Maneuver Warfare Enhanced with Land Mine Warfare

AUTHOR Major Steven F. Barilich, USMC

CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA – Warfighting

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: MANEUVER WARFARE ENHANCED WITH LAND MINE WARFARE

I. Purpose: Identify deficiencies with existing mine warfare doctrine that do not
support maneuver warfare outlined in FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING.

II. Problem: Mine fields are effective casualty producers, but their primary use is
always defensive. This defensive orientation forces a commander to concentrate on the
terrain. This runs counter to maneuver warfare, which directs the commander to
concentrate on the enemy. Mines can be effective in offensive operations, but there is no
U.S. doctrine for this purpose. Therefore, combat engineers do not receive training on the
employment of mines in the offense.

III. Data: All mine warfare doctrine supports defensive operations. Deliberate
protective and tactical mine fields receive most attention because of their size and logistic
effort to emplace. The other types of mine fields have potential use in the offense.
However, the doctrine only views the mine fields as defensive measures. History shows
tactical mine fields were not decisive in defeating a trained and determined attacker. Field
Marshal Rommel and General Montgomery were not immune from the shortcomings of
mine fields. The North African campaign is a perfect case study for this lesson. A review
of the logistical requirements to lay a tactical mine field quickly identifies the Marine
Corps' deficiencies.

IV. Conclusions: The Marine Corps' adoption of maneuver warfare requires the
validation of supporting doctrine. Mine warfare has the potential to enhance offensive
operations. Maneuver warfare can adapt several types of mine fields for the offense.
Acceptance of mine warfare for offensive operations will be a combat multiplier for the
Marine Corps.

V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps combat engineers must take the lead and
promote mine warfare in offensive operations. The combat engineers must write new
doctrine to support FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING. The Marine Corps Engineer School must
change the emphasis of mine fields from the defense to the offense.

ENHANCING MANEUVER WARFARE WITH LAND MINE WARFARE

OUTLINE

Thesis statement: The present mine warfare doctrine, accepted by the U.S. Marine
Corps, does not support FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING, because of the fixation on defensive
operations.

I. Doctrine

A. Requirement to review and validate supporting doctrine

B. FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING

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1. Definition of maneuver warfare

2. Application of doctrine

C. Mine and countermine warfare

1. Types of mine fields and their application

II. Historical Background

A. North African campaign; Montgomery vs. Rommel

B. Failure of mine fields to be decisive

C. Effects of maneuver warfare

D. Historical lessons applied to Southwest Asia

III. Logistics

A. Feasibility of deliberate and tactical mine fields

B. Number of mines required for a tactical mine field

C. Man-hours required to lay a tactical mine field

D. Availability of mines

IV. Conclusion/Solution

A. Identify mine fields that can support FMFM-1

B. New doctrine for offensive mine warfare

C. Refocus of combat engineer training

ENHANCING MANEUVER WARFARE WITH LANDMINE WARFARE

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's

cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a
turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.

FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING

The United States Marine Corps is vigorously embracing maneuver warfare doctrine.
The doctrine is ideal for the Marine Corps, particularly with the pending force reductions.
The validation of supporting doctrine must occur when tactics and equipment change.
The present mine warfare doctrine accepted by the Marine Corps does not support FMFM-
1 WARFIGHTING, because of the fixation on defensive operations. The challenge to the
Marine Corps becomes twofold. First, develop new doctrine and techniques that "dove
tails" with maneuver warfare, as expounded upon in FMFM-1, WARFIGHTING. FMFM-1
states, "Our doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so

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much as it establishes general guidance that requires judgement in application. Therefore,

while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive."(11:44) Second, refocus the training of
the combat engineers, in mine warfare, from the defense, to employing mines in the
offense.

