WHITE PAPER

TOXIC GAS MONITORING SYSTEM DESIGN

20 Years of Lessons Learned and Shared

Jim Blais
Senior Safety Engineer

AN EMPLOYEE OWNED COMPANY WWW.HALLAM-ICS.COM


Table of Contents
Lesson No. 1 Codes represent minimum requirement 3
Lesson No. 2 A TGMS should be a standalone system 3
Lesson No. 3 Always begin with a hazard
and risk assessment 4
Lesson No. 4 Perform a gas detection
supplier assessment 5
Lesson No. 5 Perform a logic controller
supplier assessment 6
Codes and best practices 7 Over the years our involvement and capabilities has ex-
True story 9
True story 9
Returning to codes and best practices 10 smart! Again – I must repeat; it has been my privilege to
True story 13
Conclusion and What’s Next 14
Toxic Gas Monitoring System Design
What’s Important To You
Becomes Everything To Us
From The Author
For the past 20 years I have been focused exclusively on
designing Toxic Gas Monitoring Systems (TGMS). It has
been quite a journey.
I’ve had the opportunity to work on many TGMS projects on
a large scale. I’ve also had many opportunities to work in
small R&D facilities with only one tool.
Large scale opportunities begin with the first “LonWorks”
based TGMS, configured in Germany and installed in the
USA with MST. This TGMS was initially a 600 point gas de-
tection system installed at the “White Oak Semiconductor”
FAB in Virginia.
We were fortunate to begin our “learning process” at Hal-
lam-ICS by actually “teaming” with major gas detection
manufacturers. At their request, we initially did the upfront
and final designs, with our teaming relationships including
Zellweger Analytics (now Honeywell Analytics) and now
also with DOD Technologies and Draeger.
panded to where we now provide turnkey services, begin-
ning with user requirements, design, fabrication, installation,
integration and validation of TGMS platforms.
So this part of my journey arrives at retirement. I have had
the privilege of working at Hallam-ICS for 27 ½ years. Hal-
lam-ICS is filled with great people, all of whom are super
meet and become friends with so many throughout this
great organization!
I have also truly enjoyed meeting and working with lots of
really fantastic people. Among the many clients I include;
Analog Devices, Applied Materials, Axcelis, MIT, MIT Lincoln
Laboratories, Cornell University, Harvard University, Global
Foundries and many others. I’m also especially grateful for
becoming friends with my much esteemed colleague Mr.
John Cox P.E., C.I.H. John has helped and worked with me
on several projects and has been a great teacher regarding
everything associated with EH&S.
Yet – I’m completely unfamiliar with the concept of this thing
called retirement. But I guess I’m going to be giving it a try.
Thank you!
Jim Blais
2
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Introduction
Please note that the following represents only a small tidbit of a few of the important things to
consider when designing a TGMS. We have a lot to share, (I’m one of those passionate “detail”
persons) but it is obviously impossible to ‘condense’ 20 years of knowledge into a small paper.
When considering the many, different requirements associated with designing a safe and prop-
erly configured Toxic Gas Monitoring System (TGMS) – one quickly discovers – there is a lot
to learn and confirm.
Fortunately; Hallam-ICS provides its employees with continuous opportunities to learn and to
stay current with the ever changing and improving technologies, codes and best practices.
Yet, the primary responsibility begins and ends with each individual. It’s the “confirming bit”…
the paying attention to the many, many “details” required, that provide a TGMS with the life
safety integrity required that really makes the difference. The overriding driver always being –
that a TGMS is a life safety system, and a complicated and very demanding life safety system.
A TGMS designer should also be motivated by the simple fact – that many of its “gas targets”
actually have no warning properties… yet they can quickly cause great harm and death. A
good example of this being – areas of oxygen deficiency.
The following is a brief summary of some key lessons learned along the way, followed with a
few more details, along with real experiences (true stories) shared – perhaps highlighting the
challenges and the need to pay attention to the… details.

Lesson No. 1 Codes represent minimum requirements

Codes are only minimum requirements, and they should never be used alone to design a
TGMS. Always review, consider and apply the many industry best practices acquired by the
experience of others dedicated to achieving safety within high technology.

