1.

Chapters 1 & 2 of PD 1529

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Title of Decree. This Decree shall be known as the PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE.

Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for the registration
of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles
underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to
lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all
pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with
the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.

Section 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. The system of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by
Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought under the operation of the
Torrens system.

The books of registration for unregistered lands provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall continue to remain in force; provided, that all instruments dealing
with unregistered lands shall henceforth be registered under Section 113 of this Decree.

CHAPTER II
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS

Section 4. Land Registration Commission. In order to have a more efficient execution of the laws relative to
the registration of lands, geared to the massive and accelerated land reform and social justice program of the
government, there is created a commission to be known as the Land Registration Commission under the
executive supervision of the Department of Justice.

Section 5. Officials and employees of the Commission. The Land Registration Commission shall have a chief
and an assistant chief to be known, respectively, as the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall be appointed by the President. The Commissioner shall be duly qualified member of
the Philippine Bar with at least ten years of practice in the legal profession, and shall have the same rank,
compensation and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. The Deputy Commissioner, who
shall possess the same qualifications as those required of the Commissioner, shall receive compensation which
shall be three thousand pesos per annum less than that of the Commissioner. He shall act as Commissioner of
Land Registration during the absence or disability of the Commissioner and when there is a vacancy in the
position until another person shall have been designated or appointed in accordance with law. The Deputy
Commissioner shall also perform such other functions as the Commissioner may assign to him.

They shall be assisted by such number of division chiefs as may be necessary in the interest of the functioning
of the Commission, by a Special Assistant to the Commissioner, and by a Chief Geodetic Engineer who shall
each receive compensation at the rate of three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than that of the
Deputy Commissioner.

All other officials and employees of the Land Registration Commission including those of the Registries of
Deeds whose salaries are not herein provided, shall receive salaries corresponding to the minimum of their
respective upgraded ranges as provided under paragraph 3.1 of Budget Circular No. 273, plus sixty per centum
thereof across the board, notwithstanding the maximum salary allowed for their respective civil service
eligibilities.

The salaries of officials and employees provided in this Decree shall be without prejudice to such benefits and
adjustments as may from time to time be granted by the President or by the legislature to government
employees.

All officials and employees of the Commission except Registers of Deeds shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Justice upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration.

Section 6. General Functions.

(1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions:

(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings and
cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;

(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other personnel of the Commission;

(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of, Registers of Deeds;

(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the Courts of First Instance
throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the
registration of lands;

(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the registration of lands and issue,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor;

(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties
titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by P.D. No. 957.

(2) The Land Registration Commission shall have the following functions:

(a) Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other
agencies in the implementation of the land reform program of the government;

(b) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings;

(c) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled under the Torrens system,
including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands.

Section 7. Office of the Register of Deeds. There shall be at least one Register of Deeds for each province and
one for each city. Every Registry with a yearly average collection of more than sixty thousand pesos during the
last three years shall have one Deputy Register of Deeds, and every Registry with a yearly average collection
of more than three hundred thousand pesos during the last three years, shall have one Deputy Register of
Deeds and one second Deputy Register of Deeds.

The Secretary of Justice shall define the official station and territorial jurisdiction of each Registry upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration, with the end in view of making every registry
easily accessible to the people of the neighboring municipalities.

The province or city shall furnish a suitable space or building for the office of the Register of Deeds until such
time as the same could be furnished out of national funds.

Section 8. Appointment of Registers of Deeds and their Deputies and other subordinate personnel; salaries.
Registers of Deeds shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. Deputy Registers of Deeds and all other subordinate personnel of the Registries of Deeds
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Land
Registration.

The salaries of Registers of Deeds and their Deputies shall be at the following rates:

(1) First Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in first class Registries shall be three thousand four
hundred pesos per annum less than that of the Deputy Commissioner.

(2) Second Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in second class Registries shall be three thousand
four hundred pesos per annum less than those of Registers of Deeds in first class Registries.

(3) Third Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in third class Registries shall be three thousand four
hundred pesos per annum less than those of Registers of Deeds in second class Registries.

(4) The salaries of Deputy Registers of Deeds and Second Deputy Registers of Deeds shall be three thousand
four hundred pesos per annum less than those of their corresponding Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers
of Deeds, respectively.

The Secretary of Justice, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration, shall cause the
reclassification of Registries based either on work load or the class of province/city, whichever will result in a
higher classification, for purposes of salary adjustments in accordance with the rates hereinabove provided.

Section 9. Qualifications of Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers of Deeds. No person shall be appointed
Register of Deeds unless he has been admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines and shall have been
actually engaged in such practice for at least three years or has been employed for a like period in any branch
of government the functions of which include the registration of property.

The Deputy Register of Deeds shall be a member of the Philippine Bar. Provided, however, that no Register of
Deeds or Deputy Register of Deeds holding office as such upon the passage of this Decree shall by reason
hereof, be removed from office or be demoted to a lower category or scale of salary except for cause and
upon compliance with due process as provided for by law.

Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public
repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the
province or city wherein such office is situated.

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it
that said instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly
canceled. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the
presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.

Section 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of vacancy, etc.

(1) Until a regular Register of Deeds shall have been appointed for a province or city, or in case of vacancy in
the office, or upon the occasion of the absence, illness, suspension, or inability of the Register of Deeds to
discharge his duties, said duties shall be performed by the following officials, in the order in which they are
mentioned below, unless the Secretary of Justice designates another official to act temporarily in his place:

(a) For the province or city where there is a Deputy Register of Deeds, by said Deputy Register of Deeds, or by
the second Deputy Register of Deeds, should there be one;

(b) For the province or city where there is no Deputy or second Deputy Register of Deeds, by the Provincial or
City Fiscal, or any Assistant Fiscal designated by the Provincial or City Fiscal;
 (2) In case of absence, disability or suspension of the Register of Deeds without pay, or in case of vacancy in
the position, the Secretary of Justice may, in his discretion, authorize the payment of an additional
compensation to the official acting as Register of Deeds, such additional compensation together with his actual
salary not to exceed the salary authorized for the position thus filled by him.

(3) In case of a newly-created province or city and pending establishment of a Registry of Deeds and the
appointment of a regular Register of Deeds for the new province or city, the Register of Deeds of the mother
province or city shall be the ex-officio Register of Deeds for said new province or city.

Section 12. Owner's Index; reports. There shall be prepared in every Registry an index system which shall
contain the names of all registered owners alphabetically arranged. For this purpose, an index card which shall
be prepared in the name of each registered owner which shall contain a list of all lands registered in his name.

The Register of Deeds shall submit to the Land Registration Commission within ten days after the month to
which they pertain his monthly reports on collections and accomplishments. He shall also submit to the
Commission at the end of December of each year, an annual inventory of all titles and instruments in his
Registry.

Section 13. Chief Geodetic Engineer. There shall be a Chief Geodetic Engineer in the Land Registration
Commission who shall be the technical adviser of the Commission on all matters involving surveys and shall
be responsible to him for all plats, plans and works requiring the services of a geodetic engineer in said office.
He shall perform such other functions as may, from time to time, be assigned to him by the Commissioner.

2. PD 892 February 16, 1976

DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH
TITLES AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of public and private
lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming
ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;

WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations between
legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the holders
of, or persons claiming rights under, the said Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and
instability in property ownership and threatening the peace and order conditions in the areas affected;

WHEREAS, statistic in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;

WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system,
being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order;

Section 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded
under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.

All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens
system.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344;

Section 2. All laws, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
foregoing provisions are hereby repealed or accordingly modified;

Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of February, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
six.
CASES

1. G.R. No. L-65129 December 29, 1986

TOMAS AVERIA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA, in her capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial
Region, Branch LVII, Lucena City, and VERONICA PADILLO, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

We gave due course to this petition against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Lucena City, 1 which is
questioned on a pure questions of law, more specifically whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the
registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell.

The oppositor, petitioner herein, refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings below,
claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said case under
Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." The respondent court then held the
hearing ex parte and later rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence
presented by the private respondent herein. 2

In his petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it is argued that the lower court had
no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as
required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. 3 The petitioner cites Fojas as v. Grey, 4 where this
Court, through Justice Serafin Cuevas, declared:

The aforequoted provision of the Land Registration Act (Sec. 112) was relied upon by appellant Apolinar Fojas
in petitioning the court a quo for the annotation of the Deed of Assignment. However, while he had the right
to have the said Deed annotated in the owner's duplicate of TCT No. T-2376, the serious objection of Saturnina
de Grey to the same raises a substantial controversy between the parties.

In a long line of decisions dealing with proceedings under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act, it has been
held that summary relief under Section 112 of Land Registration Act can only be granted if there is unanimity
among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest;
otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial which should be threshed out in an ordinary action
or in any case where the incident properly belongs. 5

While this was a correct interpretation of the said provision, the same is, however, not applicable to the instant
case. The reason is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the
Property Registration Decree, which became effective on June 11, 1979.

In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that:

SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.-Judicial proceedings for the registration of
lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles
underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to
lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine a questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all
pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with
the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.

The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial
court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court.
Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon
the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over
all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petitions."

Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief
only in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or
serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-
controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were
beyond its competence before.

It appears that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case below notwithstanding the manifestation by
the petitioner of his intention to elevate to this Court the question of jurisdiction he had raised. 6 The trial
court should have given him the opportunity to do so in the interest of due process, pending a categorical
ruling on the issue. As it happened, it arrived at its decision after considering only the evidence of the private
respondent and without regard to the evidence of the petitioner. 7

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated September 23, 1983, is set aside. Let a new trial of
Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cad. Record No. 202, Lot No. 2810-B, Lucena Cadastre, MC No. 374-82, be held, at
which the petitioner, as well as other interested parties, shall be given the opportunity to be heard. Our
temporary restraining order of October 5, 1983, is hereby lifted except as to the registration of the questioned
deed of sale which shall depend on the outcome of the said case.

SO ORDERED.
2. Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. vs. Registry of Deeds of Paranaque City, G.R. No. 133240, November 15, 2000
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant petition for review is filed on a pure question of law arising from the Decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Metro Manila, Branch 257, in LRC Case No. 97-0170.

Petitioner corporation was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. On July 15, 1996, it amended its
Articles of Incorporation to change its name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. The Amended Articles of
Incorporation was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 20, 1997.1

As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title
over real properties owned by the said corporation, all of which were under the old name, Rudolf Lietz,
Incorporated. For this purpose, petitioner instituted, on November 20, 1997, a petition for amendment of
titles with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, docketed as LRC Case No. 97-0170.2

The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought
to be amended, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 99446, 99447, 99448, 102486, 102487, 102488 and
102489,3 all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise
inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in
Pasay City.

Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of
Parañaque City.4 Hence, on February 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Petition.5 In the attached Amended Petition,6 petitioner impleaded instead as respondent the Registry of
Deeds of Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Parañaque City.

In the meantime, however, on January 30, 1998, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on
the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City
and the properties are located in Pasay City.7

Before counsel for petitioner could receive an official copy of the aforesaid order of dismissal, he filed with
the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration.8 On February 20, 1998, in view of the dismissal of the petition,
the lower court denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.9 On March 30, 1998, the lower court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration.10

Petitioner, thus, is before this Court arguing that –

The court a quo acted contrary to the rules and jurisprudence on the matter for the following reasons:

1. It has no power to immediately dismiss an initiatory pleading for improper venue;

2. Assuming the Order of 30 January 1998 was proper, it was nevertheless still a matter of right on petitioner’s
part to amend its petition in order to correct the wrong entries therein; and

3. The unassailable reality is that the subject parcels of land are located in Parañaque City, so venue was
properly laid despite that erroneous allegation in the original petition.11

The Solicitor General filed on November 4, 1998 his Comment.12 He contends that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in
Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Parañaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it
could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.

On February 15, 1999, petitioner filed its Reply.13 It discussed the distinction between jurisdiction and venue,
and maintained that the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition, but that venue appeared to be
improperly laid based on the erroneous allegation therein on the location of the properties.
The issue involved herein is simple. May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue? This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court,14
where this Court held that it may not.

While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition below was clearly that of improper
venue,15 the Solicitor General confuses venue with jurisdiction. A distinction between the two must be drawn.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law.16 It may not be conferred
by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the
parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the
proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never
be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be
waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it
relates to the place of trial.17

In Dacoycoy v. IAC, this Court ruled:

The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of improper
venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.

Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the
plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to
jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.

xxx xxx x x x.

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at
this stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance
(now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in
a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and
a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the
wrong venue, which is deemed waived.

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly
said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically
wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The
trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case.

Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu
proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the
rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases,
justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully
adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be
heard on his cause.18

Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio
in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription. Therefore,
the trial court in this case erred when it dismissed the petition motu proprio. It should have waited for a
motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense of
improper venue, before dismissing the petition. However, this was overtaken by petitioner’s motion for leave
to amend its petition.
Petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in seeking the amendment of its
certificates of title. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over matters involving the registration of lands
and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred by Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The
Property Registration Decree, viz:

Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands
throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying
the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed
after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission
with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or
petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or
issuance thereof.

More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title, such as the one brought
below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529, thus:

Amendment and alteration of certificates. --- No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of
the same by the Register of Deeds, except upon order of the proper Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court). A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the
Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the
court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant
inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon
the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or
any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate
has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage
has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a corporation
which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years after its
dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground and the court may hear and determine the petition after
notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, or grant any other
relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper: xxx.
(Emphasis ours.)

In the case at bar, the lands are located in Parañaque City, as stated on the faces of the titles. Petitioner, thus,
also correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are situated, pursuant to the following rule:

Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.19

Petitioner, however, named as respondent the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, under the mistaken impression
that it was still the custodian of the titles to lands in Parañaque. Later, petitioner learned that a Register of
Deeds for Parañaque City had taken over the record and custody of titles therein. Petitioner, thus, promptly
moved for leave of court to amend its petition. This, to our mind, was justified. In preparing its amended
petition, petitioner likewise corrected its allegation on the location of the lands involved.

Before the amended petition was filed, the trial court had already dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. It relied on the allegation in the petition that the lands are located in Pasay City. However, the titles of
the land, copies of which were attached to the petition, plainly show that the lands involved are situated in
Parañaque City. The trial court should have considered these annexes, as these form an integral part of the
pleading.
At the very least, the trial court should have allowed petitioner to amend its petition, for this was still a matter
of right on its part.1ªvvph!1

Amendments as a matter of right. --- A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is
served.20

Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far
as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of
action and unnecessary expense.21 The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed
by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily determined,
without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.22

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order
that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided
on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially
in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the trial of the case thereby giving
petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.23

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Orders dated January 30, 1998, February 20, 1998, and
March 30, 1998 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. LRC Case No. 97-0170 is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
3. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ,
respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. 106496 December 18, 1996

ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO
PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA
SAN PEDRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these two
consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim
to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately
173,000 hectares or "214,047 quiniones," 1 on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad
Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City,
Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from
Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and
Tayabas Bay in the south.2

Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles and rackets
proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme
Court, 3 in connection therewith.

We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968];
Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368
[1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association,
Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA
318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director of lands v. Tesalona, 236
SCRA 336 [1994] 4 terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it
is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end, Hence, after the
procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been
exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may
be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein
embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must
prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and
the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. 5 [Cited cases omitted]

It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment herein writing
finis to these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of the estate's claim of ownership
over this vast expanse of real property.

The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:

G.R. NO. 103727

G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for recovery of possession and/or damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision 7 dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion 8
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo,
Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum
of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with damages and with a
prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial
administrator of the "Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" against Jose G. De Ocampo,
Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R Soliven, Diomedes
Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel
Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty
Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.

In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the aforenamed
defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject
estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412,
353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 9 and
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333;
(2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions
of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated
March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development
and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April
23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and
genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been
resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First
Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B. 10

Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO,
Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 11

On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for improper
service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering
that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and
Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 12

Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the following grounds:
(a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens
titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject
estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands
which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System by private persons shall be
excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13

The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, 14 and so, the petitioner estate interposed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed 15 for being unmeritorious and the lower
court's decision was affirmed with costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:

(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented in the proceeding below;

(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the Torrens system hence, it
cannot be used as evidence of land ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from the Titulo titled lands of
private individuals;

(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by
the lower court;

(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz
originated was already cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring the same as null and
void. 16

Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992, filed the
present petition 17 docketed as G.R. No. 103727.

G.R. NO. 106496

G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a

petition 18 for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
which eventually resulted to an Order 19 dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect.

The dispositive portion 20 of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:

1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.

2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and effect and that therefore
no rights could be derived therefrom.

3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions involving the lands covered
by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no force and effect.

4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban are enjoined from representing or exercising any acts of possession or ownership or from disposing
in any manner portions of all the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate
the same.

6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court within twenty days their final
accounting and inventory of all real and personal properties of the estate which had come into their possession
or knowledge under oath.

7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the presentation of their
evidence in order to rest their case.

The consideration and approval of the administrator's final accounting and inventory of the presentation of
movants-intervenors' evidence as well as the consideration of all other incidents are hereby set on December
22, 1978 at 8:30 a.m.

The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth
Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator,
respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the petitioners was received
by the lower court without any opposition. 21

On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing Engracio San Pedro as
Administrator of the subject estate. 22

On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro upon posting of
a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). 23

On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the letters of
administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to the
following entities:

(a) The Commanding General

Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City

(b) The Solicitor General

Manila

(c) The Government Corporate Counsel

A. Mabini St., Manila

(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan

(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan

(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan

(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal

(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City

(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City

(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in which properties of the estate are located; and

(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 24

The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought about by various
persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally authorized to act for the subject
estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.