Existing mine and countermine warfare doctrine is a simple concept with only the
imagination limiting the application of the idea. Very good doctrine exists for the
employment of mines in the defense and countermine warfare in the offense. Still, there
is
almost no U.S. doctrine for the employment of mines in the offense. The defensive "mind
set" of mine warfare must be broken. FMFM-1 concludes " … that there exists no clear
division between the offense and the defense. Our theory of war should not attempt to
impose one artificially. The offense and the defense exist simultaneously as necessary
components of each other, and the transition from one to the other is fluid and
continuous". (11:26)

MINE WARFARE DOCTRINE

Current counter-mobility and mine warfare doctrine, FM 5-102 and FM 20-32, divides
mine fields into five different types. A short description and purpose of each of these is
important in understanding the focus of this subject.

The first type is the protective mine field. The protective mine field has two sub-
categories of fields; the deliberate protective and the hasty protective mine field. The
deliberate protective mine field provides for the protection of static or semi-permanent
installations. The best example is the expansive mine fields protecting the Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The mine field uses the standard pattern to emplace the mines.
The deliberate protective mine field usually incorporates the entire spectrum of
conventional anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. A closer look at the logistics and
manpower required to emplace such a field will be presented later. The hasty protective
mine field provides for local, close-in security protection of the small unit. This mine field
uses no standard pattern to lay the mines. The location of the mines depends on the
terrain, enemy, and situation. The hasty protective mine field primarily uses anti-
personnel mines, although anti-tank mines may be employed depending on availability.
An example of a hasty protective mine field would be placing claymore mines to cover an
avenue of approach where the enemy could infiltrate.

The second type is the point mine field. The primary use of this mine field is for
reinforcing other obstacles such as road craters, abatis, or wire obstacles not associated
with hasty protective mine fields. These mine fields also can stand alone as obstacles in
streams, the entrance and exit of fords, or deny a landing zone. Point mine fields have no
standard pattern and are dependent on the threat and situation. The point mine field
should cause the enemy to deploy his forces and bring up his breaching assets, exposing
those critical assets to indirect or direct fires. The point mine field takes advantage of
limited resources and existing obstacles to maximize the effect.

The third type is the tactical mine field. The primary use of this mine field is to stop,
delay, and disrupt the enemy attack. The field can be used to strengthen defensive
positions and protect the flanks. These fields use the standard pattern when laying the
mines. The full spectrum of conventional mines may be used with a variety of scatterable
mines. Like the deliberate protective mine field, the tactical mine field is logistically and

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manpower intensive. The tactical and deliberate protective mine fields have many
deficiencies when employed under the premise of maneuver warfare.

The fourth type is the interdiction mine field. The primary use of this type of field is to
trap or harass the enemy deep in their territory, assembly areas or defensive positions.
The mine field can effectively delay a road march or block a retreat. The family of
scatterable mines is ideal for this type of mine field. The methods of long-range delivery,
such as air or artillery, provide surprise and significantly add to the "fog of war."
Reconnaissance and special forces personnel also can lay conventional mines to serve the
same purpose. The significant advantage of the scatterable mines is the ability to self-
destruct at predetermined times. This feature prevents the enemy from recovering the
mines and using the mines against friendly units. The mines will not permanently restrict
access to terrain that friendly forces may need to occupy or pass through in the future.
Coordinated air strikes, artillery raids, or an ambush by combined anti-armor teams will
significantly enhance the effect of an interdiction mine field.

The fifth type of mine field is the phony mine field. The primary use of this type is to
simulate the other mine fields, supplement or extend live mine fields, and conceal gaps in
existing fields. All requirements for marking and recording mine fields apply to phony
fields, including the requirement to cover them by fire and observation. The purpose of a
phony mine field is to force the enemy to delay his attack, commit breaching assets, or
force him to change the axis of his advance. Each of these actions will force the enemy to
remain within the range of defensive fires for a longer period.

Reviewing mine warfare doctrine and the mine field breaching results of Operation
Desert Storm, several questions seem to stand out. Are deliberate protective and tactical
mine fields still practical given the intensive logistic and manpower effort to lay them? Are
deliberate protective and tactical mine fields compatible with FMFM-1, Warfighting?

The purpose of raising these questions is not to cast aside mine warfare. History does
how that mines are a very effective and economical means to produce casualties.
However, history does not seem to prove that mines were the decisive factor in victory or
defeat.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A look at historical record can often place the development of military doctrine into
perspective. The present doctrine of mine and countermine warfare originated from the
battlefields of World War II. Mines have been effective in inflicting casualties and
destroying equipment, since their inception. Still, the large expansive mine fields were
not decisive in defeating an attacker. The historical results do not seem to justify the
intense logistical effort to lay the fields.

