Cohen and Frazzini, 2008

American Finance Association
Economic Links and Predictable Returns

Author(s): Lauren Cohen and Andrea Frazzini
Source: The Journal of Finance, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Aug., 2008), pp. 1977-2011
Published by: Wiley for the American Finance Association
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THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE VOL. LXIII, NO. 4 AUGUST 2008
Economic Links and Predictable Returns

LAUREN COHEN and ANDREA FRAZZINF
ABSTRACT
This paper finds evidence of return predictability across economically linked firms.
We test the hypothesis that in the presence of investors subject to attention con
straints, stock prices do not promptly incorporate news about economically related
firms, generating return predictability across assets. Using a data set of firms' princi
pal customers to identify a set of economically related firms, we show that stock prices
do not incorporate news involving related firms, generating predictable subsequent
price moves. A long-short equity strategy based on this effect yields monthly alphas
of over 150 basis points.
Firms do not exist as independent entities, but are linked to each other through
many types of relationships. Some of these links are clear and contractual,
while others are implicit and less transparent. We use the former of these,
clear economic links, as an instrument to test investor inattention. Specifically,
we focus on well-defined customer-supplier links between firms. In these cases,
partner firms are stakeholders in each others' operations. Thus, any shock to
one firm has a resulting effect on its linked partner. We examine how shocks
to one firm translate into shocks to the linked firm in both real quantities
(i.e., profits) and stock prices. If investors take into account the ex ante pub
licly available1 and often longstanding customer-supplier links, prices of the
partner firm will adjust when news about its linked firm is released into the
market. If, in contrast, investors ignore publicly available links, stock prices of
* Cohen is at the Harvard Business School and NBER; Frazzini is at the University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business and NBER. We would like to thank Nick Barberis, Effi Benmelech,
Judy Chevalier, Kent Daniel, Doug Diamond, Gene Fama, Will Goetzmann, Ravi Jagannathan,
Anil Kashyap, Josef Lakonishok, Owen Lamont, Jonathan Lewellen, Toby Moskowitz, Lubos Pastor,
Lasse Pedersen, Monika Piazzesi, Joseph Piotroski, Josh Rauh, Doug Skinner, Matt Spiegel, Robert
Stambaugh, Amir Sufi, Jake Thomas, Tuomo Vuolteenaho, Ivo Welch, Wei Xiong, an anonymous
referee, and seminar participants at NBER, Barclays Global Investors, BSI Gamma Foundation,
Chicago Quantitative Alliance, University of Chicago, American Finance Association, European Fi
nance Association, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Lehman Brothers, London Business School,
New York University, Harvard Business School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Yale Uni
versity, AQR Capital Management, Prudential Equity Conference, and University of California
Davis Conference on Financial Markets Research for helpful comments. We also thank Wooyun
Nam, Vladimir Vladimirov, and Jeri Xu for excellent research assistance, Husayn Shahrur and
Jayant Kale for providing us with some of the customer-supplier data, the Chicago Quantitative
Alliance and the BSI Gamma Foundation for financial support. All errors are our own.
1 The customer-supplier links we examine in the paper are those sufficiently material as to
be required by SFAS 131 to be reported in public financial statements. We discuss the reporting
standard in Section II.
1977
1978 The Journal of Finance
related firms will have a predictable lag in reacting to new information about
firms' trading partners. Thus, the asset pricing implications of investors with
limited attention is that price movements across related firms are predictable:
Prices will adjust with a lag to shocks of related firms, inducing predictable
returns.
Two conditions need to be met to test for investor limited attention: (i) any
information thought to be overlooked by investors needs to be available to the
investing public before prices evolve, and (ii) the information needs to be salient
information that investors should be reasonably expected to gather.
While the latter of the two conditions is clearly less objective and more dif
ficult to satisfy, we believe that customer-supplier links do satisfy both re
quirements and provide a natural setting for testing investor limited attention.
First, information on the customer-supplier link is publicly available in that
firms are required to disclose information about operating segments in their
financial statements issued to shareholders. Regulation SFAS No. 131 requires
firms to report the identity of customers representing more than 10% of their
total sales in interim financial reports issued to shareholders. In our linked
sample, the average customer accounts for 20% of the sales of the supplier
firm. Therefore, customers represent substantive stakeholders in the supplier
firms. Furthermore, in some cases, the customer-supplier links are longstand
ing relationships with well-defined contractual ties. Second, and more impor
tantly, because we examine material customer-supplier links, the link is in fact
salient information when forming expectations about future cash flows and in
turn prices. Not only is it intuitive that investors should take this relationship
into account, we provide evidence that real activities of firms depend on the
customer-supplier link.
To test for return predictability, we first group stocks into different classes
for which news about linked firms has been released into the market. We then
construct a long-short equity strategy. The central prediction is that returns of
linked firms should forecast future returns of the partner firms' portfolios.
To better understand our approach, consider the customer-supplier link of
Coastcast and Callaway, which is shown in Figure 1. In 2001, Coastcast Cor
poration was a leading manufacturer of golf club heads. Since 1993 Coastcast's
major customer had been Callaway Golf Corporation, a retail company that spe
cialized in golf equipment.2 As of 2001, Callaway accounted for 50% of Coast
cast's total sales. On June 7, 2001, Callaway was downgraded by one of the
analysts covering it. In a press release on June 8 Callaway lowered second
quarter revenue projections to $250 million, down from a previous projection of
$300 million. The announcement brought Callaway's expected second-quarter
earnings per share (EPS) down to between 35 cents and 38 cents, about half
of the current mean forecast of 70 cents a share. By market close on June 8,
Callaway shares were down by $6.23 to close at $15.03, a 30% drop since June 6.
In the following week the fraction of analysts issuing "buy" recommendations
dropped from 77% to 50%, and going forward, nearly 2 months later, when
2 Both firms traded on the NYSE and had analyst coverage.
Economie Links and Predictable Returns 1979
Figure 1. Coastcast Corporation and Callaway Golf Corporation. This figure plots the
stock prices of Coastcast Corporation (ticker = PAR) and Callaway Golf Corporation (ticker = ELY)
between May and August 2001. Prices are normalized (05/01/2001 = 1).
Callaway announced earnings on July 25, it hit the revised mean analyst esti
mate exactly with 36 cents per share.
Surprisingly, the negative news in early June about Callaway's future earn
ings did not impact Coastcast's share price at all, despite the fact that the cus
tomer accounting for half of Coastcast's total sales lost 30% of market value in
two days. Both EPS forecasts ($2) and stock recommendations (100% buy) were
not revised. Furthermore, a Factiva search of newswires and financial publi
cations returned no news mentions for Coastcast at all during the 2-month pe
riod subsequent to Callaway's announcement. Ultimately, Coastcast announced
EPS at -4 cents on July 19 and experienced negative returns over the subse
quent 2 months.
In this example, we are unable to find any salient news release about Coast
cast other than the announcement of a drop in revenue of its major customer.
However, it was not until 2 months after Callaway's announcement that the
price of Coastcast adjusted to the new information. A strategy that would have
shorted Coastcast on news of Callaway's slowing demand would have generated
a return of 20% over the subsequent 2 months.
The above example represents a pattern that is systematic across the uni
verse of U.S. common stocks: Consistent with investors' inattention to com
pany links, there are significantly predictable returns across customer-supplier
firms. Our main result is that the monthly strategy of buying firms whose cus
tomers had the most positive returns (highest quintile) in the previous month,
and selling short firms whose customers had the most negative returns (low
est quintile), yields abnormal returns of 1.55% per month, or an annualized
return of 18.6% per year. We refer to this return predictability as "customer
momentum." Moreover, returns to the customer momentum strategy have lit
tle or no exposure to the standard traded risk factors, including the firm's own
momentum in stock returns.
We test for a number of alternative explanations of the customer momentum
result. It could be the case that unrelated to investor's limited attention to the
customer-supplier link, the effect could be driven by the supplier's own past
returns, which may be contemporaneously correlated with the customer's. In
this case the customer's return is simply a noisy proxy for the supplier's own
past return. Thus, we control for the firm's own past returns and find that con
trolling for own firm momentum does not affect the magnitude or significance
of the customer momentum result. Alternatively, the result could be driven by
industry momentum (Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)) or by a lead-lag relation
ship (Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Hou and Moskowitz (2005) and Hou (2006)).
Explicitly controlling for these effects does not have a significant impact on the
magnitude or significance of the customer momentum result. Finally, a recent
paper by Menzly and Ozbas (2006) uses upstream and downstream definitions
of industries to define cross-industry momentum. We find that controlling for
cross-industry momentum also does not affect the customer momentum result.
If limited investor attention is driving this return predictability result from
the customer-supplier link, it should be true that varying the extent of inatten
tion varies the magnitude and significance of the result. We use mutual funds'
joint holdings of customer and supplier firms to identify a subset of firms where
investors are a priori more likely to collect information on both the customer
and supplier, and hence to be attentive to the customer-supplier link. For all
mutual funds that own the supplier firm, we determine the percent that own
both the customer and the supplier (common) and the percent that own only
the supplier (noncommon). We show that return predictability is indeed signif
icantly more (less) severe where inattention constraints are more (less) likely
to be binding. Further, we show that common mutual fund managers are sig
nificantly more likely to trade the supplier on linked customer firm shocks,
whereas noncommon managers trade the supplier only with a significant (one
quarter) lag to the same customer shocks.
Finally, we turn to measures of real activity and show that the customer
supplier link does matter for the correlation of real activities between the two
firms. We do this by exploiting time-series variation in the same firms being
linked and not linked over the sample. We look at real activity of linked firms
and find that during years when the firms are linked, both sales and operat
ing income are significantly more correlated than during nonlinked years. We
then show that when two given firms are linked, customer shocks today have
significant predictability over the supplier's future real activities, while when
they are not linked, there is no predictive relationship. Also, the sensitivity of
suppliers' future returns to customer shocks today doubles when customers and
suppliers are linked as opposed to not linked.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly pro
vides a background and a literature review. Section II describes the data, while
Section III details the predictions of the limited investor attention hypothesis.
Section IV establishes the main customer momentum result. Section V provides
robustness checks and considers alternative explanations. Section VI explores
variation in inattention and customer momentum. Section VII examines the
real effects of the customer-supplier link. Section VIII concludes.
I. Background and Literature Review

