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CHAPTER 18 The Cultural Regulation of Emotions Batja Mesquita Jozefien De Leersnyder Dustin Albert Emotion regulation promotes an individu- als social adjustment, Having, an emotion means to take a stance, to have a particu- lar relationship with the world (Selomon, 2004), and to have a specific intention to act (Frijda, 1986), To take anger as an example, the experience of anger implies an attitude of nonacceptance, an assessment that one has a relatively high level of control over (others in) the situation (Frijda, Kuipers, & Terschure, 1989), and a readiness to act in snch a way that these other people accom- modate to your wishes, goals, and values (Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). Emotions are thus relationship engagements (Mes- quita, Marinetti, & Delvaux, 2012). Bmo- tion regulation refers to all those processes involved in fashioning emotions to be most adaptive within the relationship. Cultural differences in emotion regulation are to be expected, because the common and most valued relationships differ across socio- cultural contexts (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Therefore, the emotions that are most adaptive within those relationships—the endpoints of emotion regulation—are likely to differ cross-culturally as well. For exam- ple, feelings of cheerfulness and happiness are conceived as “good” and “desirable” in European American culture (D'’Andrade, 1984; Wierzhicka, 1994), because they sig- nal that a person has successfully managed 284 the central cultural tasks of standing out anc accomplishing personal and material goal (eg, Hochschild, 1995). Happiness com: municates to other Americans a “good inne! self" and psychological well-being (Markus & Kitayama, 1994). Yet, as natural as the desire to be happy may seem to most Ameri: can readers, this emotion norm is far from universal. The anthropologist Catherine Lutz (1987), herself a European American, was reprimanded for smiling at a girl whe acted happy during her stay with the Ifaluh (on a Pacific atoll). The Ifaluk condemn hap: pines, because they believe it leads.a person to neglect his or her social duties. Whereas European Americans seek to yield and 10 maximize happiness, Ifaluk life is ged toward minimizing this emotion, An emo tion's fit with the cultural models of self and relationships will thus determine whether lt is up- or down-regulated. In this chapter we propose, first, endpoints of emotion regulation in ¢ ture are those that match the cultures Ye ideas and norms of how to be a good fi dnd how to relate to other people--the called cultural models of self and 58 (Bruner, 1990; D’Andrade, 19845 & Kitayama, 1991), Second, we PI that cultural regulation of emotion initiated by an individual, but offe effect of the way the social envi ‘ “cuiuial Regulation of Emotions aad; Third, we will show that culture agasited hy a che level of the individaal at the level of the social environment) 1 Ap ampartaoe cole inal stapes of emo fon regulation cultural Mode “fp provide a foundation for the discus: Favor emotion regulation, we first briefly Hefew the idea of the cultural model itself. Dominant cultural models of self and felating are manifest in two distinct ways that may be described as “culture, in the © world® and “culture in the head” (Adams & Markus, 2004) On the one hand, “cul- ture in the world” refers to a culture’s daily Homtines and organizational structures, tO the reward structures that are in place, to social expectancics, and to the commot types of social interaction. “Culture in the world” thus stands for the affordances and constraints that implicitly (but powerfully) shape individual experience. On the orher hand, “culture in the head” refers to inter alized goals, values, meanings, representa- tions, and behavioral repertoires, and thus tranglates into experiential and behavioral tendencies, Both manifestations of cultural models—in the world and in the head appear to be involved in emotion regulation. This idea can be illustrated by contrasting the most widely studied cultural models: the European American and East Asian cultural models. According to middle-class Euro- pean American models of self and relating, the individual should be independent and free from others, as well as stand out among them (e.g. Kim’ 8¢ Markus, 19991. On the one hand, everyday social arrangements fos tera self that is independent and Free. Exam: ples are slecping arrangements: In contrast to infants in many areas of the world, Euro- pean American infants sleep by themselves very early on (Morelli, Rogoff, ‘Oppenheim, & Goldsmith, 1992; Shweder, 1991). On the other hand, culture is inteenalized as the psychological tendency of self-enhancement and the value attached to choice in Euro- pean American contexts (Heine, Lehman, Markus, 6 Kitayama, 1999; Hochschild, 1995), In contrast, the dominant goal of the