Lesson No. 2 A TGMS should be a standalone system

A TGMS should always be – as is a Fire Alarm System (FAS), a dedicated “standalone” safe-
ty platform. Any failures that occur to either a FAS or a TGMS must be safe and detectable.
Justification for TGMS standalone separation include –
a. Safe failures are:
i. Initiating
ii. Overt
iii. Spurious (Trips due to hardware/software fault, transients)
b. Dangerous failures are:
i. Covert
ii. Inhibiting
iii. Potentially dangerous
iv. Must be found by testing

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c. TGMS requirements include; “continuous gas detection” (Emergency power/UPS),

supervised wiring, sensor, logic controller and final elements diagnostics, fail-safe wir-
ing, synchronized visual notification appliances, local and remote alarm notifications,
connectivity to a constantly attended “Emergency Control Station” and periodic testing/
validation of the system (sensors, any system change) to ensure the safety system per-
formance and its integrity complies with the “safety requirement specification” (functional
cause & effect matrix) developed during the initial risk assessment.
d. Accidental failures are inevitable properties of any TGMS component. These failures are
specified as “accidental” as the constant failure rate “λ” of the component suggests that
during “equivalent time intervals” the same percentage of components will always fail.
e. If however, the successful performance of the TGMS “safety function” is demonstrated
by regular proof tests, (as needed with a FAS and TGMS) then at the time of test, the
probability that the system will perform correctly is 100 %. That is, the probability of fail-
ure has been reset to zero with each successful proof test (blue zigzag-curve).
f. Also similar to a FAS - following any TGMS configuration “change” (hardware or soft-
ware) – a TGMS also requires reacceptance testing (see NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm
and Signaling Code; Testing; Initial Acceptance Testing and Reacceptance Testing).

Lesson No. 3 Always begin with a Hazard and Risk Assessment

As a helpful guideline when determining the safety requirements and configuration of a TGMS,
why not utilize… ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 Part 1 (IEC 61511-1: Mod) - Functional Safety:
Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector, Part 1: Framework, Definitions,
System, Hardware and Software Requirements… which is a globally approved standard and
“best practice” reference and methodology to ensure the Safety Integrity of a TGMS?

I suggest using the framework and the methodical “step by step” approach developed and
outlined by the harmonized and accepted ANSI/ISA – IEC globally accepted standard to help
determine:
a. “Identity” of all possible gas related hazards;
b. “Severity” of each gas related hazard and the;
c. “Possibility” of an occurrence for each gas related hazard.

This standard includes a helpful flowchart developed to determine the overall “Safety Instru-
mented Design Lifecycle” from the ANSI/ISA standard.
d. Perform the assessment – with customer participation. The best (and only) way to pro-
ceed is to first gather and review “all” (toxic, pyrophoric, flammable, reactive and inert)
gas and vapor hazards “planned” (or used) for the facility.
e. Develop a Safety Requirement Specification (SRS) or functional “cause & effect” matrix.
This is the heart of the TGMS safety integrity. Its purpose is to absolutely identify and
then eliminate any potential gas related hazard. The purpose of the approved SRS (ap-
proved by the Owner, key stakeholders and the AHJ) is to provide people, equipment
and the facility with safety and freedom from unacceptable risks.
f. Development of an SRS requires participation of cross-functional disciplines (EH&S, Fa-
cilities and FAB Engineers and Management). The approved SRS becomes the basis of

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design for the TGMS. Depending upon the acceptable risk, the required reliability of the
TGMS can be further ensured by understanding and providing effective measures of:
i. failure avoidance,
ii. failure detection, and
iii. failure tolerance
g. Therefore the SRS should identify…
• Each potential hazard and its consequences
• Definition of the process safe state
• Description of all safety functions
• Description of each alarm level trip point and associated measurement values
• Maximum response time requirements
• Manual safety activation of the safety functions
• afety function responses to diagnostic faults (shutdown/interlocks, alarm only, or
S
other)
• Local alarm / trouble – notifications (visual and audible)
• Local alarm / trouble – HMI visualization (access and content)
• emote “Emergency Responder” alarm / trouble – notifications (paging, texting,
R
email)
• emote “Emergency Control Station” alarm / trouble – HMI visualization (access
R
and content)
• Include maintenance override capability requirements
• Provide system alarming bypass capability requirements
• Requirements for reset or alarm recovery

