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From Praetorianism To Democratic Institutionalization: Argentina'S Difficult Transition To Civilian Rule
From Praetorianism To Democratic Institutionalization: Argentina'S Difficult Transition To Civilian Rule
From Praetorianism To Democratic Institutionalization: Argentina'S Difficult Transition To Civilian Rule
INSTITUTIONALIZATION: ARGENTINA'S
DIFFICULT TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE
By Enrique Peruzzotti*
INTRODUCTION
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societal groups: specific interests and individuals utilize public office for the
promotion of their private and/or corporate interests.^
Huntington considers two main political roads to institution building:
the first one has the military as the central agent of the process of institutional-
ization. The second one relies on the organizational skills of political parties.
Let us briefly examine some of the problems posed by the military road since it
is the one that concerns us in this article. In his analysis of possible institution-
alizing alternatives, Huntington foresaw military authoritarianism as a possible
solution to the problem of praetorianism. He distinguished occasional military
interventions (an integral aspect of praetorianism) from attempts at establishing
a permanent authoritarian regime:
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The period that followed Peron's removal from power was dominated
by the polarizing dynamics set by the previous Peronist regime.^ As Floria
argued in reference to the Peronist experience:
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were not two parties; there were "two countries": one whose
inhabitants could only conceive of Argentina with Per6n, and
another that could only accept Argentina without Per6n and,
in terms of power, without Peronism.lO
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Aramburu dissolved the Peronist party, prohibited the use of Peronist symbols
or Peron's name, and banned members of the Peronist regime from occupying
public posts. A strike in support of Lonardi was rapidly repressed by the mili-
tary, and hundreds of Peronist union leaders were detained. On June 9, 1956,
Peronist military leaders staged a failed coup against the government that led to
the detention and execution of its leaders.
Divided by internal struggles and disagreements over the "Peronist
question," the Aramburu administration called for general elections. With Pero-
nism proscribed, the Radical party moved to center stage. As the only party
with national relevance, the conflict around Peronism that divided Argentine
society at large migrated to its ranks and led to its division in two parties: Radi-
cals "del Pueblo" and "Intransigentes." Between 1958 and 1966, Argentines
witnessed futile attempts at recreating a democratic regime based on the exclu-
sion of the Peronists. The 1958 elections gave the victory to the Union Civica
Radical Intransigente (UCRI) over the Union Civica Radical del Pueblo
(UCRP), bringing Arturo Frondizi to the presidency. Frondizi arrived to power
with the support of Peronist votes, after a pact with Peron that consisted of a
trade of Peronist votes for Frondizi's compromise to lift the political restrictions
against the Peronist party. The pact fostered the polarization of the anti-Peronist
camp and sealed the future of the UCRI administration.
Frondizi's tenure was marked by the absence of governmental authori-
ty against corporate assaults by social groups. Under constant attack from both
the Army and a multiplicity of corporate groups, the administration was con-
stantly forced to reverse its policies in order to "placate" threatening sectarian
demands. During his administration, Frondizi faced 26 military "planteos" or
warnings, seven attempted coups, increasing fractionalization of the Armed
Forces, the UCRP and anti-Peronist political forces' disloyal opposition, and
trade union oppositional mobilization (after he was forced to reverse his pro-
Peronist measures under military threat). In March of 1962, after lifting the
electoral ban on Peronism in a congressional and provincial election that gave a
partial victory to Peronist forces, Frondizi was ousted from the presidency. The
president of the Senate, Jose Maria Guido, who finished the constitutionally
prescribed period under close military supervision, replaced Frondizi. Guido,
pressured by the military, annulled the electoral results by decree, dissolved
Congress and intervened in provincial governments.
During Guido's short tenure, the Armed Force's internal conflicts
reached unprecedented proportions, translating into constant cabinet changes
and even open military confrontations. The two main factions, "legalist" or
"azules" and "gorillas" or "reds," represented sections of the Army and the Air
Force and the Army and the Navy respectively. The factions divided around
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Peronist list. Within the trade union movement a neo-Peronist faction emerged
under the leadership of Augusto Vandor, which attempted to establish a "Pero-
nism without Peron." In 1966, a provincial election in the province of Mendoza
took place and Peronists and neo-Peronists presented competing lists. Although
a conservative candidate obtained the governorship, orthodox Peronist sectors
outnumbered the "Vandorista" faction by over 40,000 votes, dismissing any
immediate hopes for a more acceptable "Peronism without Peron" and
corroborating, to the disillusion of non-Peronist forces, Peron's hold on the
movement.
The strength displayed by Peronist forces in the two electoral contexts
determined the fate of Illia's administration. For months, the prolegomena of
the military coup were openly discussed by the press, which generally encour-
aged it. Onganfa, the victorious "legalist" leader, appeared as the natural candi-
date of the conspiracy. The formerly maintained legalistic position emphasizing
political abstention and professionalism had now shifted to a politicized pro-
gram that combined elements of the doctrine of national security with a dis-
course on the need for deepening economic modernization. The coup was
widely supported by most social and political forces, including Vandorista trade
union groups that gave a spirited green light to the military conspirators. On
June 28, 1966, the coup took place without major disturbances, in an almost
routine way.