self in most East Asian cultural contexts is to be 285 like others and to enhance the fit between what one is doing and what is expected (cB. Lieine ct al., 1999; Lebra, 1992). The culture yalues a person's self-improvement, with the wim of meeting these relational expectations, fulfilling role-based obligations, and dem- onstrating one’s loyalty t© significant social ingroups (Heine et al., 1999; Rothbaum Pott, Azuma, Miyake, & Weisz, 2000), Cal ture in the world is organized toward these goals: Politeness rituals and strictly preserip- five role behavior are cases in. point. “Cul- ture in the head” can be seen from the Bast ‘Asian tendency to take the perspective of the generalized other and thus focus on meeting Expectations (Gohen, Hoshino-Brown, && Leung, 2007; Masuda et al., 2008). Tt should be noted that che theoretical framework of cultural models does not assume or argue that people who live in the same cultural context engage in exactly the same way. First, people engage in many models at the same time, such as models Gf gender, socioeconomic status, cohort, ethnicity, religion, and professional status. These models all structure individuals’ teal- ity, as do family dynamics, close relationship characteristics, and parenthood, Second, and perhaps relatedly, people do not inter nalize the dominant cultural models in the same way and to the same extent. Yet even i people have nor completely internalized the dominant models, they still have to contend with cultural models in the world (Shweder, 1991), The “Right” Emotions Match the Cultural Models _ What feels “right” differs substantially actoss cultures, yet we propose that every- where the endpoints of emotion regulation Ihatch the cultural models of self and rela~ tuonships (Eid & Diener 2001; Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006; Mesquita & Leu, 2007; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). The “right” emotions may be those consis- tent with injunctive norms (oxgh(-emotions, {disapproved by most others in the culture), ideal emotions (emotions wanted by mast others in the culture), or descriptive norms {emotions actvtally experienced by most oth= ere in the culture), Cultural differences in the explicit feeling rules and ideal emotions 286 illustrate the different endpoints of regula- tion; cultural differences in the commonly experienced emotions are taken as evidence for culture-specific emotion norms, if they match the respective models of self and relat- ing. Feeling Rules and Ideal Emotions Match the Cultural Models Aculture’s feeling rules—the most desirable and valued emotional states—are endpoints of emotion regulation. Differences in fecling rules ean be understood from differences in the dominant cultural models. For instance, Eid and Diener (2001) conducted a large cross-cultural study in which participants from both independent (European American and Australian) and interdependent (China and Taiwan) cultural contexts rated the desirability of several emotions, both po tive and negative. The largest cultural differ- ences in desirability were found for “pride” and “guilt.” Feelings of pride were more positively valued in independent than in interdependent cultures, whereas the oppo- site was true for feelings of guilt. This may be the case, because pride signals a person’s autonomy and uniqueness, which are va ued in independent cultures but considered “dangerous” in interdependent cultures that recognize the potential of pride to disrupt social harmony, Conversely, guilt may be desirable from the viewpoint of East Asian cultural models, because it signals an ind vidual’s concern for relational harmony (and the readiness to take full responsibility for a violation of this harmony}, but undesirable in Western cultures because it suggests a less than positive performance of the individual, There are also systematic cultural d ferences in the emotions people “ideally would like to feel” (Tsai ct al., 2006). Tsai and her colleagues asked people from dif- ferent cultures to rate their “ideal feelings” on emotion scales that represented the four quadrants of the affective circumplex; * The affective circumplex is defined by the dimensions of pleasantness (unpleasant pleasant) and activation (low-high). They found consistent differences berween Euro- pean Americans, who “ideally” wanted to feel more high-activation positive states such as excitement and elation, and East Asians, who preferred low-activation positive states SOCIAL ASPECTS such as peaceful and serene feelings. Furth research showed that ideal emotions prepare individuals best for the tasks that are cul- turally central (Tsai, Miao, Seppala, Fung, & Yeung, 2007). High-activation positive emotions, promoted in North American contexts, prepare individuals for influencing, others. In contrast, low-activation positive emotions, promoted in East Asian contexts, facilitate Social adjustment. Patterns of Emotional