On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by the Republic of
the Philippines alleging, inter alia:

4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely
inadmissible and ineffective as proof of ownership in court proceedings, except where the holder thereof
applies for land registration under Act 496, which is not true in the proceedings at bar;

5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;

6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs have lost whatever
rights of ownership they might have had to the so-called Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or
prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of inventory, settlement
or distribution in accordance with law, and all the inventories so far submitted, insofar as they embraced lands
within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and cannot be legally considered; and

8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter of the petition considering
that, except such portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject of valid adjudication or disposition in
accordance with law, the same belong in State ownership.25

On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend

Proceedings. 26

On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration was dismissed
by means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court hereby DISMISSES the
"Opposition" dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of merit, the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.

The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the Co-administrator Justino Z. Benito are ordered to furnish the
office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice
hereof. 27

On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the

Republic. 28

On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-page
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or 173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of
Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and Caloocan City;

(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon,
Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true
and lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and entitled to inherit the intestate estate
left by the said deceased, consisting of the above-mentioned tract of private land covered and described by
said above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom:
(a) all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons,
or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands declared by the
government as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d)
all portions thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the Administrator and
duly approved by a final order of the Court, except those which may hereafter be set aside, after due
consideration on a case to case basis, of various motions to set aside the said Court order which approved the
said sales, quit-claims, and/or exclusions;

(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co- administrator, is hereby revoked to take effect immediately,
to obviate any confusion in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of administration to
the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-
administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render his final accounting of his co-administration of the
Estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of copy hereof;

(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate, consolidate and take
possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and
credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take appropriate legal action to recover the same in the
proper Courts of Justice, government offices or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due
from the estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of
partition of the estate among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.

It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the
concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line with the projected urban land reform program of
the government, corollary to the agricultural land reform program of the New Society, the above intestate
estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale
by the government to be used in its human settlements and low cost housing projects.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED. 29

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision. 30

On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the Inhibition of the
then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12, 1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to
the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the said petition. 31

After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez issued the
aforestated Order 32 dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated
April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect,
thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of Appeals and alleged
that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the Republic's motion for reconsideration
which was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same court of the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San
Pedro. 33

On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs.34 In affirming the
assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de Priopriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate
court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert the Republic's claim that Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility
of the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496
(Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage
System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings).

The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision by invoking certain cases
wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals
refused to be swayed and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 35

Hence, the herein petition, 36 docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992.

After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court resolved to
consolidate both cases on September 15,
1994. 3 7

While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for intervention which we
denied on different occasions for lack of merit.

In G.R No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was denied due process of
law due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take cognizance of.

II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not
remanding the case for trial and in affirming the lower court's null and void judgment.38

In G.R No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:

First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a question of title or ownership
over which the lower court as an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated
objections of the petitioners. 39

Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge Fernandez setting aside the order
and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court reviewing,
revising, amending or setting aside the order and decision of Judges of equal rank. 40

Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge Fernandez who without
jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were already
final. 41

Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was appointed by
President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners
were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal.42

Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented before Judges Echiverri,
Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who never received a single piece of
evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guide title over Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary
owner stated therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of
the Supreme Court upholding the Guido title. 43

Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the petitioners' Spanish
title in these cases is the propriety of the lower court's resolution of the question of ownership of the subject
San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue of whether
or not petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that
we first determine whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of
administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of
ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.

Petitioners-heirs, in G.R No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch
IV, had no jurisdiction as an "intestate court" 44 to resolve the question of title or ownership raised by the
public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. 45

The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that
petitioners' contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate
of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity
of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the
intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the State's
patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased. 46

A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due
them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of wills. We
held in the case of Maniñgat v. Castillo, 4 7 that "the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate
the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration." Thus, its function
necessarily includes the examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on
whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net
assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 48 we stated, thus:

. . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased maybe passed upon
in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons . . .

Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain properties
ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for
letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
maybe resolved by the probate court. In this light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia
49 that:

. . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the
corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it
is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the
properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In
compliance with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits
of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in
the properties of a deceased person duly call the court's attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or
credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court's duty to hear the observations, with power
to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong
prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of
the said properties. 50 [Emphasis Supplied]

In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any reversible error
when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25,
1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered
by the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order of November
17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez' act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the
public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus
dubbed him as a "reviewing judge." By setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in
CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively,
Judge Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing judge," proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction.51

There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is fair and just, a
newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as the record and the evidence
are all available to him and that the same were taken into consideration and thoroughly studied. The
"reviewing judge" argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on considering that "the fact that the
judge who penned the decision did not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison
his findings and conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal." 52 In the case at
bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a
knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and setting aside Judge Bagasao's
Decision dated April 25, 1978.

Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez' disposition of the
case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus on the
core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R No. 106496 committed reversible error in excluding from
the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect.
Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and
106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the Late
Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.

It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the system
of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should
cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act 53 within six (6) months
from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. 54 Otherwise, non-compliance
therewith will result in a re-classification of their lands. 55 Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as
indubitable evidence of land ownership. 56

Section 1 of the said Decree provides:

Sec. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded
under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.

All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens
system.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.

The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to wit:

WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of public and private
lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming
ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;

WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations between
legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the holders
of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and
instability in property ownership and threatening the peace and order renditions in the areas affected;

WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;

WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system,
being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the System of registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;

In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., 57 we took cognizance of this Decree and
thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into
account the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent
to World War II.

In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought
under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. 58 Time and again
we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. 59 Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.

In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao who rendered
the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence, genuineness and authenticity
of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the
effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in
the special proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:
The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the nebulous titulo as an evidence
of ownership underscored the fact that during the pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks
had inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of the so-called estate with considerations running into
millions of pesos.

Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable and religious organizations,
including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood
wink further other gullible and unsuspecting victims. 60

In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-judicial
administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance
with damages in G.R No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasao's Decision of April 25, 1978 in
support of the Titulo's validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision had already been set
aside by Judge Fernandez' Order of November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts' holding
in G.R No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private respondents
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system is
the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We
do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness
and due execution have not been proven. In both cases, the petitioners heirs were not able to present the
original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the
petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. "Q-RP") to produce it as
requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro
and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove their claim of the subject
intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as "hypoteca" (the Spanish term is 'hipoteca')
allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented
as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the
petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of
the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-19").

The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in unequivocal
terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:

Sec. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing the contents
of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

xxx xxx xxx

Sections 3 and 4 of the same Rule further read:

Sec 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed — When the original writing has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability,
its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses.

Sec. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party's custody. — If the writing be in the custody of
the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory
proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents thereof may be proved as in the case of its
loss. But the notice to produce it is not necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been
wrongfully obtained or withheld by the adverse party.
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies,
as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been
lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be
disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence. 61

Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence and due
execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced was
not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of
the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Ching
Po v. Court of Appeals, 62 we pointed out that:

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to
the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be
changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. 63

In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in his decision,
relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January
28, 1963 denominated as "Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163"; (2) a photostat copy of the original
of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3)
the hipoteca Registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.

Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao's April 1978 decision correctly
clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures of Alejandro
Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked
by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling
Solicitor testified:

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished counsel for the government whether
he admits that there is actually a titulo propiedad 4136.

COURT:
Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?

ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are precisely impugning the titulo and I think the question of counsel is already answered by witness. The
parties have not yet established the due existence of the titulo.

ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the question. The witness is a witness for
the government, so with the testimony of this witness for the government to the effect that there is actually
in existence titulo propiedad 4136; we are asking the question candidly to the government counsel whether
he is prepared to state that there is really in existence such titulo propiedad 4136.

ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this court that there was such a document examined by the NBI insofar as the
signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be authentic.
64

The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our pronouncement that the
Titulo is of dubious validity:
. . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977 (Exhibit "O-RP")
concluded that the document contained material alterations as follows:

a) On line 15 of "p, 1, Title" and on line 5 of "p. 2, Title," the word "Pinagcamaligan" was written after "Pulo;"
b) On line 16, "p. 1, Title," "un" was converted to "mil;"
c) On Line 18, "p. 1, Title," "mil" was written at the end of "tres" in "tres mil;"
d) On line 19 of "p. 1, Title," a semblance of "mil" was written after "setentay tres;"
e) On line 6, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to a semblance of "uni;" and
f) On line 8, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to "mil."

The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong
of the NBI, there are still "pieces of black ashes around the rings of the portions which are indications of
burnings". The burnings were made on the very portions where there were previous erasures, alterations and
intercalations. Understandably, the burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act. 65

In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et a1. 66 Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera,
in reinstating the trial court's judgment therein, sustained the finding that:

. . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of Mariano San Pedro
shows obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the area and change the location
of the land described in the original title . . .

Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower court's analysis,
as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:

To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in Court. Upon request of the
Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP") was issued to the two administrators, Engracio San
Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136. But no one produced the titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to one another.

Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be produced, the Court cannot
take cognizance of any secondary evidence.

It was explained that the titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea
but who later disappeared and that his present whereabouts could not be known.

Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part of the claimants-heirs
were exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance despite the Court order to produce it in order to
determine its authenticity.

It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park's whereabouts are unknown or that there are not enough
funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be that the original would be adverse if
produced. 67

As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate estate, the
petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their admissibility as secondary
evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same
acquires no probative value. 68

At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muñoz,
as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al. 69 is enlightening. In said case, private
respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc., (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner
of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte,
province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied
on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful validity,
70 Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First. The Title
embraces land "located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City." Second. The title was
signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The
situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.

