1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH IN

DEFENSE

1.1 The Need for Operations Research in Defense

Almost all countries spend sizable portions of their budgets in the procurement and
development of weapons with increasing lethalities. This is because each country
desires to enhance its military power to maintain supremacy over its adversaries and
deter them from undertaking any provocative action. To meet this objective, each
country acquires more and more weapon systems either through procurement or
through design and development. However, acquisition of weapons involves
enormous expenditure, and therefore it is imperative for defense decision makers to
assess the long term consequences of their acquisition plans well in advance.
Besides the issues pertaining to weapons acquisition, defense executives may be
concerned with the following types of questions: Can the threat to a country be
quantified? What are the chances of war between the two countries? Who is likely
to win? What will be the consequences if the force levels are reduced on a
unilateral, bilateral or multi-lateral basis?

Similarly, military commanders may be interested in knowing the answers to the

following questions: What is the effectiveness of a weapon system or a tactical plan
in a plausible combat scenario? If the various factors influencing the performance
of a system can be expressed qualitatively, can the performance be quantified?
What force mix should be deployed for a specified mission? How many different
types of weapons should be deployed on various sites to provide cost-effective
defense? How should weapons be assigned to targets to achieve a specified
objective? ]s the thumb rule of 3: I force ratio for an attacker to achieve success
against a defender valid? Can the training of officers through field exercises be
augmented by simulated combat exercises in the laboratory?

The above questions are to be answered considering the environment at the

battlefield that has undergone rapid changes due to enhanced pace of activity,
increased lethality of weapons and military technology. These have resulted in
providing lesser time and greater ambiguity in the information received for
decision making. Also, the execution of decisions is likely to result in serious
consequences. Hence, effective synchronization of forces and their deployment at
the right place and time have become essential. Commanders must be able to see,

N. K. Jaiswal, Military Operations Research : Quantitative Decision Making

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997
2 Military Operations Research

understand and interpret the scenario, visualize the consequences and communicate
appropriate decisions to their staff.

The surveillance and communication technologies have increased manifold,

thereby enabling the commanders to have continuous vigil, information updates and
real time communication of important changes in the enemy territory. The
technology is also available to filter, correlate and fuse the information flowing
from various sources so that the commander is fully informed without being present
on the battlefield. Modem computers have helped in carrying out the above
activities through their capabilities of networking, graphics, handling large
databases and fast data processing. To a certain extent, computers have also helped
in supplementing human decision making through knowledge-based systems and
expert systems. Battlefield commanders can now access detailed information
regarding terrain features and ambient environment prevailing in the battlefield.
Some of the information is now available to the commanders on their computer
screens which present digitized cartographic displays and tactical deployment of
4
forces. These serve as quick and comprehensive decision aids. Thus effective C I
(command, control, communication, computers and Intelligence) has become vital
for decision making.

The advancement in weapon technology is also significant due to enhanced

lethality and accuracy. Precision guided munitions, laser guided bombs and smart
weapons with capabilities of homing on the target accurately are important
developments arising out of impact of science and technology. These deadly
weapons are supported by force multipliers and fire control systems for increasing
their effectiveness.

The above developments have generated additional difficulties in decision

making in defense. Estimates of probabilities of detection, acquisition, hit and kill
4
are influenced by C I, electronic counter and counter-counter measures and the
effect of these have to be incorporated in the modeling of military systems. These
pose challenges to the military modeling community in carrying out scientific
analysis to support decision making of commanders and executives that is
generally based on intuition, judgment and experience. The science that helps
military commanders and executives in arriving at rational decisions is called
Operations Research (OR).

1.2 The Birth of OR

The birth of OR can be formally attributed to the work of Professor P.M.S.

Blackett, who along with a team of scientists and engineers, was asked by the
British Government to advise on technical problems arising out of induction of new
weapons and equipment during World War II. The group observed several tactical
 Operations Research in Defense 3

situations wherein certain weapons and equipment were not utilized in an optimal
manner, and it was found that better technical performance could have been
realized if their deployment had been judiciously chosen through scientific analysis.