Lesson No. 4 Perform a Gas Detection Supplier Assessment

Hazardous gas detection technology selection is then best determined by a “supplier assess-
ment.” Selecting and applying the ideal gas detection technology and approach for each gas
target is critically important. It begins by gathering all of the available characteristics and prop-
erties of each gas. Hazardous gas detection systems will almost always require different de-
tection technologies, depending upon the specific gas targets.
a. Gathering and listing gas targets by gas family (e.g., hydrides, mineral acids, halogens,
flammables, inerts, etc.) with their chemical formulas, synonyms, Chemical Abstract Sys-
tem #, and Safety Data Sheets (SDS) is a required starting point.
b. Assessment parameters for each gas target technology, requires understanding the fol-
lowing:
• I dentifying and confirming the most recently adopted chemical substance alarm
levels for each gas target as may be applicable:
• Time-Weighted Average - Threshold Limit Values, (TWA-TLV)
• Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL)
• Short Term Exposure Limit (STEL)

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• Ceiling
• Lethal Concentration 50 (LC50)
• Lower Explosion Limit (LEL) or Lower Flammability Limit (LFL)
• Gas sample detection method (diffusion or extractive):
• iffusion sensor mounting options – (filters, remote sensor, exhaust duct adapter
D
requirements)
• xtractive tubing mounting options – (filters, tubing types, maximum tubing lengths
E
by gas family, exhaust duct adapter requirements, gas sample transport time)
• Sensor / Detection type:
i. Chemcassette (paper tape)
ii. Electrochemical
iii. Catalytic bead
iv. IR
v. FTIR
vi. Others…
• Calibration and calibration frequency
• Cross sensitivities (multiple gas responses within gas families)
• Known Interferences (negative sensor response, sensor poisoning)
• Full measuring range
• Lower Detection Limit
• Lowest Alarm Level
• Sensor drift and span over a time period
• Sensor response time to T90
• Sensor / Transmitter / Instrument – Diagnostic features and capabilities
• Cost and frequency of consumable replacements (sensors, paper tape, etc.)
• Power / Utility – UPS Requirements
• Integration choices (Ethernet/IP, Analog, relays, etc.)

Lesson No. 5 Perform a Logic Controller Supplier Assessment

A “safety instrumented function” (SIF) is a TGMS function necessary to achieve TGMS safety.
The “primary” Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) of a TGMS is to activate a gas alarm if and
whenever a TWA-TLV, % LEL concentration or other alarm level, exceeds the specific gas
alarm threshold. The SIF then shutdowns the upstream related target gas source(s). This
action is also supplemented with activation of local and remote visual and audible notification
appliances.
a. “If” (when) a gas “detection failure” (sensor or instrumentation) occurs and the TGMS
system cannot detect (protect) against a hazardous gas leak; the associated protective
actions for the specific gas sensing point – must perform an emergency “fail-safe” gas
shutdown of the associated upstream gas source/s, with the associated trouble notifica-
tions.

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b. The safe state of a gas detection subsystem that becomes “unavailable” and cannot
provide gas leak protective measures must respond with safety actions equivalent to a
gas alarm (e.g., gas shutdown and trouble notifications).
c. Hallam-ICS recommends selection of a logic controller capable of being configured to a
Safety Integrity Level “2”. The SIL 2 controller is configured to utilize its many diagnostic
capabilities to ensure safety function availability – and alerts if any aspect becomes un-
available.
Here are some additional “details” that I’d like to share about designing a TGMS:

Codes and Best Practices

Over the years it became quickly obvious that simply adopting a local jurisdictions or regions
“minimum code requirements” – and/or – also freely designing by a code “exception”; is abso-
lutely unsafe and dangerous when applied to a complicated TGMS.
• Codes alone truly cannot provide the basis of design for a safe TGMS.
And for those opposed to even considering and applying best practices, some mandated codes
(NFPA example) include the following or similar statements:
“Nothing in this standard is intended to prevent the use of systems, methods, or devic-
es of equivalent or superior quality, strength, fire resistance, effectiveness, durability, and
safety over those prescribed by this standard. Alternative systems, methods, or devices
approved as equivalent by the authority having jurisdiction shall be recognized as being in
compliance with this standard.”

