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Economics Letters: Seth Carpenter, Selva Demiralp, Bernd Schlusche, Zeynep Senyuz
Economics Letters: Seth Carpenter, Selva Demiralp, Bernd Schlusche, Zeynep Senyuz
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
highlights
• We develop an index to monitor money market stress in real-time.
• We model cyclical phases of the money market during the 2007–2009 financial crisis using a Markov-switching dynamic factor model.
• Switches to lower stress regimes appear to be associated with nonstandard policy measures by the Fed.
JEL classification:
C32
E44
Keywords:
Money market
Dynamic factor models
Markov-switching
Financial crisis
1. Introduction et al., 2011, Brave and Butters, 2011, Illing and Liu, 2006, Matheson,
2012, and Hollo et al., 2012, among others). Several financial
Money markets provide liquidity for the global financial system stress indexes are constructed by simply averaging a wide range
by facilitating the borrowing and lending by financial institutions of variables using equal weights or weights based on the relative
for short periods of time. Since stress in these markets may block sizes of the underlying markets. Others use a principal components
the flow of funding to the entire financial system, gauging the level approach that allows some variables to be more closely related to
of such stress is crucial for policy makers. financial stress than others. A more flexible approach, which we
Many indexes that aggregate information from various financial adopt in this paper, is to estimate a dynamic factor model that
variables have been constructed to measure broad financial stress allows for the relationship between the unobserved factor and the
rather than short-term funding stress that we consider in this observable data to change over time.
paper (see Hakkio and Keaton, 2009, Kliesen and Smith, 2010, Oet Instead of focusing on broad financial stress, our index provides
a more refined perspective on money markets which are at the
core of the financial system. Because stress seems to appear first
in money markets as in the case of 2007–2009 crisis, our index is
✩ The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors alone and do not
expected to pick up the first signs of funding strains before they
indicate concurrence by the Federal Reserve Board or other members of the research affect the entire financial system. Using a dynamic factor frame-
staff.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 202 973 7499. work, we extract a common factor of interest rate spreads that
E-mail addresses: seth.b.carpenter@frb.gov (S. Carpenter), sdemiralp@ku.edu.tr
are representative of conditions in different money market seg-
(S. Demiralp), bernd.schlusche@frb.gov (B. Schlusche), zeynep.senyuz@frb.gov ments. In order to shed light on the crisis period and capture sub-
(Z. Senyuz). stantially different market dynamics during that period, we also
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.017
0165-1765/Published by Elsevier B.V.
102 S. Carpenter et al. / Economics Letters 125 (2014) 101–106
terized by mean and variance asymmetries. We find that money Factor equation Factor loadings Idio. std. dev.
markets switched between low and high stress regimes dur- parameters
ing the crisis except for brief periods of extreme stress such as φ1 0.97 β2 0.23 σu1 0.04
that following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in the fall of 2008. (108.3) (6.6) (20.8)
The timing of the switches between regimes suggests that the σv 0.07 β3 0.34 σu2 0.05
(26.3) (9.2) (34.8)
non-standard policy measures used by the Federal Reserve at dif- β4 1.49 σu3 0.15
ferent stages of the crisis have been effective in reducing funding Idio. AR(1) parameters (26.0) (34.9)
stress. ψ1 0.99 β5 0.94 σu4 0.06
Section 2 describes the money market spreads used to construct (120.9) (10.3) (24.6)
our index. Section 3 presents the linear and nonlinear dynamic ψ2 0.99 β6 0.50 σu5 0.13
factor models and summarizes the estimation results. Section 4 (222.9) (23.4) (34.2)
ψ3 0.43 β7 1.22 σu6 0.05
concludes.
(11.7) (22.9) (29.2)
ψ4 0.98 σu7 0.06
2. Key variables of money market stress (121.9) (26.3)
ψ5 0.97
Even though different segments of the money market are linked (96.9)
with one another, and rates generally tend to move together, the ψ6 0.17
(2.9)
segments have distinct characteristics depending on the type of ψ7 0.90
instrument being traded and the terms of the trade. For example, (43.2)
borrowing in the repo market is secured, while borrowing in Note: t-statistics are provided in parenthesis.
the federal funds market is unsecured. Therefore, an increase
in counterparty risk may manifest itself in a widening spread
between unsecured and secured funding rates. where α is an 8 × 1 vector that includes the drift term; F is an 8 × 8
We consider the following money market spreads from January matrix of autoregressive parameters; and Q = GQ ∗ G′ with Q ∗ be-
2002 to November 2013 at a weekly frequency: (1) the three- ing the diagonal matrix that includes the variance of the common
month Libor–OIS spread; (2) the spread between three-month factor and the seven idiosyncratic component variances in its di-
forward rate agreements (FRA) and the OIS rate; (3) the spread agonal, i.e., Q ∗ = diag(σv2 , σu1
2
, . . . , σu7
2
) and G = I8 . We cast this
between the federal funds and Treasury general collateral repo model in state space and use the Kalman filter to obtain optimal
rates; (4) the TED spread, that is, the spread between three-month extractions of the state of money market.