There is a large body of literature in psychology regarding individuals' ability
to allocate attention between tasks. This literature suggests that individuals
have a difficult time processing many tasks at once.3 Attention is a scarce
cognitive resource and attention to one task necessarily requires a substitution
of cognitive resources from other tasks (Kahneman (1973)). Given the vast
amount of information available and their limited cognitive capacity, investors
may choose to select only a few sources of salient information.
One of the first theoretical approaches to segmented markets and investor
inattention is Merton's (1987) model. In his model, investors obtain informa
tion (and trade) on a small number of stocks. Stocks with fewer traders sell at
a discount stemming from the inability to share risks. Hong and Stein (1999)
develop a model with multiple investor types in which information diffuses
slowly across markets and agents do not extract information from prices, gen
erating return predictability. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Peng and Xiong
(2006) also model investor inattention and derive empirical implications for
security prices. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) focus on the presentation of firm
information in accounting reports and the effect on prices and misvaluation.
Peng and Xiong (2006) concentrate on investors' learning behavior given limited
attention.
An empirical literature is also beginning to build regarding investor limited
attention. Huberman and Regev (2001) study investor inattention to salient
news about a firm. In their study, a firm's stock price soars on the rerelease
of information in the New York Times that had been published in Nature 5
months earlier. Turning to return predictability, Ramnath (2002) examines how
earnings surprises of firms within in the same industry are correlated. He
finds that the first earnings surprise within an industry has information for
both the earnings surprises and returns of other firms within the industry.
Hou and Moskowitz (2005) study measures of firm price delay and find that
these measures help to explain (or cause variation) in many return factors and
anomalies. Furthermore, they find that the measure of firm price delay seems
related to a number of potential proxies for investor recognition. Hou (2006)
3 For a summary of the literature, see Pashler and Johnston (1998).
finds evidence that such lead-lag effects are predominantly an intraindustry

phenomenon: Returns on large firms lead returns on small firms within the
same industry.
Barber and Odean (2006) use a number of proxies for attention grabbing
events (e.g., news and extreme past returns), and find that both positive and
negative events result in individual investor buying of securities (with an asym
metry on selling behavior). Further, they find that institutions do not exhibit
this same attention-based trading behavior. DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) use
demographic information to provide evidence that demographic shifts can be
used to predict future stock returns. They interpret this as the market not fully
taking into account the information contained in demographic shifts. DellaVi
gna and Pollet (2006) then look at the identification of weekends as generating
a distraction to investor attention. They find that significantly worse news
is released by firms on Friday earnings announcements, and that these Fri
day announcements generate a larger postearnings announcement drift. Hou,
Peng, and Xiong (2006) use trading volume as a proxy for attention and show
that variation in this proxy can cause significant variation in both momentum
and post-earnings announcement drift returns, while Hirshleifer et al. (2004)
find long-run return evidence consistent with investors focusing on accounting
profitability while displaying inattention toward cash profitability. Bartov and
Bodnar (1994) examine the interaction of the foreign exchange and equity mar
kets and find that lagged movements in the dollar exchange rate predict future
abnormal returns and future earnings surprises. Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)
look at price momentum to test the model of Hong and Stein (1999) and find
that information, and especially negative information, diffuses gradually into
prices.
Two recent papers closely related to ours are Hong, Tourus, and Valkanov
(2005) and Menzly and Ozbas (2006). Hong et al. (2005) look at investor inat
tention in ignoring lagged industry returns to predict total equity market
returns. They find that certain industries do have predictive power over fu
ture market returns, with the same holding true in international markets.
Menzly and Ozbas (2006) use upstream and downstream definitions of indus
tries and present evidence of cross-industry momentum. In addition, Menzly
and Ozbas (2006) find results for a limited sample consistent with our own
results, that individual customer returns predict future supplier's returns.
While both of these papers provide valuable evidence on slow diffusion of in
formation, our approach is different. We do not restrict the analysis to spe
cific industries or specific links within or across industries. Rather, we focus
on what we believe from the investors' standpoint may be the more intuitive
links of customer-supplier. We do not impose any structure on the relation, but
simply follow the evolution of customer-supplier firm-specific relations over
time. Thus, our data allow us to test for return predictability of individual
stocks stemming from company-specific linkages when firm-specific informa
tion is released into the market and generates large price movements. Not sur
prisingly, our results are robust to controls for both intra- and inter-industry
effects.
II. Customer Data

The data are obtained from several sources. Regulation SFAS No. 131 re
quires firms to report selected information about operating segments in interim
financial reports issued to shareholders. In particular, firms are required to
disclose certain financial information for any industry segment that comprised
more than 10% of consolidated yearly sales, assets, or profits, and the identity
of any customer representing more than 10% of the total reported sales.4 Our
sample consists of all firms listed in the CRSP/Compustat database with non
missing values of book equity (BE) and market equity (ME) at the fiscal year
end for which we can identify the customer as another traded CRSP/Compustat
firm. We focus the analysis on common stocks only.5
We extract the identity of the firm's principal customers from the Compustat
segment files.6 Our customer data cover the period between 1980 and 2004.
For each firm we determine whether the customer is another company listed
on the CRSP/Compustat tape and we assign it the corresponding CRSP permno
number. Prior to 1998, most firms' customers were listed as an abbreviation of
the customer name, which may vary across firms or over time. For these firms,
we use a phonetic string matching algorithm to generate a list of potential
matches to the customer name, and we then hand-match the customer to the
corresponding permno number by inspecting the firm's name, segment, and
industry information.7 We are deliberately conservative in assigning customer
names and firm identifiers to make sure that customers are matched to the
appropriate stock returns and financial information. Customers for which we
could not identify a unique match are excluded from the sample.
To ensure that the firm-customer relations are known before the returns they
are used to explain, we impose a 6-month gap between fiscal year-end dates
and stock returns. This mimics the standard gap imposed to match account
ing variables to subsequent price and return data.8 The final sample includes
30,622 distinct firm-year relationships, representing a total of 11,484 unique
supplier-customer relationships between 1980 and 2004.
Table I shows summary statistics for our sample. In Panel A we report the
coverage of the firms in our data as a fraction of the universe of CRSP common
stocks. One important feature of the sample of stocks we analyze is the relative
size between firms and their principal customers. The size distribution of firms
in our sample closely mimics the size distribution of the CRSP universe. In
contrast, the distribution of our sample of firms' principal customers is tilted
toward large cap securities: The average customer size is above the 90th size
percentile of CRSP firms. This difference partially reflects the data generating
4 Prior to 1997, Regulation SFAS No. 14 governed segment disclosure. SFAS No. 131, issued by
the FASB in June 1997, has been effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997.
5 CRSP share codes 10 and 11.
6 We would like to thank Husayn Shahrur and Jayant Kale, and the research staff at WRDS for
making some of the customer data available to us.
7 We use a "soundex" algorithm to generate a list of potential matches.
8 See, for example, Fama and French (1993).
Table I
Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics as of December of each year. Percent coverage of stock universe
(EW) is the number of stocks with a valid customer-supplier link divided by the total number of
CRSP stocks. Percent coverage of stock universe (VW) is the total market capitalization of stocks
with a valid customer-supplier link, divided by the total market value of the CRSP stock universe.
Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the Compustat book value of equity. Size
is the firm's market value of equity.
Min Max Mean SD Median
Panel A: Time Series (24 Annual Observations, 1981-2004)

Number of firms in the sample per year 390 1470 918 291 889
Number of customers in the sample per year 208 650 433 116 411
Full sample % coverage of stock universe (EW) 13.2 31.3 20.3 5.2 19.8
Full sample % coverage of stock universe (VW) 29.1 70.7 50.7 11.9 48.4
Firm % coverage of stock universe (EW) 8.5 22.8 12.8 4.1 13.2
Firm % coverage of stock universe (VW) 3.3 20.0 9.2 4.5 9.2
Customer % coverage of stock universe (EW) 4.9 11.5 7.6 1.8 7.4
Customer % coverage of stock universe (VW) 26.4 66.5 46.5 11.3 43.5
% of firm-customer in the same industry 20.6 27.3 23.0 1.9 22.7
Link duration (years) 1.0 23.0 2.7 2.3 2.0
Panel B: Firms (Pooled Firm-Year Observations)
Firm size percentile 0.01 0.99 0.48 0.27 0.48

