19th HD Memo DEFENCE FINALL

THE 19TH HENRY DUNANT MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
ICC TRIAL CHAMBER
At The Hague
SITUATION IN THE STATE OF SOHULWA
IN THE CASE OF
THE PROSECUTOR v. Z. KARMONIC
DISPUTE CONCERNING CRIME OF GENOCIDE AND WAR CRIMES
PUBLIC DOCUMENT
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENCE

(19TH HENRY DUNANT MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………….……………….........………………………..……..3
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………..........……………...……………….….………...7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES….……………......………………………………….…...…….....8
STATEMENT OF FACTS……..………..…………………………………………………….9
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS..………..………………………………………………........11
PLEADINGS..........................…………………….……….……………………..…………..12
I. WHETHER MR. Z KARMONIC IS GUILTY OF COMMITTING THE

CRIME OF GENOCIDE UNDER ARTICLE 6(a) OF THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
A. Element of Specific intent is not satisfied….……....……………………..………… 12

B. Responsibility cannot be attributed to Z.Karmonic. ………….…………...…………16
II. WHETHER MR. Z KARMONIC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING

WAR CRIMES UNDER ARTICLE 8(2)(B)(II) FOR INTENTIONALLY
LAUNCHING AN ATTACK AGAINST THE NUCLEAR ENERGY PLANTS
OF ROKUMBA?
A. The Object Of The Attack Was Not Civilian Objects….……….……………………18

B. The Perpetrator Did Not Intend Civilian Objects To Be The Objects Of The Attack.21
C. Command Responsibility cannot be attributed to Mr. Z.Karmonic.............................23
III. WHETHER MR. Z.KARMONIC IS LIABLE FOR THE WAR CRIME OF

EXCESSIVE INCIDENTAL DEATH, INJURY, OR DAMAGE UNDER
ARTICLE 8(2)(B)(IV) OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
A. Damages are not widespread and excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated….……….……………………..………...…..25
B. Z.Karmonic did not foresee the attack that the attack would cause widespread and
excessive damage to civilian objects and the natural environment. …………...……27
PRAYER………………………………………………………………………………...…..29
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENCE 2 of 29

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
1. ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
2. STATUTE OF THE ICTY (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA)
3. STATUTE OF THE ICTR (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA) STATUTE
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
1. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949
2. PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949
3. THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF GENOCIDE, 1948
4. CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, ICRC
BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES

1. MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7TH EDN, CAMBRIDGE
2. KNUT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIME UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF
ICC, SOURCES AND COMMENTARY, 2004 EDN.
3. RALPH HENHAM, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE, INTERNATIONAL,
COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS
4. ROBERT CRYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE, 2ND EDN, CAMBRIDGE

5. W.A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, 4th EDN., 2011, CAMBRIDGE
6. W.A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2ND EDN, CAMBRIDGE
7. MARK KLAMBERG; COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT; TORKEL OPSAHL ACADEMIC EPUBLSIHER BRUSSELS; 2017
8. ICRC REPORT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES

OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS
9. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC
STUDY)
10. G METTRAUX ‘THE LAW AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY’ (2009)
CASES
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
1. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, 257 (July 8, 1996).
INTERNATION CRIMINAL COURT
1. Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir Case no ICC-02/05-01/09-139, ICC, 12
December 2011
2. Prosecutor v. Bemba (Case No. ICC–01/05–01/08), Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, 15 June, 2009

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF FORMER YUGOSALAVIA
1. Prosecutor v Stakic Case No. IT-97-24-T), Judgment, 31 July 2003
2. Prosecutor v. Jelisic (Case No. IT-95-10-A), Judgment, 5 July 2001
3. Prosecutor v. Karadˇzi ́c (Case No. IT-95-5-R61), Judgment, 11th July 2013
4. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, (Case No. IT-95-14-T), Judgment, 3 March 2000
5. Prosecutor v. Kvočka (Case No. IT-98-30/1-T), Judgment, 2 November 2001
6. Prosecutor v Delalic, (Case No. IT-96-21-T), Judgment, 16 November, 1998
7. Prosecutor v Kordić and Cerkez IT-95-14/2, Judgment, 26 February 2001
8. Prosecutor V Dario Kordic And Mario Erkez, Appeal Chamber, IT-95-14/2-A
9. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber, December 5, 2003
10. Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial Chamber, November 16, 2005
11. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber, January 31, 2005
12. Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34, Trial Chamber, March 31,
2003
13. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and Others, IT-95-16-T
14. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, and Kubura, Judgment, IT-01-47-T, 15 Mar2006
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
1. Prosecutor v Seromba (Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I), Judgement 13 December, 2006
2. Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Case No. ICTR-96-3), Judgment and Sentence, 6 December
1999
3. Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Case No. ICTR-95-1), Judgment, 21 May
1999
4. Simba v Prosecutor (Case No. ICTR-01-76-A), Judgment, 27 November 2007
5. Prosecutor v Jean- Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4), Judgment September 2, 1998

6. Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T), Judgment, 17 June, 2004
7. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T), Judgment, 7 June 2001
8. Prosecutor v. Semanza (Case No. ICTR-97-20-T), Judgment and Sentence, 15 May
2003
9. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda (Case No. ICTR-99-54-A-T), Judgment and Sentence, 22
November 2004
10. Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T), Judgment and Sentence, 28 April
2005
11. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli (Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T), Judgment and Sentence, 1
December 2003
12. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi( Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I), Judgment and Sentence, 15
July 2004
MISCELLANEOUS
1. USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide — AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 14- 210