And then there is this from OSHA (Establishing Gas Alarm Levels):
https://www.osha.gov/dsg/annotated-pels/index.html
OSHA recognizes that many of its permissible exposure limits (PELs) are outdated and inade-
quate for ensuring protection of worker health. Most of OSHA’s PELs were issued shortly after
adoption of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act in 1970, and have not been updated
since that time. Section 6(a) of the OSH Act granted the Agency the authority to adopt existing
Federal standards or national consensus standards as enforceable OSHA standards. Most of
the PELs contained in the Z-Tables of 29 CFR 1910.1000 were adopted from the Walsh-Healy
Public Contracts Act as existing Federal standards for general industry. These in turn had
been adopted from the 1968 Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®) of the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH®). Some consensus standards from the American
Standards Association were also adopted at that time, following the 6(a) procedures. Compara-
ble PELs were adopted for shipyards (29 CFR 1915.1000) and construction (29 CFR 1926.55).
Since 1970, OSHA promulgated complete 6(b) standards including new PELs for 16 agents,
and standards without PELs for 13 carcinogens.
Industrial experience, new developments in technology and scientific data clearly indicate that
in many instances these adopted limits are not sufficiently protective of worker health. This
has been demonstrated by the reduction in allowable exposure limits recommended by many
technical, professional, industrial, and government organizations, both inside and outside the
United States. Many large industrial organizations have felt obligated to supplement the exist-
ing OSHA PELs with their own internal corporate guidelines. OSHA’s Hazard Communication
standard (1910. 1200 Appendix D) requires that safety data sheets list not only the relevant
OSHA PEL but also the ACGIH® TLV® and any other exposure limit used or recommended by
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the chemical manufacturer, importer, or employer preparing the safety data sheet.
To provide employers, workers, and other interested parties with a list of alternate occupational
exposure limits that may serve to better protect workers, OSHA has annotated the existing
Z-Tables with other selected occupational exposure limits.
OSHA has chosen to present a side-by-side table with the Cal/OSHA PELs, the NIOSH Rec-
ommended Exposure Limits (RELs) and the ACGIH® TLVs®s. The tables list air concentration
limits, but do not include notations for skin absorption or sensitization.
OSHA’s mandatory PELs in the Z-Tables remain in effect. However, OSHA recommends that
employers consider using the alternative occupational exposure limits because the Agency
believes that exposures above some of these alternative occupational exposure limits may
be hazardous to workers, even when the exposure levels are in compliance with the relevant
PELs.
Even though – The OSHA Z1, Z2 and Z3 Tables and their PELs remain in effect…
• Looking at only one of the highly toxics listed in the Z1 table; “arsine” (AsH3), it provides a
good example of why one might consider using the ACGIH TLV (“Threshold Limit Value” -
time-weighted average) as an alarm level for arsine instead of the OSHA PEL…

Substance CAS No. OSHA PEL ACGIH 2017 TLV

Arsine (AsH3) 7784-42-1 0.05 ppm (50 ppb) 0.005 ppm (5 ppb)

Add to this fact that – I recall attending a SESHA conference, and a presentation many years
ago – that announced that laboratory testing had shown that only 0.01 ppm (10 ppb) of arsine
was shown to kill red blood cells. This caused a lot of concern, given the very common use of
arsine in MOCVD reactors and other tools in the SEMI world (research and fabrication).
• This news was followed by the ACGIH initially lowering their AsH3 TWA-TLV to 3 ppb.
However, due to the technology challenges associated with trying to reliably detect this gas
target at such a very low level, they finally settled on the value of 5 ppb as being the new
TWA-TLV. Technology quickly adjusted – and today – sampling and alarming at 5 ppb can be
performed and has become more of the preferred standard by EH&S professionals.
Then to add to the concern related to those inclined to stay with the OSHA PEL of 0.05 ppm…
The ACGIH has verbiage in their 2017 handbook that also states:
“TLVs will not adequately protect all workers. Some individuals may experience discomfort or
even more serious adverse health effects when exposed to a chemical substance at the TLV
or even at concentrations below the TLV. There are numerous possible reasons for increased
susceptibility to a chemical substance, including age, gender, ethnicity, genetic factors (predis-
position), lifestyle choices (e.g., diet, smoking, abuse of alcohol, and other drugs), medications,
and pre-existing medical conditions (e.g., aggravation of asthma or cardiovascular disease)…”
Considering the recommended ACGIH TWA-TLV is 10 times lower than the OSHA PEL – and
then also factoring in both the OSHA and the ACGIH cautionary verbiage; reminding us that
the OSHA levels are outdated and the ACGIH reminding us that all people may not have the
same levels of health… we recommend setting the TLV alarm for arsine at 5 ppb.