One of the classical examples is that of depth setting of a 'depth charge' (a kind
of bomb used for underwater explosion at pre-specified depth) to be dropped by
aircraft against submarines. Initially the attacks were judged to be unsuccessful as
not many submarines were reported sunk. As an alternative, EJ.WiIliams, a
member of Professor Blackett's team, was asked to consider the possibility of
designing a depth charge with an influence fuze that could be detonated by
proximity to the submarine rather than by water pressure (see McCloskey I987b).
Thus the depth charge would explode, as it fell through the water near the
submarine, irrespective of its depth. The depth setting of depth charge was based
on the assumption that a submarine would, on the average, sight the attacking
aircraft some two minutes before the instant of attack and that in this time, it could
dive to a depth of about ISO ft. Consequently an explosion at a depth of ISO ft.
would be fatal to the submarine.

The fallacy in the above argument was that in cases when the submarine sighted
the aircraft a long way off, it disappeared out of sight of the air crew, and therefore,
the air crew could not know where to drop the depth charge thus making the
effective accuracy in the attack plan very low. Also, in a few cases, when the
submarine failed to detect the aircraft and was therefore on the surface, an
explosion of a depth charge at ISO ft. failed to damage the submarine, as the lethal
radius of the depth charge was about 20 ft. Thus the existing method of setting the
depth charge at 150 ft. failed to sink deep submarines owing to the low bombing
accuracy, and failed to sink surface submarines due to small lethal radius.

Using available data and simple analysis it became clear that if the depth setting
was reduced from 150 ft. to 25 ft. and the pilots were instructed not to drop the
depth charge if the submarine had already submerged for more than half a minute
(see Morse and Kimball 1951), one would expect the average number of
submarines sunk for a given number of attacks to increase by more than two times.
Thus there was no need to develop an influence fuze to improve the effectiveness
of depth charge. This recommendation was accepted and implemented.
Subsequently enemy intelligence reported that perhaps a much more powerful depth
charge had been put into operation, which enhanced the casualties of their
submarines by more than two times!

The above example illustrates that in many cases, improvement in a system

could be achieved by merely carrying out a scientific analysis of the operations
involved, and identifying a better way in which the system should be operated. It
may be emphasized that in the problem cited, there were two alternatives to meet
the objective of improving the number of submarines sunk: (i) Designing new
4 Military Operations Research

depth charge with an influence fuze and (ii) Changing the depth setting of the depth
charge. Obviously, option (ii) led to an inexpensive and immediate solution.

A lucid account of several simple operational problems analyzed during World

War II is given by Morse and Kimball (1951). Several reminiscences of the initial
OR work done in UK and USA before and during World War II have been reported
by Falconer (1976), Lamder (1984), McCloskey (1987a, 1987b, 1987c),
Cunningham et al. (1984), Lovell (1988), Sawyer et at. (1989), and Christopherson
and Baughan (1992).

The success of scientific analysis in solving tactical problems in World War II

led to the birth of the science of Operational Research (Operations Research as it
was called in USA and countries following American English).

After the war, the scientists and engineers associated with Professor Blackett
moved to various sectors such as transport, health, industry, etc. Each of these
scientists and engineers was convinced that the operations under his control could
be analyzed scientifically and a better method for carrying out the operation could
be investigated.

While applying this concept to the operations under the control of managers in
different sectors, it became clear that the operations in different sectors had
commonalties. For example, problems of congestion in military workshops,
handling of traffic at dockyards and examining patients at hospitals constitute the
same queueing operation. Therefore, an operation in the defense sector or the
transport sector or the health sector may require the same type of analysis. This led
to the concept of Operations Research as a collection of tools and techniques which
could be used for improving systems under the control of a manager irrespective of
his field of activity. Some of these techniques are : Queueing Theory,
Mathematical Programming, Inventory Control, PERT/CPM, Search Theory, Game
Theory, Simulation, etc.

