5 Case Studies in International Relations

It is also possible the use the worksheet method with case studies in International
Relations, and this possibility greatly expands the range of application of the work­
sheet method in political science. The present chapter gives some case studies which
can be used as illustration or exercise in various fields of political science. These are
historical, i.e. they only use information available at the time decisions were made,
without the benefit of hindsight. These are the 1999–2003 Bush doctrine and the
1994–2007 North Korean nuclear standoff.

5.1 Bush Administration’s New Doctrine and Iraq

When, in March 1999, George W. Bush was considering running for President, his
tutors included both neo-conservative hawks, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Donald
Rumsfeld, and pragmatic realists, including Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice.2
During the campaign, neither side knew where it stood with the candidate. In the new
Bush administration, however, both camps were represented. The neo-conservatives
numbered Vice-President Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defence, and Wol­
fowitz as his Deputy Secretary. The pragmatic realists numbered Powell as Secretary
of State, a formidable counterweight. The two groups expressed varying views on
how to deal with Saddam Hussein. The hawks developed a military option and push
for increased aid to the Iraqi opposition. Powell advocated more targeted sanctions
that would allow more humanitarian goods into Iraq, while tightening controls on
items that could have military applications.
In summary, the new national security strategy stated that the United States pos­
sessed unprecedented strength and influence in the world. Ostensibly building on
the principles of freedom and the value of a free society, this position also came with
responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The strength of the nation was to be
used to promote a balance of power that favoured freedom.
To achieve these goals, the United States would:
–– champion aspirations for human dignity;
–– strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks
against us and our friends;
–– work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
–– prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with
weapons of mass destruction;
–– ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.

2 Sources include Keesing’s Record of World Events 2002, 2003, 2004, 2014.
 Bush Administration’s New Doctrine and Iraq   43

Following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on World Trade Towers, US President
Bush declared a War on Terror, targeting Iraq as a major player in an ‘Axis of Evil’.
Evidence for Iraqi involvement in the attacks was sketchy, but included a probable
contact between hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraq official in Czechoslovakia, as well
as evidence of defectors that prospective hijackers were trained at Salman Pak base.
From March to May 2002, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was unable to
persuade Iraqi representatives to allow inspectors return. A second attempt at talks
in Vienna with Iraq’s foreign minister, Naji Sabri, also failed – Sabri said any agree­
ment should have included route towards lifting sanctions, ending threats of regime
change, and ending no-flight zones. In August 2002, Iraq invited chief weapons
inspector to Baghdad for talks on resuming inspections. In September 2002, US Presi­
dent George W. Bush addressed a special session of the UN, and called for multilat­
eral action against Iraq. Iraq responded by announcing it would allow inspections
unconditionally, but quickly retracted the offer, making it conditional on no new US
resolutions. British Prime Minister Tony Blair released a dossier showing Iraq has sig­
nificant WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) capabilities, in an effort to gain support
for British role in projected US invasion. On November 8, 2002, UN Security Council
Resolution 1441 called on Iraq to cooperate with UN inspection teams and not to
obstruct UN forces. Iraq should declare all weapons of mass destruction in its posses­
sion by December 8, 2002. UNMOVIC inspection teams began inspecting sites in Iraq.
On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted documentation as required by UN Security
Council Resolution 1441 that details the disposal of weapons of mass destruction. The
document claimed that Iraq has disposed of all such weapons. Shortly thereafter, US
experts examining the documentation claimed it was neither complete nor convin­
cing. On January 27, 2003, reports by UNMOVIC inspector Hans Blix and International
Atomic Energy Commission head Mohamed El-Baradei were submitted.
On February 19, 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation agreed to begin
implementation of plans to provide military aid to Turkey. AWACS radar aircrafts,
Patriot missile systems and special units to combat biochemical weapons were to be
sent to the only NATO member country which shared borders with Iraq. The decision
was taken by the Defence Planning Committee to approve the start of military plan­
ning to defend Turkey if it came under attack. The Alliance also decided to form a
senior civil planning committee (SCPC) to provide civil emergency support to Turkey.
NATO has 17 AWACS in Germany and operated by 12 out of 19 Alliance member states.
The Patriot anti-missile batteries were shipped to Turkey from the Netherlands.
A second resolution was tabled at the UN on February 24, 2003, sponsored by
the US, the UK, and Spain. It was short and general, asserting that Iraq has failed to
comply with Resolution 1441, and re-stating its obligation to rid itself of nuclear, bio­
logical and chemical weapons. The 15-member Security Council was composed at the
time of the five permanent members (the US, France, the UK, China, and Russia) and
the elected members (Bulgaria, Cameroon, Guinea, Mexico, Syria, Germany, Spain,
Pakistan, Chile and Angola), with Germany then Guinea holding the Presidency.
44   Case Studies in International Relations