BRL Report No.1582, MINE AND COUNTERMINE WARFARE IN RECENT HISTORY,

1914-1970, written by Dr. Russel H. Stolfi, of the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School, April
1972, for the Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland,
contains a detailed account of the development of mine and countermine warfare. Dr.
Stolfi's report emphasizes the importance of mine fields in several wars and battles during
the period of 1914-1970. The large mine fields, used by General Montgomery and Field
Marshal Rommel, in the North African theater of operations, are of particular interest. Dr.
Stolfi makes several observations, unrelated to mine warfare, while discussing the effects
of mine fields during certain battles. These observations, highlighted in the following

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paragraphs, may be more significant to the outcome of a battle than the actual mine
fields themselves.

In 1941, "geography" presented Germany and its allies with formidable problems of
attacking through the mountainous regions of Yugoslavia and Greece. The defending
Yugoslav army worked on deficit time in preparing their defenses. The Greek army,
engaged
in a ground conflict with Italy in Southern Albania and soon supported by powerful British
ground units, could offer stiff resistance against the Germans. The terrain canalized the
movement of the motorized German formations along the few roads of a poorly
developed transportation network. The location favored the employment of mines and
demolition explosives as critical weapons for the Greek defenders. Neither the Greeks nor
British armies
involved in the defense in April 1941, used mines effectively. (6:24-25)

The reader of this report might logically conclude that the defenders lost this battle
because they did not effectively use mines fields. However, Dr. Stolfi continues with this
side bar observation. "The Germans, who had the psychological advantage of one- and
one-half years of successful ground attacks, showed remarkable flexibility and elan on the
offensive. Those factors probably would rapidly overcome a defense in the mountains,
which included even ruthless and extensive use of mines and demolitions". (6:25)

Thus, the theory behind maneuver warfare, as outlined and explained in FMFM-1,
begins to appear as a decisive element in the outcome of a campaign. Surprise, training,
and boldness are just a few of the characteristics that exemplify maneuver warfare. The
Germans demonstrated the same traits in their Balkan campaign. These characteristics
enabled the Marines in Southwest Asia to breach and penetrate the vast defensive mine
fields in Kuwait.

The Germans and the British continued to emphasize the use of mines during the
latter part of 1941. The British leaned heavily on them in the defense of Tobruk and the
Germans increased the numbers in the defenses on the Egyptian frontier. The British
launched a powerful offensive in December of 1941. The offensive was an expensive one
in terms of casualties, equipment losses, and the revelation of inferior operational
techniques. Despite the losses, the British Imperial Corps forced the Germans to retreat
from the battlefield in the critical El Adem area. (6:27)

The important feature of this encounter is not the British overcoming the mine fields.
The phrase, "revelation of inferior operational techniques" jumps off the page. Applying
the operational art of war to the campaign is more crucial to success than the physical
defeat of the enemy. The British may have defeated the Germans in this battle, but the
losses they suffered could have cost them the campaign. A commander must shape the
battlefield to attack the enemy on the ground of his choosing.

Mines continued to be used in an ever-increasing amount on the battlefield.

Commanders viewed these artificial obstacles as purely a defensive weapon. This
viewpoint seemed to trap these commanders into the same limitations and inflexibility
whether they were in the offense or in the defense. They simply did not develop an
offensive concept for the employment of mines. Even today, mine warfare in the offense
is a neglected technique that must be further exploited. Mines can become a real combat
multiplier when combined with true maneuver warfare. The Marine Corps should take the

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lead in perfecting the tactics as it has in perfecting the tactics of an amphibious landing.
(6:28)

