Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law
Administrative Law Reviewer
INTRODUCTION
I. Concept/definition of administrative law
The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the
government and determines competence of authorities who
execute the law and indicates to individual remedies for the
violations of his rights.
II. Scope of administrative law
Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is
intended to control, the administrative operations of the
government.
III. Classification of administrative law
A. That body of statutes setting up or creating
administrative agencies and endowing them with power
and duties;
B. That body of agency-made law, i.e., rules, regulations
and orders promulgated in the exercise of quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial functions;
C. That body of legal principles governing the acts of
public agents which conflict with private rights;
D. That body of determinations, decisions and orders of
administrative bodies made in the settlement of
controversies arising in their particular fields.
IV. Origin and development of administrative law
V. Advantages of the administrative process
NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
I. Concept
A. Definition of administrative agency - An
administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body
charged with administering and implementing particular
legislation. Examples are workers' compensation
commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency'
includes any department, independent establishment,
commission, administration, authority, board or bureau x x
x ."
Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226
Facts: Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank
questioned the decision of the CA which dismissed the petition of
the former on the ground of lack of capacity to sue.
Issue: WON administrative agency has only such powers as
expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof?
RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those
that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?
In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as
“government body charged with the administering and
implementing particular legislation” examples are workers
compensation commissions and the like. The term “agency”
includes any department, independent establishment, commission,
administration, authority or bureau.
B. Test for determining administrative nature
1. Mandatory – statutory requirement intended for the
protection of the citizens and by a disregard of which their
rights are injuriously affected;
2. Directory – if no substantial right depend on it and no
injury can result from ignoring it and purpose of legislature
can be accomplished in a manner other than that
prescribed and substantially, the same results attained.
C. Administrative function, defined -
Administrative functions are those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of
rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence
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Administrative Law Reviewer
In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246
Facts: It’s a petition file by judge manzano allowing him to accept
the appointment by executive order by the governor of ilocos sur
Rodolfo farinas as the member of ilocos norte provincial committee
on justice created pursuant to presidential order. That his
membership in committee will not in any way amount to an
abandonment to his present position as executive judge of branch
xix, RTC, first judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue: What is an administrative agency?
Ruling: Administrative functions are those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals
for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations
to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of
members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative functions. (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.)
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly
clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating
in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates
disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its
jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the
line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the
executive machinery of government and the performance by that
machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management
actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they
administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is
an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon
the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence "we
can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City
Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor
exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory.
A member of the judiciary joining any study group which
concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group
merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of
cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or
detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members,
and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or
rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer
the particular function involved in their implementation.
D. Public office, defined in relation to
administrative law
Fernandez vs Sto. Tomas 248 SCRA 194
Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C.
Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution
No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission and the authority of
the Commission to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of
Personnel Inspection and Audit while petitioner de Lima was
serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations, both at
the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City,
Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution
No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively,
of the Commission, was issued .
Issues :
(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority
to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS
[Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of
Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel
Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office];
and
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Administrative Law Reviewer
(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-37 10 violated petitioners'
constitutional right to security of tenure.
Ruling: Public office is frequently used to refer to the right,
authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that
individual for the benefit of the public (radlapsbip)
Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the
OCSS, OPERA and ORR, and as well each of the other Offices,
consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of which Divisions is in
turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office
comprises groups of positions within the agency called the Civil
Service Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or
less definable function or functions these functions are related to
one another, each of them being embraced by a common or
general subject matter. These offices relate to the internal
structure of the Commission.
The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution
No. 94-3710 were described in that Resolution in broad terms as
"effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the
Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These
changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on
the one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the
Commission's functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14)
Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the
Commission throughout the country, to the end that the
Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the
government employees that they are mandated to serve.
N.B. We (SC) note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the
Commission are not appointments to a specified public office but
rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus a person
may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to
the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of
Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant
case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director
IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The
same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same
position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
E. Reasons for creation of administrative
agencies -
Lianga Bay Logging, Inc. vs Judge Enage 16 July 1987
Ruling: As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged
court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability
to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of
grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable.
Solid Homes vs Payawal 29 August 1989
Ruling: As a result of the growing complexity of the modern
society, it has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified
activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them,
they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and
dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice.
Reyes vs Caneba
Ruling: "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary
administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry
out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an
administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court,
and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own
competence."
Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Vs Tantuico 29 July 1988
Ruling: The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to
audit them. They contend that they are outside the ambit of
respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-
owned or controlled corporations. This argument has no merit.
Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The
Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
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Administrative Law Reviewer

owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any Findings of these administrative agencies are rendered conclusive
of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including on the courts.
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters,
and on a post-audit basis. x x x (d) such nongovernmental entities G. Administrative framework of the Philippines
receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through (Executive Order No. 292)
the Government which are required by law or the granting
institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or Iron and Steel Authority vs CA 249 SCRA 538
equity." (Italics supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the
long established rule that private entities who handle government 1. Definition of Government of the Republic of the
funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their Phils. - refers to the corporate governmental entity
handling of said funds by government auditors. through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including,
save as the contrary appears from the context, the
various arms through which political authority is
E. Types of administrative agencies made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the autonomous regions, the
1. Those created to function in situations wherein the government provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions
is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege; (SSS, or other forms of local government.
GSIS,PAO)
2. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is 2. Definition of Agency of the government - refers
seeking to carry on certain functions of government; (BIR, LRA, to any of the various units of the Government,
BoC, BI) including a department, bureau, office,
3. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is instrumentality, or government-owned or
performing some business service for the public; (Bureau of controlled corporations, or a local government or a
Posts, PNR, MWS) distinct unit therein.
4. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to regulate business affected with public interest; 3. Definition of Instrumentality - refers to any
(LTFRB, ERB, HLURB) agency of the National Government, not integrated
5. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is within the department framework vested within
seeking under the police power to regulate private business special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
and individuals; (MTRCB, GAB, DDB) with some if not all corporate powers,
6. Those agencies to set up to function in situations wherein the administering special funds, and enjoying
government is seeking to adjust individual controversies operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
because of some strong social policy involved. (NLRC, ECC, This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
DAR, COA) institutions and government-owned or controlled
corporations.

F. Relation between administrative agencies and 4. Definition of Administration -

courts
US vs Dorr 2 Phil 332
Administrative agencies have certain quasi-judicial powers
which allows them to interpret and apply rules and regulations.

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Administrative Law Reviewer
Facts: Dorr is the owner of newspaper “manila freedom” charge
with the crime of libel together with Eduard O’Brian.
The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged
in the complaint, and each was sentenced to six months’
imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of $1,000, United States
currency. From this judgment the defendants have appealed to this
court.
During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the
defendants asking that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided
for in Article 111, section 2, of the Constitution of the United
States, and under the sixth amendment to the Constitution, which
motion was denied by the court, and an exception was also taken
to this ruling.
Issue : The issue is to determine whether these provisions of the
Constitution of the United States relating to trials by jury are in
force in the Philippine Islands.
Ruling: Administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose
hands the reins of government are for the time being.
1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has
been acquired by and belongs to the United States, there is a
difference between such territory and the territories which are a
part-of the United States with reference to the Constitution of the
United States.
2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the
treaty of Paris, under which the Philippine Islands were acquired
from Spain. By the treaty the status of the ceded territory was to
be determined by Congress.
3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United
States did not extend the Constitution here, except such parts as
fall within the general principles of fundamental limitations in favor
of personal rights formulated in the Constitution and its
amendments, and which exist rather by inference and the general
spirit of the Constitution, and except those express provisions of
the Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their
contravention under any circumstances; that the provisions
contained in the Constitution relating to jury trials do not fall within
either of these exceptions, and, consequently, the right to trial by
jury has not been extended here by the mere act of the cession of
the territory.
4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision
of the Constitution relating to jury trials, nor were any laws in
existence in the Philippine Islands, at the date of their cession, for
trials by jury, and consequently there is no law in the Philippine
Islands entitling the defendants in this case to such trial; that the
Court of First Instance committed no error in overruling their
application for a trial by jury
The act of Congress of July 1, 1902, entitled “An Act temporarily to
provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in
the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes,” in section 5 extends
to the Philippine Islands nearly all of the provisions of the
Constitution known as the Bill of Rights. But there was excepted
from it the provisions of the Constitution relating to jury trials
contained in section 2, Article 111, and in the sixth amendment.
The court reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a
body expressly recognized and sanctioned by act of Congress,
having the power to pass laws, and has the power to pass the libel
law under which the defendants where convicted.
II. Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative
agencies
A. Creation of administrative agencies
Eugenio vs CSC 243 SCRA 196
Facts: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service
(CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank, On August 2, 1993, she was
given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board. All was not to turn well for petitioner. On
October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission2 passed
Resolution No. 934359. The resolution became an impediment to
the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.
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Administrative Law Reviewer
Issue: WON the CSC had the power to abolish the career executive
service board.
Ruling: No. "Except for such offices as are created by the
Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative
function, In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not
restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the
legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable,
necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it
is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department
has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be
created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become
ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may
prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties
of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."
B. Abolition of administrative agencies
Busacay v. Buenaventura 93 Phil 787
Facts: Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and
qualified pre-war toll collector, classified as permanent by the Civil
Service Commission, but was laid off due to the destruction of the
bridge caused by flood. When the bridge was reconstructed and
reopened to traffic, Busacay notified the respondent Provincial
Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties, but
he was refused reinstatement.
Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished
the position of toll collector.
Held: The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute
are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they
are subject to the power of the legislature to abolish them. But this
is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions
may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.
De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294
Facts: The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 by imputing the lack of good
faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the president his authority to fix compensation
and allowance of the justices and judges thereafter appointed and
the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be
deemed completed. On the other hand, the solicitor general
interposed a defense of legitimate exercise of the power vested in
the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good
faith.
Ruling: Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion
flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may
abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating
new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
subject to certain limitations in the cage of the Supreme Court.
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134
Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341
converting the Phil College of Commerce into a Polytechnic
University, defining its objectives, organizational structure and
functions, and expanding its curricular offerings.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed,
the former PCC into what is now the PUP.
Held: No, what took place was a change in academic status of
the educational institution not in its corporate life.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an
organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking
authority says so.
Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its
existing structure and organization bring about the abolition of an
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Administrative Law Reviewer
educational institution and the creation of a new one only an
express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
“Stand transferred” simply means that lands transferred to the
PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PCC were to be
understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the
institution.
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing
institution and to create a new one. New course offerings can be
added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal
existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and
organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new
one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking
authority will.
C. Reorganization of administrative agencies
1. Reorganization, defined
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC
221 SCRA 145
Facts: he records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor
of Laws graduate and a First grade civil service eligible was
appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status.
Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III
pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also
appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. She
was for two years, more or less, designated as Acting Branch
Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive
Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which
authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission
to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and
regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia
was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on
October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member
of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but
her request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for
reconsideration but her motion remained unacted. On October 23,
1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was
pending decision, her temporary appointment as such was
renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the
then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of
the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on
the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said
Memorandum of Termination which took effect on February 9,
1987, was the subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review
Committee which in turn referred the appeal to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB).
Issue: Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the
qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission
(LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied
only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the
service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the
issuance and implementation of the abovesaid Executive Order.
Ruling: If the newly created office has substantially new, different
or additional functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in
fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even
though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will
be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a
new or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and
its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer
or office.
Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and
better systematize the operation of the Land Registration
Commission. A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key
positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing
circumstances and new development of the times. Private
respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy
Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear
that she cannot hold any key position in the NILTDRA. The
additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office.
Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid
reorganization measure.
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Administrative Law Reviewer
III. Power of control, supervision and investigation by the
President
A. Executive power, defined
Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise
of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution,
to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we
shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under
the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the
President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined
that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight
of the marcose’s to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under
the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to
national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite
Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to
defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal,
military, or civil service.
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of
the scopes of presidential power and its limits.
Executive power
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII,
Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by "executive
power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of
certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute
the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-
in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant-amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the
power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power
to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address
Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers
of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the
President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are
these enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive
power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers
are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987
Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated
powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her.
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered
as within the scope of "executive power." Corollary, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he
prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people"
and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
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Administrative Law Reviewer
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. H, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance
of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a
plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under
the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
Ruling: As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he
executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is
meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches
on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power
of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers
under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant-amnesty
with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or
guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to
Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-
23]. (more than the sum of the powers enumerated)
B. Power of control, defined – power of the president
to nullify, modify, alter or set aside the decisions of a
subordinate.
Section 17 Article VII, 1987 Constitution
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.
Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290
Facts: The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 6975
otherwise known as the PNP Organic law placing the Philippine
National Police under the reorganized Department of Interior and
Local Government in pursuant to the provision of the constitution
that the state shall establish and maintain one police force which is
national in scope and civilian in character. The petitioner alleged
that the said law limits only the power of the National Police
Commission into an administrative control over the PNP, thus,
control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both
the PNP and NAPOLCOM were placed.
Issue
Whether or not the control over the PNP is vested soley to
the Department Secretary of the DILG.
Ruling
The Presidential Power of control was held to mean the
power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter. This Presidential power of control over the executive branch
of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet
Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us. Thus, and
in short, the President’s power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his
authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department.
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Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569
Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the
Revised Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and
126 to 129 creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as
Vice President of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of
prohibition with prelim injunction against the Auditor general from
passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges that
executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has
been impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power
Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power.
Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate
to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the separation of powers, the
said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a
standard- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate of
determinable
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the
President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in
lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With
respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether said local
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers
act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an
ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to
pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by
law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial
officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may
he veto, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council
within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise
it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a
regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him,
except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial
board.
Araneta vs Gatmaitan 101 Phil 238
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders
restricting the banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay.
However, a group of other trawl operators questioned the said
executive orders alleging the same as null and void.
Issue: WON the executive orders in question are null and void.
Held: Since the secretary of agriculture was empowered to regulate or ban
trawl fishing, the President, in the exercise of his power of control, can take
over from him such authority and issue the executive order to exercise it.
The President’s power of control means that if a cabinet secretary or a
head of a bureau or agency can issue rules and regulations, as authorized
by law, the President has the power not only to modify or amend the same
but can also supplant the rules by another set entirely different from those
issued by his subordinate.
C. Doctrine of qualified political agency, defined –
alter ego doctrine;
Noblejas vs Salas 67 SCRA 47
Facts: It appears that on several occasions prior to 1968, various
land titles (Torrens titles) covering lands situated within the
Province of Rizal were amended on the basis of supposed
corrective resurveys, by increasing the respective areas covered
by said titles. The corresponding certifications of the verifications
of these resurveys were issued by the Land Registration Office,
headed then by petitioner Noblejas, and subsequently approved by
the court, in instances where the subdivision plans were complex,
the action of the office being sufficient where the subdivision plans
were simple. Allegedly, however, it turned out that the increases in
said various amendments were far in excess of the respective
corresponding real areas of the lands involve, so much so that
even vast portions of lands and waters of the public domain not
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capable of appropriation by any private person or entity have been

included within the expanded titles.
Noblejas contention: That the State is stopped to prosecute the
accused because it used him as a prosecution witness in cases
similar to this case and because Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino, with
the approval of the Secretary of Justice, exonerated the defendant
from any criminal complicity in resurveys with expanded areas.
As a matter of fact, Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code
places him under the 'general supervision and control' of the
Department of Justice together with other prosecuting officers and
under Section 74 of the same Code, the Secretary of Justice as
'Department Secretary shall assume the burden and responsibility
of all activities of the Government under his control and
supervision. Consequently, the constitutional power of the
President of control of all executive departments, bureaus or
offices (sec. 10, Art. VII, Constitution of the Philippines) should be
considered as embracing his office.
Issue: Can the agent act for and in behalf of the principal.
Ruling: The power of control . . . . implies the right of the President
(and naturally of his alter ego) to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. The
provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding,
whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is
entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same
shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department
Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof,
or to review, modify or revoke any decision or action of said chief
of bureau, office, division or service. Accordingly, the law confers
upon the Secretary only 'general supervision and control' may not
be construed as limiting or in any way diminishing the
pervasiveness of the Secretary's power of control which is
constitutionally based, since he acts also as alter ego of the
President. Acts of the (alter ego) secretary is presumed to be that
of the president.
D. Limitations on the power of control
Does not include:
1. the abolition or creation of an executive office;
2. the suspension or removal of career executive officials
or employees without due process of law;
3. the setting aside, modification, or supplanting of
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, including the office of
the President, on contested cases to have become final
pursuant to law or to rules and regulations promulgated to
implement the law;
E. Power of supervision
Mondano vs Silvosa 97 Phil 143
Facts : The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the
municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954
Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1)
rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2)
concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than
the conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive
Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial
governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and
report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the provincial
governor in obedience to his summons and was served with a copy
of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with the provincial
board. On the same day, the provincial, governor issued
Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office.
Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges
preferred against the petitioner over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin the respondents from further proceeding with
the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a
declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent
provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect.
Issue : Whether or not the department head as agent has the
direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction
Ruling : The department head as agent of the President has direct
control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised

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Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of
local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and,
offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of
any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus
or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which the President exercises only general
supervision as may be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1,
Article VII of the Constitution). If the provisions of section 79(c) of
the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring
upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction,
and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason
he may order the investigation of an official of a local government
for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to
the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, article VII, of the
Constitution. In administrative law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform these duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter. The power to oversee that the officials concerned performs
their duty and if they later fail or neglect to fulfill them, to take such action
or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Rodriguez vs Montinola 94 Phil 973
Facts: An original action of certiorari instituted in the Supreme
Court by the Provincial Governor and the members of the
Provincial Board of Pangasinan to nullify the disapproval of the
Secretary of Finance of their Resolution abolishing the positions of
three special counsel in the province, to prohibit the provincial
treasurer and the district from paying the salaries if three special
counsel and to prevent the latter from continuing to occupy and
exercise the functions incident to their positions.
Issue: Whether or not the said resolution requires the approval of
the Secretary of Finance.
Ruling: The court granted the petition. While the Secretary of
Finance has the power to revise their budget, local governments
should be given a large degree of freedom in determining for
themselves the propriety and wisdom of the expenses that they
make provided that the expenses contemplated are within their
financial capacity. The supervisory authority of the President over
local governments is limited by the phrase “as provided by law”
and where there is no law in accordance with which said authority
is to be exercised, it must be exercised in accord with general
principles of law. The Secretary of Finance is an official of the
central government, not of provincial governments, which are
distinct and separate. The power of general supervision granted to
the President over local governments, in the absence of any
express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean
that hem or his alter ego the Secretary of Finance, may direct the
form and manner in which local officials shall perform or comply
with their duties. Further, the court ruled that the act of the
provincial board in suppressing the positions of three special
counsel not being contrary to law, nor an act of maladministration,
nor an act of abuse, the same may not be disapproved by the
Secretary of Finance acting as a representative of he President by
virtue of the latter’s power of general supervision over local
governments.
Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512
Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC)
of Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite
the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and
the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The President elect -
Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila
Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a
letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local
Government,** protesting the election of the officers of the FABC
and seeking its mullification in view of several flagrant
irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
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Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of
the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and
ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be
presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of
Local Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it
was denied by respondent Secretary.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to
entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of
the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils. Assuming that
the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest,
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with
jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of
officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the
power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section
222 of the Local Government Code.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the
Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." The general
supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of
Local Government.
F. Power of review of other executive officers, defined
Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs IAC 146 SCRA 294
Ruling: The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is
necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction
is necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control
over the subordinate or through the instrumentality of the courts of
justice, unless the subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after
his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the
power of supervision and review over him.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
I. Doctrine of separation of powers
A. Distribution of powers of government:
1. Legislative power is the power to
propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.
2. Executive power is the power to execute
and implement the laws.
3. Judicial power is the power of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving
legal rights which are demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The Doctrine of Separation of Powers, though not mentioned
anywhere by such name in the 1987 Constitution, can be inferred
from its provisions. The heart of the doctrine is that the basic
powers of the government must be kept separate from each other,
each power being under the principal control of a branch of
government. The legislative power is granted to the Congress, the
executive power to the President, and the judicial power to the
Judiciary. The President as Chief Executive exercises control over
agencies and offices which perform rule-making or adjudicatory
functions. If the agency is created by Congress, consider the law
that created it. If the law is silent as to the control which the
President may exercise, the President can only supervise, i.e., to
see to it that the laws are faithfully executed.
B. Purpose of doctrine
So that the power of the government would not be concentrated in
one department (one person or group of persons) that would lead
to abuse.
C. Blending of powers – though each department has
their own duties and functions, they nevertheless exercise
the same in concert that they can work with other
departments and conduct checks and balances regarding
the actions of each.
• Basis for blending of powers:
1. No function is capable of exact definition.
Description is only a generalization concerning its
principal but not all of its characteristics;
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2. The Constitution allocated to the several
departments specific powers which in their nature
did not ordinarily pertain to them.
3. Practical necessity of exercising powers
incidental to those that are express or are
appropriate to it, even if such incidental powers
should fall within the category of functions
pertaining to another department.
II. Doctrine of non-delegation of powers - avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
what has been delegated cannot be delegated.
A. General rule
US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327
Ruling: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority,
there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.
B. Exception to the general rule
Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726
Facts: Calalang, in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public
works and highways with the recommendation of the Director of
Public Works and the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission
promulgated a rule closing a certain road in Manila for animal
drawn vehicle for a specific time.
The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public
Works with the recommendation of the Director of Public works to
legislate rules and laws relative to the regulation of traffic in the
country. Further, the petitioner contended that such act is invalid
delegation of legislative power.
The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of
rules is in connection with the powers vested to them by the said
law.
Issue: WON the said constitute an invalid delegation of legislative
power.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid
delegation of power. The authority therein conferred upon them
and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of
the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to
any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To
promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and
to determine when and how long a national road should be closed
to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law.
C. Prohibition against re-delegation; exceptions
KMU vs Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386
Facts: Petitioner KMU question the constitutionality of the
memoranda no. 92-009 issued by the DOTC and LTFRB which,
among others, to authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to
increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without
application there for with the LTFRB and without hearing and
approval thereof by said agency and other matters.
Issue: WON the Memoranda issued is constitutional?
Ruling: Petition granted and held the memoranda No. 92-009
invalid. Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service
Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services.
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Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise
vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June
19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB
"to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and
adjust reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative
to the operation of public land transportation services provided by
motorized vehicles."
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is
permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern
life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the
difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining
sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for
the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted
with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an
administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB may implement
broad policies laid down in a statute by neither “filling in" the
details which the Legislature may neither have time nor
competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid
provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB
alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator, or other public service.
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to
set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare is
illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to art undue delegation of
legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What
has been delegated cannot be delegated.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate fixing
and its far-reaching effects on millions of commuters, government
must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who
would benefit and profit from the industry.
American Tobacco vs Director of Patents 67 SCRA 287 GRN L-
26803 Oct. 14, 1975
Facts: This is an original action in the Supreme Court for
Mandamus with preliminary injunction. Petitioners herein, who
have pending interference and cancellation proceedings, questions
the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as amended which
authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official
of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings. Moreover, the rule
also provided that judgment on the merits shall be personally and
directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. Petitioners
contend that the amendment made by the Director on the Rule
vesting hearing officers authority to hear their cases was illegal
and void because under the law, it is the Director who should
personally hear the cases of petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his
functions.
Ruling : It has been held that the power conferred upon an
administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is
entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed
necessary or proper in order to carry out its purpose and provisions
may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication
it has been withheld. There is no provision under the general law
and RA 165 and 166 which prohibits such authority insofar as the
designation of hearing examiners is concerned. The nature of the
power and authority entrusted to the Director suggests that the
aforementioned laws should be construed so as to give aforesaid
official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and
expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said
laws. Judgment and discretion will still be exercised by him since
that the parties will still be able to adduce evidence. Due process
of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require the actual
taking of testimony before the same officer who will make the
decision.
III. Powers of administrative agencies, in general
A. Sources of powers of an administrative agency
1. Constitution – is the body of rules and
principles by which the fundamental powers of the
government are established, limited and defined.
2. Statutes – rules and regulations
promulgated by the legislature.
B. Limitations to the powers of an administrative
agency
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Matienzon vs Abellera 162 SCRA 1
Facts : Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators.
Private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent board
for the legalization of their unauthorized taxicab units citing PD
101 in order “to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of
clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become
legitimate and responsible operators. Petitioners contend that the
BOT does not have jurisdiction over the case since the law
provided a period of six (6) months which limited the time period
to legitimize such clandestine operations by certain taxicab
operators.
Issues : Whether or not the BOT had the power to legalize illegal
taxicab operators under PD 101 even after the lapse of six (6)
months.
Ruling : There was nothing in said law to suggest the expiration of
such powers granted to the BOT, six (6) months after its
promulgation. It is a settled principle of law that in determining
whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority
given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for
which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a
full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as
being germane to the law.
Heirs of Santiago Pastral vs Secretary of Public Works 162 SCRA
619
Facts : Private respondent herein led a group of residents in filing a
case against herein petitioner with the Department of Public Works
and Communications for the reason that latter were encroaching a
part of the river with their fishpond. The petitioner countered that
they were given permission by the Bureau of Fisheries. The
secretary of public works designated the City Engineer to conduct
hearings on the same and eventually ordered the same be
removed. Petitioners went to the Court of First Instance to assail
the decision of the secretary and obtain an injunction which were
ruled in their favor. The secretary appealed the lower court’s
decision.
Issues : Whether or not the secretary had the power to order an
investigation and order the removal of the encroachment made on
the river.
Ruling : Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any
provision or provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
construction or building of dams, dikes x x x which encroaches into
any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other
navigable public waters or waterways x x x shall be ordered
removed as public nuisance or as prohibited construction as herein
provided x x x. The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond
permit was issued in 1948 while the Act took effect on June 3,
1958. Therefore, the Secretary's more specific authority to remove
dikes constructed in fishponds whenever they obstruct or impede
the free passage of any navigable river or stream or would cause
inundation of agricultural areas (Section 2, Republic Act 2056)
takes precedence. Moreover, the power of the Secretary of Public
Works to investigate and clear public streams from unauthorized
encroachments and obstructions was granted as early as Act 3708
of the old Philippine Legislature and has been upheld by this Court
in the cases of Palanca v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 449) and
Meneses v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 647). The same rule was
applied in Lovina v. Moreno, (supra) Santos etc., et al. v. Secretary
of Public Works and Communications (19 SCRA 637).
C. Nature of the powers of administrative agencies
• Quasi legislative – consists of issuance of rules and
regulations; general applicability; and prospective in
application;
• Quasi Judicial – refers to orders, rewards or decision;
applies to a specific situation; and determination of rights,
privileges,etc. (fact finding investigate)
Depends on the enabling statute
D. Express and implied powers
Villegas vs Subido 30 SCRA 498
Facts : The commissioner on Civil Service issued a memorandum
which provided for the procedure of removal and suspension of
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policemen. Petitioner herein contends that the Civil Service Act
impliedly repealed RA 557 which provides, among others, that
charges against policemen shall be referred by the mayor and
investigated by the city or municipal council.
Issues : Whether or not RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557 and
Sec. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service
exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove, suspend and separate
policemen and employees of the City of Manila in competitive
service.
Ruling : Republic Act 2260, particularly Section 16 (i) thereof, is not
inconsistent with the power of the City Council under Republic Act
557 to decide cases against policemen and the power of the City
Mayor of Manila under Section 22 of Republic Act 409 to remove
city employees in the classified service.
Section 16 (i) of Republic Act 2260 leaves no doubt that the
removal, suspension or separation effected by said City Council or
City Mayor, can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner
of Civil Service. Nonetheless, the Commissioner's "final authority to
pass upon the removal, separation and suspension" of classified
service employees presupposes, rather than negates, the power
vested in another official to originally or initially decide the
removal, separation or suspension which the Commissioner is
thereunder empowered to pass upon.
Such power, furthermore, is subject to an express limitation
contained in Section 16(i), namely, the saving clause "Except as
otherwise provided by law." Accordingly, it does not obtain at all in
those instances where the power of removal is by law conferred on
another body alone, with no appeal therefrom, as in the case
provided for in Section 14 of Republic Act 296.
LLDA v. Court of Appeals 231 SCRA 292
Ruling : LLDA has a special charter that gives it the responsibility
to protect the inhabitants of the laguna lake region from the
deleterious effect of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding area. It has the power and authority
to issue a cease and desist order under RA 4850 and its
amendatory laws. Moreover, the power to make, alter, or modify
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is also impliedly
bestowed upon LLDA by EO 927.
Necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers
It is a fundamental power rule that an administrative agency has
only such power as are expressly granted to it by law, likewise an
administrative agency has also such power as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its express powers.
Polloso vs Gangan 335 SCRA 750
Facts : Petitioner was the project manager of NPC who filed a letter
of explanation and appeal from the notice of disallowance issued
by the COA. The case stemmed from the hiring of a private lawyer,
Atty. Satorre, who was compensated by virtue of a contract
entered by the NPC and the former. The COA held several persons
liable for payment of the amount due to said lawyer which included
herein petitioner. Petitioner contends the nature of services that
was contracted with the lawyer. Respondent contends that there
was a memorandum prohibiting the hiring of private lawyers
without following the necessary procedures required by the COA.
Issue : Was the issuance of the COA circular valid and applicable in
this case?
Ruling : What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that
government agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their
hiring of private lawyers to render legal services or handle their
cases. No public funds will be disbursed for the payment to private
lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a written
conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the
purpose of the circular is to curtail the unauthorized and
unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers for
services rendered to the government. This is in line with the
Commission on Audit’s constitutional mandate to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations including those for
the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties.
Blaquera vs Alcala 295 SCRA 411
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Facts : Petitioners are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies who were paid incentive
benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1
("EO 292"), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On
January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos ("President
Ramos") issued Administrative Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing
the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the
maximum amount of P1,000.00 3 and reiterating the prohibition 4
under Section 7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"),
enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll
departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY
1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount
authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to
immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a period
of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of
this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments
or agencies of the government concerned, who are the herein
respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments. To prevent the respondents from making further
deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have
come before the Supreme Court to seek relief.
Issues : Whether or not the issued Administrative Orders are valid.
Ruling : In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards
promulgated by the Commission, the President or the head of each
department or agency is authorized to incur whatever necessary
expenses involved in the honorary recognition of subordinate
officers and employees of the government who by their
suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishment, and other
personal efforts contribute to the efficiency, economy, or other
improvement of government operations, or who perform such
other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in
connection with, or in relation to, their official employment."
(Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V).
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or
agency who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved
in the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees
of the government." It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the
amount of the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or
his duly empowered alter ego.
RCPI vs NTC 215 SCRA 455 GRN 93237
Buenaseda vs Flavier 226 SCRA 645
Facts : The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners for violations of
graft and corruption.
Issues : Whether or not the ombudsman has power to suspend
government officials and employees pending investigation of
administrative complaints.
Ruling : The Ombudsman is vested with authority to preventively
suspend officers as contained in sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Act.
E. Discretionary powers vs. ministerial duty
Carino vs Capulong 222 SCRA 593
Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order
issued by the respondent Judge and prevent the same in
conducting further hearing thereof. AMA Computer College
situated in Davao city operated as an Educational Institution
without the required authorization that must be secured first
before the DECS. As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an
order for the closure of the said school with the aid of the military
as per agreement of the two governmental agencies. The private
respondent filed a case before the RTC Davao to enjoin DECS from
implementing the said closure pending the approval of the request
to operate of the said school. The said request was denied by the
DECS for not complying the requirements prescribed by the
Department. The said case was dismissed, undaunted the private
respondent appeal before the CA which later affirmed the decision
of the lower court. The private respondent then filed a petition
before the RTC of Makati with the same cause of action now using
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the organization of the parents of their students. The said court
presided by the respondent Judge issued the preliminary injunction
sought by the private respondent. Hence, this petition. The private
respondent contended that the same should be permitted to
operate because DECS is only performing a ministerial power over
the circumstance. The DECS on the other hand contended that it
exercises a discretionary power in pursuant to the provisions of law
with respect to educational institutions.
Issues : Whether or not the public petitioner exercised ministerial
or discretionary function.
Ruling : The SC ruled that the public petitioner exercised
discretionary power with respect to the issuance of permit to
operate as an educational institution. The Court further
distinguished ministerial and discretionary powers. A purely
ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment.
Accordingly, the granting of license to operate is vested upon the
judgment of the DECS in securing the quality education that an
educational institution should provide pursuant to the
constitutional provision on education and the organic law
authorizing said department to issue rules and regulations
pertinent thereto.
Mateo vs CA 196 SCRA 280
Facts : Petitioners filed an action for the recovery of a parcel of
land. RTC ruled in favor the petitioner. Issued execution of
judgment for private respondent. Petitioner filed relief from
judgment. Judge denied petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner
filed mandamus.
Issues : Whether or not granting of the petition for relief from
judgment is ministerial?
Ruling : Ministerial duty in granting appeal. But deciding on judging
on the appeal is discretionary.
1. Ministerial duty, defined - is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state
of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment (remedy mandamus)
2. Discretionary power, defined - If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and
gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed (remedy certiorari)
3. Importance of knowing distinction – to
determine the remedies available…
4. Delegation of ministerial and discretionary
power
Binamira vs Garrucho 188 SCRA 154
Facts : Petitioner herein filed a quo warranto seeking reinstatement
to the Office of General Manager in the Department of Tourism. In
1986, petitioner was designated by then Minister Gonzales as
General Manager of the PTA. The Minister sought the approval of
the president which was favored by the latter. In 1990, respondent
was the new Secretary of Tourism and asked for the resignation of
the petitioner. The president issued a memorandum to Garrucho
designating him as General Manager for the reason that petitioner
was not appointed by the President as required by PD 564 but only
by the Secretary of Tourism which was invalid. Petitioner contends
that he was validly appointed to the position since that the act of
then Minister Gonzales was also the act of the president which
presumes that the act of the department heads were the act of the
president.
Issue : Whether or not petitioner was validly appointed to his
position.
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Ruling : PD 564 clearly provides that the appointment of the
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made
by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer.
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of
its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not
possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that
discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or
designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or
ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate
even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to
another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he
was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place
has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
F. Mandatory/prohibitory and permissive/directory
duties and powers
Article 5 Civil Code
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.
1. Mandatory/prohibitory statute, defined and
effect
Sarina vs CFI of Bukidnon 24 SCRA 715
Ruling: A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively
that something be done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively
that something be not done, leaving the person concerned no choice on the
matter except to obey.
2. Permissive/directory statute, defined and
effect
Meralco Securities Corp. vs Savellano 117 SCRA
804
Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of
mandamus issued by Judge Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco
Securities Corporation to pay and petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to collect from the former the amount of 51M by
way of alleged deficiency corporate income tax, plus interests and
surcharges due thereon and to pay private respondents 25% of the
total amount collectible as informers’ reward.
Issue: WON the writ of mandamus is correct.
Ruling : Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged
by law with the task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws
and the collection of taxes has after a mature and thorough study
rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due or collectible, and
his decision is sustained by the Secretary, now Minister of Finance
(whose act is that of the President unless reprobated), such
decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the
performance of official duty and cannot be controlled much less
reversed by mandamus. A contrary view, whereby any stranger or
informer would be allowed to usurp and control the official
functions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would create
disorder and confusion, if not chaos and total disruption of the
operations of the government.
Agpalo: A directory statute is a statue which is permissive or
discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in
such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its
purpose can be accomplished in a manner other that prescribed
and substantially the same result obtained.
G. Error in the exercise of powers
1. Doctrine of non-suability of the state
inapplicable – the state cannot be sued
without its consent.
Shauf vs CA 191 SCRA 713
Facts : Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance
counselor in a school (navy based) which was denied even though
she was qualified. Filed a case against the military officials
concerned because of discrimination. The military invoked the non-
suability of the state.
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Issue : Whether or not the non-suability clause applies.
Ruling : The principle of non-suability does not apply because the
petitioner is questioning the personal judgment or discretion of the
officials not their office by virtue of their official capacity.
2. Estoppel inapplicable
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs CTA 234 SCRA 348
Ruling : Illegal or invalid acts which are in excess of the jurisdiction
of administrative agency cannot bind the government, therefore
estoppels does not apply.
3. Presumption of regularity
Blue Bar Coconut vs Tantuico 163 SCRA 716
Facts: The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut
Authority and established a coconut stabilization fund. The
members were originally 11 but reduced to 7. Thereafter,
respondent chairman of the coconut authority initiated a special
coconut end-user companies which included the petitioner. The
chairman directed to collect short levies and overpriced subsidies
to apply the same to settlement of short levies should they fail to
pay. COA agreed to release the subsidy provided they post a bond
equal to the amount of the disputed claim. Petitioner contended
that it is unacceptable that the COA Chairman and Auditor had no
jurisdiction. They caused the withholding of the subsidy case
endorsed to the court.
Issue: WON respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules
and decision had became moot.
Ruling : The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly
performed; and it is 'particularly strong as regards administrative
agencies x x vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature,
in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular
fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which
requires a technical or special training, 'aside from a good
knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said
fields, containing in the nation. The consequent policy and practice
underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should
respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless
there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence
is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.
Acts done by an official are presumed to be valid.
IV. Investigatory Powers
A. Scope and extent of powers
De Leon : Investigatory or inquisitorial powers include the power to
inspect, secure, require the disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise. They are conferred on
practically all administrative agencies. In fact, the investigatory
powers of administrative agencies, or their power and facilities to
investigate, initiate action, and control the range of investigation,
is one of the distinctive functions which sets them apart from the
court.
Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483
Facts: Manila public school teachers association (MPSTA) and
alliance of concerned teachers (ACT) undertook what they
described as “mass concerted actions” to dramatize and highlight
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
bought to the latter’s attention. As a result of the said action, the
DECS secretary dismissed from the service one of the private
respondents and the other nine were suspended.
Issue: WON the CHR has jurisdiction over certain specific type of
cases. 2. Won the CHR can try and decide cases as court of justice
even quasi-judicial bodies do?
Ruling : The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts
of controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in
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controversy may be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions.
Court declared that CHR has no jurisdiction on adjudicatory power
over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights
violation involving civil or political rights.
The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of
adjudication power is that it may investigate,.eg,. Receive
evidence and make findings of facts as regard claimed human
rights violation involving civil and political rights.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of
controversy is not judicial function. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusion in
controversy may be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or determined authoritively, finally and definitely,
subject to such appeals or modes or review as may be provided by
law.
The power to investigate does not carry with it the power
to adjudicate.
Does the power of quasi-legislative carries with it the power to
investigate?
Quasi-legislative may or may not possess the power to
investigate depending on the law granting such power.
Can an administrative agency perform investigation with or without
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power? Yes. For the reason
that some agencies are formed for the sole purpose of
investigation only (fact finding, etc.)
Concerned Officials of MWSS vs Vasquez 240 SCRA 502
Facts: MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization
Project in order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to
about 3.8 million people in the Metropolitan area. The project was
financed by funds loaned by the Overseas Economic Coop Fund of
Japan to the National Government.
MWSS caused the publication or an “invitation for pre-qualification
and bids.” The major factors considered in the evaluation were the
applicants’ financial condition, technical qualification and
experience to undertake the project. Private Respondent Phil.
Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers’ Association sent
letters offering suggestions on the technical specifications.
Thereafter 3 lowest bidders for the project were known PBAC-CSTE
recommended F.F Cruz and Inc. but other members both disagreed
and opted for a rebidding bating the contract to be awarded to
Joint Venture. But MWSS Board Committee on construction
Management and Board Committee on Engineering that contract
be awarded to F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. being the lowest complying
bidder.
PLDPPMA, through its President filed with the office of the
Ombudsman a letter-complaint protesting the public bidding
conducted by the MWSS to favor suppliers of fiberglass pipes and
urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation there on.
Ombudsman, in its fact-finding investigation pursuant to power,
functions and duties of the office under Sec. 15 of R.A 6670 MWSS
was diverted to set aside the recommendation of MWSS to award
contract.
Petitioner filed a special civil, action in the SC and cited that
respondent Ombudsman acted beyond the jurisdiction
notwithstanding that Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act, which
enumerated the administrative act, or omission that may not be
the subject of investigation clearly among the cases exempts the
same by his office.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of PLDPPMA’s complaint and to correspondingly issue
its challenged orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS
to se aside the recommendation of the PBAC-CTSE.
Ruling : No, the particular aspect in question is the investigatory
power and public assistance duties that can be found in the first
and second part of Sec.13, Art. XI of the Constitution. While the
broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or
omission which xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient
may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede however, that the
constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended to confer upon
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it veto or provisory power over an exercise of judgment or
discretion is lawfully vested.
While the authority of the ombudsman to investigate any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, other than those
specifically excepted under the Constitution and Republic Acts No.
6770, which appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, is
broad, the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did not intend to
confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus, on the
question of whether to accept or reject a bid and award contract
vested by law in a government agency, which involves the exercise
of discretion, the Ombudsman has exceeded his power by
reviewing the award and granting it to another bidder.
Deloso vs Domingo 191 SCRA 545
Facts : An alleged ambushed led to the prosecution of Governor
Delloso who was charged before the Special Prosecutor with
multiple murder. Governor Delloso questioned the said referral to
the Ombudsman alleging that the same has no jurisdiction over the
case for being irrelevant of the crime he committed to his official
function as governor.
Issue : Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the
case.
Ruling : The Court ruled in positive manner. As protector of the
people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and
duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials and to investigate any act or omission of
any public officials when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. Ombudsman is also empowered to
direct the officer concerned, in this case the Special Prosecutor, to
take appropriate action against a public official and to recommend
his prosecution. Further, the court ruled that the law does not
required that the act or omission be related to or be connected
with or arise from the performance of official duty.
B. Requirement of notice and hearing – when the
law is silent, notice and hearing may be dispensed with,
which depends upon the stage of the proceedings.
(substantial right – can be given notice and hearing)
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Facts: A request for extradition was filed against Mark Jimenez for
alleged violation of many criminal laws in the US. The DOJ formed a
panel of lawyers to review and study the request. Pending the
review, MJ requested copies of all documents and papers relative
to the request that the proceedings be suspended for the
meantime. The DOJ denied the request, hence MJ filed a petition for
mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the DOJ to furnish
him the documents. The RTC of Manila issued a TRO to maintain a
status quo ante, hence the DOJ filed an appeal to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not MJ is entitled to notice and hearing during
the preliminary or the evaluation stage of the extradition treaty
against him.
Ruling : From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of
the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the
propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly
granted to the prospective extradite. However, prior thereto, the
law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition
procedures also manifests this silence.
Ruiz vs Drilon 209 SCRA 695
Facts : GR No. 103570 refers to a petition for review on the
decision of the court of appeals consolidated with GR No. 101666
for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the executive
secretary.
Petitioner herein was the president of Central Luzon State
University who was dismissed by the President of the Philippines
from his position after investigation of a committee on several
charges against him. Petitioner undertook to ask for a
reconsideration on the same which respondent Drilon, as executive
secretary denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for TRO which granted the latter prayer.
After eight days, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for TRO. The CA dismissed
the petition on the ground that the petition was not meritorious
and a case of forum shopping. The SC dispensed with the comment
of the Solicitor General for the public respondents it being that the
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pleadings and papers already filed were already adequate for them
to act on said petition.
Issue : Whether or not the public respondents acted with grave
abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the assailed administrative orders. / Was the petitioner
entitled to be informed of the findings of an investigative
committee created to inquire into charges against him?
Ruling : Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an
administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made
of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made
against him and the evidence presented against him during the
hearings of the investigating committees.
Pefianco vs Moral 322 SCRA 439
Facts: Ma. Luisa Moral instituted an action for mandamus and
injunction before the regular courts against Secretary Gloria, who
was later replaced by Secretary Pefianco, praying that she be
furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and
that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of
dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. Moral was
ordered dismissed from the government service. Respondent did
not appeal the judgement .
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of
cause of action but the trial court denied his motion, thus elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which sustained the
trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition for Certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss.
Ruling : A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to
be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed
against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision
based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented
against her during the hearings of the investigation committee.
Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.
C. Right to counsel in administrative investigations – a
counsel may or may not assist a person under
investigation. (Remolona v. CSC)
D. Importance of administrative investigations
Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99
Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the
order of the respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs.
bagatsing et, al. which order that preliminary injunction restraining
respondent from further issuing subpoena in connection with the
fact finding investigation against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines
created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7,
1966.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested
in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including
the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to
the investigation.
Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the
authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations.
Ruling : Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts
as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the
privilege would thus be unwise.
E. Executive power to investigate, source
Section 64c Revised Administrative Code
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• Power of the president –to order, when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires, an investigation of
any action or the conduct of any person in the Government
service, and in connection therewith to designate the
official, committee, or person by whom such investigation
shall be conducted.
Section 20 Book III, 1987 Administrative Code
• Residual Powers – unless congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other powers and functions
vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or
which are not delegated by the President in accordance
with law.
Larin vs Executive Secretary 280 SCRA 713
Facts: Petitioner herein was an assistant commissioner of the
excise tax service of the BIR being appointed by then President
Aquino. Sometime in 1992, a decision was rendered by the
Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner of grave misconduct. Acting
on a report by then acting Finance Secretary Leong, the President,
through its executive secretary, issued a memorandum creating an
executive committee to investigate the administrative charge
against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner submitted a position
paper as required by the committee. Consequently, the president
issued a memorandum which streamlined the operations of the BIR
abolishing some of the offices which included the office of excise
tax and another memorandum dismissing herein petitioner from
office as a result of the investigation. Petitioner contends that he is
a Career Executive Service officer and he cannot be removed. On
the other hand, respondents contended that since petitioner is a
presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of
the president.
Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the