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True Story
The following is an actual occurrence, (experience) shared here – which is an example of how
some “best practices” may evolve from the Lab or FAB.
Not to pick on arsine, but the following occurred within an operational semiconductor fabrica-
tion facility, configured with cleanroom bays and adjoining service bays – which were filled with
process tool support equipment. As is typical, the service chase included diverse tool support
equipment, including vacuum pumps. In this case, the tool vacuum pump, did not have a con-
tainment housing or a monitored enclosure exhaust. In the event of a vacuum pump “seal fail-
ure,” hazardous gas escapes directly into the service chase ambient air. The hazardous gas
in this vacuum pump seal “incident” was arsine (AsH3), with a current TWA-TLV of only 5 ppb.
This was quite a while ago – so one assumes the alarms were set at 50 ppb, the OSHA PEL.
The relative vapor density of AsH3 is 2.7 (air = 1), with poor odor warning properties (but garlic
like), it immediately begins to collect near the floor (due to the service chase ventilation airflow
and equipment location arrangements).
The service chase was equipped with ambient hydride gas monitoring, targeting arsine and
other hydride gas family gases, but with the gas sensor extractive tubing inlet heights located
above at 7 to 8 feet above finished floor (so as not to interfere with periodic equipment mainte-
nance activities). Upon this actual leak, no detection or alarms were activated. How long this
occurred is unknown. It was only discovered when a maintenance tool technician entered the
service chase and walked through the vacuum pump leak area. This leg movement caused
the “pooled” arsine gas near the floor to rise up around his pathway and up to an extractive gas
sample tube – enabling detection, interlocks and alarming to finally occur.
Key points contributing to a lack of successful gas detection above include:
1. No containment of the tool vacuum pump via an exhausted enclosure and cabinet ex-
haust gas monitoring.
2. Service chase ventilation did not permit the capture of the heavier than air (ambient)
leaking arsine gas into a chase exhaust ventilation airflow stream for detection and re-
moval.
3. Gas monitoring sample locations focused only on “lighter than air” hydride gas targets.

True Story
A word (or two) of caution regarding “gas mixtures”…
I’ve found two extremes in the field of customer assumptions and of customer caution regard-
ing gas mixtures. It is indeed required that one evaluate if binary gas mixtures (where the
hazardous component is diluted with a non-hazardous component) remains either toxic or
flammable. Always best to check.
Toxic Mixtures –
“Lethal concentration fifty” (LC50): Is the concentration of a substance in air; exposure to
which, for a specified length of time, is expected to cause the death of 50% of the entire defined
experimental animal population.
Toxic and highly toxic gases include those gases that have a LC50 of 2,000 parts per million
(ppm) or less when rats are exposed for a period of 1 hour or less.

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For binary mixtures where the hazardous component is diluted with a nontoxic gas such as an
inert gas, the LC50 of the mixture is estimated by use of the methodology contained in CGA
P-20. Using CGA P-20 “Standard for Classification of Toxic Gas Mixtures” for determining gas
mixture toxicity:

CGA P-20 includes a table listing of many LC50 concentrations for many common toxics.

Flammable Mixtures –
To evaluate the flammability of gas mixtures, CGA P23 “Standard for Categorizing Gas Mix-
tures Containing Flammable and Nonflammable Components” provides a table of the common
flammable component concentrations (%) in various nonflammable inert mixture types, along
with supporting methods, calculations and examples.
I have found that some customers do make assumptions regarding toxicity of flammability of
mixtures. Most commonly, the assumptions are that “forming gas,” a mixture of hydrogen with
an inert gas, is always nonflammable.
Guess what? – maybe it is flammable… maybe the definition of “forming gas” is confusing.
Interestingly, the flammability of Hydrogen changes depending upon the inert gas type. For
example:
• A mixture of 5.7% Hydrogen in Nitrogen is nonflammable.
• However, a mixture of only up to 2.9% Hydrogen in Argon/krypton/neon/xenon is nonflam-
mable.
• For Helium the nonflammable mixture in Hydrogen is 3.9% - yet for Carbon dioxide it is
8.3%.
The other extreme is regarding toxic mixtures – where EH&S managers err on the side of
safety, which is impossible for me to argue with.
Considering a scenario – where one doesn’t check the P20 calculations and assumes the toxic
mixture is nontoxic – (yet it is) – and they only target the flammable component (if applicable)
and set the alarm to a % of the LEL (thousands of ppm) – when the toxic TWA-TLV is mea-
sured in ppb units.