The period between 1966 and 1983 was dominated by a demand for
order that translated into the emergence of a "negative" form of legitimating
input. Legitimacy no longer derives its authorizing power from the fulfillment
of specific normative claims but out of a functional demand for governability. In
contrast with the chronic legitimacy deficit that characterized all administrations
between 1955 and 1966, the three administrations that dominated the period
between 1966 and 1983 enjoyed, at the moment of their inauguration, consider-
able popular support
During those years, the country was torn by a plurality of centripetal
forces that were no longer reduced to the Peronism - anti-Peronism axis. Mutu-
al distrust and disagreements pervaded non-Peronist forces as well, amply illus-
trated in the series of divisions which most of those parties and institutions
underwent:, the Armed Forces were consumed by factional struggles, Radical-
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ism broke into two major parties, Socialist and Conservative parties also went
through intemal breaks, etc. Even the Peronist movement found itself divided
on which attitude to adopt toward the new rules.
The military, headed by Ongania, took power in an atmosphere of rela-
tive popular enthusiasm and support for the new administration. The majority of
the media, which had displayed a total indifference toward the fate of Illia's
administration, warmly welcomed the change. A public opinion poll conducted
shortly after the military intervention showed that an overwhelming 66% of those
interviewed explicitly supported the coup (against a meager 6% that opposed) and
73% believed that the general situation would improve in the near future.''* Such
a demonstration of support contrasted with the low degree of legitimacy con-
ferred to the prior two administrations at their inaugural moments. 15
The support for the authoritarian solution indicated, as O'Donnell has
rightly argued, a "ceiling consensus" on the need for putting an end to what was
now perceived as a destructive pattern of social interaction.'6 After years of
praetorian struggle and ungovernability, the restoration of some authority
became the main priority for a society fearful of its own self-destructive tenden-
cies. The propitious domestic environment was further strengthened by an
external context dominated by the propagation of the doctrine of national secu-
rity and the exportation of counterinsurgency methods by the U. S. that provid-
ed the ideological justification for the new type of military interventionism.'^
The period initiated a series of pompous foundational acts aimed at
regime building that were followed by boisterous regime breakdowns.'8 The
consensus enjoyed by the regimes at the moment of their inauguration proved to
be short-lived. Once a minimum of order was reestablished, the initial capital
of legitimacy deteriorated rapidly. Gradually, society returned to the factional
praetorian struggles both between power holders and excluded sectors, and
among the power holders themselves.
A crucial factor that made possible the "foundational" type of military
regimes experienced after 1966 was the temporary reunification of the Armed
Forces. Under mass praetorianism, social interactions turn into a rule-less and
ruthless struggle of all against all. Thus, the strongest and better-organized
groups had a better chance to play a dominant role. In such circumstances, the
Armed Forces became a central actor, not only because of their control of the
means of coercion, but also -as we have stressed earlier following Huntington-
as the result of their organizational strength. Huntington stresses this point in his
analysis of mass praetorianism:
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war against society and, b) by attempting to recreate and reinforce state power
and authority. Immediately after taking power, the junta issued a document, the
"Act of the Process of National Reorganization," defining itself as a revolution-
ary constituent power unbound by constitutional norms. The laws declared that
the junta, a collegiate body integrated by the commandant-in-chief of each of
the forces, was the supreme authority of the nation. After the Onganfa experi-
ence, the military regime of 1976 decided to reverse the relationship between
military commanders and executive power that they had established in the 1966
authoritarian experiment in order to be able to maintain control of the political
process. The president was to be designated by the junta and was supposed to
carry out the directives that the latter set out in the different revolutionary
proclamations. Public posts were equally distributed among members of the
three forces.
During the years of "el Proceso," the "privatization" of the state appa-
ratus reached new heights. Public bureaucracy was distributed to military offi-
cers who acted with total discretionary powers. The administration functioned
as an inarticulate aggregation of "feuds" at the hands of groups close to the
spheres of power, depriving the state apparatus of any institutional or bureau-
cratic logic.32 The "privatizing" tendencies even reached the coercive core of
the state apparatus: the war against subversion was carried out by multiple and
uncoordinated repressive groups that operated with total freedom and impunity.
The "dirty war" therefore took on a quasi-private character. Armed bands
engaged in plundering practices whose profits were distributed among the par-
ticipants.33
The glue that maintained the cohesion of the authoritarian coalition
was the subversive challenge. Once the common enemy was defeated, the
internal organizational cohesion of the Armed Forces weakened, re-initiating
the praetorian struggle within the state. The first major conflict among the com-
peting military factions was provided by the need to select a successor to Presi-
dent Videla, as dictated by the institutional act of the regime. The designation
of General Viola, who represented moderate Army groups that intended to initi-
ate a gradual process of political liberalization, stirred great opposition from the
Navy and important groups within the Army. Viola's presidency was short-
lived: in December of 1981, a palace coup displaced him, naming a hardliner.
General Galtieri, to the presidency. Galtieri tried to revive a moribund regime
by militarily occupying the Malvinas/Falkland islands. The military defeat by
Great Britain led to an acid confrontation among the three forces characterized
by mutual recriminations concerning their role in the brief war. As a result of
the departure of the Navy and Air Force from government, the junta was tem-.
porarily dissolved. Amidst the background of regime disintegration, the newly
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NOTES
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