Libor and the Treasury bill yield; (5) the spread between interest The extracted index from January 2002 to November 2013 is
rates on low quality A2/P2 and high quality AA 30-day nonfinancial plotted in Fig. 1.1 Panel A shows the index from January 2002 until
commercial paper; (6) the spread between AA unsecured financial the end of 2006 during which it fluctuates within a narrow band
commercial paper and AA unsecured nonfinancial commercial around 0.05, indicating no stress in money markets. Panel B plots
paper; and (7) the spread between asset-backed commercial paper the index from January 2007 to December 2008. In August 2007,
and AA unsecured nonfinancial paper. the index increased to levels over ten times its long-run average
The Libor–OIS spread and the federal funds rate–repo spread and exceeded 0.5 by mid-month. This period is characterized by
serve as measures for counterparty risk. The FRA–OIS spread is wide fluctuations associated with varying levels of funding stress.
considered as a measure of expected counterparty risk. The TED The index reached its peak value of 2.64 in mid-October 2008,
spread measures the perceived risk in lending to banks relative to following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Panel C shows the
investments in relatively safe Treasury bills. The remaining three index for 2009, during which time the stress in money markets
spreads serve as measures of risk premiums on different products had declined, with the most notable reduction being observed
in the commercial paper market. following the FOMC announcement that the Federal Reserve
would conduct additional asset purchases. From January 2010 to
3. Methodology and results November 2013, as shown in Panel D, the index mostly fluctuates
around its pre-crisis average except for two brief episodes. The
3.1. A common factor of money market stress first episode in mid-2010 coincides with the downgrade of Greek
government debt to junk-bond status. The second episode is in
We construct an index of money market stress using a dynamic late 2011 amid the US debt ceiling crisis, the downgrade of US
factor model that filters out the idiosyncratic noise inherent in each government debt, and the increased risks and funding stress
series. Let Zt be the 7 × 1 vector of observable money market abroad due to the sovereign debt crisis. The index declined to
variables: Zt′ = [LIBOR–OIS, FRA–OIS, FFR–Repo, TED, A2P2–AA, below zero in early 2012 and has remained there since.
AAF–AANF, AAAB–AANF]. The measurement equation that estab- The maximum likelihood estimates of the linear dynamic factor
lishes the relation between the observable series and the unob- model are presented in Table 1. The common factor is very
served state variables is given by, persistent with an AR(1) coefficient of 0.97. All factor exposures
Zt = H βt , (1) are positive and statistically significant. Significant autoregressive
coefficient estimates and standard errors for the idiosyncratic
where βt is the 8 × 1 vector of unobservable factors including the
components suggest variable-specific dynamics in all series after
common factor and the idiosyncratic components of the observ-
their common variation is accounted for.
able variables and H is the 8 × 7 matrix of factor loadings that re-
flect how each observable variable is related to the common factor.
We assume that the common factor and the idiosyncratic com-
ponents follow parsimonious AR(1) processes. Their dynamics are 1 The index is extracted from various spreads that are in percentage terms. The
specified in the transition equation: full-sample average value of the index is 0.13, with a minimum of −0.06 and a
maximum of 2.64. Progressively higher positive values indicate progressively worse
βt = α + F βt −1 + ξt and E (ξt ξt′ ) = Q , (2) than average conditions.
S. Carpenter et al. / Economics Letters 125 (2014) 101–106 103
Panel A Panel B
0.15 3.00
Weekly Weekly
0.14
2.75
0.13
2.50
0.12
0.11 2.25
0.10 2.00
0.09
1.75
0.08
1.50
0.07
0.06 1.25
0.05 1.00
0.04
0.75
0.03
0.50
0.02
0.01 0.25
0.00 0.00
Panel C Panel D
0.55 0.20
Weekly Weekly
0.18
0.50
0.16
0.45
0.14
0.40
0.12
0.35 0.10
0.30 0.08
0.25 0.06
0.04
0.20
0.02
0.15
0.00
0.10
-0.02
0.05 -0.04
0.00 -0.06
3.2. Money market stress during the financial crisis states following a first order 3-state Markov process given by,
3
Dynamics of the US money market substantially changed during pij = P [St = j|St −1 = i] and pij = 1. (3)
the 2007–2009 financial crisis with unprecedented jumps in the j =1
commonly monitored rate spreads. In order to capture cyclical dy- We estimate the model using a nonlinear version of the Kalman
namics during the crisis, we extend the above described model to filter and Hamilton’s (1989) filter along with Kim’s (1994) approx-
account for potential mean and variance asymmetries and fit it to imate maximum likelihood method. The factor and the regime
the sub-sample from May 2007 to June 2009. Eq. (2) is replaced by, probabilities are then estimated based on information at each point
in time.2
βt = αSt + F βt −1 + ξt and E (ξt ξt′ ) = QSt , (2′ )
2 See Kim (1994) for details on the estimation of dynamic factor models. A
where QSt = GQ ∗St G′ and QS∗t = diag(σv2S , σu1
2
, . . . , σu11
2
). The drift comprehensive survey and various applications of this approach can be found in
t
terms and the factor variance are assumed to switch between Kim and Nelson (1999).
104 S. Carpenter et al. / Economics Letters 125 (2014) 101–106
Table 2 presents the estimation results. The first state, the low- federal funds rate. We see from Panel A that the beginning of
stress regime, has a mean of 0.04. The second state has a mean of the crisis in August 2007 is associated with a switch to the high-
0.18, and represents the high-stress regime. The third state, which stress regime. Subsequently, the index switches between high- and
we refer to as the extreme-stress state, has a mean of 0.44, and low-stress regimes for most of the crisis, except for a very brief pe-
prevails for only 16 weeks. This state is also the most volatile state, riod of extreme stress in December 2007, and the 16-week period
followed by the high- and low-stress states. following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy which were characterized
The smoothed probabilities of high- and extreme-stress regimes by intensified market pressures that diminished liquidity in the
during the crisis period are plotted in Panels A and B of Fig. 2, funding markets. Stress remained very high until mid-December
respectively. The vertical, dashed green lines indicate cuts in the 2008. Most switches from high to low stress regimes are associated
S. Carpenter et al. / Economics Letters 125 (2014) 101–106 105
Fig. 3. The money market stress index, the Cleveland Financial Stress Index, and the National Financial Conditions Index.