May 20, 2021

For: Sir ECL

From: JMF
Re: Prescription and Applicability of 24-Month Rule

1. Rule on applicability constitutional provision of deciding

case within 24 months from submission for resolution or decision to
the Supreme Court.

Sections 14 and 16, Article III of the Constitution provide:

SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a

criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

xxx

SECTION 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy

disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the

effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
 (3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof
attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon
the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory
period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as
may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or
resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination,
without further delay.

In relation, Rule 13, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the

Supreme Court provides:

RULE 13

Decision-Making Process

SECTION 1. Period for Deciding or Resolving Cases. - The

Court shall decide or resolve all cases within twenty-four
months from the date of submission for resolution. A case shall
be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum that the Court or its
Rules require.

Both the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules state

that the 24- month period for deciding on or resolving a case is
reckoned from the date of its submission for resolution. The 24-
month period does not run immediately upon the filing of a
petition before this Court, but only when the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum has been submitted.

In In Re: Complaint-Affidavit of Elvira Enalbes, et al., Against

Former Chief Justice Leonardo-De Castro, A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC,
January 22, 2019, citing Marcelino v Hon. Cruz, the Court had the
occasion to clarify the interpretation of the above-mentioned
provisions in relation to its counterpart in the 1973 Constitution, thus:

Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution provides

the period within which courts must decide on or resolve cases
or matters brought before it.

A provision of similar import was written under the 1973

Constitution:
ARTICLE X
The Judiciary

....

SECTION 11. (1) Upon the effectivity of this Constitution,

the maximum period within which a case or matter shall be
decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be
eighteen months for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced
by the Supreme Com1, twelve months for all inferior collegiate
Courts, and three months for all other inferior courts.

In Marcelino v. Hon. Cruz, Jr., etc. et al. ,20 this Court had

the opportunity to shed light on the proper interpretation of
Article X, Sec. 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution.

Marcelino involved a petition for prohibition and writ of

habeas corpus filed against respondent Judge Fernando Cruz,
Jr., praying that he be enjoined from promulgating a decision in
Criminal Case No. C-5910, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Bernardino Marcelino. Petitioner Bernardino Marcelino argued
that respondent Judge Cruz lost his jurisdiction on the case
when he failed to render a decision within 90 days from the
case's submission for resolution. This Court, upon receiving the
case, found that respondent Cruz did render a decision within
the three (3)month period prescribed under the 1973
Constitution. Nevertheless, this Court further continued that the
constitutional provision was merely directory in nature:

The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are

to be construed as mandatory, unless by express provision or
by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest. " "The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is
often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being
that less injury results to the general public by disregarding
than by enforcing the letter of the law."

In Trapp v. McCormick, a case calling for the

interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty [30]
days within which a decree may be entered without the
consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions
which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is
essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or
some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the
statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.

On this view, authorities are one in saying that:

"Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or

immediately after the trial or verdict have been held by some
courts to be merely directory so that noncompliance with them
does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would clearly have indicated
it." . . .

Such construction applies equally to the constitutional

provision under consideration. In Mikell v. School Dis. of
Philadelphia, it was ruled that ''the legal distinction between
directory and mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it
is to statutory laws."

....

As foreseen by Mr. Henry Campbell Black in his

Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, the constitutional
provision in question should be held merely as directory. "Thus,
where the contrary construction would lead to absurd,
impossible or mischievous consequences, it should not be
followed."

xxx

Being the court of last resort, this Court should be given

an ample amount of time to deliberate on cases pending before
it.

Ineluctably, leeway must be given to magistrates for

them to thoroughly review and reflect on the cases assigned to
them. This Court notes that all matters brought before it
involves rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
It would be at the height of injustice if cases were hastily
decided on at the risk of erroneously dispensing justice.

While the 24-month period provided under the 1987

Constitution is persuasive, it does not summarily bind this Court
to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere
directive to ensure this Court's prompt resolution of cases, and
should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule.
 Magistrates must be given discretion to defer the
disposition of certain cases to make way for other equally
important matters in this Court's agenda.

In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, et al., this Court noted

that "the right to speedy disposition of cases should be
understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be
sufficient."

As a final note, the prescribed time limit should not be

ignored as to render nugatory the spirit which breathes life to
the letter of the 1987 Constitution. Ultimately, courts must
strike an objective and reasonable balance in disposing cases
promptly, while maintaining judicious tenacity in interpreting
and applying the law.