Intelligence‟. 1998-02-01.
2. UNWCC, LRTWC, vol. XV, p. 111; 15 AD 656 at 660–1.
3. ICRC Draft Rules for the Limitation of Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population
in Time of War

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is hereinafter most respectfully submitted that the Prosecutor of this International Criminal
Court has the jurisdiction to exercise this petition under Article 5 read with Article 13 of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998. Article 5(1) states a follows –
“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a while. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute
with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The Crime of Genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War Crimes;
(d) The Crime of Aggression.”
And both Sohulwa and Rokumba are parties to the ICC statute1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1
Page 14, Moot Problem

-I-
WHETHER MR. Z KARMONIC IS GUILTY OF COMMITTING THE CRIME OF

GENOCIDE UNDER ARTICLE 6(a) OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
-II-
WHETHER MR. Z KARMONIC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING WAR CRIMES

UNDER ARTICLE 8(2)(B)(II) FOR INTENTIONALLY LAUNCHING AN ATTACK
AGAINST THE NUCLEAR ENERGY PLANTS OF ROKUMBA?
-III-
WHETHER MR. Z.KARMONIC IS LIABLE FOR THE WAR CRIME OF

EXCESSIVE INCIDENTAL DEATH, INJURY, OR DAMAGE UNDER ARTICLE 8(2)(B)
(IV) OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Sohulwa, is amongst the four countries (Rokumba, Zumanja and Sambhota) of the
Sarozula subcontinent. These countries share the Sarozas ranges, the source of rivers R1
and R2. The subcontinent has witnessed several wars in the past due to diverse cultural
norms of all countries with Sarozula as the most contested territory. The Treaty of
Sarozula, 1905 was signed to settle conflicts and demarcate the boundaries of four
countries determined by the dominant religious group in that area with religious
minorities existing in each region, birthing the ‘Lands for Sarozula’ (LfS) between R1 &
R2.
2. ‘Sohu’, religion of Sarozula has its roots in the country’s ancient past of Sarozula,
whereas Rokum is the most recent religion, dominant in Rokumba. In 1995, all the four
countries emerged as secular democracies. A non-political religious outfit, Sarozula of
Sohus (SoS) was established to persuade religious minorities in Sarozula, adopt Sohu
religion, with reformations in certain Sohu practices. Its ideologies gained acceptance in
all the countries except Rokumba which infact ordered a ban on the SoS movement.
3. Rokumba advancing scientifically at a rapid rate established numerous industries along
the banks of small rivers leading to sporadic environmental disputes between Sohulwa
and Rokumba. Rokumba had even allowed for nuclear tests on its lands and waters and
established two nuclear plants by January 2018. It diverted the water of small rivers for
its domestic use and planned to link these rivers through artificial routes, a move heavily
opposed by the other countries.
4. Consequentially, pollution levels in R2 rose rapidly leading to the death of 500 children
in Sohulwa. Sohulwa stopped supplies to Rokumba which in response, withdrew itself
from 1905 treaty. On 13th March, 2018, Rokum nationals in Sohulwa, working in LfS
areas, went missing. The next day, Rokumba captured 200 Sohu followers of Sohu faith
for sedition and conspiracy. Media reported that some of the missing Rokum nationals

had adopted Sohu faith and that torturous treatment was meted out to captured students
and faculty members in Rokumba.
5. On 30th March, 2018, ‘Help Sarozula’ named Facebook account was created by Mr.Z.
Karmonic, the head of cyber wing of SoS, calling for a march towards the borders of
Rokumba. Marchers gathered near Rokumban border and Mr. Karmonic was arrested by
Sohulwa government for inciting public disobedience. The marchers then demanded for:
– i) the release of captured students & faculty members, ii) the release of Mr. Karmonic
and iii) statement of peace from Rokumba.
6. A series of bomb blasts occurred in Rokumba, on 20th April, 2018. The SoS group was
blamed for the same followed by an uprising against the Government in Sohulwa and Mr.
Karmonic going missing from custody. A National emergency was declared in Sohulwa.
7. Rokumba launched missile attacks on 5 SoS offices in Sohulwa on 22nd April, 2018
followed by a series of hostilities and 500 people were killed. ICRC, initiated
negotiations between the two countries to resolve issues. Rokumba government in this
time, used artificial rain to disperse the marchers on borders and ensued cyber attacks on
the Sohulwan army to disrupt their military capabilities. Meanwhile, Mr. Z. Karmonic
was granted pardon by the Sohulwan government.
8. On 15th July 2018, sudden blasts in both nuclear energy plants of Rokumba resulted in
radioactive leaks causing severe damage to environment in unquantifiable terms. 10
supercomputers in an underground village of Sohulwa were alleged to be the instruments
for the attacks. The ICC issued arrest warrants against five persons including Mr. Z.
Karmonic, on 15th June 2019. Mr. Z. Karmonic was arrested on 10th June 2019, from a
village in Sohulwa. Subsequently he was handed over to the ICC.