To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must be proved
not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17
Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13
Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil. 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case
involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare or per
quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree
of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for
must be measured per hectare.

Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's "Rejoinder to Opposition" dated
April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000
hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its "Opposition" of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land
as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of
Piadeco's land, Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these
proceedings.

Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title, acquired his
rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of
L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for
adjustment — showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for — were to be filed with the
Direccion General de Administration Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land with
the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).

The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at one year from
the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another
year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed,
as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of
October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arids lands, 500 hectares of land with trees
and 100 hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98
Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by
purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition,
it should be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.

But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta
de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Venture, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second petition for
adjustment within six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of
the publication of the law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands
established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which
boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal
Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may hold in their possession
(Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).

Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either dated April 29 or
April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.

Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo.
The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadeco's explanation —
not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano
mortgaged the land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio
Conrado. This transaction was said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano
Ignacio died, his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the
same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco
when she conveyed the land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration
of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came
to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land.
Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same to
Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act
496.

The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend
on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de
Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most
conspicuously over Piadeco's title.

Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 71 we categorically
enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative
value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated February 6,
1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R No. 69343. On March 29, 1985,
an entry of final judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating to the issue of
the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In the Muñoz case, we
had cast doubt on the Titulo's validity. In the WIDORA case, the Titulo's nullification was definitive. In both
cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench.
In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 72 the Court explained the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment, viz:

. . . conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was
there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and
cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be
conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential
that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment
will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same
parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not
required by merely identity of issues.

The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot
be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of
administration the inventory submitted before the probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the
Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net estate" to speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from the intestate
proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.

In G.R No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents Buhain, Ocampo
and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. "2" — De Ocampo) and TCT No.
269707 (Exh. "2" — Dela Cruz). 73 Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private respondents
became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree. 74 More importantly, TCT Nos.
372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of
validity. 75 As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the
petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the private respondents
as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the
proper witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs' claim that OCT No. 614
from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that the
negligence of counsel binds the client. 76 The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced
by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership
itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al., 77 we
held:

It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This negligence
ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the client, the
herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals,
101 SCRA 13 [1980] Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an
exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against
the petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the
petitioner bad been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect.

Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were denied due
process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing.

It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are not without
recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to
apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within
six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence
of possession, cannot be used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens
system.

All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.

In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more vigilant in handling
land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in
the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired
ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to the State.

In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on
August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of
the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993, 78 denied Catalino's
motion for leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included in
the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito
before the probate court.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

Consequently, in G.R No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1992 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

In G.R No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights could be derived
therefrom;

(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate of the
late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;

(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is,
hereby closed and terminated.

(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in
any manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are
hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.

This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 200265 December 2, 2013

LAURA E. PARAGUYA, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ALMA ESCUREL-CRUCILLO and EMETRIO CRUCILLO,* and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF SORSOGON,
Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 27, 2011 and Resolution3 dated
January 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 94764 reversing the Decision4 dated April 22,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Gubat, Sorsogon, Branch 54 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 1583 which ordered
respondents-spouses Alma Escurel-Crucillo (Escurel) and Emetrio Crucillo (Sps. Crucillo) to surrender
ownership and possession of certain parcels of land located at Maragadao, Villareal, Gubat, Sorsogon (subject
properties) in favor of pettioner Laura E. Paraguya (Paraguya), and for respondent Register of Deeds of
Sorsogon(RD) to cancel Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-177295 covering the foregoing properties.

The Facts
On December 19, 1990, Paraguya filed before the RTC a Complaint6 against Sps. Crucillo and the RD for the
annulment of OCT No. P-17729 and other related deeds, with prayer for receivership and damages, alleging
that Escurel obtained the aforesaid title through fraud and deceit. Paraguya claimed that she is the lawful heir
to the subject properties left by her paternal grandfather, the late Ildefonso Estabillo7 (Estabillo), while Escurel
was merely their administrator and hence, had no right over the same.8

On January 18, 1991, the RD files its answer and denied anyinvolvment in the aforesaid fraud maintaining that
its isuance of OCT No. P-17729 was his minsterial duty.9

Thereafter, or on February 7, 1991, Sps. Crucillo filed their answer with motion to dismiss, averring that
Paraguya’s complaint had already been barred by laches and/or prescription.10 They further alleged, among
others, that Escurel, through her father, the late Angel Escurel, applied for a free patent over the subject
properties, resulting in the issuance of Free Patent No. V-3 005844 under OCT No. P-17792 in her name.

During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following: (a) the identity of the subject propwerties which are
covered by OCT No. P-17729 in the name of Escurel; (b) the fact that the subject properties were originally
owned by Estabillo, the common ancestor of Paraguya and Escurel, being the former’s grandfather and the
latter’s great-grandfather; and (c) the fact that Sps. Crucillo are in actual possession of the subject
properties.11

During trial, Paraguya testified as to how she came about owning the subject properties, presenting a
document entitled Recognition of Ownership and Possession dated December 1, 1972 executed by her
siblings, as well as a titulo posesorio issued sometime in 1983 or 1985 in the name of Estabillo. A representative
of the Community Environment and Naural Resources Office (CENRO), by the name of Ramon Escanilla, also
testified in Paraguya’s favor, stating that aside from an affidavit dated December 17, 197612 executed by
Escurel’s brother, Adonis Escurel (adonis), there were no other documents of ownership presented before the
Bureau of Lands in support of Escurel’s application for title.13

For their part, Sps. Crucillo presented several witnesses who testified that Escurel had been in possession of
the subject properties in the concept of an owner as early as 1957. Escurel then admitted that her brother,
Adonis, executed an affidavit dated December 17, 1976 in her favor. She likewise admitted that she executed
an affidavit, entitled Ratification of Ownership (affidavit of adjudication), on the same date, in support of the
free patent application with the Bureau of Lands.14
 The RTC Ruling
In a Decision15 date April 22, 2009, the RTC granted Paraguya’s complaint, ordering theannulment of OCT No.
P-17729. Accordingly, it directed the RD to cancel the said title and Sps. Escurillo to surrender ownership and
possession of the subject propwerties to Paraguya.

It found that there was a discrepancy in the area of the subject properties applied for registration, as Adonis’s
affidavit – which was made as the basis of Escurel’s affidavit of adjudication – stated that the actual area
thereof was only 8,392 square meters (sq. m.) whereas OCT No. P-17729 indicated that the foregoing
properties had an area of 30,862 sq. m. In this regard, the RTC concluded that the requisites for the application
for registration were not complied with. Likewise, it observed that Escurel’s ownership over the subject
properties was not proven, adding that the affidavit of adjudication made by her and submitted to the CENRO
was self-serving. Based on its findings, it then concluded tha there was fraud in Escurel’s acquisition of the
above-mentioned title.16

On May 15, 2009, a motion for reconsideration was fixed by the Heirs of Sps. Crucillo, who had substituted
the letter due to their supervening death. The said motion was, however, denbied on December 16, 2009,
prompting them to elevate the case to the CA.17

The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated June 27, 2011, the CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and ordered the dismissal of Paraguya’s
complaint.

Citing Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,19 otherwise known as the "Property Registration
Decree." It held that OCT No. P-17729 became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year
from its issuance on August 24, 1979, thus barring Paraguya’s complaint.20 Moreover, it found that the
express trust relationship between Escurel and Estabillo was not sufficiently established. Finally, it pointed out
that Paraguya was not real-party-interest since she has not proven her title over the subject properties, stating
that the titulo posesorio she held could no longer be used as evidence of ownership.

Aggrieved Paraguya moved for reconsideration21 which for reconsideration21 which was however, denied on
January 9, 2012.22 Hence, this petition.

Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Paraguya’s complaint for annulment of
title.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

It is an established rule that a Torrens certificate of title is conclusive proof of ownership. Verily, a party may
seek its annulment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. However, such action must be seasonably filed,
else the same would be barred.23

In this relation, Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the period to contest a decree of registration shall be one
(1) year from the date of its entry and that , after the lapse of the said period, The Torrens certificate of title
issued thereon becomes incontrovertible and indefeasible, viz.:

Sec. 32 Review of decree of registrationl Innocent purchaser for value.1âwphi1 The decree of registration shall
not be reopened or revised by the reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court by reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right
of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of
First Instance a pettiton for reopnening and review of the decree of registartion not later than one year from
and after the date of the entry of such deceree of resgistration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase
occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbracer for
value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued
shall become inconvertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing, the Ocurt is impelled to sustain the CA’s dismissal of Paraguya’s complaint for
annulment of CT No. P-1772924 since it was filed only on December 19, 1990, or more than eleven (11) years
from the title’s date of entry on August 24, 1979.25 Based on Section 32 of PD 1529, aid title had become
inconvertible and indefeasible after the lapse of one (1) year from the date of its entry, thus barring Paraguya’s
action for annulment of title.