president have the power to order an investigation against herein
petitioner?
Ruling : The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of
the Career Executive Service under the law which is appointed by
the president. As a presidential appointee who belongs to career
service of the Civil Service, he comes under the direct disciplining
authority of the president in line with the principle that the power
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred by the
Constitution. The memorandum issued by the president which
created a committee to investigate the administrative charge
against petitioner was pursuant to the power of removal by the
president. However, the power of removal is not absolute since the
petitioner herein is a career service officer who has in his favor the
security of tenure who may only be removed through a cause
enumerated by law.
Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99
Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the
order of the respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs.
bagatsing et, al. which order that preliminary injunction restraining
respondent from further issuing subpoena in connection with the
fact finding investigation against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines
created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7,
1966.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested
in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including
the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to
the investigation.
Issue : Whether or not PARGO has the power to issue subpoenas
Ruling : The subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to
respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal
competence of the Agency to issue.
Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the
course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved,
and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the
issuance of a complaint.
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Requirements in issuing a subpoena:
1. Within the authority of the
agency
2. Information is reasonably
relevant
3. Demand is not indefinite
V. Quasi-legislative /Rule-Making Powers
Remolona vs CSC 362 SCRA 304
Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office
service in Infanta, Quezon, District Supervisor of the DECS
inquired from the Civil Service Commission as to the status of the
Civil Service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who got a rating of
81.25% of as per report of rating issued by the National Board for
Teachers. After an investigation, Remolona’s name is not in the list
of passing and failing examinees. Remolona admitted that he was
responsible in acquiring the alleged fake eligibility, that his wife
has no knowledge and that he did it because he wanted them to be
together.
A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C.
Remolona and Atty. Hadji Sdupadin for possession of fake
eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. CSS found Estelito
Remolona and Nery remolona guilty but Nery Remolona was
absolved from legibility. On appeal, CA dismissed the petition and
therefore a review by the SC.
Issue : Whether or not the CSC can dismiss the petitioner despite
of the fact that the offense committed was not done in the
performance of his official duty.
Ruling : If the government officer or employee is dishonest or is
guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of
character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to
continue in office.
Rule making power - the power to issue rules and regulations.
A. Nature of power, definition – Administrative
agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature or
quasi-legislative, and in practical effect, with the power to
make law. However, the essential legislative functions may
not be delegated to administrative agencies and in this
sense, it is said that administrative agencies have no
legislative power and are precluded from legislating in the
strict sense.
People vs Maceren 79 SCRA 450
Facts: The case at bar involves the validity of a 1967 regulation,
penalizing electro fishing in fresh water.
Issue: Whether or not the Fishery Administrative Order No. 84
penalizing electro fishing.
Ruling: The fishery laws did not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the
power to declare what act constitute a criminal offense. Electro
fishing is now punishable by virtue of PD 704. Thus, an
administrative regulation must be in harmony with law; it must not
amend an act of the legislature. In a prosecution for violation of an
administrative order it must clearly appear that the order falls
within the scope of the authority conferred by law.
1. Ordinance power of the
President/Delegation to the President
- The president has the power to issue rules and regulations
(executive orders, proclamations, etc.)
Sections 23.2, 28.2, Article VI, Constitution
Section 23. 2. - In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Section 28. 2 - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
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within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Book III, Title I, Chapter 2, 1987 Admin.
Code
Chapter 2
ORDINANCE POWER
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for
rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon
the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation
is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which
shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters
of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest
which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government
shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on
matters relating to internal administration, which the President
desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or
compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the
President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.
Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil 328
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders
restricting and banning trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay.
However, a group of other trawl operators questioned the said
executive orders alleging that the same is null and void.
Issue : Whether or not the issuance of the executive order was
valid.
Ruling : Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the
municipality allowed thrall fishing. Such law is not deemed
complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently
fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring
another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in
the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said policy.
EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the
agencies functions.
Olsen & Co. vs Aldanese, 43 Phil. 259
Facts: Walter Olsen, a duly licensed domestic corporation engaged
in the manufacture and export of cigars made of tobacco grown in
the Philippines assailed the constitutionality of Act 2613, allegedly
depriving them of their right of exporting cigars to the United
States due to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to
issue certificate of origin and that the cigars were not
manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the
province of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Viscaya.
Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue is
authorized to make rules and regulations which are not within the
scope of Act 2613.
Ruling: The only power conferred to the Collector of Internal
Revenue was that a proper standard of the quality of tobacco
should be fixed and defined and that all of these who produce
tobacco of the same standard would have equal rights and
opportunities. Such delegated power the rules and regulations
promulgated should be confined to and limited by the power
conferred by the legislative act.
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Administrative Law Reviewer
The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to makes rules
and regulations is specified and defined to the making of rules and
regulations for the classification, marking and packing of leaf or
manufactured tobacco of good quality and the handling of it under
sanitary conditions.
2. Delegation to the Supreme Court
Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar,
and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30
Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto to amend certificate of recognition
by changing scope of its reg product from glazed floor tiles to
ceramic stiles. Mariwasa oppose filed motion for reconsideration.
Mariwasa filed petition for review with respondent CA. it is
temporarily restrained BOI from implementing decision, 20 days
lapsed without respondent court issuing preliminary injunction.
Lepanto filed motion to dismiss, court appellate. Jurisdiction over
BOI vested with SC.
Issue: Whether or not CA has jurisdiction.
Held: Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of
BOI. It simply deals with procedural aspects with court has the
power to regulate by virtue of its cons rule-making power. Circular
1-91 repealed or suspended EO 226 in so far as the manner of
appeal. Appeals from decisions of BOI, which statutes allowed to
be filed with SC, are brought to CA.
3. Delegation to LGUs
Sections 5 and 9, Article X, Constitution
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have
sectoral representation as may be prescribed by law.
Sections 54, 55, 56, 57, Republic Act No. 7160
SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the
provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be.
If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall
affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he
shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The
Sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief
executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby
making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents
and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive
concerned to the Sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of
a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality;
otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had
signed it.
(c) ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay shall, upon
approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the
Punong Barangay.
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SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a)
The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or
Sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or
prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in
writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the Punong Barangay, shall
have the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a
local development plan and public investment program, or an
ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In
such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are
not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect
unless the Sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein
provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations
ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if
any, shall be deemed reenacted.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution
only once. The Sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief
executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members,
thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval
of the local chief executive concerned.
SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal
Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. - (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the
secretary to the Sanggunian Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan
shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies
of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local
development plans and public investment programs formulated by
the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such
ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall
examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for
prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of
the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing of
his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance
or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and
shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the
action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or
resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and
therefore valid.
SECTION 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within
ten (10) days after its enactment, the Sangguniang Barangay shall
furnish copies of all Barangay ordinances to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to
whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal
ordinances.
(b) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the
case may be, fails to take action on Barangay ordinances within
thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed
approved.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the
case may be, finds the Barangay ordinances inconsistent with law
or city or municipal ordinances, the Sanggunian concerned shall,
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with
its comments and recommendations to the Sangguniang Barangay
concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which
case, the effectivity of the Barangay ordinance is suspended until
such time as the revision called for is effected.
B. Rationale for the delegation of quasi-legislative
power
Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330
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Administrative Law Reviewer
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180
ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the
downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638
which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also
aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment
by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law
states that "at the end of four (4) years from the affectivity of this
Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute
the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy
projects and activities of the energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full
deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which
shall be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law
which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy
because it does not provide a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?
Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared
unconstitutional and ED. No. 372 void.The rational of the Court
annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it
disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as
cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law violates the
Constitution.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is
a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running not. Both tests are intended to prevent a
total transference of legislative authority to the delegates who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in
our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of
legislative power has become an inevitability in light of the
increasing complexity of the task of government. To cede to the
Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to
transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of
delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the
delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of
agency.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern
shipping lines for sum of money and attorney’s fee claiming that
herein respondent rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the
lower court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for
certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner
insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars.
Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its
constitutionality.
Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional
Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine
port authority has no discretion whether or not to implement the
law. Its duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a conflict between
PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is
dismissed.
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs Public Service Commission,
70 Phil. 221
Facts: Pangasinan Transportation Co. has been engaged in
transporting passengers in Pangasinan and Tarlac to Nueva Ecija
and Zambales by means of TPU buses for 20 years. It filed with
Public Service Commission to be authorized to operate ten
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Administrative Law Reviewer
additional new Brockway Trucks on the ground that they were
needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its current
certificates. As a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor
Law. The Public Service Commission denied it. Motion for
Reconsideration denied. Petition for a writ of certiorari filed.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the legislative powers granted to the
Public Service Commission by Sec.1 of the Commonwealth Act No.
454 constitute a complete and total abdication of the Legislatures’
functions and thus unconstitutional and void.
(2) Whether or not Public Service Commission has
exceeded its authority.
Held:
(1) No, Commonwealth Act no. 454 is constitutional.
Section 8 of Art. XIII of the Constitution provides that no franchise,
certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be “for a longer period than fifty years” and
when it was ordained. While in Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act No.
146 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454 that the Public
Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance
of a certificate. That it shall be valid only for a period of time it has
been declared that the period shall not be longer than 50 years.
Therefore, all that has been delegated to the commission is the
admin function\, including the use of discretion, to carry out the
will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the
promotion of “public interests in a proper and suitable manner.”
With the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and towards the approval of the practice by the courts.
(2) No, this right of the state to regulate public utilities is
founded upon the police power, applicable not only to those public
utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to
those already established and in operation.
Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726
Facts: Calalang in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public
works and highways with the recommendation of the Director of
Public works and the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission
promulgated a rule closing a certain road in Manila for animal
drawn vehicle for a specific time.
The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public
Works with the recommendation of the Director of Public works to
legislate rules and laws relative to the regulation of traffic in the
country. Further, the petitioner contended that such act is an
invalid delegation of legislative power.
The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of
rules is in connection with the powers vested to them by the said
law.
Issue: Whether or not the said Act constitute an invalid delegation
of legislative power.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid
delegation of power. The authority therein conferred upon them
and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of
the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to
any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To
promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and
to determine when and how long a national road should be closed
to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an
administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of
the law.
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Administrative Law Reviewer
C. Limitations on the rule-making power
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908, 12 August 2003
Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A.
Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy
Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of
nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing
Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without
due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of
the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging
the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and
that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and
call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed
that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-
making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed
is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set
of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. 25 This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. 26 Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs NLRC 106 SCRA 444
Ruling : By virtue of such rule-making authority, the Secretary of
Labor issued on May 1, 1977 a set of rules which exempts not only
distressed employers but also "those who have granted in addition
to the allowance under P.D. 525, at least P60.00 monthly wage
increase on or after January 1, 1977, provided that those who paid
less than this amount shall pay the difference (paragraph k of said
rules).
Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory
authority granted to the Secretary of Labor, and the same is
therefore void. The recognition of the power of administrative
officials to promulgate rules in the administration of the statute,
necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment. It is of elementary knowledge that an act of Congress
cannot be amended by a rule promulgated by an administrative
agency. "It seems too clear for serious argument that an
administrative officer cannot change a law enacted by Congress. A
regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when
once determined to have been erroneous becomes a nullity."
D. Requisites for valid delegation of quasi-legislative
power
Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330
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Administrative Law Reviewer
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180
ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the
downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638
which created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also
aimed to encourage free and active participation and investment
by the private sector in all energy activities. Section 5(e) of the law
states that "at the end of four (4) years from the affectivity of this
Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute
the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy
projects and activities of the energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full
deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the
Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which
shall be expressed in its title. That the imposition of tariff rates in
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law
which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy
because it does not provide a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?
Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared
unconstitutional and ED. No. 372 void.The rational of the Court
annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it disagrees with
deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by
Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The
right call therefore should be for Congress to write a new oil
deregulation law that conforms to the Constitution and not for this
Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the
Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180 may cost losses in
quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating
the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and
centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits
of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles
of the Constitution. When confronted by a law violating the
Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead.
Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and
guarantees both the political and economic rights of the people.
The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only
of the people's political rights but their economic rights as well.
The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the
powerless is of greater importance to them for they are concerned
more with the exoteric of living and less with the esoteric of liberty.
Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will
this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our
people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense
of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it
cannot be half-hearted.
1. Completeness test – the law must be
complete in all its items and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate, the only thing they will have to do is
enforce it (Eastern
Shipping vs. POEA)
What cannot be delegated are those which are purely
legislative in nature. He cannot determine what the law
shall be.
US vs Ang Tang Ho L-4288 20 Nov 1952
Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern
shipping lines for sum of money and attorney’s fee claiming that
herein respondent rendered pilotage service to petitioner, the
lower court ruled in favor of the respondent; herein petition for
certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner
insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars.
Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its
constitutionality.
Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional
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Administrative Law Reviewer
Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine
port authority has no discretion whether or not to implement the
law. Its duty is to enforce the law, thus, there is a conflict between
PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails. Petition is
dismissed.
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
Facts: Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27
November 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act
4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would
observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro
Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the
Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18
June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge
Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937.
On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition
to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution
also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other
things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative
of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because
section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the
power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or
otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution
also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937,
elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of
several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal
concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with
respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of
Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a
resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda
racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the
Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for
probation. On 3 July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an
exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of
intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion
for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July
1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for
reconsideration submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions
were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was
postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a
motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by
33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6
August 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the
trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment
of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail
in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera
issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for
intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14
August 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of
Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of
judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as
amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he
moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The
judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21
August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the
circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as
amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been
heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the
People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process
to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding
in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence
imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to
criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the
judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court
imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled
hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the
issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court on
21 August 1937.
Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in
present case.
Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper
party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
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and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes
without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the
People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule
that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
2. Sufficient standard test – to map out the
boundaries of the delegates’ authority by defining
legislative policy and indicating circumstances
under which it is pursued.
Serve to canalize the banks of the river from overflowing.
Chiongbian vs Orbos 245 SCRA 253
Facts: Petitioners challenged the validity of a provision of R.A 6734,
“authorizing the President of the Philippines to merge by
administrative determination the regions remaining after the
establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order
issued by the President pursuant to such authority, “Providing for
the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanano.” Four
provinces includes, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi voted in favor of creating an autonomous region, thus
became ARMM. After the plebiscite, E.O 429 as amended by E.O
439 was issued by the Chief Executive providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. The
contentions of the Petitioners contends that R.A 6734 is
unconstitutional because 1.) it unduly delegates the legislative
power to the President by authorizing him to merge the existing
regions. 2.) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the
law.
Issue: Whether the Congress has provided a sufficient standard
by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power
granted.
Whether the grant of power to the President is included in the
subject expressed in the title of the law.
Ruling: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may
simply be gathered or implied, nor it be found in the law
challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the
same subject as that of the challenged legislation.
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title. The title is not required to be
an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all provisions of the statute are pertinent to that
subject. The Reorganization of the remaining administrative
regions is pertinent to the general subject of R.A 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be
gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged
because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject
as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to
merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found
in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in the law.
Cervantes vs Auditor General L-4043 26 May 1952
Facts: Petitioner was manager of the national abaca and Fibers
Corporation. Its board of directors granted quarter allowances to
petitioner. Submitted to the control of the government enterprise
council created in EO 93 in pursuance to RA 51 for approval, the
resolution was disapproved on recommendation by auditor
general. 1. That quarter allowance constituted additional
compensation prohibited by NAFCO charter. 2. Financial condition
of NAFCO.
Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition for review by
certiorari/
Issue: that EO 93 is invalid as based on the law that is
unconstitutional being an undue delegation of legislative power to
executive.
Ruling: the rule that so long as the legislative “lays down policy
and a standard is established by the statute there is no undue
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delegation. RA 51 is authorizes the president to make reforms and
changes in the government controlled corporation for the purpose
of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations.
This lays down a standard and policy. pursuant to this authority,
the president promulgate EO 93 creating government enterprises
council with power to pass upon the program of activities and
yearly budget of member corporations. Petition is dismissed.
Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569
Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the
Revised Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and
126 to 129 creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as
Vice President of the Phil and as a taxpayer instituted a writ of
prohibition with prelim injunction against the Auditor general from
passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges that
executive orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has
been impliedly repealed by R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power
Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power.
Held: Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate
to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the separation of powers, the
said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a
standard- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate of
determinable
Ynot vs IAC 148 SCRA 659
Facts: The petitioner is questioning the validity of the Executive
order issued by the President of the Philippines prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order
No. 626 particularly with respect to age. Obviously, the petitioner
was affected to the said order with the contention that the said
order is an invalid delegation of power and unduly oppressive to
the industry. The Solicitor General contended that the said law is a
proper delegation of legislative power to the President of the
Republic.
Issue: Whether or not the said executive order is a valid delegation
of power.
Ruling: The court ruled in that the said order is an invalid
delegation of power. The court further ruled that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense
and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on
the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, the court declared Executive Order No.
626-A unconstitutional.
3. Exceptions to the requirement of
sufficient legislative standards
1. power which is not directly or
exclusively a legislative one and has no
relation whatsoever to personal or property
rights;
2. power to regulate a mere matter of
privilege
E. Issues on validity of legislation
1. Against the delegating statute itself ---
whether or not the requisites of valid delegation
are present;
2. Against the exercise of the delegated
power --- whether or not the rule or regulation
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conforms with what the statute provides and
whether the same is reasonable.
Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837
Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's
driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27,
1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District
of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under
certain conditions. Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the
Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment
that his office had never authorized the removal of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed
full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a
memorandum.
Issue: WON Memorandum/ordinance of MMA is valid.
Held: (1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, NULL and VOID; and (2)
enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila
from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when
authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver's licenses for
traffic violations within the said area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the
challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative
powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own
discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly
through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to
the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action,
PD 1605 remains effective and continues to prohibit the
confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver's licenses as well for
traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
An ordinance to be valid:
• Must not be in contravention of the constitution
• Must not be oppressive
• Must not be discriminatory
• Must not regulate or prohibit trade
• Must not be against a statute
F. Rule and rule-making, defined
Section 2.2 Book VII, Admin Code of 1987
"Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that
implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures
in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its
regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements
concerning the internal administration or management of an
agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the
public.
Section 4, Book VII, Admin Code of 1987
"Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.
Eslao vs COA 236 SCRA 161
Facts: Eslao, in his capacity as president of the Pangasinan State
University asked the SC to set aside the COA decision which denied
honoraria and per diems claimed under the National Compensation
Circular No. 53 by certain PSU personnel including petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at bar
are valid.
Ruling: COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for
any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or
propriety of which it does not agree at least not before such law or
regulation was set aside by authorized agency of government as
unconstitutional or illegal and void.
Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative
bodies to interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to
great respect.
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Supplementary legislation – A statute which leaves to the
executive the power to fill in the technical details in view of the
latter’s expertise is a recognized delegation of legislative power.
Must be in compliance with the enabling law and not
1. Classification of rules and regulations
a. Those issued by an administrative
superior and directed exclusively to the
subordinates --- rules and regulations of
internal administration to be observed by
subordinate officials for the prompt and
efficient dispatch of government business
and to facilitate the transactions of the
general public with the government;
b. Those directed not only to the inferior
officers but also and primarily to private
individuals, fixing the manner by which the
terms of a statute are to be complied with.
2. Types of rule-making powers
2.1. Rule-making by reason of particular
delegation of authority (supplementary or
detailed legislation)--- refers to the power
to issue rules and regulations which have
the force and effect of law;
2.2. Rule-making by the construction
and interpretation of a statute being
administered (interpretative legislation)---
refers to the power to interpret and
construe the statutes entrusted to them for
implementation;
2.3. The ascertainment of facts which
will form the basis for the enforcement of a
statute (contingent legislation or
determination).
G. Supplementary/detailed legislation
1. Source – enabling law;
2. Requisites for validity:
Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that
part of the decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the
Minister of Natural Resources, which declared that petitioners have
abandoned and lost their rights over their mining claim.
This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or
encroachment between two mining claims.
Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against
private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of
the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim.
The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was
no conflict between the "Ped and "Ullmann and dismissed the
petition.
Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17,
1974, the provisions of the law were made applicable to
petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with
certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims, such as
the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree.
Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost.
Issue: (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of
overlapping of mining claims; and (2) should public respondents
have such jurisdiction, whether or not they committed grave abuse
of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to
have abandoned their mining claim.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The public respondent has jurisdiction.
Petitioners had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No.
463 which vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests
involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres. Decree No. 4631.
Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of
Natural Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines,
the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders necessary to
carry out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In accordance
with the statutory grant of rulemaking power.
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Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public
respondents as basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with
invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head pursuant to
validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not
contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it
expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes
a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the
enabling law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the
statute
It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly
delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies.
4 requisites of the valid supplementary delegation
• must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
• conform to the standards that the law prescribes
• must be reasonable
• must be related to carrying in to effect the general
provisions of law
UST v. Court of Tax Appeals 93 Phil 376
Facts: The Collector of Internal Revenue notified petitioner that its
income as an educational institution was taxable. Later on UST
submitted a memorandum before the Sec. of Finance disputing the
decision of the latter as regard the taxability of the former’s
income from tuition fees.
The case was elevated before the Board of Tax Appeals in
accordance with the rules romulgated by said Board under E.O. No.
401-A, whereby the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of
respondent to take cognizance of the petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 401-A is tainted with invalidity for
the reason that it deprives the CFI’s of their jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases involving recovery of taxes.
Held: E.O. No. 401-A does not merely create the BTA, which, as an
instrumentality of the Dept of Finance may properly come within
the purview of R.A. No. 422, but goes as far as depriving the CFI’s
of their jurisdiction to act on internal evenue cases, a matter which
is foreign to it and which comes within the exclusive province of
Congress. This the Chief Executive cannot do, nor can that power
be delegated by Congress alone has “the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
department.”
Boie Takeda Chemicals vs Dela Serna 228 SCRA 329
Facts: This is a consolidated case questioning the supplementary
regulation issued by the Department of Labor and Employment
Secretary regarding the application and implementation of 13 th
month pay law. The Department order included commission as part
of the computation of determining the 13 th month pay of the
employees. Upon inspection, the petitioners were found to be
violators of the law for not including the commission on its
employees in the computation of the 13 th month pay. The
petitioner contended that the Secretary Drilon is acting in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the same. The Secretary however contended that the said
order was just a supplementary to the law which the same tried to
erase the cloud thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the said order is a valid administrative
regulation.
Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court further
ruled that the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851 is even more emphatic in declaring that
earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic
salary shall not be included in the computation of the l3th-month
pay.
"While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which defines
basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings paid by an
employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and
more controlling Supplementary Rules and Regulations which
categorically exclude from the definitions of basic salary earnings
and other remunerations paid by employer to an employee. A
cursory perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has
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hitherto been the subject of a broad inclusion is now a subject of
broad exclusion. The Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure
the seeming tendency of the former rules to include all
remunerations and earnings within the definition of basic salary.
"The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations'
which are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within its
meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves,
premium for works performed on rest days and special holidays,
pays for regular holidays and right differentials. As such they are
deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not be considered i
the computation of the 13th month pay. If they were not excluded
it is hard to find any 'earnings and other remunerations' expressly
excluded in the computation of the 13-month pay. Then the
exclusionary provision would prove to be idle and with no purpose.
GMCR vs Bell Telecommunication Phil., Inc. 271 SCRA 79
Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and
reversal of the decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals2
declaring the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter,
NTC) to be a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546 3 and
ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en bane, i.e., with the
concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation
of its quasi-judicial functions.
Issue: WON NTC is a collegial body
Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring
a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in
order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily,
the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case,
the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring
vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to
at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put,
Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC.
The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of
the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation
concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the
jurisdiction of the NTC.
Grego vs COMELEC 274 SCRA 481
Facts: Deputy Sheriff Basco was found guilty by the city court of
manila of serious misconduct and dismissed from service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits with prejudice to reinstatement
to any position in the national or local government, its agencies
and instrumentalities or GOCC.
Basco run as a councilor in 1988 election won and assume office.
In the 1992 election he run again and this time his victory not
