SILVIA CORNA • a57767 • Catástrofes Ambientais e Sociedade • Universidade Nova de Lisboa • 2018/19

UNEQUAL RISK DISTRIBUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL

MIGRATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE GAPS
- the case of Italy as destination country -
ABSTRACT

1. RISK DISTRIBUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHES

2. DIFFICULTIES IN THE DEFINITION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRANTS

3. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION

4. STUDY CASE: ITALY - AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON

a. Framework on actual political positions regarding migration
b. Finding a relation: environmental catastrophes in the main countries of origin

CONCLUSIONS

ABSTRACT
According to the statistics of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 26.4 million persons
around the world have been displaced by environmental catastrophes. A 2018 Report of the
World Bank, predicts that the number of internal migration within Asia, Africa and Latin America
will rase to 140 million by 2050, as a consequence of climate change.
Many of them, though, decide to migrate outside their country of origin, which often lack of an
adequate social security system. The most vulnerable countries to environmental catastrophes
and climate change are namely those who are less responsible for the current environmental
crisis.
The purpose of the first part of this study (paragraphs 1, 2 and 3) is to demonstrate the need of
an urgent action in term of recognition and legislation of environmental migrants, starting from
the considerations of the sociologist Ulrich Beck on the distribution of the risk.
In his renowned book Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity , Beck concludes that the exposure
to the risk is directly connected with social and economical factors. Country with poor
economies are the most vulnerable to environmental catastrophes, and this calls into question
a matter of justice, that needs to be address both on the national and global level.
The international discussion, though, is still stuck to the point of finding terms and definition for
this growing phenomenon of environmentally driven displacements, a step which is yet
necessary for a future building of an international legislative system.
At the national level, there have been some initiative to deal with this type of migration.
Italy, on the other hand, recently adopted a particularly closed position on the topic of
immigration, closing the ports to all the migrants besides those who flee from violence, war or
persecution (as is one of the signatories of the Geneva Convention).
In the second part of this study study (paragraph 4) we will try to find a relation between the
waves of migrants that came to Italy in the year 2017 and the environmental situation in their
country of origin, with the purpose to demonstrate a relation and claim for the need of a
different treatment for those who flee from a situation of profound environmental injustice.
1. RISK DISTRIBUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHES
Environmental catastrophes do not affect everybody in the same way. There is a
strong relation between wealth and vulnerability, that affects the spacial distribution of
the risk.
Vulnerability is a complex factor that does not have an unique definition; it can be
generally defined as “the capacity to be physically or emotionally wounded or hurt”
(Oxford English Dictionary), or more specifically related to the level of destruction by
which an element is subject in case of occurrence of a factor that generate risk
(Varnes, 1984). As J. Ford reports in his paper, “there is a broad agreement that
vulnerability in its simplest denotative sense means the capacity for harm in a system
in response to a stimulus”. It depends on two factors: resistance, the capacity to
oppose to change, and resilience, the capacity to recover back to the original status.
When analyzing this factor is also important to consider the scale. “Vulnerability has
been used at many different scales including the household, community, region and
nation, although most studies emphasize the nation or household level”. (Leichenko
and O'Brien 2002)
Both resistance and resilience strongly depend on the concept of wealth.
Ulrich Beck analyzes this linkage in his book Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity:
“The history of risk distribution shows that, like wealth, risks adhere to the class pattern, only inversely:
wealth accumulates at the top, risks at the bottom. To that extent, risks seem to strengthen, not to
abolish, the class society. Poverty attracts an unfortunate abundance of risks. By contrast, the wealthy (in
income, power or education) can purchase safety and freedom from risk”. (Beck, 1992)
Beck underlines three important factors related to wealth: income (financial
resources), power and education. The three of them have a strong impact on
vulnerability of an individual, household, community, region or nation.
Limited financial resources often mean fragile constructions, which can undergo a
larger scale destruction in case of catastrophe (es. slums), a weaker security
apparatus (absent civil protection,...), less technologies to address the emergency
situations and a small chance to recover back to the previews status.
Power and education also have a relevant role in this context. Western countries, for
example, used their power to move a massive part of the risks included in
modernization and intensive industrialization to “underdeveloped1” countries,
benefiting of a situation of lack of safety regulations.
“Hazardous industries have been transferred to the low-wage countries of the Third World. This is no
coincidence. There is a systematic 'attraction' between extreme poverty and extreme risk. In the shunting
yard where risks are distributed, stations in 'underdeveloped provincial holes' enjoy special popularity”
(Beck, 1992)