Incidentally, in Republic v Sandiganbayan1, penned by Justice

Leonen, the Court said,

While the Constitution guarantees the right of the

accused to speedy disposition of cases, this constitutional right
is not a magical invocation which can be cunningly used by the
accused for his or her advantage. This right is not a last line of
remedy when accused find themselves on the losing end of the
proceedings. The State's duty to prosecute cases is just as
equally important and cannot be disregarded at the whim of
the accused, especially when it appears that the alleged
violation was raised as a mere afterthought.

xxx

The right to speedy disposition of cases is constitutionally

guaranteed. Under Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution:

SECTION 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy

disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

This right is different and distinct from the right to speedy

trial, which is enshrined under Article III, Section 14(2):

1
G.R. No. 231144, February 19, 2020
 SECTION 14.
....

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be

presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Under the 1973 Constitution, the right to speedy

disposition of cases was first crafted and integrated into our
legal system. Prior to this, the 1935 Constitution only carried
the right to speedy trial, which may only be cited in criminal
prosecutions. Thus, the right to speedy to disposition of cases,
which may be raised even before quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies involving civil, criminal, and
administrative cases, provides a broader scope of protection.
In Abadia v. Court of Appeals:

The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were

precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to
protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to
nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases
to cases "before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies." This protection extends to all citizens, including those
in the military and covers the periods before, during and after
the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which
guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.

The third constitutional provision mandating speedy

dispensation of justice is found in Article VIII, Section 15, which
provides for a period within which a case must be decided and
resolved by courts. Nevertheless, the right to speedy disposition
of cases still embraces a greater scope because Article VIII,
Section 15 only covers the period after the submission of cases.

Similar to the right to speedy trial, the right to speedy

disposition of cases primarily seeks to prevent delay in the
administration of justice. As laid down in Corpuz v.
Sandiganbayan:
 The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent
delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts
to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to
whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential

ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot
be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice
is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to
the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public
justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to
the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court ate
shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that
intent. 

The right to speedy disposition of cases is violated only

when there is inordinate delay, such that the proceedings are
"attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried."

Inordinate delay was first introduced in Tatad v.

Sandiganbayan. In Tatad, this Court ruled that the inordinate
delay in the conclusion of preliminary investigation and
subsequent filing of information will result to the violation of
the right to speedy disposition of cases and right to due
process. In so ruling, this Court considered several
circumstances such as: (1) the political motivation which
propelled the prosecution; (2) the patent violation of procedural
rules; and (3) the unjustified delay attending the investigation.
Ultimately, Tatad held that the determination of whether or not
there is a violation of speedy disposition of cases applies on a
case-to-case basis:
 In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to
grant the so-called "radical relief' and to spare the accused
from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial
where it is clear that the has been deprived of due process of
law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it
goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine
enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 

Thus, the concept of speedy disposition is relative. There

is no hard-and-fast mathematical rule on the reckoning of time
involved and facts peculiar to each case must be taken into
account.

Nevertheless, this Court carved a standard test in

resolving these cases. Martin v. Ver adopted the "balancing
test" which provides four (4) factors as its guide in determining
the existence of inordinate delay, namely: (1) length of delay;
(2) reason for delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion
of his or her right; and (4) prejudice caused to the defendant
as a result of the delay. However, these factors must be taken
into account together with the other circumstances of the case.
Furthermore, the totality of the facts must be weighed and
evaluated.

In determining the length of delay, Dansal v.

Hernandez84 recognized that the period must include the
investigation even before the trial commenced. In criminal
prosecutions, rules on preliminary investigation under Rule 112,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court come to play. Section 1 of
Republic. Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial
Act, also laid down the time limit of 180 days for the entire
trial. The Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing
the [Right] of [the] Accused to Bail and to Speedy Trial likewise
provide for strict time limits that must be observed, among
other laws.

2. Prescriptive period to file a case for failure to file

SALN.

In Del Rosario v People2, the Court distinguished between the

applicability of commission and discovery rules in determining the

2
G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018
reckoning points of the prescriptive period of offenses, including that
of the failure to file SALN’s, thus:

It is notable that the informations filed against the

petitioner alleged her violation of R.A. No. 6713 for having
"fail[ed] to file her detailed sworn SALN for the year
199011991, which the law requires to be filed on or before the
30th of April following the close of every calendar year." Based
on the allegations of the informations, the eight-year
prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 (An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription shall Begin ) was
applicable in view of the silence of R.A. No. 6713 on the
prescriptive period for a violation thereof.

