he focusesmore on the individualand the psychicmechanismsthat
the individualemploysin both abstractand practicalendeavors.It is not verysur-
prisingthat Zwadlochooses Vaihingeras a foundationfor critiquingthe work of
Budd,Radford,and Dick.Vaihingerhimselfwasin some waysa precursorof logical
empiricismand was influenced by nineteenth-centuryFrench positivism.The in-
fluence of the pastand the connectionwiththe contemporaryand futureis evident
in statementssuch as the following:"Onlythroughthe reductionof the concepts,
'thought,action, observation,'etc., to elements ultimatelyphysiological,to sensa-
tion, do we obtain a correctstandardfor the valuationof logicalwork,which con-
vertselements of sensationinto logical structures"[9, p. 5].
Vaihinger,in his philosophyof "As If," is proposinga metaphilosophy - a far-
of
reachingprogram thinking about thinking.At the root of this metaphilosophy
is the assumptionthat almost all thought is governed by a psychic attractionto
fictions that can be used in place of fact, or even of truth, and that can embody
contradictionsthatenableus to conceivethingsthatwouldotherwisebe impossible.
A problemwithVaihinger's programis that,if it is correct,his own metaphilosophy
mayitselfbe a fiction.JayNewmansees this problemwithVaihingerand says,"We
are now in a position to see that fictionalismis self-defeating.There is Vaihinger,
lookingdownfromthe empyreanheightsof metaphilosophyat the mortalmetaphy-
sicianswho vainlyseek Truth. But if Vaihingeris going to be consistent,he must
admitthat metaphilosophicaltheorizingis no more objectivethan any other kind
of theorizing"[10, p. 55]. Zwadlocites RichardRortyand sayshe "concludedthat,
if we have no wayto choose between theories,we cannot choose at all, and so we
cannot have one theoryat all. If no theoryof knowledgecan tell us, a priori,that
it is better than a competing one, then we must live without such certainty,and
live withouta theorythat claimsthe specialprivilegeof telling us whatis true" [1,
p. 9] . If ZwadlobelievesRorty,then he would have to rejectVaihingeralong with
other alternativeepistemologies.
In completingthe critiqueof Budd,Radford,and Dick, Zwadlotakesin turn the
alternativespresentedin the three papers.In addressingphenomenology (a large
component of Budd's proposition) he speaks only of the personal ambitionsof
EdmundHusserland again cites Rortyas evidence that other phenomenologists
modifiedHusserl'sphilosophyand sometimesadamantlydisagreedwith him. Cer-
tainlythere are differingversionsof phenomenology,and Budd makes mention
of others, such as MartinHeidegger and Paul Ricoeur.Further,Budd notes the
complexityof dealingwithphenomenologyin a singlejournalarticleand the limita-
tions of a phenomenologybased solely on Husserl:"I recognize from the outset
thatEdmundHusserl'sphenomenologyis idealistic;that is, he envisionsphenome-
nology being able to make determinationsof essence and intention (for example)
that approachabsolute statements.Husserldoes, however,provideelements that
form an epistemic basis for phenomenology;that is, he constructsa framework
for an approachto knowingwhich is useful here" [2, p. 304]. Zwadlo'ssuperficial
dismissalof phenomenologyis indicativeof the lack of claritythat permeatesthe
paper.
Zwadlo'scritiqueof Radford'sdiscussionof MichelFoucaultis equallysuperficial

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320 THE LIBRARYQUARTERLY

and consistsof the followingstatement:''AlthoughFoucaultwrote an essayabout

librariesit is difficultto see whathis philosophycan do for librariansand libraries"
[1, p. 28]. Firstof all, Foucault'sessay"Fantasiaof the Library"[11] wasnot about
librariesas institutionsbut was a literaryappreciationof GustaveFlaubert's"The
Temptationof SaintAnthony" [12]. Foucaultused the idea of "the library"as a
metaphorfor order and rationalityin contradistinctionto the idea of "fantasia."
Second, libraryscholarMichaelHarris[13] has describedFoucault'scontribution
to LISin termsof a desire to overturnthe powerof positivismin the socialsciences
and understandthe political economy of knowledgein new and innovativeways.
Harrisstatesthat "one can only wonderat the extent to whichFoucault'sworkhas
been ignored by such professionsas librarianshipand socialworkthatwould seem
to be in a position to benefit significantlyfrom his insights" [13, p. 116] and that
"librarians,who consider their practiceto be 'neutral'and apolitical,might find
Foucault'swork both challenging and disconcertingand, perhaps, redemptive"
[13, p. 116]. Zwadlo'sconclusion that "librariansshould use methods that work,
that serve the ends of the library,its users, and the community,instead of trying
to justifyprivilegedclaimsto truth" [1, p. 119] clearlyembracesthe idealisticidea
thatlibrarianscan somehowescapefromthe systemsof power/knowledge thatFou-
cault describesin his genealogies.Foucault'sworkdevelopsthe thesis that, at any
point in history,institutionsattempt to legitimatecurrentversionsof knowledge
and truth by controlling the manner in which texts are ordered with respect to
each other. Claimsto power and knowledgerely on "institutionalsupport:[they
are] both reinforcedand accompaniedby whole strataof practicessuch as peda-
gogy- naturally- the book system,publishing [and] libraries"[14, p. 219]. The
libraryis a key institutionin the legitimationof particularordersof discourseand
acts to enforce the "ensemble of rules accordingto which the true and false are
separated"[15, p. 132]. While Zwadlois correct in statingthat Foucaultdid not
write a book about libraries,Foucaultwrote much about the systemsof power/
knowledge in which libraries operate and derive their purposes and identity.
Clearly,Foucault'sphilosophyhas much to offer as a means of describing,under-
standing,and critiquinglibraryinstitutionsand their practices.
In conclusion,we returnto Zwadlo'scentralclaimthat "wedon't need a philoso-
phy of libraryand informationscience,we're confusedenough already."Our ques-
tions are,Who is confused?And whatare they confusedabout?If, as Zwadlostates,
"writerson libraryand informationscience rarelydiscussphilosophy"[1, p. 104],
then the scholarsare not confused. Librariansand libraryusers in their everyday
discourseand practiceare not confused.They knowwhat librariesare, what they
do, and how to interactwithin their confines. In our view, there is not enough
confusion.The invisibleepistemologicalstructuresand paradigmsof our field have
not been raised,until very recently,to philosophicalscrutiny.As a result, library
practitionersand scholarsoperatewithinthe field as a ready-madeand given entity
where confusionis minimizedby an underlyingideology.If we, as a field, are pre-
paredto acceptthissituationas Zwadloproposes,then we haveno wayto determine
the limits of that field and the means to transgressthem if we should wish. We
have no means to describe the processesby which the field enables certain types
of practicesand knowledgeand marginalizesand forbidsothers.We haveno wayto
describeand understandhow the roles and relationshipswithinlibraryinstitutions
become constitutedand the systemsof power that they inevitablyserve.We have
no means of understandinghow knowledgeabout libraryprocessesis generated
and givenvalidityin libraryscholarship.The statusquo is cozyand easyto manage.
It discouragesconfusionin its constantmovementsto preserveitselfagainstalterna-

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 COMMENT 321

tiveworldviews.We need to understandthatprocessin order to overcomeit. Thus,

in responseto Zwadlo,we loudlyadvocatethat we do need a philosophyof library
and informationscience;we are not confused enough!

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3. Radford, Gary P. "Positivism, Foucault, and the Fantasia of the Library:Conceptions of
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