The Court likewise takes note that Paraguya’s complaint is likewise in the nature of an action for reconveyance
because it also prayed for the trial copurt to order Sps. Crucillo to "surrender ownership and possession of the
properties in question to [Paraguya], vacating them altogether x x x. 26 Despite this, Paraguya’s complaint
remains dismissible on the same ground because the prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance is ten
(10) years reckoned from the date of issuance of the certificate of title, except when the owner is in possession
of the property in which case the action for reconveyance becomes imprescriptible.27 Such exception is,
howevee, Crucillo, and Paraguya, who are in possession of the land covered by OCT No. P-17729.

As a final point, it is well to note that even if the barring effect of Section 32 and the above-stated prescriptive
period for reconveyance are discounted, Paraguya’s comlaint for annulment of title should be dismissed
altogether since she merely relied on the titulo posesorio issued in favor Estabillo sometime in 1983 or 1985.
Based on Section 1 of PD 892, entitled "Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and
of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings," Spanish titles can no longer be used
as evidence of ownership after six (6) months from the effectivity of the law, or starting August 16, 1976.28
viz.:

Section 1. The system of Registration under the Spanish Mortgage Las is discontinued, and all lands recorded
under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.

All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registartion proceeding under the Torrens
system. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

Hence, since Paraguya only presented the titulo posesorio during the pendency of the instant case, or during
the 1990’s onwards, the CA was correct in not giving any credence to it at all.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal’s Decision dated June 27, 2011 and
Resolution dated January 9, 2012 in CA-G.R. CV. No. 94764 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
5. G. R. No. 156888 November 20, 2006

PEDRO R. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,

vs.
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The Case
For Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is the 3 December 20021 and 7 January 20032
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002
entitled Victoria M. Rodriguez, Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo versus Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority. In the assailed Orders, the RTC denied the application for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The Facts
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Property, filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez,
Armando G. Mateo and herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago against respondent Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA) on 12 March 2002, before the RTC of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74. Included in said
complaint was a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order.

In their Complaint filed before the RTC, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R.
Santiago, alleged that:

Plaintiff (Victoria M. Rodriguez) is the sole heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez by
virtue of the Order, dated February, 1994 in Spec. Proc. No. IR-1110, "In the Matter of the Settlement of the
Estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes, etc.", (sic) of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court at Iriga City x x x.

xxxx

In his lifetime, the late Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name
under that (sic) certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree
No. 01-4-Protocol x x x.

xxxx

On January 31, 2002, plaintiff Victoria M. Rodriguez, in her capacity as heir and administrator of the estate of
Hermogenes Rodriguez, leased to Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo, for a period of 50 years, two
parcels of land of Hermogenes Rodriguez covered by his aforesaid title, x x x.

xxxx

By virtue of the aforesaid lease contract, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago is presently occupying the aforesaid parcel
of land consisting of 2.5 hectares, more particularly the improvements located at 717 Sta. Rita Road.

Despite the fact that defendant is not the owner of the two aforesaid parcels of land leased to plaintiffs
Santiago and Mateo, defendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over them. More particularly,
defendant is using these two parcels of land for its (sic) own commercial and other purposes.

It is now the desire of plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez to recover possession of the property from the defendant so
that she could comply with her contractual commitments to her co-plaintiffs.

xxxx
[D]efendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over the parcels of land described in paragraph 7
hereof. Lately, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago was informed by purported agents or employees of the defendant
that he should vacate the premises he and his family are occupying since defendant would be needing the
same for its own use. Defendant has no authority to do this since it is not the owner of the premises, and the
owner, Victoria Rodriguez (sic) has already leased the premises to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo.4

Respondent SBMA, in its counter statement of facts,5 contends that sometime in 1998, Liwanag Santiago, wife
of herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, by virtue of her employment with respondent SBMA, availed herself of
the housing privilege accorded to the latter’s employees; that due to said privilege, she was allowed to lease
a housing unit6 inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone; that the lease agreement, however, "shall be terminated
if the lessees are no longer employed with SBMA;"7 that on 31 January 2002, Liwanag Santiago’s employment
contract concluded; that since said contract was not renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee of
respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence thereof, as mandated by the SBMA Housing Policy, she and her
family were asked8 to vacate and return possession of the subject housing unit.

On 13 March 2002, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order[9] against respondent SBMA from ousting
petitioner Santiago and his family from the premises of the subject housing unit within seventy two (72) hours
from receipt. Further, it was likewise restrained and enjoined from committing any other acts that would
prevent the latter and his family from occupying the premises they have allegedly leased from Victoria
Rodriguez.

Thereafter, the RTC conducted hearings on the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

On 5 April 2002, instead of filing an Answer, respondent SBMA filed a Motion to Dismiss10 the
abovementioned complaint on the argument, inter alia,11 that the latter failed to state a valid cause of action.

On 3 December 2002, the RTC issued its first assailed order. In denying and dismissing the application for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and complaint respectively, the RTC stated that since the alleged
right of complainant Rodriguez stemmed from a Spanish Title, specifically the Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos
of 1891, it cannot be considered a right in esse. The RTC took judicial notice of Presidential Decree No. 892,12
which required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands under Republic Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,13 within six months from effectivity of the decree, or
until 16 August 1976. After such time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System. Significant parts of the assailed Order of
the RTC read:

Plaintiffs’ complaint is anchored on a Spanish title which they claim is still a valid, subsisting and enforceable
title. Despite the fact that said title was never registered under Act 496, the land Registration Act (later PD
1529), plaintiffs still claim that they have a cause of action.

The court is not convinced.

The action filed by plaintiffs is for recovery of possession based on the ownership by plaintiff Rodriguez of the
disputed property evidenced by a Spanish title. Clearly, by the sheer force of law particularly the enabling
clauses of PD 892, said type of title can no longer be utilized as evidence of ownership. Verily, Spanish titles
can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. (Citation omitted.)

As such and on its face, the complaint indeed failed to state a cause of action simply because the court can
take judicial notice of the applicability of PD 892 and of the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to the
case at bench.14

Therein plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the second assailed Order dated 7
January 2003.

The Issues
Hence, petitioner Santiago’s immediate resort to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, raising the following issues:15
I. WHETHER OR NOT SPANISH TITLES ARE STILL ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF LANDS;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPER IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT
PLAINTIFFS COULD STILL PROVE THEIR CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE SPANISH
TITLE; and

III. WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT, BY FILING A MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD OF AN ANSWER, WAS
DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP.

In essence, the present petition poses as fundamental issue for resolution by the Court the question of
whether or not the RTC committed reversible error in denying the application for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction as well as dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

The Court’s Ruling

As the appeal of respondent Santiago involves only questions of law, the Court took cognizance of the instant
petition.16

Petitioner Santiago maintains that "x x x P.D. No. 892 merely disallowed the use of Spanish titles as evidence
of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. In other words, Spanish titles can
still be used as evidence of land ownership in any other proceedings except registration under the Torrens
system. Since the instant case is not one for registration under the Torrens system, but x x x who should be
entitled to the possession thereof, then the presentation as evidence of land ownership of the Spanish title in
question is permissible." As to the non-presentation of the Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos, petitioner
Santiago had this to say:

As the trial court stated, "(F)undamental is the rule that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint for lack of
cause of action is regarded as having admitted all the allegations thereof, at least hypothetically". (sic) The
Complaint specifically alleged that plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez was the great-great-great granddaughter of and
the sole heir and administrator of the late spouses Hermogenes Rodriguez and Erlinda Flores and that in his
lifetime Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land registered in his name under that certificate
of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol. Defendant
was, therefore, deemed to have admitted these allegations. And, with such admissions, then there would be
no more need, at least at this stage of the case, for the plaintiffs to present the Spanish title. In other words,
the inadmissibility of the title, as argued by the defendant, becomes immaterial since there is no more need
to present this title in view of the admissions."

Citing the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,[17]respondent SBMA, however, stresses that "Spanish titles can no longer be countenance as indubitable
evidence of land ownership by sheer force of law, particularly, the enabling clause of P.D. 892 in expressly
providing that, if not accompanied by actual possession of the land, said type of title x x x can no longer be
utilized as proof or evidence of ownership x x x." PAG ITO NABASA MO AT IKAW UNA NAGMESSAGE GC NATIN
NG HATDOG, ILILIBRE KITA NG TURKS OR MILKTEA SA NEXT NA MEET UP NATIN.

A priori, before the Court goes into the resolution of the fundamental issue raised by the instant petition, a
critical matter must be dealt with – the fact that the assailed orders of dismissal of the complaint and denial
of the motion for reconsideration, respectively, of the RTC had already become final and executory against
Victoria M. Rodriguez due to her failure to appeal the case. It must be remembered that petitioner Santiago
is merely the alleged lessee of part of the claimed parcel of land. In the scheme of things, so to speak, his right
to recover possession is anchored on the alleged ownership of Victoria M. Rodriguez, which right to the
claimed parcel of land is not in esse. As such, petitioner Santiago is equally bound by the final and executory
order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.

Nevertheless, even if we were to overlook the foregoing grievous error, we would be hard pressed to find fault
in the assailed orders of the RTC. The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already
expressed in the case of Nemencio C. Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago,18 that the Spanish title of
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any
evidentiary value to establish ownership over real property.

Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago anchor their right to recover
possession of the subject real property on claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of
the named grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos.
Promulgated on 29 April 2005, in the aforementioned Evangelista Case, we categorically stated that:

P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only
until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of
an allegation in petitioners’ Complaint that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892,
then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the
successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as proof of
their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings.

Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record
title already created and vested. (Citation omitted.) By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration
proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title.
Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such
Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title),
only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the
circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the
courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely
undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892
intended to eliminate.

Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as proof of ownership on the basis of the
exception provided in the fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:

WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system,
being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession; . . .

Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject Property, then they could still
present the Spanish title as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. (Citation omitted.)

This Court cannot sustain petitioners’ argument. Actual proof of possession only becomes necessary because,
as the same whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish title
may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same for the
required prescriptive period. (Citation omitted.) Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the
applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in
actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the possibility that someone else has acquired a better
title to the same property by virtue of prescription.

Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just
a particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily convey a meaning quite
different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with
which it is associated. An apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with
other provisions of the statute. (Citation omitted.)

The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted and harmonized with the other provisions of
the whole statute. (Citation omitted.) Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to discontinue
the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set
a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six
months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles may no longer be presented
to prove ownership.
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for registration of their title on or before 14 August
1976. In a land registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court his Spanish title plus proof
of actual possession of the real property. However, if such land registration proceeding was filed and initiated
after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his
ownership of the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his actual possession.

Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when they filed the
Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892,
and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in
a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.

The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming ownership of the real property
on some other basis, such as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree (Citation omitted.) or the
Public Land Act.42 Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside
from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial, which this Court has already controverted;
and the Spanish title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property.

Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file
an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing
to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this
Court to address the issue of prescription of the action.19

Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue of the principle of stare decisis.
Not only are the legal rights and relations of herein parties substantially the same as those passed upon in the
aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and
documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar
to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which
are established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.

With the above provision of law and preceding discussions, in tandem with the Court’s pronouncements in
numerous cases, i.e., Director of Forestry v. Muñoz;20 Antonio v. Barroga;21 Republic v. Court of Appeals.;22
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals;23 Carabot v. Court of Appeals;24 Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court;25 Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;26 Director of Lands v. Heirs of
Isabel Tesalona;27 and Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,28 it is quite
evident that the RTC committed no reversible error in taking heed of our final, and executory, decisions –
those decisions considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so far as the use of Spanish
titles to evidence ownership are concerned. For it is the better practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases where the facts are substantially the same.291âwphi1

The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been
established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a
similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not
require identity of or privity of parties.30 This is unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code.
It is even said that such decisions "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto."31 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons,
otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably
affected and the public’s confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.32
It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on 16 February 1976,
the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496)
within six months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until 16 August 1976.33 If not, non-
compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of the real property.

In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling that Spanish titles can no longer be
countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.34 And, without legal or equitable title to the subject
property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality
to claim entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is
based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain
control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.35

Therefore, the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.

Anent the argument of petitioner Santiago that by filing the Motion to Dismiss, respondent SBMA already
admitted all the allegations of the complaint such that the question of whether or not the subject Spanish Title
was inadmissible or not had become immaterial.

We do not agree.

Basic is the rule that in a motion to dismiss complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question posed to
the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegation of facts made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action. It is beside the point whether or not the allegations in the complaint are true, for with said
motion, the movant only hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, that is, assuming
arguendo that the facts alleged are true, the facts alleged are insufficient for the court to render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.

Consequently, by anchoring their right to recover possession of property on the subject Spanish title that has
been divested of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over the subject real property, the
complaint filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago was correctly
dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action.

In fine, there is nothing more left to be argued as regards the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. The
issue has been settled and this Court’s final decision in the said cases must be respected.36 This Court’s hands
are now tied by the finality of the abovementioned decisions. The Court has no alternative but to deny the
instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed 3 December 200237
and 7 January 200338 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil
Case No. 126-0-2002, are hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
6. G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction
of municipal trial courts in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas2 in LRC Case No. N-98-20, LRA Record No. 68329, granting respondent
Bantigue Point Development Corporation’s (Corporation) application for original registration of a parcel of
land. Since only questions of law have been raised, petitioner need not have filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the assailed CA Decision before filing this Petition for Review.

The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an assessed value
of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property, more particularly
described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732 square meters,
located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. 3

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.4 On 7 August
1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.5

Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the records
were still with the RTC.6

On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San
Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.7

Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default8 and commenced with the reception of evidence.9
Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax Declarations,10 a Deed
of Absolute Sale in its favor,11 and a Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in
question is within the alienable and disposable zone.12 Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent
Corporation.13

Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,14 the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the
proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.15 The CA further found that
respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s registrable title over the subject property after
having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by
itself and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.16

Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following
arguments in support of its appeal:

I. THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL

II. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.17
 The Court’s Ruling
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further proceedings in order
to determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

I
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.

At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.18 Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.19 It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.20 Consequently,
questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.21

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if
he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s
jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him"22 is based on
the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.23 In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and
filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from
the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts
in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question
of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People,24 we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an
exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to
that in the latter case.

The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner
Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the RTC.25 At
that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the
case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed
pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the
jurisdictional question in its Brief.26 Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to
the instant appeal.

Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it."27 In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such
unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its
right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.

II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the
period for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.

First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because the
RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property
Registration Decree.28

We disagree.

The Property Registration Decree provides:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-
five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.

In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.29 On 18 July 1997, or a day after
the filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22
October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order.30 While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day
period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna
Properties, Inc.,31 petitioner Republic therein contended that there was failure to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for original registration, because there were 125 days between the Order setting
the date of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that the lapse of time between the
issuance of the Order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal
to the application. Thus, we held:

x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court;
he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. A party
cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party
if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission
over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with
all the requirements of the law.32

Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its application for
registration on account of events beyond its control.

Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November
1997,33 within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect
was still not cured, as the second Order was issued more than five days from the filing of the application, again
contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration Decree.34

Petitioner is incorrect.

The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the
filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the
court’s its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order
within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the
five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.35 It cannot be contingent
upon the action or inaction of the court.

This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that
the law deliberately meant the provision "to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter."36
However, the records of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately
set the case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for registration,37 except that it had to
issue a second Order because the initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by law.

Second, petitioner contended38 that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of Sale annexed
to respondent’s application for original registration was ₱160,000,39 the MTC did not have jurisdiction over
the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,40 the MTC’s delegated
jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which should not exceed
₱100,000.

We are not persuaded.

The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested
lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than
one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691)
(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: first, where
there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed
₱100,000.

The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent Corporation’s
application for registration on 8 January 1998.41

However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this case does
not exceed ₱100,000.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to its selling
price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to
be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement
of the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration of
the real property.42

In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the records are
bereft of any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be
done through the second method, because this method finds application only where there are multiple
claimants who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent
Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims the property.

The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations
submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for registration. From the records, we find
that the assessed value of the property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for
the entire property.43 Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question
does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended.

III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.

Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTC’s exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower court
erred in granting respondent Corporation’s application for original registration in the absence of sufficient
proof that the property in question was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State.44 The applicant for land
registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through
incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive
act of the government.45 We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient
to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered.46 The applicant must also
show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable.47

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO48 Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.49
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its application.50 Clearly,
this falls short of the requirements for original registration.1âwphi1

We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that the property
in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If respondent Bantigue Point
Development Corporation presents a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary, the application for original registration should be granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that
the land in question is alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the government, the application
should be denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to
the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the property sought
to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

SO ORDERED.
7. G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988

EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.

Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.

Rico & Associates for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

** Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No. 64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No.
62042. The subject matter of these two (2) cases and the instant case is the same — a parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.

The present petition arose from the same facts and events which triggered the filing of the earlier petitions.
These facts and events are cited in our resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as follows:

. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
involving a parcel of land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda
The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor
on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after considering the
private respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of
possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, a writ of demolition was issued
on March 29, 1982. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
On August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on
certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied
in a resolution dated January 7,1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied in another resolution dated
March 25, 1983, which also stated that the denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with
the entry of judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--
contend that the writs of possession and demolition issued in the respondent court should now be
implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to delay the
implementation of the writ; that counsel for the respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging
in a concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of possession and demolition and that
petitioners are entitled to damages because of prejudice caused by the filing of this petition before the
Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ' to
maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo.
Considering that (l)there is merit in the instant petition for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No. 64432 as
raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042;
and (2) the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended not to
render the petition moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the Court RESOLVED
to DIRECT the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues already resolved by
this Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the
writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered. (pp. 107-108, Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)

On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration of the
December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R. No. 64432. On this same date, another resolution was issued, this time
in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents
(Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9,
1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984,
dismissing Civil Case No. 00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions above cited
pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No.
64432 became final on May 20, 1984.

Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo
issued the following order:

Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel
dated August 28, 1984:

(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983
Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;

(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated December 29, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable
Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;

(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial under Act 496, therefore she must register all
orders, judgment, resolutions of this Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.

Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no opposition thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared null and void and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-106098 is hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning the ownership of Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.