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
I. MR. Z KARMONIC IS NOT GUILTY OF COMMITTING THE CRIME OF

GENOCIDE UNDER ARTICLE 6(a) OF THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
The elements of crimes have not been satisfied. Prosecution has failed to establish Mr. Z
Karmonic’s mens rea . There is absence of special intent and knowledge as regards to the
events on the evening of 25th May 2018. Mr. Z.Karmonic wasn’t aware of any plans or
organisations behind the attack. He didn’t participate in the commission of the crime at any
stage. Further, criminal responsibility can not be attributed to Mr. Z. Karmonic . The
prosecution has failed to establish the causal link and the higher standards of responsibility as
required by the ICC Statute. Lastly, there is no direct and public incitement
II. MR. Z KARMONIC IS NOT LIABLE FOR COMMITTING WAR CRIMES

UNDER ARTICLE 8(2)(B)(II) OF THE STATUTE OF THE ICC FOR
INTENTIONALLY LAUNCHING AN ATTACK AGAINST THE NUCLEAR
ENERGY PLANTS OF ROKUMBA
Firstly, the object of the attack was not civilian objects. The perpetrator did not intent civilian
objects to be the objects of the attack. Civilian objects may be subject to collateral damage .
Mr.Z.Karmonic had the military necessity of answering back to the cyber attacks by
Rokumba. Secondly, command responsibility cannot be attributed to Mr.Karmonic as: a) No
evidence of effective control has been adduced by the prosecution and b) Considerations for
knowledge have not been fulfilled.
III. MR. Z.KARMONIC IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE WAR CRIME OF

EXCESSIVE INCIDENTAL DEATH, INJURY, OR DAMAGE UNDER
ARTICLE 8(2)(B)(IV) OF THE STATUTE OF THE ICC
The damages are not widespread and excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated. Further, Mr.Z.Karmonic could not have foreseen that the
attacks would cause widespread and excessive damage to civilian objects and the natural
environment

PLEADINGS
FIRST COUNT
MR. Z KARMONIC IS NOT GUILTY OF COMMITTING THE CRIME OF

GENOCIDE UNDER ARTICLE 6(a) OF THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. ELEMENT OF SPECIFIC INTENT IS NOT SATISFIED.
(i) Statutory requirements of Intent:
1) The defense most respectfully submits for the consideration of the Court that the
constituent elements of the crime of Genocide as defined under the Rome Statute 2 are
not established for the prosecution of Mr. Karmonic in the following terms:
(i) That one of the acts listed under Article 2(2) of the Statute was committed;
(ii) That this act was committed against a specifically targeted national, ethnic, racial
or religious group,
(iii) That the act was committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the
targeted group.3
2) Prosecution has failed to adduce adequate evidence - direct as well as circumstantial,
as to this effect. Intent is one of the crucial constituent elements of genocide that
needs to be proved to establish the crime of genocide and not merely a counterpart to
an already existing factor on the side of the actus reus. Its existence outside and above
the latter4 distinguishing the crime of genocide “by a ‘surplus’ of intent”.5

2
Article 6(a), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
3
Prosecutor v Seromba (Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I), Judgement 13 December, 2006, para. 316)
4
Prosecutor v Stakic (Case No. IT-97-24-T), Judgment, 31 July 2003, para 520
5
Mark Klamberg; ‘Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court’; Torkel Opsahl Academic
EPublsiher Brussels; 2017

3) Furthermore requirement of Article 30 of the ICC Statute provides that criminal
responsibility cannot be attached without the establishment of intent and knowledge.
Intent therein is defined in relation to the conduct, “that person means to engage in the
conduct”6 or in relation to consequence “that person means to cause that consequence
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events” 7. Thus, it becomes clear
that the mental element has two aspects: genocidal or special intent and knowledge.
4) The focus on dolus specialis is highlighted in the chapeau of article II of the Genocide
Convention in the term ‘with intent’. The reference to ‘intent’ in the text indicates that
the prosecution must go beyond establishing that the offender meant to engage in the
conduct, or meant to cause the consequence. Such is a normative requirement under
the definition.8 As this special intent is sine qua non, the act in absence of such cannot
be punished as genocide.9
ii) Absence of dolus specialis
5) It is most respectfully submitted that in the present case, there is no sufficient proof of
special intent on part of Mr. Z.Karmonic. Mr. Z was an ardent follower of SoS whose
only intention was to spread the Sohu religion. The post in question was made in
reflection of the atrocities borne out by the Rokumban State. There is a clear absence
of specific intent to destroy.10 The definition of this crime requires a particular state of
mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall consequences of the 11prohibited
act.
6
Article 30(2)(a), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
7
Article 30(2)(b), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
8
Prosecutor v. Jelisic (Case No. IT-95-10-A), Judgment, 5 July 2001, para. 51
9
William A. Schabas; Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge University Press 2nd
Edition, 2009)
10
Prosecutor v Muvunyi (Case No. ICTR-00-55), Judgment 6 March, 2012