Customer size percentile 0.01 0.99 0.91 0.15 0.98
Firm book-to-market percentile 0.01 0.99 0.51 0.28 0.52
Customer book-to-market percentile 0.01 0.99 0.47 0.26 0.49
Number of customers per firm 1.00 20.00 1.60 1.09 1.00
Percentage of sales to customer 0.00 100 19.80 17.05 14.68
process. Firms are required to disclose the identity of any customer representing
more than 10% of total reported sales; thus we are more likely to identify larger
firms as customers since larger firms are more likely to be above the 10% sale
cutoff.
On average the universe of stocks in this study comprises 50.6% of the total
market capitalization and 20.25% of the total number of common stocks traded
on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The last row of Panel A shows that on aver
age 78% of firm-customer relations are between firms in different industries.9
This is not surprising given that inputs provided by the firms in our sample are
often quite different from the final outputs sold by their principal customers.
Thus, the stock return predictability we analyze is mostly related to assets in
different industries as opposed to securities within the same industry.
9 We assign stocks to 48 industries based on their SIC code. The industry definitions are from
Ken French's website.
III. Limited Attention Hypothesis and Underreaction

In this section we describe the main hypothesis and design a related invest
ment rule to construct the test portfolios. We conjecture that in the presence of
investors that are subject to attention constraints, stock prices do not promptly
incorporate news about related firms, and thereby generate price drift across
securities.
Hypothesis LA (Limited Attention): Stock prices underreact to firm-specific in

formation that induces changes in valuation of related firms, generating return
predictability across assets. In particular, stock prices underreact to negative
(positive) news involving related firms, and in turn generate negative (positive)
subsequent price drift.
In a world where investors have limited ability to collect and gather informa
tion, and market participants are unable to perform the rational expectations
exercise to extract information from prices, returns across securities are pre
dictable. News travels slowly across assets as investors with limited attention
overlook the impact of specific information on economically related firms. These
investors tend to hamper the transmission of information, generating return
predictability across related assets.
Hypothesis LA implies that a long-short portfolio, in which a long position in
stocks whose related firms recently experienced good news is offset by a short
position in stocks whose related firms experienced bad news, should yield pos
itive subsequent returns. We refer to this strategy as the customer momentum
portfolio. The customer momentum portfolio is the main test portfolio in our
analysis.
Since some firms in our sample have multiple principal customers over many
periods, we construct an equally weighted portfolio of the corresponding cus
tomers using the last available supplier-customer link. We rebalance these
portfolios every calendar month. Hereafter, we refer to the monthly return of
this portfolio as the customer return.10 In our base specification, we use the
monthly customer return as a proxy for news about customers. We believe that
a return-driven news sort is appropriate because it closely mimics the under
reaction hypothesis at hand.
To test for return predictability, we examine monthly returns on calendar
time portfolios formed by sorting stocks on their lagged customer return. At
the beginning of calendar month t, we rank stocks in ascending order based on
the customer returns in month t? 1 and we assign them to one of five quintile
portfolios. All stocks are value (equally) weighted within a given portfolio, and
the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value (equal)
weights.
10 Using different weighting schemes to compute customer returns does not affect the results. We
replicate all our results using customer returns computed by setting weights equal to the percentage
of total sales going to each customer. For most of the paper, we choose to focus on equally weighted
customer returns to maximize the number of firms in our sample, since unfortunately the dollar
amount of total sales going to each customer is missing in about 19% of firm-year observations of
our linked data.
The time series of these portfolios' returns tracks the calendar-month per
formance of a portfolio strategy that is based entirely on observables (lagged
customer returns). This investment rule should earn zero abnormal returns in
an efficient market. We compute abnormal returns from a time-series regres
sion of the portfolio excess returns on traded factors in calendar time.11 Positive
abnormal returns following positive customer returns indicate the presence of
customer momentum, consistent with underreaction or a sluggish stock price
response to news about related firms. The opposite is true for negative news.
Under Hypothesis LA, controlling for other characteristics associated with ex
pected returns, bad customer news stocks consistently underperform good cus
tomer news stocks, generating positive returns of our zero-cost long-short in
vestment rule.
Finally, note that since we are interested in testing whether investors in fact
do take the customer-supplier link into account when forming and updating
prices, in principle there is no reason to restrict the analysis to a customer
momentum strategy. The current financial regulation, however, requires firms
to report major customers (and not major suppliers). Given the presence of the
10% cutoff, our sample has more information about customers who are major
stakeholders, and not the reverse. Thus, our main tests are in the direction of
suppliers' stock price response to customers' shocks.12
IV. Results
Table II reports correlations between the variables we use to group stocks into
portfolios. The correlations are based on monthly observations pooled across
stocks. Not surprisingly, returns and customer returns are associated with each
other. Customer returns tend to be uncorrelated with firm size, defined as the
logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the previous month, market-to
book ratios (market value of equity divided by Compustat book value of equity),
and the stock's return over the previous calendar year.
There is a distinctive characteristic of the data that should be emphasized.
A caveat that arises when sorting stocks using customer returns is that, given
the large average size of the customers in our sample, it is likely for customer
returns to be highly correlated with the return of the corresponding industry.
Ideally, we would like our test portfolios to contain stocks with similar industry
exposure (both to the underlying industry and to the corresponding customer
industry) but a large spread in customer returns. In Section V, we specifically
address this issue by calculating our test portfolios' abnormal returns after
hedging out inter- and intra-industry exposure.
11 We obtain the monthly factors and the risk-free rate from Ken French's website:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
12 In unreported results, we construct measures of important supplier stakeholders and find
evidence of predictability from supplier to customer stock returns. These results are available
upon request.
Table II
Correlation between Customer Returns and Supplier
Returns, 1981-2004
Spearman rank correlation coefficients are calculated over all months and over all available stocks
for the following variables. CXRET is the monthly return of a portfolio of a firm's principal cus
tomers minus the CRSP value-weighted market return. R12 is the stock's compounded return over
the prior 12 months. Size is the log of market capitalization as of the end of the previous calen
dar month. B/M is the book-to-market ratio, which is the market value of equity divided by the
Compustat book value of equity. The timing of B/M follows Fama and French (1993) and is as of
the previous December year-end. IXRET is the (value-weighted) stock's industry return minus the
CRSP value-weighted market return. CXIRET is the (value-weighted) stock's customer industry
return minus the CRSP value weighted market return. We assign each CRSP stock to one of 48
industry portfolios at the end of June of each year based on its four-digit SIC code.
CXRET XRET R12 SIZE B/M IXRET CXIRET
CXRET 1.000 0.122 0.016 0.000 0.023 0.218 0.282

RET 1.000 0.037 0.031 0.045 0.168 0.254
R12 1.000 0.267 0.075 0.008 0.046
SIZE 1.000 -0.264 0.005 0.043
B/M 1.000 0.022 0.042
IXRET 1.000 0.291
1.000
Table III shows the basic results of this paper. We report returns in month t of
portfolios formed by sorting on customer returns in month t?1. The rightmost
column shows the returns of a zero-cost portfolio that holds the top 20% high
customer return stocks and sells short the bottom 20% low customer return
stocks. To be included in the portfolio, a firm must have a nonmissing customer
return and nonmissing stock price at the end of the previous month. Also, we set
a minimum liquidity threshold by not allowing trading in stocks with a closing
price at the end of the previous month below $5.13 This ensures that portfolio
returns are not driven by microcapitalization illiquid securities.
Separating stocks according to the lagged return of related firms induces
large differences in subsequent returns. Looking at the difference between high
customer return and low customer return stocks, it is striking that high (low)
customer returns today predict high (low) subsequent stock returns of a related
firm. The customer momentum strategy that is long the top 20% good customer
news stocks and short the bottom 20% bad customer news stocks delivers Fama
and French (1993) abnormal returns of 1.45% per month (?-statistic = 3.61),
or approximately 18.4% per year. Adjusting returns for the stock's own price
momentum by augmenting the factor model with Carhart's (1997) momentum
factor has a negligible effect on the results. Subsequent to portfolio formation,
the baseline long-short portfolio earns abnormal returns of 1.37% per month
(?-statistic = 3.12). Last, we adjust returns using a five-factor model by adding
is YVe run the tests in the paper also relaxing this $5 cut-off, and all results in the paper are
robust to this alternative. These results are available upon request.
Table III
Customer Momentum Strategy, Abnormal Returns 1981-2004
This table shows calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns. At the beginning of every calendar
month, stocks are ranked in ascending order on the basis of the return of a portfolio of its principal
customers at the end of the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of five quin
tile portfolios. All stocks are value (equally) weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios
are rebalanced every calendar month to maintain value (equal) weights. This table includes all
available stocks with stock price greater than $5 at portfolio formation. Alpha is the intercept on
a regression of monthly excess return from the rolling strategy. The explanatory variables are the
monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios, the Carhart (1997) momen
tum factor, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. LIS is the alpha of a zero-cost
portfolio that holds the top 20% high customer return stocks and sells short the bottom 20% low
customer return stocks. Returns and alphas are in monthly percent, ?-statistics are shown below
the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated by *.
Panel A: Value Weights Ql(Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(High) L/S