The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)

The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for reconsideration and manifestation filed
by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending case
before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo
Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.

In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte motions for
issuance of an order directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and implement
the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be issued:

1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting
Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the lower court;

2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title
to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;

Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)

Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432
granting the motions as prayed for. Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by the petitioners, we
issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for
implementation by the judge below.

In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G.
Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated November 6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:

ORDER

This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the movants through counsel on October 20, 1986;
the Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of
deeds for the Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting
Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.

Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986
seeking the full implementation of the writ of possession was granted by the Honorable Supreme Court,
Second Division per its Resolution dated September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to register the Order of this
Court dated September 5, 1984 as prayed for.

xxx xxx xxx

ORDER

This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772
submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2, 1986, in compliance
with the order of this Court dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to File Opposition filed
by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to
its order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period
granted by the Court finding the petition tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to
this Court within ten (10) days from the date of this order, after which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-25772 is hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of
Title in lieu thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate
shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)

On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio Perez, private respondent in G.R. No.
64432 and petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated
September 17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:

a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of TCT T-25772, should the same be referred
to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it already deemed granted
by implication (by virtue of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?

b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only the implementation of the writ of
possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536, Rollo — 4432)

Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987
noting all these motions and stating therein:

xxx xxx xxx

Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7, 1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30,
1984, and all that remains is the implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to refer the matters
concerning the execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and
to apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with the implementation of the resolutions of
this Court. No further motions in these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. 615, Rollo-64432)

In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders dated November 6, 1986 and January 6,
1987, Acting Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561
and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-106098.

However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still
pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued to the
petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987
ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.

This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial
court to reinstate its order dated February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice
of lis pendens in the new certificates of titles.

In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said motion to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 23 for appropriate action.

Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the petitioners'
motion to reinstate the February 12, 1987 order in another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners
filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the
respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to
cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners.

The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a notice of is pendens on the new
certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an
urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.

In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted the motion and directed the Acting
Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-
111560; T-111561 and T-111562.

Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 12,
1987 order stating therein:

That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said order based on the second paragraph of
Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to wit:

"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant or other disposition of the action such as to
terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a
memorandum or notice of Lis Pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of
Lis Pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the
action or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof."

That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562
by virtue of a case docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals,
entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."

That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the cancellation of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only
be made or deemed cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action
or proceeding was pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.

Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis Pendens was based is still pending with the
Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this Honorable Court in a mere
cadastral proceedings can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)

Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were
not privies to the case affected by the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside his
February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.

The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of
Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
A corollary issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens
in a torrens certificate of title.

Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517 of Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the
same subject matter of G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was
annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.

Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued an order dated October 24, 1984
dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.

The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the reason why respondent Judge Gustilo
recalled the February 12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens
annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.

This petition is impressed with merit.

Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042. Although Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido,
Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as parties, it
is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-
owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in
her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p.
51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No.
62042 was as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings, respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the
authority to declare as null and void the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner Maria Provido
Gotera and her other co-owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)

It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to G.R. No. 62042 contrary to the trial
court's findings that they were not.

G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in the reconstitution proceedings
declaring TCT No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void for
being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.

The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25,1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871
was filed.

Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents herein, in filing Civil Case
No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R.
No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition
in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.

The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner:

Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof With
the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For,
notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular
property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble
on the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14, RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3, 11; I
Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3, citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481, 485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this case necessitate the
application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of
Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect
that:

We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot
be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to
cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff
does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the
plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the
defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
supra)

The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme Court illustrate how
the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R.
No. 64432.

Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting
Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot
No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the
Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides:

Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of
the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the
Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.

This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled by the respondent Acting
Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court
of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below but based on the order, it can be safely
assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the
petitioners (the defendants therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the
Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432.

The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate and/or
cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons
therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken
or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for
registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by
the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken
to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of
Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.
According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought
to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to
express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of
deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over
the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or
other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land
Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in
accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this Court's
already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara
Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory
tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents
involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12, 1987
order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
8. A.C. No. 8261 March 11, 2015
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., and ATTY.
ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 8725

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the
disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan,
Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order that became the
basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice ofadverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the
Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.

Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a civil action they brought
to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as
the notice of lis pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.

In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the
complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres, they
inherited upon the deaths of their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy,
Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been
unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the
names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of
their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.

It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598 in order to end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and the proceeds
thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would be
withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of
the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated February 26, 2008,6
which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants’ lack of objection thereto
and the defendants’ willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim.7

The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they
could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and visits to his office;
that they found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that new annotations were made
on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty.
Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the annotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the complainants’ Motion to Withdraw
Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter request dated June 30, 2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of
Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation of their notice of adverse
claim and their notice of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively. The LRA set
Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda and/or supporting documents on or beforesuch scheduled hearing.10 However, the records do
not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or remained pending at the LRA.

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for his
professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. They submitted that
the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order
specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr.
and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds
by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the
new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.

On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified complaint.11 Atty. Victorio,
Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert Torres had been actively
involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the mediation process; that the
complainants, after having aggressively participated in the drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now
claim that they had been deceived into entering the agreement in the same way that they could not feign
ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did not commit any abandonment as alleged, but had
performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he
should not be held responsible for their representation in other proceedings, such as that before the LRA,
which required a separate engagement; and that the only payment he had received from the complainants
were those for his appearance fees of ₱1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.

In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing that
he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during the
hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter request dated June 30, 2008
of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no knowledge about how said letter-request had been
disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the present complaint was the second disbarment case filed by
the complainants against him with no other motive except to harass and intimidate him.

Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy
Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that resulted in the cancellation of
the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the cancellation of the
annotations was undertaken in the regular course of official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty of
the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was performed in the cancellation of the annotations;
and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby
discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the case.

Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15

As the result of Atty. Quilala’s allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.’s
signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another sworn disbarment
complaint dated August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of Atty. Cunanan.16
This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and was later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117
because the complaints involved the same parties and rested on similar allegations against the respondents.

Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the
arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted Atty.
Quilala’s Comment.19

Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary
sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The complainants’ allegations of the respondents’ acts and omissions are insufficient to establish any
censurable conduct against them.

Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the general duties of
the Register of Deeds, as follows:

Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – x x x

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it
that said instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and that the same are properly canceled.
If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the present or of
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta
in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature.21 A purely ministerial act or duty is
one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.22

In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that registration is a merely ministerial act of
the Register of Deeds, explaining:

x x x [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds
to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the documents
sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.

In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty.
Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of
lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-
request dated June 30,2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch
as their duty to examine documents presented for registration was limited only to what appears on the face
of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order, they found the same to
be sufficient in law and to be in conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to
perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.24

Should they be aggrieved by said respondents’ performance of duty, the complainants were not bereft of any
remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter by way of consulta with
the LRA, as provided by Section 11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated in Gabriel v. Register
of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the province of a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues
concerning the validity or invalidity of a document registered by the Register of Deeds.

The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each other to
guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable settlement, and then to
cause the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-
290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their cause since the issuance
of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008. The complainants’ charges are devoid of substance.

Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy because conspiracy
may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is nonetheless essential that
conspiracy be established by clear and convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in this regard. Outside
of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order
to cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the annotations, they presented no evidence to
support their allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated their own active participation in
arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not
now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had themselves entered into.

Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated and participated in the settlement of the
case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant
to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:

RULE 1.04 – A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement.1âwphi1

In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the complainants and the defendants in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28

Anent the complainants’ charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance, the complainants
obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis, without
any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not competently and
persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation
was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.

Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time
during the engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s legal representation
was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its
members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional
services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s alleged failure to
respond to the complainants’ calls or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have
access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to
abandonment without the credible showing that he continued to come under the professional obligation
towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr.,
Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victoria, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.

SO ORDERED.
9. G.R. No. 94033 May 29, 1995

FELICIANO RAMOS, Substituted by his heirs through VALERIANA VDA. DE RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO C. RODRIGUEZ, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal and LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Feliciano Ramos applied for the registration of a parcel of land in San Jose, Rodriguez, Montalban, Rizal,
identified as Lot 125-B of subdivision plan Psd-760 with a total area of 156,485 square meters. Upon his death
on April 6, 1982 and during the pendency of said application, Feliciano was substituted by his heirs, petitioners
herein.

After issuing an order of general default, respondent judge rendered a decision on July 28, 1988, adjudicating
the said lot to the petitioners.

On September 12, 1988, the court a quo issued an Order for Issuance of Decree stating that the July 28, 1988
decision had become final and directing the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) 1 to comply with Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, that is, to prepare the
decree and certificate of registration.

Instead of issuing the said decree, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio submitted a report dated
September 26, 1988, which was earlier required by the court, recommending that the July 28, 1988 decision
be set aside after due hearing because the subject lot was part of Lot 125, Psu-32606 which is already covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8816 issued on October 29, 1924, in case No. 1037 in the name of the
Payatas Estate Improvement Company, and which was assigned Decree No. 1131 on January 31, 1905.
Petitioners later claimed that TCT No. 8816 was fraudulent but they failed to present any evidence in support
of such allegation.