Another development in scientific decision making took place at the beginning

of 1960 when Mr. Robert S. McNamara took over as Secretary, Department of
Defense, USA. It was realized that the techniques of Operations Research which till
then were largely used for near future or existing operations, could not be used for
vital decision making regarding induction of weapons. This was mainly because of
the following reasons: The life cycle of a complicated weapon spanned over 15 to
20 years due to scientific and technological developments, the cost of development
has increased enormously, and the concept of weapon affiliation to a Service had
lost its importance, e.g., a rocket could be considered as a long range artillery
weapon belonging to the Army or an unguided missile belonging to the Air Force.
Due to long range planning, the decision making scenario contained a larger
number of uncertainties and risks. Also, the decision of acquiring a weapon did
 Operations Research in Defense 5

not depend only on the specific requirement of a particular Service that sponsored
the proposal but needed to be analyzed in the wider context of national security.
Due to these reasons it became clear that the decision making problems of weapon
acquisition were no more amenable to structured analysis of OR. This led to the
birth of a new scientific discipline named Systems Analysis (SA).

The basic thought behind Systems Analysis can be explained as " a systematic
approach to helping a decision maker choose a course of action by investigating his
full problem, searching out objectives and alternatives, and comparing them in the
light of their consequences, using an appropriate framework - insofar as possible
analytic - to bring expert judgment and intuition to bear on the problem" (see
Quade and Boucher 1968). This suggests that a cycle consisting of definition of
objectives, exploration of alternatives, and evaluation of alternatives in terms of
their costs and effectiveness, needs to be considered. The cycle may be repeated in
the light of new information required while redefining the objectives and,
identification and evaluation of alternatives, till the total spectrum is clearly
understood. Consequently, during the early sixties, a large number of weapon
evaluation and cost effectiveness studies were carried out, mainly in USA, to advise
decision makers regarding weapon acquisition programs. Thereafter Systems
Analysis became a recognized activity in the defense sector.

As in the case of OR, Systems Analysis, after its initial success in defense, found
applications in civil sectors. Much debate followed subsequently whether OR and
SA were the same or different. It is true that initially OR and SA evolved from
short (tactical) and long (strategic) range planning perspectives respectively.
However, this distinction faded out soon. We, therefore, do not make any
distinction between these two decision making sciences in what follows and address
them as OR only.

1.3 Military OR

OR has been applied to almost all activities of human endeavor. However, we

restrict ourselves in this book to Military Operations Research (MOR). The word
'military' stresses on the applications that are relevant to decision making in
defense. It does not mean, however, that the techniques and tools discussed here
have no relevance to the non-military sectors. In fact, in view of the commonality
discussed earlier, the techniques and tools of Operations Research remain largely
the same irrespective of the sector. However, MOR deals with operations that may
be different from those arising in economic and social activities. For example, in the
civil sector it is unusual for an aircraft to fly at a speed of more than 3 Mach and at
an altitude of more than 75,000 feet or a nuclear powered submarine carrying
nuclear missiles lying below the frozen ice. Even air-to-air refueling or aircraft
taking-off from ships in open seas and destruction by weapon systems are
6 Military Operations Research

specifically military activities having no parallel in civil sector. The extreme

capabilities of systems including personnel in defense arise since warfare is a purely
competitive activity in which one side wins if and only if the other side is
completely or partially annihilated (see Washburn 1994).

Another important aspect of war is that it occurs rarely and has large
uncertainties and complexities. Due to this, the analysis and planning of military
operations are more complicated and difficult than civilian operations. Availability
and reliability of war data pose another problem in analyzing military operations.

The objectives in many such operations are expressed in terms of casualties of

men and material, loss of territory and achievement of goals. The measure of
effectiveness may, therefore, not be expressed in terms of cost which is normally
the criterion in civil operations. This poses a problem of comparing the
effectiveness of a number of systems involved in a military operation. For example,
comparing the effectiveness of a gun with a tank is much more difficult than
comparing two systems in civil sector which can be compared on the basis of cost.

In view of the above, the application of OR to military sector poses unique

modeling problems and raises issues pertaining to establishing relevant measures of
effectiveness. As such, study of applications of OR to military operations, as
different from applications to civil sectors, becomes important and relevant.

As a formal definition of Military Operations Research, we may modify the

definition of OR by Morse and Kimball (1951) and define Military OR as "a
scientific method of providing defense departments with a quantitative basis for
decisions regarding the operations under their control".