The draft United Nations Security Council resolution on Iraq presented to the
Council on February 24, 2003, was proposed by the United States and Britain and co-
sponsored by Spain. Its key points stated that Iraq has failed to take the final opportu­
nity afforded it in Resolution 1441. On March 7, Blix gave an oral report to the Security
Council. On March 19, 2003, US defence officials said the air strikes so far had been
of limited scope, and were designed to prepare the field for more intense operations.
US President George W Bush addressed the nation, saying that coalition forces had
begun striking targets of military importance in Iraq.
On March 17, France said President Bush’s ultimatum to Saddam Hussein is ‘con­
trary to the will of the UN Security Council. The US increased its terrorism alert to
orange, the second highest level. President Bush delivered a live television address,
saying Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours or face mili­
tary conflict. The former foreign secretary, Robin Cook, resigned, saying he could not
support a war without international agreement or domestic support. The UK advised
all its citizens, except diplomatic staff, to leave Kuwait. Reports emerge that UN
observers stationed along Kuwait’s border with Iraq have ceased all operations. The
US ordered non-essential diplomats to leave Israel, Syria and Kuwait.
On March 18 2003, The Pentagon confirmed new air strikes by the US and British
planes against what it says are surface-to-surface missiles and artillery in the no-fly-
zone in south-eastern Iraq. The US said 17 Iraqi soldiers surrendered to American
forces on the Kuwaiti border. The Iraqi leadership rejected the US ultimatum for Presi­
dent Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave the country. The UK House of Commons
voted on Iraq. French President Jacques Chirac denounced impending US invasion
as bound to undermine future efforts at peaceful disarmament. German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder said there was no justification for war against Iraq and no reason
to end the weapons inspections.
The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, had stressed
speed and decisiveness, the aim being to knock the Iraqi regime off-balance and to
keep it there. The three elements of the campaign were: an air campaign of great
intensity; a psychological warfare assault to convince the Iraqi military that resis­
tance was pointless; and a ground operation to encircle Baghdad. The hope was that
there would be only limited resistance from demoralised and isolated units. Those
that did fight would face the full force of American combat power. It was hoped the
Iraqi regime would collapse.
Unlike 1991, the air and ground phases of the plan were less distinct. There was to
be movement on the ground quite early in this campaign, and if resistance was light,
American and British forces were encouraged to continue advancing. It began with
air attacks against radars, surface-to-air missile systems and command and control
centres. New, so-called E-bombs could be used to destroy electrical circuitry. The aim
was to isolate Saddam Hussein and his senior commanders. There were fewer targets
than in 1991, but the attacks  – especially in the Baghdad area – were to be much
more intensive and concentrated into a much shorter time period. Attacks would be
 Bush Administration’s New Doctrine and Iraq   45