Excess returns -0.596 -0.157 0.125 0.313 0.982* 1.578*
[-1.42] [-0.41] [0.32] [0.79] [2.14] [3.79]
Three-factor alpha -1.062* -0.796* -0.541* -0.227 0.493* 1.555*
[-3.78] [-3.61] [-2.15] [-0.87] [1.98] [3.60]
Four-factor alpha -0.821* -0.741* -0.488 -0.193 0.556* 1.376*
[-2.93] [-3.28] [-1.89] [-0.72] [1.99] [3.13]
Five-factor alpha -0.797* -0.737* -0.493 -0.019 0.440 1.237*
[-2.87] [-3.04] [-1.94] [-0.07] [1.60] [2.99]
Panel B: Equal Weights Ql(Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(High) L/S
Excess returns -0.457 0.148 0.385 0.391 0.854* 1.311*
[-1.03] [0.38] [1.01] [1.01] [2.04] [4.93]
Three-factor alpha -1.166* -0.661* -0.446* -0.304 0.140 1.306*
[-5.27] [-3.89] [-2.74] [-1.76] [0.71] [4.67]
Four-factor alpha -0.897* -0.482* -0.272 -0.224 0.315 1.212*
[-4.20] [-2.89] [-1.70] [-1.28] [1.61] [4.24]
Five-factor alpha -0.939* -0.549* -0.239 -0.041 0.420* 1.359*
[-4.61] [-3.27] [-1.38] [-0.23] [2.11] [4.79]
the traded liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).14 The liquidity
adjustment has little effect on the result: Subsequent to portfolio formation,
the baseline zero-cost portfolio earns abnormal returns of 1.24% per month (t
statistic = 2.99). The results show that even after controlling for past returns or
a reversal measure of liquidity, high (low) customer momentum stocks earn high
(low) subsequent (risk-adjusted) returns.15 We return to this issue in Section V
where we use a regression approach to allow for a number of control variables.
14 The traded liquidity factor is obtained by sorting the CRSP monthly stocks file data into 10
portfolios based on their sensitivity to the liquidity innovation series, as described in Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003). The traded factor is the (value-weighted) return of a zero-cost portfolio that is
long the highest liquidity beta portfolio and short the lowest liquidity beta portfolio.
15 In addition, none of the five-factor loadings are significant for the long-short customer mo
mentum portfolio.
Figure 2. Customer momentum, event-time CAR. This figure shows the average cumulative
return in month t+k on a long-short portfolio formed on the firm's customer return in month t. At
the beginning of every calendar month, stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the return
of a portfolio of its major customers at the end of the previous month. Stocks are assigned to one of
five quintile portfolios. The figure shows average cumulative returns (in %) over time of a zero-cost
portfolio that holds the top 20% high customer return stocks and sells short the bottom 20% low
customer returns stocks.
The alphas rise monotonically across the quintile portfolios as the customer
return goes from low (negative) in portfolio 1 to high (positive) in portfolio 5.
Although abnormal returns are large and significant for both legs of the long
short strategy, customer momentum returns are asymmetric: The returns of
the long-short portfolio are largely driven by slow diffusion of negative news.
This pattern is consistent with market frictions (such as short-sale constraints)
exacerbating the delayed response of stock prices to new information when bad
news arrives.16 Using equal weights rather than value weights delivers similar
results: The baseline customer momentum portfolio earns a monthly alpha of
1.3% (?-statistic = 4.93).
Figure 2 illustrates the result by reporting how customer returns predict in
dividual stock returns at different horizons. We show the cumulative average
returns in month t+k on the long-short customer momentum portfolios formed
16 Note that the abnormal returns are negative for most of the portfolios. This is due to the fact
that during the sample period the average supplier underperforms the market. The three-factor
monthly alpha of an equally weighted portfolio of all suppliers in our sample is -41 basis points,
probably due to the fact that U.S. suppliers have been continuously squeezed by international
competition (we thank Tuomo Vuolteenaho for suggesting this interpretation).
on customer returns in month t. We also plot the cumulative abnormal return

of the customer portfolio (the sorting variable). To allow for comparisons, we
show returns of the customer portfolio times the total fraction of the supplier
firm's sales accounted for by the principal customers. Figure 2 shows that sup
plier stock prices react to information that causes large swings in the stock
price of their principal customers. Looking at the long-short portfolio, supplier
stock prices rise by 3.9% in month zero, where the (sales-weighted) customer
portfolio jumps by 7.8%. Nevertheless, stock prices drift in the same direction
subsequent to the initial price response. The customer momentum portfolio
earns a cumulative 4.73% over the subsequent year. The predictable positive
returns persist for about a year and then fade away.
In Table IV we explore the relation between the customer returns, the initial
stock price reaction of related firms, and the subsequent price drift on both the
customer and supplier. We compute customer returns using weights equal to
the percentage of total sales going to each customer, and form calendar-time
portfolios as before. In Panel A we report the average cumulative returns on a
long-short portfolio formed on the firm's (sales-weighted) customer return in
month t. CRET is the (sales-weighted) customer return in month t, and CCAR is
the customer cumulative return over the subsequent 6 months. Similarly, RET
is the supplier stock return in month t, and CAR is its cumulative return over
the subsequent 6 months. In Panel B we report the "underreaction" coefficients
(URC) for both the customer and the suppliers. URC is a measure of the initial
price response to a given shock as a fraction of the subsequent abnormal return.
URC is defined as the fraction of total return from month t to month t+6 that
occurs in month t, URC = RET/(RET + CAR), and is designed to proxy for the
amount of underreaction of a stock. If the market efficiently incorporates new
information, this fraction should on average be equal to one. Values of URC
less than one indicate the presence of underreaction or a sluggish stock price
response to news about customers. Conversely, values of URC greater than one
indicate the presence of overreaction to the initial news content embedded in
the customer return.17
The results in Table IV show that on average stock prices underreact to in
formation about related customers by roughly 40%. That is, when customers
experience large returns in a given month t, the stock price of a related supplier
reacts by covering about 60% of the initial price gap in month t, and it subse
quently closes the remaining 40% over the next 6 months. This can also be seen
in the significant positive CAR of the supplier portfolio of 2.8% (?-statistic =
3.74) following the initial price movement of the customer. Note from Panel B
that the URC for customers is 0.94 and not statistically different from one. An
other way to see this, from Panel A of Table IV, is that customers do not have
a significant CCAR following the initial price jump. That is, while information
that generates large price movements for the customer is quickly impounded
into the customer's stock price, only a fraction of the initial price response (60%)
spills over to supplier's stock price, generating the profitability of the customer
We thank Owen Lamont for suggesting this measure to us.
Table IV
Underreaction Coefficients
This table shows returns on the customer momentum portfolio and the corresponding underreaction coefficien
month, stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the return of a portfolio of its major customers at the end
of the customer portfolio times the total fraction of the firm's sales accounted for by the principal customers. S
portfolios. All stocks are value-weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calen
This table includes all available stocks with stock price greater than $5 at portfolio formation. Panel A repo
long-short portfolios formed on the firm customer return in month t. CRET is the customer return in month
returns over the subsequent 6 months [i+1, ?+6]. RET is the supplier's stock return in month t. CAR is the
6 months, ?-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated by
coefficients. URC (underreaction coefficient) is defined as the fraction of total returns from month t to month
(RET + CAR)). PERCSALE is the % of firm sales accounted for by the principal customer, ?-statistics are sho
Panel B, the ?-statistics represent the distance of the coefficient from one, which is the case of no underreaction
by*.
All Smaller PERCSALES Q

Larger
Firms Firms Firms l(Low)
Panel A: Supplier and Customer Returns

PERCSALES 0.351 0.351 0.363 0.086 0.132 0.199
CRET 6.791* 6.795* 7.026* 3.979* 4.710* 5.035*
(Sales weighted) [42.51] [41.74] [41.55] [30.26] [28.78] [42.43]
RET 4.192* 5.270* 2.055* 6.076* 5.350* 4.715*
[13.17] [14.57] [5.09] [3.89] [6.80] [7.56]
CCAR[f+l, ?4-6] 0.442 0.495 0.336 0.502 0.460 0.183
[1.59] [1.72] [1.12] [1.24] [1.50] [0.63]
CAR[?+1, M-6] 2.799* 2.383* 3.854* 2.769 2.457 1.929
[3.74] [2.91] [3.55] [0.64] [1.12] [1.29]
Panel B: Underreaction Coefficients
URCcust 0.939 0.932 0.954 0.888 0.911 0.965