Experience Match the Cultural Models ‘That the endpoints of regulation differ may also be inferred from cultural differences in the prevalent emotional patterns (Le, the patterns of frequencies and intensities), which can be understood from the pertinent culeural models of self and relating. Adopt. ing a variety of methods, Kitayama and his colleagues (2006; Kitayama 8 Markus, 2000) found that European American par- ticipants reported more sacially disengag- ing cmotions—such as feeling pride, anger, or irritation—and Japanese participants reported more socially engaging emotions— such as feeling close, ashamed or indebted. The dimension of social engagement was empirically derived, and emotions on the disengaging end of the dimension underline an individual's independence, whereas emo- tions on the engaging end foreground the connectedness between people, The studies made use of the self-reported frequency of emotions in the past month, the self-reported emotional experience in response to a pre- defined sct of situation types, and daily dairy studies. Cultural differences in emotions, as they appear from these studies, correspond with other reports of emotions for the same cultures (see the high frequency and preva leace of shame in Japanese cultural contexts as reported by Benedict, 1946; Heine et al, 1999). Culturally prevalent patterns of emo: tions thus appeared to match the cultural models of self and relating. That the endpoints of regulation are ul: turally defined is also suggested by research on emotional accilturation: changes in t patterns of emotional experience after pea” ple move to a different culture. In a seties of studies, we asked immigrant and majottt? groups to rate the patterns of emotions a rienced in different types of situations # | gre cutwral Regutation of Emotions ie defined according to the valence (pos i- wee agai) and the social engagement isengaged) of the emotion they it, For each type of situation, ceo spared immigrants) pattern of em0- Ma ratings wich the average majority mem, pers pattem. ‘The more an immigrant had Pein exposed ro the new culture, the more hisor her pattern of emotions resembles that fibeaverage majority member. This finding feld true for two different minority groups peesyo different majority cultures: Turkish fnmigrants in Belgium, and Korean immi jeants in the United States (De Leersnyder, Mesquita, 8& Kim, 2011). In both immigrant groups, the umber of years spent in the new avtare, as well as the dlegeee of contact with Frembers of the majority cultuee, predicted emotional similarity to the majority culture, A separate study compared, for the same type of situations, emotional patterns of Bel- gian Turks and Belgian natives to those of Turks living in Turkey (De Leersnyder, Mes- quita, 8& Kim, 2013). Fmotional patterns of Belgian Turks were more similar to the Bel- gian norm than were emotional patterns of ‘Turks in Turkey, even though the Turks in Turkey were on average better educated (and in that respect more similar to the Belgians) than Belgian Turks. The combined find- ings suggest that exposure to a new culture sparks changes in the prevalent emotional patterns that supposedly march the new eul- tural models more closcly. ‘That ceoss-culturally different endpoints of regulation ate rewarding can be inferred from the link with well-being. The combined evidence suggests that having the “right” emotions is associated with higher well- being. In the diary study reviewed earlier {Kitayama ct al., 2006), emotions that were consistent with the descriptive norm best pre~ dicted well-being: disengaging emotions in the European American sample, and engag- ing emotions in the Japanese sample, Simi- larly, our own research with U.S., Korean, and Belgian samples showed that emotional similarity to the cultural average predicted higher satisfaction with social relationships (De Leersnyder, Mesquita, Kim, Bom, & Choi, 2013).Thus, having the “right” emo- tions appears to be rewarding, even if the exact processes involved are as yet unknown, Conversely, emotions that ate discrep- ant with the culturally ideal emotions have 287 negative consequences. for well-being. ‘Tsai and her colleagues (2006) found that the discrepancy between a person's actual and ideal emotions predicted that person’s level of depressive symptoms, but only for the domain of emotions that was culturally most focalt The discrepancy between actual and ideal high-activation positive emotions pre dicted depression in European Americans, ‘whereas the discrepancy between actual and ideal Jow-activation positive emotions pre- dicted depression in East Asians. Therefore, jot having the “right” emotions appears to have negative personal consequences. In summary, emotions appear to be regu- lated in ways that improve their match with the prevalent cultural models of self and relating, This is suggested by findings that (1) actual emotions fit the