6) ‘Specific’ intent is used to distinguish offences of ‘general’ intent, which are crimes
for which no particular level of intent is actually set out in the text of the infraction.12
7) Vague and indirect allegations cannot establish the genocidal intent which is not
understood as intent related to general crimes but ‘the intent to accomplish certain
specific types of destruction’ against a targeted group.13
8) Further, not necessary whether specific intent existed prior to the occurrence of the
crime, but that specific intent must exist when the act was actually committed. 14 The
inquiry is therefore in relation to the occurrence itself and not prior formation of
intent. 15
In the case at hand, there was neither any existence of specific intent of
extermination of Sohulwan national Rokums prior to the commission of the act, nor at
the time of the commission of the act. The actions of attackers cannot therefore be
projected unto Mr. Karmonic.
9) Such constitutive element of the crime demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to
produce the act charged.’16 Even where an act itself appears criminal, if it was purely
accidental, or committed in the absence of intent to do harm or knowledge of the
circumstances, then the accused is innocent.17
11
Mark Klamberg; Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court; (Torkel Opsahl Academic
EPublsiher Brussels, 2017)

12
Edition, 2009)
13
Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Case No. ICTR-96-3), Judgment and Sentence, 6 December 1999
14
Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Case No. ICTR-95-1), Judgment, 21 May 1999
15
Simba v Prosecutor (Case No. ICTR-01-76-A), Judgment, 27 November 2007
16
Malcolm N. Shaw; International Law (Cambridge University Press, 7th Edition)
17
Edition, 2009)

10) Help Sarozula previously demanded, as factually established, that Rokumba shall
return to the path of mutual co-existence and development 18. This further goes on to
show that the any manifestation of intent was not genocidal in nature. With the
ongoing hostilities in the state and violent attacks and practices being followed by
Rokumba, the clarion call was for bravery and resilience towards external aggressors.
iii) Lack of Knowledge
11) The statement made by Mr.Karmonic on 25th May was bonafide and he wasn’t aware
about what the other perpetrators were upto. He is not culpable because he did not
know or could have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in part,
a group.19Since he never intended in the first play to cause such destruction , he never
had the knowledge as well about what planning had been going on behind the attacks
on the Rokum minorities and what may be the result of such attacks .
iv) Plan or systematic organization is a sine qua non
12) The most important aspect of the requirement of knowledge is that there must have
been a plan or some form of organisation which would lead to such a catastrophic
result. There did not exist any plan for extermination of Rokums from Sohulwa and
even if it did, Mr. Z.Karmonic had no knowledge about its existence.
13) It is submitted that the Prosecution must establish that the accused planned, ordered or
instigated the killing, killed or aided and abetted in the killing of one or several
members of the group in question with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the group
as such.20 There is excruciating difficulty in practice of proving the genocidal
18
Moot Proposition, Page 9
19
Prosecutor v Jean- Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4), Judgment September 2, 1998, para. 498, 520
20
Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T), Judgment, 17 June, 2004

intention of an individual if the crimes committed were not widespread 21 or backed up
by an organisation or a system.22
14) It is a reasonable requirement that may , in any kind of circumstance , cross the mind
of a prudent man .Raphael Lemkin spoke regularly of a plan as if this was a sine qua
non for the crime of genocide. Genocide is an organized and not a spontaneous
crime.23 Such ‘project’ or ‘plan’24are supportive elements for establishing a crime,
which is widespread, and systematic, as involving ‘some kind of preconceived plan or
policy’.25 However, in the case at hand , there is no such preconceived plan or policy .
15) It is a requirement that it be proved beyond a reasonable doubt - that a perpetrator
possessed genocidal intent and therefore an inference must be "the only reasonable
[one] available on the evidence.”26 In the present case, the genocidal intent has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
B. RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO MR.KARMONIC
16) Mr. Karmonic cannot be charged be with either individual criminal responsibility or
civilian superior responsibility for the alleged offences. Apart from the lack of intent
the prosecution has failed to show any causal link27 as additionally required by the
21
Prosecutor v. Jelisic (Case No. IT-95-10), Judgment, 5 July 2001
22
Malcolm N. Shaw; International Law (Cambridge University Press, 7th Edition)
23
Edition, 2009)
24
Prosecutor v. Karadzic (Case No. IT-95-5-R61), Judgment, 11 July 2013
25
Ibid., para. 579
26
The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Case no ICC-02/05-01/09-139), ICC, 12 December 2011
27
Prosecutor v. Bemba (Case No. ICC–01/05–01/08), Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June, 2009,
para. 423

ICC being fulfilled. The prosecution has not displayed “causal connection between
the instigation and the actus reus of the crime”28, for the incitement to “directly and
substantially contribute” to the other person’s commission of the substantive
offense,29 or must at least have been a “clear contributing factor”. 30 The mere material
act may not provide enough information to enable a court to conclude that the intent is
specific, and not merely general31 as manifested in the actions.
(i) Standard for responsibility is high
17) The defense submits that Article 28 imposes a higher standard of mens rea for
superior responsibility in terms that such person “knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated”. Second, a civilian superior’s responsibility is
expressly limited to crimes that are related to the activities within his effective
responsibility and control32.
18) Further, Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I, and similarly reflected in Rule 153 33,
envisages that the failure to conduct further inquiry, in spite of information,
28
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T), Judgment, 7 June 2001, para. 30; Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, (Case No. IT-95-14-T), Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 280; Prosecutor v. Semanza (Case No. ICTR-
97-20-T), Judgment and Sentence, 15 May 2003, para. 381; Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda (Case No. ICTR-99-54-
A-T), Judgment and Sentence, 22 November 2004, para. 593; Prosecutor v. Muhimana (Case No. ICTR-95-1B-
T), Judgment and Sentence, 28 April 2005, para. 504; Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli (Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T),
Judgment and Sentence, 1 December 2003, para. 762
29
Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi (Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I), Judgment and Sentence, 15 July 2004, para. 456
30
Prosecutor v. Kvočka (Case No. IT-98-30/1-T), Judgment, 2 November 2001, para. 252
31
Genocide, a "serious crime": the 1948 Convention
32
Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-94-4-T), Judgment, 2 September, 1998, para. 557
33
Yael Ronen, ‘Superior Responsibility of Civilians for International Crimes Committed in Civilian Setting’

