he Root of 

Brazil's Political Problems

By Paulo Gregoire
Jul 31, 2016
Summary

Much ado has been made about Brazil's precarious political situation ahead of the 2016
Summer Olympics. But how did the country come to be in such a tight spot? In large part
the answer lies in the massive number of political parties active in Brazil, which has led to a
particularly fragmented congress. It is an old trend, observed most famously
by Brazilian political scientist Sergio Abranches in a 1988 paper titled "Coalition
Presidentialism: The Brazilian lnstitutional Dilemma." According to Abranches, one
of Brazil's most serious institutional challenges is what he deemed to be a "coalitional
presidentialism" — a system by which the president must form and govern over a
multiparty coalition, which becomes more difficult the more parties are involved.

Brazil's was a concerning political model, but a temporary one, Abranches argued. He
believed that as democracy strengthened in the country, elections would limit the number of
viable political parties. But he was wrong. Since Abranches made that prediction in 1988,
the number of political parties with more than 5 percent representation in congress has
doubled, rising from four to eight. In the same period, the Brazilian congress impeached
former President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992, and it is now in the process of
impeaching President Dilma Rousseff, who will likely be forced out of office by the end of
August. This is not to say the proliferation of political parties actually caused these
impeachments. But it certainly made them more difficult for the executive powers to
manage, and impeachment more difficult to avoid.

The problem with a system that incorporates so many political parties is that it can weaken
the executive if he or she is unable to unify a ruling coalition. Maintaining balance in such a
heterogeneous environment becomes more difficult in times of social upheaval or political
crisis. That is why even when marches and protests were being held against Rousseff
across Brazil in early 2015, Stratfor was monitoring Roussef's political coalition even more
closely than the developments on the street. At the time the protests, though dramatic, did
not pose the biggest threat to the president; the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
(PMDB), the main political ally of the ruling Workers' Party, did.

Though an impeachment case must be based on a specific alleged legal violation, it is

ultimately a political decision rather than a judicial one. If Rousseff had been capable of
maintaining a cohesive coalition in congress, she would have earned the one-third of the
votes needed to stop the impeachment proceedings against her. As it happened, though,
once the PMDB distanced itself from Rousseff, her impeachment became all but certain.

Rousseff did not lose control of her coalition in one fell swoop. It was a gradual process,
driven by a declining economy, accusations of budget manipulation and revelations of a
monumental corruption scandal involving state-owned oil company Petroleo Brasileiro,
which Rousseff formerly chaired. The final nail in the coffin, however, came when PMDB
candidate Eduardo Cunha, an outspoken opponent of Rousseff, won the presidency of the
lower house of congress over the Workers' Party candidate. In this role, Cunha had the
authority to take up the impeachment request against Rousseff in December 2015.

Forming a Coalition

The more parties there are in Brazil's political landscape, the more difficult it is to build a
viable coalition. The PMDB, the country's largest party, has only 13 percent of the seats in
congress. But in Brazil, where there have been impeachment requests filed against every
president since 1988, building an effective coalition is vital for a president, not only for the
purposes of passing legislation but also for keeping the post. Only in 1992 and 2015
have Brazil's ruling coalitions been so weak as to allow impeachment requests to pass
through congress and into the judiciary; the 1992 request led to the ouster of the sitting
president, and the 2015 request appears as though it will do the same.

In fact, interim President Michel Temer has already been working to strengthen a new
ruling coalition in preparation for Rousseff's permanent removal. Temer has allocated
ministries and high-level positions in state-owned companies, including the Caixa
Economica Federal bank, to members of nearly all the political parties in the coalition to
win their favor. When asked why Temer appointed mostly politicians rather than industry
experts to his Cabinent, he responded that his first priority was to build a strong ruling
coalition. In his view, he would be able to remedy the economy only with congressional
unity and support.

Creating Corruption

Though creating a solid coalition is necessary to avoiding impeachment, the process of

actually cultivating support can also lead to corruption. For example, one of the Workers'
Party's main tactics is to allocate prominent positions to political allies and their supporters.
By appointing party backers to key positions in state-owned companies, politicians can
ensure bribes and kickbacks for themselves. Former Presidents Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Fernando Collor de Mello, among others, have been
accused of adopting such tactics.

The Brazilian congress is currently considering legislation to limit the number of political

parties active in the government based on a minimum performance in elections, but the
Supreme Federal Court ruled a similar proposal unconstitutional in 2006. The reality is that
the fragmentation of the Brazilian congress is likely to be enduring, no matter which party
controls the presidency. It will also probably be both a source of corruption and a threat to
the stability of the presidency. Even if Rousseff is ousted, Temer will have to pull together
a strong coalition that will back him if an impeachment case is brought against him. But he
will have to be careful to ensure that in doing so, he does not empower any one party any
more than the others — because as Rousseff knows all too well, that can be a dangerous
approach.