culture's models of self and relating, (2) immigrants’ actual emotions become more consistent with the new cultural models, and (3) emotions that hee consistent with either the descriptive norms or the ideal emotions in a culture positively predict well-being, ‘The rest of this Chapter is devoted to the question of how the match between emotions and cultural mod- cls is achieved: This is the domain ‘of emo- tion regulation proper. Cultural Regulation of Emotions _ Emotion regulation has been defined broadly as “the processes that influence which emo- tions we have, when we have them, and how Wee experience or express these emotions” (Gross, 1998; Gross, Sheppes, & Urry, 2011, p. 767}. In this chapter, we subscribe to this definition, and we note that it is agnostic to {t) the source of regulation, and (2) whether the regulation is effortful or conscious. We propose that culturally driven emotion regu- lation may be initiated by either individuals themselves or their social environments, and they may be either conscious and effortful or automatic and effortless. We speak of cul- tural regulation when there is evidence that emotional processes are fashioned to match the cultural models of seif and relationship. ‘Most of the literature on emotion regula- tion has focused on individual emotion reg- tation —far example, a person who avoids secing a friend who makes her feel miser- Able, who seeks distraction after a fight wath 288 her boss, or who tries to see the situation in a different light. However, @ full under- standing of the role of culture in emotion Tepulation requires that we move beyond individual emotion regulation to include what we call social eration regulation. We speak of social emotion regulation when the social environment is the agent of cmotion regulation. Culture “in the world” is clearly important to this type of regulation. Exam- ples abound: Sex segregation in some cul- tures is a means to avoid situations of cmbar- rassment (Abu-Lughod, 1986}; head hunting rituals in another culture serve to channel individuals’ ingroup anger (Rosaldo, 1980) Closer to home, social sharing with friends can help to restore a person's self-esteem, after a painful breakup, thereby alleviating distress, Thus, culture plays an important role in both individual and social emotion regulation. Tt should be noted that our appraach dif- fers from accounts that assimilate emotion regulation to the effortful redirection of “the spantancous flow” of emotions (Koole, 2009, p. 6). First, in light of cultural differ- ences in the most prevalent emotions, we challenge the notion of spontaneous flow. Second, we propose that emotion regula~ tion is often automatic (cf, Bargh 8 Wil- iamns, 2007; Gyurale, Gross, & Etkin, 20715 see Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2008, for a Guleucal perspective on automatic emotion regulation). it is not always possible (and perhaps not meaningful either; see Mesquita & Frijda, 2011) to draw a distinction between cultural emotion regulation and culturally influenced ‘inotion generation. Regulatery processes are clearly distinct when individual and gocial emotion regulation changes the course of an ongoing emotion in culture-specific ways, but in many cases, emotion regulation is inferred from the fact that emotional out- comes cross-culturally vary in nonrandom ways, For example, the types of situations that individuals encounter may be responsi: ble for aligning emotions with the endpoints of regulation (e.g., politeness reduces anger, and may thus help to achieve relational har mony). In this cas¢, the distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation becomes futile (Mesquita 8¢ Frijda, 2011}. ‘However, we speak of emotion regalation in these cases because the social organization. SOCIAL ASPECTS indisputably plays a role in “what emotions we have” and “when we have them” (Gross et al., 2011, p. 767). To the extent that either individual or social processes seem to increase the match of emotions to norms, we consider them forms of emotion regulation. ‘We assume that a culture's individual and social emotion regulation strategies go hand in hand, and supplement each other, in an attempt to realize the cultural norms (Kita- yama, Karasawa, & Mesquita, 2004; Mauss et al., 2008). Below we discuss evidence for the role of culture in multiple strategies of emotion regulation; for each strategy we consider evidence for both individual and social emotion regulation. Situation Selection One major path of emotion regulation has heen termed situation selection, described as “approaching of avoiding certain people, places, of objects in order to regulate emo- tions” (Gross, 1998, p. 283). Cultural dif. ferences in situation selection are suggested with regard to individual and social emotion regulation. Differences in individuals" moti vational focus are taken as evidence for the role of culture in individual emotion regula- tion; differences