constitutes knowledge of the subordinates’ offences34. Such knowledge is manifestly
lacking in the situation at hand with no evidence being evinced by the prosecution.
(ii) There is no direct and public incitement
19) It is submitted that there does not exist any direct and public incitement: more than
mere vague or indirect suggestion goes to constitute direct incitement 35, which cannot
be assumed from the posts which he was not the author of and furthermore the post
itself was directed against the actions of the neighboring state.
20) Neither can common criminal design be culled out from the factual matrix. Ability to
control or punish has not been established which would lead to the incurrence of
liability36. The prosecution must clearly identify the individuals over whom the
accused exercised such control, however the identities of attackers remains unrelated
with the HS fighters.
SECOND COUNT
MR. Z. KARMONIC IS NOT LIABLE FOR COMMITTING WAR CRIME OF

INTENTIONALLY DIRECTING ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN OBJECTS
34
Rule 153, Customary IHL, ICRC
35
Prosecutor v Delalic (Case No. IT-96-21-T), Judgment, 16 November, 1998, para. 235
36
Prosecutor v Kordić and Cerkez (Case No. IT-95-14/2), Judgment, 26 February 2001, para 416

UNDER ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(ii) OF THE ROME STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT
Article 21 provides that in order to constitute a crime under the Rome Statute of the ICC the
“Elements of Crime” must be proved.37
A) The Object Of The Attack Was Not Civilian Objects
21) The second element of the Elements of Crimes under Article 8(2)(b)(ii) specifies,
“The object of the attack was civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military
objectives”38. Civilian objects are defined in Article 8(2)(b)(ii) in the negative, as
“objects which are not military objectives”, thereby espousing the international
humanitarian law approach39
22) Articles 43 and 50 of Additional Protocol I and Article 4A of Geneva Convention III
establish that members of armed forces (other than medical personnel and chaplains)
and members of militias are “combatants” and cannot claim civilian status40
23) In the instant case, the defence submits that the objects against which the attacks have
been directed are ‘military’ and not civilian in nature. This is manifest from the
technological and military prowess of ‘Rokumba’. As per the media reports published
in January 2015 and not denied by Rokumba’s authorities, Rokumba clandestinely
allowed foreign powers to make use of its lands and waters for a series of nuclear tests
and were subsequently successful in establishing 2 nuclear thermal power plants by
January 201841. Hence the cyber attack on the nuclear power plants in Rokumba must
be acknowledged as a military object.
37
Elements of Crime, UN doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000); Article 9, Rome Statute of the ICC
38
Elements of Crimes, page 18
39
Article 52(1), AP I
40
Prosecutor v Dario Kordic And Mario Erkez, (Case No. IT-95-14/2-A), Judgment 26 February, 2001
41
Moot Problem, Page 7 and 8

24) The determination of whether civilians were targeted is a case-by-case analysis, based
on a variety of factors, including the means and method used in the course of the
attack, the distance between the victims and the source of attack, the ongoing combat
activity at the time and location of the incident, the presence of military activities or
facilities in the vicinity of the incident, the status of the victims as well as their
appearance, and the nature of the crimes committed in the course of the attack42
25) With respect to the concepts of ‘civilian population as such’ and ‘individual civilians’,
the finding of a US Military Tribunal in the Ohlendorf case (Einsatzgruppen Trial)
after the Second World War is of help. : “A city is bombed for tactical purposes:
communications are to be destroyed, railroads wrecked, ammunition plants
demolished, factories razed, all for the purpose of impeding the military. In these
operations, it inevitably happens that non-military persons are killed. This is an
incident, a grave incident to be sure, but an unavoidable corollary of hostile battle
action. The civilians are not individualized”43
26) Attacks aimed at military objectives (objects and combatants) may cause collateral
civilian damage. This collateral damage is not unlawful if the conditions of the rule of
proportionality as expressed in Art. 51(5)(b) AP I are respected.44
27) The objectives belonging to the following categories are those considered to be of
generally recognized military importance:
- Industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the war:
Installations providing energy mainly for national defence, e.g. coal, other fuels, or
atomic energy, and plants producing gas or electricity mainly for military
42
Prosecutor v. Galic (Case No. IT-98-29-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment, December 5, 2003 para. 132;
Prosecutor v Kunarac (Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1) Judgment, 12 June, 2002, para. 91
43
UNWCC, LRTWC, vol. XV, page. 111
44
Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute, Sources and Commentary, Knut Dormann, Page. 136