1.4 Methodology of OR Analysis

The performance of a system can be augmented either by technological

improvements in hardware, or through an analysis of its existing operating
procedures to identify the one that optimizes a specified measure of effectiveness.
The 'management' generally identifies alternative procedures or courses of action
(COAs), and selects the action to be taken on the basis of their judgment,
experience and intuition. It may be possible that the decision arrived at by the
management is the best amongst possible alternative COAs but OR provides a
method of examining the alternatives scientifically and therefore helps in
quantitative and rational decision making.

How does an OR analyst carry out this analysis? A schematic diagram

representing the various steps generally used for an OR study is given in Fig. 1.1.
 Operations Research in Defense 7

Problem Fonuulation

Data Collection
and
Model Solution

Evaluation
and
Implementation

Fig. 1.1 : Steps of an OR Study

Each of these steps will be illustrated by an example in which the decision maker
has to select the best air defense (AD) gun system out of the available alternatives.

(i) Problem Formulation: This is the first and the most important step of an OR
analysis in which the analyst holds discussions with the management to understand
and appreciate the problem to be solved, identifies the objectives and generates the
alternatives (Keeney 1994). The analyst also selects the variables affecting the
problem, the constraints imposed due to various limitations, and detenuines the
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE). The initial definition of the problem or the
measure(s) of effectiveness or the COAs may change after discussions.

For the example of AD gun system selection, the word 'best' may mean a gun
system that has maximum Cumulative Kill Probability (CKP) against specified
enemy aircraft averaged over a number of likely scenarios. Thus an average CKP
may be defined as the MOE for this problem. It may be emphasized that a number
of different MOEs are possible to define. For example, one may define the MOE in
tenus of the value of the surviving assets of the friendly forces or in tenus of the
cost of enemy offensive weapons required to inflict a specified damage on the
8 Military Operations Research

assets of the friendly forces defended by alternative AD gun systems ( see

Brodheim et al. 1967).

(ii) Model Development: The word 'model' is familiar to all of us. Most of us
would be able to recall that we use toys as models to represent and explain real life
objects to our children. Our teachers used models of atoms and molecules to
explain molecular structures in our chemistry classes. These are called 'scalar' or
'iconic' models. Similarly, the maps, diagrams and charts used in various classes or
seminar presentations are 'schematic' models. In OR analysis, 'symbolic' models
are generally used which are in the form of mathematical equations and represent
relationships between various 'uncontrollable' (which can not be changed by the
management in the normal course) and 'controllable' variables. The analyst aims at
determining the values of controllable variables so as to optimize the Measure of
Effectiveness. For the example of AD gun system selection, if the objective is
maximization of CKP, the model development involves establishing a mathematical
relationship between CKP and the probability of hit, number of rounds fired during
engagement, probability of detection, probability of fuze functioning, number of
barrels in the gun, etc. Such a relation can be easily established for this simple
problem and is given, for a specific threat scenario, by

b
CKP= 1- n(I-SSKPJ
i= I

and

where Pd = Probability of detection x Prob. of acquisition x Prob. of tracking

P~ = Probability of hit of the ith round
pf = Probability of fuze functioning of the ith round
P~/h = Probability of kill by the ith round if it hits the target
b = Number of barrels in the gun system
n = Number of rounds per barrel fired during engagement.

Each of the probabilities, namely Pd , P~, pf and pLh is evaluated either

analytically, empirically or through simulation in terms of the parameters relating to
the characteristics of the gun, ammunition and target.

Models are used either for purposes of prediction or prescription. In Chapter 9,

we develop models to predict the winning side in a given combat situation. In case
of prescription, we wish to specify a certain state of the system and answer the
question as to how do we operate or control the system so that the system behaves
as we want it to behave. Again referring to combat modeling in Chapter 10, we
consider optimization models wherein we ask the question as to how many Red
 Operations Research in Defense 9

forces should be deployed so as to ensure its win over Blue while minimizing the
number of casualties suffered. For an interesting discussion on predictive and
prescriptive models, reference may be made to Simon (1990).

(iii) Data Collection and Model Solution: Once the model has been formulated,
relevant data are collected and the model is solved either analytically or through
simulation. The analytical method helps to explicitly obtain an expression between
the MOE and the system variables. This method is better since it helps to study the
effect of controllable variables on the system effectiveness. The simulation is an
experimental approach on the model and is preferred in situations where analytic
solution is not possible or difficult.