Although R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act) and R.A. No 6713 both punish the failure to file the SALN,
we need to clarify that the 15-year prescriptive period explicitly
provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 was not relevant. The
violation of Section 71 of R.A. No. 3019 which requires
the "filing or submission of SALN, after assuming office, and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as
well as upon the expiration of a public officers term of office, or
upon his resignation or separation from office" – was not
alleged in the information.

R.A. No. 6713 – enacted in 1989 – was a much later law

than R.A. No. 3019, which was adopted on August 17, 1960. As
the mandatory requirement for the filing of SALNs currently
exists, therefore, the public official or employee should file and
submit the SALN "on or before April 30, of every year " as
required by R.A. No. 6713 instead of filing the same " within the
month of January of every other year " pursuant to R.A. No.
3019. Verily, R.A. No. 6713 – by reflecting who are required to
file the SALN, who are exempt from the requirement, when
should the SALN be filed, and what should be included and
disclosed in the SALN – embodies the latest legislative word on
transparency and public accountability of public officers and
employees.

xxxx

The Sandiganbayan erred in applying the discovery rule

to the petitioner's cases.
 Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 mandates the submission of
the sworn SALNs by all public officials and employees, stating
therein all the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests of their spouses, and of their unmarried
children under 18 years of age living in their households.
Paragraph (A) of Section 8 sets three deadlines for the
submission of the sworn SALNs, specifically:(a) within 30 days
from the assumption of office by the officials or employees; (b)
on or before April 30 of every year thereafter; and (c) within 30
days after the separation from the service of the officials or
employees.

R.A. No. 6713 does not expressly state the prescriptive

period for the violation of its requirement for the SALNs. Hence,
Act No. 3326 – the law that governs the prescriptive periods for
offenses defined and punished under special laws that do not
set their own prescriptive periods24 – is controlling. Section 1 of
Act No. 3326 provides:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall,

unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished
only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one
month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two
years; (c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six
years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense
punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the
crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years.
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe
after two months.

xxxx

In applying the discovery rule, the Sandiganbayan relied

on the rulings handed down in the so-called Behest Loans
Cases,23 whereby the prescriptive period was reckoned from the
date of discovery of the offenses. The Sandiganbayan explained
that it would be difficult for the Office of the Ombudsman to
know on the required dates of filing of the failure to file the
SALNs on the part of the erring public officials or employees;
and that to suggest that the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
the Office of the Ombudsman and any other concerned agency
should come up with a tracking system to ferret out the
violators of R.A. No. 6713 on the dates of the filing of the
SALNs would not only be burdensome, but highly impossible.

The Sandiganbayan erred in applying the discovery rule

to the petitioner's cases.

Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 mandates the submission of

the sworn SALNs by all public officials and employees, stating
therein all the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests of their spouses, and of their unmarried
children under 18 years of age living in their households.
Paragraph (A) of Section 8 sets three deadlines for the
submission of the sworn SALNs, specifically:(a) within 30 days
from the assumption of office by the officials or employees; (b)
on or before April 30 of every year thereafter; and (c) within 30
days after the separation from the service of the officials or
employees.

R.A. No. 6713 does not expressly state the prescriptive

period for the violation of its requirement for the SALNs. Hence,
Act No. 3326 – the law that governs the prescriptive periods for
offenses defined and punished under special laws that do not
set their own prescriptive periods24 – is controlling. Section 1 of
Act No. 3326 provides:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall,

unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished
only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one
month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two
years; (c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six
years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense
punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the
crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years.
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe
after two months.

The complaint charging the petitioner with the violations

was filed only on October 28, 2004, or 13 years after the April
30, 1991 deadline for the submission of the SALN for 1990, and
12 years after the April 30, 1992 deadline for the submission of
the SALN for 1991. With the offenses charged against the
petitioner having already prescribed after eight years in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326, the informations
filed against the petitioner were validly quashed.

The relevant legal provision on the reckoning of the

period of prescription is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, to wit:

Section 2. Prescription of violation penalized by special

law shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the violation be not known at the
time from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

Under Section 2, there are two modes of determining the

reckoning point when prescription of an offense runs. The first,
to the effect that prescription shall "run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law," is the general rule. We
have declared in this regard that the fact that any aggrieved
person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to
sue or of the facts out of which his right arises does not
prevent the running of the prescriptive period. 25 The second
mode is an exception to the first, and is otherwise known as
the discovery rule.