carried out with cheaper, and hence more numerous, more accurate satellite-guided
weapons. The aim of the US and British was to reduce these to a minimum and to
reduce damage to the civilian infrastructure to a minimum as well. They were likely
to be clearing up the mess afterwards and responsible for restoring essential services.
The psychological campaign, using leaflets and broadcasts, would only be
proven effective when war actually broke out. Within days – some people believed
hours US and British ground forces moved into Iraq. Some airmobile units might have
leap-frogged deep into the country. The bulk of the heavy US and British armour con­
centrated on the southern front where a number of water obstacles might pose chal­
lenges. If the advance was rapid then a key problem would be maintaining their lines
of supply. The US also wanted to get significant forces on the ground in northern Iraq
as quickly as possible to secure oilfields and to maintain order in Kurdish areas.
Some former US military officers worried the US had gathered insufficient forces
for a full-scale invasion of Iraq. In the military world, it is not so much the numbers
of troops or tanks that matter, but the way units and weapons systems combine to
provide combat power. The US and British deployment in the Gulf was actually rather
small. Some 250,000 soldiers – half the number assembled for the 1991 Gulf War –
actually provided about 150,000 US and British combat troops.
The outcome of this conflict was not in doubt. How long it was to take and the level
of casualties would depend upon the degree of Iraqi resistance. But the imbalance
between the two sides was stark. Urban warfare, in Baghdad for example, enabled
the Iraqis to inflict significant casualties on the Americans, but risked a terrible price
in civilian loss of life. Equally the use of chemical weapons could have caused some
problems for advancing American and British forces, but they were well-equipped
and trained. Civilian casualties, on the other hand, could be serious if the weapons
were used near inhabited areas.
Internationally, the stakes were high. The Administration hoped that victory in
Iraq would spread democracy in the Middle East, deter other dictators and vindicate
its policy of pre-emptive action. Bush was very explicit about the need for regime
change in Baghdad, and appealed directly to the Iraqi people in his speech, saying
the US would liberate them from an oppressive dictator.

Worksheet 5.1.1: Strategy

Issue/Problem How Bush is to deal with Iraq

Goal Topple Hussein regime

Core Idea (metaphor, slogan, etc.) Knock Iraq off balance

Tactics (actions or bundles of actions) 1 Plan combined assault

2 Confront Hussein with ultimatum

3 International diplomacy using the UN and NATO

46   Case Studies in International Relations

Worksheet 5.1.2: Key Actors

All Actors Can this actor affect achieving the goal?

(Yes/ No)

President of the United States Y

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Y

United Nations Security Council Y

Saddam Hussein N

Parliament of the United Kingdom Y

Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Y

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan N

NATO allied countries N

Worksheet 5.1.3: An Actor’s Actions and Tactics

Actor: President of the United States

Time/Date Action Is this a tactic?

(Yes/No)

Not known Approves new doctrine Y

September 11, 2001 Visits schools in Florida N

September 11, 2001 Declares war on terror Y

September 2002 Addresses United Nations General Assembly Y

January 2003 Gives Axis of Evil State of the Union address N

March 17, 2003 Delivers ultimatum to Hussein Y

March 19, 2003 Announces beginning of air strikes in address to the nation Y

Ongoing Chairs Cabinet meetings Y

 Bush Administration’s New Doctrine and Iraq   47

Worksheet 5.1.4: Key Resources

Resource Is there enough? Is this a ‘nice to Is this a ‘must

(Yes/No) have’? have’?

Secretary General of United Nations Y X

Secretary general of NATO Y X

Leader of United Kingdom Y X

Leader of Turkey Y X

Leaders of NATO allies countries Y X

US armed forces Y X

US federal budget for defence N X

Media Y X

Presidential staff Y X

Worksheet 5.1.5: Key Rules

Goal or Actor:President of the US

Rule Does this rule help reach Does breaking this rule
the goal? guarantee failure?

North Atlantic Treaty Y N

US Constitution Y Y

International law on war Y N

United Nations Charter Y N

UN Security Council procedures Y N

Worksheet 5.1.6: Factors Outside Anyone’s Control

Goal: remove Hussein from power

Factors that help Factors that don’t help

→ ← International crisis elsewhere

48   Case Studies in International Relations

Worksheet 5.1.7: Do-or-Die Moments

Steps to Goal Problem 1 Problem 2

Approves new doctrine

▾

Visits schools in Florida

▾

Declares war on terror

▾

Addresses the UN General Assembly

▾

Gives Axis of Evil State of the Union

address
▾

Delivers ultimatum to Hussein

▾

Announces beginning of air strikes in

address to the nation
▾

Use as many columns or rows as necessary. When the task is completed, bold or circle
each do-or-die moment.

