Imperfect Cognitions

In today's post Quassim Cassam (Warwick) is presenting his

new book, Conspiracy Theories (Polity, 2019). See also his
post on the Polity Books blog on why we should not ignore
conspiracy theories, and the interview on the New Books
Network on conspiracy theories as a form of propaganda.

In my book, I address four questions: What is a conspiracy

theory? Why do people believe them? What is the problem
with conspiracy theories? How should we respond to them?
The take home message of the book is that conspiracy
theories are a form of political propaganda. This is, in a
technical sense, their function, and also what makes them
dangerous. The deeper meaning of conspiracy theories is
political, and these theories are as pernicious as the political
causes they promote. In practice, these causes have often
been extremist causes. Anti-Semitism is part of the DNA of
conspiracy theories, and even seemingly apolitical theories
are a gateway to more overtly political theories.

Here is one popular but misguided way of thinking about

conspiracy theories: a conspiracy theory is a theory that
explains a significant happening by reference to the actions
of a small group of people working in secret to do
something harmful. Some conspiracy theories are true,
others are false. We are justified in believing a conspiracy
theory – say that theory that 9/11 was an inside job – when
the evidence supports it. As philosophers we can argue
about what counts as evidence, and what it would take for
us to be justified in believing a particular conspiracy theory.
However, there is no justification for thinking that we could
never be justified in believing a conspiracy theory.

On this account, conspiracy theories can be adequately

understood and assessed using the standard tools of the
epistemologist or philosopher of science. To think of
conspiracy theories in this way is to epistemologize them. In
contrast, the propaganda model I defend in my book
politicizes them, that is, recognises and focuses on their
political or ideological function. I distinguish between well-
documented theories about conspiracies – like the theory
that Al Qaeda was responsible for 9/11 - and capital C,
capital T Conspiracy Theories. As well as being politically
motivated, the latter tend to be speculative, esoteric and
amateurish. The theory that 9/11 was an inside job is not just
a theory about a conspiracy but a Conspiracy Theory.

It is typical of a certain kind of philosopher not to see the

politics of Conspiracy Theories but that doesn’t make it any
less of a mistake. I contend that it is also a mistake to
psychologize Conspiracy Theories, that is, to understand
belief in them purely psychological terms. To take an
obvious example, Hitler and Stalin were Conspiracy
Theorists because Conspiracy Theories were integral to
their political ideologies. To explain their conspiracy
theorizing by reference to their cognitive biases or a
psychological trait they had in common is not just
implausible but also misses the ideological purpose of their
theories. Conspiracy Theories are as pernicious as the
ideologies they promote, and their social harms also need to
be taken into account.

This shows the importance of combatting conspiracy

theories by highlighting their politics. The philosophy of
conspiracy theories is an increasingly popular research
area, and a number of influential figures in this area are
sympathetic to conspiracy theories. Such conspiracy
apologists either miss the point of conspiracy theories
altogether or misunderstand their real political significance.
Either way, they risk associating themselves with repellent
political ideologies.