Field Marshal Rommel penetrated the mine fields of Tobruk that had a perimeter of
mines thirty-five miles long. The success was partially due to the inner mine fields of the
British defenses having fallen into decay. The British were also unable to launch a credible
counter attack. The defeated British retreated, but the Germans were unable to exploit
the success due to the terrain. This illustrates another example of a large deliberate
protective mine field defeated by a determined attacker. Later, the British defenses
stalemated Rommel at Alexandria, not because the mine fields were impenetrable, but
because he made the advance without reinforcing or resting his Army. (6:30)

The British began an intensive training program during the previously mentioned
stalemate. Many participants felt the emphasis on countermine measures and the
techniques used to clear enemy mine fields, were perhaps the most vital preparations
before the second battle of Alamein. The British engineers developed a deliberate and
well-rehearsed method for breaching. The technique incorporated direct and indirect fires
and supporting armor. Rommel began an intensive mine laying effort sowing over
500,000 mines. He wanted to form a barrier that no British soldier could penetrate. The
mine fields did delay the British attack and inflicted many casualties. Still, the training, the
coordination and air supremacy forced the Germans to disengage and flee west. (6:30-
38)

The prelude and scenario of the second battle of Alamein is strikingly similar to the
training effort, fire support coordination, and well-rehearsed breaching operations of the
U.S. Marine Corps combat engineers during Operation Desert Storm. The only difference
is the extremely low number of casualties suffered by the Marines, due to the
unwillingness of the Iraqis to fight. The Marine Corps must not forget these parallels.
Again, the example shows that a trained, determined, and disciplined force will not allow
a mine field, no matter how extensively laid, to stop them.

Dr. Stolfi makes several positive points on how the Germans used mine fields at
Alamein. Most of the points are common knowledge but two of them are worth noting.
First, mines are effective barriers to movement and are useful weapons for weak
defenders. Second, mines benefit the attacking forces. They block the shoulders of
penetrations against counter attacks and cover the flanks of attacking motorized columns
still engaged against units defending in deep echelon. This second point is very
interesting since neither the British nor the Germans used mines offensively. The negative
points Dr. Stolfi identifies are equally important. Mine fields, once emplaced, are static in
nature and restrict the mobility of friendly forces. They can be just as difficult to clear by
friendly forces as they are for the enemy. (6:39)

The preponderance of Dr. Stolfi's report seems to emphasize the value of mine fields
in the defense, but two observations stand out. Mines failed in adding enough defensive
strength to prevent either Field Marshal Rommel or General Montgomery from achieving
victories. Again, the question arises: Were the effects of mine fields really worth the effort
to prepare and could another more mobile and flexible weapons system have done the
same job? The second observation was the large-scale use of mines preceded the defeat
of the user. A conclusion may be drawn that a defending force, that resorts to extensive
mine laying, has already acknowledged the superior strength of the adversary and its own
impending defeat. (6:40-41)

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LOGISTICS

Logistics and manpower surface as reasons to diminish the emphasis of deliberate

protective and tactical mine fields on Marine Corps combat engineer training. These two
types of mine fields exist in Cuba and Korea. The maintenance of these fields requires
extensive manpower and assets. The ordnance used to replace deteriorated mines might
have better use elsewhere. These mine fields have a limited effect on a well-trained,
equipped, and determined enemy. The logistics of defensive mine fields have the
potential of seriously limiting the offensive options of a commander, if emplaced without
any relation to the enemy's intent. This assessment of mine fields raises other questions.
Can a commander afford the assets and manpower required to remove the mine field if
the enemy's intention changes or the mine field is no longer required? Does a commander
risk becoming permanently fixed to a location because of the effort and assets required to
lay the mine fields?

A closer look at the requirements for a small, generic tactical mine field, using the
planning guidance from FM 20-32, should clearly illustrate this point. The size of the mine
field will have a front of 200 meters and a depth of 300 meters. This would barely cover
the front of a platoon in the defense. The total mines required would be as follows: 246
anti-tank; 931 anti-personnel fragmenting; 1811 anti-personnel blast; for a total of 2988
mines. (9:29-31)

The time involved just to lay the mines would take 350 man-hours and could exceed
450-500 man-hours during limited visibility or NBC conditions. The man-hours do not
reflect moving the mines into position, breaking the mines out of their crates, or the
laying out and recording of the mine field. Additionally, an engineer unit must be
dedicated for continued maintenance on the field and therefore, be unavailable for other
vital engineer tasks. (9:35)

Currently, there is a total of only 4500-5000 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines

aboard Maritime Prepositioning Ships. Obviously, employing these mines in a tactical
mine field, in support of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade would be futile. The mines would
be best used in support of the offense, laid in point or interdiction mine fields.