[1.53] [1.70] [1.15] [1.40] [1.78] [0.70]
0.600* 0.689* 0.348* 0.687 0.685 0.710
[5.71] [3.89] [8.15] [0.92] [1.58] [1.81]
momentum portfolio. Looking at larger firms versus smaller firms (defined as

firms below or above the median market capitalization of all CRSP stocks that
month) reveals that the underreaction coefficients tend to be negatively related
to size. Larger firms cover 69% of the abnormal drift in the initial month, clos
ing the remaining 31% gap in the subsequent 6 months. Smaller firms cover
only 35% of the gap in the initial month, closing the remaining 65% in the sub
sequent 6 months. We return to this issue in Section V Although the customer
momentum total abnormal return is roughly the same in large and small cap
securities, prices tend to converge faster for large cap stocks.
The results in Tables III and IV and in Figure 2 support Hypothesis LA: News
travels slowly across stocks that are economically related, generating large sub
sequent returns on a customer momentum portfolio. When positive news hits a
portfolio of a firm's customers, it generates a large positive subsequent drift, as
initially the firm's stock price adjusts only partially. Conversely, when a port
folio of customers experiences large negative returns in a given month, stock
prices have (predictable) negative subsequent returns. This effect generates
the profitability of customer momentum portfolio strategies. These findings
are consistent with firms adjusting only gradually to news about economically
linked firms.
V. Robustness Tests
A. Nonsynchronous Trading, Liquidity, Characteristics, and Size
Although the results are consistent with the LA hypothesis, there are a num
ber of other plausible explanations of the data. Table V shows results for a
series of robustness tests.
A number of papers find that larger firms, or firms with higher levels of ana
lyst coverage, institutional ownership, and trading volume, lead smaller firms
or firms with lower levels of analyst coverage, institutional ownership, and trad
ing volume.18 Given the fact the average customer tends to be much larger than
the average supplier (Table I), the customer momentum results could be a man
ifestation of the lead-lag effect among firms of different size, analyst coverage,
institutional ownership, and trading volume. To ensure that lead-lag effects are
not driving the predictability from customer to suppliers, in Panel A of Table V
we show value-weighted customer momentum returns where we drop all links
from the portfolios in which, at portfolio formation, customer firms are larger,
have higher turnover, have a higher number of analysts providing earnings es
timates, and finally have higher institutional ownership than supplier firms.19
18 Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993), Badrinath, Kale,
and Noe (1995), Chordia and Swaminathan (2000), Hou and Moskowitz (2005), and Hou (2006).
19 We are grateful to the referee for suggesting these tests. We define turnover, TURN, as the
average daily turnover (volume divided by shares outstanding) in the prior year. Analyst coverage,
NUMEST, is the number of analysts providing forecasts of earnings per share for the current
fiscal year. Analysts forecasts are from I/B/E/S. Institutional ownership, IO, is defined as the total
number shares owned by institutions reporting common stocks holdings (13f) to the SEC as of
the last quarter-end divided by the number of shares outstanding. Institutional holdings are from
Thomson Financial.
Table V
Robustness Tests
This table shows calendar-time portfolio returns. At the beginning of every calendar month, stocks are ran
the return of a portfolio of its principal customers in the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to on
are value (equally) weighted within a given portfolio, and the overlapping portfolios are rebalanced every cal
weights. Panel A includes all available stocks with stock price greater than $5 and satisfying the condition on the
ME is the market value of equity in the prior calendar month. TURN is the average daily turnover in the pr
volume divided by shares outstanding. NUMEST is the number of analysts providing forecasts of earnings p
Analysts' forecasts are from I/B/E/S. 10 is institutional ownership, defined as the total number shares owned b
holdings to the SEC as of the last quarter-end divided by the number of shares outstanding. Institutional holdin
is the intercept on a regression of monthly excess return from the rolling strategy. The explanatory variables
and French (1993) mimicking portfolios, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2
additional robustness checks. We report returns of a value (VW) and equally weighted (EW) zero-cost portfolio t
return stocks and sells short the bottom 20% low customer return stocks. "Liquid stocks" are stocks with strict
trading day over the previous 12 months. "Larger cap stocks" are all stocks with market capitalization above
month, smaller stocks are below median. DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw monthly retu
weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, market-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. Indust
monthly returns minus the returns of the corresponding industry portfolio. Returns and alphas are in monthly
the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical significance is indicated by *.
Panel A: Value-Weighted Returns, 1981-2004
Five-Factor Alpha
Restrict Investment to: Ql(Low) Q5(High) L/S Ql(Lo
Supplier's ME > customer's ME -0.792 0.428 1.220* -0.29
[-1.62] [0.92] [2.06] [-0.52
Supplier's TURN > customer TURN -0.781* 0.314 1.095* -0.00
[-2.18] [0.89] [2.23] [-0.01
Supplier's NUMEST > customer NUMEST -1.245* 0.416 1.661* -0.55
[-2.55] [0.82] [2.24] [-0.95
Supplier's IO > customer's 10 -0.894* 0.049 0.943* 0.0
[-2.76] [0.08] [2.31] [0.23
Table V?Continued
Panel B: L/S Returns
1-Month Customer Return
Liquid Stocks Skip a We

Weight # Months VW EW VW EW VW
Return 288 1.578* 1.311* 1.377* 1.046* 1.464*

[3.79] [4.93] [3.16] [3.14] [3.55]
DGTW 288 1.121* 0.839* 0.873* 0.955* 1.061*
[3.23] [3.23] [2.33] [3.19] [3.05]
Smaller firms 288 1.487* 1.071* 0.584 0.610 1.266*
[3.95] [3.06] [0.53] [0.57] [3.69]
Larger firms 288 1.475* 1.336* 1.405* 1.096* 1.375*
[3.70] [4.21] [3.26] [3.45] [3.29]
1981-1992 144 1.963* 1.391* 0.501 0.550 1.763*
[4.39] [4.28] [0.76] [0.79] [4.08]
1993-2004 144 1.266* 0.698 1.367* 1.034* 1.161
[1.99] [1.66] [3.12] [3.08] [1.72]
Industry adjusted 288 0.975* 0.508* 0.812* 0.711* 0.882*
[2.89] [2.14] [2.23] [2.51] [2.55]
Different industry 288 1.157* 1.162* 1.240* 1.212* 1.023*
[4.83] [2.84] [2.57] [3.68] [3.43]
Same industry 288 1.288* 1.192* 1.938* 1.372* 1.173*
[2.49] [2.90] [3.53] [2.69] [2.34]
These filters reduce the sample considerably, given that SFAS 131 requires that
firms report customers accounting for at least 10% of reported sales. Results in
Panel A of Table V show that the customer momentum predictability is largely
unaffected by this adjustment, indicating that lead-lag effects are unlikely to
account for the results. After restricting investments to supplier firms that
are larger than their customers, the average monthly five-factor alpha across
all four specifications is around 1.37% per month and, although portfolios are
much less diversified given the limited sample, we can safely reject the null
hypothesis of no predictability on each of the four specifications. We further
return to the issue of lead-lag effects in the subsection below, where we use
cross-sectional regressions to allow for a richer set of controls.
Panel B of Table V presents additional robustness tests. We show average
monthly returns of the long-short customer momentum portfolio. In columns
1 to 4 we report the return of portfolios sorted on lagged 1-month customer
return. Nonsynchronous trading can generate positive autocorrelation across
stocks.20 In the analysis, we use monthly data and exclude low priced stocks
when constricting the test assets; hence, nonsynchronous trading is unlikely
to be driving the results. Confirming this intuition, Table V shows that skip
ping a week between portfolio formation and investment has little effect on
the return of the customer momentum portfolio. Also, although we exclude
low priced stocks when constricting the test assets, it is plausible that some
illiquid stocks are not captured by this rough filter. Furthermore, there is
the possibility some stocks don't trade for weeks, thus generating an appar
ent lagged reaction to news not captured by simply skipping a week between
portfolio formation and investment. To control for liquidity effects, we com
pute the test asset by only including stocks with strictly positive volume every
trading day over the previous 12 months. The results in Table V show this ad
justment has little effect on the return of the customer momentum portfolio.
Given the evidence on five-factor alphas in Table III and the results of Table V,
we conclude that liquidity is unlikely to be driving the customer momentum
result.
Daniel and Titman (1997, 1998) suggest that characteristics can be better
predictors of future returns than factor loadings. Following Daniel et al. (1997),
we subtract from each stock return the return on a portfolio of firms matched on
market equity, market-to-book, and prior 1-year return quintiles (a total of 125
matching portfolios).21 We industry-adjust returns in a similar fashion using
the 48 industry-matched portfolios.22 The results in Table V show that firms
whose customers experienced good (bad) news out- (under-)perform their corre
sponding characteristic portfolios or industry benchmark. Splitting the sample
20 Lo and MacKinlay (1990).

21 These 125 portfolios are reformed every month based on the market equity, market-to-book
ratio, and prior year return from the previous month. The portfolios are equal weighted and the
quintiles are defined with respect to the entire CRSP universe in that month.
22 Industries are defined as in Fama and French (1997). All the results in the paper are robust
to using alternative (coarser) industry classifications.
into smaller and larger firms (defined as firms below or above the median mar
ket capitalization of all CRSP stocks that month) or splitting the sample in
halves by time period also has little effect on the results.
Columns 7 and 8 report results for a portfolio sorted on 1-year customer re
turns. We skip a month between the sorting period and portfolio formation.
Looking at 1-year customer momentum, the results do vary by firms' size. For
equally weighted portfolios (or for smaller firms) the 1-year customer momen
tum is large and highly significant. The baseline rolling strategy earns returns
of 1.13% a month (?-statistic = 4.16). On the other hand, although returns of
value-weighted strategies (or larger cap stocks) are large in magnitude (the
average return of the value-weighted 1-year customer momentum is about 70
basis points per month), we cannot reject the hypothesis of no predictability at
conventional significance levels.
All of these results tell a consistent story: Lagged customer stock returns
predict subsequent stock returns of linked supplier firms. Prices react to news
about firms' principal customers but later drift in the same direction. The drift is
equally large (on average about 100 basis points per month) for both smaller and
large cap securities, but its persistence is correlated with size: Prices converge
faster in large cap securities. For smaller firms or equally weighted portfolios,
the predictable returns persist for over a year.
B. Fama-MacBeth Regressions: Hedged Returns

