Vdocuments - MX B GL 351 001 FP 001 Signals in Support of Land Operations Volume 1 Principles

B-GL-351-001/FP-001
SIGNALS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS

VOLUME 1
PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS

(ENGLISH)
Supersedes B-GL-321-001/FT-001 dated 1991-07-26.

WARNING
ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM
DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR
NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE RELEASED.
This publication is issued on the authority of the Chief of Land Staff.

B-GL-351-001/FP-001
SIGNALS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS

VOLUME 1
PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS

(ENGLISH)
Supersedes B-GL-321-001/FT-001 dated 1991-07-26
WARNING
ALTHOUGH NOT CLASSIFIED, THIS PUBLICATION, OR ANY PART OF IT, MAY BE EXEMPT FROM
DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT. ALL ELEMENTS OF
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR
NOT THE PUBLICATION OR ANY PART OF IT MAY BE RELEASED.
This publication is issued on the authority of the Chief of Land Staff.
OPI DAD 6 2008-05-01

SILO — Principles and Fundamentals
PREFACE
APPLICATION
1. B-GL-351-001/FP-001, Signals in Support of Land Operations, Volume 1, Principles and

Fundamentals is issued on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff by the Army Publishing
Office, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario. It is effective on receipt and supersedes B-GL-321-
001/FT-001 Signals in Battle, Volume 1, Principles and Employment, which shall be destroyed.
2. The French version of this publication is B-GL-351-001/FP-002, Les Transmissions au

cours des opérations terrestres, volume 1, Principes et rudiments.
3. Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded to LFDTS DAD 6.
AIM
4. This publication states the Signals doctrine for Land Force field operations. It is
commonly referred to as SILO.
SCOPE
5. The doctrine is applicable to all scales of conflict and to all levels of command within an
area of operation. The publication describes:
a. the requirement for a command and control information system;
b. the principles for the provision of this system;
c. the characteristics of major system components; and
d. the major tactical considerations that affect the provision of communications on the
battlefield.
CONTEXT
6. This manual in the B-GL-351 series highlights Signals support in the tactical land
environment. The cut-off point between the various manuals is arbitrary and some overlap is
inevitable.
7. The primary references were:
a. B-GL-310-001/AG-001 Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for

Canada’s Army of Tomorrow;
b. B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations;
c. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations;
d. B-GL-358-001/FP-001 Land Forces Information Operations Electronic Warfare;
e. B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations; and
i
B-GL-351-001/FP-001
f. Capability Development Record—Command Version 1.1, Draft-8 September 2006.
TERMINOLOGY
8. The terminology used in this manual is consistent with that of the Army Glossary and
AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................i
CHAPTER 1 SIGNALS IN THE LAND FORCE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
SECTION 1 SCOPE OF SIGNALS .......................................................................................1-1
101. Introduction .........................................................................................................1-1
102. Role of Signals....................................................................................................1-1
103. Signals’ Functions...............................................................................................1-1
104. Signals’ Components..........................................................................................1-1
105. Command and Control........................................................................................1-2
106. Command and Control System...........................................................................1-3
107. Army Operational Functions ...............................................................................1-4
108. Information Environment.....................................................................................1-4
109. Signals’ Command and Staff ..............................................................................1-5
110. General Principles of System Management (SM)...............................................1-6
111. Responsibilities of Signals in System Operations...............................................1-7
112. Tasks of Signals in CIS Planning........................................................................1-8
SECTION 2 THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .............................................................1-8
113. General ...............................................................................................................1-8
114. Continuum of Operations Framework.................................................................1-9
115. Spectrum of Combat.........................................................................................1-10
116. Full Spectrum Operations .................................................................................1-11
117. The Electromagentic Battlespace .....................................................................1-12
118. Joint, Interagency, Multi-national and Public ....................................................1-12
SECTION 3 TYPES OF LAND FORCE OPERATIONS ......................................................1-14
119. Land Operations ...............................................................................................1-14
120. Expeditionary Operations .................................................................................1-14
121. Domestic Operations ........................................................................................1-15
122. Joint, Inter-agency, Multi-national, and Public (JIMP) ......................................1-15
SECTION 4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS/IMPERATIVES.................................................1-16
123. Collaborative Working.......................................................................................1-16
124. Effects Based Approach to Operations.............................................................1-17
SECTION 5 COMMAND SUPPORT ...................................................................................1-18
125. General .............................................................................................................1-18
126. Command Support Components ......................................................................1-19
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127. Command Support Capability .......................................................................... 1-20

128. System Interoperability..................................................................................... 1-22
129. Security ............................................................................................................ 1-24
CHAPTER 2 THE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM
SECTION 1 GENERAL ......................................................................................................... 2-1
201. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 2-1
202. Background ........................................................................................................ 2-1
203. Role of the Tactical Command and Control Information System ....................... 2-2
204. Effectiveness Criteria for a Tactical Command and Control Information System2-3
SECTION 2 ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS AS AIDS TO INFORMATION PROCESSING... 2-5
205. General .............................................................................................................. 2-5
206. Elements of Computerized Information Processing ........................................... 2-6
207. Computer-based Communications..................................................................... 2-8
208. Networked Computing Environments............................................................... 2-10
SECTION 3 COMPUTER-BASED INFORMATION SYSTEMS.......................................... 2-11
209. General ............................................................................................................ 2-11
210. Business Information Systems ......................................................................... 2-13
211. Business Information Databases ..................................................................... 2-14
212. Transaction Processing Systems ..................................................................... 2-15
213. Management Information Systems .................................................................. 2-16
214. Decision Support Systems ............................................................................... 2-20
215. Executive Information Systems ........................................................................ 2-22
216. Office Automation Systems .............................................................................. 2-24
217. Hybrid Business Information Systems ............................................................. 2-25
218. Real-time Systems ........................................................................................... 2-25
SECTION 4 FUNCTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A LAND FORCE TACTICAL
COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM................................ 2-30
219. General ............................................................................................................ 2-30
220. Tactical Command and Control Information System Responsibilities.............. 2-34
221. System Development of the Tactical Command and
Control Information System.............................................................................. 2-35
CHAPTER 3 TACTICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 3-1
301. General .............................................................................................................. 3-1
302. Terminology ....................................................................................................... 3-2
iv
SECTION 2 MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS .....................................................................3-2

303. General ...............................................................................................................3-2
304. Telecommunications...........................................................................................3-3
305. Physical Communications...................................................................................3-5
306. Transmission Capacity .......................................................................................3-6
307. Communication Links .........................................................................................3-7
308. Modulation Systems ...........................................................................................3-8
309. Multiplexing.......................................................................................................3-11
SECTION 3 RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS...........................................................3-12
310. Characteristics of Radio Communications........................................................3-12
311. Frequency Spectrum ........................................................................................3-13
312. Radio Propagation ............................................................................................3-15
313. Radio Communication by Sky Wave ................................................................3-17
314. Radio Communications by Combat Net Radio Systems ..................................3-19
315. Radio Communications by Satellite ..................................................................3-22
316. Radio Communications Through Area Trunk Systems.....................................3-25
SECTION 4 LINE COMMUNICATIONS ..............................................................................3-28
317. General .............................................................................................................3-28
318. Characteristics ..................................................................................................3-29
319. Application ........................................................................................................3-30
320. Modes of Operation ..........................................................................................3-30
SECTION 5 HAND CARRIAGE COMMUNICATIONS ........................................................3-31
321. General .............................................................................................................3-31
322. Characteristics ..................................................................................................3-31
323. Applications ......................................................................................................3-32
SECTION 6 NETWORKING (MULTI-POINT COMMUNICATIONS) ...................................3-32
324. General .............................................................................................................3-32
325. Switched Networks ...........................................................................................3-33
326. Broadcast Networks..........................................................................................3-35
327. Computer Network Communications ................................................................3-36
CHAPTER 4 ELECTRONIC WARFARE IN THE ELECTRO MAGNETIC BATTLESPACE
SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................4-1
401. General ...............................................................................................................4-1
402. Electronic Warfare—Definition............................................................................4-1
403. The Role of Electronic Warfare...........................................................................4-3
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404. Electronic Warfare Capabilities .......................................................................... 4-4

SECTION 2 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT.............................................................. 4-8
405. General .............................................................................................................. 4-8
406. Search and Intercept Function ........................................................................... 4-9
407. Direction Finding .............................................................................................. 4-12
408. Analysis............................................................................................................ 4-13
SECTION 3 ELECTRONIC ATTACK.................................................................................. 4-16
409. Electronic Jamming.......................................................................................... 4-17
410. Control of Jamming .......................................................................................... 4-17
411. Jammer Platforms ............................................................................................ 4-20
412. Expendable Jammers ...................................................................................... 4-20
SECTION 4 ELECTRONIC PROTECTION ........................................................................ 4-20
413. Electronic Attack as Electronic Protection: Jamming in Non-electronic
Warfare Units ................................................................................................... 4-21
SECTION 5 ORGANIZATION FOR EMPLOYMENT .......................................................... 4-21
414. Light Electronic Warfare................................................................................... 4-21
415. Medium Electronic Warfare.............................................................................. 4-21
SECTION 6 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE......................... 4-22
416. Command of EW.............................................................................................. 4-22
417. Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell ............................................................... 4-23
418. Analysis and Control Element .......................................................................... 4-24
419. Electronic Warfare Liaison Officers .................................................................. 4-24
SECTION 7 ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNING AND PROCESSES........................... 4-24
420. The Operational Planning Process .................................................................. 4-24
421. Electronic Warfare and the Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlefield Process ..................................................................................... 4-25
422. The ISTAR Planning Process .......................................................................... 4-27
423. Priority Intelligence Requirements ................................................................... 4-27
424. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield......................................................... 4-27
425. Operations Plan Development ......................................................................... 4-28
426. ISTAR Plan ...................................................................................................... 4-28
427. The EW Processes .......................................................................................... 4-29
SECTION 8 ELECTRONIC DECEPTION ........................................................................... 4-30
428. Aim ................................................................................................................... 4-30
429. Planning ........................................................................................................... 4-30
vi
SECTION 9 ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION .................................................................4-31

430. General .............................................................................................................4-31
CHAPTER 5 SIGNALS PLANNING
SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................5-1
501. Responsibilities of the General Staff to Signals..................................................5-1
502. Responsibilities of Signals to the Staff................................................................5-2
503. Signals Command and Control...........................................................................5-3
504. Signals Planning Principles ................................................................................5-3
505. Signals Planning Process ...................................................................................5-6
SECTION 2 SIGNAL ESTIMATE ..........................................................................................5-7
506. General ...............................................................................................................5-7
507. Information Presentation.....................................................................................5-7
508. Methodology .......................................................................................................5-8
509. Determining the Requirement.............................................................................5-9
510. Consideration of External Factors (Signal Preparation of the Battlefield).........5-13
511. Service Delivery Assessment ...........................................................................5-15
512. Assessment of External Factors .......................................................................5-15
513. Analysis ............................................................................................................5-17
514. Developing and Assessing Courses of Action ..................................................5-18
515. The Decision Briefing........................................................................................5-19
516. Presenting the Plan ..........................................................................................5-19
517. Keys to Successful Planning ............................................................................5-20
518. Communications-Electronics Annexes .............................................................5-20
519. Communications-Electronics Operation Order .................................................5-20
520. Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions ........................................5-21
521. Communications-Electronics Technical Instructions ........................................5-21
522. Communications Electronics Standing Instructions..........................................5-22
523. Standing Operating Procedures .......................................................................5-22
524. Additional Publications......................................................................................5-23
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 5 SIGNAL ESTIMATE FORMAL TEMPLATE .............................. 5A-1
CHAPTER 6 SIGNAL TACTICS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS
SECTION 1............................................................................................................................6-1
601. Introduction .........................................................................................................6-1
602. Offensive Operations ..........................................................................................6-2
603. Signal Considerations for a Hasty Attack ...........................................................6-3
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604. Signals Considerations for a Deliberate Attack .................................................. 6-3

605. Signals Considerations in an Exploitation or Pursuit.......................................... 6-3
606. Defensive Operations......................................................................................... 6-4
607. Signals Considerations for the Main Defensive Battle ....................................... 6-4
608. Signals Considerations for the Delay ................................................................. 6-5
609. Stability Operations ............................................................................................ 6-5
610. Signals Considerations for Stability Operations ................................................. 6-6
611. Enabling Activities .............................................................................................. 6-7
612. Signals Considerations for an Advance to Contact ............................................ 6-7
613. Signals Considerations for a Meeting Engagement ........................................... 6-8
614. Signals Considerations for Relief Operations..................................................... 6-8
615. Signals Considerations for a Withdrawal.......................................................... 6-10
616. Signals Considerations Obstacle Crossing and Breaching .............................. 6-11
SECTION 2 UNIQUE OPERATIONS.................................................................................. 6-13
617. Airmobile Operations........................................................................................ 6-13
618. Signals Considerations for Airmobile Operations............................................. 6-14
619. Airborne Operations ......................................................................................... 6-16
620. Signal Considerations for Airborne Operations ................................................ 6-16
621. Amphibious Operations.................................................................................... 6-18
622. Signals Considerations for Amphibious Operations ......................................... 6-18
623. Operations in Enemy Controlled Territory ........................................................ 6-20
624. Signals Considerations for Operations in Enemy Controlled Territory ............. 6-20
SECTION 3 TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS .......................... 6-22
625. Chemical and Biological Weapons Effects on Signals ..................................... 6-22
626. Nuclear and Radiological Effects on Signals ................................................... 6-23
627. Operations in Mountains .................................................................................. 6-26
628. Operations in the Arctic and Cold Weather ...................................................... 6-27
629. Operations in the Jungle .................................................................................. 6-29
630. Operations in Desert and Extremely Hot Conditions........................................ 6-30
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1: Signals Two Main Components CIS and EW ........................................................1-2

Figure 1-2: Signals System Management in Network Operations ...........................................1-6
Figure 1-3: The Spectrum of Conflict .....................................................................................1-10
Figure 1-4: The Continuum of Operations .............................................................................1-11
Figure 1-5: Land Operations and Tasks ................................................................................1-14
Figure 1-6: The Model Shows the Linkages Between IM and SM, and
Responsibility Layers Between All-arms Command and Staff to
Signals Command and Staff................................................................................1-20
Figure 1-7: Primary Functional Components of SM in Their Relation to Signals Functions
and Tasks Within Command Support ..................................................................1-21
Figure 1-8: A Representative Structure Combining Military/Commercial and
Allied Military Systems.........................................................................................1-23
Figure 3-1: Ground Wave Transmission Paths ......................................................................3-16
Figure 3-2: Transmission Paths .............................................................................................3-17
Figure 3-3: CNR Linking Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQs,
Forward Operating Bases (FOB) and Specialized Assets...................................3-21
Figure 3-4: Satellite Communications Linking Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQs...3-23
Figure 3-5: LOS Linking a Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQ and FOBs..................3-26
Figure 3-6: Local Area Network .............................................................................................3-37
Figure 3-7: Wide Area Network..............................................................................................3-37
Figure 4-1: The Electromagnetic Spectrum .............................................................................4-3
Figure 4-2: EW Vehicle Conducting Electronic Reconnaissance and
Electronic Surveillance ........................................................................................4-10
Figure 4-3: EW Vehicles Conducting Direction Finding Tasks...............................................4-13
Figure 4-4: Electronic Attack on the Receiver........................................................................4-17
Figure 5-1: LCSS Planning Flowchart......................................................................................5-6
Figure 5-2: Connectivity Overlay............................................................................................5-11
Figure 5-3: IER Overlay .........................................................................................................5-12
Figure 5-4: Information Services Requirement Overlay .........................................................5-12
Figure 5-5: Table Describing Constraints and Restraints ......................................................5-13
Figure 5-6: Table Describing Comparison of Courses of Action ............................................5-19
Figure 6-1: Table Describing Land Tactical Operations and Constituent Activities .................6-2
ix
CHAPTER 1
SIGNALS IN THE LAND FORCE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
SECTION 1
SCOPE OF SIGNALS
101. INTRODUCTION
1. Since 1903, Signals has been assigned the responsibility for the provision of
communication links and services required by army commanders for command and control (C2)
of their forces during operations. As the world changes and technology continues to evolve
exponentially, the fundamental principles of Signals have remained constant. Signal Doctrine,
as it applies to supporting commanders engaged in Land Operations, is rooted, is proven
principles that more so adapt to the demands expected of it and the processes it supports. This
document will describe how Signals supports commanders and war fighters in the modern
operational environment.
102. ROLE OF SIGNALS
1. The role of Signals is to provide the commanders and their staffs with the means to
exercise command and control through the exploitation of the military and global information
environments while denying and exploiting the enemy's use of the same.
103. SIGNALS’ FUNCTIONS
1. Signals has two major functions in support of Land Force (LF) within the operating
environment:
a. Signals must enable Commanders at all levels to command and control their
forces in the successful completion of their assigned mission across the entire
Spectrum of Conflict within the Continuum of Operations.
b. Signals must be able to conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations as

they pertain to the electromagnetic (EM) battle space.
104. SIGNALS’ COMPONENTS
1. To enable commanders to execute effective command and control and to enhance their
decision making process within the Land Command Support System (LCSS), it is important to
understand the two components of Signals—Communication Information System (CIS) and
Electronic Warfare (EW) see Figure 1-1. CIS has two sub-components—Tactical Command
and Control, Information System (TacC2IS) and Tactical Communications (TacComms)—and
shares a relationship with the Electronic protection (EP) sub-component of EW. Chapters 2 and
3 of this volume cover in detail TacC2IS and TacComm. EW has three sub-components—the
Electronic Attack (EA), the Electronic Support (ES) and the Electronic Protection (EP).
Chapter 4 of this volume will cover EW in detail. This construct is duplicated at all levels of
command and each signals component has a technical relationship with its counterpart at
higher, lower and lateral levels.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-1
Figure 1-1: Signals Two Main Components CIS and EW
2. The LCSS supports the Army’s desired end-state of command superiority by:
a. fully integrating with the Canadian Forces (CF) unified command and control
(C2) systems to support future missions;
b. operating across the full spectrum of conflict;
c. interacting seamlessly with civil authorities and non-governmental organizations;
and
d. being user-friendly, effective, achievable, affordable and sustainable within both
integrated garrison and deployed domains.
3. The primary purpose of the LCSS is to provide commanders with the information and
information services required to make effective and timely C2 decisions about their forces
deployed in domestic and expeditionary operations. The LCSS is a combination of systems that
can be grouped into TacComms and TacC2IS and delivers major Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) systems to operational commanders and
staffs. This includes EW, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), Weapon Locating Sensors (WLS),
Ground-based Air Defence (GBAD) and Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) sensors.
105. COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. Command is defined as the authority vested in an individual for the direction and
control of military forces.1 This involves the exercise—and delegation of—authority,
acceptance of responsibility and a demonstration of leadership and competence. Command is
the purposeful exercise of authority over structures, resources, people and activities.2
1
B-GL-300-003/FP-001, Command in Land Operations.
2
Canadian Defence Academy, Leadership in the Canadian Forces, Doctrine, 2005, p. 7
1-2 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals in the Land Force Operating Environment
2. NATO has defined control as “the process through which a commander, assisted by his
staff, organizes, directs and co-ordinates the activities of the forces allocated to him”3. Control
should be viewed, not just as top-down direction, but also as including the feedback from
bottom-up as to the effect of the action taken. To achieve control, the commander and his staff
employ a common doctrine and philosophy for command and use standardized procedures
(including staff work) in conjunction with the communications information systems available.
106. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
1. The exercise of command and control is accomplished through a combination of

systems. A command and control system is an integrated system comprised of doctrine,
procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities and communications that
provides authorities at all levels with timely data to plan, direct and control their activities. The
army command and control system is made up of the following major components:
a. Chain of Command. A chain of command designates commanders at various

levels and for designated functions. Their responsibilities are described in
B-GL-300-003/FP-001, Command in Land Operations Chapter 3. This command
and control component will not be discussed any further in this publication.
b. Staff System. It is described in B-GL-331-001/FP-001, Command Support in

Land Operations, Chapter 2. It will not be discussed any further in this
publication.
c. Headquarters Facilities. The functioning of headquarters will be discussed in

detail in this series of publications.
d. Communication and Information Systems. Communications and Information

Systems (CIS) are the resources that bind all of the other components of the
command and control system. To be more precise, it is an assembly of
equipment, methods, procedures and, if necessary, personnel, organized to
accomplish specific information conveyance and processing functions. CIS
encompasses both communications and computer related resources including
the associated low level software applications.
(1) Communications System: Communication System (CS) provides

communication between users and includes transmission systems and
switching systems in support of information transfer.
(2) Information System: An Information System (IS) is used by individuals

to store, retrieve, process and display information in support of job related
tasks. It includes software, applications and processing devices such as
computers, scanners, and printers, in other words the Local Area Network
(LAN) itself.
3
NATO Definition AAP 6 (2005)
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-3
107. ARMY OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS
1. The Army defines five operational functions: command, sense, act, shield, and sustain.
Commanders seek to integrate and apply these functions as overwhelming combat power when
and where required. B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations defines combat power as “the
total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit or formation can apply
against an opponent at a given time”. The aim is to convert the potential of forces, resources
and opportunity into actual capability that is greater than the sum of the parts. Signals provides
a capability to integrate the activities of the operational functions to enhance or magnify the
effect of friendly combat power and diminish that of the enemy:
a. Command. Signals provide the means for commanders to exercise command

and control (C2) over their forces and facilitate the timely execution of C2
processes. Commanders seek to achieve information superiority at the right
place, at the right time, and under the right circumstances. Signals enable
Commanders to enhance the decision making cycle by processing information,
linking sensors, commanders and weapon platforms on the battlefield, as well
as ensuring the availability of battle visualization.
b. Shield. Signals role in this operational function is protection and security of the
network from both CS and C2IS threats posed by hackers, viruses and enemy
electronic warfare (EW) units.
c. Sense. Signals role in this operational function is associated with information

operation in support of the military forces activities in the Electromagnetic (EM)
battlespace. It encompasses the search for, interception and identification of
electromagnetic emissions.
d. Act. Signals role in this operational function is associated with Electronic Attack
(EA), which is a sub-component of EW. It is the employment of electromagnetic
energy, including direct energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the
electromagnetic spectrum and to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.
e. Sustain. Signals role in this operational function is to maintain the operational

network. This includes the CS and the C2IS equipment and software crucial in
processing functions and information transmission in the operational
environment.
108. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
1. The domain in which Signals will forever be intrinsically linked is the information
environment. The term “information environment” brings with it an immensity and scope that is
seemingly all encompassing. Of particular importance to Signals is the inherent understanding
of the following two sub-sets of the information environment:
1-4 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
a. The Military Information Environment (MIE) is defined as “the environment

contained within the global information environment, consisting of the
information systems and organizations, friendly and adversary, military and non-
military that support, enable, or significantly influence a specific military
operation.”4
b. The Global Information Environment (GIE) is defined as “all individuals,

organizations or systems, most of which are outside the control of the military or
National Command Authorities, that collect, process and disseminate
information to national and international audiences.”5
2. The information environments exist within the land operations environment, and in order
for Signals to effectively enable information exploitation in support of commanders and their
staffs, Signals must understand the land operational environment in which they operate.
Therefore, the Army requires the infrastructure that allows the Land Forces to operate within the
MIE and to interface with the GIE so as to use CIS to enable the integration of all Land Force
activities as follows:
a. Support the decision-making process;

b. Transmit information, including orders and reports;
c. Link sensors, commanders and weapons platforms;
d. Provide a multi-dimensional relevant common picture; and
e. Enable efficient sustainment of the force.
109. SIGNALS’ COMMAND AND STAFF
1. To enable operational commanders to execute effective command and control and

enhance the decision making processes in the operational environment in conjunction with CIS,
a Signals command and staff organizational structure is required. This organizational structure
includes personnel, equipment, facilities, processes and expertise which provide authorities at
all levels to plan, direct and monitor network operations. For Signals` commanders and staff to
plan, direct and monitor activities for network operations an information management plan (IMP)
from the operational commander and staff is required. Without the IMP, Signals will not be able
to anticipate and support the functions of situation awareness (SA), battle management, battle
planning and sensor integration in the operational environment. The IMP identifies how relevant
information (RI) is to be managed internally and externally. The IMP assigns information
management (IM) responsibilities to specific staff, describes information requirements, provides
guidance to system management organizations on requirements for voice and data
communication links, as well as command guidance with respect to information currency
requirements and information protection needs. Figure 1-2 shows the relationship between
Signals planning, directing and monitoring network operations once the IMP has been issued.
4
Ibid
5
Land Force Information Operations B-GL-300-005/FP-001
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-5
Figure 1-2: Signals System Management in Network Operations
110. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEM MANAGEMENT (SM)
1. The general principles of system management (SM) include capacity, economy,

flexibility, mobility, reliability, security, simplicity, survivability and timeliness.
2. Capacity. The SM capability should be built on a modular basis to permit it to cater to a

variety of force structures across the entire spectrum of CF operations. System management
tools and procedures should be scalable, allowing an increase in the size of the supported HQ
without an equivalent increase in system workload.
3. Economy. The limited availability of highly qualified support personnel suggests that
service desk functions should be centralized with the senior deploying HQ. System support
capabilities should allow for remote management of distant devices. Best industry practices in
information technology (IT), where this is possible and sensible, are used. These include a
tiered structure with junior (i.e. less experienced) personnel acting as initial points of contact
with access to more specialized resources provided when the situation warrants. This “bottom
up” approach is harmonized with the fact that CIS plans are developed from the top down. That
is, the SM concept is integrated with existing and developing staff and signals doctrine.
4. Flexibility. The mature SM concept addresses the entire spectrum of operations from
war fighting through peace support operations (PSO) to domestic operations and through the
five phases of operations; i.e. a single support concept for garrison and deployed forces is the
goal. In addition, CIS must be robust such that the loss of any single workstation, server or
communications means has the minimum operational impact.
1-6 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
5. Mobility. Headquarters must possess a high degree of strategic and tactical mobility to
facilitate flexible C2. System support capabilities must possess the same degree of mobility.
Hardware repair (primarily through replacement of faulty communications or computer
components) should be carried out as far forward as possible. Software repair6 (less data and
quick-fix issues) is normally carried out as far back as possible.
6. Reliability. Users will become increasingly dependent on the availability of C2IS

systems and associated information holdings. Untimely or lengthy failures in communications,
software or hardware will pose significant operational risks. Software configurations should
have maximum standardization, reliability and maintainability to improve operational availability.
7. Security. Communications and information security considerations must be an integral

part of all systems management doctrine and training.
8. Simplicity. Open interfaces should exist to simplify management of networks,

messaging and software applications.
9. Survivability. The system has to be capable of withstanding physical and electronic

attacks by the enemy.
10. Timeliness. Restoration of service to the current baseline operational environment,

including operational data, is the highest priority task for system management. Rapid fault
identification and equipment replacement or software restoration is essential.
111. RESPONSIBILITIES OF SIGNALS IN SYSTEM OPERATIONS
1. Within Signals, there are functional responsibilities directly associated with providing the
means of C2 to a commander and their staff. These responsibilities, as they pertain to the
signal network, can be categorized as:
a. System Establishment. Consists of the personnel, equipment and processes

required to establish and extend the infrastructure and terminal equipment
(static or mobile) required to facilitate signal system interaction for the purpose
of communication, command and control, and/or exploitation.
b. System Operation. Consists of the personnel, equipment and processes

required to utilize the signal system and monitor its performance as an enabler
to the support command or staff function.
c. System Exploitation/Protection. Consists of the personnel, equipment and

processes required to gain advantage of our adversary’s use of the information
environment while preserving and protecting our own use of the same
information environment.
6
Software repair in this context refers to issues such as adjustments to computer code and development of software
patches. Software problems that can be resolved through simple re-installation of applications are carried out on site.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-7
d. System Maintenance. Consists of the personnel, equipment and processes

required to conduct fault finding and signal system repair in order to ensure the
continued operational capability of the supporting system.
2. It is important to note that the above categories are mutually supportive of each other
and only by achieving synergy amongst the categories can effective signal system support be
achieved. Also key to note is that the term “system” is not limited to only the physical personnel,
equipment and networks, but encompasses the electromagnetic spectrum, tactical and technical
processes, operational mission, and the entire compliment of information that is applicable to
accomplishing that mission.
112. TASKS OF SIGNALS IN CIS PLANNING
1. The primary tasks assigned to Signals are:
a. System Planning. Conducted in an iterative manner and integrated within the

supported command and staff processes, to support the commander in
achieving their intent.
b. System Adaptation. The Signals command and staff needs to create the
conditions for maintaining the operating integrity of the supporting information
bearer capabilities.
c. System Management. Tactical Situational Awareness (SA) and technical

