062 Phil 848:

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 42258. January 15, 1936.]

In re Will of the deceased Leoncia Tolentino, VICTORIO PAYAD, Petitioner-

Appellant, v. AQUILINA TOLENTINO, Oppositor-Appellant.

Vicente Foz, Marciano Almario and Leonardo Abola for Petitioner-

Appellant.

Leodegario Azarraga for Oppositor-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; TESTATOR’S SIGNATURE. — It was not

necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix
requested Attorney A to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in
question in accordance with law.

2. ID.; ID.; TESTATOR’S MARK. — "A statute requiring a will to be ’signed’ is

satisfied if the signature is made by the testator’s mark." (Quoted by this court
from 28 R. C. L., p. 117; De Gala v. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 108.)

DECISION

GODDARD, J.:

Both parties in this case appeal from an order of the trial court denying the probate
of the alleged will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased. That court found that the will in
question was executed by the deceased on the date appearing thereon, September
7, 1933, one day before the death of the testatrix, contrary to the contention of the
oppositor that it was executed after her death. The court, however, denied probate
on the ground that the attestation clause was not in conformity with the
requirements of law in that it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused
Attorney Almario to write her name at her express direction.

The appeal of the oppositor-appellant is based upon the alleged failure of the trial
court in not finding that the will in question was executed after the death of Leoncia
Tolentino, or that she was mentally and physically incapable of executing said will
one day before her death. After a careful examination of the evidence on these
points we find no reason for setting aside the conclusion of the trial court as set
forth above. The assignments of the oppositor-appellant are therefore overruled.

As to the contention of the petitioner-appellant, as stated above, the trial court

denied probate of the will on the sole ground that the attestation clause does not
state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to write her name. The last
paragraph of the questioned will reads in part as follows: jg c:ch an rob les.com .p h

"En prueba de todo la cual, firmo el presente testamento con mi marca digital,
porque no puedo estampar mi firma a causa de mi debilidad, rogando al abogado
M. Almario que ponga mi nombre en el sitio donde he de estampar mi marca digital
. . ."
cralaw virt u a1 aw lib rary

The evidence of record establishes the fact the Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by
Attorney Almario, placed her thumb mark on each and every page of the
questioned will and that said attorney merely wrote her name to indicate the place
where she placed said thumb mark. In other words Attorney Almario did not sign
for the testatrix. She signed by placing her thumb mark on each and every page
thereof. "A statute requiring a will to be ’signed’ is satisfied if the signature is made
by the testator’s mark." (Quoted by this court from 28 R. C. L., p. 117; De Gala v.
Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 108.) It is clear, therefore, that it was not
necessary that the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix
requested Attorney Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the
will in question in accordance with law.

The appealed order of the trial court is reversed and the questioned will of Leoncia
Tolentino, deceased, is hereby admitted to probate with the costs of this appeal
against the Oppositor-Appellant.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.