Several settings for the hearing were made before the court in an order dated February 2, 1990, merely noted
the said report. The court opined "that it cannot set aside its (July 28, 1988) decision on the basis of the report
dated September 26, 1988, which was received by this Court on October 10, 1988, after the finality of its
decision." It added that the proper remedy of the government was an action for annulment of judgment.

Bonifacio filed on March 9, 1990, through the Chief Legal Officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), a
motion for reconsideration of the February 2, 1990, order.

On May 29, 1990, the court a quo issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration, denying petitioner's
application for registration, setting aside its decision dated July 28, 1988, as well as its order for the issuance
of decree dated September 12, 1988 and denying the petition to re-direct the LRA to issue the decree of
registration. The court noted that the subject lot was already covered by an existing certificate of title and that
no final decree has yet been issued by the LRA.

Petitioners are now asking the Court to set aside the trial court's May 29, 1990, order on the strength of the
principle of finality of judgments.

This issue has already been settled in a similar case, 2 where the Court declared that:

. . . Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does
not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility(,) until after the expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the
entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree
has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has
not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
It is also argued by petitioners that the issuance of the decree of registration and the certificate of title by the
LRA is a ministerial duty which follows as a matter of course the order of the court directing it to issue said
decree. This, too, has been squarely met in Gomez, thus:

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in
conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion
in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the
decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect as officials of the court and not
as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."

In the case at bench, Administrator Bonifacio filed his report as an officer of the court precisely to inform the
latter that the NLTDRA cannot comply with the order to issue a decree because the subject lot sought to be
registered was discovered to have been already decreed and titled in the name of the Payatas Estate. Under
these circumstances, the LRA is not legally obligated to follow the court's order.

This is also one of the reasons why we have to reject the claim of petitioners that the court's Order for Issuance
of Decree is the reckoning point in determining the timeliness of a petition to re-open or review the decree of
registration in view of the ministerial nature of the LRA's duty. The other reason is that the one-year period
stated in section 32 of P.D. 1529 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree of registration
clearly refers to the decree of registration described in Section 31 of the said P.D., which decree is prepared
and issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration.

Finally, petitioners aver that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the July
28, 1988, decision and the order for issuance of decree dated September 12, 1988, upon the mere motion for
reconsideration filed by the LRA, not by the Solicitor General, of the February 2, 1990 order.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Solicitor General is bound to "[r]epresent the Government in all
land registration and related proceedings." 3 Add to this the fact that P.D. 1529 itself, specifically Section 6
thereof which enumerates the functions of the Commissioner of Land Registration, is bereft of any grant of
power to the LRA or to the Commissioner to make the same representation as the Office of the Solicitor
General in behalf of the government in land registration proceedings.

The court a quo could not have committed grave abuse of discretion because it was merely following the
earlier recommendation of the LRA which was then acting as an agent of the court.

Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may
be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. 4 This is especially true when, as in this case, a
strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree
of registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.

It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas
Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been
issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early
case, 5 "[t]he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently
brought under a second action for registration." The application for registration of the petitioners in this case
would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under
Section 48 of P.D. 1529.

At this point, it may be stated that this controversy could have been avoided had the proper procedure in land
registration cases been observed by both the trial court, acting as a land registration court and by the LRA,
acting as an agent of the court. The court should have rendered its decision only "after considering the
evidence and the reports of the commissioner of Land Registration and the Director of Lands," as mandated
by Section 29 of P.D. 1529, instead of precipitately adjudicating the land in question to the applicant and
directing the Commissioner to issue a decree of registration and certificate of title when the report of the LRA
was still forthcoming. On the other hand, if a faster disposition of the proceedings were really desired, the
court could facilely wield the powers of its office in order to compel the LRA to speed up its investigation,
report, and recommendation.

Finally, the Solicitor General is reminded to be more vigilant in handling cases which his office should, under
the law, properly represent.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED, and the order of respondent court dated May
29, 1990, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
10. G.R. No. 94033 May 29, 1995

FELICIANO RAMOS, Substituted by his heirs through VALERIANA VDA. DE RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO C. RODRIGUEZ, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal and LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Feliciano Ramos applied for the registration of a parcel of land in San Jose, Rodriguez, Montalban, Rizal,
identified as Lot 125-B of subdivision plan Psd-760 with a total area of 156,485 square meters. Upon his death
on April 6, 1982 and during the pendency of said application, Feliciano was substituted by his heirs, petitioners
herein.

After issuing an order of general default, respondent judge rendered a decision on July 28, 1988, adjudicating
the said lot to the petitioners.

On September 12, 1988, the court a quo issued an Order for Issuance of Decree stating that the July 28, 1988
decision had become final and directing the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) 1 to comply with Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, that is, to prepare the
decree and certificate of registration.

Instead of issuing the said decree, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio submitted a report dated
September 26, 1988, which was earlier required by the court, recommending that the July 28, 1988 decision
be set aside after due hearing because the subject lot was part of Lot 125, Psu-32606 which is already covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8816 issued on October 29, 1924, in case No. 1037 in the name of the
Payatas Estate Improvement Company, and which was assigned Decree No. 1131 on January 31, 1905.
Petitioners later claimed that TCT No. 8816 was fraudulent but they failed to present any evidence in support
of such allegation.

Several settings for the hearing were made before the court in an order dated February 2, 1990, merely noted
the said report. The court opined "that it cannot set aside its (July 28, 1988) decision on the basis of the report
dated September 26, 1988, which was received by this Court on October 10, 1988, after the finality of its
decision." It added that the proper remedy of the government was an action for annulment of judgment.

Bonifacio filed on March 9, 1990, through the Chief Legal Officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), a
motion for reconsideration of the February 2, 1990, order.

On May 29, 1990, the court a quo issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration, denying petitioner's
application for registration, setting aside its decision dated July 28, 1988, as well as its order for the issuance
of decree dated September 12, 1988 and denying the petition to re-direct the LRA to issue the decree of
registration. The court noted that the subject lot was already covered by an existing certificate of title and that
no final decree has yet been issued by the LRA.

Petitioners are now asking the Court to set aside the trial court's May 29, 1990, order on the strength of the
principle of finality of judgments.

This issue has already been settled in a similar case, 2 where the Court declared that:

. . . Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does
not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility(,) until after the expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the
entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree
has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has
not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
It is also argued by petitioners that the issuance of the decree of registration and the certificate of title by the
LRA is a ministerial duty which follows as a matter of course the order of the court directing it to issue said
decree. This, too, has been squarely met in Gomez, thus:

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in
conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion
in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the
decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect as officials of the court and not
as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."

In the case at bench, Administrator Bonifacio filed his report as an officer of the court precisely to inform the
latter that the NLTDRA cannot comply with the order to issue a decree because the subject lot sought to be
registered was discovered to have been already decreed and titled in the name of the Payatas Estate. Under
these circumstances, the LRA is not legally obligated to follow the court's order.

This is also one of the reasons why we have to reject the claim of petitioners that the court's Order for Issuance
of Decree is the reckoning point in determining the timeliness of a petition to re-open or review the decree of
registration in view of the ministerial nature of the LRA's duty. The other reason is that the one-year period
stated in section 32 of P.D. 1529 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree of registration
clearly refers to the decree of registration described in Section 31 of the said P.D., which decree is prepared
and issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration.

Finally, petitioners aver that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the July
28, 1988, decision and the order for issuance of decree dated September 12, 1988, upon the mere motion for
reconsideration filed by the LRA, not by the Solicitor General, of the February 2, 1990 order.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Solicitor General is bound to "[r]epresent the Government in all
land registration and related proceedings." 3 Add to this the fact that P.D. 1529 itself, specifically Section 6
thereof which enumerates the functions of the Commissioner of Land Registration, is bereft of any grant of
power to the LRA or to the Commissioner to make the same representation as the Office of the Solicitor
General in behalf of the government in land registration proceedings.

The court a quo could not have committed grave abuse of discretion because it was merely following the
earlier recommendation of the LRA which was then acting as an agent of the court.

Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may
be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. 4 This is especially true when, as in this case, a
strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree
of registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.

It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas
Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been
issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early
case, 5 "[t]he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently
brought under a second action for registration." The application for registration of the petitioners in this case
would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under
Section 48 of P.D. 1529.

At this point, it may be stated that this controversy could have been avoided had the proper procedure in land
registration cases been observed by both the trial court, acting as a land registration court and by the LRA,
acting as an agent of the court. The court should have rendered its decision only "after considering the
evidence and the reports of the commissioner of Land Registration and the Director of Lands," as mandated
by Section 29 of P.D. 1529, instead of precipitately adjudicating the land in question to the applicant and
directing the Commissioner to issue a decree of registration and certificate of title when the report of the LRA
was still forthcoming. On the other hand, if a faster disposition of the proceedings were really desired, the
court could facilely wield the powers of its office in order to compel the LRA to speed up its investigation,
report, and recommendation.

Finally, the Solicitor General is reminded to be more vigilant in handling cases which his office should, under
the law, properly represent.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED, and the order of respondent court dated May
29, 1990, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.