Situational Understanding (SU) must be maintained to ensure preservation of
the information flow required to enable the commander to make timely and
effective decisions.
d. System Administration. Administer the assigned signal systems and

networks, as well as providing close tactical, technical and administrative
support to the headquarters.
e. System Support. Provided through the employment of technical experts who

understand the needs of the commander and are themselves warriors in the
context of military operations.
SECTION 2
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
113. GENERAL
1. 21st century armies conducting land operations must remain flexible, adaptive, and
capable of succeeding across the entire continuum of operations. No longer is the massing of
armies along fixed lines, using the acquisition of physical territory as the indicator of success or
failure, the norm; however, this must remain as a potential threat. The modern threat is
asymmetrical and the battlefield of the future is often a non-linear, non-contiguous battlespace
to be potentially fought in urban terrain and complex environments wherein the threat is not
readily identifiable. Combatants may well be insurgent groups, organized military or possibly a
combination of both.
1-8 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
2. The rapid advances in technology and its application in weapons and communication
networks have become relatively inexpensive to place in a nation’s arsenal or in the hands of
insurgent organizations. The ease of acquisition has given an adversary the potential to be a
lethal threat to the stability of not only states within their sphere of influence but also to global
peace.
3. The operating environment is the overall operational and tactical circumstances in which
the LF is expected to conduct operations. It exists on both the physical and psychological
planes. It is a complex mix of the geographical, environmental and human factors that
collectively and significantly complicate the conduct of operations.
4. The LF will operate in an increasingly complex, interdependent environment in which

they must plan to conduct operations that will influence the physical and psychological aspects
of the terrain, threats and hazards, the local populace and other systems, actors and entities.
They must do so using a comprehensive approach, working within a Joint, Interagency and
Multinational within the Public domain (JIMP) framework to achieve enduring success. This
complex, complicated, asymmetric operating environment has a significant impact on how
Signals must conduct operations as part of the Command Support team and increasingly as a
part of the “Act” and “Shield” operational functions available to Commanders at all levels.
5. As a direct result of the complexity of the operating environment, the threats within it and
the technology available both to us and our adversaries, Signals has two major functions in
support of LF within the LF operating environment:
a. Signals must enable Commanders at all levels to command and control their
forces in the successful completion of their assigned mission across the entire
Spectrum of Conflict within the Continuum of Operations; and
b. Signals must be able to conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations as

they pertain to the electromagnetic (EM) battlespace.
114. CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK
1. Campaigns and subordinate operations often require military forces to operate

effectively across the spectrum of conflict, conduct a wide range of military activities
simultaneously, and transition quickly from one type of operation to another in rapidly changing
operational environments. Commanders must be able to visualize how a campaign or operation
will likely evolve over time in light of changing circumstances.
2. The concept of a continuum of operations identifies a number of campaign themes and

provides a framework for commanders to understand the complexity of the operational
environment and the manner in which missions contribute to a lasting peace, or at least to an
environment in which conflict is diminished. The continuum of operations consists of four
aspects:
a. The spectrum of conflict;
b. Predominant (operational level) campaign themes, including counter-

insurgency;
c. Types of tactical operations (offensive, defensive and stability); and
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-9
d. Simultaneous conduct of different types of tactical operations.
115. SPECTRUM OF COMBAT
1. The spectrum of conflict is a backdrop for all operations and describes the environment
in which they occur. The main discriminator is the level of violence involved, which ranges from
peaceful interaction amongst international players (states, corporations, non-government
agencies (NGOs)), through low-level conflicts, to general war (see Figure 1-3). Military forces
operate throughout this spectrum.
Figure 1-3: The Spectrum of Conflict
2. Military operations do not necessarily go through a progression along the spectrum in

either direction. Operations typically start somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, not at
either end. There may be different levels of conflict in different parts of a single theatre of
operations, or even within a joint operations area. Indeed, levels of conflict may vary over time
within a single area. In general, no specific operation exists at just one point of this spectrum.
Reality is more complex: at any one time there may be a humanitarian crisis in one location, an
insurgency in another, and intense fighting between forces nearby, all within the same area of
operations. Similarly, at any one location there may be house-to-house fighting one day,
collection of forensic evidence the next day, and restoration of electricity and water supplies the
day after. In other words, full spectrum operations will be conducted simultaneously and
sequentially.
3. The Continuum of Operations is a conceptual framework used to explain the

relationship between campaigns and the various types of tactical activities that constitute their
conduct (see Figure 1-4). It aids in understanding the complexity of the operational environment
while planning, preparing for, conducting and assessing operations. It recognizes that
campaigns are realized through a combination of tactical activities that reflect the level of
violence and overall campaign theme. Commanders must maintain a long-range vision of
where a campaign is going and consider the long-term effects of current operations. This
framework should help commanders think beyond the specifically assigned mission to what may
come next.
1-10 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Figure 1-4: The Continuum of Operations
4. Signals must made aware of and understand the requirements of all forces operating
throughout the spectrum of conflict and provide Commanders at all levels, regardless of their
place within that spectrum, with the Command Support and offensive, defensive and stability
operations support (as they pertain to the EM battlespace) that best suit the demands of the
supported LF at any given time or instance. Signals must ensure that the support provided is
adaptive, responsive and simple enough to respond to the exigencies of the constantly evolving
framework that is defined as the continuum of operations.
116. FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1. Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) is defined as “The simultaneous conduct of operations

by a force across the spectrum of conflict.”7 In FSO, the psychological plane is as important, if
not more important than the physical plane. An LF formation headquarters (HQ) will require the
competencies and supporting systems to apply all physical and psychological means in a Joint,
Interagency, Multi-national and Public (JIMP) framework in order to achieve the desired effects.
Manoeuvre, firepower and more importantly, Information Operations (Info Ops) must be
designed to achieve effects in time and space over the course of a campaign. They must
disrupt and defeat adversaries to the campaign objectives, as well as enhance the efforts of the
JIMP. The vast majority of operations in the land operating environment are likely to be non-
kinetic. The threat is adaptable and asymmetric and will seldom attack our kinetic strength.
Therefore, the Command system must also be responsive and include the necessary mobility
and protection to counter asymmetric threats. Command systems must be balanced and
adaptive in order to provide command in FSO or cater to the range of potential operations within
the spectrum of conflict.
7
Army Terminology Panel
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-11
117. THE ELECTROMAGENTIC BATTLESPACE
1. The importance of the EM Battlespace to Command within a network-enabled land

operations environment cannot be overstated. It is imperative that Commanders at all levels
understand the existence of the EM battlespace and ensure that their operations include
activities that enable their forces to dominate that EM battlespace.
2. The EM Battlespace is a unique environment that encompasses all devices (including

people) that employ electrical or electronic means to transmit, receive, process, store, display,
sense and analyse information. The EM battlespace is, therefore, not dissimilar from the
Aerospace environment, in that it exists only due to our ability to exploit it through a specialized
infrastructure to achieve both physical and psychological effects. The “Shielding” necessary to
protect our own infrastructure and the “Act” of prosecuting our adversaries’ infrastructure within
this EM battlespace are primarily Signals functions, but require activities from Commanders and
soldiers at all levels to be successful. Although the philosophy, doctrine and tactics associated
directly with military operations in the land environment have aspects that support a military
force’s activities in the EM battlespace, warfare in the EM battlespace requires its own set of
doctrine and tactics. These activities, Electronic Attack (EA) and Electronic Protection (EP), are
sub-divisions of Electronic Warfare (EW), the military action that describes the use of EM
activity to control that EM battlespace
3. Volume 3 of Signals in Land Operations will contain a more comprehensive description

of the doctrine and tactics associated with warfare within the EM battlespace. The basic
principles of warfare in the EM battle space are discussed in Chapter 4 of this volume.
118. JOINT, INTERAGENCY, MULTI-NATIONAL AND PUBLIC
1. Adapting to the JIMP framework is instrumental to the success of the command function
particularly in the Comprehensive Approach to Canadian operations. The LF can anticipate that
few if any future operational deployments will be conducted outside of this framework. How one
deals with events as one moves through the continuum of operations will differ as will those who
have responsibility for response in a supporting or supported role to a given emergency or
contingency. Under the JIMP framework, the military becomes just one of the many effects
available to government in the context of domestic, continental or international operations. This
applies equally to all elements of national security, including civilian security partners, in order to
achieve unity of effort through Collaborative Working (CW), collective response and combined
effects. In many campaigns, the military will be in a supporting role depending upon the cause
of the crisis and the requirement to exercise that element of power.
2. This serves to reinforce the point: for the LF command systems to be effective within the
JIMP framework, they must be applied in harmony with many other actors and commanders
must be personally engaged in the process. Indeed, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)
charges his strategic staff and operational level HQ to maintain such contact and liaison with all
potential security partners.8 Commanders at section through formation levels must be
cognizant of and be prepared to operate within the JIMP framework. All levels of HQ,
8
CDS, Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command. NDHQ, 14 Nov 05
1-12 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
particularly land formation and unit task force, must be organized to engage and interact with
local authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other government departments
(OGDs), other security services, etc. This involves staff, liaison and communications personnel
with the right training, education, skills and collaborative tools to engage actively with civilian
agencies to achieve coherent mission planning and execution.
3. The interagency aspect, though not well understood, is key to mission success, in
particular as it is at the heart of the strategy for the Comprehensive Approach. Mutual
understanding, liaison, building trust, confidence and a sense of common purpose with other
players (and even integrating them into campaign planning or sharing information) are at the
heart of effective command and mission success. A network of liaison teams must be
established to reinforce the concepts of CW, Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO),
and Network Enabled Operations (NE Ops) with emphasis on psychological effects. The priority
function of a formation HQ will be to plan and synchronize psychological effects, with the
delivery of physical effects left to the tactical commanders, within the commander’s intent and
extant targeting rules. Command and Control Information Systems structures, processes,
systems and security measures must allow for civilian integration within any operation.
4. Multi-National (MN) operations have broad implications for Canada particularly in a lead
nation context. Our recent history suggests that Canada is likely to be asked by NATO, the UN
or possibly other coalitions to command an MN force at the formation level. Commitments such
as these bring real benefits to Canada in terms of influence and presence, and provide all
elements of the LF with much needed operational experience in the LF operating environment.
The most likely mission will involve a CF-led MN force at the land formation level. Implicit in this
is the capacity to provide the core command and command support capabilities regardless of
the staff composition and contribution from coalition partners. Within an MN staff there is a
need to assemble the team early in the training and mounting stages in order to build trust and
cohesion. Equally, clear operating procedures are essential, and the staff decision tools and
CIS must impose limited training and be configured to cater to the appropriate security domain.
Signals must be prepared to provide a core command support capability that can expand to
accommodate an MN formation and/or units and operate concurrently with national command
elements (NCEs). Command systems, processes and procedures must account for the
technological awareness of the entire MN team and be designed with this in mind.
5. An inherent challenge in a MN formation will be the sharing of information and

intelligence, both within an MN HQ and across the force. In an LF-led MN force, there will be a
clear distinction between information and intelligence that is held nationally and that which is
declared to the coalition. Notwithstanding the operational imperative and desire to share
information, LF commanders may not have access to all intelligence sources from coalition
nations and must retain access to national sources and capabilities. In an asymmetric
environment most useful and actionable information comes through human intelligence
(HUMINT) from the elements on the ground, with deployed and reach-back signals intelligence
(SIGINT) and EW assets accounting for the majority of actionable and targeting information.
Multi-national chains of command are a valuable source of national intelligence. Therefore,
means must be found to tap into these sources. National command functions and supporting
systems must complement and operate effectively within a coalition and JIMP environment.
National staff will have to have access to support and CIS capability that is distinct from the
coalition.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-13
SECTION 3
TYPES OF LAND FORCE OPERATIONS
119. LAND OPERATIONS
1. The broad range of tactical level operations, tasks and activities that are conducted to
realise success in a campaign are divided into three groupings or categories as follows:
a. offensive operations;
b. defensive operations; and
c. stability operations.
2. These types of tactical level operations, together with tactical tasks, describe the total
tactical activity undertaken by a military force within a campaign. Each type is guided by a set
of principles. These types of operations are further broken down into subordinate types of
tactical operations (see Figure 1-5). Operations will be further discussed in Chapter 6 of this
volume.
Offensive Operations Defensive Operations Stability Operations

Attack Raid Defence Control and Security
Exploitation Delay Support to Demobilisation,
Disarmament and
Pursuit Feint
Reintegration (DDR)
Demonstration
Support to Security Sector
Ambush Break-out Reform (SSR)
Support to Infrastructure and
Governance
Assistance to Other Agencies
Enabling Activities
Reconnaissance Link-up Retirement Advance to Contact
Security Relief of Encircled Force Relief of Troops in Combat
Meeting Engagement Withdrawal Obstacle Breaching/Crossing
Figure 1-5: Land Operations and Tasks
120. EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS
1. The intent that Canada will deploy a CF expeditionary capability has been recognized in
the recent establishment of an expeditionary command. The emphasis at the moment is on
structure with doctrine, process, culture and equipment being considered in parallel.
2. The implications of creating a full spectrum expeditionary capability for the CF are not
readily apparent. One can surmise that a joint C2 capability will be required along with a
harmonization of the key command support elements. The challenge will be to identify the
1-14 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
requirements, based on a solid joint doctrinal foundation, sufficiently early enough to allow the
new capability to be fielded for maximum effectiveness from the outset. The LF plays a key role
in CF expeditionary operations and will be an important participant in developmental aspects of
a joint capability. Expeditionary forces are inherently joint and must have processes and
systems in place that allow communications and collaboration without reliance on ad hoc
solutions. This implies a set of core capabilities at high readiness and with the necessary
mobility. Land HQs must be rapidly deployable domestically or internationally by a combination
of air, sea and land (rail); therefore their design must facilitate strategic mobility. To improve
responsiveness and agility, expeditionary forces must leverage the use of networks for
collaborative working and reach-back communications. Split-base operations can be part of the
design of forward Command elements.
121. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
1. With the stand-up of Canada Command (CANCOM), there will soon be more clearly
defined Command requirements for the surveillance of, and conduct of operations within,
Canada’s territory, airspace and coastal approaches. It is important to note that although the
location of the operations is different than Expeditionary operations, the nature of the operations
and the campaign themes associated with them remain unchanged.
2. Canada Command has moved to re-energize a regional command structure, with joint
operation centres in each of the six regions, and as a consequence established a need for a
supporting CIS infrastructure. This has implications for the manning and command support
capabilities within each of the regional Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ, in particular the termination
of national CIS at the protected, classified and caveat levels. Less clear are the respective
command responsibilities for force employment (FE) and force generation (FG) between
CANCOM—ostensibly as the force employer—and the environmental chiefs of staffs.
3. The LF will need to ensure that its Tactical Command and Control Information System
(TacC2IS) is integrated such that it supports deployments within Canada using both military and
civil infrastructure. It is imperative that the C2 tools used both domestically and abroad are the
same to ensure that the Command Support process is seamless to LF Commanders and their
staffs.
122. JOINT, INTER-AGENCY, MULTI-NATIONAL, AND PUBLIC (JIMP)
1. To respond to the threats (real or potential), the Army must be prepared to conduct
operations as part of a Joint, Inter-Agency/Inter-Departmental, Multi-National and Public (JIMP)
effort. The application of military effects cannot succeed in isolation and the Army is but one
element of a comprehensive approach to address the root causes of conflict across the
continuum. This operational reality demands that today’s army be one that understands the
strategic imperatives to success and is able to coordinate within that JIMP environment to
achieve it. This operational reality demands a Command and Control Information
Systems architecture as its backbone to enable success. Signals must succeed at defining,
implementing and evolving that C2IS architecture.
2. Adapting to the JIMP framework is instrumental to the success of the command function
particularly within the national strategy of Diplomacy, Development and Defence (3D) context
for Canadian operations. The LF can anticipate that few if any future operational deployments
will be conducted outside of this framework. How one deals with events as one moves through
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-15
the continuum of operations will differ as will those who have responsibility for response in a
supporting or supported role to a given emergency or contingency. Under the JIMP framework,
the military becomes just one of the many effects available to government in the context of
domestic, continental or international operations. This would apply equally to all elements of
national security, including civilian security partners, in order to achieve unity of effort through
CW, collective response and combined effects.
3. This serves to reinforce the point for the CF command systems to be effective within the
JIMP framework, they must be applied in harmony with the many other actors and commanders
must be personally engaged in the process. Indeed, the CDS charges his strategic staff and
operational level HQ to maintain such contact and liaison with all potential security partners.9
Commanders at section through formation levels must be cognizant of and be prepared to
operate within the JIMP framework. All levels of headquarters, particularly land formation and
unit task force, must be organized to engage and interact with local authorities, NGOs, OGDs,
other security services, etc. This involves staff, liaison and communications personnel with the
right training, education, skills and collaborative tools to overcome a natural mistrust and
engage actively with civilian agencies to achieve coherent mission planning and execution.
SECTION 4
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS/IMPERATIVES
123. COLLABORATIVE WORKING
1. Collaborative Working and its sub-set collaborative planning are concepts gaining wide
acceptance within both the military and civilian environments. They have the potential to help
overcome the intra-military and civil-military cultural gaps which hinder communications,
common understanding and action, and the building of trust. Collaborative Working can create
new synergies and multiply the net capacity of the spectrum of partners and can be defined as
the process by which the collective intellectual power, experience and knowledge of command
and staff teams are applied to achieve a common intent.10
2. Teams can be temporary or permanent, single or multi-functional, collocated or

distributed, intra or interagency, mixed military and civilian, and include multi-layers of
government, national or coalition elements. Distributed teams are second nature to military
organizations and are prevalent in the LF operating environment with robust and versatile
command support systems being critical to mission success. These systems are critical to
mission success. They must be built on the premise that CW is central to the workings of all
members of the military team and that they include the full spectrum of JIMP partners whether
they be in a supporting or supported role. Collaborative processes and tools that allow for
simultaneous rather than cascading planning and execution are essential if CW is to work in the
LF operating environment. Collaborative Working enables mission command and is critical to
building trust and establishing SA and Situational Understanding (SU) particularly in the JIMP
environment.
9
CDS, Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command. NDHQ, 14 Nov 05
10
DRDC Valcartier, Collaborative Working in a Domestic Operation (CW in DOMOPS) Study, p. 5
1-16 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
3. The application of mission command through command led collaboration in the LF

operating environment has the potential to generate benefits that include:
a. Implicit or explicit sharing of SA and SU;
b. Harnessing of knowledge, experience, intellect and capabilities of the JIMP

team allowing for more efficient use of all human and material resources;
c. Better identification of accepted and agreed outcomes leading to a common

understanding of the end state and how it is best achieved; and
d. Capitalization on emerging opportunities and to mitigate unintended or

undesirable consequences.
4. Collaborative Working goes beyond the concept of teamwork and demands

organizational and technological solutions that will allow the diverse and distributed teams to
work in harmony to achieve the common end-state. Open processes and systems are essential
to facilitate CW, thus the design of HQs and Command Support must leverage collaborative
tools and technologies. Co-operative, compatible and inventive solutions to capitalize on the
collective intellectual power, experience and knowledge of the broader JIMP team will be
essential to future FSO missions’ success in generating shared common intent.
124. EFFECTS BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS
1. Effects Based Approach to Operations is defined as “A planning philosophy combined

with specific processes that enable firstly, the integration and effectiveness of the military
contribution within a comprehensive approach with other elements of power, and secondly, the
realization of operational objectives.”11 Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) is also
described as “the synergistic application of the full range of the nation’s capabilities at the
tactical, operational and strategic levels… and on the physical and psychological planes.”12 An
EBAO approach is still a maturing concept, one that requires refinement and is not yet fully
embodied in doctrine. It is understood that:
a. effects Based Approach to Operations complements the manoeuvrist approach

and enables commands to more effectively operate on both the physical and
psychological planes;
b. the exercise of command-led operational art and the sensible use of mission
command will be critical to the success of EBAO; and
c. by synchronizing resources through collaboration across all elements of the

JIMP framework, commanders can produce the right combination of effects, on
the lines of operation to achieve the desired end state.
11
Army Terminology Panel
12
Army FEC, pp. 24 and 25
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-17
2. With information acquisition becoming more bottom-up, an understanding and

application of EBAO down to the lowest level is critical. Signals must enable the chain of
command to apply EBAO and measure the success of EBAO within the land operations
environment.
SECTION 5
COMMAND SUPPORT13
125. GENERAL
1. Within the context of command, control is seen as a single yet vital element that is
exercised through command support, which is defined as the integrated system of resources
necessary to enable command. If “Control” is viewed as the means by which command is
exercised, this definition encompasses the idea that all resources (human, intellectual and
physical) involved in enabling the control of military operations by the commander, when
integrated as a system, are considered Command Support.
2. The most significant recent development in the army’s C2 capability has been the
increased application of information technologies to military operations. In the past, the staff
collected, processed, stored, displayed and disseminated battlefield information using a variety
of manual or analog systems. The signal and administrative communities supported these
activities through the use of combat net radio (CNR), teletype, manual dispatch services and
central registry systems. Battlefield information held by various commanders was often
inaccurate and untimely and the subsequent sharing of this information through analog systems
often led to very different views of the battlefield within a given command. This lack of shared
and common awareness of the battle space presented a significant impediment and risk to our
conduct of military operations.
3. The introduction of networked sensors and information systems within the military and
the digitization of battlefield information have blurred the clear dividing line between yesterday’s
staff and signal systems organizations. Communication and Information Systems networks now
link human operators to essential battlefield information through the provision of advanced
software applications. The human, intellectual and physical resources employed by the two
domains are now becoming part of a single integrated system.
4. The capability generated through the subsequent integration of the staff and signal
systems is now referred to as “Command Support.” The purpose of Command Support is to
enable the commander to exercise effective control of assigned military forces and operations
through the exploitation of battlefield information and CIS.
5. It is important to note that the information required by today’s military commander has
changed little over the years. The real change has occurred in our ability to effectively manage
that information and present it to commanders in a form useful for decision-making. To fully
exploit the technology now available to our forces, we must be prepared to rethink our existing
command support system from the ground up.
13
B-GL-331-001/FP-001 – Command Support in Land Operations
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126. COMMAND SUPPORT COMPONENTS
1. Command Support is made up of the following components:
a. Chain of Command. The basis of the command framework, in peace, conflict

and war, is the chain of command—the structure by which command is
exercised through a series of superior and subordinate commanders. For a
chain of command to be effective, it must be flexible and accurately reflect the
path of decision-making and authority within a military force. Two contributing
factors—the first human, the second technology—enhance a chain of
command’s effectiveness. Each link in the chain must be connected via
communication and information systems and by standard operating procedures.
Where these systems and procedures are not guaranteed or standardized,
liaison is essential. The most important prerequisite of the chain of command is
that each commander knows where he or she fits into the chain, from whom he
or she receives orders and whom he or she commands. Normally, observance
of a clear chain of command will be the most efficient case. The movement of
information, however, must not be constrained exclusively along hierarchical
lines. There will be times when the imperative of timely decision-making is best
met by information reaching different levels of command simultaneously rather
than sequentially. This model will become the norm as technology improves.
b. Staff. This is explained in detail in B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in

Land Operations and therefore will not be expanded upon in this manual.
c. Headquarters Facilities. The types and functions of HQs are discussed in

detail in B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations and for
this reason will not be expanded upon in this manual. The siting of HQs, layouts
and deployments will be discussed in Signals in Land Operations Volume
2(LCSS Architecture and Organizations).
d. Land Command Support System. The Land Command Support System

(LCSS) is the interconnected network of digital CIS by which the data needed to
plan, direct and control tactical land operations is communicated, stored,
processed and displayed. The LCSS is divided into two sub-systems:
(1) Tactical Communications. Tactical communications (TacComms) is the

transparent integration of CIS in support of the LF in operations. Tactical
communications enable commanders at all levels to have access to a
fully integrated, secure communications system that gives them the
ability to command and control LF through voice and/or data
communications across the spectrum of conflict. Chapter 3 will further
discuss in detail the LCSS sub-system.
(2) Tactical Communications Command and Control Information

Systems. Tactical communications command and control information
systems (TacC2IS) is comprised of a series of software and applications
that are resident on TacComms and specifically provide automated
decision support to Commanders at all levels to enable them to affect
command and control of LF across the spectrum of conflict. Chapter 2
will further discuss in more details TacC2IS.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-19
Figure 1-6: The Model Shows the Linkages Between IM and SM, and Responsibility Layers
Between All-arms Command and Staff to Signals Command and Staff
127. COMMAND SUPPORT CAPABILITY
1. Command Support capability is provided through two primary activities:
a. Information Management. Information Management (IM) is the planning,

coordination and control of the acquisition, analysis, processing, integration,
distribution, use, safeguarding and disposal of information, and associated
technology and supporting resources. Information Management ensures that
the value of that information is identified and fully exploited. In a military
context, IM includes five major processes: collecting, processing14, storing,
displaying and disseminating relevant information. Information Management is
covered in more detail in B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land
Operations and therefore will not be expanded upon in this manual.
b. Systems Management. Systems Management (SM) combines the policies,

procedures, tools, personnel and structures that ensure a consistent and robust
land force CIS environment is provided to all users. SM and control of CIS is
achieved through several levels and layers of control. The primary functional
components of SM are known as the following:
14
In the purest sense, tactical information will answer “who,” “what,” “when” and “where” type questions. This
information must still be exploited by human beings, perhaps assisted by technology, to answer “why” and “”how
“type questions. While type of information processing would more properly be classified as “Knowledge
management,” this manual will assume information processing to include all of these questions.
1-20 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
(1) System Executive and Planning (SEP). The SEP functions occur at
the highest level of the formation. The SEP function includes planning,
issuing orders and instructions, and monitoring the execution of the plan.
The functions will depend on the nature and size of the deployment.
(2) Operational System Control (OSC). This is the next echelon of system
management and exists in all HQ above unit level and at formation
resources. The OSC responsibilities include performing technical
supervision of the system and issuing detailed directives to subordinate
system management facilities, in accordance with SEP orders and
instructions, concerning, move timings, times for opening and closing
links and nets, communication resources, Communication security
(COMSEC).
(3) Facility Control (FC). The FC is the control level, which is responsible
for the technical control of all CIS equipment and implementation of
respective OSC directives and orders at each communication facility.
The FC is responsible for the details real-time technical control of the
system equipment.
(4) Detachment Members. Signals Operator (Sig Op) detachment members

deal with local hardware and software problems within their local area
network (LAN). They provide technical feedback to their FCs.
Figure 1-7: Primary Functional Components of SM in Their Relation to Signals Functions and
Tasks Within Command Support
2. System Management in network operations includes some of the following key tasks:
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-21
a. planning (participate in the operational planning process, conduct signals

estimate, prepare the signals plan);
b. directing (issue the signals plan)
c. initialization of network segments, crypto-logic segments, cross domain
interfaces (automated and procedural);
d. monitor and control the network;
e. operating a Help Desk;
f. maintaining status of equipment and facilities;
g. fault finding and system restoration;
h. installing and upgrading software and hardware;
i. conducting performance management and optimization;
j. conducting configuration management;
k. supporting transfer of control between HQ elements;
l. operating international IS gateways;
m. managing connectivity with all HQ IS;
n. managing information systems security; and
o. employing HQ IS to perform system management tasks.
128. SYSTEM INTEROPERABILITY
1. Global connectivity is essential for linking strategic, operational, and tactical aspects of
command and control and the ability to project forces worldwide. CIS support operations
globally with space-based and terrain-based systems. CIS must be configured to provide the
required information support with a minimum of physical repositioning, whether in a strategic
deployment phase or moving for a tactical attack. Both military and commercial CIS play
important roles in today’s Land Force operations.
2. The Army uses information technologies on the battlefield to provide an integrated
Command and Control structure. The Army has migrated to a tiered common user core with
associated specialist applications, which will function in a seamlessly fashion in garrison and in
the field. This common user core concept uses Commercial Communication Services,
Multinational Military Satellite Communications and the LCSS as an information bearer. This
common user core is supplemented as required by specialist applications to deal with specific
information requirements or processing. The integration of modern CIS with our tactical units will
continue to enhance their connectivity, decision-making, and, ultimately, lethality, survivability,
and the ability to control the tempo of operations.15
15
B-GL-300-005/FP-001 Land Force Information Operations.
1-22 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
3. Much of the Land Force information traffic flows over commercial systems. This is quite
true domestically and like most nations the Land Force relies on elements of an information
environment it does not control (see Figure 1-8). Some examples of non-military networks are:
a. Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN);

b. postal and telegraph systems;
c. wireless networks;
d. computer networks;
e. commercial communication satellites;
f. the Internet; and
g. public-accessed databases and bulletin boards.
Figure 1-8: A Representative Structure Combining Military/Commercial and Allied Military

Systems
4. While the availability of non-military IS can often offer commanders an alternative means
to satisfy requirements there is a need to carefully assess the security risks of this option. Using
non-military IS may also reduce the requirement for deployed military IS, and allow planners to
compensate for shortages and or meet surge requirements in this area. Additionally, by using
non-military IS, there may be savings in support and maintenance. Signals have a responsibility
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 1-23
for standardisation of non-military equipment and software used throughout the area of
operation (AO). Planners who deploy modular IS will need to ensure that these systems ideally
are open, non-proprietary, and have commonly accepted standards and protocols in order to
simplify the interface requirements.
129. SECURITY
1. The increasing dependence on CIS has created both increased capability but also
increased vulnerability. Computer systems and networks are vulnerable to attack at any time.
The Rand Corporation of the United States has stated that the anonymity of cyberspace has
blurred the distinction between crime and warfare and between accident and attack. A wide
range of methods and techniques can accomplish gaining access to someone’s computer or
communications network. Cyber attacks provide the opportunity for individuals or small groups
to wreak havoc on networked services and information that may have impact on a local,
regional, and global scale. These intrusions may be initiated at any time or any point in
operation. Accordingly, security measures and procedures must actively, as well as passively
preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and functionality of our networks.16
2. Communication systems such as microwave and satellite links between sites are
vulnerable as well to monitoring and tapping. A microwave system may emit a signal the
diameter of a nickel. That same signal will have a diameter of one mile when it reaches a
receiving dish approximately 20 miles away. Anyone with the right equipment can monitor the
signal if they are within the beam path. A communication satellite has a footprint that is as big
as North America. Once again, the signal is easy to monitor, and Signals must take all
necessary steps to preserve the integrity and functionality of the network by implementing good
security policies, installing cryptographic equipment and building a robust and redundant
network.
16
B-GL-300-005/FP-001 Land Force Information Operations.
1-24 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
CHAPTER 2
THE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM
SECTION 1
GENERAL
201. INTRODUCTION
1. This chapter presents the principles and general characteristics of a tactical command
and control information system (TacC2IS) for the Canadian Land Forces in the early twenty-first
century. These principles and characteristics are not specific to any particular equipment or
system, but rather provide the conceptual foundations upon which such equipment and systems
are to be designed, constructed, operated, managed and employed. While this chapter lays out
the general requirements for information storage, retrieval, processing and display at various
Land Force (LF) organizational levels, it does not prescribe the technical implementation of a
TacC2IS by which to achieve them. Operations and engineering staffs must continually work
together to define and develop specifications for hardware and software that make maximum
use of evolving technologies to improve the physical implementation of the LF TacC2IS.
202. BACKGROUND
1. Command and control (C2) has always been a vital aspect of military operations, but
only recently has it used such an extensive amount of sophisticated technology. The increasing
range, speed and accuracy of modern weapons systems are continually shortening the time
available for the tactical decision-action cycle, while at the same time, improvements in
intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities are producing more
and more information over greatly increased distances. Consequently, the real size of the
tactical battlespace is continually increasing. Advancements in technology are also enhancing
the mobility and the night-fighting capabilities of the world’s military forces, resulting in an
increased tempo of tactical operations.
2. Apart from the changes in the conduct of traditional tactical operations against opposing
military forces brought about by improvements in warfighting technology, the complex nature of
contemporary conflict sees Canadian Land Forces increasingly engaged in protracted battles
against forces employing asymmetric capabilities and tactics. Defeating such forces requires
the identification and tracking of trends in the behaviour of many groups and individuals
operating across a large geographic area, the timely dissemination of actionable intelligence to
the lowest echelons of our own forces, the rapid recognition and evaluation of innovations or
changes in the adversary’s capabilities or tactics and the constant sharing of information
throughout the force and with the force’s joint, interagency, multinational and public partners
(JIMP) in order to maintain the accurate shared situational awareness necessary to ensure unity
of purpose and co-ordination of action. Consequently, command and control of land tactical
forces in contemporary operations depends to an unprecedented degree on communications
and the ability to process information fast enough for decisions to be relevant.
3. The ongoing improvements in military warfighting technology, the considerable increase

in the tempo of tactical operations, the expanding volume of information available at all
headquarters (HQ) throughout the force and the complex nature of contemporary conflict
demand the use of a computer-based system to aid in the management, processing and display
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-1
of C2 information. The TacC2IS is the component of the overall command support capability
responsible to provide computer-based information handling support to LF tactical commanders
and their staffs. As such, it constitutes the land operations extension of the CF integrated
command and control information system (C2IS).
203. ROLE OF THE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM
1. The purpose of the TacC2IS is to support the information storage, retrieval, processing
and display requirements of LF commanders in the field. It supports tactical commanders at all
echelons and for all arms and services. In order to ensure that command support processes
remain focused on the commanders, and not their staffs, any special requirements of the staff
are subordinate to the direct needs of the commanders themselves. This does not mean that
the TacC2IS ties commanders to their HQ, only that TacC2IS resources are assigned to ensure
that the information requirements of commanders are met first, whether directly or through their
HQ staff.
2. The TacC2IS is built solely for the purpose of assisting in the tactical command and
control of land forces in operations. It is not designed to be used for the general administration
of resources such as maintaining the personnel records on each soldier. Those activities are
supported by CF enterprise information systems with connections to the TacC2IS as necessary.
At the other extreme, the TacC2IS is not intended to directly control the actions of specific
resources on the battlefield. For example, it will not be used to calculate the charge and
elevation for a gun and will not be used to tell a gun when to fire. These platform level C2
activities are supported by the single combat function information systems developed and used
by each arm and service, and/or by on-board fire control systems embedded within the
weapons platforms themselves.
3. The tasks performed in a given tactical HQ or command post (CP) may be considered to
be divided between common C2 tasks and specialized single combat function tasks. TacC2IS
provides the so-called Common User Core (CUC) of computer-based information storage,
retrieval, processing and display capabilities required for effective, efficient command and
control of land operations. This includes such things as office automation tools, messaging
capabilities, common database management facilities, electronic maps and other common
geospatial information. While the single combat function tasks performed within a specific
command post are, by definition, not common C2 tasks, some of them are so closely related to
C2 activities that including support for them in the TacC2IS is easily accomplished and,
furthermore, not including them in the TacC2IS reduces the overall effectiveness of the
command post. This loss in effectiveness is due to the need for personnel working in the
command post to frequently switch contexts between C2 tasks performed on TacC2IS
workstations and single combat function tasks performed manually or on different workstations.
In other words, where it makes sense to do so, certain single combat function information
storage, retrieval, processing and display requirements may be implemented directly in the
TacC2IS. Regardless, all single combat function information systems must interoperate with the
TacC2IS in such a manner as to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall
command and control of tactical land operations.
2-2 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
The Tactical Command and Control Information System
204. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR A TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