A commander also must question whether an area or asset he considers vital requires
an extensive mine field. If the answer is yes, then perhaps the asset is in the wrong
location in the first place. The ability to displace and conceal a vital asset becomes
paramount in a tenuous situation. Protecting assets or an area with mine fields forces the
commander to focus on terrain and not the enemy. This fixation runs counter to
maneuver warfare. An area surrounded by a large mine field can attract the enemy's
attention and become a lucrative target.

CONCLUSIONS

The Marine Corps must concentrate its training effort in the employment of the point,
the interdiction, the phony, and the hasty protective mine fields. All four mine fields have
application in the defense, but their combined effect with offensive operations has the
most potential. The point and interdiction fields are ideal for confusing and disrupting the
enemy. They can be used to protect exposed flanks or avenues the enemy can use to
counterattack. These mine fields can be placed behind the enemy blocking his retreat and
helping to fix him in place to be defeated. The phony mine field can enhance the general
deception plan. The hasty protective mine field is ideal for our forces when they have

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reached their culminating point in the attack. Mine warfare focused in this direction now
truly becomes a combat multiplier.

Operation Desert Storm proved the Marine Corps' ability to adapt and find solutions
for difficult situations. The operation also showed the value and abilities of combat
engineers to breach extensive enemy mine fields. They wrote another chapter in the
history of mine and countermine warfare. Again, history shows that large, deliberate mine
fields will not be decisive in defending against a determined, well trained attacker. Yet, do
not forget that mines still produce casualties, both psychological and physical. Thus,
mines are still a valuable weapon. The goal is to maximize the effects of mines, as with
any other weapon system. Refocusing the employment of mines to the offense will
multiply the total effect of maneuver warfare.

If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy's cohesion, the immediate
object toward that end is to create a situation in which he cannot function. By our actions,
we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster
than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must be made to see his situation as
deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and
paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.

FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING

The Marine Corps' engineering community has the opportunity to take the lead toward
achieving that "ultimate goal." The combat engineers must develop an aggressive
doctrine for the employment of mines in the offense. The new doctrine must take
advantage of the
latitude provided by FMFM-1 and must not become strangled by a static defense or
terrain-oriented mentality. The combat engineers cannot sit on the laurels of the success
they received from the breaching operations in Kuwait. The engineers must use the
momentum
of Operation Desert Storm to correct past deficiencies. A new doctrine for using mines in
the offense will provide a "full tool box" to take to the next war. When mine warfare
begins to support the direction and guidance of FMFM-1, the Marine Corps will remain the
innovative force the world knows and respects.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Landmine and Countermine Warfare, Italy 1943-
1944, Washington D.C., 1972.
2. Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories Landmine and Countermine Warfare, Korea 1950-
1954, Washington D.C., 1972.
3. Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Landmine and Countermine Warfare, North Africa
1940-1943, Washington D.C., 1972.
4. Lucas, James, War on the Eastern Front 1941-1945, New York: Bonanza Books, 1982.
5. Manstein, Field Marshal Erich von, Lost Victories, California: Presidio Press, 1982.
6. U.S. Army, Aberdeen Research and Development Center, BRL Report No. 1582, Mine and
Countermine Warfare in Recent History, 1914-1970, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 1972.
7. U.S. Army, U.S. Army Engineer School, Engineers in the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Task
Force, FC 5-71-2, Virginia, 1986.
8. U.S. Army, HQTRADOC, Countermobility, FM 5-102, Virginia, 1985.
9. U.S. Army, HQ TRADOC, Mine/Countermine Operations, FM 20-32, Virginia, 1985.
10.U.S. Marine Corps, Campaigning, FMFM 1-1, Washington D.C., 1989.
11. U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, FMFM 1, Washington D.C., 1989.

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