without unchallenged.
A quo warranto was filed against him but was dismissed. At second
time petitioner Grego a registered voted file a petition with
comelec for disqualification and suspension of his proclamation.
Basco was proclaimed and assume office; petitioner filed an urgent
motion seeking to annul a hasty and illegal proclamation.
Issue: Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on
January 1, 1992?
Ruling: There is no provision in the statute which would clearly
indicate that the same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows
that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not
applicable to the present case. Basco was NOT subject to any
disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government
Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from
office on or after January 1, 1992.
"We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative
officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation
of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what
is provided in the legislative enactment. The regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as
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the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of
the law, they are valid.'
Romulo, Mabanta vs HDMF 333 SCRA 777
Facts: Issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, which require
the existence of a plan providing for both provident/retirement and
housing benefits for exemption from the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage
under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as amended.
Issue: WON the amendments are valid
Held: The amendments are null and void insofar as they require
that an employer should have both a provident/ retirement plan
and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in
order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund coverage.
Nasipit Lumber Co. vs NWPC 289 SCRA 667
3. Requirement of reasonableness
a. Bears a reasonable relation to the
purpose sought to be accomplished;
b. Supported by good reasons;
c. Free from constitutional infirmities
or charge of arbitrariness
Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848
Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 “that no examine shall attend
any review class, briefing, conference, or the like conducted by or
shall receive any handouts, review material or any tip from school
or any review center during the three days immediately preceding
every examination day including the examination day.
Issue: won the resolution no. 105 is valid.
Ruling: the court rule in favor of petitioner. Its is an axiom of
administrative law administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations.
To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and
fairly adapted to secure the end view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are authorized to
be issued, then they must be held invalid.
The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and
regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment.
H. Interpretative legislation
1. Distinction between rule and interpretation
Victorias Milling Co vs Social Security Commission 114 Phil 555
Ratio : When an administrative agency promulgates rules and
regulations, in the exercise of its rule making power delegated to it
by the legislature, it makes a new law with the force and effect of a
valid law. When it renders an opinion, or gives a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law, hence, merely
advisory.
2. Types of executive
construction/interpretation
a. Construction by an executive
officer directly called to implement the law.
It may be express (embodied in a circular,
directive or regulation) or implied (practice
or mode of enforcement of not applying the
statute to certain situations; by usage or
practice);
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b. Construction by the Secretary of
Justice as chief legal adviser of the
government. May be reversed by President
in the exercise of the power to modify,
alter or reverse;
c. Interpretation handed down in an
adversary proceeding in the form of a
ruling by an executive officer exercising
quasi-judicial power.
2. Weight accorded to administrative
constructions
Asturias Sugar Central vs Commissioner of Customs 29 SCRA 617
Facts: The Bureau of Customs issued an Administrative Order in
the silence of the Tariff and Customs Code which extends the
period of exportation of a specific containers in which the
petitioner was directly affected. The petitioner questioned the said
order alleging that the construction of a specific statute by an
administrative body must not be observed.
Issue: What weight should the court observes in administrative
construction.
Ruling: The court ruled that where the court of last resort has not
previously interpreted the stature, the rule is that the courts will
give considerations to construction by administrative or executive
departments of the state. The construction of the office charged
with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a statute should
be given controlling weight.
Melendres vs COMELEC 319 SCRA 262
Facts: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing and promulgating ex parte the assailed
resolution without complying with the provisions of Sections 5 and
6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10, Sections 1 to 6 of Rule 14,
Sections 1 to 4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18, all of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman
of Barangay Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May 12, 1997 barangay
elections. After the counting of the votes, petitioner (Concepcion)
was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman. On May
21, 1997, private respondent (Melendres) filed an election protest
against petitioner (Concepcion) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, contesting therein the results of the election in all forty-
seven (47) precincts of said barangay. The case was assigned to
Branch 68.
On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election case,
it was shown that no filing or docket fee was paid by the protestant
therein, which payment is required in the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6. Petitioner Concepcion moved to dismiss
the case on the ground of failure to comply with this requirement.
In the contested Order, public respondent denied the motion to
dismiss on the ground that the requirement of payment of filing or
docket fee is merely an administrative procedural matter and [is]
not jurisdictional.
Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved
that the payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election
protest and counter-protest is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-
compliance therewith at the outset will not operate to deprive the
Court of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and acquired
pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the
instant petition is hereby denied.
When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the
administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the court
that finally determine what the law means.
Peralta vs CSC 212 SCRA 425
United Christian Missionary Society vs SSC 30 SCRA 982
Facts: this is the appeal from SSC, seeking to annul the orders of
commissioner in dismissing the petition, on the ground that in the
absence of express provision in Social Security act, vesting in the
commission the power to condone penalties. Petitioners contention
that they had under the impression that international organization,
they were not cover under SSC. They paid their premiums and ask
for condonation, which was denied by commissioner.
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ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority
under SSC to condone the penalty prescribed by law for late
premiums.
RULING: No error in the commissioner’s action. The provision on
the SSC precisely enumerates the power of the commission,
nowhere from the said powers may it shown that the commissioner
is granted expressly or by implication the authority to condone
penalties imposed by the act.
3. Construction of administrative rules and
regulations
Ollada vs Secretary of Finance 109 Phil 1072
Ratio : An administrative body has the power to interpret its own
rules and such interpretation becomes part of the rule itself. Unless
shown to be erroneous, unreasonable or arbitrary, such
interpretation is entitled to recognition and respect from the
courts, as no one is better qualified to interpret the intent of the
regulation than the authority that issued it. Thus, its interpretation
that the rule it issued is not retroactive, not being unreasonable,
should be followed.
I. Contingent legislation or delegation to ascertain facts
Cruz vs Youngberg 56 Phil 234
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1
Lovina vs Moreno 9 SCRA 557
J. Penal rules and regulations
1. Requisites for validity of penal rules and
regulations
Marcos vs CA 278 SCRA 843
US v. Panlilio 28 Phil 608
Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of
Province of Pampaga of a violation of the law relating to the
quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous diseases known
as rinderpest. The conviction was grounded on illegal and
voluntary act of herein accused by way of permitting and ordering
the carabaos on issue to be taken from the corral while the
quarantines against the same was still enforce. On other hand, that
herein defendant interposed a defense that the acts complained of
did not constitute a crime.
Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not
constitute a crime.
Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the
case at bar do not fall within any of the provisions of the Act No.
1760. However, the said finding does not prevent the court from
finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the revised
penal code.
People v. Exconde 101 Phil 1125
People v. Maceren 79 SCRA 450
2. Imposition of penalties by administrative
authorities
K. Rate-fixing power
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to
annul and set aside an order issued by respondent Commissioner
Jose Luis Alcuaz of the NTC, which directs the provisional reduction
of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain
specified lines of its services by 15% with the reservation to make
further reduction later, for being violative of the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a
denial or procedural, as well as substantial due process of law. The
said provisional reduction is allegedly under the contemplation of
E.O. 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-
fixing powers; and E.O. 196, placing petitioner under the
jurisdiction of respondent NTC.
Issue: Whether or not the order in issue is constitutional.
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Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged order,
particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative
of due process clause is void and should be nullified . Thus,
temporary rate-fixing order is not exempt from the procedural
requirement of notice and hearing. Moreover the temporary rate-
fixing becomes final legislative act as to the period during which it
has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case.
In case of delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which
the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
admin authority is that the rate reasonable and just. However, it
has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement
as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. The fixing of
rate is quasi-legislative when the rules or the rates are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines,
in which case, notice and hearing are not required for their validity.
L. Effectivity of administrative rules and regulations
1. Publication requirement
Section 2, Civil Code
Section 2, Civil Code states that the law shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following their completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette unless otherwise provided.
Section 18, Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is
otherwise provided.
Chapter 2 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
Chapter 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent
functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under
pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing
agency and shall be open to public inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making
requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each
rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing
as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or
specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health,
safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a
statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take
appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons
who may be affected by them.
Sec. 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the
Philippines Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed
with it during the preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published
and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and
appropriate tables.
Sec. 6. Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the
Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the
codification any rule if its publication would be unduly
cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of
that rule shall be made available on application to the agency
which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the
general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof
may be obtained.
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(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which,
pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty
shall in all cases be published in full text.
Sec. 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The
University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free
copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or
supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate
courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules
shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or
agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a
price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution
costs.
Sec. 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the
certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin
or the codified rules.
Sec. 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law,
an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices
of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the
first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.
Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F.
Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity
and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek a writ of mandamus to compel
Juan C. Tuvera (in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office), and Florendo S.
Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing), to publish,
and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates
Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary
in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date — for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication — but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2
of the New Civil Code, however, does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision
is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
The publication of laws has taken so vital significance when the
people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast
by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansa — and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records — no such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. The publication of all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only
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to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. The publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law
that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. However, the
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may
have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.
The publication must be full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of its contents.
2. Notice and hearing requirement
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders vs DOF 238 SCRA 63
3. Application, general rule – that the
issuance of rules and regulations to implement the
law does not require that there be prior notice and
hearing conducted by the administrative agencies.
However, if the statute making the delegation
requires such hearing, then one must be conducted
before such rules and regulations are issued. On
the other hand, if the statute is silent on the
matter, a public hearing, if practicable, may be
conducted.
VI. Adjudicatory Powers
a. Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body,
defined
Quasi-judicial power - This is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
in enforcing and administering the same law.
Quasi-judicial body – an organ of government other than a court
and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule making power.
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A.
Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy
Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of
nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing
Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without
due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of
the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging
the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and
that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and
call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed
that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-
making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed
is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set
of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
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power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power
of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out
their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as
basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature.
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public
elementary school. As the school year was then about to end, the
"Committee On the Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted
by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of
selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the
school Principal, as chairman, and the members of the committee
deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat
and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,
respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set
for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third
placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with
his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of
honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned
civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, committee
members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic
Supervisor of the place.
Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION”
"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on
the part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities
rather than to a real grave abuse of discretion that would amount
to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of
jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.
WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not
impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial
acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard
thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to a writ of
certiorari, it is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be
performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs
it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or
quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings
should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that
word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if
they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in
making their decision, whatever may be their public character. . ..'
The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and
what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to
determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the
performance of legislative or administrative dudes, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine
what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is
clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially.
Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Oil Industry Commission 145
SCRA 433
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Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a
"Sublease and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell)
originally in the year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969. The
latter was filed and registered with the OIC.
While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments,
Manuel B. Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for
his purchases of gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner
Shell sent demand letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap who
continued to ignore these demands letters forcing petitioner Shell
to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the contract.
Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written
notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their
"Sublease and Dealer Agreement."
Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil
courts, OIC persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a
decision stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged
contractual right of petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated.
The OIC negated the existence of such right because the
stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent
OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of
the decision within which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as
adjudged in a Civil Case. Petitioner Shell moved for a
reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it.
Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide
contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil
company.
Held: The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A detailed
reading of the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no express
provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and
decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil
company. It is of course a well-settled principle of administrative
law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies like
respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.
As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):
" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the
performance of administrative functions, but in so doing, the
legislature must state its intention in express terms that would
leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be
limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to, or in
connection with, the performance of administrative duties which do
not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively
vested in the courts."
b. Distinguished from judicial power
Judicial Power – is the power to courts of justice to settle actual
case of controversies involving legal rights which are demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not there is grave
abuse of discretion.
Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483
Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of
the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they
described as amass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight'
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been
brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had
decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the
protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990
without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from
the Secretary of Education. Through their representatives, the
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an
order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did
not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report
and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section
41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced. An investigation
committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807."
Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction,
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear
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and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
rights violation involving civil or political rights.
Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have
no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to
the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that
power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may
adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or
in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular
or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
"x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial
functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights
of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes
to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having
merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking
Teachers HRC
Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249
SCRA 162
Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development
Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank
Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the
following issue:
Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining
Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated
April 1994, on promotion.
Held: It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on
a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited
compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the
appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our present law relating to
voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by
the parties,"5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
such decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there is an
express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter,
Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the
decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
c. Distinguished from administrative function
Administrative Function – are those which involve the regulation
and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature as such are devoled upon the
admin agency by the organic law of existence.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348
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Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task
Force, the President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute
so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country. PADS issued
search warrants against certain companies.
Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants
under the 1973 Constitution?
Held: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of
government other than a court and other than a legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule making." The most common types of such bodies have been
listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations
wherein the government is offering some gratuity,
grant, or special privilege, like the defunct
Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for
Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans
Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations
wherein the government is seeking to carry on
certain government functions, like the Bureau of
Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the
Board of Special Inquiry and Board of
Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the
Central Bank of the Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in situations
wherein the government is performing some
business service for the public, like the Bureau of
Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine
National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in situations
wherein the government is seeking to regulate
business affected with public interest, like the Fiber
Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent office,
office of the Insurance Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in situations
wherein the government is seeking under the
police power to regulate private business and
individuals, like the Securities & Exchange
Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board
of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional
Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to adjust individual controversies
because of some strong social policy involved, such as the
National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian
Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the
Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards,
Women and Minors Bureau.
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to
adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its
decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing
authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A
perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic
act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not
meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide
claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called
upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing
and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to
handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.
Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226
Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to
prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds.
Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task
force to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of
all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon the
creation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino, the
PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President not only
in the recovery of illgotten wealth or unexplained wealth
accumulated by the former President, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in the
investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President
may assign to the Commission from time to time and to prevent a
repetition of the same in the future.
Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a
preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor
General without violating petitioner's rights to due process and
equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to
conduct such preliminary investigation.
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Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the
anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General
against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the
alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.
Held: Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the
authority to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2)
freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable
that, as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exists a
prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order,
freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to
contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both
are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the rules
and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is
concerned, it may be divided into two stages. The first stage of
investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is the
factfinding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law
enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview
witnesses after which they assess the evidence and if they find
sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of preliminary
investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation
stage of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed,
where it is ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a
person to trial.
It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and
judge at the same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed
the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle
with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint,
this time as a public prosecutor.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be
promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition
and the petition for intervention and that the records of the same
should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent
constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this
nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take
appropriate action.
Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80
Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio
Sarenas and Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive
right to the use of the waters flowing through the estero for
irrigation purposes. The claim of Sideco goes back to 1885 when
the predecessor in interest of his father constructed a dam in these
waters; the use of the dam was afterwards interrupted by outside
causes such as imprisonment and war, but again reasserted in
1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas' contention is,
is not quite clear on the facts before us. However, it appears that
they made application to the Director of Public Works, only to meet
with the opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, granted the two Sarenas the right, in preference
to all other persons, to use the waters of the estero Bangad. Sideco
then took the proceedings to the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. After trial, judgment was entered, dismissing the complaint
and the appeal of Sideco and confirming the decision of the
administrative authorities, with the costs against the plaintiff.
The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the
correctness of the findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its
judgment.
Issue: WON
Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to
the use of waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended.
Controversies must be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce
and Communications through the Director of Public Works. The
"decision" of the Secretary thereon is final "unless appeal
therefrom be taken to the proper court within. thirty days after the
date of the notification of the parties of said decision. In case of
such appeal the court having jurisdiction shall try the controversy
de novo." (See. 4.) A more extensive method is also provided,
somewhat akin to our cadastral system, which makes it the duty of
the Director of Public Works to make a technical examination of
streams and to prepare a list of priorities. In the performance of
this work, the Director of Public Works or any official especially
authorized by him, may examine witnesses under oath, and can
issue for this purpose subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum.
(Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates signed by the Secretary of Commerce
and Communications are then granted each appropriator. (Secs. 9,
18.) "Appeal" lies from the "decision" of the Director of Public
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Works, as approved by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in
which the property is situated. Such action must be brought within
ninety days of the date of the publication of the approved list of
priorities. (Sec. 10.)
DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF JUDICIAL
RECORD.-The decision of the Director of Public Works, affirmed by
the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, containing as it
does the technical findings of officers especially qualified in
irrigation engineering, should invariably be made a part of the
judicial record because (1) the determination of these officials
would be most useful to the courts, and (2) the exact date of the
decision is of moment since it decides whether the appeal was
taken in time.
Ocampo vs US 234 US 91
d. Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making
Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848
Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution
No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all
those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent
provisions:
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or
the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review
material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor
official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions during the three days immediately preceding every
examination day including the examination day. Any examinee
violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf
of all others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint
for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from
enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.
Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional
Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of
Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in
the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least
minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of
legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three
precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all
that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their
mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-
would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch.
What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the
source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials
or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it.
Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be
observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are
committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These
are all within the powers of the respondent commission as
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the
right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means
to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.
e. Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with
quasi-judicial power
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268
Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville
Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to
private respondent Efren Diongon. The installment payments
having been completed, Diongon demanded the delivery of the
certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the petitioner
nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for
specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental. The case was set for initial hearing. It was then
that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and
decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the court contending that it
had jurisdiction over the matter.
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Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.
Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise
known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective
Decree," provides that the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive authority to regulate the real estate trade and business.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and
empowered the National Housing Authority to issue writs of
execution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.D. No. 957,
specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to
regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental
powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government
to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the
modem world.
f. Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative
agency
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
dismissed six (6) employees as being "notoriously undesirable,"
they having allegedly been found to be connected with
irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. Five of these
six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The
Board found the dismissals to be illegal because affected without
formal charges having been filed or an opportunity given to the
employees to answer, and ordered the remand of the cases to the
GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The GSIS appealed
to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution, the Commission
ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSIS appealed
to the SC and affirmed the decision of the CSC with a modification
that it eliminated the payment of back salaries until the outcome
of the investigation and reinstatement of only 3 employees since
the other two had died. The heirs of the deceased sought
execution of the order from the CSC which was granted. GSIS
opposed and came to the SC on certiorari contending that the CSC
does not have any power to execute its resolution or judgment.
Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or
judgment.
Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a constitutional
commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not
only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with
quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or
brought to it on appeal.
The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779
adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of
procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest cases,
pursuant to the authority granted by the constitutional and
statutory provisions. The provisions are analogous and entirely
consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman
by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the
Commission. In light of all the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil
Service Commission the power or authority to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be
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stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It would seem
quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is
carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases,
should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders,
unless the law otherwise provides.
Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the
initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the
continuation of any then pending, against the deceased
employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the
Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it
makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition
precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an
impossible performance or decree a useless exercise.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the
respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by
Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said
petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first
assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission.
Issue : Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?
Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It
is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp.
138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged
also in the Electoral Commission.
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election
of members against whom no protests has been filed at the time of
its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a
limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time
the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the
Legislature, confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority
incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of
said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of
the returns of its members against whose election no protests have
been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of
the election of any member is not required by the Constitution
before he can discharge his duties as such member.
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463
Facts : Petitioner PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a
Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows
gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of
matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage
qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36,
par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like
PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against
importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. Private
respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4)
containers of matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of
Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore.
Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the
Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a
certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in
the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price." PTFI
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then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for
injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining
order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to
enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative"
products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing
the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the case asseverating that
the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the
Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau
of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial
Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban
is devoid of any legal basis.
Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs
contesting the legality of match importations may already take the
nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which
would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction.
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine
Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes
on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to
judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become
well nigh indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the
ultimate relief sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs
to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the
determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the
Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of mandamus. But
this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
if the Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its
jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency
to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is with its
prerogative; except when in the excrcise of its authority it clearly
abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no
occassion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion as
excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.
Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164
Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Bañez offered to sell to
petitioner Enriqueto F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by
respondent corporation. Private respondent suggested that
petitioner pay a reservation fee of P20,000.00, which would form
part of the consideration in case they reach a final agreement of
sale and which amount was to be returned to the petitioner should
the parties fail to reach an agreement. After paying the reservation
fee, the respondent corporation changed the terms of monthly
amortization which resulted in the demand of the petitioner for the
return of his reservation fee. Respondent refused to return the
same and petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a collection of
sum of money. Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss
contesting the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear the case. The same
was denied and respondents appealed to the CA who decided in
their favor. Petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no
perfected contract of sale between the parties, the claim for
recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC.
Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of
reservation fee.
Ratio : Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving refund and other
claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said
provision of law that makes a distinction between a perfected sale
and one that has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer" in the law
should be understood to be anyone who purchases anything for
money. Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to
buy is as much a buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected
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contract of sale. Said powers have since been transferred to the and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
HLRB. Commission.

Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is

therein provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over g. Classification of adjudicatory powers
claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers,
and dealers, among others. 2. Directing powers. Illustrated by the
corrective powers of public utility commissions,
When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial powers of assessment under the revenue laws,
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter reparations under public utility laws and awards
pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within under;
the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split 3. Enabling powers. The grant or denial of
jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for refund of permit or authorization;
reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a subdivision lot 1. Dispensing powers. The authority to
obviously the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. exempt from or relax a general prohibition, or
authority to relieve from affirmative duty. The
licensing power sets or assumes a standard, while
Cariño vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483 the dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a
standard;
Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having 2. Summary powers. To designate
merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and administrative power to apply compulsion or force
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking against person or property to effectuate a legal
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize
do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the such action;
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in 3. Equitable powers. An administrative
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, tribunal having power to determine the law upon a
or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, particular state of facts has the right to and must
the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the consider and make proper application of the rules
question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged of equity.
in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or
otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying VII. The Power to Issue Subpoena
on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers
to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836
order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390
if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original which required her to appear before his sala under the penalty of
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of law. Caamic was surprised for she was not aware of any case filed
the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, against her. When she appeared at the date, time and place stated
in the subpoena, she was berated by the respondent and

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demanded 8K from her. Said amount was the amount of the life
insurance policy of one Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was
issued upon request by Generosa Sandagan who sought the help
of respondent because she could not get a share of the proceeds of
the life insurance policy of her dead husband whose beneficiary
was Caamic.
Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.
Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that
under Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a
process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify
at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation
conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of his
deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued
purports to be in a form for criminal cases pending in his court, it
was not, in fact, issued in connection with a criminal case or for
any other pending case in his court nor for any investigation he
was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of this
Court. It was designated for a specific purpose, viz., administrative
conference. That purpose was, in no way connected with or related
to some of his administrative duties because he knew from the
beginning that it was for a confrontation with the complainant as
solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for the latter to get a share in the
death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was received by the
complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's
court for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court
concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was for
respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible
compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-
official and absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or
remotely related to his official functions and duties,
accommodating the request and using his official functions and
office in connection therewith was, by any yardstick, improper.
In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of
the questioned "subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining
party is afforded his full rights of redress.
Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104
Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair
competition in the lower court. During the trial and after the
presentation of some of private respondents’ witnesses, they
requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum as regards to the
books of herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena
on the ground that it can only be regarded as a “fishing bill” to
discover evidence against herein petitioner and that such is not
applicable in a case for unfair competition. The trial court denied
the same.
Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a
case for unfair competition.
Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction
and damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for
infringement of a trademark, complainant is entitled to an
accounting and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold
under that mark, as incident to, and a part of, his property right,
and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition. In such case,
the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for
and yield up his gains on a principle analogous to that which
charges as trustee with the profits acquired by the wrongful use of
the property of the cestui que trust, and defendant's profits are
regarded as an equitable measure of the compensation plaintiff
should receive for the past harm suffered by him.
In order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces
tecum, " it must appear. By clear and unequivocal proof, that the
book or document sought to be produced contains evidence
relevant and material to the issue before the court, and that the
precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has
been so designated or described that it may be identified. A
"subpoena duces tecum" once issued by the court may be quashed
upon motion if the issuance therof is unreasonable and oppressive,
or the relevancy of the books. documents or things does not
appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued
fails to advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.
In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the
subpoena duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to
the complaint of private respondent for unfair competition.
Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27
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Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was
charged with several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when
it opened 3 boxes without the presence of the persons and/or
parties indicated in its Resolution. After appearing and showing
cause why they should not be punished for contempt, the
COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing a
fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.
Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for
his acts.
Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,
but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that
may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this
sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as
a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section
30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may
however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies
that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.
When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot
exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is
inherently judicial in nature.
". . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial
duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case,
it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as
postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in
nature.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the, administration of
justice.
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a
necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by
administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making
effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that
power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid.
VIII. The Power To Punish For Contempt
Ruling: Rule 64 applies only to inferior and superior courts and
does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative
officials or bodies, unless said contempt is [clearly considered and
expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2
of Sec. 580 of the revised administrative code. The refusal to
comply with order of tenancy law, enforcement division is neither
contempt nor a penalized offense.
Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152
IX. Power to impose penalties
Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller 99
Phil 762
Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's
Department Store situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was
owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and
Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace Act,
Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her
above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because
of her membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to
her separation, said employers had been questioning their
employees regarding their membership in said union and had
interfered with their right to organize under the law.
The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the
complainant was dismissed from the service because of her
misconduct and serious disrespect to the management and her co
employees so much so that several criminal charges were filed
against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after investigation,
filed the corresponding information’s against her and the same are
now pending trial in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to
impose the penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No.
875.
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Ruling: In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to
impose the penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No.
875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial
Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court"
contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the
industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon
petitioners is illegal and should be nullified.
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of
Industrial Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases
negates those constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is
so because, among other things, the law provides that "the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Act that the
Court (of Industrial Relations) and its members and Hearing
Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard
to technicalities of law, or procedure." It is likewise enjoined that
"the Court shall not be bound solely by the evidence presented
during the hearing but may avail itself of all other means such as
(but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of well-
informed persons which results must be made a part of the
record". All-this means that an accused may be tried without the
right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be convicted
merely on preponderance of evidence and not beyond reasonable
doubt.
This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It
may be contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the
Court of Industrial Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable
to criminal cases to meet the requirements of the Constitution, but
this would be tantamount to amending the law which is not within
the province of the judicial branch of our Government.
CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524
X. Power in deportation and citizenship cases
Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction
A. Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600
Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of
chastity. He filed an appealed contending that he married the
victim therefore his criminal liability should be extinguished. The
Attorney-General entered an opposition to said petition wherein,
after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal Code and Act
No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he
concluded that the marriage of the accused with the offended
party cannot extinguish his liability as perpetrator of the crime of
abuse against chastity.
Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether
or not section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse
against chastity among those cases in which criminal liability is
extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the offended
party.
Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No.
1773 was that the marriage of the accused or convict with the
offended party should extinguish the criminal liability in the cases
of seduction, abduction and rape and those involving offenses
included in said crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction,
abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability for a
crime is extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished,
and for a stronger reason, in the lesser crimes. Now then, if the
crime of abuse against chastity is not denominated rape, it is only
for the lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being identical in
every other respect, though of different degrees of gravity. We
therefore conclude that the crime of abuse against chastity is
included in the crime of rape mentioned in section 2 of Act No.
1773 and, consequently, the marriage of the accused with the
offended party in the present case has extinguished his criminal
liability.
B. Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies
performing quasi-judicial acts
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190
Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512
Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC)
of Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite
the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and
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the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The President elect -
Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary- Vicente Avila
Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales. Respondent Leandro L
Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent Luis
T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the
election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in
view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was
conducted. Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the
election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June
18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as
possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the
Department of Local Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it
was denied by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari
before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of
respondent for being null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to
entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of
the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that
the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest,
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with
jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of
officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the
power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section
222 of the Local Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies,
functions, plans, programs and projects;"
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless
expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of
judicial powers.19 The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is
dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing
power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves.20 Such
jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations."
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly
or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of
Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an
election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga
barangay. Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of
general supervision of the President over local governments, We
hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the
validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan.
To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power
than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him
control over local government officials for it will permit him to
interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at
strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local
governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be
achieved.
II. Procedure to be followed
Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
A. Source of authority to promulgate rules of
procedure
Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution
Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed
the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the
said district, for having received the most number of votes, the
petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying,
among other things, that said respondent be declared elected
member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas,
or that the election of said position be nullified.
Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?
Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
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and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede
the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said
body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission
and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period
within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It
is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
included. The incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary
for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication
to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
B. Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of
procedure
First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30
C. Technical rules not applicable
Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337
Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination
of employment of publics respondents. The arbitration’s decision is
appealed to the NLRC. Public respondents in their appeal
questioned the validity of the NLRC’s decision on the ground that
the NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the
principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly
bound by the rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following
reasons: (1) there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers
Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abundiente had no authority to
appear and represent petitioner at the hearings before the arbiters
and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the
arbiters and respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated
and self-serving evidence and were rendered in violation of
petitioner's right to due process.
Issue: WON publics respondents’ claim is tenable.
Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of
due process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions
of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in
obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor
disputes. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission,
Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded
to the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further
proceedings.
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained
by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section
20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes.
(Section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals
to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial
Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable
cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials
and investigations of an administrative character.
Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757
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Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the
decision of the defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of
Rizal, Branch VI, which declared null and void its decision in
Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private respondent Simplicio
C. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto.
Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his
former position as policeman of the same municipality with back
salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his actual
reinstatement.
Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that
respondent Simplicio C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law
because the Police Commission decided Administrative Case No.
48 even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of
the case.
Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as
falling short of the legal requirements of due process, because it
decided the subject administrative case without stenographic
notes (which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of the
proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not
provide that the Board of Investigators shall be a "board of record,"
and as such it does not provide for office personnel such as clerks
and stenographers who may be employed to take note of the
proceedings of the board. The proceeding provided for is merely
administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle
that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed
liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses." The formalities usually attendant
in court hearings need not be present in an administrative
investigation, provided that the parties are heard and gven the
opportunity to adduce their respective evidence.
D. Justiciable controversy and forum shopping
SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738
Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the
SEC of its powers in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING)
and a stock transfer agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant
petition for review on certiorari, contending that the appellate
court erred in setting aside the decision of the SEC which had (a)
ordered the replacement of the certificates of stock of Philex and
(b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY and CUALOPING.
Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both
regulatory and adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory
responsibilities, the SEC may pass upon applications for, or may
suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing), certificates of
registration of corporations, partnerships and associations
(excluding cooperatives, homeowners' associations, and labor
unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances; conduct
inspections; and impose fines or other penalties for violations of
the Revised Securities Act, as well as implementing rules and
directives of the SEC, such as may be warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to
"jointly replace the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the
transfer thereof in the names of the buyers" clearly calls for an
exercise of SEC's adjudicative jurisdiction. The stockholders who
have been deprived of their certificates of stock or the persons to
whom the forged certificates have ultimately been transferred by
the supposed indorsee thereof are yet to initiate, if minded, an
appropriate adversarial action. A justiciable controversy such as
can occasion an exercise of SEC's exclusive jurisdiction would
require an assertion of a right by a proper party against another
who, in turn, contests it. The proper parties that can bring the
controversy and can cause an exercise by the SEC of its original
and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or any of those who are
adversely affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates of
stock. Any peremptory judgment by the SEC, without such
proceedings having initiated, would be precipitat.
The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of
a P50,000 fine on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely
different matter. This time, it is the regulatory power of the SEC
which is involved. When, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
latter set aside the fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its
instant petition, can no longer be deemed just a nominal party but
a real party in interest sufficient to pursuant appeals to this Court.
Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Int’l Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
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R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
E. Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction
Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704
F. Pre-trial conference; default
Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
G. Hearing
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396
Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700
H. Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2. Clear and convincing evidence
Black’s Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227
3. Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4. Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
I. Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1. Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
2. Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3. Finality, promulgation and notice of
decision
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4. Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5. Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
6. Application of the doctrine of res judicata
Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812
Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497
Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963
Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429
J. Administrative appeal in contested cases
Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965
PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560
Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283
De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584
Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92
Section 23 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261
Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673
K. Execution
Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235
III. Due process of law in administrative adjudication
A. Substantive and procedural due process, defined
DUE PROCESS contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered, affecting one’s person or property. It
is designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by
paying undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail
over form.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
• Consists of the 2 basic rights of notice and hearing, as well
as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and
competent tribunal
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• By procedural due process is meant a law which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and
renders judgment only after trial
• The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty and property without due process of law,
which clause optimizes the principle of justice which hears
before it condemns which upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.
Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356
Facts: Petitioner Santiago was charged with violation of Arts. Of
War 96 and 97. He was arraigned though without summons and
subpoena afforded to him. From the proven facts and the
admission likewise of the respondents, the court martial which
tried his case was not properly convened. There was no special
order published by the headquarters Philippine Constabulary
creating or directing the General Court Martial composed of the
respondents to arraign and try however was already an existing
court trying another case.
The validity of the court martial proceeding was challenged
by the petitioner at the regular court on the ground of due process.
Issue: WON failure to comply with law on conveying a valid court
martial amount to denial of due process
Held: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE LAW A DENIAL OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.- The failure to comply with the
dictates of the applicable law insofar as convening a valid court
martial is concerned, amounts to a denial of due process. There is
such a denial not only under the broad standard which delimits the
scope and reach of the due process requirement, but also under
one of the specific elements of procedural due process.
LACK OF AUTHORITY OF COURT-MARTIAL TO TRY PETITIONER.- Nor
is such a reliance on the broad reach of due process the sole
ground on which the lack of jurisdiction of die court-martial
convened in this case could be predicated. Recently, stress was
laid anew by us on the first requirement of procedural due process,
namely, the existence of the court or tribunal clothed with judicial,
or quasi-judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.
This is a requirement that goes back to Banco Español Filipino vs.
Palanca, a decision rendered half a century ago. There is the
express admission in the statement of facts that respondents, as a
court martial, were not convened to try petitioner but someone
else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a
desire to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that
the absence of a competent court or tribunal is most marked and
undeniable. Such a denial of due process is therefore fatal to its
assumed authority to try petitioner. The writ of certiorari and
prohibition should have been granted and the lower court, to
repeat, ought not to have dismissed his petition summarily. The
significance of such an insistence on a faithful compliance with the
regular
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Facts: President Marcos issued PD No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the
doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped;
the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the
intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other
interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive
department and the courts in the proper implementation of said
treaties. The Department of Justice received from the Department
of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request
for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the
United States. private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter
dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as well as
all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be
given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers. Petitioner refused
because it is not included in the procedure of the RP-US Treaty.
Issue: WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach
of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-
Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is
there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process
clause in the Constitution?
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Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered
to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition
petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of
extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to
the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent
as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures
also manifests this silence.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a)
taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based
upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative
Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United
States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as
examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative
powers of an administrative body which better enables it to
exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of
persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to
require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records,
reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or
otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and
analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-
judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948
Facts: Plaintiff Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for
breach of contract. Albert died before the case proceeded to trial,
and Justo R. Albert, his estate's administrator, was substituted.
Finally, defendant's liability was determined by this Court in L-
15275. Plaintiff was to recover P15,000.00 with legal interest from
judicial demand.
From the inception of the suit below up to the time the
judgment in L-15275 was to be executed, the corporate existence
of University Publishing Company, Inc. appears to have been taken
for granted, and was not then put in issue. However, when the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued on July 22, 1961 an order of
execution against University Publishing Company, Inc., a new
problem cropped up. By virtue of this writ, plaintiff's counsel and
the Sheriff of the City of Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego who
signed the contract with plaintiff on behalf and as President of
University Publishing Company, Inc. They then discovered that no
such entity exists. A verification made at the Securities and
Exchange Commission confirmed this fact. On July 31, 1961, said
Commission issued a certification "that the records of this
Commission do not show the registration of UNIVERSITY
PUBLISHING CO., INC., either as a corporation or partnership."2
This triggered a verified petition in the court below on August 10,
1961 for the issuance of a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff of
Manila to cause the satisfaction of the judgment against the assets
and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant in the case.
All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for
the University Publishing Company, Inc. Instead of informing the
lower court that it had in its possession copies of its certificate of
registration, its article of incorporation, its by-laws and all other
papers material to its disputed corporate existence, University
Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain silent. On August 11,
1961, University Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel Aruego,
Mamaril and Associates (the law firm of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid)
merely countered plaintiff's petition for execution as against
Aruego with an unsworn manifestation in court that "said Jose M.
Aruego is not a party to this case," and, therefore, plaintiff's
petition should be denied.
Issue: WON Aruego is a party to this case
Held: "The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as
representative of a non-existent principal, was the real party to the
contract sued upon; that he was the one who reaped the benefits
resulting from it, so much so that partial payment of the
consideration were made by him; that he violated its terms,
thereby precipitating the suit in question; and that in the litigation
he was the real defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice,
responsibility under the judgment falls on him.
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"By 'due process of law' we mean 'a law which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial. . . .' (4 Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581); or, as
this Court has said, 'Due process of law' contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting
one's person or property.' (Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23,
32).' (Sicat vs. Reyes, 100 Phil., 505; 54 Off. Gaz. [17]4945.) And it
may not be amiss to mention here also that the 'due process'
clause of the Constitution is designed to secure justice as a living
reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For
substance must prevail over form. It may now be trite, but none
the less apt, to quote what long ago we said in Alonso vs. Villamor,
16 Phil. 315, 321-322: 'A litigation is not a game of technicalities in
which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is,
rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly
lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Laws uits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts. There should he no
vested rights in technicalities.
B. Cardinal primary requirements of due process
1. The right to a hearing which includes the right to present
one’s case and submit evidence
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
3. The decision must have something to support itself
4. The evidence must be substantial
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at
the hearing
6. The tribunal or body of any judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy
7. The board or body should in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involves and
reason for the decision rendered
8. The officer or tribunal conducting the investigation must
be vested with competent jurisdiction
• A violation of any of the cardinal requirements of
due process in administrative proceedings renders
any judgment or order issued therein null and void
and can be attacked in any appropriate proceeding
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
Facts: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other
hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the
majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court
of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has
filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new
trial of the respondent National Labor Uuion, Inc.
Issue: What are the cardinal primary rights?
Held: CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.-There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must
the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the
duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that
of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be
some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know Lin: various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