For the AD gun problem, a mix of analytical and simulation methods may be
adopted. The probabilities of hit and damage could be evaluated either through
simulation or analytically. The probability of fuze functioning can be determined
from experimental data. .

(iv) Model Validation: A model is a representation of the real world situation and
therefore the model solution is expected to closely predict the behavior of the real
world system. One may like to know the closeness of this prediction. If the results
of the system operation are available, we can statistically compare model results
with those obtained from system operation. Statistical analysis, therefore, plays an
important role in model validation. This includes analysis of variance, tests for
goodness of fit, regression and correlation analysis. Military system studies,
however, suffer from lack of historical data and therefore in most cases, the model
validation gets limited to the perception of the military experts.

The problem of model validation has been extensively discussed by Gass (1983)
who mentions the following concepts for validating models:

(a) Face validity or expert opinion: When the model is demonstrated to experts
who are aware of the system being modeled, do they feel satisfied with the behavior
of the model, i.e., is the model credible?

(b) Variable - parameter validity or sensitivity analysis: If an analysis is carried

out, do the changes in model output due to changes in variables and parameters
occur in accordance with the real world system?

(c) Hypothesis validity: If pairwise or higher level relationships of the model are
studied, do these correspond to similar relationships in the real world system?

Military systems may lead to casualties or destruction and therefore are difficult
to replicate. At best one can use data from field trials in which dummy targets are
used. However, the data from field trials may not have the details as required for a
10 Military Operations Research

scientific study. Presumably, the expert opinion, sensitivity analysis and hypothesis
validity are the only possibilities for model validation in military systems.

For the example discussed above, the sub-models for detection, acquisition,
tracking and hit probabilities, fuze functioning and damage probability may be
validated individually using past data. Also, the model may be validated from field
trial results for existing AD gun systems.

(v) Evaluation and Implementation : Once the model has been validated, the
available alternatives or COAs are evaluated by determining their MOEs. The
analyst then recommends the preferred alternatives in the order of their suitability
for meeting the defined goal. The responsibility of deciding or rejecting the
preferred course of action, however, lies on the decision maker or the executive. In
view of this, Military OR provides an aid to the military executive in rational
decision making.

1.5 Success of a Military OR Study

In this section, we emphasize on some of the factors which should be kept in view
while organizing a military OR study.

(i) Composition of the Team : OR analysis requires a team of analysts from

different disciplines. For military OR, military officers from the concerned service,
to which the problem under study belongs, should be associated with the team to
assist in problem formulation, data collection and model validation. This
requirement is much more important in constituting a Military OR team than in
other areas of applications. The background and experience of the military officers
help in better communication with the decision maker and in the interpretation and
implementation of recommended courses of action. Besides the military officers,
specialists with OR background and software development experience are essential.

(ii) Data Availability : Military OR studies suffer due to non-availability of

required data. This affects model development and validation. Military data,
particularly from the operations, are either not available or are confidential. In
either case, the data are generally not kept with as much detail as desired by the
analyst for study and may not be reliable. The availability and reliability of data
needed for analysis should be ensured.

(iii) Mutual Understanding between the Analyst and the Decision Maker :
Enhancing 'mutual understanding' between the analyst and the decision maker is
vital for implementation of an OR study (see Churchman and Schainblatt 1965).
Transportability of software, interactive computing and graphics features of
Personal Computers (PCs) have already played an important role in enhancing the
 Operations Research in Defense 11

mutual understanding. OR analysts should appreciate these capabilities of

computer systems in communicating the essence of an OR study to the decision
maker in its simplest form. The graphics facilities available on workstations have
already helped in developing more realistic war games as tactical trainers (see
Chapter 4). The concept of Visual Interactive Modeling (see Bell 1991) in which
OR models and MIS/graphics are interfaced through interactive algorithms to
provide a dynamic animated view will further improve mutual understanding.

(iv) Duration of an OR Study: Military OR studies are time bound and complex.
The pressure from decision makers on an OR analyst seems to be much more in
military sector than in other sectors. Current developments in parallel computing,
faster algorithms and heuristics should be fully utilized by military OR analysts in
meeting the deadlines set by the decision makers.

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