Returning to Codes and Best Practices

As noted above, most codes do recognize that their standards are intended to be the “mini-
mum requirements.” Codes are developed by committee, follow technology and they may not
be immediately adopted by the local authority having jurisdiction for “years” and then they may
be locally amended.
• Typically – many jurisdictions require compliance with selected ICC and/or selected NFPA
codes:
Required Codes (Typical):
• Access to the following latest editions published (or locally specified) by the “International
Code Council” (ICC):
• International Building Code, International Fire Code, International Plumbing Code, In-
ternational Mechanical Code…

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• Access to the latest editions (or locally specified) published by the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA):
• NFPA 1 – Fire Code, NFPA 2 – Hydrogen Technologies Code, NFPA 30 – Flammable
and Combustible Liquids Code, NFPA 45 – Standard on Fire Protection for Labora-
tories Using Chemicals, NFPA 55 – Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code,
NFPA 70 – National Electric Code, NFPA 72 – National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code,
NFPA 318 – Standard for the Protection of Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities, NFPA
496 – Standard for Purged and pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment, NFPA
497 - Recommended Practice for the Classification of Flammable Liquids, Gases, or
Vapors and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical
Process Areas

Recommended Industry Best Practices:

After more than 20 years of experience designing TGMS platforms throughout many different
regions (primarily within the USA and Canada), it is very evident that in addition to the mini-
mum codes required; utilizing best practices (learned and shared) from actual “users” (facility
engineers, researchers, tool managers, EH&S professionals, etc.) within the high technology
research and fabrication industry – should always be considered and then applied when and
where needed.
As an example within the university – laboratory research realm; MIT has a “labnetwork” with
participants communicating and sharing challenges and support ideas from around the world.
As one might imagine – their work is research, therefore there are no easy answers, so they
share ideas that solve problems and help each other – which evolve into their best practices.
The following is a listing of “best practice” resources that provide an excellent supplement to
the sometimes missing or incorrect information contained within minimum code requirements.
Mind you – these samples are only a starting point for providing a better understanding of “in-
dustry best practices” that will help to enhance the safety integrity of a TGMS.

ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienist

http://www.acgih.org/tlv-bei-guidelines/documentation-publications-and-data
• The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienist (ACGIH®) is a mem-
ber-based organization that advances occupational and environmental health.
A primary example is the “annual” edition of the TLVs® and BEIs® book and work practice
guides in ACGIH®’s Signature Publications.
Considering and applying toxic gas monitoring alarm levels in accordance with the
most recently adopted (and applicable) ACGIH… TWA-TLVs, STELs and Ceilings are
highly recommended.
• Handbook of Ventilation for Contaminant Control (ACGIH)

NIOSH
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/
The NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards is another source of general industrial
hygiene information on several hundred chemicals/classes for workers, employers, and
occupational health professionals.

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The NIOSH Pocket Guide does not contain an analysis of all pertinent data, rather it
presents key information and data in abbreviated or tabular form for chemicals or sub-
stance groupings (e.g. cyanides, fluorides, manganese compounds) that are found in the
work environment. The information found in the NIOSH Pocket Guide should help users
recognize and control occupational chemical hazards.

“SESHA” the Environmental Safety & Health Association for High Technology
http://www.semiconductorsafety.org/
• SESHA is the premier Environmental, Safety & Health association serving the high tech-
nology and associated industries. We provide value to our members through education
and professional development.

SEMIViews
http://www.semi.org/en/Standards/SEMIViews
“SEMI” is the global industry association serving the manufacturing supply chain for the
micro- and nano-electronics industries.
“SEMIViews” is an annual subscription-based product for online access to SEMI Stan-
dards. This resource provides password-protected access to over 900 Standards. Stan-
dards are arranged in “volumes” including those best practices focused on: Facilities,
Gases, Process Chemicals and Safety Guidelines. New and revised Standards are au-
tomatically made available through the system ensuring access to the latest documents.
SEMI Guideline topic examples include:
SEMI F6 Guide for Secondary Containment of Hazardous Gas Piping Systems
• Containment application, piping annulus monitoring (pressure decay or
vacuum), etc. 
SEMI S2 Environmental, Health and Safety Guideline for Semiconductor Manufactur-
ing Equipment
• Safety philosophy, Safety interlocks, Emergency shutdown, etc.
SEMI S6 EHS Guideline for Exhaust Ventilation of Semiconductor Manufacturing
Equipment
• Safety performance criteria for exhaust ventilation, validation methods, etc.