consumption.
- Installations constituting experimental, research centers for experiments on and the
development of weapons and war material.45
28) In light of the list of military objectives stated by the ICRC, attacking the Nuclear
Energy Plants of Rokumba can be posited as a definitive military object due to the
military necessity of protection against a possible nuclear attack from Rokumba. It is
well established within the facts that Rokumba was aggressively engaged in building
their nuclear technology through conducting nuclear tests and subsequently
establishing 2 nuclear thermal power plants46
29) Therefore the 2nd element of crime under Article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the ICC statute is not
satisfied as Nuclear Energy plants in Rokumba are a characterized ‘military
objective’, and not civilian.
B) The Perpetrator Did Not Intend Civilian Objects To Be The Objects Of The
Attack
30) Article 57(2)(a)(i) of the Additional Protocol 1 espouses the principal that those who
plan or decide upon such an attack will base their decision on information given to
them, and they cannot be expected to have personal knowledge of the objective to be
attacked and of its exact nature.47
i) Civilian Objects may be subject to collateral damage
31) The object of the attack only limited to the Nuclear Energy Plants and those who took
45
List of Categories of Military Objectives according to Article 7, paragraph 2 of ICRC ‘Draft Rules for the
Limitation of Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War’, ‘Commentary on the Additional
Protocols’ of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
46
Moot problem, Page 7
47
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949

direct part in hostilities.48 Furthermore, media reports not denied by Rokumba pointed
that the Nuclear Energy plants granted support in a military capacity. Death and injury
to civilians no longer participating in hostilities if any is a collateral damage 49 that is
unintended or incidental to the intended outcome. 50 Not all civilian deaths are
unlawful and it is a collateral damage‟ expected in war.51
32) The protection of civilians and civilian objects provided by modern international law
may cease entirely or be reduced or suspended in exceptional circumstances: (i) when
civilians abuse their rights; (ii) when, although the object of a military attack is
comprised of military objectives, belligerents cannot avoid causing so-called
collateral damage to civilians.52
33) The Chamber in the Bemba case considered that the suspect could not be said to have
intended to commit any of the crimes charged, unless the evidence shows that he was
at least aware that, in the ordinary course of events, the occurrence of such crimes was
a virtually certain consequence.53
ii) Military Necessity

48
Prosecutor v. Halilovic (Case No. IT-01-48-T), Trial Chamber, November 16, 2005, para. 36
49
Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez (Case No. IT-95-14/2-A), Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17 December,
2004, para. 52; Prosecutor v. Galic (Case No. IT-98-29-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment 5 December, 2003, para.
58
50
USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide — AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 14- 210 Intelligence‟. 1998-02-01. page.
180.
51
Prosecutor v. Strugar (Case No. IT-01-42-T), Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 January, 2005, para. 300-301,
310, 312; Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic (Case No. IT-98-34), Trial Chamber, Judgment 31 March,
2003, para. 605; Prosecutor v Blaskic (Case No. IT-95-14), Trial Chamber, 3 March, 2000, para. 185;
Prosecutor v Brdjanin (Case No. IT-99-36-T), Trial Chamber, 1 September, 2004, paras. 597, 598, 596
52
The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and Others, (Case No IT-95-16-T), Judgment 14 January, 2000
53
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08

34) The Appeals Chamber in Kordic and Mario Cerkez clarifies that the prohibition
against attacking civilians and civilian objects would not be a crime when justified by
military necessity.54
35) Z.Karmonic’s actions are justified on the ground that Cyber experts of the Rokumban
armed forces hacked the website of the Sohulwan armed forces, significantly
disrupting the military capabilities of the Sohulwan army. 55 Therefore Z.Karmonic,
tasked with answering the cyber actions of Rokumba allegedly disrupted the Nuclear
Energy Plants of Rokumba as a measure of Military Necessity. Evidence does not
show that in the ordinary course of events, occurrence of the war crime was a certain
consequence.56
C. Command Responsibility cannot be attributed to Mr. Z.Karmonic
(i) No evidence of effective control
36) Attribution of command responsibility in terms of dolus directus cannot be attributed
in the absence of evidence, showing even the circumstances connecting him to such.
Such requirement is not met when the Prosecutor has not shown any chain of
command57 connecting the operators of the supercomputers to Mr. Karmonic.
37) The essential requisites to show effective control over such actors which perpetrated
the attack are thus incomplete.58 “Ordering” under Article 2569 requires the superior
to have actively contributed to the crime in question. Without establishing his control
54
Prosecutor v Dario Kordic And Mario Cerkez (Case No- IT-95-14/2-A), Judgment 26 February, 2001
55
Moot Problem, Page 18
56
Prosecutorv. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber, (Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08)
57
G Mettraux ‘The Law of Command Responsibility’ (2009)
58
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Case No. IT-95-14-A), Judgment, 29 July,2004, para. 69

over the tools so captured, which have not been procured form any military base but
from a solitary, unrelated location,59 the control is not established.
38) Even if the Court is inclined towards addressing his indirect responsibility, “simple
exercise of powers of influence over subordinates does not suffice” to prove criminal
responsibility.60 No information or alerts of essential movements or activities 61 which
could have therefore put him on notice.62
(ii) Considerations for knowledge not fulfilled
39) Further, the standard of knowledge could have only been derived from authority over
the users so identified in order to establish dereliction of duty63.
40) The actual knowledge is affected by the considerations on the number of illegal acts,
the scope, the time, the type and number of force involved, the means of available
communication, the modus operandi of similar acts, the location of the commander at
the time and the geographical locations of the acts.
41) Alternatively, defense submits that Mr. Karmonic was under an obligation of the
mandate given to him in respect of the attacks perpetrated against the cyber systems
of Sohulwa by Rokumba64.
59
Moot Proposition, Page 13
60
Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, and Kubura (Case No. IT-01-47-T), Judgment, 15 March, 2006, para. 80 and
795
61
Geneva Convention IV, Art. 42, Compare Krnojelac, (Appeals Chamber), September 17, 2003, para. 155
62
Prosecutor v Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber II, (Decision pursuant to
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the charge of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo),
p.434
63
Prosecutor v Halilovic (Case No. IT-01-48-T), Judgment, 16 November, 2005
64
Moot Proposition, Page. 11