Worksheet 5.1.8: Tactics, Countervailing Tactics

Goal, actor 1: President of the US Goal, Actor 2: Hussein

Tactics Tactics

Approves new doctrine → ← Declines ultimatum

Declares war on terror → ←

Addresses the UN General Assembly → ←

Gives Axis of Evil State of the Union address → ←

Delivers ultimatum to Hussein → ←

Announces beginning of air strikes in address to the → ←

nation
 The North Korean Nuclear Stand-Off   49

5.2 The North Korean Nuclear Stand-Off

On a visit to Pyongyang in October 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly

pressed the North on suspicions that it was continuing to pursue a nuclear energy
and missiles program, citing evidence of a secret uranium-enriching program carried
out in defiance of the 1994 Agreed Framework.3 Under this deal, North Korea agreed
to forsake nuclear ambitions in return for the construction of two safer light water
nuclear power reactors and oil shipments from the US. Later that month, the US
announced that North Korea had admitted in their talks to a secret nuclear arms
program. Initially the North appeared conciliatory. Kim Jong-Il said he would allow
international weapons inspectors to check that nuclear facilities are out of use.
The North-South Korea talks in Pyongyang were undermined by the North’s
nuclear program ‘admission’. US Secretary of State Colin Powell then said further
US aid to North Korea was now in doubt. The same month, five Japanese citizens
abducted by North Korea 25 years before were allowed a brief visit home. But they
ended up staying, thereby provoking more tension in the region.
The North adopted a mercurial stance, one moment defiantly defending its right
to weapons development, offering to halt nuclear programs in return for aid and the
signing of a non-aggression pact with the US the next. It argued that the US had not
kept to its side of the Agreed Framework, as the construction of the light water reac­
tors – due to be completed in 2003 – was now years behind schedule. US President
George W. Bush declared that the November oil shipments to the North would be the
last if the North does not agree to put a halt to its weapons ambitions.
In December 2002, North Korean-made Scud missiles were found aboard a
ship bound for Yemen, provoking American outrage. The US detained the ship, but
released it, conceding that neither country has broken any law. The North threatened
to reactivate nuclear facilities for energy generation, saying the Americans’ decision
to halt oil shipments left it with no choice, blaming the US again for wrecking the 1994
pact.
On December 13, North Korea asked the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to remove seals and surveillance equipment from its Yongbyon power plant,
then removed them itself. North-South Korea talks over reopening road and rail
border links stalled. North Korea began shipping fuel rods to the Yongbyon plant
which could be used to produce plutonium. The IAEA expressed concern and the two
IAEA nuclear inspectors were expelled from the country. North Korea also said it was
planning to reopen a reprocessing plant, which could start producing weapons-grade
plutonium within months.

3  Sources include BBC News, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2013; Keesing’s Record of World Events, 2002,
2003, 2004, 2005.
50   Case Studies in International Relations