1 The quotes are related to an inside critic toward the western concept of development, that was imposed to the rest
of the world since the last century and is now leading to a even worst scenario because of the insurmountable
planet boundaries.
Education has a key role too, related to the awareness to the risks. The access to
factories and chemicals is often seen as a way of emancipations for those countries, a
way to “gain a bit of independence from the power centers of the industrial world”
(Beck, 1992). The implicit risks are very often unknown or underestimate.
Nowadays, with the exacerbation of climate change and the globalization of its effects,
injustices related to the distribution of the risk are becoming wider. While western
countries own more knowledge and technology to adapt to climate change and to
respond to the increasing environmental disasters, southern countries are more
vulnerable to their effects. The unfairness is even more considerable if we look at it in
term of responsibilities. As is well known, wester countries are the primarily
responsible for global warming, but they are more resistant and resilient to its effects.
However, the author emphasize that in the long term, “risks display an equalizing
effect within their scope and among those affected by them. [...] the 'class' of the
'affected' does not confront a 'class' that is not affected. It confronts at most a 'class'
of not-yet affected people”. (Beck, 1992) No one will be able to escape the effects of
climate change or to all the risks related to technologies.
“Risks of modernization sooner or later also strike those who produce or profit from them. They contain a
boomerang effect, which breaks up the pattern of class and national society. Ecological disaster and
atomic fallout ignore the borders of nations. Even the rich and powerful are not safe from them”. (Beck,
1992)
But at the same time, as Beck don't forget to underline, “risks produce new
international inequalities, firstly between the Third World and the industrial states,
secondly among the industrial states themselves”. (Beck, 1992).
These considerations are relevant for a detailed analysis on environmental migrations,
because they call into question the right to migrate and to be recognized as a refugee
when an extreme event occurs.
Oxfam's report “Uprooted by Climate Change” focuses precisely on the unequal
distribution of climate change effects and displacement.
“Poor communities, whose greenhouse gas emissions are barely measurable, are at a much higher risk of
displacement than those who are doing the most harm to the environment. Datas from 2008 to 2016
shows that on average, extreme weather displaced 14 million people (0.42 percent of the population) in
these countries, compared to approximately 1 million (0.08 percent) in high-income countries”.
As reported in the study, displacements are more likely to occur from low-income
countries, due to their lack of resources to face extreme events, with a ratio of 14 out
of 15 million people.
In conclusion, the distribution of the risk related to environmental catastrophes and
climate change turns out to be unequal, if the aspect of responsibility is taken into
account, and to be directly connected to the environmental migration rates.
2. DIFFICULTIES IN THE DEFINITION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRANTS
The question of recognition, however, is not an easy topic.
After years of international meetings and discussions, there is still no consensus on the
definition of environmental migrants, and this happens to be one of the main causes
for the gap in the international law regarding this growing phenomenon (Véron and
Golaz, 2015).
There is only one working definition, which dates back to 2007, from the International
Organization for Migration:
“Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or
progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to
leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either

within their country or abroad". (IOM, 2007)