in che social realities that individuals encountcr—the a priori selec tion of situations—are considered a form of social emotion regulation, Individual Regulation of Situation Selection ‘There is some evidence that different cul tural models affect individuals’ situation selection. A number of studies found that the relative focus of individuals on cithet avoiding negative or approaching pos tive situations differs across cultures (Cf Elliott, Chirkox, Kim, 8 Sheldon, 2001: Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000). Whereas the dominant focus in American contexts appears ta be on the accomplishment positive outcomes (i.e. a promotion foet5h Test Asians and Russians have been Fott to be more concerned with avoiding faut to meet social expectations {ixe., 9 Prev tion focus). These cultural diffe motivational focus can be understoor the respective models of self and relating: independent American model emphasit® Te n of Emotions ment and the achievement of anfefaveomies, Whereas the more intet- iment Fast Asian and Russian models aie the importance of avoiding social ions, and may thus be more driven by idence than approach. Mat differences in situation selection pa affect emotional experience wA8, s0g- feted by 2 cross-cultural vignette study by Beetal (2000, Studies 3-5). The rescarch- He amined differences in emotional reac- fons to success and failure between Ruro- Mn Americans (promotion focus) and Pet Asian Hong Kong Chinese (prevention fra), They bypothesized that a promo tion focus would foster happiness under eniditions of success, and sadness under eniditions of failure, whereas a prevention focus would lead to reports of relaxation fr relief upon success, and anxiety upon fiilure, Consistent with the differences in otivational focus, the European Ameri- can participants reported higher intensi- : ties of happiness-depressed emotions than telief-anxiety emotions, whereas the Chi nese participants reported higher intensities of rclief-anxiety than happiness-depressed emotions. This is some of the first evidence that cultural differences in situation selec~ tion may be related to differences in the prevalent types of emotions. In summary, cultural models of self and relating moti- vate individual-level selection of situations, which itself can be understood asa form of emotion regulation. Social Regulation of Situation Selection Social situation selection may render certain emotions either more frequent or more rare. For example, European American social life is characterized by practices that serve to make individuals feel special and unique, and that promote happiness and feeling good about themselves (D’Andrade, 1984). Contemporary American schools promote the happiness and pride of their students with practices that make the children feel important and special. AAs early as preschool, children are the focus of attention during “Show-and-tell” mectings, and throughout elementary school, children’s accomplish- ments are marked by smiley faces, stickers, and gift-box rewards for every achieve ment, however small. The importance of 289 self-esteem is nicely illustrated by anecdotal evidence. In his book The Geography of Thought, the American psychologist Rich- ard Nisbett (2003) describes how the school board in his hometown cven “debated whether the chief goal of the schools should be to impart knowledge or inculcate self esteem” (p. 55), In contrast, many of the practices in Japa- nese cultural contexts promote anticipatory fear or shame, consistent with a cultural model emphasizing the continuing obliga- tion to accommodate others, fulfill one’s roles, and perfect one’s contributions in order to approach others’ expectations or cultural ideals in general (Heine et al., 1999). For example, at the end of each day Japanese schoolchildren are encouraged to engage in self-reflection or self-criticism (i.e., hansef), so that they can look for ways to improve their shortcomings or weaknesses in order to meet the group’s standards (c.g., Lewis, 4995). The constant awareness of ‘one’s shortcomings is conducive to the experience ‘of emotions such as anticipated fear and shame, Culturally comparative research provides systematic support for the idea that situa- tions eliciting culturally condoned emotions, such as shame in Japan, are relatively more frequent than culturally condemned emo- tions, such as anger in Japan (c.g. Boiger, Mesquita, Uchida, & Barrett, 2013). In a recent study, we compared the frequeney of shame and anger situations in Japan and the United States, utilizing carefully selected, representative elicitors of shame and anger that had been reported in extensive pilot studies by either Japanese or U.S. college students. Shame was chosen because it was expected to be consistent with an inter- dependent, but not with an independent, model of self and relating; anger was selected because it was thought to have the opposite