In January 2003, the IAEA passed a resolution demanding that North Korea
readmit UN inspectors and abandon its secret nuclear weapons program. The US
said it was willing to talk to North Korea about how it met its obligations, but would
not provide goods to North Korea in exchange. North Korea then announced it would
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. US satellites tracked movement
at the Yongbyon plant throughout January.
In February 2003, North Korea said it had reactivated its nuclear facilities. The
IAEA found North Korea in breach of nuclear safeguards and referred the matter to
the UN Security Council. On February 24, 2003, North Korea fired a missile into the
sea between South Korea and Japan, firing a second one in March. On March 2, North
Korean fighter jets intercepted a US reconnaissance plane in international air space
and shadowed it for 22 minutes.
On April 1, the US announced that stealth fighters sent to South Korea for train­
ing would stay on. The UN Security Council expressed concern about North Korea’s
nuclear program. North Korea announced that it was willing to negotiate, having
started to reprocess its spent fuel rods. Talks did begin in Beijing, led by the US
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian affairs, James Kelly, and the deputy Direc­
tor General of North Korea’s American Affairs Bureau, Li Gun. Nonetheless, in May,
North Korea scrapped a 1992 agreement with the South to keep the peninsula free
from nuclear weapons, its last remaining international agreement on non-prolifera­
tion.
In June 2003, officials admitted to a visiting delegation of US congressmen that
the country had nuclear weapons. North Korea said that it would build a nuclear
deterrent, ‘unless the US gives up its hostile policy’. In August, it agreed to six-way
talks on its nuclear program – the US, Japan, China and Russia and the two Koreas.
The talks failed to bridge the gap.
In October, North Korea announced that it would display its nuclear deterrent,
and it also agreed to resume talks on the nuclear crisis. In December, it offered to
freeze its nuclear program in return for a list of concessions from the US. It warned
that if the US did not agree, it would not take part in further talks. The US declined.
In January 2004, an unofficial US team visited Yongbyon and was shown what
appeared to be weapons-grade plutonium, but no evidence of a nuclear bomb. In May,
the UN atomic agency investigated allegations that North Korea secretly sent uranium
to Libya. In June, a third round of six-nation talks was held in Beijing, with the US
making a new offer to allow North Korea fuel aid if it froze then dismantled its nuclear
programs. In July, US Secretary of State Colin Powell met the North Korean Foreign
Minister, Paek Nam Sun. North Korea later described US President George W. Bush
as an ‘imbecile’ and a ‘tyrant that puts Hitler in the shade’; in response to comments
President Bush made describing the North’s Kim Jong-Il as a ‘tyrant’. Following that
sparkling moment in diplomatic history, Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon told the
UN General Assembly that his country had turned plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel
rods into nuclear weapons.
 The North Korean Nuclear Stand-Off   51

In January 2005, North Korea expressed willingness to restart stalled talks on its
nuclear program. In February, North Korea suspended its participation in the talks
over its nuclear program and repeated its assertion to have built nuclear weapons
for self-defence. In April, South Korea noted that the Yongbyon reactor had been
shut down, a move which could allow it to extract more fuel for nuclear weapons.
On May 1, 2005, North Korea fired a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan. On May
11, it completed extraction of spent fuel rods from Yongbyon. On May 16, North and
South Korea held their first talks in 10 months. The US suspended efforts to recover
the remains of missing US servicemen in North Korea, saying restrictions placed on
its work were too great. In June, North Korea requested more food aid from the South,
and in July it said it would re-join nuclear talks.
In July, South Korea offered the North huge amounts of electricity as an incentive
to end its nuclear weapons program. The fourth round of six-nation talks in Beijing,
reached deadlock within two weeks, but after a month resumed. North Korea agreed
to give up all its nuclear activities and re-join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The US said it had no intention of attacking. But on September 20, North Korea said
it would not scrap its nuclear program until it is given a civilian nuclear reactor. In
December, North Korea announced it intended to resume building nuclear reactors,
because the US had pulled out of a key deal to build it two new reactors.
There the matter rested until April 2006, when a two-day meeting aimed at per­
suading North Korea to return to talks on its nuclear program failed. In July, Washing­
ton dismissed a threat by North Korea that it would launch a nuclear strike against the
US in the event of an American attack as ‘deeply hypothetical’. North Korea test-fired
at least six missiles. South Korea suspended food aid and the UN Security Council
unanimously banned exports and imports of missile-related materials. In September,
North Korea blamed the US financial sanctions for the deadlock in a speech to the
UN General Assembly. It carried out a nuclear test on October 9. As a result, the UN
Security Council voted unanimously to impose weapons and financial sanctions on
North Korea. The six-nation talks resumed briefly in December in Beijing, but without
progress.
In January 2007, the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, stated his country
could not tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea and called for closer international
co-operation to stop such an outcome. The six-nation nuclear talks then resumed, in
Beijing.4