INFORMATION SYSTEM
1. The effectiveness of any C2IS, whether computer-based or manual, depends primarily

upon the quality of the information it makes available to commanders at all levels. The quality of
command and control information is determined by five criteria:
a. Timeliness. Information is timely if it is available to a commander in time to

influence his or her decision. As information becomes older its value generally
decreases; however, timeliness is measured relative to the decision at hand.
Lower-level tactical decisions must have more current and timely information,
and as we move up the ladder to higher-level tactical and operational decisions
the information can be somewhat older.
b. Accuracy. Information is accurate if it is free of error. The amount of error that
can be tolerated is related to other factors, especially timeliness and the
consequences of the decision to be made. If a commander must make a
decision quickly, a greater degree of error can be tolerated than if he or she has
considerable time and resources available to reduce the data error.
c. Relevance. Information is relevant if it has significant bearing on the matter at
hand and, more specifically, the decision(s) to be made. In other words, any
information that can improve a commander’s decision is relevant.
d. Verifiability. Information is verifiable if its accuracy can be confirmed.
Information can be verified through comparison with other information that is
known to be accurate. Quite often, though, verification is achieved by tracing
information to its original source. The term audit trail is often used to describe
the means by which summarized information can be traced back to its original
source. Without this trail it is usually impossible to determine the accuracy of
information, therefore bringing into question the usefulness of such information.
e. Usability. Information is usable if a commander can grasp its significance to his
or her situation and, accordingly, use the information to improve the quality of
his or her decision making.
The TacC2IS must provide commanders at all levels timely access to accurate, relevant,
verifiable information in forms that make that information directly usable as an aid to
command decision making.
2. In addition to providing commanders at all levels with high quality information in support
of command decision making, an effective LF TacC2IS must exhibit the following general
system characteristics:
a. Flexibility: the adaptability of the TacC2IS to changing user requirements, and

its versatility for use in any operational scenario. This includes the ease with
which the in-service system can be expanded and reconfigured to satisfy
evolving user requirements and/or to fulfill changing operational roles.
b. Maintainability: the ease with which the TacC2IS can be operationally
maintained in order to minimize downtime. This includes the ease with which
logistic support and field upgrades can be provided for the in-service system
under operational conditions.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-3
c. Mobility: the ease with which the TacC2IS can move around on the battlefield in
response to changing operational needs and priorities. This includes such
considerations as software portability and the packaging and transportability of
installations and major system components.
d. Reliability: the ability of the TacC2IS to operate consistently for sustained

periods of time. This includes the provision of appropriate redundancy in the
system as well as its ability to enable graceful reversion to manual methods in
the event of technology failure.
e. Survivability: the ability of the TacC2IS to continue to exist as a useful system

connecting various HQ and CPs in the harsh and hostile environment of the
battlefield. This includes appropriate protection against enemy interference
and/or direct physical action, reduction in the targetability of installations and
major system components, as well as provisions for change of location of
command and succession of command.
The TacC2IS must be sufficiently flexible, maintainable, mobile, reliable and

survivable to enable continuous, effective command of full spectrum land
operations conducted within the prevailing operational environment anywhere in
the world.
3. Two final, but vitally important, characteristics essential to the effectiveness of the LF
TacC2IS are the protection of command integrity and the safeguarding of command authority:
a. Command Integrity. In order to protect the philosophy of mission command,

the TacC2IS must not encourage or necessitate the encroachment upon a given
commander’s authority by a senior commander through the provision of
imbalanced or inappropriate access to information and tools across the
established echelons of command. In other words, higher level commanders
must not have higher quality information regarding the situation on the ground
than those lower level commanders directly responsible for carrying out the
actions intended to influence that situation. To do so leads inevitably to so-
called micro-management and the gradual centralization of planning and
decision making at the higher levels of command. This, in turn, reduces the
flexibility, freedom of action and responsiveness of the lower echelon forces.
The TacC2IS must support, not stymie, the effective exercise of mission
command.
b. Command Authority. The computer-based automation of specific procedures

within the C2 process must not abrogate a commander’s authority. While
command is defined as “the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces
for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces,” it is understood that
to exercise this authority effectively a commander must be a leader. Leadership
is, in part, a personal quality. It may be learned, but it is not learned in the same
way one learns to prepare a defensive position or a movement order.
Therefore, it cannot be programmed into a computer. Furthermore, leadership
is best expressed through face-to-face contact. An individual may be appointed
leader but will have a great deal of difficulty influencing people to help manifest
his or her will if subordinates never meet their leader or if the leader does not
express his or her will by making decisions. For example, one can easily
2-4 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
imagine what would happen to the authority of a commander if a TacC2IS were

fielded that was capable of stating the aim of an operation, of developing and
analysing a set of options, and of selecting the best one. Even though orders
would be issued under the commander’s authority, subordinates would know
that those orders were not really expressions of the commander’s will, but rather
that of some nameless and faceless system designer who had, at best, an
idealized and abstract understanding of military operations. A commander
would no longer be the person whose experience, skill and determination could
be relied upon to defeat the enemy. However, if this scenario were changed
slightly to leave the aim of the operation with a commander, to have the
TacC2IS assist in the development and analysis of options and to continue to
have a commander decide which is the best option, then when subordinates
receive orders there would be no doubt that they have come from their
commander and are an expression of his or her will. The commander has
merely used the TacC2IS to help prepare those orders. The TacC2IS must
facilitate, not hinder, a commander’s ability to express his will and exercise his
leadership influence over those he commands.
The TacC2IS must not intrude upon, and should wherever possible enhance,
command integrity and command authority, thereby reinforcing and facilitating
the Canadian Land Force philosophy of mission command.
SECTION 2
ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS AS AIDS TO INFORMATION PROCESSING
205. GENERAL
1. The term data processing has traditionally been defined as the capture, storage, and
processing of data necessary to turn it into information upon which management and control
decisions can be based. There is an important difference between data and information. Data
are collected facts, which generally are not useful for decision making without further
processing. Information, on the other hand, is directly useful in decision making. Information is
based on processed data and is, therefore, the output of a data processing system. In practice,
however, the distinction between data and information is often difficult to make. One individual’s
data may be another’s information. For example, the ammunition held by individual soldiers is
certainly information to a frontline non-commissioned officer. However, when the decision
maker is the commander of a brigade, the ammunition holdings of individual soldiers are simply
data that must be further processed and summarized to be of use in his or her decision making.
Because electronic digital computers are being used increasingly at all levels of decision
making, the term information processing is used rather than data processing.
2. Each of the individual steps of information processing done by a computer can also be
done by the human mind. What makes the electronic digital computer so powerful is the speed
(orders of magnitude faster than human thought) and accuracy with which simple calculations
and/or logic operations can be processed. This makes it possible for the computer to perform
computational tasks that would otherwise be impossible because of time limitations. This, in
turn, allows the creation of information that would have been impossible to obtain with manual
systems simply because the amount of calculation necessary to produce the information would
have been prohibitive. Consequently, the use of electronic digital computers has substantially
increased the quantity of information available to decision makers in business, government and
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-5
military organizations. However, the vast quantities of information made available by computers
are not always helpful to decision makers. So much information is now available that decision
makers sometimes have difficulty sorting it out in order to identify and use what is truly relevant.
Luckily, the processing power of the electronic digital computer, if properly applied, can aid this
as well.
3. Computers do not actually perform tasks. To say that they do is to anthropomorphize

the computer, leaving the impression that electronic digital computers possess some sort of
intelligence. They do not. Computers behave as directed by human intelligence; they can only
carry out computations in accordance with the instructions programmed into them. Thus, the
computer is not a tool that thinks for us; it is one that extends human intelligence by combining
into a single machine the computing capability of a digital electronic calculator and the
information storage capability of printed or written records. Computers can assist people in their
performance of information processing tasks in one of the following three ways: mechanization
of procedures, enhancement of procedures and automation of procedures:
a. Mechanization: the replacement of a manual procedure by one that is done by

a machine under the control of a person performing the task. The use of a hand
calculator as an aid to solving mathematical equations is a simple example of
the mechanization of certain information processing procedures. Computer-
based word processing programs also mechanize a number of information
processing procedures. If, for example, a person were employing a word
processing package to prepare a letter, when he or she finished typing it he or
she would instruct the machine to file the results. Because the user is still in
control of the execution of the task and must issue the instruction for any
computerized action to occur, this is an example of mechanization of an
information processing procedure.
b. Enhancement: the introduction of new capabilities that were not possible in

previous technologies. These computerized capabilities are still under the
control of a person performing the information processing task. For example,
most computer-based word processing packages have a command that allows
the user to “undo” the previous command he or she gave to the computer.
Since this ability was not possible in previous document preparation
technologies, it is an enhancement derived from the adoption of electronic digital
computers as aids to information processing.
c. Automation: the execution of a programmed procedure by the machine without

any intervention by a person being required. For instance, when the user of a
computer-based word processing package inserts text into a document, the
word processor can automatically repaginate the text, renumber the pages and
update the Table of Contents. Since no instructions from the user are required
to initiate the execution of these computerized actions, this is an example of
automation of an information processing procedure.
206. ELEMENTS OF COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION PROCESSING
1. The electronic digital computer’s capabilities as an aid to information processing can be

described in terms of four basic elements: input, database, models and output.
2-6 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
a. Input. To be of any use as an aid to information processing, there must be

some way for users to provide the electronic computer with information for
processing, as well as some way to tell the computer what is to be done with
that information. Input, therefore, encompasses all the information and user
instructions that enter the computer while it is operating. Input schemes must
allow the user maximum flexibility to interact with the computer and the
information within it, through a combination of questions and answers,
commands, menus, dialogue boxes and the like, using natural languages (both
written and spoken), touch panels, joysticks and so on.
b. Database. The database is where user information of enduring value is stored

as persistent data. Apart from organizing and storing user information as data
for later use, the computer’s database provides the means to search for,
associate and retrieve that data such that it meets the specific information needs
of its various users. In fact, electronic digital computers have transformed the
storage and retrieval of information. A computer is able to store extremely large
quantities of data. While this is also true of a library filled with books, the
essential difference is that, because of its powerful data processing capabilities,
the computer can access specific information very quickly. The computer-based
search for and retrieval of previously stored information represents a quantum
leap over traditional methods of searching information stored on paper. In fact,
the computer’s ability to locate and link information has allowed entirely new
forms of information processing and organization to emerge such as the
electronic spreadsheet, the relational database and word processing (as distinct
from mere typing or even traditional typesetting). Because information that has
been stored in a digital electronic database can be retrieved, manipulated and
updated directly by a computer executing programmed instructions, a wide
range of information handling procedures can be completely automated by the
use of electronic digital computers as aids to information processing.
c. Models. These are the procedural, logical and mathematical representations

used to guide the processing of information. The models are coupled to the
database so that they can store and retrieve information as needed. For
instance, a procedural model might take an input and update the appropriate
file(s) in the database. A logical model might combine certain data elements
within the database to provide an appropriate response to a user’s query for
information. A mathematical model might express an arithmetic relationship
between individual pieces of information (i.e., variables) to provide the result of a
user-directed calculation. Models are encoded and stored in computers as
application programs. Users employ models by providing the appropriate inputs
while a computer is executing the programme containing the desired models.
One of the great strengths of the electronic digital computer is that it allows the
integration of a number of information processing tools whenever the output
from one software package (i.e., set of models) can be provided as input into
another software package for further processing. This ability to move
information directly from one set of models to another allows people who use
electronic digital computers to process information more efficiently than would
otherwise be possible. Moreover, the proper combination of procedural, logical
and mathematical models within one or more application programs can result in
the complete automation of a variety of relatively complex information
processing tasks.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-7
d. Output. Sooner or later, to be of use in a management and control system, at

least some of the processed information generated by an electronic digital
computer has to flow through a human brain for use in managerial decision
making. Thus, output is the ultimate product of the electronic digital computer
employed as an aid to information processing—it is the processed information
as it is presented to users. To a large extent, output is the element that must
guide and influence the other three elements. If the output does not meet the
user’s actual need for accurate, timely, relevant and usable information, then the
input, database and models are of little consequence. Quality of output
depends upon the quality of both the input and models used in its analysis.
Output schemes must allow the user maximum flexibility to have processed
information displayed in the forms best suited to assist human understanding
and the use of that information in decision making.
207. COMPUTER-BASED COMMUNICATIONS
1. In addition to the storage, retrieval, processing and display of information, computers

have also transformed the way people communicate. The electronic digital computer has five
basic forms of output by which it can facilitate the dissemination of information. First, it can use
of a variety of printers to produce traditional print format outputs that can be distributed in the
same way as any other printed material. Second, it can portray information to more than one
person at a time in a variety of video display formats using large display screens or projectors.
Third, a computer can drive loudspeakers in order to present information in the form of sound.
Fourth, a computer can store data files electronically on a portable medium that can be
transported to another computer, which can then access the information for local storage,
processing, display or printing. Fifth, an electronic digital computer can encode information as
electrical/electromagnetic signals that can be transmitted over a telecommunications system∗ to
another computer, where the information can be locally stored, processed, displayed or printed.
2. The speed of electrical/electromagnetic communications allows information to be

conveyed to a computer halfway around the world (almost) as quickly as to a computer in the
next room. The integration of electrical/electromagnetic communications capabilities into an
electronic digital computer can be beneficial in two ways: the computer can add power to the
communications or the communications can add power to the computer. Often, these two
benefits co-exist in the same setting. In the first instance, suitably equipped computers can
replace various telecommunication devices, and do their jobs much better. An appropriately
programmed computer can play the role of a teletypewriter, a data terminal, an answering
machine, a television, a telephone or even a combination of such devices. The general purpose
computer’s versatility as a communications device does not derive from processing power
alone—almost any standard telecommunication device can have a microprocessor added to it
at little cost, but this usually only helps the device do what it already does a bit faster and/or
more accurately. It is the computer’s balance of programmability, disk-storage capacity and
user interface, coupled with the availability of specialized plug-in hardware that makes it such a
capable and versatile instrument for communication. Combining electronic mail with a chat
program and a web camera on a computer connected to the Internet is an increasingly common
∗
The functions, capabilities and characteristics of telecommunications systems are presented in Chapter 2 of this
manual.
2-8 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
example of the versatility of the electronic digital computer as a communications device. It

allows the user to communicate with people around the world in a variety of ways through a
single terminal device.
3. Apart from allowing the use of computers as highly effective replacements for traditional
communications devices, the availability of computer-to-computer communications systems also
facilitates the storage, retrieval, processing and display of information by making the data,
software and hardware that reside on many different computers available to a single user. The
use of microcomputers, sometimes called personal computers (PCs) or workstations, as
desktop aids to information processing puts the power of the electronic digital computer as an
aid to information processing directly into the hands of the people who process an
organization’s information. This allows individuals to select, configure and execute computer
programs at times and in ways, that are most useful to them in the performance of their jobs.
They are able to interact directly with the computer to provide input, apply models and create
output that meets their specific requirements for accurate, timely, relevant and usable
information. The proliferation of computer programs designed to provide microcomputer users
with electronic office tools such as word processors, electronic spread sheets and even
database management systems has helped to establish the microcomputer as the principal aid
to the individuals engaged in information processing in many businesses and government
organizations.
4. On the other hand, for all its information processing power, the desktop computing
environment is fraught with hazards to the most important element of managerial effectiveness:
communication among members of the organization. If left unregulated, the diversity of
hardware, software and data file formats available to microcomputer users can reduce an
organization’s electronic information processing capability to a Tower of Babel, wherein every
individual can employ his or her computer to store, retrieve, process and display information
quickly and accurately, but nobody can use anyone else’s electronic outputs as input to his or
her own computer. Under such conditions, users resort to obtaining printed copies of the
information produced by other people that they must then manually re-enter into their own
computer for electronic storage, processing or display. Even in situations where microcomputer
hardware, software and data file configurations are well-regulated so that data files copied onto
portable media such as diskettes, CD-ROMs, DVDs and flash drives can be readily retrieved
and used by any other computer user in the organization, this method of transferring information
between computers may be too slow to be of real use for organizational information processing,
especially in organizations with geographically dispersed elements. Additionally, it is often very
difficult to know for sure that the copy of the information received on a portable medium is the
most current version of the information—the other person might have updated the information
on his or her computer after the copy on the portable medium was made. The obvious solution
to these problems is to link the desktop computers together and create a shared central
repository of information. This creates a networked computing environment in which the data,
software and hardware resident on each of the computers connected to the network can be
made available to any user on the network.
5. The principal benefits of a networked computing environment as an aid to information
processing are:
a. Access to Reliable and Up-to-date Information. A well-managed, centralized
data storage system allows multiple users, perhaps at different locations, to
store and retrieve data from the same repository and to limit access to data
while it is being processed or manipulated. This ensures that all users have
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-9
timely access to information that is accurate (i.e., up-to-date), consistent and

verifiable.
b. Speedy Sharing of Data Between Computers. Transferring data files
between computers across a network is almost always faster than other non-
network means of sharing data files.
c. More Efficient Communication Within Work Groups. Electronic mail is a
staple of most networked computer environments, as are scheduling systems,
project monitoring software, online conferencing and groupware. All of these
applications help work teams be more productive by facilitating communication.
d. More Efficient Management of Computer Resources. For example, multiple
users can share a single top-quality printer, rather than putting duplicate,
possibly lesser quality, printers on every desktop. Network software licenses
can also be less costly than separate, stand-alone licenses for the same number
of users.
208. NETWORKED COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS
1. A local area network (LAN) is simply two or more electronic digital computers connected
to each other in a single location, usually within a single building or facility. Some peripheral
electronic devices such as printers, plotters, scanners, projectors and the like can also be
connected directly to a LAN so that they can be used by anyone on the network. Individual
LANs at different locations can be interconnected by so-called wide area networks (WAN) that
make use of telecommunication systems to convey information between computers on
geographically separated LANs. There are three roles for computers in a network:
a. Clients: computers that use but do not provide network resources.
b. Peers: computers that both use and provide network resources.
c. Servers: computers that provide network services.
2. The type of operating system a computer uses determines which role it plays. Servers
run network operating systems. Clients run client operating systems. Peers run peer network
operating systems. However, since many commercially available operating systems support
more than one of these roles, the manner in which a computer is actually used on the network is
often what determines its role. Based on the roles of the computers attached to them, networks
are divided into three types:
a. Client-Server (also called Server-based) Networks: are defined by the
presence of dedicated servers on the network that provide security and
resources to the network. Client-server networks divide information processing
tasks between clients, which request services such as file storage or web page
access, and servers, which provide the services. There are many types of
servers, including file servers (often called shared drives), print servers,
application servers (including database management systems [DBMS]), e-mail
servers and web servers, among others. Server computers are typically more
powerful than client computers, and are often optimised to function as servers.
Client-server networks require users to login to the network before access to
servers is provided. A user can work on a client as a stand-alone computer
without logging in to the network, but without login authorization from the
2-10 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
network’s centralized security controller, no network services (i.e., servers) will

be accessible from that client. Once a user provides the correct password to
login to the network, that user may access any resource for which he or she has
appropriate permissions.
b. Peer-to-Peer (also called Peer) Networks: are defined by a lack of central

control over the network. There are no servers in peer networks; users simply
share disk space and resources, such as printers and scanners, as they see fit.
However, peers are not optimised to share resources. Generally, when a
number of users are accessing resources on a peer, the user of that peer will
notice significantly degraded performance. Peer networks are organized into
workgroups over which there is very little security control. There is no central
login process; as soon as a user logs into one peer on the network, all
resources on the network, except those protected by a specific password,
become available to that user. This means that a computer user either has
unrestricted access to network resources or must know the individual password
for each controlled resource. Any user who knows the password for a resource
can access that resource; the owner of the resource cannot specify which users
on the network can access that resource.
c. Hybrid Networks: are defined by the presence of all three types of computers
operating simultaneously. This means that while most shared resources are
located on servers, network users still have access to any resource being
shared by peers in their workgroups. Users can work on a client and access
peer resources without logging in to the network, but in order to access server
resources, that user must login to the network through the centralized security
controller.
3. The Internet is the largest and most familiar WAN in the world; however, a great number
of businesses, governments and private organizations operate private WANs, called intranets,
to interconnect their internal computer users at different geographic locations. The Internet has
had a profound effect on the storage and retrieval of information. It effectively pools all of the
information that is stored on all of the servers linked to the Internet to create the largest
collection of data and information ever assembled in human history—all accessible to anyone
with an electronic digital computer connected to the Internet. Intranets allow the pooling of
information within an organization so that information whose distribution must be restricted to
those within the organization can be shared internally among all users connected to the intranet.
SECTION 3
COMPUTER-BASED INFORMATION SYSTEMS
209. GENERAL
1. A computer-based information system is any computer-based system the primary

purpose of which is information processing in support of decision making. Computer-based
information systems can be broken into six parts: inputs, processes, data files, outputs, people
and hardware. Processes transform inputs (data or information) into outputs (information useful
for the decisions at hand). Data files store information for use within these processes. The
processes within a computer-based information system can be subdivided into procedures,
which are performed by the people within the system, and computer programs, which are
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-11
executed by the computer hardware within the system. In other words, in a computer-based
information system, the actual processes by which data and information are transformed into
outputs for use by decision makers are a prudent combination of procedures, carried out by
people, and programs, executed by electronic digital computers.
2. Generally speaking, the more complex and unstructured the decisions to be supported
are, the more intertwined and interactive the human procedures and the computer programs
must become. The goal within any computer-based information system is to design information
processes so as to maximize the use of computer programs to mechanize, enhance and even
automate the procedures associated with storing, retrieving, processing, displaying and
communicating information, while still retaining the necessary degree of human insight, intuition
and judgement throughout each process to ensure that decisions made with the help of the
system are appropriate and effective. This implies that the application programs within a
computer-based information system cannot be developed in isolation from the human
procedures with which they must interact in order to provide the required quality of output to the
decision makers. Conversely, the human procedures within a computer-based information
system cannot be developed in isolation from the application programs intended to mechanize,
enhance and even automate many of those procedures in order to improve the quality of output
available to the decision makers.
The design and implementation of the human procedures and the computer
programs within any computer-based information system must result in
processes that reflect the truly symbiotic relationship between people and
computers in all such systems.
3. Beyond that, the ways in which these information handling processes are defined,
shaped and interwoven with inputs, data files, outputs, people and hardware to form the overall
computer-based information system by which decision makers are supported will be determined
largely by the nature of the decisions to be made and the characteristics of the decision making
environment. In other words, the true “power” of the computers used in such systems cannot be
measured by the speed of their processors and the size of their memories; rather, it must be
assessed by the degree to which they allow human thought, creativity and intuition to interact
with the computational capabilities of electronic digital computers to create powerful new ways
of formulating, understanding, analysing and, ultimately, solving the complex problems faced by
decision makers at all levels of the organization. Thus, the value of the computers within an
organization is determined by the ease with which users can understand, configure, manipulate
and communicate with those computers in order to have the computers mechanize, enhance or
automate procedures in ways that allow the users to achieve their information processing goals
with effectiveness, productivity, safety and satisfaction under the intended operational
conditions.
Computer-based information systems are extensions of, not replacements for,

human cognitive processes.
4. The need to support different types of decisions made under different operational
conditions has led to the emergence of a number of more or less standard classes of computer-
based information systems. Commonly encountered classes include business information
systems, real-time (information processing) systems and modelling and simulation systems.
These classes represent broad collections of systems unified by some dominant purpose,
feature or characteristic. Within each class, there are a number of categories into which specific
systems can be placed. Classifying and categorizing computer-based information systems is a
2-12 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
slippery undertaking; the classes and categories tend to blend, separate and change over time
in response to changes in technology, changes in the computing environment and changes in
the tasks to which electronic digital computers are applied. However, despite the shortcomings
of computer-based system classification schemes, they still do have a practical use. Even
though the boundaries and definitions shift, often resulting in overlaps and inconsistencies, each
system class and category emphasises certain features that may be relevant in any particular
situation. Therefore, the most practical use of computer-based system classifications is in
identifying a number of widely usable features that are typically associated with particular
system types.
5. Army tactical C2 information systems form a distinct class of computer-based
information systems that is unlike any other class of computer-based system presently found in
the world. While they share individual functions and characteristics with a number of traditional
types of computer-based systems, the total requirement creates a unique type of system that is
neither simply a new category within an existing class nor a mere aggregation of categories of
systems drawn from different existing classes. The best way to describe army TacC2IS as a
class of system is first to describe some of the system categories found within the traditional
classes of computer-based information systems, and then to synthesize the relevant functions
and characteristics from each category into a coherent portrayal of an army TacC2IS.
210. BUSINESS INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. The most obvious class of computer-based information systems with which to begin any
consideration of army TacC2IS is business information systems. These give managers at all
levels of a business or government organization the ability to collect, analyse and summarize
the diverse types of information they need to perform effectively. Throughout business and
government, management uses information for two purposes: planning and control. Planning
occurs prior to the execution of any organizational activity. Objectives are established in the
planning process. Planning depends to a large degree on predictive and external information.
Historical information is useful in planning only in that it helps management predict the future.
Control is the process of comparing actual results with the plans identified in the planning
process. Feedback information about the performance of the business or governance system is
used by management for control. When deviations from the plan are detected, management
attempts to get the business or governance system back in control by making changes to the
inputs. Thus, a large percentage of the information produced and used within businesses and
government is feedback. Business information systems monitor the business or government
operation being controlled, compare the operation’s outputs to plans, and provide the feedback
information necessary for management control. The use of computer-based information
systems to support management planning and control within both business and government has
always been directed at making operations more effective and efficient; however, since the mid-
1980s the emphasis within the business community has shifted toward using those same
systems to gain competitive advantage in the marketplace.
2. The computer-based information systems used in business and government have
traditionally been more successful in providing information for control decisions than for
planning decisions. In other words, their success has tended to decrease the higher the level of
decision making. However, advances in a wide-range of electronic digital computer
technologies have made the use of computer-based information systems increasingly applicable
to planning, as well as to decision making at the higher levels of organizational control.
Consequently, over the years, a hierarchy of system categories has emerged within the
business information system domain to account for the stratification of information processing
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-13
activities generally performed within business and government organizations to transform mere
data about an organization’s interactions with its environment into the sort of information needed
by decision makers at various levels of management and control within the organization. The
standard model consists of a hierarchy of four categories of computer-based business
information systems, supported by a fifth category that spans all four levels.
3. At the base of the business information system hierarchy are the transaction processing
systems (TPS), which give workers and their first-line supervisors ready access to information
that ensures the effective conduct of the organization’s minute-to-minute activities. These
systems also populate the database(s) used by the systems at the other levels of the hierarchy.
The second level of the business information system hierarchy consists of the management
information systems (MIS) that help lower and middle-level managers implement the
organization’s policies and plans by providing information that helps maintain and, whenever
possible, increase employee performance, product quality and customer service. The third level
of the business information system hierarchy comprises the various decision support systems
(DSS) that are used to analyse alternatives and answer what-if questions in order to inform
management decisions regarding future actions. Finally, at the pinnacle of the business
information system hierarchy, are the executive information systems (EIS) that support top-level
managers in formulating strategy and policies. All four levels of the hierarchy are supported by
office automation systems (OAS) that provide computerized support to routine office work in the
form of word processing, presentation packages, electronic spread sheets, electronic calendars
and so on.
211. BUSINESS INFORMATION DATABASES
1. The shared database is the key building block in the design and implementation of any
business information system. The shared database is the prime integrating force that provides
coherence to the overall information system. If a good fit is not achieved between the
processing and decision-making needs of the organization and the database, in terms of the
accuracy, timeliness, relevance, verifiability and usability of the information supplied, the design
and implementation efforts expended on the other elements of the system will have been in
vain. A database consists of data elements organized into records and files in a way intended
to most efficiently meet users’ information requirements. The data stored in an organization’s
database provide meaningful representations of the real-world entities that influence and are
influenced by the decisions made within the organization. For example, sales clerks may often
need to know how many pieces of angle iron are in stock in order to fulfill a customer’s desire to
purchase some angle iron. It would be impractical to have to go to the warehouse and count
the number of items every time to know the quantity on hand. Instead, a clerk accesses the
data within the information system that represents the actual angle iron inventory. Clearly, to be
of use to a sales clerk, the data retrieved from the database must be accurate and up to date,
reflecting the precise quantities of angle iron presently stored in the warehouse. It must also be
displayed to a sales clerk, in a usable form, in less time than it would take the clerk to go to the
warehouse and count the angle iron.
2. The warehouse manager, on the other hand, probably does not care about the minute-
to-minute tally of angle iron on hand; however, he or she probably does want to know when the
amount of angle iron in the warehouse reaches a certain level, so that more can be ordered
before the warehouse runs out of stock. The same database that was used to tell the sales
clerks precisely how many of each type of angle iron was on hand can inform the warehouse
manager when a certain threshold level of angle iron is reached, triggering a decision to order
more angle iron. At still higher levels within the organization, an executive might wish to know
whether angle iron will continue to be a profitable item to stock in the coming year. The
2-14 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
database can provide historical data to support the analysis of sales trends, the impact of
certain market factors on profits from angle iron and so on in order to inform the executive of the
likely outcomes of various plausible alternative situations. In this way, a well-designed database
integrates all of the information that is important to the organization so that it can be efficiently
and effectively stored, retrieved, processed, displayed and communicated as needed by
decision makers at all levels.
212. TRANSACTION PROCESSING SYSTEMS
1. A transaction processing system (TPS) is a computer-based information system that co-

ordinates and assists with the storage, retrieval, processing and display of information derived
directly from individual business transactions. A transaction is a unit of business activity, a
fundamental business event that affects the organization in some way. Selling a book, taking a
room reservation, transferring money from a savings account to a checking account, and hiring
a new employee are examples of business transactions. A transaction, such as transferring
money from one account to another, may actually consist of several discrete events, such as
changing the savings account balance, changing the checking account balance and issuing a
receipt. However, these individual events are not considered transactions because they exist
only in the context of the larger logical unit of activity and do not normally take place on their
own—such events have no inherent value of their own.
2. Transaction processing systems control the collection of specific data in specific formats
and in accordance with rules, policies and goals of the organization. They generally include
components to collect, retrieve, and report data on each individual transaction, as well as to
make these data available for processing as part of other transactions, for use in management
decision making or for some strategic purpose. Certain TPS such as airline reservation
systems may automate some decision-making functions within a transaction, such as finding the
flight that best meets the customer’s needs. Examples of TPS are point-of-sale systems, order-
entry systems, distribution and logistics systems and general accounting systems. Transaction
processing systems were the first type of computer-based business information systems, but
now TPS applications are usually just components of a more comprehensive business
information system.
3. Organizations keep detailed records of individual transactions for four primary reasons:
a. to provide information needed by employees to transact business and perform

their job functions;
b. to collect information that managers need to make informed decisions;
c. to provide information for customers, suppliers, business partners and others
who participate in the transactions; and
d. to create records called “audit trails” that auditors can use to verify corporate
information reported by the company.
4. Transaction records provide employees the up-to-date information they need to do their
jobs, e.g., seats remaining on a particular flight, current price per seat, etc. This allows multiple
employees to co-ordinate their work efficiently and effectively by working from common, up-to-
date information. Even a single employee might need records of transactions. For example, a
lawyer records the time spent and content of work done for each task performed for a client so
that he or she can accurately bill the client for the services provided. At levels above the
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-15
organization’s front-line employees, managers use both detailed and summarized records of
business transactions to make decisions. They need to follow trends, identify problems and
verify that their decisions have the impact they expect. By recording detailed transaction data
directly in the organization’s database, the TPS makes that data available to the organization’s
managerial decision-making processes. Audit trails based on the transaction data stored by
TPS can be used both externally, as in independent audit of financial reporting, and internally,
as in troubleshooting a business problem.
5. The primary design objectives for a TPS are (a) to provide employees and first-level
supervisors with timely access to accurate, up-to-date information in formats that allow that
information to be used directly in the performance of specific business transactions and (b) to
get the correct data entered into the system with the least amount of time and effort. Since the
goal is to correctly carry out and record all business transactions with minimum time and effort,
TPS are based on detailed models of how each particular transaction should be processed.
Most contain enough structure to enforce rules and procedures for work done by clerks or
customer service agents. A well-designed TPS can minimize data entry effort and reduce errors
by automatically filling in data such as a customer address or unit price once the user has
entered the customer number or product identification. Some TPS bypass clerks entirely and
totally automate certain business transactions, such as the way automated teller machines
(ATMs) automate deposits and cash withdrawals. Either way, a well-designed TPS checks
each transaction for easily detectable errors such as missing data, data values that are
obviously too high or too low, data values that are inconsistent with other data in the database
and data in the wrong format. It may also check for required authorizations for the transaction.
Finally, when all the data for the transaction have been collected and validated, the TPS stores
the data in a standard format for later access by others. The key attribute of any TPS is
“throughput,” the volume of transactions that can be correctly processed in a given time.
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based transaction

processing system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and
hardware) must satisfy the throughput requirements of the employees and front-
line supervisors within the supported organization, when used under operational
conditions.
213. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. A management information system (MIS) is a computer-based information system that

can integrate and summarize data from various sources to provide the information necessary for
management decision making. The idea of MIS predates the computer age. For example, as
long ago as the mid-1500s, the Fugger family in Augsberg, Germany had business interests
throughout Europe and even in China and Peru. To keep in touch, they set up a worldwide
news reporting service through which their agents wrote letters about critical political and
economic events in their areas of responsibility. These letters were collected, interpreted,
analysed and summarized in Augsberg and answered through instructions sent to the family’s
agents. This paper-based system encompassing planning, execution and control helped the
family move more rapidly in the mercantile world than their rivals.
2. Computerized MIS generate information for monitoring performance, maintaining co-

