PASCUAL VS.

BOARD OF EXAMINERS
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical
Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner.
Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to
be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the
witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure
to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination. 

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the
witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right
against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. 

Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the
first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for
malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board. 

Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-
Incrimination Clause.

Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court
found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case
may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner
would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the
revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right
to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he
chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." 
SUNRIPE COCONUT PRODUCT vs. CIR

G.R. No. L-2009 | April 30, 1949

Topics: Independent Contractors vs. Employees; “Pakyaw” System;
Facts:
The instant case concerns an appeal from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations. The latter ruled
that the “parers” and “shellers” of petitioner are its laborers entitled to 12 day-sick leave (1 day for each
month of service), notwithstanding the fact that they are piece-workers under the "pakiao" system.

CIR held that when a worker possesses some attributes of an employee and others of an independent
contractor, which make him fall within an intermediate area, he may be classified under the category of
an employee when the economic facts of the relation make it more nearly one of employment than one of
independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished.

Petitioner contends the following:

a) That the economic facts characteristic of the independent contractor far outweighs the
economic facts indicative of an employee.
b) That the CIR departed from the definition of the word "employee" or "laborer" found in the
Workmen's Compensation Law.
c) That the principal test in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor is the employer's right of control over the work, and not merely the right to
control the result, it being intimated that the "parers" and "shellers" are controlled by the
petitioner only to the extent "that the nuts are pared whole or that there is not much meat
wasted."
d) That the “parers” and “shellers” are piece-workers under the “pakiao” system.

Issue: Whether the “parers” and “shellers” are independent contractors and do not fall within the category
of employees or laborers.

Held:
NO. As to the first contention, SC upheld the CIR ruling that the “parers” and “shellers” work
under some degree of control or supervision of the company, if not under its absolute direction; that said
"parers” and "shellers" form stable groups composed of matured men and women who regularly work at
shelling and paring nuts; that for the most part they depend on their work in Sunripe for their livelihood;
that they are admittedly working in the factory of said company, alongside persons who are indisputably
employed by said company.
As to the second contention, SC upheld CIR. The Workmen’s Compensation Law defines a
laborer or employee as a person who has entered the employment of, or works under a service or
apprenticeship contract for, an employer. On the other hand, CIR defined it as an employee is any person
in the service of another under a contract for hire, express or implied, oral or written. In essence, CIR
ruling does not run counter to the legal definition.
 As to the third contention, SC held that the requirement imposed on the "parers" and "shellers" to
the effect that "the nuts are pared whole or that there is not much meat wasted," in effect limits or controls
the means or details by which said workers are to accomplish their services. It is inconceivable that the
"parers" and "shellers," in order to meet the requirement of the petitioner, would not follow a uniform
standard in the performance of their work.
As to the fourth and last contention, SC made reference to C.A. 103, the organic law of the CIR.
It provides that a minimum wage or share shall be determined and fixed for laborers working by the
hours, day or month, or by piece-work, and for tenants sharing in the crop or paid by measurement unit.
Thus, the organic law of the CIR even orders that laborers may be paid by piece-work; and the fact that
the "parers" and "shellers" are paid a fixed amount for a fixed number of nuts pared or shelled, does not
certainly take them out of the purview of CA 103.
On a final note, SC made a general remark that in cases of this kind, wherein laborers are usually
compelled to work under conditions and terms dictated by the employer, a reasonably wide latitude of
action and judgment should be given to the CIR with a view to settling industrial disputes conformably to
the intents and purposes of its organic law. To decide this case otherwise would set a precedent that may
tend to encourage other employers to adopt this strategy or scheme to deprive their laborers of benefits
under the law.