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The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board
than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a
court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented
to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more
active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).
Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256
Facts: The petitioner herein, successor –in-interest in the case of
the former DECS Secretary against the public school teachers who
were illegally dismissed for staging a mass action and failure to
heed to the return-to-work order, filed a petition for the judgment
of the trial court holding that said public school teachers were
denied of due process in the proceedings. It was held that the
proceedings contravened RA 4670 which required that
administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by
a committee composed of the corresponding school
superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative
who at least have the rank of a supervisor, where the teachers
belong, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization
and supervisor of the Division, the last 2 to be designated by the
Director of Public Schools.
Petitioner argued that DECS complied with RA 4670
because all the teachers who were members of the various
committee are members of either the QC Teachers Federation or
the QC Elementary teachers Federation and are deemed
representatives of teacher’s organization.
Issue: WON there was denial of due process
Held: The Court held that there was indeed a denial of due process.
Mere membership of said teachers in their respective organizations
does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of the
organizations. Under the law, the teacher’s organization possess
the right to indicate its choice of representatives. Such right cannot
be usurped by the Secretary of Education or the Director of Public
Schools or their underlings. The teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers organization as its representatives in said
committee.
Hence the failure to comply with the requirement vested
no jurisdiction to the committee to hear the case. Respondent
teachers were denied of due process.
Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489
Facts: PAL's proposal to introduce new Mercury night flights had
been referred to a hearing examiner for economic justification, PAL
submitted a so-called consolidated schedule of flights that included
the same Mercury night flights and this was allowed by Board
Resolution No. 139(68). The Board's action was impelled by the
authorizations of certain flight schedules previously allowed but
were incorporated were about to expire; thus, the consolidated
schedule had to be approved temporarily if the operations of the
flights referred to were not to be suspended. In short, the
temporary permit was issued to prevent the stoppage or cessation
of services in the affected areas.
The Board, considering the report of the hearing examiner,
passed Resolution No. 190 (68) approving, for a period of 30 days
starting 31 July 1968, only three or four frequencies of the seven
proposed new flights. There is no proof, not even allegation, that in
all those hearings petitioner was not notified or give opportunity to
adduce evidence in support of its opposition.
Issue: WON PAL violated the requisites of administrative due
process
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Held: YES. It was precisely prescribed that "all schedules under the
DTS-35 for which no previous approval has been granted by the
Board, are hereby referred to a hearing examiner for reception of
evidence on its economic justification."
It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not
exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in
investigations and trials (Asprec vs. Itchon. 16 SCRA 921). And this
administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to
notice*, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the
proceedings that may affect a person s legal rights; (b) reasonable
opportunity to appear and defend his rights*, introduce witnesses
and relevant evidence in his favor: (c) a tribunal so constituted* as
to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and
one of competent jurisdiction. and (d) a finding or decision by that
tribunal supported by substantial evidence* presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the
parties affected
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
C. Necessity for notice and hearing
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and
hearing are necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry
should therefore be into the enabling statute which clothes an
administrative agency or officer with certain duties and
responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may
adversely affected.
Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers’ Association vs Premiere
Productions, Inc., G.R. No. L-5621, 25 March 1953
Facts: The Court of Industrial Relations authorized lay off of
workers solely on the basis of an ocular inspection.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of
workers on the basis of an ocular inspections without receiving full
evidence to determine the cause or motive of such a lay off
Held: No. The required process has not been followed. The court of
quo merely acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it
conducted in the premises of the respondent company was
incurring financial losses. The allegations cannot be established by
a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when conducted
at the request of the interested.
Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437
Facts: Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabubay) is a
corporation engaged in the garments and textile import business
for the last twenty-seven years. Among the government
requirements for engaging in this type of business are the export
quota allocations issued by the respondent Garments and Textile
Export Board.
Sometime in 1982, the Board granted export quota allocations for
1983 to the petitioner. These export quotas have been granted
annually to the Petitioner since 1976. They are automatically
renewed every year provided the grantee has utilized its quotas
during the previous years.
On March 2, 1983, the petitioner received a letter from the Board
informing it that its 1983 export quota allocations were revoked
effective February 1983. Furthermore, its major stockholders and
officers were also distinguished from engaging in business
activities involving garment and textile exports.
Issue: WON the revocation of the quota is valid
Held: "The summary revocation of the export quotas and export
authorizations issued in favor of the petitioner without hearing
violates not only the above-mentioned provisions of the Raise and
Regulations of the respondent board but also the 'due proem of
law' clause of the Constitution of the Philippines to the effect that
'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of
the laws.'(Article TV, Sec. 1. New Constitution). According to Daniel
Webster in the Dartmouth College case. due proem is the
equivalent of the law; a law which hears before it condemns. which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The
meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,
and immunities under the protection of the general rules which
govern society.' (cited in Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 168 by
Neptali Gonzales, 1975 ed.)
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"Administrative due process requires that there be an
impartial tribunal constituted to determine the right involved; that
due notice and opportunity to be heard be given; that the
procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial; and that the proceedings be conducted in such a way that
there will be opportunity for a court to determine whether the
applicable rules of low and procedure were observed.' (42 Arm Jur.
p. 451, cited by Neptali Gonzales, p. 183, Philippine Constitutional
Law). "
Privileges that had long been enjoyed transforms and becomes in
the character of one’s property.
Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447
Facts: This special civil action of certiorari to set aside the decision
of the NAPOLCOM: The fact that the Jai alai bookies were operating
in the house being occupied by herein respondent-appellant, the
apprehension of his wife and brother in two (2) successive raids
effected by law enforcement authority and his intercession for the
dismissal of the case filed in consequence thereof, are tangible
proofs that he was, indeed, an accessory - if not a principal - in said
gambling operation.
Petitioner maintains that he was not served written
charges and informed of the nature of such charges; that no
hearing had actually been held by the summary dismissal board:
and that at any rate he was not heard.
Issue: WON the contention of petitioner is with merit
Held: YES. We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process
of law and that not even the fact that the charge against him is
serious and evidence of his guilt is - in the opinion of his superiors -
strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the
record of this case. It is precisely in cases such as this that the
utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of
the police those who are innocent are denied justice or, through
blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.
BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; OBSERVANCE THEREOF
REQUIRED IN SUMMARY DISMISSAL.- Petitioner's case was decided
under P.D. No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1707. While Sec. 8-A
of the Decree authorizes summary dismissals "without the
necessity of a formal investigation" of members of the INP "when
the charge is serious and the evidence is strong," the Decree and
the implementing rules nonetheless give the respondent the right
to be furnished a copy of the complaint and to file an answer within
three (3) days. The filing of charges and the allowance of
reasonable opportunity to respondent to answer the charges
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. In summary
dismissal proceedings it is mandatory that charges be specified in
writing and that the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the
complaint because these are the only ways by which evidence
against the respondent can be brought to his knowledge. The
formal investigation, which is dispensed with, refers to the
presentation of witnesses by their direct examination and not to
the requirement that the respondent be notified of the charges and
given the chance to defend himself.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; SUMMARY DISMISSAL
BOARD; BASIS OF DECISION, NOT PROPER.- What the summary
dismissal board appears to have done in this case was simply to
receive the report on two raids allegedly conducted on petitioner's
house in the course of which what were believed were gambling
paraphernalia were allegedly found and two witnesses allegedly
admitted they were collectors of petitioner and his brother Lolito
Go. But the report is not in the record of this case which the
NAPOLCOM transmitted to the Court. Nor does the decision of the
summary dismissal board disclose on what the supposed report
was based. This is in violation of the rule that in administrative
proceedings "the decision must be rendered on the evidence
contained in the record and disclosed to the party affected." In all
probability, said report was not in writing and the supposed
testimonies of the two witnesses were not taken down. This is
evident from the decision of the board which refers to the result of
an -investigation.- The facts found by the board were not the result
of any investigation conducted by it but by some other group.
D. Cold neutrality of a judge
A reviewing official or body tasked to resolve an appeal must
refrain from participating in reviewing any decision rendered or
concurred by him in another official capacity. The reviewing officer
must be other than the officer whose decision is under review,
otherwise there would be no different views or there could be no
real review of the case, in violation of due process of law.
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Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261
Facts: Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960
wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or
protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of
Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the
rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining
claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales.
On the basis of petitioners' evidence, Director Gozon found that
the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located
mining claims in accordance with law.
The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending.
Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, as
if he was adjudicating the case for the first time. Thus, Secretary
Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had
decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in
the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he
acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case.
We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion
in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant
anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of
administrative justice.The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137,
provides:
"SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations
shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision:
"Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may
be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
within thirty days from the date of its receipt.
Issue: WON Petitioners-appellant were deprived of due process
when Gozon reviewed his own decision
Held: Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process,
meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his
own decision as Director of Mines.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no
real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would
be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view
of the case.
E. Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of
procedural due process
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and
hearing are necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry
should therefore be into the enabling statute which clothes an
administrative agency or officer with certain duties and
responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may
adversely affected.
Essential elements of due process:
a. An impartial tribunal
b. Due notice and opportunity to be heard be given
c. The procedure at the hearing be consistent with the
essentials of a fair trial
d. The proceedings may be conducted in such a way that
there will be opportunity for the court to determine
whether the applicable rules of law and procedure
e. That the decision or ruling be supported by substantial
evidence
In administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following
a. The right to actual or constructive notice…
b. A real opportunity to be heard…
c. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction…
d. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence
Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34
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Facts: Anita Villa was granted a building permit issued by the City
Engineer to contrcust a funeral parlor. Following adverse judgment
to the court in his suit to enjoin the construction of the funeral
parlor, Veneracion, instead of appealing the judgment, lodged a
complaint with the HSCR on substantially the same ground
litigated in the action – relative parlors’ distance from hospitals
whether public or private. Villa received a telegram from the HSRC
through Commissioner Dizon requesting “transmittal of proof of
location clearance granted by this Office.” Villa sent a reply
telegram reading: “Locational Clearance based on certification of
City Planning and Development Coordinator and Human
Settlement Officer, copies mail.” Subsequently, Villa received from
Dizon an “Order to Present Proof of Locational Clearance. “ Since
she had already sent the required locational clearance, Villa made
no response. Then Villa received a “show cause” Order, requiring
her to show cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a
cease-and desist order issued against her for her failure to show
proof of locational clearance. In spite of her communication that
she had already mailed all required documents, she received an
Order imposing on her a fine of P10,000 and requiring her to cease
operations, and later, a writ of execution in implementation of the
order. A motion for reconsideration to which she attached copies of
the Commission Proper was also denied on account of the finality
of the Order. An appeal to the office of the Presidential Assistant
for Legal Affairs, and so was the motion for reconsideration.
Noteworthy are the following: neither Veneracion nor the
Commision, ever made known the complaint of Veneracion to Villa
until much later, after the Commission has rendered several
adverse rulings against her; the orders of the Commission made no
reference whatever to the documents Villa had already sent by
registered mail; and the resolutions of the Presidential Assistant
Lazaro likewise omitted to refer to the telegrams and documents
sent by Veneracion
Issue: WON Villa was denied due process against which the
defense of failure of Villa to take timely appeal will not avail.
Held: Yes. These facts present a picture of official incompetence or
gross negligence and abdication of duty, if not active bias and
partiality that is most reprehensible. The result has been to subvert
and put to naught the judgment rendered in a suit regularly tried
and decided by a court of justice, to deprive one party of rights
confirmed and secured thereby and to accord her adversary, by
resorting to the prescribed practice of forum-shopping, the relief
he had sought and had been denied in said case.
The mischief done by the commissioner Dizon’s baffling
failure even to acknowledge the existence of the documents
furnished by petitioner was perpetuated by the “Commissioner
proper” and respondent Lazaro, who threw out petitioner’s appeals
with no reference that would have been decisive.
There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held
out as an administrative proceeding against Villa without informing
her of the complaint which initiated the case; for conducting that
inquiry in the most informal manner by means only of
communication requiring submission of certain documents, which
left the impression that compliance was all that was expected of
her and with which directives she promptly and religiously
complied.
The court finds no merit in the proposition that relief is
foreclosed to Villa because her motion for reconsideration of Nov.
22, 1982 was filed out of time. The very informal character of the
so-called administrative proceedings, an informality for which Com.
Dizon himself was responsible and which he never sought to
rectify, militates against imposing strict observance of the limiting
periods applicable to proceedings otherwise properly initiated and
regularly conducted.
RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420
Facts PLDTCO entered into an agreement with the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, wherein both companies
agreed to establish telephone services between the Philippines and
the United States. As it lacked the necessary equipment and
facilities, PLDTCO on the same date entered into another
agreement with RCA whereby the latter constituted itself a carrier
of PLDTCO's telephone messages to and from the United States.
The term of the agreement was for five years and "shall thereafter
continue in force until terminated by either party giving the other
24 calendar months previous notice in writing."
On January 3, 1956, PLDTCO sent RCA a notice of
termination of its arrangements with the latter, the same to be
effective not later than February 2, 1958, and three months later,
filed an application with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, through the Radio Control Board, for authority to
construct and operate a radio-telephonic station of its own at
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Administrative Law Reviewer
Marilao, Bulacan, and for the assignment to It of appropriate radio
frequencies.
RCA filed a petition for prohibition) with the Court of First
Instance of Manila to prevent the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications and the Radio Control Board from proceeding
further on PLDTCO's pending application. The complaint alleged
that the approval by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications of the construction permit in favor of PLDTCO
without previous hearing and opportunity to plaintiff RCA to
present evidence in support of its opposition was without due
process of law.
Issue: Whether or not RCA was denied of hearing and opportunity
present case.
Held: No, that in administrative proceedings, hearing is only
necessary in those cases where the statute so requires. A cursory
reading of the Radio Control Law (Act No. 3846, as amended)
shows that, unlike in other proceedings or instances specified in
section 3, paragraphs d and 1, of the said law, no, hearing is
required in the consideration by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications of any application for the installation,
establishment, or operation of a radio station (paragraph k). At any
rate, even assuming that a hearing is required, RCA must be
considered to have waived its right thereto, its counsel having
addressed a letter to the Radio Control Board saying that "little
would be gained by arguing the matter both before yourselves and
before the Public Service Commission."
Section 11 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103
Facts: Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar.
information was filed against him and two others for alleged
overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
That he and others wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase
contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the
purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one hundred (100)
reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit prim of Five Hundred
Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for
said item was only Fifty-Five Pews (P55.00) or a total price of Five
Thousand Five Hundred Pews (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue
injury to the government in the total amount of Forty-
NineThousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00) CONTRARY TO
LAW.
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he
entered a plea of "not guilty."
On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo
Orencia moved for petitioner's suspension, citing see. 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in part:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.-Any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book 11 of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Petitioner opposed the motion alleging that preventive
suspension should therefore be ordered only when the legislative
purpose is achieved, that is, when "the suspension order x x x
prevent(s) the accused from using his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him." Corollarily, when the
legislative purpose is not achieved, preventive suspension is
improper and should not be decreed
Issue: Whether or not preventive suspension was proper.
Held: Yes, It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019
makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public
officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that
law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is
filed.5 The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to
determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or
frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in
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office. The presumption is that unIess the accused is suspended he
may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that
there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law
requires the judge to issue a warrant fur the arrest of the accused.
The law does not require the court to determine whether the
accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
F. Notice and hearing, when dispensed with
1. Where there is an urgent need for
immediate action, like the summary abatement of
a nuisance per se, the preventive suspension of
public servant facing administrative charges;
Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536
Facts: Monetary Board (MB)issued Resolution No. 596 ordering the
closure of Triumph Savings Bank (TSB), forbidding it from doing
business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership, and
appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. TSB filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Central Bank
and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596, with prayer
for injunction, challenging in the process the constitutionality of
Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, otherwise known as 'The Central Bank Act," as
amended, insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to take over a
banking institution even if it is not charged with violation of any
few or regulation, much less found guilty thereof.
The trial court granted the relief sought and denied the
application of TSB for injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings
under the receivership of the officials of the Central Bank was done
without prior hearing, that is, without first hearing the side of the
bank. They further admit that said resolution can be the subject of
judicial review and may be set aside should it be found that the
same was issued with arbitrariness and in bad faith.
Issue: Whether or not summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad
faith" and a denial of "due process.
Held:
Ruling: No, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing
before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under
receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289)
provides for the filing of a case within ten (10) days after the
receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is unmistakable
that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the case.
Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no
prior notice and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the
same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of absence thereof.
In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v Arca [1965],17
It was held that a hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29
nor does the constitutional requirement of due process demand
that the correctness of the. Monetary Board' s resolution to stop
operation and proceed to liquidation be first adjudged before
making the resolution effective, It is enough that a subsequent
judicial review be provided.
Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595
Facts The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to
Tan Gin San, surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to
occupy the lot where the building stands for a period of one (1)
year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the
Quonset (hut) for the storage of copra.
Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action
Officer, notified Tan Gin San by mail to remove or relocate its
quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the
municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and.
stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and
unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard. Since the
notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor
ordered the demolition.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without
judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner's Quonset
building.
Ruling: No, Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and
quonset building by virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports
Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It
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was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling
value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal
authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a
nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate
action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in
abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had
deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. The
fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently
heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of
Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to
hearing and the authority to demolish without a judicial order
being a prejudicial issue.
Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458
2. Where there is tentativeness of
administrative action; where the respondent is not
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and
hearing at a later time without prejudice to the
person affected, such as the summary distraint and
levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer and
the replacement of a temporary appointee;
Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497
Facts: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor
refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge of attempted
rape to the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo as
ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously
refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the
Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was
brought against them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman and
were placed under preventive suspension. It appears that
petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of
which she found that only acts of lasciviousness had been
committed.
Issues:
1. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the
prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor
Ilustrisimo.
2. Whether or not the preventive suspension is invalid as it
denied them opportunity to refute the charges against
them
Ruling:
1. Yes, The office of the Ombudsman has the power to
"investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14
This power has been held to include the investigation and
prosecution of any crime committed by a public official
regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of
are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act
or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the
crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a
municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute.
2. No, Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such
suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step
in an administrative investigation.
As held in Nera v. Garcia:
In connection with the suspension of petitioner
before he could file his answer to the administrative
complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a
punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and
misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure.
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty of
acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation
and before the opportunity to prove his innocence.
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3. Where the twin rights have previously been
offered but the right to exercise them had not been
claimed.
• Where the law is silent on prior notice and hearing
as a requirement before an agency action, which
refers to the whole or part of every agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or
denial thereof, can be done, compliance with the
requirement of prior notice and hearing depends
upon the nature of the power to be exercised or
the end to be achieved.
• Prior notice and hearing is not required in the
exercise of police power
• Prior notice and hearing is not required in granting
provisional reliefs
Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921
Facts: Respondent Jacinto Hernandez lodged with the Board of
Examiners for Surveyors administrative complaint2 for
unprofessional conduct against petitioner Cleto Asprec. He
requested Asprec to undertake survey on his lot in Port Junction,
Ragay, Camarines Sur. That no survey was conducted and that it
was a mere copy of one Damian Alham. that Asprec was guilty of
deceit and thus violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors. The
Board's unanimous decision of October 27, 1959 revoked, and
required surrender of, Asprec's certificate of registration as a
private land surveyor. A complaint was but was absent in the
hearing.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to present his
case.
Ruling: No, petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defe
nd himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at t
he last and stipulated date of bearing, he cannot look to the law or
to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new on
e. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the Board i
n proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because wi
thout cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client
have chosen to shy away from the trial. Presence of a party at a tri
al, petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of due proces
s. Really, all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this const
itutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an o
pportunity to be heard. Petitioner had notice of the trial of May 11t
h. More than this, that date of trial (May 11) had been previously a
greed upon by the parties and their counsel. Petitioner cannot now
charge that he received less-than-a-fair-treatment. He has forfeited
his right to be heard in his defense.6
Petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are
quasi-criminal in nature. From this he proceeds to draw the conclus
ion that no valid trial could proceed even if he absented himself th
erefrom. We do not see eye to eye with this view. It is best answer
ed by a reference to the opinion of the court below, thus The rule a
pplies even to quasi-criminal or criminal proceedings. So, where th
e respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the dat
e set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was hel
d that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge order
ed him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to giv
e, he having been given an opportunity to be heard
Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767
G. Notice and hearing in rate-fixing
As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of
rates fixed for its services by a public service commission
Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46
Facts: Republic Act No. 316, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light
Company, Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an
electric light heat and/or power plant for the purpose of generating
and distributing light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits
of several Municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur.
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Petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of
an alleged letter-petition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107
alleged residents of Vigan, Ilocos, Sur", charging the following:
The sale of 2,000 ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan
Electric Light Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal
and also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by the
consumers had been installed in bad faith and they register
excessive rates much more than the actual consumption.
The finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a net
operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its
invested capital, we believe that it is in the public interest and in
consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction
of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect
immediately.
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the
present meter rates for its electric service effective upon the billing
for the month of June, 1962
Petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul
said order of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, latter had not
furnished the former a "copy of the alleged letter-petition of
Congressman Crisologo and others. Respondent then expressed
the view that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter
to petitioner, because respondent was merely holding informal
conferences to ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the
reduction of its rates. That petitioner had not even been served a
copy of the auditor's report upon which the order complained of is
based, that such order had been issued without notice and
hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner had been denied due
process.
Issue: WON the twin notice of hearing is required in rate fixing?
Rulig: The hold that the determination of the issue involved in the
order complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial
function and that, having been issued without previous notice and
hearing, said order is clearly violative of the due process clause,
and, hence, null and void.
Whether notice and a hearing is proceedings before a public
service commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory
or constitutional provisions applicable to such proceedings, which
make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the
commission, and upon the nature and object of such proceedings,
that is, whether the proceedings, are on the one hand, legislative
and rule-making in character (SUBJECT TO STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS, ON DUE PROCESS), or are, on the other hand,
determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial (IN ALL INSTANCES, DUE
PROCESS IS REQUIRED), affecting the rights and property of
private or specific persons.
As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of
rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.
H. Motion for reconsideration as a cure
The rule that the filling of a MR of the decision /ruling against a
party cures the defect in the lack of prior notice and hearing as to
preclude the party from claiming denial of due process assumes
that the other requirements of due process have been complied
with. However such opportunity is nothing and he is still denied
due process, where the decision against him has nothing to
support itself, one of the cardinal requirements of due process
being that the decision or ruling of an administrative body must be
supported by substantial evidence.
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Facts: Petitioner Medenilla is a contractual employee of DPWH as
Public Officer II. Later on, she was detailed as Technical Assistant
in the office of the assistant secretary for the admin. and
manpower management. On Jan. 2, 1989, petitioner was appointed
to the contested position of Supervising Human Resource
Development Officer. Respondents {being the next-in-rank-
employees} jointly lodged a protest before the DPWH task force
re-organization contesting the appointment of petitioner. The task
force dismissed the protest of the respondents thereby appealing
before the Civil Service Commission. The Commission disapproved
the appointment of the petitioner reversing the ruling of task
force. Petitioner filed a ‘motion for reconsideration” before the CSC
but to no avail, hence , the petition then was filed before the