Under the rulings in the Behest Loans Cases, 26 the

discovery rule, which is also known as the blameless ignorance
doctrine, stipulates that:

x x x the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of

the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of
action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the
statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has
no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of
action.27

The application of the discovery rule was amply discussed

in the 2014 ruling in Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) v. Carpio-Morales,28 which cited a number
of rulings involving violations of R.A. No. 3019. The Court said
therein:
In the 1999 and 2011 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto , the Court, in
said separate instances, reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman
that the prescriptive period therein began to run at the time the
behest loans were transacted and instead, it should be counted
from the date of the discovery thereof.
 In the 1999 case, We recognized the impossibility
for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violation of RA 3019 at the time the questioned transactions
were made in view of the fact that the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries
of the loans." There, We agreed with the contention of the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee that the
prescriptive period should be computed from the. discovery of
the commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission. x x x
Similarly, in the 2011 Desierto case, We ruled that the
"blameless ignorance" doctrine applies considering that
the plaintiff therein had no reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action. In this
particular instance, We pinned the running of the prescriptive
period to the completion by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee of an exhaustive investigation on the loans.
We elucidated that the first mode under Section 2 of Act No.
3326 would not apply since during the Marcos regime, no
person would have dared to question the legality of these
transactions.
Prior to the 2011 Desierto case came Our 2006 Resolution
in Romualdez v. Marcelo, which involved a violation of Section 7
of RA 3019. In resolving the issue of whether or not the
offenses charged in the said cases have already prescribed, We
applied the same principle enunciated in Duque and ruled that
the prescriptive period for the offenses therein committed
began to run from the discovery thereof on the day former
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed the complaint with
the PCGG.

This was reiterated in Disini v. Sandiganbayan where We

counted the running of the prescriptive period in said case from
the date of discovery of the violation after the PCGG's
exhaustive investigation despite the highly publicized and well-
known nature of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project
therein involved, recognizing the fact that the discovery
of the crime necessitated the prior exhaustive
investigation and completion thereof by the PCGG.

In Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr., however, We held that not

all violations of RA 3019 require the application of the second
mode for computing the prescription of the offense. There, this
Court held that the second element for the second mode to
apply, i.e., that the action could not have been instituted during
the prescriptive period because of martial law, is absent. This
 is so since information about the questioned investment
therein was not suppressed from the discerning eye of
the public nor has the Office of the Solicitor General
made any allegation to that effect. This Court likewise
faulted therein petitioner for having remained dormant during
the remainder of the period of prescription despite knowing of
the investment for a sufficiently long period of time.

An evaluation of the foregoing jurisprudence on the

matter reveals the following guidelines in the determination of
the reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations
of RA 3019, viz.:

1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the

date of the commission of the offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not
known, it shall be counted form the date of discovery thereof.
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the
exception that should apply in a particular case, the availability or
suppression of the information relative to the crime should first be
determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records
based on which the crime could be discovered is readily
available to the public, the general rule applies.
Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the
commission of the crime.

Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing

thereof or should information about the violation be
suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the
exception applies and the period of prescription shall be
reckoned from the date of discovery thereof. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Although a distinction between impeachment and quo warranto must

be placed, in allowing the Quo Warranto Petition against then Chief
Justice Sereno in the case Republic v Sereno 3, the Court ruled that
prescription does not lie against the state when acting in its character
as a sovereign, thus:

The rules on quo warranto, specifically Section 11, Rule

66, provides:

3
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
 Limitations. - Nothing contained in this Rule shall be
construed to authorize an action against a public officer or
employee for his ouster from office unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such
ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office
or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in
accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section
unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the
entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the
office in question. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the 1960's the Court had explained in ample
jurisprudence the application of the one-year prescriptive
period for filing an action for quo warranto.

In Bumanlag v. Fernandez and Sec. of Justice ,[194] the Court

held that the one-year period fixed in then Section 16, Rule 68
of the Rules of Court is condition precedent to the existence of
the cause of action for quo warranto and that the inaction of an
officer for one year could be validly considered waiver of his
right to file the same.

In Madrid v. Auditor General and Republic ,[195] We held that a

person claiming to a position in the civil service must institute
the proper proceedings to assert his right within the one-year
period, otherwise, not only will he be considered to have
waived his right to bring action therefor but worse, he will be
considered to have acquiesced or consented to the very matter
that he is questioning.