But this is still not internationally recognized. As Dun, O. and Gemenne, F. claim in
their article Defining ‘environmental migration’, “the main reason for the lack of
definition relating to migration caused by environmental degradation or change is
linked to the difficulty of isolating environmental factors from other drivers of
migration”.
When an environmental catastrophes occurs, there is an evident reason for
environmental migration; but environmental changes are sometimes slower and
progressive, and displacements, in those cases, are likely to be confused with other
reasons, such as the economical one. Desertification is one of the leading examples for
this phenomenon: as it consist of a progressive environmental change, displacement
caused by land erosion and consequently by food security are often categorized under
other driving reasons (Dun and Gemenne, 2008). Something similar happens for
draughts, which are more difficult to be immediately classified under the definition of
environmental disaster, and coastal erosion. The rising sea level is one of the most
concrete effect of climate change nowadays: a huge number of cities are located on
the costs, making littorization one of the main causes of future environmental
migration. But when the environmental degradation is progressive, it is always hard to
find a direct linkage with the migration rates.
Environmental migrations are difficult to be identified because they result from
complex decision-making processes. “The decision to leave may well be linked to the
environment, but people contemplating a move also consider other aspects of their
situation” (Veron and Golaz, 2015). Those are linked to different factors, such as
political and economical situation of the country where the catastrophe or
environmental degradation took place (availability of resources to face the emergency,
existence of family support, etc...).
As reported in the European Commission thematic issue “Migration in response to
environmental change”, environmental change might affect other drivers of migration,
such as the economic, social, political or demographic one. For example, the reduction
of agricultural or fisheries’ productivity due to environmental degradation can affect
the economical situation of rural people, and the scarcity of essential resources (es.
water) can cause or exacerbate a political conflict.
This issue is related to another hot topic of discussion within environmental migration ,
which is the question on whether migrations are forced or voluntary. “A decision to
move may often be a function of a push to leave one disaster-affected location and the
economic pull of another, more promising location”. (EU thematic issue, 2015)
Even if those questions are difficult to be answered, there should be an international
commitment to go deep into the reasons of migration in order not to leave anyone
without protection; this could be more easily achieved a consensual definition would
be found. “The need for a definition is a crucial step in the conceptualization of
environmental migration, and the development of policy responses to address these
flows”. (Dun and Gemenne, 2008)
Considering the actual situation, with the exacerbation of climate change,
technological risks and consequently environmental disaster, and a growing injustice
on the distribution of the risk, there is an urgent need of international recognition and
legislation: “From the beginning of human history, environmental changes have forced
people to leave their homes, but in recent decades the number of potential migrants
has risen sharply because populations are increasingly concentrated in zones now at
risk from climate change”(Véron, J. and Golaz, V., 2015).
This should then lead to the creation of the status of environmental refugee2,
accompanied by an adequate humanitarian protection system.

3. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION

Without a precise definition, practitioners and policymakers are not easily able to establish plans and
make targeted progress. Migrants and displaced persons falling within the definition are not clearly
recognizable and may thus not receive appropriate assistance. (Dun, O. and Gemenne, F., 2008)
With regard to international recognition, the discussion is still ongoing.
“Normative gaps in the protection of migrants from disasters and environmental
disasters hold a strong resistance from the international community regarding the
creation of a specific category of 'environmental refugees'. These gaps contrast with
the current international context, where there is a growing demand for the recognition
of the specific rights of this group of people”. (Passos Gomes and Viveiros, 2018)
Environmental migrants are not covered by the 1951 Geneva Convention, which is
designed to protect those who flee persecution, war or violence. In the Convention, the

2 This term has widely being used, but largerly criticized, as it does not have a legal meaning.
refugee status was bounded to those who are “unable or unwilling to return to their
country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”
(Article. 1, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951). Environmental
catastrophes are not included in the list.
As Olsson claims in her thesis, “human rights law cannot be considered to adequately
cover environmentally induced migration as there are no explicit human rights
protections for this specific group, and the principle of non-refoulment does not seem
to assist a person displaced by environmental factors, as current jurisprudence put
forward that violations of socio-economic is insufficient to find such a protection claim”
(Olsson, 2015).
This research specifically explored a practice known as Temporary Protection Status,
that exists in the European law and can be applied in the case of a ‘mass influx’. This
system offers protection to those that cannot return to their state of origin because of
particular circumstances. Olsson evidences the limits of this system, that can offer just
temporary protection, even if fully applied.
The situation is even more complex, considering that most people can't afford to
migrate internationally, while the poorest ones cannot even afford to move within the
country, resulting to be the most vulnerable subjects. That's why the emergency
should be primary address at the national level. (Pacific Standard, 2018)
The major step forward to the recognition of environmental displaced people is
represented by the Nansen Initiative and the creation of a Protection Agenda. The
process started in 2011 with the Nansen Conference of Climate Change and displaced,
where the participants devised 10 principles on climate change and cross border
displacement. In 2012 Norway and Switzerland launched the Nansen Initiative, as a
follow up to the conference, with the purpose to address potential legal and protection
gaps for peoples displaced outside their country due to environmental change and
extreme weather conditions. This process was concluded with the redaction of the
Protection Agenda, a guide to manage disaster displacements, and the creation of a
Platform on Disaster Displacement, “a multi-stakeholder forum for dialogue,
information sharing as well as policy and normative development”
(disasterdisplacement.org)