Compressed Gas Association (CGA)

http://www.cganet.com/customer/Publication.aspx
The mission of the CGA includes developing, publishing, and globalizing technical in-
formation as standards and practices for the safe, environmentally responsible, and ef-
ficient practices in the transportation, storage, and disposal of industrial and medical
gases and their containers.
This includes standards focused on protection and safe handling of hazardous gases.
CGA Standards include those referenced and required by National and International
Codes such as:
G-13 “Storage and Handling of Silane and Silane Mixtures”

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P-20 “Standard for Classification of Toxic Gas Mixtures”

P-23 “Standard for Categorizing Gas Mixtures Containing Flammable and Nonflam-
mable Components”

FM Global
https://www.fmglobal.com/research-and-resources/fm-global-data-sheets
FM Global provides free access to their “Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets”.
These data sheets provide another resource focused on helping to reduce the risk of
property loss due to fire, weather conditions, and failure of electrical or mechanical equip-
ment. They incorporate nearly 200 years of property loss experience, research and en-
gineering results, as well as input from consensus standards committees, equipment
manufacturers and others. Examples include:
7-7 Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities
7-45 Instrumentation and Control in Safety Applications
7-91 Hydrogen

UL SCCL Subscriber
https://www.ulstandards.com/unsecured/about.aspx
• Provides access to the UL Standards Certification Customer Library, providing peri-
odic revision updates to UL Standard requirements, to specific UL Standards, such
as:
UL 508A – The “Standard for Safety – Industrial Control Panels” and similar “NRTL
listings” are required by many (most if not all) “authorities having jurisdiction”.
UL 698A “Standard for Safety - Industrial Control Panels Relating to Hazardous
(Classified) Locations”
• NOTE – All “Industrial Control Panels” fabricated by Hallam-ICS are UL Listed.
.

True Story
The following is an actual occurrence, (experience) shared here from an EH&S manager at
a prominent laboratory. He related that he and another colleague entered a building, which
included a closed off service room. The service room had sources of nitrogen (N2) inside but
without O2 monitoring.
So – they have a buddy system established with in this case; his colleague is entering the room
first. His colleague took about two steps into the room and then collapsed. Based upon his
training, the EH&S manager stopped, grabbed his colleague by the ankles and pulled him out
of the room – saving his life.
Had he entered the room with him quickly, they both could have died. They later determined the
cause of the leak and calculated that the room had very little oxygen – in the % single digits of
O2. NIOSH and the ACGIH define oxygen depletion as being <19.5% O2.
• Great reading on this topic is found within ACGIH 2017, TLV Handbook, Appendix F: Min-
imal Oxygen Content... on why you should always consider monitoring for oxygen and
alarming in rooms containing inert gas sources.

20 Years of Lessons Learned and Shared 13

 What’s Important To You
Becomes Everything To Us

So - Please also include a complete review of inert gases planned for the facility.
Inert gas sources typically have “zero” warning properties – creating an unknown and immediate life
threatening hazard to anyone entering a room or an area equipped without proper oxygen depletion
monitoring and alarms (visual and audible).
So – we need to begin with recognizing that not only can highly toxic, toxic, corrosive, pyrophoric, flam-
mable and reactive gases and vapors are dangerous – but even inert sources can be extremely harmful
– with their primary target being limited to… human life.
• Note: We should also recognize – that too much of a good thing… “oxygen” can also increase
the potential for hazards. An accidental oxygen release will create an oxygen enriched area. This
immediately increases the risk of ignition and fire. Materials including fireproofing materials that do
not burn in normal air, will burn in enriched areas. Sparks that are normally harmless can cause fire
and flames are propagated much faster. Therefore – in locations where warranted, it is a proper to
monitor both “O2 depletion and O2 enrichment”. Many facilities shutdown all dedicated O2 sources
with an active area Fire Alarm.

Conclusion and What’s Next

The above, obviously does not include many, many other very important considerations regarding
TGMS design.
I urge you to contact Hallam-ICS with any questions regarding this content – or even if you have ques-
tions pertaining to topics not briefly mentioned above.
Although entering retirement – I’m happy to respond on behalf of Hallam-ICS if I can be of any assis-
tance.
Sincerely –
Jim Blais

Jim Blais
Senior Safety Engineer
Hallam-ICS
jblais@Hallam-ICS.com
802-658-4891

Toxic Gas Monitoring System Design 14

 www.Hallam-ICS.com
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