In this section we use a Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression
approach to isolate the return predictability due to customer-supplier links
by hedging out exposure to a series of variables known to forecast the cross
section of returns. Because we are interested in testing return predictability
of individual stocks generated by firm-specific news about linked firms, it is
important to control for variables that would cause commonalities across asset
returns.
We use Fama and MacBeth (1973) forecasting regressions of individual stock
returns on a series of controls. The dependent variable is this month's supplier
stock return. The independent variables of interest are the 1-month and 1-year
lagged stock returns of the firm's principal customer. We include as controls
the supplier firm's own 1-month lagged stock return and 1-year lagged stock
return. These variables control for the reversal effect of Jegadeesh (1990) and
for the price momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). We control
for the industry momentum effect of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) by using
lagged returns of the firm's industry portfolio. We use lagged returns of the cus
tomer's industry portfolio to control for the cross-industry momentum of Menzly
and Ozbas (2006). Finally, we control for the intra-industry lead-lag effect of
Hou (2006) by using suppliers' and customers' industry size-sorted portfolios.
Following Hou (2006) we sort firms in each industry into three size portfolios
(bottom 30%, middle 40%, and top 30%) according to end-of-June market capi
talization and compute equally weighted returns. We use as controls the lagged
returns of the small, medium, and large industry portfolios corresponding to
both the customer and the supplier.23 The loadings on these additional portfolios
capture systematic lead-lag effects across or within industry. We also include
(but we do not report in the tables) firms' size and book-to-market as additional
controls.
Since we are running 1-month-ahead forecasting regressions, the time series
of the regression coefficients can be interpreted as the monthly return of a zero
cost portfolio that hedges out the risk exposure of the remaining variables.24
Nevertheless, achieving these returns is likely to be difficult, since, although
the weights of the long-short portfolio sum up to zero, the single weights are
unconstrained, and hence the regression could call for extreme overweighting of
some securities. To obtain feasible returns, we follow Daniel and Titman (2006)
and rescale the positive and negative portfolio weights so that the coefficients
correspond to the profit of going long $1 and short $1 (either equally weighted or
value weighted).25 Table VI reports four-factor alphas of each of these portfolios.
The returns in the table have the following interpretation: the profit of going
long $1 and short $1 in a customer momentum strategy using all the available
stocks in a single portfolio after hedging out exposure to size, book-to-market,
1-month reversals, price momentum, industry momentum, cross-industry mo
mentum, and lead-lag effects.
The results in Table VI give an unambiguous answer: Past customer re
turns forecast subsequent supplier stock returns. The effect is large, robust,
and largely unrelated to other documented predictability effects.26 Using the
full set of controls and value-weighted portfolios, the average net effect in Table
VI (after hedging) is around 88 basis points per month.
VI. Variation in Inattention

If limited investor attention is driving the return predictability results, vary
ing inattention should vary the magnitude and significance of the result. In this
section we use a proxy to identify subsets of firms where attention constraints
are more (less) likely to be binding. We test the hypothesis that return pre
dictability is more (less) severe for those firms in which it is more (less) likely
that information is simultaneously collected about both of the linked firms,
reducing the inattention to the customer-supplier link.
The proxy we use is "common ownership," COMOWN. For every link rela
tion, we use data on mutual fund holdings to compute common ownership as
COMOWN = (#COMMON/#FUNDS), that is, the number of mutual funds hold
ing both the customer and the supplier (#COMMON) divided by the number of
mutual funds holding the supplier over the same month (#FUNDS). COMOWN
23 For brevity we only report coefficients on the small and large industry portfolios.
24 See Fama (1976).
25 See Daniel and Titman (2006).
26 Adding contemporaneous customer returns as a regressor to control for the indirect effect of
omitted contemporaneous customer returns has no effect on the results. For brevity we do not
report these results, but they are available upon request.
Table VI g
Cross-Sectional Regressions, Hedged Returns
This table reports monthly abnormal returns of a portfolio constructed using Fama-MacBeth forecasting re
The dependent variable is the monthly stock return. The explanatory variables are the lagged customer re
return (RET), the lagged return of the corresponding industry portfolio (INDRET), the lagged return of the corr
(CINDRET), the lagged returns of the corresponding size-sorted small (P1JRET) and large (P3JRET) industry por
corresponding customer size-sorted small (Pl-CIRET) and large (P3-CIRET) industry portfolio. To compute size-so
industry into three size portfolios (PI bottom 30%, P2 middle 40%, and P3 top 30%) according to end-of-June ma
weighted returns. Firm size (log of market equity), book-to-market, 1-month size-sorted medium (P2) industry
1-year size-sorted small (PI), medium (PI) and large (P3) industry and customer industry portfolios are included
Cross-sectional regressions are run every calendar month. We rescale the portfolio weights to correspond to the
(either equally weighted or value-weighted). Abnormal returns are the intercept on a regression of monthl
The explanatory variables are the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios an
Returns are in monthly percent, ?-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates, and 5% statistical sig
- Equal Weights
-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (
CRET?_i 0.895* 0.730* 0.724* 0.445 0.730* 1.170* 1.151*
[4.03] [2.99] [3.01] [1.83] [2.68] [3.57] [3.10
CRET?_12,?-2 0.529* 0.598* 0.604* 0.529* 0.220 -0.136 -0.0
[2.88] [2.80] [2.83] [2.44] [1.20] [-0.43] [-0.08] [
RETt-i -0.862* -0.866* -1.005* -1.089* -0.119 0.0
[-2.69] [-2.69] [-3.22] [-3.88] [-0.32] [0.0
RETt_i2,?-2 0.344 0.167 0.194 0.100 -0.071 0.3
[1.22] [0.53] [0.62] [0.36] [-0.19] [
INDRETt-i 0.791* 0.819* 0.518* 0.297 0.
[3.04] [3.32] [2.33] [0.87] [0.7
INDRETt-i2,?-i 0.208 0.219 0.18 -0.286 -0.
[0.92] [0.97] [0.85] [-0.79] [-0.7
CINDRETt-i 1.407* 1.096*
[4.92] [3
Equal Weights Value W
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CINDRETt_i2,t-i -0.38 0.202 g.

[-1.79] [0
Pl_INDRETt-i 0.198 -0.074 ?
[1.06] [
P3_INDRETt_i 0.820
Pl_CINDRETt_i
[3.82]
0.234
[1.07]
P3_CINDRETt_i 0.59
[3.26]
thus measures the fraction of all mutual funds owning the supplier firm that
also own the customer. For example, suppose that at the end of month t, 100
mutual funds hold shares of XYZ. Firm XYZ's customer is ABC. If out of the 100
managers holding XYZ, 60 managers also hold shares of ABC, COMOWN for
firm XYZ is given by 60/100 = 60%. To construct COMOWN, we extract quar
terly mutual fund holdings from the CDA/Spectrum mutual funds database
and match calendar-month and quarter-end dates of the holdings assuming
that funds do not change holdings between reports. The idea behind COMOWN
is that mutual fund managers holding both securities in their portfolios are
more likely to gather information or monitor more closely both the customer
and the supplier. Thus, we expect information about related firms to be im
pounded into prices more quickly for stocks with a higher fraction of common
fund ownership.
Every calendar month, we use independent sorts to rank stocks in two groups
(low and high) based on the measure COMOWN. We then perform the customer
momentum strategy (long-short customer momentum portfolios) separately for
each of the high COMOWN and low COMOWN groups. Our COMOWN measure
is scaled by the number of funds to control for the fact that mutual funds tend
to have portfolio weights tilted toward larger cap liquid securities; hence, our
measure of common ownership is designed to control for liquidity and breadth
of ownership issues.27 In order to further ensure that the results are not driven
by small cap illiquid securities, we also report long-short returns by size and
total fund ownership.
We report the results in Table VII. Consistent with the customer momentum
returns being driven by investor inattention, varying inattention, as proxied
by the fraction of common managers' holdings, significantly varies the returns
to customer momentum. Looking at the universe of large cap securities (those
above the NYSE median) with fund ownership of at least 20 managers, the cus
tomer momentum portfolio for stocks with a low (or zero) overlap of common mu
tual fund managers (high inattention) delivers 2.70% per month (?-statistic =
3.49, equally weighted), while the same zero-cost portfolio for securities with
a large amount of common ownership across funds (low inattention) generates
0.61% per month (?-statistic = 1.05). The spread in common ownership gen
erates a significant spread in the returns to customer momentum (high inat
tention minus low inattention) of 2.09% per month (?-statistic = 2.42). Other
results reported in Table VII show this same pattern: Prices of suppliers with a
lower fraction of managers holding shares of both the customer and the supplier
underreact significantly more to news about related customers than suppliers
who are more commonly owned with their customers. The spread in customer
momentum returns is large, on average 132 basis points per month, although
as the returns are volatile, in some subsamples we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis that the returns are statistically different.28
27 The correlation between COMOWN and total mutual fund ownership is 7%.
28 All of the point estimates of differences are in the same direction and are greater than 90
basis points per month. However, double sorting significantly reduces the number of stocks in each
portfolio, substantially raising idiosyncratic volatility.
Table VII
Mutual Fund Common Ownership, Customer Momentum
This table shows calendar-time portfolio returns. At the beginning of every calendar month, stocks are ranked
return of a portfolio of its principal customers in the previous month. The ranked stocks are assigned to one of
include all available stocks with stock price greater than $5 at portfolio formation. Stocks are further split in
based on COMOWN. For each supplier "common ownership", COMOWN = (#COMMON/#FUNDS), is defined
both the customer and the supplier in that calendar month (ttCOMMON) divided by the number of mutual fun
month (#FUNDS). All stocks are value (equally) weighted within a given portfolio, and the overlapping po
month to maintain value (equal) weights. We report returns of a value (VW) and equally weighted (EW) zero
high customer return stocks and sells short the bottom 20% low customer return stocks. Returns are in mont
the coefficient estimates. 5% statistical significance is indicated by *.
At Least 20 Mutual Funds Holding th