4. STUDY CASE: ITALY - AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON

a. Framework on actual political positions regarding migration

According to the National Statistic Institute (ISTAT), population with foreign citizenship
residing in Italy amounted to 5.65 million individuals on the 1st of January 2018, which
represents the 8.4% of the total population (ISTAT 2018). If we just take into
consideration non-EU citizens, up to January 1st 2017 there were 3,7 million individuals
legally residing in Italy (ISTAT 2017).
The italian government currently in power adopted a strong position against
immigration, issue that was now the core of an important decree, approved in October
2018.
The “Security Decree” foresees some crucial changes in immigration legislation. One
of the main changes concerns the elimination of the possibility of granting protection
to migrants on humanitarian grounds, “a residence permit issued to persons who are
not eligible to refugee status or subsidiary protection but cannot be expelled from the
country because of ‘serious reasons of humanitarian nature, or resulting from
constitutional or international obligations of the State’ (art. 5(6) of the Consolidated
Act on Immigration)”. (Carta, 2018)
Asylum will be granted just to refugees of war or victims of political persecution, while
for other restricted “special cases”, related to exceptionally serious medical
conditions, exceptional natural disasters, or exceptional civil acts, it hands out special
permits of a maximum duration of one year.
“The majority of migrants who have arrived in Italy in recent years have been granted
humanitarian protection, with some 100,000 people estimated to hold the permit,
which is valid for two years and enables them to work” (The Guardian, 7/12/2018).
Experts argues that this new law will make illegal immigration quote increase. (Il Sole
24 ore, 3/12/2018).
The decree also provides the creation of a list of “safe countries”, in order to prevent
groundless asylum requests. In addition, it considers the possibility of repatriation also
for those who are proven victims of persecution or had other valid reasons for
emigrating, if in their country of origin there is a region considered to be safe.
(Internazionale, 27/11/2018)
Those measures abolish key forms of protection for migrants and make it really hard to
access to Europe through Italy.
The situation is even harder for environmental migrants, which are just partially
consider within the statement of “exceptional natural disasters” and could be
accepted just for one year by obtaining the “special permit” . This of course excludes
all those other cases of progressive environmental degradation such as desertification,
droughts or coastal erosions, making impossible, for persons in need, to find asylum in
Italy. Even for those which could be accepted due to “exceptional natural disasters”,
the destiny is not so clear, as they would be likely returned to their country of origin if
there are regions which are safe from the catastrophe, a scenario which is highly
probable to occur.
This would mean that Italy is currently deaf to the environmental migration emergency
and to any more fair “redistribution” of the climate change consequences (if we
consider accepting environmental migrants as a way to rebalance the situation).
The ministry of intern, Matteo Salvini, which was the main promoter of this decree,
claimed that this law was necessary to stop the mass immigration of the past years
(which he considers to be one of the biggest issues of italian economy right now), by
preventing people to migrate to Italy without a “serious” motivation, other than war or
political persecution. Migrants coming to Italy due to economical reason will no longer
be accepted.
But what if part of those who migrated to Italy in the past years could be recognized as
environmental migrants? This could change the perspective on some of the migration
floods, which could turn out to be rather forced than actually voluntary.

b. Finding a relation: environmental catastrophes in the main countries of

origin

Taking into account the year 2017, we are going to identify the 3 main countries of
origin of the immigrants that came to Italy, with the purpose of studying the situation
of their home countries in term of environmental catastrophes and verifying the
existence of a relation with migration quotes.
In order to meet this objective, we will be using the official statistics of the ministry of
Internal Affairs the Italian Republic on the asylum requests. We will consider, thus, just
the numbers of those who submitted an asylum request, as they represent ascertained
quotes which could might be more connected to environmental migration.
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Italian Republic
As we can see from the table “Principali Paesi d'Origine” above, the 3 main countries
of origin of asylum seekers of 2017 were Nigeria, with 25.964 requests, Bangladesh,
with 12.731, and Pakistan, with 9.728.
Checking the previews 3 years, we can notice that those are countries of origin of
massive migration also in the previews years and they don't represent a “new entry”:

2016

2015

2014

We can also conclude that the asylum request trend has been growing in the period
between 2014 and 2017, resulting to double the number from the beginning of this
time frame to the end: 63.456 requests in 2014 versus 130.119 in 2017.
In this section, we will describe the situation of the selected sample countries (Nigeria,
Pakistan and Bangladesh) in term of environmental changes, in order to verify the
existence of a relation with the migration quotes.

Nigeria is a country with a very delicate political and economical situation.