ordination and providing background information about an organization’s operations. Typically,
they extract and summarize data from TPS to allow managers to monitor and direct the
organization and to provide employees with accurate feedback about easily measured aspects
of their work. Thus, MIS users can include both managers and employees who receive
2-16 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
feedback about performance indicators such as productivity, product quality and customer
service. A typical MIS report provides summary information rather than the details of individual
transactions; however, much of the information that the MIS uses is initially captured and stored
by one or more TPS. The key difference is that transaction processing is oriented toward
capturing, processing and storing data, whereas an MIS is oriented toward using the data to
produce management information. For example, a list of every sale that occurred during a day
or week would be extremely difficult for a manager to use in monitoring a retail store’s
performance. However, the same data could be summarized in measures of performance such
as total sales for each type of item, for each salesperson, and for each hour of the day. In this
example, the computerized inventory and price assistance provided to transaction processing
remains essential, but the MIS then summarizes and organizes the data collected by the TPS to
present information for use by management. As the data are collected through various TPS,
they also become available to produce the reports required by an MIS. Historically, most
organizations implemented TPS first, since efficient processing and tracking of transactions with
customers was (and is) a necessity in both business and government. The concept of MIS
emerged partly as a response to the shortcomings of these first computerized TPS, which often
improved transaction processing but provided little information useful for management decision
making.
3. An MIS is focused on aiding managers in making sound control decisions. It helps

structure the comparatively unstructured task of “managing” by focusing attention on important
measures of performance. How to fix performance problems remains the human manager’s
decision. Hence, the MIS within any large organization is typically a federation of functional
information systems. Specialists within each functional area (such as finance, production,
accounting and engineering) are much more familiar with the management information
requirements of that function than anyone else in the firm. These specialists are best positioned
to oversee the design of functional information systems to assist with the management of their
functional area within the organization. The functional information systems throughout an
organization must be integrated through the use of a common database. Database
management systems (DBMS) greatly enhance the ability of functional information systems to
share data. The important point is that the integrated functional information systems are the
MIS. Each functional information system is made up of application systems. The accounting
information system, for example, includes several applications. Each application is typically
made up of one or more computer programs. Data are the central resource of any MIS.
Managing this resource is crucial to effective decision making for the management and control
of business or government operations. A DBMS is a collection of programs that serve as an
interface between the many application programs that together make up the MIS and the
common set of co-ordinated and integrated data files called a database. Prior to the advent of
DBMS there was little, if any, integration or data sharing among functional information systems
within organizations.
4. One of the most important components of an MIS is the management reporting system
(MRS) that retrieves data from the database and presents it to users in the form of reports. A
report is simply a printing or display of items of information in a form that is useful to managers.
The representation of information in a report can be textual, graphical, pictorial or whatever
other format is best suited to aiding the manager in understanding the significance of the
information and then using it in his or her decision making. The MRS used by managers within
the individual functional areas of an organization is often simply the reporting component of the
respective TPS. At higher levels of management, MRS can combine data from two or more
TPS (through the DBMS) to provide information that managers could not obtain from the
individual systems. Managers generally use some combination of detail reports, summary
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-17
reports, exception reports and predictive reports to monitor organizational performance and
identify problems:
a. Detail Reports: provide managers with information useful in overseeing day-to-

day operations of a department or working group. Used primarily by lower-level
managers, detail reports provide information about individual transactions, such
as payments made by customers, parts manufactured and debits and credits to
the general ledger. An MIS should provide detail reports often enough for
managers to readily use the information they contain. Different detail reports
contain information from the same transaction data arranged in different orders
or containing different parts of the transaction. This helps managers in verifying
relationships and trends in business activities.
b. Summary or Statistical Reports: show totals, averages, maximums,

minimums or other statistical data aggregated over time, personnel, products or
some other quantity. Each line of a statistical report summarizes large amounts
of transaction data that a manager can examine in a detail report. As managers
move up the organizational ladder, they deal with reports that have data
aggregated to increasing degrees.
c. Exception Reports: notify management when an activity or system is out of

control so that corrective action can be taken. This supports management by
exception, one of the most efficient approaches to management. It allows
managers to spend their time dealing with exceptions, or those situations that
are out of control. Activities that are proceeding as planned are in control and,
therefore, do not need the manager’s attention. A listing that identifies
customers having overdue account balances is an exception report. An error
report is another type of exception report. Exception reports can show
information at either a transaction or a summary level; however, unlike detail
and summary reports, they do not show all available information. As a result,
they allow managers to quickly target problems without wading through a
morass of extraneous information to find what is relevant.
d. Predictive Reports: are useful in developing plans for future activities. They
often make use of statistical and modelling techniques such as regression, time-
series analysis and simulation. These reports help management personnel
answer what-if questions about their part of the business. The statistical and
modelling techniques that produce predictive reports depend largely on
historical data. Such data must be readily accessible by the MIS in a form that
can be used by the models; otherwise, these models will be of little use to
management.
5. Management reporting systems must produce management reports such that managers
are provided with the information they need at the appropriate time without overloading them.
To achieve this, MRS typically employ three report generation strategies: periodic, event-
initiated and on-demand:
a. Periodic or Scheduled Reports: are produced on a regular basis, such as

daily, weekly or monthly, and are delivered to a specified list of managers and
employees. Periodic reports are usually summary reports intended to assist
with routine control decisions. They are the traditional source of feedback within
2-18 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
the organization; however, as microcomputers have become more widespread,

periodic reports have diminished in importance. Managers no longer feel
compelled to ask for information on a scheduled basis just in case they may
need it in the future—by having their own microcomputers connected to the
business information system, managers can retrieve the information they need
on demand.
b. Event-initiated Reports: are generated on the occurrence of a specified event,

typically either a milestone or an expected problem. A pre-specified list of
recipients generally receives such event-initiated reports. These can be detail,
summary, exception or, in rare cases, predictive reports. The aim of event-
initiated reports is to draw managerial attention to a specific circumstance that
requires a decision or action. Notification systems are a particular type of event-
initiated reporting system that use alerts instead of reports to draw the attention
of managers to situations requiring some decision or action. An alert is
generated by the notification system in response to the occurrence of a specific
event in the real-world. Alerts can replace exception reports in some situations,
thereby reducing the number of reports managers need to review. They can
also increase the value of a single report by honing in on particular information,
rather than requiring the manager to scan the entire report to find the relevant
information.
c. On-demand Reports: are provided to authorized managers when they request

specific information. These reports fill irregular needs for information. In the
earlier days of computing, the contents of an on-demand report had to be
previously anticipated or there would be a delay of often weeks or months in
receiving the data. It simply took time to modify programs to produce
information that filled unanticipated demands. Today, the widespread use of
microcomputers with user application programs connected directly to powerful
DBMS means that MRS can fulfill unanticipated demands for information very
quickly, often within minutes. This is possible because users and managers
themselves can use the query languages of the DBMS to produce their own
reports.
6. The primary design objective for an MIS is to provide managers with timely access to
accurate, relevant, verifiable information about the organization’s current performance in
formats that allow that information to be used directly in their decision making. Management
Information Systems are used to allow managers to recognize when current performance is
deviating significantly from planned or expected performance, in terms of some agreed upon set
of performance measures, so that they may initiate appropriate corrective action within their
portions of the organization. Most contain enough structure to enforce organizational policies
and procedures for work done by managers and front-line supervisors. A well-designed MIS
can minimize the time and effort required to recognize and diagnose problems and to initiate
appropriate corrective action by presenting information in consistently structured, easily
understandable formats that allow users to grasp the significance of the information straight
away, and by automatically transferring information generated during monitoring and diagnosis
into the formats used to communicate instructions and other control information to the elements
being managed. Some MIS bypass managers entirely and totally automate certain routine
monitoring and control functions. Either way, a well-designed MIS allows managers to identify
deviations from planned performance and assists them with the selection and initiation of
appropriate corrective actions to prevent those deviations from causing adverse consequences
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-19
for the organization. The key attribute of any MIS is “data integration,” the degree to which the
disparate pieces of data important to decision making throughout the organization can be
maintained, aggregated and manipulated to provide individual decision makers with timely,
accurate and relevant information in a form they find useful.
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based management

information system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and
hardware) must satisfy the data integration requirements of the managers within
the supported organization, when used under operational conditions.
214. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
1. A decision support system (DSS) is a computer-based information system that helps

middle and upper-level managers to reach decisions in ambiguous and complex environments.
Traditional business information systems such as TPS and MIS have been most successful in
acquiring and storing large quantities of detailed data concerning transaction processing and,
from that data, providing information for routine, structured and anticipated types of decisions.
They have been less successful in providing information for semi-structured or unstructured
decisions, particularly unanticipated ones. A DSS provides a set of integrated computer tools
that allow the user to apply a variety of models and analytical techniques to the available data in
order to create information useful for semi-structured and unstructured decision making under
conditions of uncertainty. Unlike an MIS, which provides managers primarily with information on
current conditions to guide short-term control decisions, a DSS offers forecasts of future
conditions for use in analyses conducted primarily in support of planning. It typically gives
managers the ability to quantitatively analyse decision alternatives.
2. The common thread through a wide range of DSS applications is that they emphasize
analytical work rather than transaction processing, general management work or general office
work. Decision Support System software helps with tasks such as figuring out the best way to
load and ship a product on trucks and trains or determining how running one customer’s order
affects another order in the pipeline. Essentially, a DSS is used to model a complex set of
circumstances and then allow the user to manipulate various parameters of the model to assess
the impact of diverse conditions. A DSS supports this work by providing flexible, user-
controllable methods for displaying and analysing data and formulating and evaluating decision
alternatives. The users of the various application software packages and computer programs
within a DSS might include managers themselves for certain general types of analysis,
functional specialists within a manager’s staff for more elaborate analyses within a particular
field of activity and highly skilled analytical specialists (e.g., operations researchers and/or
management scientists, economists, behavioural scientists, etc.) for the application of rigorous
analytical methods and techniques to complex managerial problems.
3. As with all computer-based information systems, a DSS comprises the input, data files,
processes, outputs, people and hardware needed to store, retrieve, process, display and
communicate information in ways that are both relevant and useful. Many DSS users do a lot of
analytical work and feel comfortable working with models, data analysis and statistics. To be of
benefit to the planning and control of an organization’s activities, however, the DSS must
provide effective, efficient mechanisms by which managers can present problems to the system
for analysis, and by which the results of those analyses can be communicated to managers in
ways that support, not supplant, their decision making processes. In cases where the
managers themselves conduct the analyses, aided only by the software applications available
2-20 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
directly to them, the need is for appropriate user interfaces to the software. In cases where the
analyses are conducted by people other than the managers who must make the actual
decisions, the need is for well-articulated procedures, techniques and tools for (a) accurately
translating managerial questions into problems to be solved by analysts employing specialized
methods and techniques and (b) presenting the results of the analyses back to managers in
forms they can understand and use effectively within their overall decision making processes.
4. The principal benefits of a well-implemented DSS include:
a. improved decision making through better understanding of the business;
b. an increased number of decision alternatives examined;
c. the ability to implement ad hoc analysis;
d. faster response to expected situations;
e. improved communication;
f. more effective teamwork;
g. better control; and
h. time and cost savings.
5. Decision Support Systems originally relied on improved user interfaces, graphical and
statistical methods and simulation and optimization models to support better decision making.
Many once-innovative DSS concepts are now common across many types of business
information systems. For instance, predictive reports generated by an MIS might well be based
on simple simulations and elementary statistical techniques originally implemented only in highly
specialized DSS. Nonetheless, there are still many applications with a distinct DSS flavour. An
insurance agent showing a customer costs and benefits of various alternatives computed from
the details of the customer’s actual situation is an example of a DSS supporting repetitive
decision making by first structuring the customer’s decision and then providing information,
models and analytical tools to help the customer in making that decision. A production manager
using a process simulation package to determine the likely increase in productivity that would
result from the acquisition and use of an expensive new piece of equipment is an example of a
DSS supporting non-repetitive decision making by providing a detailed statistical analysis in
response to a simple what-if question.
6. The database provides access to internal or external data relevant to the decision
making being supported by the system. A business information system DSS normally retrieves
data from the same corporate database that is updated by the organization’s various TPS and
used by its MIS. These data form a baseline that mathematical models can use in extrapolating
from past to future conditions. Within the DSS, they are employed to analyse trends, make
forecasts and model various alternative situations. The knowledge base provides information
about highly complex relationships among data that an ordinary database has problems
representing. It consists of rules of thumb, known as heuristics, which define acceptable
solutions and methods for evaluating them. For instance, a knowledge base could incorporate
some heuristics about an appropriate ratio of staff to sales volume in order to signal if the
forecasted volume resulting from some proposed change exceeds the volume that the projected
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-21
staff can handle. The model base typically includes an array of spreadsheets, simulation
packages, forecasting tools and statistical packages that allow DSS users to create what are
essentially sophisticated ad hoc queries of the data and knowledge bases, based on what-if
questions, that incorporate into their reports the uncertainty associated with forecasting future
events.
7. The user interface for a DSS must allow its users to control the data and models to be
included in their analyses. The flexibility of the DSS user interface contrasts with that typically
found in MIS and TPS where the user is more passive, receiving data in limited formats or
entering data into carefully crafted screens or forms. Because DSS support complex decision
making under conditions of uncertainty, users typically analyse many alternatives and extensive
data about each alternative. This means a high quality DSS should compare, contrast and
aggregate data in a wide range of graphical and tabular formats. This often requires the
application of statistical techniques to the data available within the database and/or the use of
simulations to conduct experiments relevant to the impending decisions. The computer-based
simulations in DSS range from simple Monte Carlo simulations run in an electronic spread sheet
to full-blown interactive process simulations of an entire business activity run in a sophisticated
modelling and simulation package. Because DSS users are usually not computer
programmers, a DSS must provide users with a language for manipulating the system’s models
that they find easy to understand and use. However, whereas an MIS simplifies user access to
data by employing carefully predefined formats that impose structure for the purpose of
supporting timely control decisions, a DSS allows users to construct previously undefined
formats based on innovative queries that generate novel combinations of data elements to
answer what-if questions for the purposes of exploring decision alternatives in support of
planning. Essentially, these ad hoc queries are the manager’s what-if questions, along with
descriptions of the relevant factors and conditions of interest for the decision to be made, re-
formulated to match the DSS user’s choice of models and analytical techniques.
8. The primary design objective for a DSS is to provide managers with timely access to
accurate, relevant, verifiable information about the likely effects of various alternative courses of
action in formats that allow that information to be used directly in their decision making.
Decision Support Systems are used to allow managers to explore and, if possible, quantitatively
compare decision alternatives in terms of some agreed upon set of performance measures.
Most contain enough structure to support rigorous analysis of the alternatives. A well-designed
DSS allows managers to understand (a) which course of action is preferable in terms of the
criteria applied during the analysis, (b) which factors relevant to the decision those criteria
represent and (c) the degree of uncertainty associated with the preference for one alternative
over all others. The key attribute of any DSS is validity, the degree to which the models within
the system, including those created by users, provide a useful representation of the real world
problem confronting the decision maker.
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based decision support

system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and hardware) must
satisfy the validity requirements of the decision makers within the supported
organization when used under operational conditions.
215. EXECUTIVE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. An executive information system (EIS) is a highly interactive computer-based information

system that provides top-level managers and executives flexible access to information for
2-22 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
monitoring operating results and general business conditions. Sometimes called “executive
support systems,” these systems attempt to take over where the traditional approach to MIS
falls short. Although sometimes acceptable for monitoring the same indicators over time, the
conventional MIS practice of providing pre-specified reports, either on a scheduled basis or on-
demand, is too inflexible for many questions executives really care about, such as
understanding problems and new situations. In order to address this deficiency, EIS provide
executives with the status and performance information they need, as well as helping them
understand the causes of exceptions and surprises.
2. The point of any EIS is to provide executives timely access to the accurate, relevant,
verifiable information they need, whenever they need it and in whatever form they find to be
most useful. A well-designed EIS is an upward extension of the various MIS and DSS within an
organization. For an EIS to operate effectively, line managers, functional staff members and
analysts throughout the organization must ensure that the information available to executive
decision makers from various other systems through the EIS is timely and accurate. The
essential purpose of the EIS is to allow the executive to determine, interactively with the system,
which information is relevant and in what form it is most usable. For example, an EIS might
allow its users to isolate and interactively re-organize information from a standard financial
report generated by an MIS to combine, aggregate and represent the information contained in
the report in a variety of ways that allow their experience and intuition to “see” the information
from many different perspectives. It may also allow users to combine the information from a
number of different MIS reports to create entirely new aggregations and perspectives that cross
the functional, departmental and geographical lines of management within the organization.
This type of semi-structured, interactive dialogue with the information available within the
organization is a key to sparking the sort of creative insights necessary for understanding novel
situations, making new connections between potential causes and effects and generating
innovative solutions to problems. Thus, an EIS aims to support the creative and intuitive
aspects of running a business or government organization, rather than the more structured and
analytical aspects associated with the routine planning, direction and control of standard or
ongoing activities.
3. An EIS typically provides a set of integrated computer tools that allows a decision maker
to interact directly with the data and models available within the organization’s computers in
order to retrieve information useful for understanding novel or complex situations and for
supporting unstructured decisions. Such decisions might involve plant expansion, mergers,
acquisitions or new products. Executive information system users can interactively choose
among numerous tabular or graphical formats for the display of outputs. They can also control
the level of detail, the triggers for exception conditions, and other aspects of the information
displayed. To facilitate this, an EIS provides user-friendly languages and interfaces to give
decision makers direct control over the information retrieval, processing and display capabilities
of the system. An EIS is intended for use by people with high levels of knowledge and insight
into the business activities they plan and direct, but perhaps very limited computer-related
knowledge and formal analytical skills.
4. Executives who use EIS often receive the results of analyses done by others, but rarely
spend time doing analytical work themselves. Consequently, EIS are much more concerned
with providing information in an easy-to-use format than providing sophisticated analytical
capabilities such as statistical tests or model building. Although they sometimes resemble DSS,
EIS respond to the particular requirements of top-level managers. They focus less on modelling
and more on assembling and displaying data, recognizing trends, determining underlying
causes and communicating knowledge. Executives generally use EIS to answer specific
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-23
questions or monitor performance; however, some executives scan information in an EIS

without specific questions in mind. For them, EIS help broaden their outlook, challenge their
assumptions and provide greater insight into their business.
5. The primary design objective of an EIS is to provide executives with timely access to
accurate, relevant, verifiable information about the organization’s overall performance, including
its position in the business market or public opinion, in formats that allow that information to be
used directly in their (strategic) decision making. Executive Information Systems are used to aid
executives in exploring the deeper significance of the organization’s information by allowing
them to shape and study the available information in imaginative and original ways based on
their experience and insight. Most impose very little structure, leaving users free to organize
and re-organize information in as many ways, and in as many formats, as possible. A well-
designed EIS allows executives to find novel or innovative relationships within the organization’s
information in order to (a) grasp the underlying causes of problems with the organization’s
performance, (b) recognize important new opportunities for the organization and (c) identify
emerging threats to the organization’s success. The key attribute of any EIS is intuitiveness, the
degree to which the system not only behaves in ways that appear intuitive to users (making it
easy to use), but actually stimulates the user’s intuition and supports creative problem solving in
the domain of interest.
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based executive

information system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and
hardware) must satisfy the intuitiveness requirements of the executives within the
supported organization, when used under operational conditions.
216. OFFICE AUTOMATION SYSTEMS
1. Office automation systems (OAS) facilitate everyday information processing tasks in

offices and business organizations. These systems include a wide range of tools, including
spread sheets, word processors and presentation packages. Although telephones, electronic
mail, voice mail and facsimile are sometimes included in this category, Canadian Signal doctrine
treats communication systems separately from information systems. Office automation systems
help people perform personal record keeping, writing and calculation chores efficiently. Of all
the computer-based information system categories, OAS is the most widely familiar to people.
Tools generally grouped within the OAS category include:
a. Electronic Spreadsheets: provide an efficient method of performing
calculations that can be visualized in terms of the cells on a spreadsheet.
These systems started with simple arithmetic spreadsheets but have evolved to
include support for complex mathematical computations and statistical analysis
as well as the organization and manipulation of tables containing text rather than
numbers.
b. Text and Image Processing Systems: store, revise and print documents
containing text or image data. These systems started with simple word
processors but have evolved to include desktop publishing systems for creating
complex documents ranging from brochures to book chapters.
c. Presentation Packages: help users develop presentations independently
instead of working with typists and technical artists. These systems started with
simple slide shows as visual aids to oral presentations but have evolved to
include systems that support full-blown multi-media presentations.
2-24 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
d. Personal Database Systems and Note-taking Systems: help people keep

track of their own personal data (rather than the organization’s shared data). In
addition to relational database management systems, typical applications
include a calendar and appointment book, a to-do list and a notepad.
2. Originally conceived as an aid to individual productivity, OAS are typically applied when
work is unstructured and the users can use the tools however they like. In these situations,
some individuals use them extensively and enjoy major efficiency benefits, whereas others do
not use them at all. However, the same tools can also be used for broader purposes in which
they form part of a larger system that an organization uses to structure and standardize tasks.
Originally sold as separate products, most are now bundled together as suites including a
spreadsheet, word processor, presentation package, electronic mail and possibly a personal
organizer or database management system.
217. HYBRID BUSINESS INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. Hybrid systems contain characteristics of several categories of business information

system. For example, a given business information system might, at one level, be a TPS that
collects and uses information about individual transactions. At another level, that same system
might be a DSS that provides information for analysing the market. At yet another level, it might
be an EIS providing information for executives. While unquestionably part of a single hybrid
business information system, each of these individual systems is most likely a separate
software package. As a case in point, almost all business information systems incorporate an
OAS that serves both as a personal productivity tool for individuals and as an aid to the storage,
retrieval, processing, display and communication of information within TPS, MIS, DSS and/or
EIS. For example, many MIS and DSS have functions that allow the user to export a standard
report or the response to a query directly to an electronic spreadsheet or a presentation slide.
218. REAL-TIME SYSTEMS
1. Alongside business information systems, the other important class of computer-based

information systems with characteristics particularly relevant to army TacC2IS is that of real-
time (information processing) systems. There are many interpretations of what constitutes a
real-time system; however, they all have in common the notion of response time—the time
taken for the system to generate output from some associated input. The basic feature of a
real-time information processing system is its ability to operate continuously, or whenever
necessary, so as to receive data and produce related output within a time that is normally short
compared with the overall system of which the information processing apparatus is but one part.
In other words, a real-time information processing system is any information processing activity
or system which has to respond to externally generated input stimuli within a finite and specified
period.
2. Computer-based real-time information processing systems monitor, respond to or control
an external environment. That is to say, they interact with the outside world. Taken in the most
general sense, this appears to cover a very wide range of computer-based activities. There is,
however, a distinction between computer-based real-time systems and merely interactive
computer systems. For example, a word processing package might seem to qualify as a real-
time information processing system because while it is running, it monitors the keyboard and the
mouse, waiting for a command to be entered by the user; when the user does enter a
command, he or she expects an appropriate response from the computer within a few seconds.
Clearly, word processors interact with their environment, and as such require a certain level of
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-25
responsiveness to external events; however, it is usually not a disaster if the response to a user
command entered into a word processor is not forthcoming. The user may become annoyed at
having to wait for responses to individual commands, but if the overall word processing job can
be done faster, more effectively and/or more economically with the aid of an electronic digital
computer to mechanize, enhance and automate the many procedures involved (including those
associated with communicating and/or subsequently modifying the text), then the user will
simply adapt to the lack of responsiveness and use the computer anyway. Similarly, a
computer-aided procedure that takes anywhere from several minutes to a few hours to produce
an output from some associated input is perfectly acceptable if the business decision it informs
only has to be made within a day or two of the time the information is available for processing.
3. A real-time system, on the other hand, interacts with its environment with the explicit aim
of affecting, usually by controlling or alerting someone who can control the current state of some
part of that environment. It is this aspect of directly controlling the current state of some portion
of its environment that distinguishes a real-time system, where response time is critical to
mission success, from an interactive system, where response time is important but not crucial.
The consequences of a computer word processor taking too long to respond to a user input are
generally limited to adversely altering the current emotional state of the human operator (e.g., it
can result in impatience and frustration on the part of the user). On the other hand, the
consequences of a jet fighter’s computer-based avionics system taking too long to produce an
output in response to an input from its environment generally include loss of control of the flight
behaviour of the aircraft, a situation that can lead directly to the failure of the operational mission
and, quite possibly, the loss of the aircraft and the pilot. In a real-time information processing
system, the consequences of not providing an output in time are just as bad as those resulting
from the provision of an output that is logically incorrect. Most business information systems are
interactive, but are not real-time systems. In terms of response time,
a. Interactive Systems: are those where response times are important to the
perceived usability of the system, but not to the correctness of its operation.
The successful performance of the overall mission does not depend on the
computer-based information system meeting finite and specified deadlines for
the provision of output in response to some associated input.
b. Real-time Systems: are those in which the correctness of the system depends
not only on the logical result of the computation, but also on the time within
which the results are produced. The successful performance of the overall
mission depends on the computer-based information system meeting finite and
specified deadlines for the provision of output in response to some associated
input.
The correctness of a real-time system depends not only on the logical result of
the computation, but also on the time at which the results are produced.
4. A qualitative distinction is made between hard and soft real-time systems:
a. Hard Real-time Systems: are those in which it is absolutely imperative that

responses occur within the specified deadline. In other words, these systems
must, without exception, meet their timing constraints—if a constraint is violated,
the system fails. Hard real-time systems are characterized by the fact that
severe consequences will result if logical or timing correctness properties of the
system are not satisfied.
2-26 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
b. Soft Real-time Systems: are those in which response times are central to the
correct behaviour of the system, but the system will still function properly, that is,
perform its mission successfully, if deadlines are occasionally missed. Soft real-
time systems are characterized by the fact that the system can tolerate some
violations of timing constraints without severe consequence.
5. There is a continuum between the extremes of “hardness” and “softness” and most
systems fit somewhere in between. For example, the flight control system of a combat aircraft
is a hard real-time system because a missed deadline could lead to a catastrophe, whereas a
data acquisition system for a process control application is soft as it may be defined to sample
an input sensor at regular intervals, but also to tolerate intermittent delays. In many real-time
applications, activities that have to occur in a timely fashion coexist with those that are not time
critical. An accounting application or a long-term planning activity running on an automated
factory’s computer is an example of the latter. Both types of activities consist of one or more
tasks, and a task with a finite and specified time constraint is known as a real-time task. Ideally,
the computer should execute real-time tasks so that each task will meet its deadline, whereas it
should execute the remaining tasks so that the average response time of these tasks is
minimized.
6. Most real-time information processing systems are complex, special-purpose systems

embedded within some larger technological system. In the majority of real-time applications, an
electronic digital computer is interfaced directly to some physical equipment and is dedicated to
monitoring or controlling the operation of that equipment. This equipment generally comprises
real-time input and output devices consisting of sensors, which monitor the current state of
some specified part of the overall system’s physical environment, and actuators, which act on
that same part of the system’s environment in order to change it in ways desired by the
operators of the system. Thus, in real-time applications, the computer-based information
system acts as the regulating element in the feedback loop by which the operation of the overall
system is controlled. The primary difference between real-time information processing systems
and business information systems is the time scale for responsiveness to inputs. Real-time
systems generally seek to control physical processes with control loops that must provide
responses in seconds, or even milliseconds, to be effective; whereas business management
systems generally seek to control social processes with control loops whose periods extend
over hours, days, weeks, months, quarters and years.
7. A real-time system can be divided into two parts—the controlled system and the
controlling system. The controlled system within a real-time system consists of the hardware
devices, e.g., sensors and actuators that form the system’s interface with the physical
environment it seeks to affect. For example, in a telecommunications system the controlled
system might consist of multiplexers, switches and printers, whereas in a process control
system it might include valves, relays or hoppers. The controlling system within a real-time
system comprises the computer-based information processing system that directs the behaviour
of the controlled system. For example, in an automated factory, the controlled system is the
factory floor with its robots, assembling stations and assembled parts, while the controlling
system is the computer and the human interfaces that manage and coordinate the activities on
the factory floor. As with all other computer-based information systems, the controlling system
within a real-time application consists of inputs, processes, data files, outputs, people and
hardware. For highly structured situations, such as an automated assembly line, the controlling
system might rely exclusively on automated procedures, in which case the human operator’s
only role is to initiate system operation and then monitor the system’s performance in order to
stop or over-ride the computer in the event of a system error or failure. In less structured
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-27
situations, such as flying a high performance aircraft, the control processes might involve
human operators carrying out procedures that guide the controlling system’s computers in the
execution of their programs. Either way, time and reliability constraints are imposed on the
entire system by the ongoing physical behaviour of the external world that it seeks to affect.
Unless the computer-based information processing system can provide the correct instructions
to the appropriate components of the controlled system, e.g., the control surfaces of an airplane,
in a timely and reliable manner, the computer’s role will be meaningless.
8. Although the nature of the equipment that constitutes the controlled system varies widely
with the purpose of the system, the design of the controlling system can be generalized. It is, in
fact, this commonality across a wide range of controlling systems that makes real-time systems
a class of computer-based information systems. The minor idiosyncrasies required by the
various types of controlled systems simply result in distinguishable categories within the real-
time systems class: (real-time) communications systems, (real-time) flight control systems,
(real-time) process control systems and so on. The primary characteristics of any real-time
information processing systems are:
a. Responsiveness: in order to control its environment successfully, a real-time

system must be responsive to changes in its environment. It is this
responsiveness that forms the fundamental property of a real-time system.
Unless the system reacts sufficiently rapidly to influence ongoing events in the
external environment, it cannot be considered to be operating in real-time. This
property is quantified by the system’s response time. The response time is the
time that the system will take to react to a change in, or a stimulus from, its
environment. The response time must be such that the system reacts in time to
produce the desired effect in the external environment. What constitutes
reacting ‘in time’ will vary with the controlled device. For a power-station boiler,
“in time” may mean reaction to a temperature change within thirty minutes. For
the system controlling a missile, the reaction to a course change must occur
within a few milliseconds.
b. Correctness and Completeness: in order to control its environment
successfully, a real-time system must correctly and completely handle all
changes in its environment. The system must be correct in that suitable
decisions are made when the different situations arise (even if the decision is to
do nothing at all). The system must be complete in the sense that it has catered
for all possible eventualities and situations that may arise in the environment or
in the controlling software itself.
c. Concurrency: in order to control its environment successfully, a real-time
system must be able to handle the fact that the external world is a mass of
concurrent activities, so signals may arrive at the same time. This requires
knowing when each signalled event occurred and how to respond within the
applicable response time. Interacting simultaneous tasks can arise in systems
in which several processes are running concurrently, perhaps to handle tasks
arising from quite independent external events. If simultaneous tasks refer to
the same data and one or more of them can modify this data, then, if there are
variable time relationships between the tasks, it cannot be reliably predicted
whether one task will read data which have or have not yet been modified by
another. Worse still, some data may have been modified and other data not, so
a task might act on inconsistent information. In other words, real-time systems
2-28 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
must have safeguards to ensure that their responses are based on information
that properly represents the current state of the controlled environment.
d. Reliability: in order to control its environment successfully, a real-time system
must be able to perform its function dependably, giving consistent results on
successive processes. Operators must be able to trust real-time systems to
perform as intended. In essence, reliability is a measure of how often a system
will fail. Although real-time systems are designed to maximize the time between
failures, fault tolerance is concerned with the recognition and handling of failures
when they do occur. A real-time system must fail gracefully—it must provide a
useful degraded service in the face of failure.
e. Economy: in order to control its environment successfully, a real-time system
must be affordable and economically sustainable. The cost of in time response,
completeness, total correctness and absolute reliability must be taken into
account when considering these ideals. As with any product, the performance
of an actual real-time system is constrained by economic considerations. An
on-line system that guarantees a maximum response time of half a second may
not be able to compete with a system that only offers a response time of two
seconds, but sells at half the price. In order to maintain its commercial viability,
a real-time system must be as inexpensive to produce, run and maintain as
possible.
9. The primary design objective for a real-time information processing system (i.e., the
controlling system within a real-time system) is to reliably compute the correct responses to
inputs representing the current state of a controlled system and provide outputs in the form of
instructions to the actuators within the controlled system in time to produce the desired effect(s)
in the external environment. Since the goal is to affect the external environment by directing the
behaviour of the controlled system, real-time information processing systems typically have
substantial amounts of knowledge concerning the characteristics of the application domain and
the controlled system built into the system. The more structured the application domain is, the
more automated the control processes can be. A well-designed real-time information
processing system can improve the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of a real-time system
by incorporating appropriate computer programming and, if need be, operator procedures for
dealing with about-to-be-missed deadlines, and by allowing for the graceful degradation of
capability in the event of major component failure. The key attribute of any real-time information
processing system is timeliness, the speed with which an undesired condition in the controlled
system can be recognised and correctly diagnosed, appropriate decisions made and corrective
action initiated.
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based real-time