At Least 10 Larg
All Stocks All Stocks Common Funds (CRSP
EW VW EW VW EW VW EW
Low COMOWN 1.653* 2.301* 1.659* 2.306* 1.469 1.889* 1.572*
Lower percentage of [5.46] [5.24] [2.96] [3.64] [1.75] [2.08] [2.82]
common ownership
High COMOWN 0.750* 1.098* 0.528 0.736 0.532 0.835 0.407
Higher percentage of [1.97] [2.17] [0.98] [1.23] [0.85] [1.21] [0.75]
common ownership
High-low -0.903* -1.203* -1.131 -1.571* -0.937 -1.054 -1.165
[-2.08] [-1.99] -1.60] [-1.98] [-0.92] [-0.95] -1.66]
The results in Table VII lend support to the customer momentum returns doc
umented in Section IV and Section V being driven by investor inattention (as
proxied by disjoint fund ownership). Furthermore, they provide some evidence
consistent with high COMOWN managers keeping prices closer to fundamen
tals, as news about related firms appears to be impounded into prices more
quickly for stocks with a higher fraction of COMOWN.
As common holding managers are more likely to jointly monitor both the
customer and the supplier, we would expect a common fund to promptly react
and trade when information about a related firm is released into the market. On
the other hand, managers that do not hold a firm's customer in their portfolio
are more likely to initially overlook or react with a lag to news about a firm's
principal customer, and thus will trade less promptly on these customer shocks.
We now turn to a test of this hypothesis.29
We test this implication by looking at net trading activity by mutual fund
managers. For every stock in our sample, let the total number of shares (S)
owned by the mutual fund sector at the end of quarter t be equal to S = CS +
NCS, where CS (common shares) is the total number of shares held by managers
who also hold shares of the firm's principal customer, and NCS (noncommon
shares) is the total number of shares held by managers who do not hold shares of
the firm's principal customer. Net mutual fund purchases for stockj (NETBUY)
in quarter t is given by
NFTBIJYSHROUTt-x
= ASjt = SHROUTt-i
ACSjt +.ANCSjt
SHROUTt^
NETBUY0 NETBUYNC (1)
NETBUYjt =NETBUYcjt +NETBUY*]tc,

where SHROUT is total shares outstanding. Equation (1) decomposes the total
net purchase by mutual funds (as a fraction of shares outstanding) into net
purchases by common (C) and noncommon managers (NC). We regress net pur
chases in quarter t on contemporaneous and lagged customer returns (CRET),
and a series of controls X,30 to estimate the sensitivity to linked customer news:
NETBUY] = a + b[CRETlt + 0% + v\ ie {C, NC}. (2)

Under the null hypothesis that common managers are more likely to trade
stocks in response to news about related firms we have b^ > b^c. That is, ce
teris paribus, we expect managers holding both firm XYZ and its customer
ABC to be more likely to purchase (sell) shares of XYZ in quarters when ABC
experiences good (bad) news. Clearly, equation (2) is silent about causality.
Although it could be the case that common managers react to shocks about
29 We would like to thank Toby Moskowitz for suggesting this test.

30 Controls include lagged customer and own-firm returns, industry returns, size, and book-to
market.
related customers by purchasing more shares of the supplier, an alternative

hypothesis is that, in a given quarter, common managers buy both suppliers
and customers in tandem and the buying activity actually pushes both prices
higher. Given the fact that we observe fund holdings at the semiannual or at
most the quarterly level, we cannot distinguish between the two hypotheses.
We simply test the hypothesis that, when compared to noncommon funds, com
mon funds are more likely to be net purchasers (sellers) of a stock in quarters
when linked firms experience large stock returns (controlling for the stock's own
return), consistent with common ownership being a relaxation in the limited
attention constraint.
We estimate equation (2) using Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional
regressions. Cross-sectional regressions are run every quarter and Table VIII
reports time-series averages of the coefficients. The column "difference" tests
the null hypothesis b^ = 6^c.31 The results in Table VIII show that common
managers are more likely to be net purchasers (sellers) of stocks in quarters in
which their customer firms experience large positive (negative) returns, while
noncommon managers are not significantly related to contemporaneous cus
tomer returns. Further, as conjectured, the difference b? ? bif0 is positive and
significant, indicating that common managers trade significantly more than
noncommon managers on news about a linked customer firm. Figure 3 bet
ter illustrates the result by reporting how customer returns predict managers'
trading activity at different horizons. We show the cumulative average returns
in quarter t+k on the long-short customer momentum portfolios formed on
customer returns in quarter ?,32 We also plot mutual fund net purchases on
the long-short customer momentum portfolio over time. Figure 3 shows that
common funds immediately react to information that causes large swings in
the stock price of their principal customers. Looking at the long-short port
folio, common funds tend to increase their holdings in quarter 0 (the sorting
quarter), while noncommon managers show almost zero net trading. Net pur
chases by noncommon managers spike in quarter 1, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that managers not holding a firm's customers in their portfolio
are more likely to initially overlook the impact of customer-related news and
react with a significant lag (one quarter).
Models 2 and 3 in Table VIII show that, controlling for the firm's own past
returns, noncommon managers' net purchases are unrelated to both contem
poraneous and lagged customer returns, while they are strongly related to the
firm's own stock return. Thus, given a customer shock at date ?, it appears that
noncommon manager net purchases at date ?+1 are entirely due to the fact
31 We use the time-series variation of the difference in the two coefficients to generate standard
errors.
32 These returns are the quarterly counterpart to Figure 2. At the beginning of every quarter,
stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the return of a portfolio of its major customers at the
end of the previous quarter. Stocks are assigned to one of five quintile portfolios. The figure shows
average cumulative returns (in %) and mutual fund net purchases (in %) over time of a zero-cost
portfolio that holds suppliers with the top 20% customer return stocks and sells short suppliers
with the bottom 20% customer return stocks.
Table VIII ^
Mutual Fund Common Ownership, Net Purchases
This table reports quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions of mutual fund manager net buying activity. The depend
quarterly net purchase of mutual fund managers. For a given stock, NETBUY0 is defined as NETBUY0 = ACSt/SHRO
number of shares owned by mutual fund managers that also hold the customer in their portfolio in a given quarter. S
is defined as NETBUYN0 = ANCSt/SHROUTt-i, where ANCSt is the change in total number of shares owned by mu
customer in their portfolio. The explanatory variables are the contemporaneous and lagged customer return iCRET
lagged returns iRET), the return of the corresponding industry portfolio UNDRET), the stock's market capitalization i
NETBUY? = a + b\CRET\ + 0% + v\ ie {C,NC}.
Cross-sectional regressions are run every calendar quarter and the estimates are weighted by the cross-sectio
inverse of the standard error of the coefficients in the cross-sectional regressions. Cross-sectional standard errors
column "difference" tests the null hypothesis b? = b^0. Fama-MacBeth ?-statistics are reported below the coeffici
is indicated by *. <?"
(1) (2) (3) |"

NETBUYC NETBUYNC Diff NETBUYC NETBUYNC Diff NE
CRETt 0.240* -0.052 0.292* 0.248* -0.342 0.590* 0.
[2.66] [-0.32] [2.53] [2.44] [-1.73] [2.58]
CRETt_i 0.218 0.282* 0.242* -0.104
[1.92] [2.60] [2.14] [-0.57] [2
CRETt-5,^2 0.047 0.041 0.051 -0.039
[0.80] [0.46] [0.77] [-0.41] [0
RETt 0.377* 1.355* 0.376* 1
[4.40] [9.00] [4.2
RETt-i 0.267* 0.889* 0.267* 0
[3.73] [6.25] [3.5
RETt_5i-2 0.078* 0.245* 0.069*
[2.83] [5.09] [2.5
IRETt_5i 0.170 -0
M/B -0.025 -0.085 -0.028 -
[-1.01] [-1.66] [-1.0
log(MEt) 0.020 -0.008 0.020 -
[1.15] [-0.30] [1.14
R2 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.030 0.026
Figure 3. Customer momentum, event-time CAR, and mutual fund's net purchases. This
figure shows the average cumulative return and mutual funds net purchases in quarter t+k on a
long-short portfolio formed on the firm's customer return in quarter t. At the beginning of every
quarter, stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the return of a portfolio of its major cus
tomers at the end of the previous quarter. Stocks are assigned to one of five quintile portfolios. The
figure shows average cumulative returns (in %) over time of a zero-cost portfolio that holds the
top 20% high customer return stocks and sells short the bottom 20% low customer returns stocks,
and the average net purchases by common and noncommon funds. For a given stock NETBUY
COMMON is defined as ACSt/SHROUTt^i, where ACSt is the change in total number of shares
owned by mutual fund managers that also hold the customer in their portfolio in a given quar
ter. SHROUT is shares outstanding. NETBUY NONCOMMON is defined as ANCSt/SHROUTt_lf
where ANCSt is the change in total number of shares owned by mutual fund managers that do not
hold the customer in their portfolio.
that the high returns of the customer at date t predict high supplier returns at
?+1. Once controlling for the effect customer returns have on a supplier's own
returns, the marginal effect of customer returns on noncommon managers' net
purchases is not significant.
Taken jointly, the results in Tables VII and VIII, and in Figure 3, lend sup
port to the hypothesis of the customer momentum findings being driven by
inattention, as proxied by cross-ownership or cross-trading by mutual fund
managers, in that variation in inattention leads to variation in the extent of
return predictability. Suppliers in which market participants are more likely
to simultaneously collect information about linked customers, thus reducing
"inattention" to the customer-supplier link, see more timely trading on linked
customer shocks and less of a lag in price response to the shocks (so less return
predictability).
VII. Real Effects