Supreme Court.
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Issue: WON CSC is correct in disapproving the appointment of
petitioner and that WON the petitioner was denied of due process
of law in the absence of notice?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that CSC is incorrect in
disapproving the appointment of petitioner. The CSC is limited only
to determine whether the appointee possesses the appropriate
civil service eligibility and not whether another is more qualified
than the petitioner. Petitioner was not notified of the appeal before
the Commission. The essence of due process is the opportunity to
be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice but the absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be
heard. Any defect may be cured by the filing of motion of
reconsideration.
i. Right to counsel, not a due process requirement
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party
in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented
by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall
not be bound by such proceedings
Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125
Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the
Department of Agrarian Reform - Cordillera Autonomous Region
(DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that
position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12,
1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs
instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning
such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-
CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-
Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-
complaint dated November 16, 1989,1 charged Lumiqued with
malversation through falsification of official documents. From May
to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93
counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating
committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992, finding
Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him.
The investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal
or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate criminal charges against him.
This instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the
reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice
Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the
orders of Secretary Quisumbingit prays for the "payment of
retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased
Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages
from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his
death on May 19, 1994.
ISSUE: WON the due process clause encompass the right to be
assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
RULING: While investigations conducted by an administrative body
may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains
that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may
or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of
the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself
and no duty rests in such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel,28 In an administrative proceeding
such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as
Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or
not.
Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of hearings
attended by Lumigued clearly show that he was confident of his
capacity and so opted he represent himself.
The hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not
part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more
pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable,
it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation
through falsification of public documents in its report and
recommendation.
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IV. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
A. Definition and objective
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff should
first seek relief in an administrative proceeding before he seeks a
remedy in court, even though the matter is properly presented to
the court, which is within its jurisdiction. The court will not
determine a controversy:
1. Where the question demands administrative
determination requiring special knowledge, experience,
and services of the administrative tribunal
2. Where the question requires determination of technical
and intricate issues of fact
3. Where uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with
the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.
Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A.
Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy
Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of
nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing
Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without
due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of
the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging
the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and
that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and
call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed
that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-
making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed
is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set
of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. 25 This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. 26 Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
B. Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES applies
where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an
administrative agency; judicial intervention is withheld until the
administrative process has run its course.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of claim requires the resolution of issues which, under
a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its views
Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220
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C. Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327
FACT: This is petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal
of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal by
the trial court of Petitioner Vicente Villaflor complaint against
Private Respondent Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc.
Villaflor in a Lease Agreement leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a
parcel of land. Villaflor claimed having discovered that after the
execution of the lease agreement, that Nasipit Lumber 'in bad faith
surreptitiously grabbed and occupied a big portion of plaintiff's
property.
Villaflor executed a document, denominated as a 'Deed of
Relinquishment of Rights, in favor of Nasipit Lumber.
The Director of Lands issued an 'Order of Award in favor of Nasipit
Lumber Company, Inc.
Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested the Sales
Application of Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the company has not
paid him P5,000.00 as provided in the Deed of Relinquishment of
Rights.
The Director of Lands found that the payment of the amount of
P5,000.00 in the Deed xxx and the consideration in the Agreement
to Sell were duly proven, and ordered the dismissal of Villaflor's
protest and gave due course to the Sales Application of Nasipit
Lumber.
ISSUE: WON the director of land has primary jurisdiction over the
case?
RULING: Primary Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands and Finality
of Factual Findings of the Court of Appeals
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the
doctrine of primary Jurisdiction; courts cannot and will not resolve
a controversy involving a question which is within the Jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds
application in this case, since the questions on the identity of the
land in dispute and the factual qualification of private respondent
as an awardee of a sales application require a technical
determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency
with the expertise to determine such matters. Because these
issues preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts
to stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to
proceed, in recognition of the primary Jurisdiction of the
administrative agency.
Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176
Facts: Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back
rentals and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran
City against petitioners Lope Machete and 11 others. The
complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold
agreement with respect to Villanon’s landholdings at Poblacion
Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which Machete et al. were to pay
private respondent a certain amount or percentage of their
harvests. However, despite repeated demands and with no valid
reason, Machete et al. failed to pay their respective rentals.
Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay
him back rentals and damages.
Machete et al. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter. They
contended that the case arose out of or was connected with
agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell
squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under the
Revised Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and later denied the
motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the petitioners maintain
that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from
an agrarian relation and that respondent appellate court failed to
consider that the agreement involved is an agricultural leasehold
contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws
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governing its execution and the rights and obligations of the
parries thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844, R.A. 66577 and other
pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the application,
implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are
matters which have been vested in the DAR, this case is outside
the jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA found the petition to be
impressed with merit. E.O. 2298 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial
powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as
well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform except those failing under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
accordance with law, hence, this case.
Issue: WON the CA’s decision is correct.
Ruling: There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which
is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to
pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private
respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal
competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court
to assume jurisdiction over this case. At any rate, the present legal
battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent
because as this Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo v. Court o
Appeals,the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the
parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes,
being the administrative agency presumably possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings
therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by
the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that
agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a
just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying
reconsideration is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and 28
September 1989 are REINSTATED.
Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463
Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a
Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows
gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of
matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage
qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36,
par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like
PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against
importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. Private
respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4)
containers of matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau of
Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore.
Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the
Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a
certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in
the Philippines for the match industry at reasonable price." PTFI
then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for
injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining
order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to
enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative"
products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and releasing
the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the case asseverating that
the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of the
Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau
of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial
Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban
is devoid of any legal basis.
Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs
contesting the legality of match importations may already take the
nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which
would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction.
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
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knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine
Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes
on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to
judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become
well nigh indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the
ultimate relief sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs
to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the
determination to seize or not to seize is discretionary upon the
Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of mandamus. But
this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
if the Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its
jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the court cannot compel an agency
to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is with its
prerogative; except when in the excrcise of its authority it claerly
abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no
occassion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion as
excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.
Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139
Facts: Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in
Tagum, Davao, which are covered by Transfer Certificates. The
lands were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for
distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the
valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the
Philippines and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the
just compensation for its property. The petition was filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao, which dismissed the
petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the
DARAB. Since this case was filed only on January 26, 1994, the
fifteen-day period provided for under Section 51 of Republic Act
6657 which is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law within
which to appeal, already lapsed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the decision was affirmed. It was held that: Jurisdiction over land
valuation cases is lodged in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, as is plainly provided under Rule II of the
DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review.
Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to
determine the just compensation for the taking of lands under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, because such
jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of just
compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal
provided from the decision of the DAR adjudicator.On the other
hand, respondents argue that actions for the fixing of just
compensation must be filed in the appropriate courts within 15
days from receipt of the decision of the DAR adjudicator, otherwise
such decision becomes final and executory, pursuant to §51 of R.A.
No. 6657.
Issue: Which contention is meritorious?
Ruling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. R.A. No. 6657
provides: The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . .
.The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by
this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases
under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.
D. When doctrine does not apply
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Where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction, the doctrine
does not apply. It does not apply in any of the exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
Facts : This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for
damages which was instituted by the petitioners against the
private respondents for closing a logging road without authority.
From the facts, petitioners were hauling logs to be loaded on a
vessel. Private respondent EastCoast ordered the closure of the
road, a national highway, through their security force, to prevent
passage of the trucks hauling the logs for the Japanese vessel.
Private respondent claim that they were the only authorized timber
licensee to use the road. Petitioners filed a case before the trial
court, which was dismissed on lack of jurisdiction, the court a quo
holding that the issue is within the realm of the Bureau of Forestry
which should have heard the case before filing t case in court.
Issue : WON the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry applies.
Held : The petitioners maintain that since their action is for
damages, the regular courts have jurisdiction over the same.
According to them, the respondent court had no basis for holding
that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that
the closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages
can be instituted.
P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does
not vast any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to
determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or
illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an
action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint
instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such
closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the
petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private
respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial
proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of
Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a
passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages
based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
V. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
A. Definition and purpose
As a general rule, recourse through court action cannot prosper
until all the remedies have been exhausted at the administrative
level.
Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344
Ruling : Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, recourse through court action, as a general rule, cannot
prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted at the
administrative level.
When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive
Department of the government, but nevertheless, a Litigant fails or
refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to
interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on
convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party
litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this
should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) court."
Petitioners however, claim that they were denied due process,
obviously to show that their case falls within one of the exceptions
to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Such contention is however untenable, because in the first place,
they were made to avail in the same administrative agency, the
opportunity or right to oppose, which in fact they did, when they
filed a motion for reconsideration and later when the motion was
denied, they appealed to the Secretary of Education and Culture.
Precisely, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is curative in
character on the issue of alleged denial of due process.
Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657
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Facts: Jose L. Gonzales, a senior teacher civil service eligible, was
appointed Principal of the Lambunao High School established in the
municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo. Lambunao High School was later
converted into a Regional Vocational High School under the name
of Iloilo Vocational High School. Gonzales then received a letter
from the Secretary of Education appointing him as Head of the
Related Subjects Department of the Bureau of Public School. He
also received a copy of a letter of the Director of Public Schools
addressed to respondent Alfredo Pineda, at the time Principal of
the Samar Trade School, appointing him as Principal of the Iloilo
Vocational School. When Pineda came to assume the office of
Principal of the latter school, Gonzales refused to yield the same to
him, and sent a written protest against Pineda's appointment as
well as against his own appointment as Head of the Related
Subjects Department, addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo
School of Arts and Trades, who forwarded it without undue delay to
the Director of Public Schools by a second indorsement. Without
waiting for any action on his protest-in fact even before said
protest could be forwarded and submitted to the Director of Public
Schools-Gonzales, filed the present petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to
restrain the Secretary of Education and the Director of Public
Schools from giving effect to the appointment of Alfredo Pineda as
Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School, and to recover damages.
After due trial, the lower court rendered the appealed judgment.
Appellants claimed that the lower court erred in not holding that
the present action was instituted prematurely.
Issue: WON the appellee initiated the appropriate administrative
proceeding.
Ruling: The facts of this case disclose that appellee initiated
appropriate administrative procedures to obtain relief from the
orders that he considered prejudicial to his rights by means of his
first, addressed to the Superintendent of the Iloilo School of Arts
and Trades. This protest was forwarded by the latter to the
Director of Public Schools, but even before this date appellee
instituted the present action. It is, therefore, clear that he did not
give his superior officers any opportunity to reconsider the
questioned orders before seeking judicial intervention. The rule of
exhaustion of appropriate remedies before resorting to the courts
to seek relief appears to be of stronger application to the present
case where, according to the record, appellant Pineda and the
superior officers of appellee did not appear to have exerted any
undue pressure upon him to compel him to yield and give up the
position in question. The decision appealed from is reserved, with
the result that the present action is dismissed.
Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132
Facts: Private respondent Pontejos was issued a permanent
appointment as Labor Arbitration Associate by herein petitioner
Carale who is the NLRC Chairman. Carale, pursuant to his exercise
of admin. authority and supervision over all NLRC officials , issued
an admin. Order detailing and re-assigning private respondent to
NLRC 4th division in Cebu. In this regard, private respondent filed a
case before the RTC of Cebu against petitioner for Illegal Transfer
tantamount to removal without cause in violation of the security of
tenure under the Constitution. Petitioner moved for a motion to
dismiss the case but RTC denied the petitioner. Petitioner
questioned the court’s jurisdiction to try the case without first
resorting to exhaustion of administrative remedy to the Civil
Service Commission.
Issue: WON private respondent failed to exhaust administrative
remedies available to him?
Ruling: Private respondent did not exhaust the administrative
remedies available to him. Respondent Pontejos is subject to civil
service laws and regulations pursuant to the Constitution as Labor
Arbitration Associate.
Respondent’s grievances must be first raised before the Civil
Service Commission before resorting to judicial intervention.
Therefore the instant case is premature and that respondent
should exhaust all the available remedies to his grievances before
resorting to courts.
The petition was granted and that respondent court {RTC} was
ordered to dismiss the case filed by Pontejos.
The exceptions under the “Doctrine of Exahaustion of
Administrative Remedies” mentioned in this case are the following;
1) where the question is purely legal,
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(2) where judicial intervention is urgent,
(3) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage,
(4) where the controverted acts violate due process,
(5) failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought
to act on the matter, and
(6) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot.
B. Effect of failure to exhaust remedies
It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of
non-compliance with the rule is that it will deprive the complainant
of a cause of action, which is ground for a motion to dismiss. Non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a ground for motion to
dismiss or is a defense which may be raised in the answer.
De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224
Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Basilan City dismissing a petition for mandamus to compel
Limbaga, the engineer of that city, to authorize de los Santos to
construct a residential house on the land described in the petition.
It is alleged the respondent without any lawful cause refused to
grant said permit; and that in view of this refusal, petitioner
suffered damages.
In his answer, the respondent, represented by the City Fiscal of
Basilan, denied the allegations of the petition and interposed the
following affirmative defenses: that after a fire which occurred in
Lamitan that raged down a major portion of the market site
therein, the city government approved the purchase of an
additional area to enlarge the said site and that, incidentally, the
lot claimed by the petitioner was included in the area; that by
virtue thereof, expropriation proceedings had been instituted
thereon, hence, the denial of the permit applied for by petitioner.
The city fiscal moved to dismiss the petition on the following
grounds: that mandamus will not lie since the issuance of the
permit applied for was a discretionary and not a ministerial duty on
the part of the city engineer to which the trial court agreed.
Issue: WON the case will prosper and WON there is compliance
with the DEAR.
Ruling: Mandamus cannot prosper in this case for the simple
reason that, as the record shows, the land in question is already
the subject matter of expropriation proceeding instituted by
Basilan City pursuant to a resolution approved by the City Council,
which proceeding is now pending in the Court of First Instance of
Basilan. Moreover, herein petitioner has failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him. Petitioner should have
first brought the matter to the Director of Public Works who, under
the law, exercise supervision and control over city engineers of
chartered cities (see Commonwealth Act No. 424), and if he was
not satisfied with the Director's decision he should have appealed
to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
The principle is fundamental that a party aggrieved by a decision
of an administrative official should. before coming to court, apply
for review of such decision by higher administrative authority. This
principle rests on the presumption that the administrative agency
if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438
Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530
C. When applied
The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies applies
only where the agency exercise judicial or quasi-judicial function. It
does not apply in the exercise of its rule-making power or
legislative power.
Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952
Facts: The petitioner, a duly registered partnership of Manila,
alleges in substance (1) that it had placed orders for textiles
amounting to about P340,000 with foreign suppliers which orders
were accepted before July 31, 1949; (2) that in November 1950 it
requested the respondent to allow importation of the textiles
against its quota for 1949 pursuant to circular No. 12 and (3) but
that respondent with grave abuse of authority and discretion has
denied the request and instead ordered that said orders of Ang
Tuan Kai & Co., be charged against the firm's 1951 quota and
exchange allocations in pursuant to the order issued previously by
the same board. Hence this case.
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Issue: WON the petitioner has cause of action in the herein case
before the court.
Ruling: Special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus against the
Import Control Commission do not lie if the petitioner has a plain
and adequate remedy by an appeal to the President. Certiorari or
mandamus against administrative officers should not be
entertained if superior administrative officers can grant relief.
Thus, the petition is denied.
D. Exceptions to the doctrine
• When there is a violation of due process
• When the issue involved is purely a legal question
• When the administrative agency is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
• When there is estoppels on the part of the
administrative agency concerned
• When there is irreparable inquiry
• When the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President hears the implied
and assumed approval of the latter
• When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable
• When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
• When the subject matter is private land in land cases
proceedings
• When the rule does not provide a plain speedy and
adequate remedy
• There are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention (Paat vs. CA)
Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482
Facts: The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement
(TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within the
concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in
Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on
September 31, 1992.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the
cancellation of the TLA, on the ground of serious violations of its
conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein
private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages
against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732
in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit:
1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs
had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the
injunction sought was expressly prohibited by Section I of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December
11, 1987,1 and the motion for reconsideration on February
15,1988.2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the
respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a
decision dated July 4, 1988,3 and in its resolution of September 27,
1988, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly applied the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling: The lower court erred in misapplying the doctrine. One of
the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of
powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of
noninterference with matters coming primarily (albeit not
exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The
theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position
to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and
that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be
rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. The
argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal
is also not acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both
in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pagethan City, that the petitioner
has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions
of forestry laws and regulations.21 The charge involves factual
issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such
evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities,
employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the
rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise
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their powers of review. here is no question that Civil Case No. 2732
comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court.
Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was
supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities
of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or
not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been
violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is
the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the
DENR. The application of the expertise of the administrative
agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition
precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the
same question by a court of justice.
Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802
Facts : Respondent executive secretary authorized the importation
of several tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private
sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of
the other respondents herein for the implementation of said
proposed importation.
Petitioner is the president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association engaged in the production of rice and corn, filed the
petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make
said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents
"are, acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction",
because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends
Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice
and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency; that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a
prelinainary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the
rights of the parties during the pendency of this case and to
prevent the judgment therein from becoming ineffectual.
Respondent, among others, countered that the petitioner did not
exhaust all administrative remedies available to him before coming
to court.
Issue : WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is applicable in this case.
Ruling : The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable "where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one”, or where the controverted act is
"patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a department secretary,
whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by
him, or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the
foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention
is, therefore, untenable.
Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167
Facts: The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989
when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on
its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for
brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver
could not produce the required documents for the forest products
found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in
Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation
of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen, (15) days within
which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the
required explanation. On June 22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive
Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No.of temporary
restraining order of petitioners was granted by this court. Invoking
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners
aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for
replevin because the buck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to
avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case
falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that
(1) due process was violated because they were not given the
chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful
on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b)
that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the
commission of the crime.
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Ruling: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is
a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause
of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that
the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to
dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by
a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative
one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies." To
sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the
instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted
cases heretofore stated.
Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962
Facts: While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of
Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, he was charged in an administrative case, for alleged
dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of
authority, oppression, misconduct, etc., preferred against him by
employees of the Bank, resulting in his suspension by the
Monetary Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3-man
committee to investigate him. The committee was composed of
representatives of the Bank, Bureau of Civil Service and the Office
of the City Fiscal of Manila. After receiving the answer of the
respondent therein, the committee heard the case, receiving
testimonies of witnesses on both sides. On May 5, 1959, the
committee submitted its Final Report, the pertinent conclusion and
recommendation therein reading as follows: "(1) In view of the
foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon which to
recommend disciplinary action against respondent and therefore
respectfully recommends that he be immediately reinstated."
Unable to agree with the committee report, the Monetary Board
adopted Resolution No. 957 on July 20, 1959 which considered "the
respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his
suspension." The pertinent portion of the resolution reads thus:
"After an exhaustive and mature deliberation of the report of the
aforesaid fact finding committee, in conjunction with the entire
records of the case and representations of both complainants and
respondent, through their respective counsel; and, further, after a
thorough review of the service record of the respondent,
particularly the various cases presented against him, object of
Monetary Board Resolution No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which
all involves fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent, and moreover,
upon formal statement of the Governor that he has lost confidence
in the respondent as Special Assistant to the Governor and In-
Charge of the Export Department (such position being primarily
confidential and highly technical in nature), the Monetary Board
finds that the continuance of the respondent in the service of the
Central Bank would be prejudicial to be best interests of the