information processing system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people
and hardware) must satisfy the timeliness requirements for the initiation of
appropriate corrective action, when used under operational conditions.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-29
SECTION 4
FUNCTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A LAND FORCE TACTICAL COMMAND
AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM
219. GENERAL
1. The LF TacC2IS is a network of microcomputer clients supported by dedicated servers

and interconnected through the TacComms system to provide an integrated information system
that allows the mechanization, enhancement and automation of information handling
procedures in support of army tactical command and control. This includes information storage,
retrieval, processing and display, and communication procedures across the full range of C2
activities associated with planning, directing and monitoring land operations. Commanders and
their supporting staff officers must be able to store, retrieve, process, display and communicate
timely, accurate, verifiable information for use in support of both battle management and battle
planning. To this end, they receive information from a variety of sources, such as formations,
units and individuals, sensors and surveillance devices and other allied forces. In order to
organize and integrate all of this information so that it can be efficiently and effectively stored,
retrieved, processed, displayed and communicated as needed by commanders and staff at all
levels, the TacC2IS employs computer databases managed by powerful database management
systems. Apart from organizing and storing tactical information, the TacC2IS operational
database provides the means to search for, associate and retrieve that data such that it meets
the specific information needs of its various users throughout the land operations chain of
command. This shared database is the key building block in the design and implementation of
the TacC2IS; it is the prime integrating force that provides coherence to the overall information
system.
2. The data stored in the operational database provide meaningful representations of the
real-world entities that influence and are influenced by the decisions made by LF tactical
commanders. In order to keep those representations up to date in the rapidly changing
environment of land operations, the TacC2IS must provide a highly efficient transaction
processing capability. Specifically, it must provide duty officers and current operations staff at
all levels with a well-designed system for getting data regarding tactical “transactions” (e.g.,
contact reports, situation reports, repair and recovery requests, etc.) entered into the system
correctly with the least amount of time and effort. This requires carefully defined user interfaces
based on detailed models of how each particular transaction should be processed. The
interfaces should contain enough structure to enforce the information management procedures
associated with the processing of these transactions by duty officers and current operations
staff. A well-designed tactical transaction processing capability within the TacC2IS can
minimize data entry effort and reduce errors by automatically filling in information items that are
already available and verified within the database. Some transaction processing within the
TacC2IS can be totally automated, as is the case with automatic position determination and
reporting systems such as the Canadian LF Situation Awareness System. Either way, a well-
designed tactical transaction processing capability checks each transaction for easily detectable
errors such as missing data, data values that are obviously too high or too low, data values that
are inconsistent with other data in the database and data in the wrong format. However, the key
attribute of the tactical transaction processing capability is throughput, the volume of
transactions that can be correctly processed in a given time.
2-30 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based transaction

processing capability (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and
hardware) within the TacC2IS must meet the throughput requirements of the
various command posts and duty centres throughout the land operations chain of
command, when used under operational conditions.
3. Beyond mere transaction processing, staff officers throughout the land operations chain
of command must be able to retrieve and process all of the information relevant to a particular
situation in order to evaluate, interpret and analyse it in preparation for presentation to their
respective commanders. For current operations staff, this calls for the ability to integrate and
summarize transaction information from various sources to provide the information necessary
for control decision making. This equates to a tactical management information system
capability within the TacC2IS to provide current operations staff with timely access to accurate,
relevant, verifiable information about the organization’s current performance in formats that
allow that information to be used directly in their execution-monitoring decisions. The tactical
MIS capability within the TacC2IS is used to allow current operations staff to recognise when
execution is deviating significantly from planned or expected activities, in terms of some agreed
upon set of performance measures, so that they may initiate appropriate corrective action on
behalf of the commander or provide the commander with the information needed to make the
appropriate decision(s). This capability should contain enough structure to enforce the
applicable tactics, techniques and procedures, including information management procedures.
4. A well-designed tactical MIS capability can minimize the time and effort required to
recognise and diagnose problems encountered during mission execution and to initiate
appropriate corrective action by presenting information in consistently structured, easily
understandable formats (e.g., standardized reports presented textually, graphically, pictorially
and/or acoustically) that allow current operations staff to grasp the significance of the
information straight away, and by automatically transferring information generated during
monitoring and diagnosis into the formats used to communicate instructions and other control
information to the subordinate elements being controlled by the headquarters. Some tactical
MIS capabilities within the TacC2IS can bypass current operations staff entirely and totally
automate certain routine monitoring and control functions. Either way, a well-designed tactical
MIS capability allows current operations staff to quickly identify deviations from planned or
expected performance and assists them with the selection and initiation of appropriate
corrective actions to prevent those deviations from causing adverse consequences for the
organization. The key attribute of the tactical MIS capability within the TacC2IS is data
integration, the degree to which the disparate pieces of data important to execution phase
decision making throughout the land operations chain of command can be maintained,
aggregated and manipulated to provide individual current operations staff officers with timely,
accurate, verifiable information relevant to the situation at hand and in a form they find useful.
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based tactical

management information system capability (i.e., input, data files, processes,
outputs, people and hardware) within the TacC2IS must meet the data
integration requirements of the current operations staff officers within the land
operations chain of command, when used under operational conditions.
5. The plans staff at the various headquarters within the land operations chain of command
also need to retrieve and process all of the information relevant to a particular situation in order
to evaluate, interpret and analyse it in preparation for presentation to their commanders. In their
case, however, the requirement is for timely access to accurate, relevant, verifiable information
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-31
about the likely effects of various alternative courses of action in formats that allow that
information to be used directly in their decision making. This calls for a tactical planning support
capability within the TacC2IS that will allow plans staffs to explore and, if possible, quantitatively
compare decision alternatives in terms of some agreed upon set of performance measures.
Much like the DSS found in the business information system domain, the tactical planning
support capability should contain enough structure to support rigorous analysis of the tactical
alternatives. One significant difference between the traditional DSS and a tactical planning
support capability is the absence of a knowledge base of heuristic information. The heuristic
planning information associated with tactical land operations requires more judgement and
insight than can presently be represented in computer data files. The staff officers from the
various staff branches, arms and services must apply this knowledge to select the inputs, guide
the execution of the computer programs and to interpret the output produced by the computer
models. Therefore, the processes by which planning information is produced and used must
consist of a tight interaction between human procedures and computer programs; the two must
be developed together if the computer-based planning support capability within the TacC2IS is
to be effective. A well-designed tactical planning support capability allows plans staff to
understand (a) which course of action is preferable in terms of the criteria applied during the
analysis, (b) which factors relevant to the decision those criteria represent and (c) the degree of
uncertainty associated with the preference for one alternative over all others. The key attribute
of the tactical planning support capability within the TacC2IS is validity, the degree to which the
models within the system, including those created by users, provide a useful representation of
the real world problem confronting the supported commander(s).
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based tactical planning

support capability (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people and
hardware) must satisfy the validity requirements of the plans staffs and
commanders within land operations chain of command, when used under
operational conditions.
6. Finally, commanders throughout the land operations chain of command must be able to
use the accurate, up-to-date information available to them through the TacC2IS operational
database effectively and efficiently in order to quickly and accurately assess the situation, make
sound decisions and issue appropriate directions. Because command involves the creative
expression of human will, commanders need a capability within the TacC2IS that will provide
them with timely access to the accurate, relevant, verifiable information they need, whenever
they need it and in whatever form they find to be most useful. Such a commander’s information
system capability is patterned on the executive information systems found in the business
information system domain. A well-designed commander’s information system is at once an
upward extension of the various tactical MIS capabilities and tactical planning support
capabilities within the TacC2IS and the driving force behind the design and implementation of
those staff support capabilities. In the Canadian LF, commanders are the central focus of the
command function and, hence, of the command support capability. Therefore, the primary
purpose of the tactical transaction processing capability, the tactical MIS capability and the
tactical planning support capability within the TacC2IS is to provide commanders at all levels of
the land operations chain of command with timely access to the accurate, verifiable information
they require to make sound tactical decisions. Where these capabilities provide staff officers
with the tools to make decisions and issue direction, it is because they do so on behalf of the
commander in order to relieve him of direct responsibility for the myriad minor details involved in
the planning and execution of land operations.
2-32 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
7. For the commander’s information system to operate effectively, subordinate

commanders, HQ staff officers and analysts throughout the land operations chain of command
must ensure that the information available to commanders from various other systems through
the commander’s information system is timely and accurate. The essential purpose of the
commander’s information system capability within the TacC2IS is to allow commanders at all
levels to determine, interactively with the system, which information is relevant to their current
situation and in what formats that information is most usable to them. It is aimed at aiding
tactical commanders in exploring the deeper significance of the information available to them by
allowing them to shape and study that information in imaginative and original ways based on
their experience and insight. For example, the commander’s information system might allow a
commander to isolate and interactively re-organize information from a series of standard contact
reports generated by the tactical transaction processing capability within the TacC2IS. By
combining, aggregating and representing the information contained in those reports in a variety
of ways, the commander can allow his or her personal experience and intuition to see the
information from many different perspectives. A commander’s information system may also
allow a commander to create entirely new aggregations of information and perspectives from
which to study them that cross the functional, organizational and geographical lines within the
land operations chain of command by combining the information from a number of different
summary reports generated by staff officers at various headquarters using the tactical MIS
capability.
8. The commander’s information system imposes very little structure, leaving commanders
free to organize and re-organize information in as many ways, and in as many formats, as
possible. This type of semi-structured, interactive dialogue with the information available within
the TacC2IS is a key to sparking the sort of creative insights necessary for understanding novel
situations, making new connections between potential causes and effects and generating
innovative solutions to problems. Thus, the commander’s information system aims to support
the creative and intuitive aspects of planning and executing land operations, rather than the
more structured and analytical aspects associated with the routine staff work involved in the
planning, direction and control of standardized activities. A well-designed commander’s
information system capability allows commanders at all levels to find novel or innovative
relationships within the available information in order to (a) grasp the underlying causes of
problems with the organization’s tactical performance, (b) recognize important new tactical
opportunities for the organization and (c) identify emerging threats to the organization’s tactical
success. The key attribute of the commander’s information system capability within the
TacC2IS is intuitiveness, the degree to which the system not only behaves in ways that appear
intuitive to commanders (making it easy to use), but actually stimulates the commanders’
intuition and supports creative problem solving in the planning and execution of land operations.
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based commanders’

information system capability (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people
and hardware) within the TacC2IS must meet the intuitiveness requirements of
commanders throughout the land operations chain of command, when used
under operational conditions.
9. Notwithstanding the fact that much of the structure and functional capability of the
TacC2IS is drawn from the business information system domain, the tactical command and
control of land operations is a real-time system. The controlled system is the actual combat
power of the fighting units and formations, i.e., the sensors are the reconnaissance and
surveillance vehicles, the unmanned aerial vehicles, the electronic intercept and direction
finding systems, the foot patrols and so on, while the actuators are the tanks, guns, armoured
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-33
personnel carriers and so on that deliver the effects that alter the external environment to fit
Canada’s political and diplomatic will. In other words, these are the assets that monitor the
current state of the battle space and, when so directed, act to change that state in ways
beneficial to the achievement of the force’s tactical, operational and strategic objectives. The
controlling system is the chain of command, the unbroken sequence of commanders, supported
by their staffs, that connects each individual soldier to Canada’s national objectives. The chain
of command acts as the regulating element in the feedback loop by which the operation of the
overall system, in this case a LF field organization conducting tactical operations, is controlled.
10. As United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd famously explained, war is a time-
competitive struggle. The side that can correctly understand the situation first and, therefore,
initiate an appropriate action first has a decided advantage over the adversary who must now try
to understand the new situation created by the side that acted first. This means that response
times to events in the battlespace have finite and specified deadlines. These deadlines are
determined by the enemy’s capacity to act—in order to win, one must operate with a shorter
observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) cycle than one’s adversary. These deadlines
are real, and so are the consequences of missing them. Tactical land operations must be
categorized as soft real-time systems, because deadlines can occasionally be missed without
causing disastrous consequences. However, if a single major deadline or a series of minor
deadlines is missed, the system will fail to achieve its mission. Thus, the controlling system
must operate in real-time, subject to strict timing and reliability constraints.
11. This all means that the TacC2IS is a real-time information processing system, the
correctness of which depends not only on the logical results of the information processing
activities carried on within it, but also on the time at which those results are produced. Each
and every process, from transaction processing through aggregation and summary reporting to
support control of ongoing operations through analyses conducted in support of planning, all the
way to command decision making as a creative act of human will, is subject to the rigours of
timing and reliability constraints derived from the need to interact with the external world as
events occur. It is this combination of the need to capture, organize and manipulate vast
amounts of information in order to understand and reason about what is in essence a very
complex, unstructured situation with the need for real-time response times on the order of
seconds, minutes and hours that makes army TacC2IS a unique class of computer-based
information systems.
The design and implementation of the overall computer-based tactical command

and control information system (i.e., input, data files, processes, outputs, people
and hardware) must meet the timeliness requirements for the initiation of
appropriate tactical actions, when used under operational conditions.
220. TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM

RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The staff decides access authorizations, authentication procedures, data retention and
release criteria, and basic operating procedures. In order to ensure that the TacC2IS functions
effectively and efficiently as part of the overall command support capability, Signals:
a. executes the staff directives through hardware distribution, software

management, and network management;
2-34 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
b. maintains technical control of the LF TacC2IS, including ensuring interoperability

with other systems as necessary;
c. operates and provides first line maintenance of TacC2IS software and hardware
at headquarters; and
d. operates TacC2IS facility control centres (FCC), which give real time fault
control of the system.
221. SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT OF THE TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

INFORMATION SYSTEM
1. The unique nature of army Tac2CIS presents a significant challenge to those who must
specify, design, construct, operate, manage and employ such systems because the knowledge,
methods, techniques and tools available to support the performance of these activities have
generally been developed to meet the needs of one or more of the traditional classes of
computer-based information system. Almost since the introduction of electronic digital
computing, the computer-based systems realm has been divided into two distinct domains:
business information systems (often referred to generically as management information
systems) and real-time control systems (sometimes referred to as embedded systems). Each
domain enjoys a very large community of practice, and is well supported by academic
institutions, industry standards bodies and professional journals. However, because each
domain comprehensively addresses the particular needs of an entire sphere of uses for
computer-based information processing, and because there is as yet very little overlap between
those spheres of use, little in the way of models, methods, techniques and tools are shared
between the two domains. On the other hand, one of the things that makes army Tac2CIS so
unique is that the most fundamental functions and characteristics that define any computer-
based system as being part of either one domain or the other are of equal importance in army
Tac2CIS. This is perhaps the principal reason for the extreme difficulty military forces around
the world seem to be encountering in developing and employing these systems.
2. An army TacC2IS is a complex computer-based information processing system that
seeks to utilize the most current technology for its hardware and software platforms as well as
the latest techniques for software definition, development and life-cycle maintenance. In
addition, its implementation involves the co-ordination, interface and, eventually, integration of
several information systems, some of which are more advanced than the Tac2CIS in their life-
cycle and others of which have not yet been initiated. Furthermore, experience has shown that
information systems interact very strongly with their environment and the requirements of these
systems evolve not only with time but also with use. With time and experience, the users’
needs and expectations will evolve and require more sophistication and performance. In such
an environment, the risks associated with using a linear approach to life-cycle management are
unacceptable; therefore, an evolutionary approach will be applied. The development and
implementation of new system versions must be carefully planned and managed to avoid
damage to the current operational system and discrepancies between the identified
requirements and the implemented versions. However, the users of army Tac2CIS cannot rely
upon system developers and technical experts to produce the systems they need based simply
on past experience and the use of industry standard practices; they must take ownership of their
requirements and remain active participants throughout the entire process of developing
systems by which to satisfy them. The developers, for their part, must constantly work to find
better ways of specifying, designing and constructing systems that will meet the needs and
expectations of army Tac2CIS users.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 2-35
3. The method traditionally used to define the requirements for a Tac2CIS rests upon two
fundamental principles. The first is primacy of data and the second is the progressive
decomposition of the problem into its constituent parts in a coherent manner. The reason for
the primacy of data is that experience in the information systems field has shown an
organization’s data is relatively stable when compared with the functions that are performed.
The data usually only changes when the mission of the organization changes, whereas the
functions performed adapt to changes in the environment in which the organization operates.
Therefore, an information system based upon the data will be more stable and will likely require
fewer resources to maintain during its lifecycle than one based upon functions. Moreover, in
complex environments a shared database is the prime integrating force that provides coherence
to the overall information system.
4. The progressive decomposition of the problem starts at the overall or purpose of the
system and then analyses the constituent components at successive levels of detail until
sufficient detail has been exposed to permit the solution design phase to begin. This is the tried
and true engineering approach of breaking a large, complex problem down into a coherent set
of manageable problems that can then each be solved and the solutions subsequently
integrated to solve the original problem. This decomposition can take the form of data flow
diagrams, object interaction diagrams, use cases or any other method for describing the
functional information processing behaviour of the system. Because different parts of the
system emphasize different functions and characteristics, the methods and tools must be
selected in order to match the particular problem being addressed. Proper selection and use of
techniques and tools drawn from these methods can ensure the logical correctness of the
resulting computer-based system.
5. It is important to remember, however, that the correctness of an army Tac2CIS depends

not only on the logical results of its computations, but also on the time at which the results are
produced. Therefore, whatever methods, techniques and tools are used to decompose and
describe the functional behaviour of the system must incorporate (i.e., explicitly model) the time
constraints on the information processing tasks within that behaviour, as well as the need to
perform the tasks in some alternative way in the event of system failure. This presents a
significant challenge to existing methods, techniques and tools for the development of
computer-based information systems. Lacking adequate models with which to analyse and
define the impact of timing constraints on system design and implementation, more reliance
must be placed on prototyping and experimentation. In fact, under the contemporary
circumstances it is impossible to separate development of the system from use of the system.
Just as the human procedures and computer programs must evolve together in a symbiotic
relationship, so too must the users and developers come together in a way that blurs, if not
eradicates, the line between development and use.
2-36 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
CHAPTER 3
TACTICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
301. GENERAL
1. Operational success will continue to be more and more dependent upon knowledge
based, network-enabled Command. Increasingly, the Army will be a digitized force to the lowest
level possible, incorporating the application of current and evolving technologies.
Interconnectivity and interoperability must be maintained between headquarters (HQ) that are
linked to an array of sensors, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike platforms. Units and
individual soldiers will provide commanders and staffs at all levels and echelons with an
increasingly near real-time, relevant and multi-dimensional common operating picture (COP).
Communications and Information Systems (CIS) provide the underlying infrastructure for a
network-enabled command capability that supports operations by providing the integrated
information network necessary to achieve the Commander’s goal of information superiority in
the battlespace. Communications and Information Systems encompasses two distinct but
closely related systems, the communications systems (CS) that are used to relay information
between locations, and the information systems (IS) that are used by individuals to store,
retrieve, process and display information in support of their job-related tasks. Information
systems specifically designed and employed to support the exercise of command and control
over military forces are referred to as command and control information systems (C2IS).
2. In order for the Army to successfully operate in a Joint, Interagency, Multi-national and
Public (JIMP) context the CIS must possess a high degree of interoperability. Communications
and Information Systems must provide reliable connectivity within and between the tactical,
operational and strategic levels. Communications and Information Systems must include
interfaces with coalition forces and national and international infrastructure to enable the
acquisition, processing and distribution of the information necessary to ensure the successful
execution of the commander’s mission.
3. This chapter presents the principles and general characteristics of a tactical

communications (TacComms) system for the Canadian Land Forces in the early twenty-first
century. These principles and characteristics are not specific to any particular equipment or
system, but rather are the conceptual foundations upon which such equipment and systems are
to be designed, constructed, operated, managed and employed. While this chapter lays out the
general communications requirements at various Land Force (LF) organizational levels, it does
not prescribe the technical implementation of a tactical communications system by which to
satisfy them. Operations and engineering staffs must continually define and develop
specifications for communications hardware and software that make maximum use of evolving
technologies to improve the capabilities of the LF TacComms.
4. Any form of communication involves patterns: for example, patterns of ink on a printed
page, electrical current variations on a wire or vibrating air molecules. In order to communicate
information, we must first agree on assigned meanings for particular patterns, and then find a
way to transmit sequences of such patterns. The paths between communication parties are
called communication channels or communications links, and might involve electrical cable,
telephone lines, microwave channels or some combination of these. The devices employed to
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-1
send and receive information across a channel or link are usually called stations; when we need
to distinguish their respective roles in the communications process, we refer to them as
transmitters and receivers. We can simplify matters for now by concentrating on
communications channels that merely connect one station to another. Of course, more than two
stations may be linked together on a single channel, but this is an example of networking, which
will be addressed later on.
5. A communication channel between stations requires a medium over which to transmit

(convey) the signal. This transmission medium is the physical path between the transmitter and
the receiver in a communication system. Information is transferred by creating patterns in the
energy flow (electricity, radio waves, light and sound) through the medium. Such a pattern is
called signalling. Different forms of signalling are appropriate for different media. A
communications system requires a means by which to get information, in the form of signals,
onto and off of the particular transmission medium being used. The speed of information
transfer refers to the rate at which symbols can be passed across a link. Distance, the overall
length of the link, is an important consideration since it may affect the degree of signal loss.
Most of the limitations on information transfer speed and distance can be lifted through the use
of more sophisticated technology, but this raises questions about the cost of communications.
The installation, maintenance, operation and management of signalling devices are some of the
primary responsibilities of Signals.
302. TERMINOLOGY
1. Line of Sight Communications. Although Line of Sight Communications (LOS)

systems are heavily terrain-dependent, LOS TacComms are systems whose operational ranges
are typically limited to 30 to 40 kilometres due to the curvature of the earth (optical LOS is
limited directly by the curvature whereas radio LOS can extend slightly beyond due to the
behaviour of radio waves).
2. Beyond Line of Sight Communications. Beyond Line of Sight Communications

(BLOS) systems provide the links needed for communications between stations when they are
deployed at greater than LOS distances from each other. These TacComms are becoming the
norm rather than the exception on the nonlinear, non-contiguous battlefield.
SECTION 2
MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS
303. GENERAL
1. The means of communication are defined as follows:
a. Telecommunications. The conveyance of information between individuals or

locations by sending agreed upon signals over a transmission medium,
composed of the following methods:
(1) Electrical/Electronic. Signals is responsible for the planning,

installation, operation, maintenance and management of
electrical/electronic telecommunications systems and facilities integral to
the Canadian LF. Signals is also responsible for the planning, co-
ordination and management of the Canadian Land Forces’ use of non-
3-2 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Tactical Communication Systems
integral electrical/electronic telecommunications systems and facilities,

including those provided by other CF organizations, allied military forces,
public infrastructures and commercial interests.
(2) Visual. Signals no longer has any responsibilities associated with the
employment of visual means of communication.
(3) Aural. Signals has no responsibilities associated with the employment of

aural means of communications.
b. Physical Communications. The conveyance of information between

individuals or locations by a person or persons entrusted to carry a physical
copy of the information from origin to destination which include:
(1) postal; and
(2) messenger/courier (i.e. hand carriage).
304. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1. Telecommunications is the traditional term for wide-area communications handling all

types of traffic, including voice, data and video. Convergence is becoming more important in
telecommunications networks. Convergence is defined as the techniques used to format,
transport, or interpret voice, data and video traffic, using the same network facilities.
Convergence can be implemented at three levels in communications:
a. at the transmission level, voice, data and video are carried by the same
transmission medium, but they are independent;
b. at the network level, voice, data and video are carried by a single network that is
aware of the differences between them; and
c. at the application level, there is a logical connection among voice, data and
video which is understood by the communication equipment.
2. Electrical/Electronic Means. Electrical/Electronic transmission media may be

classified as either guided or unguided. In both cases, communication is in the form of
electromagnetic waves. With guided media, the waves are guided along a solid conductor that
physically interconnects the transmitter and the receiver; examples of guided media are twisted
pair, coaxial cable, and optical fibre. Traditional Signals terminology refers to all such guided
transmission media as line.
3. Unguided media provide a means for transmitting electromagnetic waves but do not
guide them; examples are propagation through air, vacuum and seawater. Traditional Signals
terminology refers to all such unguided transmission media as radio or wireless.
4. Electrical/electronic communication modes include telephony, computer based

information systems, imagery, video and database technology which furnish rapid, multi-
capacity communications needed for the conduct of operations. They are described as follows:
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-3
a. Telephony (Voice). This is the transmission and reception of speech and as an

operational mode can be half-duplex, full duplex, point to point or broadcast—all
informed in nature. It is still the most common method available to tactical LF.
Telephony uses a multitude of TacComms including Combat Net Radio (CNR),
area trunk systems using radio or line, cellular based phone system, Canadian
and host nation public switched networks and military and commercial
communications satellite systems. Where required, all voice transmissions are
encrypted and classed as secure in keeping with current communications
security policies.
b. Computer Based Systems. Command and Control systems utilized today and
into the future rely on secure networks based on current and evolving
technology. Using battlefield automation systems and communications allows
users to share resources and pass information by maximizing the available
information networks through near seamless connectivity and interoperability.
This means allows for managing, transporting via messaging, processing and
presenting data as usable information. This information can take the form of
imagery, video, colour graphics, digital overlays, geospatial and database
related information. Information can be passed, then printed as hardcopy or
stored on a magnetic or optical medium for future reference. Documents and
images sent throughout the network can be restricted by limitations present in
the CIS infrastructure.
c. Facsimile (Imagery). Facsimile is the transmission of fixed images with

subsequent reproduction in permanent form. It supports the transmission and
reception of written text, pictures, maps, traces or other similar graphic material.
This has largely been superseded as a tactical means by C2IS computer based
multimedia technology but through its use of a simplified universal protocol a
capacity may be retained for communicating with allied or coalition members
who may not have a compatible CS.
d. Video. This is the transmission and reception of transient images of fixed or

moving objects. This can be video teleconferencing, whiteboard, chat
exchanges or actual closed circuit television in format. While some specialized
equipment is required to implement the respective modes, the main cost to
communications is the considerable bandwidth consumption, which varies with
the format choice.
e. Database Technologies. This is the transmission and reception of information

in digital format and is the responsibility of the digitized TacComms. It should be
noted that the storage and processing of this digital information is the domain of
the IS, which will be addressed later. Analog information, such as voice
communication, may be transmitted by this method but must first be converted
into digital form. This conversion process is inherent in the design of the
TacComms used. Data or digital systems in the form of networks have the
ability to handle large amounts of warehoused data information, graphics and
digital voice. Data may be transmitted in fully automated modes and at high
speeds. The use of image compression, multimedia and evolving transmission
technologies will allow for the transfer and viewing of three-dimensional imagery
and graphics along with video from various sensors and platforms.
3-4 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
5. Visual Means. Visual means are those methods of transmission that can be received
by optical systems. Visual means are available to everyone and are useful to send simple,
prearranged signals over short distances. Visual codes are insecure and can be imitated by the
enemy to deceive and confuse. In the absence of other electronically based TacComms, visual
means is an extremely useful form of LOS short-range communications and may be less
vulnerable to enemy actions. Some of the visual LOS means of communicating are:
a. arm and hand signals;
b. aircraft manoeuvres;
c. directional and non-directional flashing and coloured lights;
d. flags;
e. infra-red (IR);
f. pyrotechnics, including coloured smoke (as authorized in ACP 168 current

Canadian approved edition); and
g. panels.
6. Aural. This means of communication utilizes sound signals for the transmission of
information over audible ranges such as whistles, horns, sirens or voice amplifiers. Sound
signals are vulnerable to interception and can be imitated by the enemy, thus their usefulness
may be impaired by local and battle noises.
305. PHYSICAL COMMUNICATIONS
1. Postal Services. This means of communication involves the use of general-purpose

mail handling systems to convey information recorded on a physical storage medium, such as
paper, magnetic tape, computer disk(ette), CD, DVD, etc., from a source to a destination. It is
the primary means by which personal and welfare-related letters and packages are
communicated between deployed military personnel and civilians anywhere in the world. Postal
services are not normally used for military operational or administrative traffic because ordinary
mail handling systems do not generally provide the speed, flexibility and security necessary for
such communications. The provision of postal services to the Canadian Land Forces is a
logistics function for which Signals has no responsibility.
2. Hand Carriage. This means of communication involves one or more designated

individuals “hand carrying” operational or administrative information recorded on a physical
storage medium, such as paper, plastic talc, magnetic tape, computer disk(ette), CD, DVD, etc.,
from a source to a destination. It differs from postal services in that hand carriage is planned,
operated and managed specifically to satisfy the speed, flexibility and security requirements of
military operational and administrative communication. All arms and services employ hand
carriage in the form of liaison officers, messengers and runners. Signals provides common user
hand carriage services as an adjunct to its electrical/electronic telecommunications systems and
facilities when necessary to ensure the timely, secure conveyance of operational and
administrative information for which Signals is responsible.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-5
306. TRANSMISSION CAPACITY
1. It is evident that the electrical/electronic means best satisfy the tactical requirements for
rapid, high capacity communications. The ability to use these means will depend on the
characteristics of the information to be transmitted, the distances to be covered and the
operational environment. The amount of information that can be transmitted by
electrical/electronic means depends on a number of technical factors. The three most important
factors are:
a. signalling speed;
b. redundancy; and
c. bandwidth.
2. Signalling Speed. The amount of information that can be passed will vary directly with
the rate at which it can be transmitted and received. However, this by itself may be misleading,
as it gives no indication of response time. Speech rates over voice circuits average less than
100 words per minute; however, the response time for person-to-person conversation is fast.
Data transmission is very fast, enabling users at different levels of command at different
locations to access information concurrently in a near real-time or real-time manner.
3. Redundancy. Redundancy is the proportion of non-essential information that the

system passes while conveying the essential information. Visual modes of transmission
possess more inherent redundancy than speech modes while the latter are more redundant
than data modes:
a. Visual. The amount of redundancy inherent in facsimile and television depends

on the picture to be transmitted. In both cases, it is considerably greater than
speech.
b. Speech. Normal conversation is not formalized and it is usually spontaneous as

opposed to deliberate and condensed. Speech transmissions include all
unproductive pauses and noises made in order to create a sense of intimacy
between speakers.
c. Data. This is the least redundant mode of transmission but the length, number
and spacing of the code elements introduces some redundancy to gain
readability and accuracy. High-speed electronic techniques such as Cyclical
Redundancy Checks (CRC) exist to ensure that data is successfully exchanged
between subscribers to a system.
4. Bandwidth. Bandwidth is the frequency range (i.e. the band of frequencies or

wavelengths) over which a transmission circuit is allowed to operate. Bandwidth also refers to
the amount of data that can be transmitted in a fixed amount of time. For digital devices,
bandwidth is expressed in bits per second (bps) or bytes (8 bits) per second (Bps). For analog
devices, bandwidth is expressed in cycles per second, or Hertz (Hz). Transmission capacity is
proportional to the allowed bandwidth of the circuit. The necessary bandwidth is the minimum
value of bandwidth sufficient to ensure the successful transmission of information at the rate
and with the quality required for the system employed. Some of the effects of transmission
modes on bandwidth are as follow:
3-6 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
a. Data. The transmission requirements for coded data such as used in

automated systems require higher speeds and the acceptable error rates are
normally lower. This leads to wider bandwidths being utilized. Current (at time
of publication) systems carry 100 MB LANs within vehicles, 10 MB connection
vehicle-to-vehicle, from 256 kbps to 2 MB bandwidth on LOS radios and 16 kbps
over CNR. The bandwidth capabilities will increase with new technologies as
they emerge and system updates are applied.
b. Voice. Voice may be transmitted in analog form—for example, over a simple

telephone circuit, over a 3 kHz bandwidth—because the electrical signal is a
direct analog of the voice signal. When voice is converted to a type of digital
code, for example, for encryption, it can be transmitted over difficult paths but at
the expense of a greatly increased bandwidth (30 to 40 kHz).
c. Facsimile. A still picture can be transmitted slowly over a voice circuit or more
rapidly over a data circuit of greater bandwidth. Largely superseded by C2
Message Handling Systems supporting attachments, facsimile transmission is
retained for legacy purposes and for basic communications with non-digitized
allies and coalition members.
d. Video. The reproduction of moving or transient imagery requires an increased