Nonetheless, environmental changes can be consider as one of the main drivers of
migration.
The biggest environmental challenge of the last years is connected to the drainage of
Lake Chad, which was once the sixth largest lake in the world.
This lake, which represented the source of water to millions of people in West Africa,
has shrunk by 90% since 1960 due to climate change, increase in the population and
unplanned irrigation (BBC, 21/3/2018).
“Around 25 million people in the region depend on the lake for their livelihoods in agriculture, fisheries
and livestock. The dramatic reduction in water levels means that almost 7 million people are currently
food insecure. Thousands of fishermen and farmers became unemployed in recent years”.
(Torelli, 2017)

North-eastern Nigeria is at the heart of the larger Lake Chad Basin crisis, which affects
also north-eastern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, western Chad and south-east Niger.
This environmental catastrophe was one of the main causes of Nigeria's critical
situation. When the lake started to shrunk, herdsmen were forced to migrate, from
their traditional grazing grounds, mostly in the northeast of Nigeria, towards the
southern part of the country. The roots of Nigerian conflict, which is still ongoing
nowadays, has to be found into those forced migrations: as the herders are
predominantly Muslim and the farmers largely Christian, religious radicals have
exploited the conflict (Obaji, 2018). Taking advantage of the situation, the military
islamist group Boko Haram created a base in this area, destabilizing the Nigerian
country even more.
“This migration into the savannah and rainforest of the Middle Belt did not just increase pressure on the
land and pave way for the conflict in the region, it also created an opening for militant groups to establish
themselves in areas around the Lake Chad Basin”.
(Obaji, 2018)
This situation generated food insecurity, difficult access to water and high rates of
unemployment in the whole Lake Chad basin, whose population was for 60% occupied
in activities related to agriculture (Vigil, 2017).
Over the years, the government has struggled to find a solution to the herdsmen-
farmers crisis, while this was gradually expanding into southern portions of the country
(Obaji, 2018). To this day, the conflict was not yet solved, and the concrete solution
that is now being discussed is the one of replenishing the Lake Chad basin, which
happens to be rather complicated both environmentally and economically speaking.
Current data shows that a large part of those forced to move (more than 90%) decide
to remain in the region, rather than migrate to Europe. “This is largely due to a lack of
material resources needed to leave the continent. However, given the demographic
trends, neighbouring countries will not be able to absorb the flows forever. As such, it
is likely that people will look increasingly toward Europe as their lifeline”. (Torelli, 2017)
Due to the gap in the international and national law, Nigerian migrants that reach
Europe and Italy, are classified under other categories such as economical, political,
etc. Nonetheless, analyzing the sources, we found an evidence between the migration
wave and environmental grounds. We could then question if a recognition as
environmental migrants (or rather refugees) would be appropriate in this case.

Bangladesh is internationally recognized as especially vulnerable to climate change.

The rising sea-level is one of the most worrying consequences, which already caused
internal and external migration and affected food production. In 2015, the United
Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was estimating that the
country’s population at risk of sea-level rise would touch 27 million by 2050.
A recent study by Valerie Mueller, a research fellow at the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI), and Joyce Chen, associate professor at Ohio State University
reveled that soil salinization is one of the country's biggest challenges. The
researchers demonstrated that adverse consequences of salinity on crop production
have direct effects on internal and international migration, even more than inundation
itself. According to the study, nearly 200,000 coastal residents will be forced to
migrate to inland areas to find alternative livelihoods due to water salinization.
These changes will lead to significant shortages of drinking water in the coastal areas,
scarcity of water for irrigation, and significant changes in the coastal aquatic
ecosystems. “Changes in the availability of freshwater fish will likely affect the
composition of capture fishery, although the increase in brackish water will enhance
opportunities for brackish water aquaculture” (Dasgupta, S., Akhter Kamal, F., Huque
Khan, Z., Choudhury, S., Nishat, A., 2015).
Internal migration is usually addressed towards the capital, Dhaka. “The Chittagong
and Khulna districts—home to the second- and third-largest cities in Bangladesh—are
likely to witness the highest within-district additional migration, estimated between
15,000 and 30,000 people per year” (Mueller, Chen, 2018). According to an article of
the Scientific American of 21/4/2017, most of the climate change refugees end up in
slums.
The vulnerability of Bangladesh is so high because most of the farmers still practice a
small-scale agriculture, which makes them more exposed to climate change. “In
addition, the population pressure in the country is high; economic development and
urbanization are largely unplanned and poverty is endemic” (Huq, N., Hugé, J., Boon,
E., K. Gain, A., 2015)
Even if the migration is mostly internal, a lot of people choose to move outside the
country to find better living option. “In the past, many Bangladeshis would go work in
wealthy Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar or the United Arab Emirates. But work
there is becoming more scarce due to falling oil prices in recent year, and human
rights violations are rampant in those countries”. (InfoMigrants, 2017)
Nowadays a lot of them are moving to Europe, passing through Italy and often deciding
to stay (they are currently 3rd biggest group arriving to Italy). Should those people be
recognized as environmental migrants?