Central Bank, and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the respondent, Mr. R.
Marino Corpus, resigned as of the .date of his suspension."
Three days after, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995,
dated July 23, 1959, approving the appointment of herein
respondent Mario Marcos to the position involved in place of
petitioner R. Marino Corpus. The lower court was of the opinion
that petitionerappellant should have exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him, such as an appeal to the Commissioner
of Civil Service, under Republic Act 2260, or the President of the
Philippines who under the Constitution and the law is the head of
all the executive departments of the government including its
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agencies and instrumentalities. This is the main issue disputed in
this appeal.
Ruling: True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review
either by the President or the Civil Service Commission. However, it
is our opinion that a resort to these administrative appeals is
voluntary or permissive, taking into account the facts obtaining in
this case. (1) There is no law requiring an appeal to the President
in a case like the one at bar. The fact that the President had, in two
instances cited in the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from
decisions of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, should not be
regarded as precedents, but at most may be viewed as acts of
condescension on the part of the Chief Executive. (2) While there
are provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the
Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of
Appeals, We believe the petitioner is not bound to observe them,
considering his status and the Charter of the Central Bank. In
Castillo vs,. Bayona, et al., 106 Phil., 1121, We said that Section
14, Republic Act 265, creating the Central Bank of the Philippines,
particularly paragraph (c) thereof, "is sufficiently broad to vest the
Monetary Board with the power of investigation and removal of its
officials, except the Governor thereof. In other words, the Civil
Service Law is the general legal provision for the investigation,
suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section
14 is a special provision of law which must govern the
investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the Central
Bank-, though they may be subject to the Civil Service Law and
Regulations in other respects."
In this case, the respondent Monetary Board considered petitioner
resigned from the office to which he has been legally appointed as
of the date of his suspension, after he has been duly indicted and
tried before a committee created by the Board for the purpose. An
appeal to the Civil Service Commission would thereby be an act of
supererogation, requiring the presentation of practically the same
witnesses and documents produced in the investigation conducted
at the instance of the Monetary Board. Moreover, Section 16(i) of
the Civil Service Law provides that "except as otherwise provided
by law," the Commissioner of Civil Service shall have "final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of
all permanent officials and employees in the competetive or
classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline, and efficiency of such officials and employees; * * *."
Considering again the fact that the Charter of the Central Bank
provides for its own power, through the Monetary Board, relative to
the investigation, suspension or removal of its own employees
except the Governor, coupled with the fact that Petitioner has
admitted that he belongs to the non-competetive or unclassified
service, it is evident that an appeal by petitioner to the
Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is
permissive and voluntary. "The reason is obvious. While it may be
desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one
is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are
prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings
it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office
allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in
the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the
reglementary period. As emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38
Phil. 621, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil., 828; 46 Off. Gaz., 3683,
public interest requires that the right to a public office should be
determined as speedily as practicable."
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August
2003
Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A.
Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy
Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of
nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing
Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without
due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of
the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging
the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and
that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and
call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed
that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case
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Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-
making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. What is assailed
is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set
of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. 25 This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. 26 Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works
8 SCRA 179
Facts: It appears from the allegations of the petition that the
petitioner was denounced before the Port and Harbor Board,
Manila for making certain constructions near the mouth of Calat-an
Creek in Sipalay, Negros Occidental; that on September 11, 1958,
petitioner was served with copy of the charges filed against it by
two investigators of respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications who conducted an investigation of said charges;
that on the basis of this investigation, respondent Secretary
rendered a decision dated January 16, 1959 ordering the petitioner
herein to remove the causeway illegally constructed at the mouth
of the Calat-an River and restore the bed of said river to its original
condition within thirty days from receipt of copy of the decision,
otherwise, the removal shall be effected by the government at the
expense of herein petitioner. Without appealing the decision of the
respondent Secretary to the President, herein petitioner has filed
with this Court the present petition for certiorari seeking that the
decision of respondent be annulled."
Ruling: Nowhere in the foregoing provisions, or in any other part of
Republic Act No. 2056, is it required that appeal to the President
should precede recourse to the courts. The silence of the statute,
to be sure, does not mean that the President may not review the
action of the Secretary. His power to do so is implicit in his
constitutional power of control of all the executive departments
(Section 10, Works and Communications par. 1, Art. VII of the
Constitution). This, however, does not resolve the issue, which is
not whether petitioner could have appealed to the President but
whether he should have done so before seeking judicial relief. The
answer depends, in turn, upon whether an appeal to the President
would have been sufficiently effective, adequate and expeditious, a
negative finding in this respect being the basis on which the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, as prayed for by petitioner, may be
issued. The absence of an express provision in Republic Act No.
2056 for an appeal to the President from the decision of the
Secretary, considered together with the peremptory character of
the periods therein prescribed, shows that such an appeal-
assuming that it may be taken in view of the President's
constitutional power of executive control-would not affect the
inexorable requirement that those periods be observe& the only
exception being in favor of Works and Communications the
Secretary, if there is justifiable or valid reason for his failure or
delay to terminate and decide a case or effect the removal of the
illegal construction such as, for Instance, an injunction issued by a
court. We are of the opinion that an appeal to the President from
the order of respondent Secretary would not have been
expeditious enough for petitioner's purposes and hence the latter
did not have to resort to it before seeking judicial relief. In any
event, we believe the facts of this case place it within the rule
enunciated in Dimaisip vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil., 237, as
follows: "Such failure (to appeal from the decision of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President) cannot
preclude the plaintiffs from taking court action in view of the
theory that the Secretary of a Department is merely an alter-ego of
the President; the assumption is that the action of the Secretary
bears the implied sanction of the President, unless the same is
disapproved by the latter."
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Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794
Facts: On April 29, 1958, Pedro B. Patanao commenced Special
Civil Case No. 48 with the Court of First Instance of Agusan, against
Valeriano, C. Bueno and one Juanito Merin, for injunction and
damages. In his amended petition, Patanao alleged that on March
10, 1958 the respondents therein disturbed him in his, possession
of his timber concession by illegally entering the same and cutting
and hauling logs therein; that when he went to the area to stop
said respondents and their laborers, truckers and loggers from
cutting and hauling logs "he was met with riot guns, pistols and
other firearms"; and that defendants were able to cut no less than
one million board feet of exportable logs worth not less than
$64,000.00 and would be able to cut and haul even a bigger
amount in the space of one month as they had allegedly
concentrated all their logging machineries and equipment with the
apparent intention of illegally denuding the forest area covered by
his license. Patanao thus urged the court below to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction so as to enjoin the respondents, their
agents, laborers and lawyers, from entering the area and cutting
and hauling logs therein pending trial and, after trial, to make the
injunction final and permanent, and to condemn said respondents
liable in an amount of not less than P175,000. 00 as actual and
moral damages, attorney's fees and costs.
Ruling: At first glance, petitioner's argument appears to be tenable.
True, the common boundary of the parties was verified by the
Bureau of Forestry way back in March 1955. It seems, however,
that while petitioner Bueno had endeavored to respect the
verification report, respondent Patanao had refused to conform
thereto, so much so that the conflict was brought anew to the
attention of the Director of Forestry who has formally taken a hand
therein. On or about April 8, 1958, before Patanao instituted Civil
Case No. 48 with the respondent court, he was officially requested
to designate a representative to accompany Forestry officials in
the verification of the common boundary line between him and
petitioner (Exhibit 8, letter addressed to Patanao by Anastacio G.
Sison, officer-incharge, Esperanza Forest Station, Agusan, p. 5;
Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, dated, July 23, 1958.) That said boundary dispute is still
pending in the Bureau of Forestry at the filing of this petition is
shown by the letter of the District Forester of Agusan, now in the
record as Annex A-Opposition. The record also discloses that
Patanao's application for renewal and consolidation of his timber
licenses for 1957-58 had not yet been approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Its renewal depends upon
the consideration of the Director of Forestry. The granting of
timber licenses, their renewal or cancellation, and the
determination of conflicting claims or boundary lines involving
forest zones, such as those presently occupied by the parties
hereto, are all vested by law primarily upon the Director of Forestry
and ultimately upon his Department head.
Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151
Facts: In his complaint before the NLRC, herein private respondent
Rodito Nasayao claimed that sometime in May 1974, he was
appointed plant manager of the petitioner corporation, with an
alleged compensation of P3,000.00, a month, or 25% of the
monthly net income of the company, whichever is greater, and
when the company failed to pay his salary for the months of May,
June, and July 1974, Rodito Nasayao filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission, Branch IV, for the recovery
of said unpaid salaries. The case was docketed therein as NLRC
Case No. LR6151. Answering, the herein petitioners denied that
Rodito Nasayao was employed in the company as plant manager
with a fixed monthly salary of P3,000.00. They claimed that the
undertaking agreed upon by the parties was a joint venture, a sort
of partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the machinery
in good working condition and, in return, he would get the
contracts from end-users for the installation of marble products, in
which the company would not interfere. In addition, private
respondent Nasayao was to receive an amount equivalent to 25%
of the net profits that the petitioner corporation would realize,
should there be any. Petitioners alleged that since there had been
no profits during said period, private respondent was not entitled
to any amount. The case was submitted for voluntary arbitration
and the parties selected the herein respondent Jose T. Collado as
voluntary arbitrator. In the course of the proceedings, however, the
herein petitioners challenged the arbitrator's capacity to try and
decide the case fairly and judiciously and asked him to desist from
farther hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused. In
due time, or on 29 December 1975, he rendered judgment in favor
of the complainant, ordering the herein petitioners to pay Rodito
Nasayao the amount of P9,000.00, within 10 days from notice.
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Upon receipt of the decision, the herein petitioners appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission on grounds that the labor
arbiter gravely abused his discretion in persisting to hear and
decide the case notwithstanding petitioners' request for him to
desist therefrom: and that the appealed decision is not supported
by evidence. On 18 March 1976, Rodito Nasayao filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator is final, appealable, and immediately executory;3 and, on
23 March 1976, he filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution. Acting on the motions, the respondent Commission, in a
resolution dated 7 May 1976, dismissed the appeal on the ground
that the decision appealed from is final, unappealable and
immediately executory, and ordered the herein petitioners to
comply with the decision of the voluntary arbitrator within 10 days
from receipt of the resolution.5
The petitioners are before the Court in the present recourse. As
prayed for, the Court issued a temporary restraining order,
restraining herein respondents from enforcing and/or carrying out
the questioned decision and resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the private respondent that
the petitioner failed to follow the doctrine of exhaustion of admin
remedies is tenable.
Ruling: The contention is without merit. The doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies cannot be invoked in this case, as
contended. In the recent case of John Clement Consultants, Inc.
versus National Labor Relations Commission, the Court said: "As is
well known, no law provides for an appeal from decisions of the
National Labor Relations Commission; hence, there can be no
review and reversal on appeal by higher authority of its factual or
legal conclusions. When, however, it decides a case without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, the
party thereby adversely affected may obtain a review and
nullification of that decision by this Court through the extraordinary
writ of certiorari. Since, in this case, it appears that the
Commission has indeed acted without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of a belated appeal sought
to be taken from a decision of Labor Arbiter and thereafter
reversing it, the writ of certiorari will issue to undo those acts, and
do justice to the aggrieved party."
Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92
Facts: On 2 September 1985, the Municipal Government of
Muntinlupa (hereinafter, Municipality), Metro Manila, thru its then
Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a contract with the
KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MCA MAGTITINDA SA
BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM)
represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter's
management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market.
The contract provides for a twenty-five (25) year term commencing
on 2 September 1985, renewable for a like period, unless sooner
terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties,
at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P35,000) to be paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of
each month which shall, however, be increased by ten percent
(10%) each year during the first five (5) years only. Following his
assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago
Carlos, Jr., petitioner Ignacio Bunye, claiming to be particularly
scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the agreement,
contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently inequitable rental," directed
a review of the aforesaid contract.3 He sought opinions from both
the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC)
on the validity of the in strument. In separate letters, these
agencies urged that appropriate legal steps be taken towards its
rescission. The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the MMC even granted
the Municipality authority "to take the necessary legal steps for the
cancellation. rescission of the above cited contract and make
representations with KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover
of the possession, management and operation of the New
Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa."
Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye with the
Municipal Council, the latter approved on 1 August 1988 Resolution
No. 45 abrogating the contract. To implement this resolution,
Bunye, together with his co-petitioners and elements of the Capital
Command of the Philippine Constabulary, proceeded, on 19 August
1986, to the public market and announced to the general public
and the stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over
the management and operation of the facility, and that the
stallholders should thenceforth pay their market fees to the
Municipality, thru the Market Commission, and no longer to the
KBMBPM.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners in the first case failed to
follow the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies.
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Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is
well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego
of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him.69 This doctrine of qualified political
agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed.
There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the
President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved
is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act
is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of
petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796
Facts: On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application
for retention of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the
Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR), Regional Office in Tobaco, Albay. After due hearing,
Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation
report dated June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of the Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be
petitioner's tenant over her riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to
take the necessary action, petitioner reiterated her application
sometime in 1979-1985 alleging that her tenant deliberately failed
and refused to deliver her landowner's share from 1975 up to the
time of the Ming of the said application and, that the latter had
distributed his landholding to his children. A reinvestigation was
conducted this time by Atty. Seth Evasco who on October 31, 1985
filed his report recommending the cancellation of private
respondent's CLT. Said report was elevated to the MAR. In an
endorsement dated November 25, 1985, Regional Director
Salvador Pejo manifested his concurrence with the report of Atty.
Evasco holding that the properties of the petitioner consist of
4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
27167, 27168 and 27344 and hence not covered by the Operation
Land Transfer Program. Juanito L. Lorena, the Officer-in-Charge of
MAR likewise concurred therewith. However, in the order dated
February 13, 1986, then Minister Conrado Estrella denied
petitioner's application for retention. On April 17, 1986, petitioner
appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The case
was entitled Hilda Ralla Almine vs. MAR and docketed as AC-G.R.
SP No. 08550. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal. However, it was denied in an order dated May 28, 1986. A
motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. After the
parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision dated June 29, 19871 dismissing the appeal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as to
whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his
land holdings, if administratively decided by the Minister of
Agrarian Reform, are appealable and could be reviewed only by
the Court of Agrarian Relations and now by the Regional Trial
Courts pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.2 Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated
October 22, 1987.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the CA is tenable.
Ruling: A perusal of the provision above cited reveals that
questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be
allowed to retain his landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the
Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose decision may
be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of
Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus excluded from those
cognizable by the then CAR, now the Regional Trial Courts. There is
no appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said
decision may be reviewed by the courts through a special civil
action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as the case may be
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the respondent
appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the
petition for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a
decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave
abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a matter within
the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of
Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the
Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The failure to
appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the
Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter
ego of the President.
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Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553
Facts: Ramon Tapales was duly appointed Director of the
Conservatory Music in UP as recommended by the President of the
University of the Philippines after compliance of the required
qualifications under the Charter of the same. Consequently, the
Board of Regents of the said University issued a resolution fixing
the terms of the office of the Dean and Directors thereof allegedly
in pursuant to same charter. Thereafter, the University President
issued a memorandum reminding the Deans and Directors whose
terms are about to expire that unless they are recommended by
the same for reappointment, their assumption to their respective
office is deemed terminated. Tapales was injured by the said
resolution and memorandum as such filed before the court a
question on the validity of the said resolution and memorandum.
The respondent on the other hand alleged that the petitioner failed
to exhaust the required administrative remedies available.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner failed to observe the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ruling: It is contended in this connection, that the appellee failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies by not asking the Board of
Regents to reconsider the challenged resolution before bringing
the matter to court. An administrative review is not a condition
precedent to judicial relief against a statute or ordinance which is
claimed to be unconstitutional and void (73 C.J.S. 357), or where
the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done (73 C.J.S. 354). Here,
appellee impugned the constitutionality and validity of the
Resolution of October 2, 1959, and appellee's objection thereto is a
purely legal one.
Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA
210
Facts: Quintos is the legitimate owner of a racehorse which was
duly and officially registered with NSF and for which he is issued a
certificate of registration, thereby entitling it to participate in horse
races and sweepstakes draws in legally authorized racing clubs or
tracks. In line with the SOP and usual racing practices for horse
owners, Quintos applied for inclusion of his horse in a particular
race 3 days before the date of the race which application was duly
approved by Phil Racing Club, Inc. On the very day when Quintos’
race-horse was scheduled to participate in race no. 15, the PRC
announced thru the PA system before the start of race no. 13 that
his horse was being excluded from taking part in race no. 15. It
was then alleged that the cancellation of the certificate of
registration of his horse was arbitrary and oppressive, due process
being denied him in the absence of a formal investigation or
inquiry prior thereto. The trial court dismissed the complaint
primarily on the ground of lack of EAR – that the admin remedy of
Quintos was to ask the Board of Trustees of NSF to reconsider its
resolution cancelling the certificate of registration, and in case of
denial of appeal to the Games and Amusement Board or to the
Office of the President. The CA certified the case to the SC since it
found that a purely legal question was involved, to wit: WON the
trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Issue: Does Quintos have a valid cause for complaint?
Ruling: None. Quintos prematurely instituted a suit for damages.
The reason for this short-circuiting of administrative processes is
not explained by Quintos. His gives no reason for his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Indeed, there is none. The order
of dismissal, therefore, certainly cannot be considered as being in
derogation of the due process guarantee. The judicial forum sought
by Quintos was in effect an unwarranted disregard of the concept
of primary jurisdiction. In the traditional language of administrative
law, the stage of ripeness for judicial review had not been reached.
Quintos ignored factors not predetermined by formula but by
seasoned balancing for and against the assumption of jurisdiction.
All that had been said so far would seem to indicate that under
such a test, the lower court’s insistence of the fundamental
requirement of exhausting administrative remedies is more than
justified.
Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116
Facts: This is MOTION TO CORRECT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. P-672 COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD.
FRANCISCA SOTO. Specifically, the change sought is in the civil
status of the registered owner, whom the petitioner wants to be
described in the certificate of title as married to her rather than as
a widower.
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The said registered owner was Sergio Serfino, who was married in
January 1933 to the petitioner. In 1939, he filed an application for a
homestead patent, describing himself as "married to Francisca
Soto," but in 1953, when the original certificate over the
homestead was issued, it was in favor of "Sergio Serfino, widower."
Serfino died in 1965, and soon thereafter the petitioner filed a
motion with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
praying that his description as a "widower" be changed to "married
to Francisca Soto." Two daughters of the couple opposed the
motion. While conceding that their parents were married in 1933,
the oppositors nonetheless pointed out that their mother had
abandoned them in 1942 to live with another man. Later, they
said, she had adulterous relations with still a second man by whom
she begot eleven children. According to these oppositors, it was
their father himself who had described himself as a widower in
1953 because he had not heard from the petitioner since 1942.
Their purpose, obviously, was to prevent the land from being
considered conjugal and therefore equally owned by the spouses.
The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the
change prayed for, but later it reconsidered its decision and held
itself without jurisdiction to act on the matter. Its reason was that
there was no observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Issue: Does the trial court have jurisdiction to order an amendment
of a certificate of title without previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies?
Held: Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions.
The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will
deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for
a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground
is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the
case and try it.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not applicable to private lands, as also settled in a number of
decisions rendered by this Court. Once registered, the homestead
granted to Sergio Serfino ceased to have the character of public
land and so was removed from the operation of the said doctrine.
But notwithstanding the above principles, the petition will still have
to be dismissed because the change sought is not authorized
under Section 112 of Act 496, as interpreted by this Court.
Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338
Facts: Sunga, et al. filed before the NLRC a complaint against ACD
Computer Services and Cabel for illegal dismissal and non-payment
of certain benefits. The labor arbiter rendered a decision sustaining
the petitioners' position. The labor arbiter, then, upon motion of
the petitioners, issued a writ of execution to enforce said decision.
The following day, the sheriff served a notice of garnishment to the
Commercial Bank of Manila after which the total amount of
P15,031.85 was garnished. This amount has already been turned
over to the petitioners.
A levy on execution was made upon the properties found in the
respondents' office premises. ACD Group Inc., an American firm
based in California, U.S.A., through its Chairman, Dulay filed a
third-party claim in the NLRC case on the ground that it is the real
owner of the computers levied upon and scheduled for auction.
This third-party claim was denied.
ACD Computer Services and Cabel filed before the NLRC a petition
for relief from judgment in NLRC-NCR Case No. 6-2423-86 with
prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order. The NLRC then issued the questioned resolutions
incidental to Injunction Case. The petitioners filed before the NLRC
a motion to dismiss and/or answer to the petition on the ground
that a petition for relief is not a remedy granted under the Labor
Code and NLRC Rules.
Without waiting for the NLRC's resolution on their motion to
dismiss, the petitioners filed the present petition. This petition
seeks to annul the three NLRC resolutions, to prohibit the NLRC
from taking further proceedings in Injunction Case and to direct the
NLRC to dismiss said injunction case and to order the full execution
of the decision.
The Solicitor General recommends that the petition be dismissed
for being premature, applying the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. He further stressed the jurisdiction of the
NLRC and its exercise of sound discretion.
Issue: WON the Soc Gen’s position is tenable.
Ruling: The Court gave due course to this petition on a finding,
among others, that the instant case falls under the exceptions to
the general rule. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
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remedies is not an inflexible rule. In fact, it yields to many
accepted exceptions. As we have noted in a number of cases,
exhaustion is not necessary where inter alia there is estoppel on
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; where there is unreasonable delay or official action
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant: where the amount
involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided anyway by the courts of justice.
At least two of these exceptions are present in the instant case on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. There had been no action
on the challenge to the petition for relief from judgment for almost
a year. This is considerably long considering that the labor arbiter's
decision had already become final and in fact has been partially
executed. The main case had been filed as early as June 20, 1986.
Moreover, this case involving the propriety of a remedy and the
suspension of an execution would only be further delayed if we
remand it to the NLRC, only to have any decision raised again
before this Court.
Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623
Facts: Petitioner Sabello, was the Elementary School Principal of
Talisay and also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay
High School of the Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high
school was in deficit at that time due to the fact that the students
could hardly pay for their monthly tuition few. Since at that time
also, the President of the Philippines who was earnestly
campaigning was giving aid in the amount of P2,000.00 for each
barrio, the barrio council through proper resolutions alloted the
amount of P840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the high school
teachers, with the honest thought in mind that the barrio high
school was a barrio project and as such therefore, was entitled to
its share of the RICD fund in question. The only part that the herein
petitioner played was his being authorized by the said barrio
council to withdraw the above amount and which was
subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name
of the Talisay Barrio High School. That was a grave error on the
part of the herein petitioner as it involves the very intricacies in the
disbursement of government funds and of its technicalities. Thus,
the herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were
charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were
convicted to suffer a sentence of one year and disqualification to
hold public office. The herein petitioner appealed his case to the
Court of Appeals, Manila. The Court of Appeals modified the
decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being
involved. The herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no
longer hire a lawyer to proceed to the highest court of the land.
Finally, Sabello was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to full
civil and political rights. With this instrument on hand, the herein
petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government service,
only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere classroom
teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School
Principal I.
Issue: WON petitioner Sabello should be reappointed to his
position.
Ruling: The question of whether or not petitioner should be
reappointed to his former position is a matter of discretion of the
appointing authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if
the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of what is rightfully his,
the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to
the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of
the appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and
justice.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports cannot be sued, the only answer is that its officials can be
sued for alleged grave errors in their official acts. Again, We ignore
technicality by considering this a suit against the officials of this
government agency.
Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a nonlawyer,
who claims that poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, the
Court set aside the requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and resolved to go direct to the merits of the petition.
The petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and/or his duly authorized
representative is hereby directed to appoint petitioner to the
position of Elementary School Principal I or its equivalent
Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490
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 Jose Rizal Memorial State University – College of Law
Administrative Law Reviewer

Facts: Montes was charged with negligence in the performance of

duty (Dredge No. 6 under him bad sunk because of water in the
bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care). the
Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of
findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of
Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of
contributory negligence in not pumping, the water from the bilge,
and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day
of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the
discretion of the appointing officer.
Montes then filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
to review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a
motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted
all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 598, which provides: The Civil Service
Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority to hear and
decide all administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its
decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised or modified by
the President of the Philippines.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in applying Sec 2 of

Commonwealth Act No. 598 in the instant case.

Ruling: There is no duty imposed on a party against whom a

decision has been rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals
to appeal to the President, and that the tendency of courts has
been not to subject the decision of the President to judicial review.
It is further argued that if decisions of the Auditor General may be
appealed to the courts, those of the Civil Service Board of Appeals
need not be acted upon by the President also, before recourse may
be had to the courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to
the President, his action should be final and not reviewable by the
courts because such a course of action would be derogatory to the
high office of the President. The judgment appealed from is thus
affirmed.

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