THIRD COUNT
Z.KARMONIC IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE WAR CRIME OF

EXCESSIVE INCIDENTAL DEATH, INJURY, OR DAMAGE UNDER ARTICLE
8(2)(b)(iv) OF THE ROME STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. Damages are not widespread and excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated
42) In its advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case65, the ICJ held that Articles 35(3)
and 55 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I provide additional protection for the
environment. Taken together these provisions embody a general obligation to protect
the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe environmental
damage. It is well established that these criteria under the Protocol set a very high
threshold that applies only to exceptionally catastrophic events66.
43) The 2nd element of crimes under Article 8(b)(2)(iv) is not satisfied in this case.
Excessiveness lies in the balance between the foreseeable 67 military advantage and
expected collateral damage68. “Widespread” damage has been interpreted to mean a
territorial extent close to 20,000 square kilometers.69
44) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) criminalizes damage caused to the environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
65
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 257 (July 8,
1996)
66
ICRC Opinion paper, ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?’, 17,
(March 2008)
67
Additional Protocol I (API), Art.49; Prosecutor v Kordic and Cerkez, (Case No- IT-95-14/2-A), Judgment 17
December 2004, para. 47
68
Additional Protocol I, Arts.51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii)(b)
69
Karen Hulme, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, 92 (2004)

anticipated. This lays down a test of proportionality between damage to the
environment and the expected military advantage.70
45) A military advantage generally consists in weakening the enemy’s armed forces,71 and
may involve the denial of humanitarian access to opposing forces.72 There existed a
concrete military advantage with a clearly defined, short-term end. 73 Z.Karmonic
could not have predicted the prolonged nature of damages in this case.
46) Whether the attack was clearly excessive in relation to the perceived military
advantage can be determined by comparing the losses inflicted by the attack to the
losses prevented by the achievement of the military advantage anticipated. 74

In the
present case the military advantage sought by Z.Karmonic was to deter a possible
nuclear war reprisal by the Rokumban Armed Forces through their Nuclear Energy
Plants, which outweighs the damage caused due to cyber manipulations to the Nuclear
Plants.
47) The advantage concerned must be substantial and relatively close, as in not being
determined by long-term planning.75 The facts of the case do not indicate any pre
conceived plan of a cyber manipulation of nuclear plants of Rokumba as a way to
70
ICRC Report on ‘International Humanitarian Law and The Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’,
03/IC/09, 12 (2003)
71
ICRC Report on’ International Humanitarian Law and The Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’,
03/IC/09, 12 (2003)
72
ICRC Report on ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’,
31IC/11/5.1.2, 23 (2011)
73
ICRC, Commentary on ‘The Additional Protocols To The Geneva Conventions’, Art. 57, para. 2208 (1987)
74
Haque, Adil Ahmad, Law and Morality at War, 8(1) Criminal Law and Philosophy, 79, 97 (2014)
75
Commentary on the ‘Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC Study)’, para. 2209

cause widespread damage. Unavoidable civilian casualties are lawful in order to
conduct operations out of military necessity against valid military targets.76
B. Z.Karmonic did not foresee that the attack would cause widespread and
excessive damage to civilian objects and the natural environment
48) The requisite mens rea on the part of a commander would be actual or constructive
knowledge as to the grave environmental effects of a military attack; a standard which
would be difficult to establish for the purposes of prosecution.
49) Z.Karmonic could not have known that attack would cause excessive casualties in
either the ordinary course of the attack or unforeseeable circumstances
50) The preparatory committee that drafted the ICC criminal elements clarified, in the
Article 8(2)(b)(iv)’s preparatory works, that “directing an attack” as required by the
above war crime, “describe(s) the act of the attack itself” whereas “launching an
attack,” the actus reus of an excessive attack found in Article 8(2)(b)(iv), “would also
include the planning phase.”77 There was no element of a pre-empted plan stated in
the facts of this case
51) In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine
whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could
have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack78
52) A critical element is the knowledge of the perpetrator at the time of launching the
attack.79. The Elements of Crimes clarify that the information available to the
76
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Trial Chamber I, (Case No. IT-98-29-T), Judgment, 5 December, 2003
77
Knutt Dormann, Elements of War Crimes: Sources and Commentaries
78
Prosecutor v. Galic, Trial Chamber I, (Case No. IT-98-29-T), 5 December, 2003
79
ICC Elements, Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) para. 3