4  BBC News. (2007) North Korea Nuclear Crisis. 8 February. (www.bbcnews.co.uk).

52   Case Studies in International Relations

Worksheet 5.2.1: Strategy

Issue/Problem Suspicions that North Korea is pursuing nuclear weapons

Goal Stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons

Core Idea (metaphor, slogan, etc.) Tame North Korea’s nuclear wild horse

Tactics (actions or bundles of actions) 1 Officials visit

2 Bargain goods

3 Display military strength

4 Participate in talks

Worksheet 5.2.2: Key Actors

All Actors Can this actor affect achieving

the goal? (Yes/ No)

US Y

North Korea Y

South Korea Y

Colin Powell Y

Jim Kelly N

Japanese citizens in North Korea N

President of the US Y

Yemen N

International Atomic Energy Association N

IAEA nuclear inspectors N

UN Security Council Y

Japan Y

Li Gun, Deputy Director, American Affairs Bureau, North Korea N

Russia Y

Libya N

Foreign Minister of North Korea, Paek Nam Sun N

Kim Jong IL, leader of North Korea Y

Vice foreign minister, North Korea N

US Secretary of State Y
 The North Korean Nuclear Stand-Off   53

continued Worksheet 5.2.2: Key Actors

All Actors Can this actor affect achieving

the goal? (Yes/ No)

Senior US diplomat N

Unofficial US inspection team N

Japanese Prime Minister Y

Worksheet 5.2.3: An Actor’s Actions and Tactics

Actor: United States

Time/Date Action A tactic?