bandwidth with, as an example, closed circuit television being some five
hundred or more times larger than that required for a single voice circuit (up to 3
MHz). However, digitized video and video teleconferencing operate on much
reduced bandwidths by slowing the scan and refresh rates of the individual
pictures that together constitute the video.
307. COMMUNICATION LINKS
1. Communication link is the general term used to describe the connection over which
signals are passed between two directly communicating stations. The term includes both the
physical transmission medium and the devices that use that medium to provide one or more
communication channels between the stations. Communication links are categorized by the
degree to which signals can be passed in both directions over the physical transmission
medium between communicating stations. There are four types of communication links:
simplex, half-duplex, duplex and multiplex.
2. Simplex. A simplex communication link can pass signals in only one direction between
stations. One of the stations is equipped with a transmitter; the other station is equipped with a
receiver. This provides one-way communication from the source station to the destination
station over the single physical transmission path by which they are connected. The most
common examples of simplex communication links are commercial radio and television
broadcasts.
3. Half-Duplex. A half-duplex communication link can pass signals in both directions

between stations, but only in one direction at a time. Each station is equipped with a dual-
purpose receiver/transmitter to permit two-way communication over the single physical
transmission path by which they are connected; however, only one station at a time may
transmit a signal over the shared path. Common examples of half-duplex communication links
include walkie-talkies, citizen band (CB) radio and combat net radio.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-7
4. Duplex. A duplex communication link can pass signals between stations in both
directions at the same time. In order to send and receive signals simultaneously, each station is
equipped with a both a transmitter and a receiver. This simultaneous two-way communication
requires the establishment of two physical transmission paths between the communicating
stations so that each transmitter has a dedicated connection to the receiver at the other station.
Thus, a duplex link is really two simplex links passing signals in opposite directions between the
communicating stations. Duplex links are sometimes called full-duplex links, but this term is
considered redundant and its use is to be discouraged. The term “four-wire circuit” is a
traditional term used in line networks to indicate a duplex link consisting of two pairs of wires,
each providing a simplex link between the communicating stations. In radio networks, a duplex
link consists of two different carrier frequencies, each providing a simplex link between the
communicating stations. A familiar example of a duplex communication link is a telephone.
5. Multiplex. A multiplex link can pass more than one signal between stations at the same
time. This allows more than one source to convey information simultaneously over the same
physical transmission path. In addition to transmit and/or receive device(s), each station is
equipped with a multiplexer that divides the overall bandwidth of the physical transmission path
into a number of separately accessible lower-bandwidth paths. Each of these lower-bandwidth
paths provides an independent communication channel capable of carrying its own signal
between the communicating stations. In other words, a multiplex link uses a single physical
transmission path to provide a number of communication channels between stations. This
allows each of a number of sources at one station (up to the number of channels multiplexed
onto the transmission path) to communicate independently with a selected destination at the
other station as if each source-destination pair had its own physical transmission path between
the communicating stations. Common examples of multiplex links are cable television
distribution systems that use a single cable to simultaneously deliver a number of television
channels to a cable subscriber, telephone trunks that use a single microwave link to
simultaneously carry a number of separate subscriber calls between telephone exchanges and
satellite links that use a single physical transmission path to simultaneously carry a variety of
telephone and data services to CF personnel deployed on a mission somewhere in the world.
308. MODULATION SYSTEMS
1. Modulation. Modulation is the process by which the intelligence to be transmitted, e.g.,

the voice signal, is superimposed on the radio or carrier wave. Common terms associated with
modulation systems used with tactical radio are:
a. Amplitude Modulation;
b. Frequency Modulation;
c. Phase Modulation;
d. Pulse Modulation; and
e. Spread Spectrum Techniques.
2. Amplitude Modulation (AM). The amplitude of the carrier wave is varied in accordance
with the signal carrying the intelligence. A complex wave form results consisting of the original
carrier wave plus two bands of frequencies called sidebands, one above and one below the
carrier frequency. The system is simple but not very efficient since both sidebands contain the
3-8 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
same intelligence and the carrier wave contains none. This modulation technique is also prone
to carrying both man-made and natural electrical disturbances. All older, high frequency (HF)
radios employ AM.
3. Single Sideband (SSB). This is a form of AM in which only one of the sidebands is
transmitted; the second sideband and the carrier may be suppressed. Compared with double
sideband AM, SSB increases by about 50% the ground wave range for a given weight of radio
and battery, and occupies a much narrower bandwidth. SSB adds to the complexity of the
radio set and requires a high standard of frequency stability. Independent sideband (ISB) is a
variation on this system in which both sidebands are transmitted but each one is modulated with
a different intelligence signal.
4. Frequency Modulation (FM). In this method of modulation, the frequency of the carrier
wave is varied by the intelligence signal. The resulting radio system is more complex than in AM
but is considerably more efficient: it provides higher quality circuits with better signal-to-noise
ratios and weak interfering signals are suppressed. On the other hand, the transmitted signal
occupies a wide bandwith, a result which precludes its use below very high frequency (VHF)
and limits its range. FM is the standard method for combat net radio (CNR).
5. Phase Modulation (PM). In this method, the phase of the carrier wave is modulated by
the intelligence signal. This technique is used either as a preliminary stage to FM to avoid the
need for extensive frequency stabilization or alone. In this latter case, it requires a wide
bandwidth.
6. Pulse Modulation. An alternative method to the transmission of intelligence by a

continuous wave is the transmission by a series of short carrier-wave pulses. The most
frequently used variants of this technique are:
a. Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM). The mixing of the intelligence wave and
the carrier wave is done as for normal AM except that the transmitter is turned
on and off. The pulses are equally spaced and of equal duration (1 to 3
microseconds) but vary in amplitude. This technique produces very low average
power in relation to peak power and allows the driving of the transmitting circuits
far above their normal power ratings for continuous operation. A second
advantage is increased signal-to-noise ratio if the receiver is silenced during the
pulse intervals.
b. Pulse Frequency Modulation (PFM). The mixing of the intelligence wave and
the carrier wave is done as for normal FM except that the transmitter is turned
on and off. In this case, the amplitude of the pulses remains constant and the
frequency of the carrier is made to vary from pulse to pulse by the modulator.
This technique provides the same advantages as PAM under the same
conditions. PAM and PFM techniques can be combined to achieve diplexing.
c. Pulse Width Modulation (PWM). In this method, the transmitter produces

carrier pulses of constant amplitude and frequency but of varying duration. The
duration or width of the pulses is varied in accordance with the amplitude of the
modulating signal while the frequency of the pulse variations is made equal to
the modulating frequency. This technique is readily adaptable to multiplexing in
telephony.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-9
d. Pulse Time Modulation (PTM). Contrary to previous pulse modulation variants

where at least one characteristic of the pulse is altered in accordance with the
audio modulating signal, in this technique, a series of pulses are transmitted,
which are of constant amplitude, duration and frequency but with variable timing.
The time interval between successive pulses is made to vary in accordance with
the instantaneous amplitude of the modulating signal. The frequency of the
pulses is governed by the frequency of the modulating voltage. This technique
has the following advantages: the signals are very simple; noise can be
considerably reduced to achieve higher signal-to-noise ratio than AM or FM
systems; the total bandwidth requirement of a PTM system is independent of the
number of channels used. This technique is widely used in multi-channel radio
and cable telephone communications, ultra high frequency (UHF) broadcasting
and TV sound channels.
e. Pulse Code Modulation (PCM). In this form of modulation the amplitude of the
modulating signal is sampled at regular intervals and transmitted as a binary
code group of pulses. The size of the group of pulses increases with the
requirement for higher fidelity with an attendant increase in bandwith. Digital
techniques are advantageous in that much more intelligence can be transmitted
at a faster rate compared to the other forms of modulation. Also, the encryption
of voice signals is much simpler to accomplish when the intelligence is
converted into digital form from its initial analogue form. These systems require
a wide bandwidth for more efficient operation and are, therefore, suitable for
high capacity trunk circuits.
f. Delta Modulation (DM). This modulation uses the same technique as PCM;
however, instead of the absolute signal amplitude being transmitted, at each
sample, only the changes in signal amplitude from sampling instant to sampling
instant are transmitted.
7. Spread Spectrum Techniques. Spread spectrum is a generic term applied to a signal

whose bandwidth is much larger than that necessary to pass the information. These techniques,
through the properties of coded modulation, can provide systems which produce low
interference to other systems, have high interference rejection capability and provide multiple
access capability. Although their efficiency is lower than that of frequency division or time
division systems, these systems are of special interest in military communication systems
because of their resistance to enemy jamming and low probability of intercept. There are three
main methods employed in these systems and a particular system may employ one or more
depending on the design of the system:
a. Direct Sequence Modulation. The digital information signal is combined with a

pseudo-random binary sequence signal which has a much higher bit rate (1000
times or more) and the resultant signal is used to change either the frequency or
the phase of the carrier. The bandwidth of the transmitted signal is, therefore,
broadened far beyond what is needed to accommodate the information and has
all the appearances of noise. At the receiver, the identical pseudo-random
binary sequence signal must be used to demodulate the carrier in order to
recover the original information.
3-10 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
b. Frequency Hopping. The digital information is used to modulate the radio

frequency carrier in the normal manner, however, a pseudo-random code is
then used to pulse the carrier frequency over a large bandwidth. A typical
system might employ over 250 different frequencies with the carrier changing
frequencies at a rate of 100 times per second. The receiver must employ the
identical pseudorandom code in order to tune to the correct frequency at the
correct instant and recover the signal.
c. Linear Frequency Modulation (also known as "Chirp"). A long transmitted

pulse is suitably modulated and its frequency is linearly increased from F1 to F2
during the pulse duration. Only a matched receiver can demodulate the signal.
This technique is often applied to radar systems but is not generally used for
communications. It is, however, used in the HF band to scan the ionosphere to
determine the optimum traffic frequency (called a "Chirp Sounder").
309. MULTIPLEXING
1. Multiplexing is the transmission of two or more signals using a common carrier wave. It
enables a number of voice or other channels to be sent over a single circuit. Multiplexing
systems are generally described in terms of the numbers and types of channels which they are
designed to accept. Common methods of multiplexing are:
a. Frequency Division Multiplex (FDM). Prior to transmission, each

communication channel is translated onto a unique band of frequencies within
the bandwidth of the transmitted radio frequency carrier. This method is
economical in bandwidth because it maximizes the number of channels which
can be obtained from a radio link; it is the least complex and the most
economical in frequency requirements. It is commonly used with FM or PCM.
The most serious disadvantage of FDM is that the noise and signal distortion
introduced in each path link of a radio system, e.g., radio relay, limits the
number of links that can be employed in a single system.
b. Time Division Multiplex (TDM). Each communications channel is allotted a

discrete time slot within the basic sampling frame and each communication is
then transmitted in turn, in the allotted time slot. It is normally used with PCM. A
TDM/PCM system occupies a far greater bandwidth than an FDM system of the
same channel capacity but it can give better results over inferior transmission
paths. It also has some advantage when two or three radio relay links are
connected in series, because the pulses can be reconstituted (i.e., cleaned up)
after each link. The digital form of the signal is convenient for high speed
automatic switching. TDM multiplexers use complex circuitry but are simple to
set up and operate.
2. Sub-multiplexing is the process of combining a telegraph or data circuit with a speech

circuit or utilizing a speech width channel to carry a number of telegraph or data circuits. Most
sub-multiplexing equipment use FDM techniques and can be transmitted over voice channel by
either FDM or TDM systems. Some TDM equipment combines both the multiplexing and
submultiplexing functions at one terminal.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-11
3. Multiplex and sub-multiplex transmissions employing voice frequency or radio frequency

carrier may be operated over line. This is termed carrier telephony or telegraphy depending on
the modes being operated. Multiplexed radio and line systems are referred to collectively as
multi-channel systems.
SECTION 3
RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
310. CHARACTERISTICS OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
1. Radio communication or wireless communication is the transmission of information

through space by means of electromagnetic waves. No physical transmission path is required.
This fact gives radio its specific advantages:
a. Flexibility. Communication can be established quickly and rearranged readily.

Radio can carry all modes of communications as well and is capable of
integration with other systems.
b. Mobility. Terminals are not tied to a fixed transmission path and are free to
move.
c. Economy. No physical transmission path has to be constructed. Line-of-sight,
such as area trunk and cellular systems, and BLOS, such as commercial and
military satellite communications, require alignment between transmit and
receive terminals.
d. Adaptability. Communications can be provided across ground that is
inaccessible and impassable.
e. Security. While the terminals need physical protection online encryption of the
transmitted signals provides the appropriate level of information protection.
2. The major disadvantages of radio are:
a. Vulnerability. Radio communication can be exploited and disrupted by enemy

Electronic Attack (EA)17, such as jamming and/or deception to deny use of
electronic emitters. To obviate this liability, special communication security
(COMSEC) measures and Electronic Protection (EP)18 such as emission control
(EMCON) and facility siting must be adopted.
b. Interference. Radio communications are subject to natural and man-made
interference. Natural interference can restrict the usefulness of radio in certain
physical environments and in certain parts of the frequency spectrum; man-
made interference can originate from other electrical or electronic equipment
operated in the vicinity or on the same and adjacent frequencies. With the large
number of electronic, electrical, surveillance, data, radar and radio systems,
17
Formally known as electronic counter measures (ECM).
18
Formally known as electronic protective measures (EPM).
3-12 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
problems of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) are becoming ever more

complex within the battlespace.
c. Range. The power rating of radios, the nature of the ground, the propagation
conditions, the propagation characteristics of the frequency band in use, all tend
to limit the range over which reliable radio communication can be provided.
d. Capacity. The traffic capacity of any link is limited by the type, power and
bandwidth of the radio set.
311. FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
1. All users of electromagnetic radiations must share one single frequency spectrum. This
sharing is regulated world wide by a UN agency, the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU). By international agreement the spectrum is divided into bands, sub-bands and
frequencies designated for specific purposes. From these bands, allocations and assignments
are made by national authorities who are responsible for ensuring their proper use. Frequencies
which are likely to be received beyond national boundaries must be co-ordinated internationally.
2. Within these bands, allocations are made for civilian and military purposes. In addition to
frequencies for radio communications, allocation must be made for radio location, navigation
systems, surveillance equipments, fire control systems and various industrial processes.
3. Despite improvements in equipment design, the ever increasing civilian and military
demand for frequencies makes the task of allocating frequencies ever more complex. The
difficulty is increased by the fact that certain frequency bands are more effective than others for
certain purposes. In war, the enemy will also be sharing the same frequency spectrum for his
own purposes.
4. The frequency spectrum is divided into the following bands:
a. Very Low Frequency (VLF) 3-30 kHz. This band offers few frequencies and
this all but precludes its use for general communications. Parts of the band are
used for long range radio navigation signalling (Omega), for frequency
calibration and for sub-marine communications. The ground wave component
has great penetration power and can travel in excess of 1600km. The sky wave
component is perfectly reflected by the ionosphere and can encircle the globe.
Power requirements are high.
b. Low Frequencies (LF) 30-300 kHz. As for VLF, the ground wave component
can reach relatively great distances. The sky wave component is subject to
increasing attenuation as the frequency increases but it is not affected by
ionospheric disturbances like HF and is a better transmission medium in the
auroral zone. Ranges from 800 to 12000 km are possible.
c. Medium Frequency (MF) 300-3000 kHz. This band is used intensively by
civilian broadcast stations. The range of ground wave can vary from 80 km at
3000 kHz to 300 km at the lower limit of the band. Sky wave communication is
unreliable during the day but at night distances of up to 5000 km can be
achieved. Attenuation reaches its maximum at about 1800 kHz and varies with
the season. At all times, fading is severe.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-13
d. High Frequency (HF) 3-30 MHz. The range of the ground wave decreases to
little more than line of sight distances. Long range sky wave communication is
possible but is subject to ionospheric conditions: range will vary with frequency,
day and night and solar activities. This band is used by the military for
long-range communication and back up tactical radio nets. Civilian use includes
radio amateurs, short wave broadcast, citizen's band and various industrial,
scientific and medical users.
e. Very High Frequency (VHF) 30-300 MHz. There is no usable surface wave and
sky wave reflection in the lower part of the VHF band. This can only be achieved
through sophisticated scatter techniques over ranges of 600 to 2000 km.
Transmission in this band is done mostly through a direct wave which travels
above the surface of the earth. The range is generally limited to line of sight, and
the best results are obtained when antennas are elevated above the ground.
Longer range can be obtained through a technique called automatic radio
rebroadcast (RRB) in which a received signal is automatically retransmitted on a
different frequency by the second radio of a rebroadcast station specially sited
for this purpose. This band is used by the military for CNR and by civilians for
FM radio and TV broadcast and air traffic control. Radio communication in this
band is free from noise and interference, provides good speech quality and is
reliable 24 hours a day over suitable terrain.
f. Ultra High Frequency (UHF) 300-3000 MHz. Except for the lower part of this
band where troposcatter reflection can achieve moderate ranges,
communication is near line of sight. Lack of interference and fading generally
affords high quality reception. Compact and directive antennas can concentrate
the radiated energy in a narrow beam resulting in much greater transmission
efficiency. The military use this band for air to ground communication, for radio
relay transmission and for some satellite links. Civilian use includes TV
broadcast, some industrial usage and satellite navigation.
g. Super High Frequency (SHF) (3-30 GHz). This band offers many times the
information carrying capacity of all lower bands put together. Throughout this
band, wide band communications are obtained over line of sight paths with very
low power. The reduced size of the antenna permits this form of transmission
from aircraft or satellite, enabling global ranges to be achieved by
retransmission. Transmissions in this band are subject to atmospheric
absorption and will be affected by weather; i.e., rain, fog, etc.
h. Extremely High Frequency (EHF) (30300 GHz). This band is also known as
millimetric waves. Tropospheric, ionospheric and atmospheric absorption is
severe in this band and circuits must be carefully engineered. Once established,
these circuits offer high reliability and very wide bandwidths capable of large
volumes of traffic. Ground range is normally limited to a few kilometres making
enemy interception or jamming difficult, except when satellite or aircraft
platforms are used. This band permits use of small dish antennas. The full
capability of this band is still not fully exploited. In addition to satellite
communication, the army could use this band for intra-HQ communications.
i. Decimillimetric waves (300-3000 GHz). Imagery, target acquisition,
surveillance devices and thermal sensors operate in this band. Atmospheric
absorption is most severe in a humid or moist environment and ranges are
reduced in fog and rain.
3-14 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
j. Optical (400-800 tHz). Fibre optics transmission is done in this band.

Attenuation is proportional to the degree of impurities found in the core of the
transmission cable. Interference and interception is easily detectable. Laser
devices can also be used to transmit light signals. Developments in laser
technology may result in range finding, telecommunication and weapon control
equipments for the military.
312. RADIO PROPAGATION
1. Propagation Paths. There are two principal paths by which radio waves can travel from
a transmitter to a receiver: by ground wave or sky wave. All radio transmissions use one or both
of these paths or various associated phenomena.
2. Ground Wave. Ground waves travel more or less directly from the transmitter to the
receiver (see Figure 3-1). This form of propagation is affected by the electrical characteristics of
the ground and by the amount of diffraction, or bending, of the wave around the curvature of the
earth. The components of the ground wave are:
a. Direct Wave. This component travels directly through space from the
transmitting to the receiving antenna. On the ground, range is limited to the
line-of-sight distance plus the small distance added by atmospheric refraction
diffraction of the wave around the curvature of the earth. The range can be
extended by raising the height of the antenna above the ground. Range is also
affected by antenna gain, the power of the transmitter and the sensitivity of the
receiver.
b. Ground Reflected Wave. The ground reflected wave is the portion of the direct
wave that reaches the receiving antenna after being reflected from the surface
of the earth. When both the transmitting and receiving antennas are on, or close
to the ground, the direct and ground reflected components tend to cancel each
other;
c. Surface Wave. This component travels in contact with the ground and follows
the curvature of the earth. The surface wave predominates at frequencies below
30 MHz and relatively long ranges can be expected over areas of high
conductivity. Wave dissipation or attenuation is greatest over jungle and desert
and is least over sea water. Although surface waves tend to follow the contours
of the ground, obstacles such as hills gradually attenuate these waves by
reflection, scattering, and absorption.
d. Sky Wave. The second path over which radio waves can travel is through
ionospheric reflection (see Figure 3-2). These waves travel up to the ionosphere
and are reflected back to earth. Long distance transmission is achieved
principally by the use of sky waves at HF. For very long ranges, (beyond 4000
km) transmission may take place by successive skips from the ionosphere and
the earth's surface (multi-hop transmission). There are, however, some special
considerations in achieving a sky wave path. Above 30 MHz, sky wave working
is generally impossible. Furthermore, for any given path there are critical limits
to the frequency and to the angle at which the wave must strike the reflecting
medium (angle of incidence). The optimum frequency depends on the
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-15
geographic location of, and the distance between the transmitter and receiver,
the time of day, and the season of the year. The path and angle of propagation
determine to a large extent the type of antenna that must be employed.
Depending on its frequency and the angle of attack, the reflected sky wave may
return to a point lying within the range of the ground wave, or beyond it. In the
former case, severe distortion of the received signal may result from the
alternating reinforcement and cancellation of the two incoming waves. In the
latter case, no signal will be received between the limit of ground wave reception
and the point at which the sky wave returns to earth. The area in which no signal
is received is termed the skip zone. Despite these limitations and except for
periods of severe ionospheric disturbances, sky wave working can be a useful
method of communication.
Figure 3-1: Ground Wave Transmission Paths
3. Forward Scatter Reflection. In addition to the relatively efficient reflection that can be
achieved by a sky wave at HF, a much weaker reflection and scattering phenomenon occurs at
considerably higher frequencies. Unlike sky wave reflection, which takes place only in the
ionosphere, scattering takes place throughout a large volume of the atmosphere and at some
depth causing the propagated wave to diffuse widely. The signal arriving at the receiver,
therefore, is the sum of a large number of very small signals. As a result the signal strength is
constantly varying with rapid short term seasonal and daily variations. Communications
employing this path require high power transmitters, complex receivers, and high gain
directional antennas. There are two forms of scatter transmission in wide use:
a. Ionospheric Scatter. Ionospheric scatter operates in the frequency range of 25

to 60 MHz. It is a relatively narrow band method used to provide
communications over ranges extending to 2500 km. The range, coupled with the
size of the transmitters and antennas used in this mode of transmission,
preclude mobility; it is therefore reserved for strategic links or for links between
the rear of the combat zone and the communication zone.
3-16 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
b. Tropospheric Scatter. This mode of transmission operates over frequencies

from 300 MHz to 8 GHz and can give ranges of several hundred km. Like
ionospheric scatter, it requires high power transmitters and high gain antennas,
but the shorter range stations can be made mobile. Used as a mixed voice and
data wideband system, it can be used to extend the area trunk system in the
rear combat zone, for example from corps to army group HQ. Siting of the
antennas is critical and a danger zone exists around this high power radiator.
Figure 3-2: Transmission Paths
313. RADIO COMMUNICATION BY SKY WAVE
1. Links. A link is a communication path of specified character between two points. Link
communication for passage of voice or data signals can be achieved through sky wave High
Frequency (HF) radio, scatter radio or satellite. Only HF sky wave radio will be dealt with in the
following paragraphs.
2. Characteristics. Sky wave radio generally shows the characteristics of all radio
communication however some specific aspects deserve mention:
a. Capacity. A link is operated in the duplex mode whenever possible so as to

provide enhanced traffic carrying capability as compared with net radio;
however, this may not always be possible. In the HF band, capacity is mainly
improved by increasing transmission speed.
b. Automatic Link Establishment. Systems with Automatic Link Establishment

(ALE) can react adaptively to changes in link conditions, e.g. by changing the
traffic frequency, the transmitter power and/or the modulation format.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-17
Manufacturers develop their own specific systems, therefore, the capability to

interoperate with systems from other manufacturers may be limited.
c. Mobility. The need for a number of elaborate and large antennas seriously
limits the mobility of this type of station. Once installed, the station cannot be
moved without an interruption in its communications.
d. Signal Security. Because of the often-unpredictable range of sky wave

transmission, considerable attention must be paid to security. High-grade
encryption is required to adequately protect the information passing over such
links.
e. Vulnerability. Sky wave radio is vulnerable in the following ways:
(1) The extensive antenna parks generally required for this type of operation
are readily distinguishable by aerial or ground reconnaissance and
present inviting targets.
(2) The requirement to operate these links within narrow and predictable
frequency limits renders these systems very vulnerable to detection, and
thus to jamming or direction finding.
(3) Electromagnetic Pulse. Electromagnetic pulses (EMP) or post nuclear
atmospheric disturbances would black out these links for some time.
3. Application. Sky wave radio is normally used for the following BLOS applications:
a. Rear links from the area of operations (AO) to national HQ.
b. Operational and administrative links within the AO and at the joint and coalition
level.
c. Communications to distant formation logistics installations such as a Sea Port of

Debarkation (SPOD) and an Air Port of Debarkation (APOD).
d. Communications to long-range patrols and to forces engaged in special

operations.
4. Choice of Frequency Bands:
a. HF is the normal method of providing these communications although low

frequency (LF) or medium frequency (MF) may be employed. The frequency
selected depends on the availability of suitable radios and frequencies, the
geographic location, path length and ionospheric conditions.
b. Frequencies chosen for this form of transmission are based on estimates of path
performance provided by prediction tables or computer calculations. Although
generally dependable, these estimates are no guarantee of continuous and
reliable operation. Several frequencies are normally required for long term day
and night or all season operation. The application of ALE capable radios
enhances link stability.
3-18 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
c. In Arctic latitudes, LF is a preferred frequency band.
5. Operating Modes. Operating modes may include voice and data. Facilities afforded
the user are mostly a function of the bandwidth available, the speed of transmission possible
and the mobility required.
6. Facilities:
a. Remote Installation. Terminal equipment may be located away from the radio
station in which case mobility is further restricted. Costs in operating personnel
are higher as both the radio and the remote sites must be manned.
b. On-Line Encryption. Normally data and voice signals will be automatically

encrypted and decrypted by use of on-line cryptographic equipment to provide
security of information.
314. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BY COMBAT NET RADIO SYSTEMS
1. General. Combat Net Radio (CNR) systems are categorized into three distinct
groupings based on inherent characteristics acquired with their respective use of the frequency
spectrum, engineering design and technical capabilities. The three groupings are Combat Net
Radio Primary (CNR(P)), Combat Net Radio High Frequency (CNR(HF)) and Combat Net Radio
Air-Ground-Air (CNR(A/G/A)). Characteristics specific to the current CNR radio family are
detailed under their separate headings in Volume 2 while common characteristics to these
groups are:
a. Radio Nets. A combat radio net consists of a net control station and a number
of sub-stations. Radio Rebroadcast (RRB) stations may also be employed to
extend the operating range. The net control station, normally found at the senior
HQ, controls the traffic (voice or data) and enforces circuit discipline. Sub-
stations on the net are provided by a subordinate unit HQ or attached to an
adjacent HQ see (Figure 3-3). Key personnel when moving away from the HQ
may be required to join this net during the period of absence.
b. Radio Detachments. A radio detachment or station consists of the CNR, the

crew and the ancillary equipment including vehicles, tents, generators, etc.
Stations may be manpack, vehicle-borne or mounted in aircraft. Depending on
their tasks, detachments may be equipped with one or more radios to operate
on one or more nets; some key detachments may have radios to operate on
guard nets on alternate frequency bands.
c. All transmissions on CNR are simplex; that is, no more than one station can
transmit at any one time. In principle, all stations hear all messages passed on
the radio net, thus making the network “all informed”.
d. The great flexibility of CNR systems and their instantaneous responsiveness is

counterbalanced by their limited traffic bearing capacity. There is also a
practical limit to the number of stations on a net.
e. CNR transmitted information can be either in a secure (encrypted) mode or a

non-secure (non-encrypted) mode. In the secure mode, only the information is
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-19
protected; while use of the frequency spectrum (even in the frequency hopping
mode) is still evident to the enemy, the information being passed is not. Secure
is the normal operating mode for CNR.
f. CNR nets, although their information is protected by encryption, are vulnerable

to enemy electronic warfare (EW) operations as follows:
(1) Enemy Electronic Support.19 Enemy Electronic Support (ES) can often
determine, by traffic volume and electromagnetic signature, the types of
formations/units within the battlespace and may even determine by
analysis of the various CNR nets friendly intentions or possible
operations. The presence of a cluster of stations at a particular location,
located through the use of direction finding equipment, that are operating
on several different nets can facilitate the identification of that unit just by
analyzing the different modes and bands that the CNR are operating in
and the number of distinct nets that are operating.
(2) Enemy Electronic Attack. Enemy Electronic Attack (EA) refers to

jamming and deception in the UHF, VHF and HF bands. CNR net
discipline must be strict with electronic protection (EP) drills well
rehearsed and communication security procedures continually enforced.
2. Common Application. Because of their characteristics, CNR nets are particularly

suited to the operations of tactical groups at brigade level and below where instantaneous
acknowledgement and reaction is essential. The distribution of CNR equipment facilitates
regrouping as tactics require and passage of information between nets is made possible by the
provision of multiple radio stations at a specific HQ.
3. Frequency Coverage. The most suitable frequencies for CNR systems are in the HF,
VHF and UHF radio frequency bands. Current radios used by the Army operate in the bands
from 1.5 MHz to 400 MHz. Certain CNR radios are designed to operate in fixed frequency
mode as well as various forms of spread spectrum transmission such as frequency hopping.
Net radios with wide frequency coverage tend to be expensive; however, technological
advances in radio design and production are reducing costs. Individual radios that cover only
one or part of a radio frequency band are normally used; therefore, a radio detachment often
requires two or more radio sets, usually an HF and VHF combination, with a consequent weight
and size penalty. Radios with much broader frequency coverage and the capability for more
than one form of modulation are justifiable however for special roles (e.g. long range patrols).
19
Formally known as electron support measures (ESM).
3-20 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
COMBAT NET RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
UHF
UHF
JTF HQ
VHF
VHF
RRB VHF RRB