perpetrator at the time is central80. This is consistent with general principles of
criminal and with State practice.
53) Z.Karmonic cannot be held to be responsible for intending a widespread damage as he
was not informed as to the repercussions of the cyber manipulation, which was simply
instigated at the behest of the Sohulwan Armed Forces that had tasked Z.Karmonic to
properly answer the cyber actions of Rokumba.
54) Not every crime committed during an armed conflict is a war crime, and not every
violation of jus in bello constitutes a war crime either: there must be a nexus to both
the armed conflict and a serious violation.81 These requirements exist both to avoid
having opportunistic but ordinary crime occurring during an armed conflict
considered as war crimes, and to ensure that not every violation of the myriad rules of
warfare is stigmatized as a war crime.82
PRAYER
Wherefore in light of the questions presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Defence respectfully requests this Court to adjudge and declare that the dismissal of the
charges under the Rome Statute against Mr.Z.Karmonic for the following reasons:
80
Art. 30 (mental element) and Art. 32 (mistake of fact) of the ICC Statute
81
Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Law of Punishment of War Crimes’, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 58, 74 (1944)
82
CASSESE’S ICL, noting that a crime committed, for example, by one combatant against a fellow combatant
during an armed conflict is not a war crime, even though the conflict provided the opportunity and context for
the crime; the offense must be “perpetrated to (wrongly) pursue the purposes of war.”

1. The elements of crimes have not been satisfied. Prosecution has failed to establish Mr.
Z Karmonic’s mens rea as there is absence of special intent and knowledge as regards
to the events on the evening of 25th May 2018.
2. Criminal responsibility cannot be attributed to Mr. Karmonic. The prosecution has
failed to establish the causal link and the higher standards of responsibility as required
by the ICC Statute.
3. There is no direct and public incitement.
4. The object of the cyber attack was a not civilian object. The perpetrator did not intend
civilian objects to be the objects of the attack. Civilian objects may be subject to
collateral damage.
5. Mr.Z.Karmonic had the military necessity of answering back to the cyber attacks by
Rokumba.
6. Command responsibility cannot be attributed to Mr. Karmonic as: a) No evidence of
effective control has been adduced by the prosecution and b) Considerations for
knowledge have not been fulfilled.
On Behalf of the Defence
Counsel for the Defence

19th HD Memo DEFENCE FINALL

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THE 19TH HENRY DUNANT MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

ICC TRIAL CHAMBER

SITUATION IN THE STATE OF SOHULWA

THE PROSECUTOR v. Z. KARMONIC

DISPUTE CONCERNING CRIME OF GENOCIDE AND WAR CRIMES

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENCE

I. WHETHER MR. Z KARMONIC IS GUILTY OF COMMITTING THE

A. Element of Specific intent is not satisfied….……....……………………..………… 12

II. WHETHER MR. Z KARMONIC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMITTING

A. The Object Of The Attack Was Not Civilian Objects….……….……………………18

III. WHETHER MR. Z.KARMONIC IS LIABLE FOR THE WAR CRIME OF

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENCE 2 of 29

2. STATUTE OF THE ICTY (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE

3. STATUTE OF THE ICTR (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

1. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949

2. PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12

3. THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE

CRIME OF GENOCIDE, 1948

4. CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, ICRC

BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES

2. KNUT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIME UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF

ICC, SOURCES AND COMMENTARY, 2004 EDN.

3. RALPH HENHAM, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE, INTERNATIONAL,

COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL ASPECTS

4. ROBERT CRYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

AND PROCEDURE, 2ND EDN, CAMBRIDGE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENCE 3 of 29

5. W.A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT, 4th EDN., 2011, CAMBRIDGE

6. W.A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2ND EDN, CAMBRIDGE

7. MARK KLAMBERG; COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT; TORKEL OPSAHL ACADEMIC EPUBLSIHER BRUSSELS; 2017

8. ICRC REPORT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES

9. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA

CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC

10. G METTRAUX ‘THE LAW AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY’ (2009)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Rep. 226, 257 (July 8, 1996).

INTERNATION CRIMINAL COURT

1. Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir Case no ICC-02/05-01/09-139, ICC, 12

2. Prosecutor v. Bemba (Case No. ICC–01/05–01/08), Decision on the Confirmation of

Charges, 15 June, 2009

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF DEFENCE 4 of 29

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF FORMER YUGOSALAVIA

1. Prosecutor v Stakic Case No. IT-97-24-T), Judgment, 31 July 2003

2. Prosecutor v. Jelisic (Case No. IT-95-10-A), Judgment, 5 July 2001

3. Prosecutor v. Karadˇzi ́c (Case No. IT-95-5-R61), Judgment, 11th July 2013

4. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, (Case No. IT-95-14-T), Judgment, 3 March 2000

5. Prosecutor v. Kvočka (Case No. IT-98-30/1-T), Judgment, 2 November 2001

6. Prosecutor v Delalic, (Case No. IT-96-21-T), Judgment, 16 November, 1998

7. Prosecutor v Kordić and Cerkez IT-95-14/2, Judgment, 26 February 2001

8. Prosecutor V Dario Kordic And Mario Erkez, Appeal Chamber, IT-95-14/2-A

9. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber, December 5, 2003

13. Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and Others, IT-95-16-T

14. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, and Kubura, Judgment, IT-01-47-T, 15 Mar2006

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

1. Prosecutor v Seromba (Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I), Judgement 13 December, 2006

2. Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Case No. ICTR-96-3), Judgment and Sentence, 6 December

3. Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Case No. ICTR-95-1), Judgment, 21 May

4. Simba v Prosecutor (Case No. ICTR-01-76-A), Judgment, 27 November 2007