The Court explained in Madrid that the reason for setting a

prescriptive period is the urgency of the matter to be resolved.
The government must be immediately informed or advised if
any person claims to be entitled to an office or position in the
civil service, as against another actually holding it, so that the
government may not be faced with the predicament of having
to pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding the
office although illegally, and another for one not actually
rendering service although entitled to do so. [196]

In Torres v. Quintos,[197] the Court further explained that public

interest requires that the rights of public office should be
determined as speedily as practicable. We have also explained
in Cristobal v. Melchor and Arcala[198] that there are weighty
reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the
adoption of such limitation as there must be stability in the
service so that public business may not be unduly retarded. [199]
Distinctively, the petitioners in these cited cases were private
individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case
where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief
Justice. Instead, it is the government itself which commenced
the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the
qualification of the person holding the highest position in the
Judiciary.

Thus, the question is whether the one-year limitation is equally

applicable when the petitioner is not a mere private individual
pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking
relief for a public wrong and suing for public interest? The
answer is no.

Reference must necessarily be had to Section 2, Rule 66 which

makes it compulsory for the Solicitor General to commence
a quo warranto action:

SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must

commence action. - The Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines,
or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to
believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be
established by proof must commence such action. (Emphasis
supplied)

In other words, when the Solicitor General himself

commences the quo warranto action either (1) upon the
President's directive, (2) upon complaint or (3) when the
Solicitor General has good reason to believe that there is proof
that (a) a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) a public
officer does or suffers an act which is a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or (c) an association acts as a
corporation without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act, he does so in the discharge of his task and
mandate to see to it that the best interest of the public and the
government are upheld. In these three instances, the Solicitor
General is mandated under the Rules to commence the
necessary quo warranto petition.

That the present Rule 66 on quo warranto takes root from Act

No. 160, which is a legislative act, does not give the one-year
rule on prescription absolute application. Agcaoili v. Suguitan,
[200]
 squarely addressed this non-absolute character of the one-
year prescriptive period as follows:

x x x in re prescription or limitation of the action, it may

be said that originally there was no limitation or prescription of
action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for
the reason that it was an action by the Government and
prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the
Government. The ancient writ of quo warranto was a high
prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King
against any one who usurped or claimed any office, franchise
or liberty of the crown, to inquire by what authority the usurper
supported his claim, in order to determine the right. Even at
the present time in many of the civilized countries of the world
the action is still regarded as a prerogative writ and no
limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the action. As a
general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes
of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo
warranto proceeding brought to enforce public right.

x x x x

In our opinion, even granting that section 216 is applicable to

the appellant, the period of prescription had not begun to run
at the time of the commencement of the present action. He
was justified in delaying the commencement of his
action until an answer to his protest had been made. He
had right to await the answer to his protest, in the confident
belief that it would be resolved in his favor and that action
would be unnecessary.[201] (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)

Continuing, Agcaoili cites People ex rel. Moloney v.

Pullmans Palace Car Co.,[202] to emphasize that the State is not
bound by statute of limitations nor by the laches, acquiescence
or unreasonable delay on the part of its officers:

It is conceded, the state, acting in its character as a

sovereign, is not bound by any statute of limitations or
technical estoppel. It is urged, however, that in quo warranto,
under the common-law rule, the courts, in the exercise of their
discretion to grant the writ or not, or upon final hearing,
refused aid when the conditions complained of had existed for
a number of years with knowledge on the part of the sovereign,
and that the provisions of § 1 of chapter 112 of the Revised
Statutes, entitled Quo Warranto, that leave to file the
information shall be given if the court or judge to whom the
petition is presented shall be satisfied there is probable cause
for the proceeding, leave the court still possessed of power to
consider upon the hearing, and then apply the same doctrine of
waiver and acquiescence. It is the general rule that laches,
acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the
performance of duty on the part of the officers of the
state, is not imputable to the state when acting in its
character as sovereign. There are exceptions to this general
rule, but we are unable to see that the allegations of the plea
bring the case within the principles of any such exceptions.

Jurisprudence acros the United States likewise richly

reflect that when the Solicitor General files a quo
warranto petition in behalf of the people and where the
interests of the public is involved, the lapse of time presents no
effective bar:

An information in the nature of a quo warranto cannot be

filed by a private individual without leave, which the court may,
at its discretion, either grant or refuse. To regulate their
discretion as affected by the lapse of time, the English courts
adopted the rule which we have stated. But the Attorney
General, representing the Crown in England and the State in
this country, may file an information in the nature of a
quo warranto, without leave, according to his own
discretion; and we find no English law which holds that an
information, so filed, can be barred by the lapse of six years
independently of any statute to that effect