VHF
BG HQ
Coy FOB #2
VHF HF HF
ISTAR VHF
Long Sensor
Coy FOB #1 Range
Patrol Patrol
Figure 3-3: CNR Linking Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQs, Forward Operating Bases
(FOB) and Specialized Assets
4. Operating Modes. CNR can be used to provide voice and data as modes, but secure
voice is the priority mode of operation.
5. Facilities:
a. Remote Operations. Ancillary equipment can allow operators or users to be

located a distance from the radio itself. The distance is limited by the design
specifications of the radio. An operator may still be needed at the radio to tune
or adjust the set.
b. Antenna. CNR antennas are distinct to the radio type as well as related
engineering design specifications such as using cosite antenna designs on
vehicles where more than one transceiver is fed to the same antenna. The
employment of tactical radios also has a bearing on the type and size of
antenna used, for example, manpack or vehicle borne. VHF radios typically use
omni-directional antennae in a whip or elevated ground configuration with direct
wave propagation as the communication path. HF radios tend to use omni-
directional, long wire or specific tuned-to-frequency constructed antennae. HF
radios utilize both direct and skywave to achieve desired transmission path
results. Distance, terrain, power output, mobility and electronic protective
measures (EPM) all have a bearing on antenna performance and use. Normally
the antenna used in CNR cannot be sited at any great distance from the
transceiver.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-21
c. Rebroadcast. Radio Rebroadcast (RRB) is a method of extending the range of

a radio net by using an intermediate station. Rebroadcast may be automatic, in
which case two transceivers are employed back-to-back, each operating on a
different frequency (retransmission) or hop set in the frequency hopping mode;
or it may be manual during voice operations, in which case retransmission is
performed by an operator on the common or net frequency (relay) or hop set.
d. On-line Encryption. Signals will be automatically encrypted and decrypted by

the use of on-line security equipment. On-line cryptographic equipment, either
integral to the radio itself or a separately installed peripheral to the radio, will
provide security of information. The keying of cryptographic material must be
done locally or remotely according to formation communications electronics
standing instructions (CESI).
315. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BY SATELLITE
1. Satellite transmission provides radio communications between two or more terrestrial

points via a repeater located on a spacecraft. It is primarily used for BLOS rear link or strategic
gateway services communications or where relatively short ranges cannot be accomplished
because of terrain. The use of tactical level satellite communications (TacSAT) between mobile
forces that are beyond the range of current CNR systems, are becoming more prevalent. The
use of TacSAT is also a result of the ever-increasing complex environment encountered on
current operations see (Figure 3-4).
2. A spacecraft based repeater in geosynchronous orbit (36,000 km above the earth) will
appear to be stationary with respect to the terrestrial terminals and can be accessed from
anywhere in an area of one-third of the earth's surface depending on the “footprint” of the
satellite. The terminal can be fixed or mobile and the transmission path extends from the
earth's surface to the spacecraft and back. The quality of transmission to the ground terminals is
not affected by intervening terrain or distance within the earth bound footprint.
3. Communication between satellites and terrestrial terminals20 is accomplished through the

transmission signal between earth based station and the satellite known as an uplink and the
transmission signal between the satellite and earth based station known as downlink. The downlink
signal is characterized by the satellite receiving the uplinked signal, amplifying it, shifting it to a lower
frequency and re-transmitting it to an earth(s) stations. As an example C-band uplink frequencies are
from 5.925 to 6.425 GHz with downlink frequencies from 3.7 to 4.2 GHz while Ku signals are
uplinked at the 14.0 to 14.5 GHz range and downlinked in the 10.7 to 12.2 GHz for the Fixed Satellite
Service in North America. The frequency and power output of a satellite signal determine the size of
the earth station antenna (dish) in relationship to wavelength (frequency). The shorter the
wavelength (higher the frequency) the smaller the dish. C-band requires a dish size minimum of 1.8
m to 3.7 m using a lower frequency than Ka and Ku bands requiring 0.66 m to 1.2 m respectively
(assuming the bandwidth is constant).
20
http://broadband.gc.ca/pub/technologies/tech_factsheets/satellite/index.html
3-22 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
JTF HQ
BG HQ
Coy HQ
Pl
Pl
Coy HQ Coy HQ
Pl Pl
Figure 3-4: Satellite Communications Linking Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQs
4. Satellite Types:
a. Equatorial. Geosynchronous satellites are parked above the equator at an

orbital height of 35,700 km which causes rotation once every 24 hours. Most
civilian satellite communications use geosynchronous satellites which have long
delays and fixed antennas. Three equatorial spaced satellites can provide near-
global coverage. With equatorial satellites there is little atmospheric drag,
potentially longer satellite lifetime and minimal station-keeping. However, there
is no polar visibility and there is a large propagation delay. First generation
satellites use C-band (406 GHz) window and second generation satellites are
being deployed as Ku-band (11-14 GHz) or dual band. Equatorial satellites
provide high quality video and high speed data. Both military and commercial
communication satellites in geosynchronous orbit, are used to provide BLOS
communications links for deployed forces to access gateways linking strategic
National, Joint and Combined operation centres.
b. Non-equatorial. Low earth orbit (LEO) satellites’ orbits are non-equatorial with
orbital heights less than 1500 km above the earth. This type of satellite has
shorter delay and requires the ground terminal to switch between satellites as
they pass overhead. LEO limits visibility of satellites in terms of earth coverage
area and times of coverage. With LEO Doppler effects are present
continuously but vary with orbit, satellite orbital position, and location of earth
station. LEO vehicles have higher atmospheric drag, orbits are not as secure
as high-orbit satellites and satellites require additional fuel for orbit maintenance.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-23
5. Satellite communication systems can provide high quality speech, data and television
channels. Tactical communications systems utilize satellites to obtain wide bandwidth
transmission at extended ranges over terrain not otherwise accessible.
6. Characteristics:
a. Flexibility. Satellite communication is a flexible method for providing all types

of communication requirements found within the battlespace. Flexibility is
limited only by the number of terminal equipment and satellite stations available.
b. Mobility. Forward area satellite terminals are highly mobile and can be either
man portable or installed in tactical vehicles.
c. Economy. Satellite communication terminals are just as economical to operate

as other communication terminals of equivalent capability. However, the space
segment is very expensive and very few nations can afford to have satellite
communication systems for military purposes despite their undoubted efficiency;
d. Vulnerability. Satellite communication is vulnerable because of the following:
(1) There is a danger of losing satellites and thus of suffering irreparable

damage to operational communications systems.
(2) Rain is the main factor that negatively effects satellite communications
while clouds, snow and fog can contribute to poor propagation.
Atmospheric particles can affect communications particularly higher
satellite frequency bands such as Ku and Ka.
(3) It is susceptible to damages caused by EMP and direct attack by anti-

satellite weapons.
(4) It is susceptible to intercept and jamming, unless hardened to military

specifications.
(5) Satellite control is capable of being seized by enemy forces unless

specific countermeasures are used.
7. Signal Security. Traffic over all channels can best be encrypted by using on-line bulk
encryption devices. These may be located at ground terminal stations and at switching facilities
as required to ensure security of transmission between subscribers. The satellite simply acts as
a repeater and there is no requirement to decrypt and re-encrypt the signal at the satellite. All
classified traffic passed by this form of transmission is protected by cryptographic equipment.
Unclassified services such as Internet access can use clear channels.
8. Application:
a. Low capacity, man portable terminals, capable of speech as well as data

transmission in a secure mode, is available. These enhance communications
within the battlespace especially in the forward area and over difficult terrain.
3-24 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
b. Medium capacity tactical satellite terminals can be advantageously used in all

types of conditions. High ground is not a requirement if direct line of sight paths
to the satellite can be established and maintained. Terminal stations are easily
transportable by rotary wing and vertical take-off and landing aircraft.
c. Satellite communication systems can form part of the area trunk system.
Interconnecting links are required to permit integration of systems and/or to
provide communications to the supported HQ or local signal facility.
9. The present and ever expanding use of intelligence gathering systems in the form of
battlespace sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as an example, finds satellite
communications systems ideal as an intelligence gathering and forwarding platform.
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) is a prime user of
this system.
316. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH AREA TRUNK SYSTEMS
1. Area Trunk Systems. Trunk systems are often referred to as Area Systems. The Area
Trunk System is a microwave system which provides trunk telephone and data communications
delivered by SHF and UHF line-of-sight (LOS) Radio Relay (LOS-RR) as well as fibre optic
cabling and equipment. The Trunk System could also provide access to strategic
communications, allied or commercial networks. The system is comprised of high capacity
long-range communications (static and limited mobility). LOS radio can establish links up to 40
km and can be used to link subordinate HQs of a formation or with a coalition HQ
(see Figure 3-5). A Radio relay describes a form of wide band radio transmission employing
LOS paths for point-to-point or link communications:
a. Radio relay consists of two terminal stations communicating with each other
directly or through one or more repeater stations. Repeater stations possess
duplicate radio equipment to enable tandem operation. Combinations of these
basic installations allow a variety of system and circuit interconnections.
b. Depending on the type of equipment, radio relay systems can provide a set
number of high quality speech and data channels, or a lesser number of video
channels.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-25
Director Land Command & Information
LINE OF SITE (LOS) COMMUNICATIONS
Allied
HQ
JTF HQ
Coy FOB #3
BG HQ
Coy FOB #2
Coy FOB #1 FOB – Forward

Operating Base
Directeur Commandement et Information Terrestre
Figure 3-5: LOS Linking a Formation Level HQ with Subordinate HQ and FOBs
2. Characteristics:
a. Flexibility. Radio relay is a much more flexible method of providing multi-

channel communications than tactical line and cable or scatter systems.
However, its flexibility depends greatly on the number of stations that are
available to step up and relay. When available, radio relay can be readily
relocated, extended and rearranged to conform to changing tactical
requirements.
b. Mobility. Radio relay cannot currently be operated on the move. It is, however,
readily transportable by vehicle. Helicopters may be used to move stations over
impassable terrain or to otherwise inaccessible sites. Once on site, it can be set
up and torn down relatively quickly.
c. Economy. For average path ranges, radio relay is much more economical in
resource use than the other methods of providing multi-channel
communications. However, its greatest advantage is that, provided suitable
sites are available, additional links can be interconnected with the deployment of
few additional stations. It is thus possible to provide a communication grid
economically.
d. Reliability. Radio relay is virtually immune to atmospheric interruption and

enjoys a drastically reduced susceptibility to interference from other emitters.
The relative ease with which a grid can be established greatly enhances the
opportunities for alternate routing. Equipment is easy to operate and maintain,
3-26 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
circuit paths can be predicted with a high degree of assurance and, once
engineered, circuits are extremely stable. However, this method is quite
susceptible to weather conditions. For example, the range might be degraded
by as much as 50% in a severe rain or snowstorm.
e. Vulnerability:
(1) It is necessary to site stations within LOS either on high ground or in

isolated positions; radio relay stations are thus relatively easy to target.
This can be reduced by proper tactical siting of detachments, to include
the remote placement of antennas, and careful shielding of paths from
enemy observation.
(2) Radio relay is less susceptible to interception, direction finding and

jamming than other forms of radio because it employs highly directional
antennas in a ground-to-ground mode. There is, however, a risk that the
detection of a number of signals from a single radio relay node in a
narrow arc will disclose not only the communications grid but also
possibly the formation axis during high intensity conflict. In order to
minimize the risk of detection and interception, the radio relay shot should
be as parallel as possible to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
During low to mid intensity conflict within a non-contiguous battlespace,
protection of these isolated communications stations is a consideration
and planning must include for protection of these assets from any enemy
ground threat.
(3) It is susceptible to EMP.
3. Signal Security. Although the low power of equipment and the effects of screening by
terrain greatly reduce the range of useful intercept, interception is still possible and traffic must
be protected. Traffic over all channels is encrypted with the use of on-line, bulk encryption
devices.
4. Application:
a. Low capacity radio relay sets generally have the associated multiplexing
equipment as an integral feature of the installation. In higher capacity stations,
installation of the radio relay set and the associated multiplexing equipment may
be separate depending on size and capacity.
b. Because of its characteristics, radio relay is the main transmission system for
tactical area trunk CS (voice and data) used at Brigade Group to Battalion/Battle
Group HQ level in the area of operations (AO).
5. Frequency Band:
a. The wide bandwidth employed in radio relay necessitates operation in the VHF,
UHF, or SHF bands:
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-27
(1) At VHF, it is still possible to work beyond the optical path and with
relatively narrow margins of path clearance. In this frequency range, the
methods of predicting usable circuits are well established and
comparatively simple. Because of the less demanding characteristics,
VHF is much more suited to tactical use, particularly for maintaining
communications with mobile forces within the AO. Unfortunately, the
congestion in this band does not always afford the large number of
frequencies needed for a wide area radio relay system.
(2) At the upper VHF (225 to 300 MHz), and within the UHF and SHF bands,
the path is virtually true LOS and transmission quality is excellent in clear
weather and with an unobstructed path (i.e. clear of deciduous and
coniferous trees) provided Fresnel zone clearance is accounted for.
Severe degradation may be experienced in heavy precipitation.
b. A radio relay system requires a large number of frequencies over a broad band.
Circuits are normally duplex and adjacent links must be established with broad
frequency separation. At junctions, links of adjoining systems require a similar
separation of frequencies. Because of the zigzag course usually followed by
radio relay links, dissimilar frequency lists may be needed for nearby parallel
links if interference is to be avoided. It is normal to use computer software for
frequency assignment, path loss calculation and siting of stations.
SECTION 4
LINE COMMUNICATIONS
317. GENERAL
1. Line communications is a form of communication where there is a physical connection

between the transmitter and the receiver. The most usual means of connection is the metallic
wire, the coaxial cable or the wave-guide. Metallic wires may be single or grouped in pairs or
pair multiples to form multi-core cable. Coaxial cables are especially designed for transmission
at radio frequencies. Line can be used for multiple voice and/or data channels.
2. Fibre optic cables or fibre optic cable assemblies (FOCA) are also used for line
communications. In this case, the connection is a clear plastic or glass fibre and the information
is passed by modulating a light beam, as it is transmitted over the fibre. The major advantages
of fibre optic cables over metallic cables are:
a. the cable is lighter and smaller;
b. it is immune to electromagnetic interference including EMP;
c. it is very difficult to tap into by the enemy and unauthorized intrusions can easily
be detected by monitoring the signal strength; and
d. it has a bandwidth up to 1000 times greater than that of a metallic cable of the
same size. Multiple strands of fibre in the cable exponentially increase the
bandwidth available.
3-28 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
3. Fibre optic cable has developed into the pre-eminent means of tactical line
communications at HQs, primarily because of its massive bandwidth. Fibre optic cables are
used exclusively in connecting large capacity data systems to their backbone radio relay
carriers. Fibre is also used to connect a HQ node to its radio emitters up to 5 km away from the
HQ site.
4. Line systems are classified according to the degree of permanence inherent in the
installation as either field or permanent line systems. Field line systems are characterized by
ruggedness, simplicity, ease and speed of installation and removal. Permanent line systems
tend to be more complicated, must be individually planned and built and take time and heavy
equipment for construction.
5. Line communication systems can be laid over the ground, suspended on poles or
towers, buried or submerged, or structure wired into buildings.
318. CHARACTERISTICS
1. Line has the following characteristics:
a. Flexibility. Line communications are relatively inflexible in the context of

military operations. Once laid to support a specific configuration of forces, they
require a lot of work to adjust to a change in troop disposition or requirements.
The construction of line takes time, considerable manpower and considerable
amount of stores, which increase with distance. Therefore, distance, frequency
of moves and response time are critical factors to be considered before deciding
on line as a means of communications. On the other hand, it can be used
during electronic or radio silence and is not constrained by radio frequency
allocation.
b. Capacity. Line communications can provide a very high traffic capacity. They
provide a stable and high quality transmission path, which can be built up as
required. The operating range of line communications varies according to the
characteristics of the cable and terminating equipment and the method of
construction. Field cable is affected by wet weather conditions and wear and
tear (damaged insulation and excessive splicing). Range may be extended by
the use of line repeaters.
c. Economy. Line construction is expensive in time, manpower and material.
Once installed, line communications are relatively easy to maintain; they are
also operated with relatively few personnel. Unlike radio communications,
subsequent increases in capacity result in very modest increase in personnel
and equipment.
d. Vulnerability. Line communications are vulnerable to deliberate or accidental
damage throughout their length. This is an even greater risk within unprotected
areas of the AO because of enemy action, friendly troop movements and the
method used for line construction. Artillery bombardments, for example, can
badly damage field line in the impact zone. Line construction or maintenance
crews must work along exposed routes, at times without cover or concealment
and are subject to shelling, strafing and ambush. Line routes must be patrolled
and line crews must be capable of fighting in self-defence. Metallic wire and
cable lines are also subject to EMP.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-29
e. Signal Security. Line is immune to most forms of EA and signals emanating

from it can only be detected at close proximity. It is thus a valuable alternative
to radio in the preparation stages of an operation or under conditions of
electronic or radio silence. Provided line routes are regularly patrolled, its use in
friendly areas provides a relatively secure means of communication.
319. APPLICATION
1. Line has the following applications:
a. Line communications are best used where mobility is not a paramount

requirement but where high capacity and signal security are essential.
b. Field line communications will be used in periods of radio and electronic silence,
in the preparatory stages of offensive operations, as long as possible during
defensive operations and at all times within unit or formation HQ. Specific
usage will be to provide combat information exchange, voice and data, within
staff cells of an HQ, to connect an HQ to the area trunk CS, to provide remote
facilities for CNR and to provide an inter-unit line grid in the absence of radio
communication. Fibre optic cable assemblies are also used as CIS backbone
cabling connecting radio parks to HQ facilities at distances up to 5 km.
c. Line communications will gradually become the mainstay of communications as

distance from the enemy increases, as communication requirements become
more permanent, more complex and denser and as mobility of users become a
less important factor. In many cases, line communication will be integrated into
area trunk communication links to form hybrid radio and line systems where the
advantages of both techniques will be exploited fully.
320. MODES OF OPERATION
1. Line has the following mode of operations:
a. Multiplex signals may be transmitted at radio frequency over line (coaxial cable)
or at light frequencies over FOCA. A higher grade of field cable, e.g., carrier
quad or a fixed line system is required for this form of transmission. Such a line
requires repeaters and equalizers inserted at regular intervals throughout its
length. This type of line system normally forms part of an area multi-channel
trunk system.
b. Television and high-speed data circuits, which occupy a very wide band, are
transmitted over coaxial or fibre optic cable. Coaxial cable is subject to line loss
and problems inherent in amplifying this type of signal limit the length of these
lines for field applications. However, fibre optics (field grade) cable does not
have the same restrictions and is the preferred transmission medium for high-
speed data circuits with lengths up to 5 km.
3-30 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
SECTION 5
HAND CARRIAGE COMMUNICATIONS
321. GENERAL
1. Hand carriage describes a physical means of communication in which signal traffic is

manually taken between HQs, and in certain cases between originators and addressees.
2. The common methods of carriage consist of runners on foot (within HQ only) and
dispatch riders on motorcycles or wheeled vehicles (Signals dispatch service (SDS) and/or
Liaison Officers (LO). When available, aircraft, boats, trains or any other form of transport may
be used for this purpose. Formations and units provide these communications to subordinate
and lateral headquarters.
3. In addition, a courier is a person appointed in accordance with security orders to

accompany or carry CRYPTO-caveated, COMSEC and other controlled material, from or within
an AO. Within an area, couriers are detailed to travel directly between originators and
addressees. Couriers are employed when the security classification precludes it being sent
through the normal scheduled SDS.
322. CHARACTERISTICS
1. Hand carriage communications has the following characteristics:
a. Flexibility. This is a very flexible means of communication, which can be

readily adjusted in terms of timings, destination and frequency according to the
needs of the moment. It requires little specialized training other than map
reading and driving.
b. Capacity. Carriers can transport a sizable amount of information depending on

their mode of transport. This is offset, however, by their relative slowness and
the fact that each carrier must reach each addressee in turn. Speed is a
function of the mode of transport, distance, terrain, weather, routes available
and the tactical situation.
c. Economy. This method may be relatively costly in personnel but under difficult
warfare conditions, it is an effective method of passing critical
messages/information.
d. Vulnerability. Carriers are not subject to EW but are as subject to physical

destruction as other combatants at the same tactical echelon. In the forward
combat zone, there is danger of ambush by enemy infiltrated parties.
e. Signal Security. This is probably the most secure means of communication

available to commander and staff.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-31
323. APPLICATIONS
1. Hand carriage serves to complement the other means of communications. It can be

used for:
a. Transmission of message traffic that cannot be passed by electronic/electrical

means due to its security classification or its format. The latter includes lengthy
messages, bulky documents, large charts or maps.
b. Communications within sub-units or for minor elements or installations within

sub-units or for minor elements or installations within an area which lack other
means of communication.
c. Collection of traffic within a HQ or between components of a HQ.
d. Message traffic when the other means of communication are inoperative or are
reserved for higher priority traffic.
e. Transmission of data in the form of removable high capacity computer storage

peripherals such as tapes, hard drives removable memory devices or discs.
2. Common user hand carriage may be scheduled or unscheduled. When it is scheduled,

it is called SDS. It is provided when the quantity of traffic between HQ and units warrants it.
When it is unscheduled, it is called Special Dispatch Rider (SDR) service and is provided when
unforeseen requirements arise. On the high intensity battlefield, in the face of heavy enemy
electronic warfare interference, this means of communications may well be critically important in
AO.
SECTION 6
NETWORKING (MULTI-POINT COMMUNICATIONS)
324. GENERAL
1. A communication network is created any time more than two stations are connected by a
single communication system. When a communication system connects only two stations, it is
obvious that every signal transmitted by one station is intended to convey information that is
both meaningful and relevant to the destination served by the other station. This is not always
the case for a communication system that connects three or more stations. In such a system,
not every signal transmitted by a given station will necessarily be meaningful and relevant to all
other stations on the network. Moreover, many transmissions may convey information intended
exclusively for some identifiable subset of all the stations connected to the network. Telephone
calls and e-mails are examples of communications of the latter nature. On the other hand,
some communication systems are specifically intended to allow a single source to convey
information that is assumed to be meaningful and relevant to all destinations served by the
system. Television programmes and earthquake or tsunami warnings are examples of
communications of this nature. The diverse nature of communications between various sources
and destinations has led to the development of a number of different architectures and
techniques for conveying information between stations on a communication network. At the
most general level, communication networks may be divided into two architectural groups:
switched networks and broadcast networks.
3-32 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
325. SWITCHED NETWORKS
1. Many modern communication systems connect tens, hundreds or even thousands of

stations that, at any given time, must be able to send information to and/or receive information
from any other selected station or stations on the network. In other words, each station on the
network must be able to convey information exclusively to any other selected station, or possibly
group of stations, whenever the need arises. However, it is usually quite impractical for each
station on such a network to maintain a direct point-to-point communication link to every other
station on the network to convey information only when required. Switching is one solution to
this problem. In a switched communication network, the stations, also known as terminal
nodes, are interconnected through one or more intermediate nodes, called switches.
2. The intermediate nodes in a switched network are not concerned with the content of the
transmitted signal; their purpose is simply to provide a facility that will route the signal from node
to node (i.e., switch to switch) through the network until it reaches the selected destination
station(s). This requires the source station to provide the system with the address(es) for the
destination station(s). The switches then use this address to determine which series of
communication links to use to convey the signal to the selected destination station(s). The use
of switches substantially reduces the number of communication links required to interconnect all
the stations. This is especially important when new stations are added to the network; a new
station requires only the installation of a single link to the nearest switch rather than the
installation of a separate link to each existing station on the network. Many of the
electrical/electronic telecommunication systems for which Signals is responsible employ
switched networks. There are three types of switched networks: circuit-switched, message-
switched and packet-switched.
3. Circuit-switched Networks. In a circuit-switched network, the intermediate nodes are

used to establish a temporary direct physical transmission channel (i.e., a dedicated circuit)
between the communicating stations. Because an intermediate node (i.e., circuit switch)
maintains an actual physical connection between the incoming channel and the selected
outgoing channel for the duration of a communication session, signals transmitted by the source
station pass straight through the switch as if it were not there. Thus, circuit-switched networks
are able to provide real-time communication by allowing signals to propagate directly along a
continuous end-to-end physical transmission path between the communicating stations.
4. Circuit-switching is designed to provide an efficient infrastructure for real-time interactive

voice communications (i.e., telephony) between a source and one or more selected
destinations. However, circuit-switched networks can be a very inefficient way of conveying
record information such as narrative (i.e., written text) messages or computer data files. First, it
takes a considerable amount of time to set-up and tear-down the end-to-end connection
between stations, sometimes longer than it takes to transmit a short message or data file across
the resulting circuit. Second, the requirement for an end-to-end physical connection between
communicating stations can lead to under-utilisation of some communication links within the
network while other links are overloaded. This problem can be particularly difficult (and
expensive) to rectify in situations where the traffic patterns among stations change frequently.
The most common example of a circuit-switched network is the global telephone network.
5. Message-switched Networks. Message switching is designed specifically for routing

large volumes of record information, such as narrative (i.e., written text) messages or computer
data files, efficiently from source stations to destination stations. As in all switched networks,
stations are connected to intermediate nodes known as switches, but, unlike circuit-switched
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-33
networks, no direct end-to-end physical transmission path is ever established between

communicating stations in a message-switched network. Instead, each message is transmitted
from the source station to an intermediate node, where it is temporarily stored on a queue for
processing and subsequent onward transmission (i.e., forwarding) towards the selected
destination station(s). Thus, the term store-and-forward is associated with message-switched
networks. Each intermediate node (i.e., store-and-forward message switch) generally has
communication links to two or more other store-and-forward message switches, allowing each
message to be routed through the network via the most efficient path between its source station
and the selected destination station(s), taking into account such dynamic considerations as
traffic congestion, circuit outages and so on. A message is stored at a node until a
communication channel to the next node in the chosen path to the destination station becomes
available. The entire message is then forwarded along that channel to the next node, where it is
once again stored, processed and subsequently forwarded. This process of storing and
forwarding the message continues until it is delivered to the selected destination station(s).
6. Clearly, the queuing nature of message switching does not support “real-time”
communication between stations. However, the combination of store-and-forward switching
with multiple path routing allows message-switched networks to make efficient use of a
relatively modest number of transmission channels to convey large volumes of record
information between three or more stations in a timely, reliable manner.
7. Packet-switched Networks. Packet switching is so named because the source

station’s information is broken up and sent across the network as a sequence of small chunks,
called packets. Each packet contains both user information and network control data, all of
which are switched as a composite whole. A packet-switched network is constructed such that
each node in the network has communication links to two or more other nodes, creating a large
number of possible paths between source and destination stations. Because each packet
contains its own control and identification data, individual packets can be independently routed
through the network from the source station to the destination station. As in message-switching,
a source station’s packets are sent to an intermediate node (i.e., packet switch) that receives
the packet, stores it until a communication channel to the next node on the way to the packet’s
destination station is available and then forwards the packet along that channel. Each packet is
routed through the network along the most efficient end-to-end path from source to destination,
taking into account such dynamic considerations as traffic congestion, outages, error conditions,
and other network performance criteria. Because packets are small and packet switches are
electronic computers, it takes only a very short time to transmit a packet between nodes. This
means that the channel used to transmit a packet from one node to the next is available to
transmit another packet, perhaps from a different source en route to a different destination, after
only a very brief delay.
8. The combination of small packet size and powerful routing over multiple paths allows a
packet-switched network to efficiently convey large volumes of information between many
stations, in what can often appear to be real-time, over a relatively modest number of
transmission channels. Packet-switched networks are commonly used for computer-to-
computer data communications over so-called wide area networks, often utilizing existing
transmission infrastructures such as telephone networks.
3-34 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
326. BROADCAST NETWORKS
1. Broadcasting is an alternative way of connecting three or more stations by a single

communication system. In a broadcast communication network, there are no intermediate
nodes. All stations are directly connected to each other by a single, common physical
transmission channel. Broadcasting, like switching, alleviates the need for separate point-to-
point communication links between each pair of stations connected to the network. In a
broadcast network, however, all signals transmitted over the single shared transmission channel
are received by all stations on the network. This makes broadcast networks ideal for situations
where the intent is to disseminate the same information to all stations as quickly and efficiently
as possible. A simple example of this is a combat net radio system, in which all users tuned to
the same communication channel (i.e., frequency) receive all transmissions sent over that
channel. There are three types of broadcast network: simplex, half-duplex and addressable.
2. Simplex Broadcast Networks. In a simplex broadcast network, one station is the

source of all information conveyed over the network. The source station is the only one
equipped with a transmitter, usually one of high power output. All other stations on the network
are passive receivers with no ability to transmit signals of their own on the network. In most
cases, the receivers are anonymous to the source station. The most common examples of
simplex broadcast networks are television and commercial radio stations that transmit signals
through the air as electromagnetic waves that can be received and enjoyed by anyone with a
suitable television or radio receiver. Military applications of simplex broadcast networks include
warning networks intended to disseminate information about imminent threats and hazards to
everyone within a given geographic area without requiring any sort of acknowledgement that
they received it.
3. Half-Duplex Broadcast Networks. The purpose of half-duplex broadcast networks is

to allow any station connected to the network to convey information to all other stations
simultaneously. Each station is equipped with a dual-purpose receiver/transmitter to permit two-
way communication over the shared transmission channel to which all stations are connected.
The result is an “all-informed” network in which information from any source connected to the
network is automatically conveyed to all destinations in real-time. Because all stations share
the same physical transmission channel, only one station at a time may transmit a signal across
the network. However, the ability of any station to transmit a signal over the network means
that, unlike simplex networks, destinations can acknowledge or respond to the information they
receive, and that all such acknowledgements and responses will also be received by all other
stations connected to the network. The all-informed nature of such communications is a
valuable characteristic in any situation in which a number of individuals or organizations must
co-ordinate their efforts in pursuit of a common goal, especially under dynamic operational
conditions. Combat net radio is a familiar military example of a half-duplex broadcast network.
4. Addressable Broadcast Networks. Digital information processing technology has

made it possible to combine the features of a broadcast network with those of a switched
network. As in any broadcast network, all stations are directly connected to each other by a
single, common physical transmission channel. In other words, there are no intermediate nodes
or switches between the terminal stations. However, each device connected to the shared
transmission channel is assigned an address. As in a standard packet switched network, each
packet transmitted across the network contains both user information and network control data,
including the address of the destination station. Instead of having intermediate nodes route
each packet to its destination, every station on the network receives all packets transmitted over
the single shared transmission channel. Each receiving station simply checks the destination
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-35
address of the packet to determine whether it should process the packet in order to convert the
user information within it into a suitable form for presentation to the intended recipient or simply
ignore it. Normal all-informed broadcasts are possible on an addressable broadcast network
simply by assigning one address as the “broadcast” address. Every receiving station will
process packets addressed to the broadcast address. An even more sophisticated
enhancement is the use of multi-cast addresses which specified groups of receiving stations will
process. Local area networks (LANs) that interconnect computers within a small geographic
area are the most common example of addressable broadcast networks.
5. The Internetworking Protocol. The Internet Protocol (IP) was created as a way to hide
the complexity of physical addressing by creating a virtual addressing scheme that is
independent of the underlying network. The Internetworking Protocol does not ensure that data
is delivered to the application in the appropriate order; that responsibility is left to upper-layer
protocols such as transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol (UDP).
(Note: IP is a connectionless, network-layer protocol in that it does not require a reply but
assumes the data was received, this is why it is used along with TCP which requires a recipient
reply before continuing with data transmission).
327. COMPUTER NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS
1. Computer network communications are very analogous when compared to telephone

system communications. This type of network is categorized in several different ways but one
of the more common methods is by classifying the network in accordance with the geographical
area it spans. A local area network (LAN) is a computer network covering a small local area,
like an office environment of a unit or a formation HQ (Figure 3-6). Current LANs are most
likely to be based on switched Ethernet or wireless (WiFi) technology running at from 10 to 1000
Mbps. LANs can be segmented into smaller groups for ease of administration and maintenance
yet still share a common server through switching or routing devices. The defining
characteristics of LANs in contrast to other area networks are:
a. much higher data rates;
b. smaller geographic range; and
c. they do not as a rule involve leased telecommunication lines.
3-36 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Figure 3-6: Local Area Network
2. A wide area network (WAN) is a computer network covering a wide geographical area,
involving a vast array of computers see (Figure 3-7). This is different from LANs that are usually
limited to a room, building or a deployed HQ complex. The best example of a WAN is the
Internet. WANs are used to connect distant LANs together, so that users and computers in one
location can communicate with users and computers in other locations. Many WANs are built for
one particular organization and are private. Others, built by Internet service providers, provide
connections from an organization's LAN to the Internet. WANs are most often built using leased
lines. At each end of the leased line, a router connects to the LAN on one side and a hub within
the WAN on the other.
Figure 3-7: Wide Area Network
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 3-37
CHAPTER 4
ELECTRONIC WARFARE IN THE ELECTRO MAGNETIC BATTLESPACE
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
401. GENERAL
1. Electronic warfare (EW) has been practiced in every conflict since World War I.
Fundamentally the practice of EW has not changed. However, the context in which EW must
operate has. The Canadian Land Force (LF) has placed a greater emphasis on joint and
coalition operations. As well, closer relationships with national and strategic agencies have had
significant impacts on the conduct of EW. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview
of EW and the role it plays to conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations as they
pertain to the electromagnetic (EM) battlespace.
2. The EM Battlespace is a unique environment encompassing all devices including people

that employ electrical or electronic means to transmit, receive, process, store, display, sense
and analyse information. The EM battlespace is, therefore, not dissimilar from the Aerospace
environment, in that it exists only due to our ability to exploit it through a specialized
infrastructure to achieve both physical and psychological effects. The “Shielding” necessary to
protect our own infrastructure and the “Act” of prosecuting our adversaries’ infrastructure within
this EM battlespace are primarily Signals functions, but require activities from Commanders and
soldiers at all levels to be successful.
3. EW may be conducted by a broad range of assets, ranging from a single soldier with
man-portable equipment to a full squadron operating under armour. In order to maximize the
capabilities of the Canadian Forces (CF) signal intelligence system and LF EW assets, EW
operations will, wherever possible, be integrated with coalition and CF EW and signal
intelligence agencies.
402. ELECTRONIC WARFARE—DEFINITION
1. The concept and doctrine of EW are derived from a series of definitions that, in general
terms, explain the boundaries of the activity. The central definition for EW, from which
subordinate definitions are derived, is as follows:
Military action to exploit the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum which encompasses

the interception and identification of EM emissions, the employment of EM
energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the EM
spectrum and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.21
21
NATO Military Committee (MC) 64 NATO EW Policy, NATO ATP 51(A) EW in the Land Battle and AAP-6 (U)
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-1
2. As previously stated in Chapter 1, Signals has a communication and information

systems (CIS) component and an EW component. The EW component is further divided into
three sub-components:
a. Electronic Support (ES). It encompasses the search for, interception and

identification of electromagnetic emissions in the EM battlespace. ES products
include:
(1) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). The generic term used to describe