We show a significant and predictable return in supplier firms, consis
tent with some investors ignoring material and publicly available customer
supplier links. The investor limited attention hypothesis is based on the as
sumption that investors should give attention to customer-supplier links. In
this section we provide evidence to support this assumption. We exploit time
variation in our customer-supplier links data and show that firms' real opera
tions are significantly more correlated when they are linked, relative to periods
when they are not linked. The real quantities we examine are sales and oper
ating income. Panel A of Table IX gives the correlations between customer and
supplier sales and operating income,33 both when the pair are linked and not
linked. From Panel B, correlations and cross-correlations of all real quantities
rise substantially when the customer and supplier are linked. The correla
tion of customer to supplier operating income, for example, increases by 38.7%
(?-statistic = 3.88), while the correlation of customer to supplier sales increases
by 51.4% (?-statistic = 8.55) when linked.
Panel C tests the ability of customer shocks today to predict future real shocks
in supplier firms, both when a customer and a supplier are linked and not
linked. We use a regression framework where we can control for industry and
time effects. The dependent variables are suppliers' future annual operating
income and sales (both scaled by assets), and future monthly returns. The in
dependent variable, CRET(t), is today's customer return. The categorical vari
able LINK is equal to one when two firms are linked via a customer-supplier
relationship, and zero otherwise. We include industry-pair by date fixed effects,
defined as the distinct (Cus. Ind, Supp. Ind.) pair that exists between customer
and supplier firms interacted with date (year or month). The coefficient on the
interaction of CRET(t) * LINK(t) can be interpreted as the predictive power of
customer shocks over suppliers' subsequent profits and returns within a given
industry-pair (e.g., steel and automobiles) and year (e.g., 1981), solely because
the given set of firms are linked as opposed to not linked.
The results in Column 1 and Column 2 of Panel C suggest that when a cus
tomer and supplier are not linked, shocks to the customer do not have predictive
power over the future profits or sales of the supplier. In contrast, when the two
firms are linked (LINK * CRET), customer shocks today predict the future real
shocks in the supplier firm. Column 3 presents similar evidence for returns.
This section presents evidence that firms' real operations and returns are sig
nificantly more related when the two firms are linked via a customer-supplier
relationship than when they are not linked. This lends support to the assump
tion, and affirms the intuition, that customer-supplier relationships generate
significant comovements in the underlying cash flows of the linked firms, and
thus should be given attention by investors.
33 Both of the real quantities are winsorized at the .01 level in the table. The results are not
sensitive to logging the variables or using another winsorizing level.
Table IX
Real Effects of Company Links
This table presents the effect of company links on the real quantities of firm sales and operating income. Pa
annual sales and operating incomes of customers and suppliers, along with 1-year lagged customers' sales and op
for each customer-supplier pair as a year when the supplier reports the given customer as a major customer (m
link year is a year when the customer and supplier are not linked in the data. Panel B reports differences betwee
Panel C reports predictive regressions of supplier real quantities and returns on past customer shocks. Both
by firm assets and are annual figures, while returns are monthly to keep comparability to previous tables. CRE
year for the annual variables and prior month for the return regressions. All variables in the table are winsorize
The results are not sensitive to logging or using other winsorizing cutoffs. All regressions include industry-pair
fixed effects. Industry pair is defined as the pairing of industries to which the customer and supplier, respecti
relationship. The regressions are estimated with constants, which are not reported. Standard errors are adju
monthly level, ?-statistics calculated using the robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. 5% st
OILup ? Operating Income of Supplier/Assets Linked S?us = Sales of Customer Lin
i OINu? = Operating Income of Supplier/Assets Not Linked S?ru? = Sales of Customer No
Panel A: Correlations of Real Quantities Panel B: Differences in Corr

Linked Not Linked Correlation (Linked - Not
0ISup ?tSup nTSup qSup

U1NL
O/f" 0.275 0.358 OjCus
UINL 0.199 0.222 iOISuP, OICus) 0.077*
[3.88]
c?Cus 0.315 0.428 qCus 0.237 0.283 0.145*
iSSup,SCus)
[8.55]
Table IX?Continued
Panel C: Real Effects of Customer Shocks - Linked and Not Linked
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable Operating Income/Assets (?+1) Sales/Assets (?4-1)
CRET(?) -0.004 CRET(?) -0.011

[-0.77] [-0.84]
LINK*CRET(?) 0.024* LINK*CRET(?) 0.072*
[3.00] [2.91]
Ind-pair-date fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.422 0.540
VTII. Conclusion
This paper suggests that investor limited attention can lead to return pre
dictability across assets. We provide evidence consistent with investors display
ing limited attention, and this limited attention having a substantial effect on
asset prices. The customer-supplier links in the paper are publicly available
and in some cases represent longstanding relationships between firms, with
the given customer on average accounting for 20% of the supplier's sales. In
vestors, however, fail to take these links into account, resulting in predictable
returns by buying (selling) the supplier firm following a positive (negative)
shock to its customer. This customer momentum strategy yields large returns
and is largely unaffected in both magnitude and significance by controlling
for the three-factor model, liquidity, own-firm momentum, industry momen
tum, within-industry lead-lag relationships, and across-industry momentum.
As well, we focus on short-term predictability using monthly data; hence mar
ket microstructure noise typical of studies with daily or intradaily data and
asset pricing model misspecification problems related to long-term studies are
less likely to be an issue.
We believe the customer-supplier link provides a natural framework to test
investor inattention. Not only is the link publicly available to all investors, but
given our results on real effects of the link, it is difficult to argue that this link
should not be taken into account when forming expectations about suppliers'
future cash flows. More generally, customer-supplier limited attention poses
a roadblock for standard asset pricing models. What we document is not an
isolated situation that is constrained to a few firms, but instead is a system
atic violation across firms that has a material effect on prices. If it is true that
investors ignore even these blatant links, then the informational efficiency of
prices to reflect more complex pieces of information is potentially less likely.
We believe future research in limited attention should examine to what extent
different types of information and different delivery paths affect investors' at
tention, and how attention varies across other financial instruments or product
markets. This could give us a better understanding of how investors process in
formation and allow us to make richer empirical predictions about asset prices.
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American Finance Association

Economic Links and Predictable Returns

Economic Links and Predictable Returns

2 Both firms traded on the NYSE and had analyst coverage.

I. Background and Literature Review

3 For a summary of the literature, see Pashler and Johnston (1998).

finds evidence that such lead-lag effects are predominantly an intraindustry

II. Customer Data

Min Max Mean SD Median

Panel A: Time Series (24 Annual Observations, 1981-2004)

Firm size percentile 0.01 0.99 0.48 0.27 0.48

III. Limited Attention Hypothesis and Underreaction

Hypothesis LA (Limited Attention): Stock prices underreact to firm-specific in

CXRET XRET R12 SIZE B/M IXRET CXIRET

CXRET 1.000 0.122 0.016 0.000 0.023 0.218 0.282

Panel A: Value Weights Ql(Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5(High) L/S

on customer returns in month t. We also plot the cumulative abnormal return

We thank Owen Lamont for suggesting this measure to us.

All Smaller PERCSALES Q

Panel A: Supplier and Customer Returns

Panel B: Underreaction Coefficients

URCcust 0.939 0.932 0.954 0.888 0.911 0.965

momentum portfolio. Looking at larger firms versus smaller firms (defined as

Panel A: Value-Weighted Returns, 1981-2004

1-Month Customer Return

Liquid Stocks Skip a We

Return 288 1.578* 1.311* 1.377* 1.046* 1.464*

20 Lo and MacKinlay (1990).

B. Fama-MacBeth Regressions: Hedged Returns

VI. Variation in Inattention

CINDRETt_i2,t-i -0.38 0.202 g.

At Least 20 Mutual Funds Holding th

NETBUYjt =NETBUYcjt +NETBUY*]tc,

NETBUY] = a + b[CRETlt + 0% + v\ ie {C, NC}. (2)

29 We would like to thank Toby Moskowitz for suggesting this test.

related customers by purchasing more shares of the supplier, an alternative

NETBUY? = a + b\CRET\ + 0% + v\ ie {C,NC}.

(1) (2) (3) |"

VII. Real Effects

OILup ? Operating Income of Supplier/Assets Linked S?us = Sales of Customer Lin

i OINu? = Operating Income of Supplier/Assets Not Linked S?ru? = Sales of Customer No

Panel A: Correlations of Real Quantities Panel B: Differences in Corr

0ISup ?tSup nTSup qSup

Panel C: Real Effects of Customer Shocks - Linked and Not Linked

CRET(?) -0.004 CRET(?) -0.011

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