October 2002 Presses North Korea on nuclear program Y

October 2002 Announces that North Korea admitted to the program Y

December 2002 Outraged to find scuds shipped to Yemen Y

January 2003 Detains ship Y

Announces movement at Yongbyon plant Y

February 2003 Sends reconnaissance plane, later intercepted Y

April 2003 Announces stealth fighters will remain in S. Korea Y

Leads talks in Beijing Y

June 2003 Sends delegation of Congressmen to North Korea N

January 2004 Sends unofficial inspection team to North Korea Y

May 2004 Suspends efforts to recover servicemen remains N

July 2004 Participates in six-nation talks Y

Says it won’t attack North Korea Y

July 2006 Dismisses North Korean threat Y

December 2006 Participates in six-nation talks Y

January 2007 Participates in six-nation talks Y

54   Case Studies in International Relations

Worksheet 5.2.4: Key Resources

Goal or Actor: US

Resource Is there enough? Is this a ‘nice to Is this a ‘must

(Yes/No) have’? have’?
International law Y X

Diplomatic ability of IAEA Y X

Diplomatic ability of Japanese Prime Minister Y X

US technical expertise Y X

Diplomatic ability of Kelly Y X

Diplomatic ability of Powell Y X

Oil Y X

Nuclear technology in US Y X

Goodwill of North Korea N X

International nuclear agreements Y X

US credibility with North Korea Y X

North Korean credibility with US N X

Worksheet 5.2.5: Key Rules

Goal or Actor: US

Rule Does this rule help Does breaking this rule

reach the goal? guarantee failure?
International law on sovereignty N N

International law on nuclear technology Y N

Non-aggression pact Y Y

Agreed framework Y N

Informal rules of international diplomacy N N

Worksheet 5.2.6: Factors Outside Anyone’s Control

Goal: Stop nuclear weapons in North Korea

Factors that help Factors that don’t help

Famine in North Korea → ← Nuclear technology available on black market

 The North Korean Nuclear Stand-Off   55

Worksheet 5.2.7: Do or Die Moments

Steps to Goal Problem 1 Problem 2 Problem 3

Presses North Korea on

nuclear program ▾

Announces that North

Korea admitted to the
program ▾

Outraged that North

Korean scuds are found
on their way to Yemen ▾

Detains ship ▾

Announces that there

was movement at
Yongbyon plant ▾

Sends reconnaissance
plane, which is inter-
cepted ▾

Announces stealth fight- Leads talks in Beijing ▾

ers will remain in South
Korea ▾

Sends delegation of
Congressmen to North
Korea ▾

Sends unofficial nuclear

inspection team to North
Korea ▾

Suspends efforts to Participates in 6-nation

recover remains of talks ▾
servicemen ▾

Says it won’t attack

North Korea ▾

Dismisses threat ▾

Participates in 6-nation
talks ▾

Use as many columns or rows as necessary. When the task is completed, bold or circle
each do-or-die moment.
56   Case Studies in International Relations

Worksheet 5.2.8: Tactics, Countervailing Tactics

Goal, actor 1: Stop North Korea from developing Goal, Actor 2: Get as much as possible for agree-
nuclear weapons ment to not develop

Tactics Tactics

Presses North Korea on nuclear program → ← Admits to nuclear program

Announces that North Korea admitted to the → ← Participates in talks with South Korea
program

Outraged that North Korean Scuds are found → ← Defends weapons development
on their way to Yemen

Detains ship → ← Offers halt

Announces that there was movement at → ← Accuses US of defaulting on agreement

Yongbyon plant

Sends reconnaissance plane, which is inter- → ← Makes confusing or ambiguous statement

cepted

Announces stealth fighters will remain in → ← Ships Scud missiles

South Korea

Leads talks in Beijing → ← Blames US for Agreed Framework

Sends delegation of Congressmen to North → ← Asks IAEA to remove surveillance equipment

Korea from nuclear facility

Sends unofficial nuclear inspection team to → ← Removes IAEA equipment from nuclear facil-
North Korea ity

Suspends efforts to recover remains of → ← Ships fuel rods to Yongbyon

servicemen

Participates in six-nation talks → ← Announces withdrawal from Non Proliferation

treaty

Says it won’t attack North Korea → ← Insults President of US

Dismisses North Korean threat → ← Says it reactivated plants

Participates in six-nation talks → ← Fires missiles into sea

Participates in six-nation talks → ← Announces it is reprocessing spent rods

→ ← Scraps last nuclear agreement

→ ← Announces it is building a nuclear deterrent

→ ← Offers concessions

→ ← Offers to restart six-party talks

→ ← Makes contradictory statements

 The North Korean Nuclear Stand-Off   57

Other Applications
The worksheet method has been used successfully to analyse a wide range of situa­
tions in International Relations, including Dark Winter, a US preparedness exercise,
Arctic sovereignty, and the Gulf War.
Part II: Simulations And Exercises
The theory and practice of politics is often covered by a combination of lectures deliv­
ery and long form written work – essays, examinations, etc. A simulation exercise,
on the other hand, presents all the advantages of active pedagogy, as well as cover­
ing some of the basic themes typically present in upper-year or – division courses.
Role-play simulations are extensively established in the literature on teaching and
learning at the university level (Woodworth and Gump, 1982; Walcott, 1976; Gould,
1979). In recent years, classroom role-play simulations have been used for Cabinet
and budget processes in courses on Canadian Politics at the University of Toronto,
for determining foreign policy at Dalhousie University, for determination of future
Canadian policy in Afghanistan by the Senlis Council, and in single class simulations
in comparative politics at the University of Delaware. The second part of this book
describes the simulations, outlines the content and concepts covered, explains how
the simulation can be integrated into a twelve- or fourteen-week course, and speci­
fies requirements to maximise student learning. The instructor also stands to learn a
good deal about politics from students, because the collective research capacity of the
students always exceeds his or her own. However, the most recent political develop­
ments tend to come up in any simulation, making them more predictable than they
might at first seem. Not only are these simulations fun, students develop skills as
well as knowledge, but motivation to work is less of a problem for students, given the
cooperative competitive nature of them.
Some role-play simulations use the generic analysis worksheets discussed previ­
ously. Others have worksheets specifically developed.