connotations, New samples of Japanese and U.S. students read standardized vignettes describing these eliciting situations, and rated (I) their likelihood of occurrence ‘and (2) the degree to which the situations would elicit the intended emotion (anger or shame), In the United States, where shame violates the cultural model of independence, Wwe expected people to avoid shame, but in Japan, where shame is an expression of the cultural model of interdepencience, we 290 expected them to promote it. In contrast, we expected anger to be avoided in Japan (because it interferes with social harmony), and promoted in the United States (since it underlines independence). The findings pro- vided support for culturally different pat terns of situation selection. Situations that clicited higher levels of shame were rated as more likely to occur in Japan, and as less likely to occur in the United States, In con tast, situations that were thought to elicit more anger were rated as more frequent in the United States, and less frequent in Japan. Thus, the “social” selection of situations may contribute to the previously reported differences in the frequencies with which people in American and Japanese cultural contexts experience anger (disengaging) and shame (engaging) emotions (see Kitayama et al,, 2006), One way of understanding these findings is that Americans simply encoun: ter more anger-provoking situations, an Japanese more shame-provoking situations in their everyday lives. Social conventions may help to avoid situations of interper- sonal frustration in Japan, and situations of interpersonal eriticism in the United States, cespectively. In other words, social interac tions may be structured in culture-specific ways that affect emotional experience. Child-rearing practices provide another example of social situation selection affect- ing emotional experience, Several studies suggest that Japanese mothers structure their children’s environment in ways that encourage relative stability and modera- tion of emotion, whereas American mothers provide greater situational variability, thus increasing the probability that their children will experience a range of both positive and negative emotions (Rothbaum ct al., 2000}. Japanese mothers lull and comfort their infants more by soothing and maintaining close proximity to their children. In doing 0, they create a safe and stable environ ment, thus decreasing the likelihood that their children experience strong negative emotions. In contrast, American mothers allow their children more exploratory activ- ity and use more distal proximity strategies (ce, eye contact) than do Japanese mothers (Rothbaum et al., 2000). They offer their children the opportunity for exploration, and in doing so create more excitement but also greater potential for negative emotions, ——————— SOCIAL ASPECTS In summary, cultural differences in the common forms of social interaction account for differences in emotion experience. We speak of soefal sitwation selection if these differences in emotional experience match the vespective cultural models of self and relating, Several studies suggest the exis- fence of cultural differences in social situa- tion selection. Focus of Attention Culture may also be instrumental in regu- lating the focus of attention, or what in the emotion regulation literature has been called atientional deployment (Gross, 1998): the channeling of attention in ways that are con- ducive to the desired emotional outcome, There is some evidence that attention may be channeled in ways that are consistent with the cultural models, Individual Regulation of the Focus of Attention Cultural models. may affect individuals’ focus of attention on relatively different aspects of emotional situations. In 2 com- parative study on emotion perception, Japa- nese and Americans rated the emotions of ‘a central person expressing, anger, saditess, or happiness, who was surrounded by four other people (Masuda ct al., 2008), The facial expressions of the other people vat- ied, independent of the expression of the central person, Consistent with an indepen dent model, Americans exclusively focused attention on the central person's emotions, disregarding the emotions of the surround ing people. Consistent with an interdepet dent model, however, the Japanese focuses attention on the other people in the pierre as well, For example, Japanese rated the sadness of the central person to be hight if the other people in the situation were S488 well, relative to situations in which the out people were not sad. Eye tracking confit: that, compared to American participatty Japanese participants spent more time sa hing the periphery of the picture for facial expressions of the other people: Be fore, consistent with interdependent mo of self and relating, Japanese focused i attention on everybody involved in Theses situation, ae

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