Pakistan is among 10 countries affected most by climate change, according to the

2018 Global Climate Risk Index released by the public policy group Germanwatch.
The country geographic location, makes it more vulnerable to temperature rise, which
are predicted to increase by 3°C to 5°C by the year 2100 for a central global emissions
scenario, while higher global emissions may yield a rise of 4°C to 6°C (Asian
Development Bank report, 2017).
This year, in some regions, the temperatures reached the 50 degrees during the month
of May, event that was recorded as the hottest day on earth (Usa Today, 24/7/2018).
Those extreme temperatures caused an exceptional wave of death and heat illnesses
in June 2015, which left 1200 victims (Asian Development Bank report, 2017).
Climate change is considered to be the main cause of the increasing droughts and
flooding, that threaten health, agriculture and water supplies. As the Usa Today
reports, “60 percent of the land receives less than 10 inches of rain per year” and
“rivers are mainly fed by the Hindu Kush-Karakoram Himalayan glaciers, which are
melting rapidly due to global warming”. The crop production turns out to be strongly
affected by climate change, due to water scarcity and rising temperature, and this
situation leads to food insecurity.
The most remarkable flood of the last years was the one that occurred between July
and August 2010, which killed 1,600 people, inundated an area of 38,600 square
kilometers (km 2) and caused damage worth around $10 billion (Usa Today,
24/7/2018). Sea level rise was estimated at 1.1 mm per year from 1856–2000 along
the Karachi coast, due to two major processes of thermal expansion of ocean from
global warming and glacier mass loss (Asian Development Bank report, 2017).
The Asian Development Bank, in the preface of its report “Climate Change, profile of
Pakistan” of 2017, states:
“Climate change raises the prospect that these and other natural hazards will increase in
frequency and severity in the coming decades—a stark reminder that Pakistan is one of the countries
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change”.
But if we look at Pakistan situation in term of risk distribution justice, we notice a
pattern of injustice:
“Pakistan contributes less than 1 percent of the world's greenhouse gases blamed for causing global
warming, yet its 200 million people are among the world's most vulnerable victims of the growing
consequences of climate change” (Usa Today, 24/7/2018).

Forced migration are a frequent scenario in Pakistan. “Climate-induced migration is

mainly caused by floods and heat stress, which force people to migrate temporarily or
permanently” (The Diplomat, 22/9/2017). Migration are both internal and international:
some people are pushed by seasonal changes to move and seek shelter and livelihood
in to avoid climate-induced hazards, other decided to emigrate outside the country.
Italy is the nation with more Pakistani of Europe (Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis, 2013-
14). It might be appropriate to reconsider if those people were actually forced to
migrate because of the environmental changes that occurred within the country.

CONCLUSIONS
As a conclusion to the experimental comparison, we can affirm that the 3 countries that we
took as sample in order to find connections between the italian immigration phenomenon and
environmental catastrophes, presented complex situations where the environmental factor was
substantially determinant. Nigeria, Bangladesh and Pakistan are internationally considered to
be particularly vulnerable to climate change. This vulnerability depends on a multiple frame of
factors: the geographical location and the changes in rainfall patterns represent just partially
the reasons of their particular exposure to the risk, which is rather linked to a little availability
of resources to face emergency situations, fragile infrastructures and an economy that
massively depends on climatic conditions, between the others.
This situation can be depicted as unfair, if we consider that the population of those countries
had a negligible impact on climate change and on other man-driven environmental changes.
Building an international system of protection of environmental migrants should be therefore
threaten as a urgent priority. Accepting migrants and offering them an adequate protective care
should not yet be consider as an act of humanitarian aid, but rather as a duty and a
responsibility towards those countries that are going to suffer the consequences of a process
that they didn't contribute to start, before us and in a more drastic way, as they lack of
mitigation techniques.
The italian case is an exceptional negative example of retrocession in term of migration
policies. Migration was instrumentalised in the political debates and was recently the core of an
important decree on security.
The situation for environmental migrants, which was even before not governed by law, has
become harder, as from this year on (2018) just few specific migration profiles will be accepted
in the country.
Finding the evidences of a relation between migration waves and environmental catastrophes
could represent a first step towards a more understanding position of the current italian
government and could contribute to change the public opinion on migration.
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