COMINT and ELINT when there is no requirement to differentiate
between these two types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two.
(2) Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). Technical material and intelligence

information derived from EM non-communications transmission (i.e.
radar, navigational aids, jamming transmissions) by other than intended
recipients.
(3) Communication Intelligence (COMINT). Technical material and

intelligence information derived from EM communications and
communication systems (i.e. morse, voice, facsimile) by other than
intended recipients.
b. Electronic Attack (EA). It is the employment of electromagnetic energy,

including direct energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic
spectrum and to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.
c. Electronic Protection (EP). The action taken to ensure friendly effective use of
the EM spectrum despite the adversary's use of EM energy.
3. Electromagnetic (EM) Spectrum. Visible light is a form of energy. When it travels

through the atmosphere it is partly absorbed and reflected by all objects in its path. This action
creates a pattern of light, shade and color that enables the human eye to recognize objects.
This form of energy is related to radio, radar and X-rays. All of these forms of energy have
similarities and, collectively, are known as electromagnetic energy. The main similarity is that all
electromagnetic energy travels in waveform. The wavelength of the energy (the distance
between the wave crests) determines the form of energy, and there are an infinite variety of
wavelengths. The whole range of wavelengths is known as the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum
see (Figure 4-1). All electromagnetic waves, regardless of their position in the EM spectrum,
travel at the speed of light, which is approximately 300,000,000 meters per second. The EM
spectrum is the domain of operations for LF EW.
4-2 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Electronic Warfare in the Electro Magnetic Battlespace
Figure 4-1: The Electromagnetic Spectrum
403. THE ROLE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1. The role of EW is to conduct operations in the EM spectrum in support of the

commanders objectives. These operations include actions to exploit the EM spectrum which
encompasses the interception and identification of EM emissions, the employment of EM
energy (including directed energy) to deduce or prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum and
actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.
2. They also support defensive EW carried out by all arms/services. Specifically, the
following tasks can be carried out by EW organizations:
a. Provide EM support to the commander in the following three operational

functional areas:
(1) Sense (ES),
(2) Act (EA), and
(3) Shield (EP).
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-3
b. Work in the Global Information Environment (GIE)/ Military Information

Environment (MIE), which means that the commander’s area of interest has
significantly expanded.
c. With the expanded area of interest, national assets are now deployed and work
closely with tactical EW elements to support LF operations.
d. Provide single source tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) in the form of EW

summaries (EWSUMs) or tactical reports (TACREPs), which supports current
operations and future planning.
e. Provide target acquisition of adversary electromagnetic emitters.
f. Provide immediate threat warning to commanders.
g. Provide EP advice to protect the Land Command Support System (LCSS).
404. ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES
1. General Capabilities. To perform the roles/tasks assigned to them, EW elements must

have the following basic capabilities:
a. A 24/7, all weather ES coverage of the commander's area of interest.
b. A capability to conduct EA—the range of a commander’s EA capabilities

contributes to his overall area of influence along with other combat systems.
c. The capability to process and secure highly classified information and special
materials based on national policies and security orders.
d. A secure and reliable communication means within the EW organization, to the

supported formation headquarters (HQ), to the higher EW organization and to
the national level organizations.
e. A capability to operate in an EW and/or nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC)

environment.
f. The ability to operate either under armour (medium EW) and using highly mobile
platforms or man-packs (light EW) in order to effectively compliment the
supported formation.
g. Enough redundancy to sustain operations.
2. Equipment and System Capabilities. Electronic Warfare equipment tends to be highly

specialized and is required to adapt quickly to an ever-changing EM target presented by various
adversaries. Electronic Warfare equipment forms modular components that can be integrated
to allow multi-tasking and highly responsive, adaptable operations by ES detachments. In brief,
each ES detachment has the technical capability to perform intercept and direction finding (DF)
across the spectrum, including both communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic
intelligence (ELINT) targets. These capabilities are organized and deployed depending on
mission specifics and the target environment. They are as follows:
4-4 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
a. Electronic Support—Search/Intercept Capability. These ES capabilities

consist of the personnel and equipment whose purpose is to search, intercept
and conduct direction finding (DF) in the EM spectrum for targets and gather
detailed information on detected targets. A search/intercept component requires
the following capabilities:
(1) Broad band coverage search.
(2) Interoperability with national strategic systems.
(3) The ability to be used in vehicle (platform independent) and/or

dismounted operations.
(4) The ability to integrate with the DF capability to provide a single package
capability.
(5) The ability to detect and track low probability of intercept (LPI) signals
(e.g., frequency hopping (FH)).
(6) The ability to exploit targets throughout the threat spectrum.
(7) Conduct first line analysis on collection and reflected in the TACREP.
(8) The ability to have an integral linguistic capability.
(9) Recording and storage capabilities.
(10) The ability to interface directly with the EW analysis component.
b. Electronic Support—Communications Direction-Finding Capability. This

ES component consists of a number of detachments with modular equipment
that form baselines to provide location information of target communication
emitters. The DF components require the following capabilities:
(1) Sufficient accuracy to allow cueing of other sensor systems such as

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
(2) Broad band coverage to the greatest extent possible and in step with
intercept capabilities.
(3) The ability to integrate with search and intercept capability to provide a
single package capability.
(4) The ability to locate LPI emitters.
(5) The ability to be used in mounted (platform independent) and/or

dismounted operations.
(6) The ability to interface directly with the EW analysis component.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-5
c. Electronic Support—Electronic Intelligence Capability. This ES component

is deployed in detachments with modular equipment that forms a baseline. The
ELINT components provide search, intercept, DF and analysis of target non-
communications emitters. The equipment conducts analysis by comparing
emitter data to a database that determines the radar type and associated
equipment. An ELINT component must be capable of the following:
(1) Broadband coverage of the radar frequency band.
(2) Interoperability with national and other service systems.
(3) Flexible, platform independent deployment.
(4) Rapid reprogramming of new signals by field operators.
(5) Interfacing with the land integrated support station (LISS) to enable 2nd
level collation of new signals.
(6) Interaction with standard electronic parameter databases such as the

Canadian Forces EW Database (CFEWDB) and the NATO Emitter
Database (NEDB).
(7) Recording.
(8) Interfacing directly with the EW analysis component.
d. Electronic Attack Capability. The EA component consists of a number of

dedicated detachments and modular equipment, which may be integrated with
ES detachments for attacking both communication and non-communications
targets, either in a deliberate or a surgical fashion. Electronic Attack
detachments require the following capabilities:
(1) Platform independence to the greatest extent possible.
(2) The ability to attack both communications and radar frequency bands.
(3) Upgradeability.
(4) Ability to perform a range of EA tasks, including but not limited to

electronic masking, spoofing, deception and jamming.
e. Analysis Capability. The analysis component of an EW unit converts the data

and information collected by the EW sensors into a single source product,
EWSUMs or TACREPs. This component consists of specially trained personnel
and specialized equipment. It can be as simple as an analyst working along
side a search/intercept operator. Analysis is usually conducted in a distributed
fashion, with various baseline detachments, the SIGINT EW operations centre
(SEWOC) and the EW coordination cell (EWCC) each adding layers of
analytical refinement to the end product. The component has the following
capabilities:
4-6 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
(1) The capability to receive sensor data.
(2) Tools to assist the analyst to process the data.
(3) Electronic Warfare trained analytical personnel.
(4) The ability to create, hold and secure highly classified materials and
databases.
(5) Access to other intelligence databases.
(6) The ability to be mobile in both light and medium armoured vehicles.
(7) The ability to interface directly with ES and EA components.
(8) The ability to interface directly with national-level SIGINT databases.
f. Electronic Warfare Command and Control Intelligence System Capability.

Electronic Warfare coordination cell (EWCC) and/or the EW liaison officer
(EWLO) at the supported formation HQ (as required) provide for the command
and control of EW assets. The EWCC is the command and control element
which is attached to the supported HQ. The EWCC can also attach elements to
the ISTAR all source cell (ASC) or to the all source intelligence centre (ASIC).
This component is supported by an integral signal organization of appropriate
size. The EW C2IS capability must support the following:
(1) Dispersed deployment of EW assets throughout the area of operations

(AO).
(2) Interoperability with the Tactical Command and Control Information

System (TacC2IS).
(3) The capability of handling highly classified information.
(4) The capability of supporting timely transmission of data from the sensor to
the end-product customer without requiring either hard-copy or air
gapping.
g. Combat Service Support Capability. The combat service support (CSS)

component provides the CSS necessary for EW operations. Electronic warfare
organization are supported as other units of a formation are and in accordance
with sustainment doctrine22. Electronic warfare organizations have specialist
maintenance capabilities to support specialized fleets of EW equipment. Some
equipment provided by the national/strategic level authorities will be maintained
by those agencies and not through the integral LF EW unit CSS component.
22
For more information see B-GL-300-004/FP-000 Sustainment and supporting sustainment
system manuals.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-7
SECTION 2
ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT
405. GENERAL
1. In order to provide the best support to operational commanders, deployed EW units

must take advantage of national and international capabilities to augment limited resources. A
deployed LF commander will receive EW support from three areas:
a. organic EW resources;
b. resources from other nations in theatre (force level EW capabilities); and
c. Canadian national/strategic resources.
2. Organic EW Resources. Organic EW resources provide the access to the national
signal intelligence system. It is unlikely that LF organic resources will be able to provide all the
EW information necessary for operations, therefore national and international assets need to be
leveraged to augment capability. Electronic Warfare units cannot provide their full potential
combat effect without access to national signal intelligence systems.
3. Other Nations in Theatre. Theatre EW units, depending on their tasks, may be able to
provide both ES and EA support. This support will be coordinated by the EWCC. There may be
national limitations on the provision of this support.
4. Canadian National Resources. Canadian Forces Information Operations Group
(CFIOG) is to provide a CF level signal intelligence capability for the provision of databases,
analysts, force generate a deployable SIGINT support team (DSST) as part of the EW Troop
and sanctuary operations.23 Also, CFIOG will provide access, through the Canadian Security
Establishment (CSE), to resources and information from allied nations and, via the LISS, to the
CFEWDB. Lastly, CFIOG will force generate a signals intelligence satellite support element
(SSE) to augment deployed LF EW assets on an as required basis.
5. It is important to note that augmentation of an SSE results in the creation of either a
SEWOC and/or a SEWCC capability as an SSE will locate with either the EWCC or EWOC. In
tasked tailored operations, the DSST could be located with the EWCC and the functions
traditionally done by the EWOC could be integrated into the EWCC.
6. At the LF level, the LISS provides a Land EW operational support (LEWOS) capability to
deployed LF EW systems. An example of this is the provision of a start state radar database for
ELINT ES ops during pre-deployment preparations.
7. Electronic Support is defined as “that division of EW involving actions taken to locate,
intercept and identify EM emissions and locate their sources for the purpose of immediate threat
recognition. It provides a source of information required for immediate decisions involving EA,
EP and taking other tactical actions.”24 It provides information that contributes to production of
SIGINT.
23
Sanctuary (or split based) operations is a term used to describe operations that are being conducted from a safe
area (normally out of theatre in Canada) to directly support operations in theatre.
24
MC 64 NATO EW Policy.
4-8 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
8. Electronic Support systems collect data and/or produce information or intelligence, which
can be used to:
a. Contribute as a source of information for the production of Red situational

awareness (SA) within the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and
reconnaissance (ISTAR) system.
b. Provide targeting information for EA operations.
c. Initiate self-protection measures.
d. Support EP efforts.
e. Pull data from SIGINT databases populated from the collection done by
EW/SIGINT assets.
f. Provide warning to the COMINT supported commander.
9. Essentially, ES is the exploitation of adversary transmissions for the purpose of

providing immediate threat warning, force protection, and SIGINT about the area of interest as
well as targeting information for EA. Electronic Support is composed of search and intercept,
DF and analysis functions applied against communications and non-communications targets.
The ES process is described below and mirrors the intelligence cycle. Electronic Support can
be carried out from ground-based equipment in the forward area and at greatly extended ranges
from airborne platforms. All EM radiation has a distinct characteristic or signature, ranging from
a single radio frequency to the unique signature of an air defence radar/weapon system.
Electronic Warfare units deploy electronic sensors so they can listen to, locate and identify
adversary transmissions.
10. Electronic Support (except for organic communications systems) employs passive
sensing. In general, ES can collect information throughout a commander’s area of interest and
is an all weather capability. Direction finding ranges and accuracy of ES are greatly increased
with the use of elevated platforms. Electronic Support equipment needs to be modular and
compatible to allow for deployment in fixed-wing, rotary-wing or UAV type platforms. Electronic
Support requires special equipment, well trained soldiers and clear direction from the ISTAR
process on priorities, the types of targets sought and the kind of information desired so wasted
effort is prevented.
11. To exploit the adversary's transmissions, EW elements search the spectrum to find
which frequencies the adversary is using. When they find a target frequency, or set of
frequencies in the case of frequency agile systems, they then intercept the transmissions, use
DF equipment to locate the transmitters and then analyse the message content or emission
types to gain information and disseminate the information to anyone who requires it.
406. SEARCH AND INTERCEPT FUNCTION
1. Search and intercept should be considered electronic reconnaissance and electronic

surveillance (see Figure 4-2). In general, these two functions cannot be separated as the same
equipment and operators do both functions. In the past, search was viewed as the start of the
EW process; however, it is unlikely that deployed land forces will arrive in a theatre without
some national SIGINT database support allowing for immediate commencement of intercept
tasks.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-9
Figure 4-2: EW Vehicle Conducting Electronic Reconnaissance and Electronic Surveillance
2. Search. The search function based on SIGINT already available conducts a

reconnaissance of the EM spectrum for exploitable activity. Search must be conducted
continuously, and some resources will always need to be dedicated to it. Analysis of the results
of the search function is very useful in determining adversary activity even if the internal
information of the communications cannot be immediately exploited.
3. In the early stages of an operation, search operations are vital to providing the
information necessary for development of the overall ES capability. The results of search
provide detailed information on the portions of the EM spectrum employed by an adversary and
from this allow the ES package to be task-tailored to exploit the particular theatre. This is
particularly important where the size of the EW force will be limited by the overall contingent
size.
4. Search and intercept operators are required to exploit as much of the EM spectrum as
possible. This will include high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), ultra high frequency
(UHF), super high frequency (SHF) and extremely high frequency (EHF) bands for
communications and radar activity. In tasked tailored operations, the requirement might exist to
have one team focused on search and the other on intercept and cross queuing each other for
direction finding. The team focused on search has some knowledge of the target language, and
will record all voice transmissions heard. The team notes the frequency, the type of modulation
and the mode of transmission. If the net is operating in plain language, the operator can log the
call signs, the type of net and an outline of the traffic. If the operator recognizes it as an
important net, the operator calls for another operator to look specifically at that particular
frequency. In the case of non-communication transmissions, general operators are looking for
emissions with unique signal characteristics before conducting follow on direction finding and
analysis.
4-10 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
5. The team involved in a specific search will be assigned to specific frequencies and looks
for specified nets. Following a frequency change, the team will be busy trying to rediscover the
net on its new frequency. Details of priority nets and those which show promise of providing
useful information are then passed to an intercept operator. Modern search equipment
incorporates microprocessors, which can be programmed to automatically scan a portion of the
band, ignoring friendly or restricted frequencies.
6. Intercept. While the search function conducts a reconnaissance of the EM spectrum,

the intercept function conducts surveillance of specific target frequencies. The aim of intercept
is to exploit the specifics of adversary transmissions, primarily by transcribing unencrypted voice
transmissions, facsimile and data.
7. These activities require very specialized operator skills such as linguistics. Once an
important radio net is identified by search, it is handed off to an intercept operator who records
the information passed on that net. The intercept operator exploits the information on the net to
the extent possible and then passes the results to analysts for further exploitation, fusion and
reporting. The intercept operator passes the data files to the analyst for further exploitation.
The same process is conducted with regard to intercept of non-communication emitters.
8. Many signals will not be immediately exploitable. These signals will be recorded,
logged, databases updated and passed to other EW assets for exploitation. In certain
instances, the support of coalition national agencies will be necessary to exploit these signals.
The process of exploitation in this case must be as fast as possible to ensure the commander is
supported with timely strategic SIGINT.
9. However, when an immediate threat is identified, a warning in the form of a TACREP is

reported directly to the EWCC/All Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC) for furtherance to the
targeted unit.
10. Intercept can be conducted against secure and insecure nets, but the information
obtained will vary. Secure targets yield valuable information in the form of emission
characteristics (e.g., frequency and modulation), and some inference can be drawn about the
relative importance of the net based on traffic patterns and location of stations. Secure stations
are still subject to DF, as are stations working insecure.
11. From intercept the analysts receive information about frequency, message content,
traffic flow, activity patterns and transmission types. This information is enhanced by locations
and movement provided by DF. In conjunction with other sources of intelligence, the analyst will
try to determine the adversary order of battle, strengths, intentions, unit identities and
deployment.
12. Search and Intercept Equipment. The fundamental equipment in any search and
intercept system is the receiver and associated antenna or antenna system. Intercept receivers
are very sensitive with high degrees of both of frequency accuracy and stability. With a high
gain antenna and good siting, receivers are capable of exploiting signals at a greater range than
normal communication receivers. Intercept receivers usually incorporate a digital frequency
meter, which gives the operator a precise frequency read-out for use by direction-finding
stations. They also have a panoramic display that can detect all transmissions within a certain
range even if these transmissions are infrequent or short.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-11
407. DIRECTION FINDING
1. Direction finding (DF) is an ES function that provides location information on target

emitters. This information when fused with other search and intercept information is invaluable.
Direction-finding equipment is a receiver with a specialized antenna system that is capable of
providing a line of bearing (LOB) to where the emitter is located. The quality of the DF system,
terrain, signal strength, reflection, and equipment determines the accuracy of the LOB. DF
determines the location of an emitter by triangulation. Three or more direction-finding stations
are used by taking a simultaneous LOB on the target station transmission (see Figure 4-3). DF
can also be used to give guidance to other sensors and supplement intelligence products. In
other words, ES data including DF provides excellent cueing for other sensors to detect targets
with sufficient accuracy to target. Increasing the number of bearings obtained and using
elevated DF platforms can improve DF accuracy. Air based intercept and DF systems can
provide this fidelity. Additionally, DF accuracy tends to improve when targeting higher
frequencies. As technology advances, we can expect in the future that locating emitters will
improve significantly.
2. Emitter Density Location. A number of secure and insecure transmissions on different

frequencies all emanating from the same area may indicate the location of an important HQ. In
any formation, each type of unit or level of HQ will have its own distinctive electronic signature,
which, if identified and located, will obviously provide vital intelligence. The interrelationship
between stations on a net and their locations is an important element in establishing the
adversary's electronic order of battle.
3. In tasked tailored operations, Search, intercept and DF functions could be combined on

the same platform. Integration of intercept and DF information greatly improves the analytical
effort to fuse information. Therefore this will result in combined ES detachments for search,
intercept and DF. Current ELINT systems already have an integrated search, intercept and DF
capability.
4. In the HF frequency band, single station location can be performed. In effect, the target
emitter is located by a single ground station rather than by triangulation with a deployed
baseline. Again, it is expected that in the near future, this type of locating capability will be
available in other bands a well. In essence, the need to deploy a baseline to obtain accurate DF
information will be reduced. This will have particular application in operations other than war
(OOTW), where a limited number of EW systems can be deployed and in situations where it is
not practical to deploy baselines.
5. Ground-based detachments must be sited to obtain a good electronic view of the

adversary emitters [usually line of sight (LOS)]. They can locate forward with reconnaissance
(recce) to allow for cross-queuing of information if the communications systems do not allow the
EW asset to locate further to the rear. If those systems are available, then the EW asset can
locate further to the rear, for example, with an artillery detachment or battery, and still provide
real time assistance to the recce detachment. As with search and intercept equipment, DF
equipment benefits from elevated platforms via UAV and aviation assets. This greatly improves
the accuracy and range over ground-mounted systems but is limited by the availability of
platforms and weather. Direction finding via elevated platforms should augment a ground-
based capability.
4-12 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Figure 4-3: EW Vehicles Conducting Direction Finding Tasks
408. ANALYSIS
1. Analysis is a process of taking sensor data and converting it into information that is
useful. It is important to understand that analysis occurs throughout the ES process and not just
as a final step. The key principles in analysis that apply to ES are accuracy and speed. The
outputs from analysis are SIGINT, immediate threat warnings, force protection, EA targets and
assessments of the effectiveness of EA and other IO measures such as psychological
operations (PSYOPS) or deception.
2. Specially trained SIGINT analysts primarily carry out the analysis function. The analyst
takes direction—Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)—from the EWCC and converts this
into tasks for the ES sensors. The ES sensors then collect the necessary data and information
and provide them to the analysts. The analysts then take the sensor results, use various
databases and produce their products. The analyst must integrate information from search,
intercept, and DF of communication and non-communication emitters and produce a SIGINT
view of the battle. From an all-source cell perspective, SIGINT is considered a single source
that must be integrated with other sensor information [recce, UAV, human intelligence
(HUMINT)] to produce Red Situational Awareness (SA) for the commander.
3. Accuracy of the products is critical. The ES process must produce reliable information
and be able to indicate to the ASIC how accurate the information is. Inaccurate information can
have a detrimental effect on the entire process of producing Red SA. Speed of reporting
requires the ES process to produce accurate results as quickly as possible. This allows the
commander to have Red SA faster and hence enables him to quicken his decision-action cycle
relative to the adversary’s.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-13
4. With software and databases being part of ES systems, software can compare ES
results to known databases and provide instantaneous analysis of a signal. This is particularly
true in ELINT. Radars are detected, characterized, located, identified and reported without
necessarily having a human interface. This level of analysis converts signal data into useful
information. Search and intercept operators conduct analysis based on knowledge of the
adversary systems. In principle, the analysis should be done as quickly as possible using
integral software and operator knowledge. As analysis and data fusion software develops, ES
equipment and operators will conduct more analysis. Analysis is a time consuming process.
The adversary uses many means to ensure that it takes considerable time to produce results.
5. From intercept, the analysts receive information about frequencies, call signs, types of
net, message content, traffic flow, activity patterns and transmission types. For both radio and
radar, intercept can identify the equipment by its technical characteristics (electronic
fingerprinting). When fused with locations and tracks from DF, this information enables the EW
analyst to build up the adversary electronic order of battle. The result of their efforts will be
intelligence concerning the adversary order of battle, strengths, intentions, unit identities and
equipment developments. Some information cannot be held by the analyst while developing
SIGINT since it is time perishable and therefore must be passed immediately to the
EWCC/ASIC for action. The analyst is a detective and quickly seizes upon any errors or
breaches of security. The building up of an overall SIGINT picture by analysis is a lengthy
process. If the adversary EP is effective, SIGINT obtained by intercept is fragmentary at first
and gains coherence only as a result of close observation over a period of time.
6. The tactical SIGINT picture is optimally complemented by National systems and their
access to first and second party databases. In theatre, SIGINT analysts can work with the
National system to provide a SIGINT picture of the area of operation. This in turn provides a
detailed communications picture for the EW analysts, the EWCC and the ASIC to aid in their
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and subsequent tasking of the commander’s EW
assets.
7. Location of Analysis. Many factors dictate the location of the analysts. Factors that
would determine the location of the analysis function are:
a. Continuity. Electronic Support analysis needs to be continuous. When there is

a period of time that analysis is not being conducted, gaps in knowledge are
created that will directly affect the accuracy and speed of reporting. The
analysis function needs to be as stationary as possible, have redundant
capabilities or a split based capability.
b. Access to Databases. The analysis function requires access to databases

both for SIGINT and other intelligence information. The databases provide
quick references to previously conducted activities and greatly speed the
analysis process.
c. Communications. Limitations in the size of communications links may require

analysts to deploy directly with the sensors. In other cases, the communication
may allow for the analyst to be physically separated from the sensors but in
virtual contact. The analysis function must have reliable communication with the
ES sensors. The commander must always have some analysis capability in
theatre to allow for time of communications disruptions.
4-14 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
8. Traditionally, the analysis function has been co-located with the search and intercept
functions. Tactical communications has normally been conducted with low bandwidth tactical
radios. The analyst had to reduce the amount of information passed to a size that could be
routinely transmitted by that means. The arrangement also allowed for a close relationship
between intercept and analysis. Current communications technology allows for a far more
flexible deployment of the analysis function. In recent operations, both sensor and analysis
functions have been conducted in separate locations over strategic distances. Additionally, the
analysis function has been integrated with ES sensors into a single vehicle detachment. This
demonstrates that the location of the analysis function is flexible and mission dependant.
9. Within the ISTAR CC there will likely be a need to have SIGINT analysis capabilities.
This will create a synergy with the ASIC and the other sensors. As well, national level
communications links will be readily available to the analysts.
10. Analysis Security. Many SIGINT databases and analytical methods are highly
classified and specially protected. This creates a requirement for a Special Compartmented
Information Facility (SCIF). Access to the information and many SIGINT products require
special security clearances. Commanders, designated staff and the ISTAR CC will require
regular access to this information and will need to be cleared appropriately.
11. Dissemination of Analysis Products. Analysis derived products will be disseminated

on a need to know basis. In general, the products will be sanitized to allow them to be passed
on the LF command and C2IS. The sanitation procedure will be in accordance with nationally
set guidelines and the source protection necessary. The normal products of the EW process
are:
a. Tactical Reports and Summaries. These reports are produced in an approved

text format that allows for quick dissemination, database updates and display on
maps as necessary.
b. Overlays. Overlays allow for a pictorial representation of various ES results.

For example, all air defence radars, communications towers and all or selected
DF results.
12. Enemy Electronic Deception versus Analysis. Analysts must be aware that an
adversary may attempt deception. A properly conceived deception plan is aimed at the
commander not the ES system. An electronic deception is normally planned as part of an
overall deception plan. In some instances, however, it is possible for only an electronic
deception to be attempted. In this case, the aim is to deceive the ES system into reporting false
information that will be reported to our commander. Analysts must be aware that deception is
possible and question results that appear unusual. When this occurs, the ISTAR system may
be able to confirm or deny the adversaries’ use of deception with other sensors. Analysts
should not be over cautious and not report for fear of deception.
13. Conclusion. As discussed earlier, automated tools will significantly speed up the
analysis process, but analysts must still be highly skilled in order to quickly make sense of a
myriad of data. Although progress in the areas of artificial intelligence and automated tools is
constantly being made, the main tool remains a highly skilled analyst.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-15
SECTION 3
ELECTRONIC ATTACK
1. Electronic Attack is defined as: That division of EW involving actions taken to prevent or
reduce an adversary's effective use of the EM spectrum through the use of EM energy. There
are three subdivisions of EA—electronic jamming, electronic deception and electronic
neutralization25:
a. Electronic Jamming. Electronic Jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-

radiation or reflection of EM energy with the object of impairing the effectiveness
of electronic devices, equipment or systems being used by an adversary.26 In
jamming, EW is not able to stop the transmitter from sending out its signal,
therefore the receiver is targeted by EW by putting out a stronger signal thus
suppressing the command signal from the receiver see (Figure 4-4).
b. Electronic Deception. Electronic deception is the deliberate radiation, re-

radiation, alteration, absorption or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended
to confuse, distract or seduce an adversary or his electronic systems27 .
c. Electronic Neutralization. Electronic neutralization is the deliberate use of EM

energy to either temporarily or permanently damage adversary devices, which
rely exclusively on the EM spectrum.28
2. Electronic Attack is the offensive arm of EW. Electronic countermeasures are

coordinated through the targeting process as described in Chapter 3. The electronic warfare
support measures process is the target acquisition (TA) system for EA. Electronic
countermeasures are subdivided into three categories: electronic jamming, electronic deception
and electronic neutralization.
25
26
27
28
4-16 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Figure 4-4: Electronic Attack on the Receiver
409. ELECTRONIC JAMMING
1. Electronic jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of EM energy

with the object of impairing the effectiveness of electronic devices, equipment or systems being
used by an adversary. Jamming used at the right time on the right targets (e.g., on command
links during an assault) can greatly reduce the adversary’s effectiveness by denying him critical
information and communications. If jamming is poorly coordinated, it will alert the adversary
and can compromise our own capability and intentions. If jamming is conducted too early, it will
allow the adversary time to react and restore communications and therefore have limited effect.
A jamming signal can affect both friend and foe, and its effects can be widespread. Adversary
transmissions are often a source of intelligence, and if they are jammed, the information they
provide is lost. Jamming, therefore, is an activity that must be closely directed and coordinated
by the G3 staff.
2. Within the LF, EW units conduct electronic jamming. The responsibility for jamming
rests with the G3 /Chief of Staff (COS), and jamming is coordinated by the FSCC and electronic
EWCC. The EWCC is responsible for the execution of jamming based on targets determined by
the targeting process. Coordination with other staffs, in particular the G2 and G6, is critical.
410. CONTROL OF JAMMING
1. Jamming operations are most successful when they are permitted the greatest possible
latitude to attack both planned and opportunity targets. Coordination of jamming operations
should commence early in the planning cycle and continue through all operational phases. The
measures for controlling jamming are normally contained in the operations order. Control is
exercised in one of four ways:
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-17
a. Positive Control. Positive control is the issuance of specific orders to jam

and/or deceive a given target or blanket authority to neutralize by jamming
and/or deception a category of target (for example, an adversary fire control net
or ground surveillance radars). Frequencies and times are not specified.
b. Negative Control. Negative control is the denial of permission to conduct

jamming (for example, no jamming before H-hour).
c. On/Off Control. On/off control is the direct control of a jamming operation from
moment to moment.
d. Restricted Frequency Control. Restricted frequency lists (RFLs) are a

mechanism to prevent jamming from affecting friendly operations. Annex A to
this chapter provides a process and procedures for developing and maintaining
RFLs. There are three categories of frequencies:
(1) Taboo. A friendly frequency on which jamming or other intentional

interference is prohibited.29
(2) Guarded. An adversary frequency used as a source of information.30
(3) Protected. A friendly frequency on which interference must be

minimized.31
2. These four methods of controlling jamming are applied in a manner that permits
maximum flexibility and minimum delay in obtaining authority to conduct jamming operations
without compromising limitations imposed by superior headquarters. Unless forbidden by a
higher commander or established rules of engagement, any formation commander can
authorize jamming. Commanders at all levels must be fully conversant with the orders
governing the use of jamming and be aware of the possible adverse effects on intelligence
collection, command and control and weapon systems.
3. Jamming is a technique that is used to capture an adversary’s communication device

(radio) by radiating enough energy that the intended receiver only receives the jamming signal
and only the intended one. Jamming effectiveness is determined by several factors:
a. Jammer Power. In general, the higher the power the more effective the
jamming.
b. Range to the Target Receiver. The closer the target, the more effective the
jamming.
29
ATP 51(A) Chapter 4.
30
31
4-18 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
c. The Link Distance. The link distance is the distance between the transmitter
and receiver. The longer this distance, the more effective the jamming is (less
jamming power is required).
d. Ground. For ground-based jammers, the ground itself can mask the target or
necessitate greater power to produce effective jamming.
e. Power of the Adversary Transmitter. Depending on the power output of the
adversary transmitter, more jammer power may be required to effect jamming.
Normally, the power output is known and can be factored into the equation to
determine the required jammer power output.
4. Jammers can use a variety of modulations. It is important to tailor the jamming

modulation to the target. The most successful jammer is one that is perceived as anything but a
jammer. For example, the jammer can use a random Morse signal against a net operating on
Morse code or use a random data signal against a data net.
5. Types of Jamming. The types of jamming that may be employed are as follows:
a. Spot Jamming. Spot jamming occurs when a jammer attacks one frequency or
narrow band of frequencies in specific use by the victim. It is normally tuneable
over a range of frequencies. Spot jamming causes minimum interference with
friendly systems and permits maximum use of available jamming power. A spot
jammer requires very accurate knowledge of adversary frequencies.
b. Barrage Jamming. Barrage jamming occurs when a jammer attacks over a
wide band of frequencies simultaneously. The power available will be spread
over the entire bandwidth; this results in less power on any particular frequency
than occurs with spot jamming. Barrage jamming is likely to harass the victim
over a number of frequency options rather than totally deprive the victim of using
any particular frequency. Less detailed steerage is necessary for barrage
jamming. Also, the chance of interference with friendly nets is greater than with
spot jamming.
c. Sweep Jamming. Sweep jamming attempts to compromise between the
advantages of spot jamming and barrage jamming. The frequency of the
jamming signal is continuously varied within a specific bandwidth. All available
power is used for one frequency or a narrow band at any instant, but the tuning
is swept back and forth across a whole band of frequencies. Higher sweep
rates can achieve more effective results.
d. Automatic Search Jamming. More sophisticated jammers use advanced
technology to maximize their effectiveness yet reduce their vulnerability. The
automatic search jammer (also known as a responsive jammer) incorporates an
intercept receiver, which automatically searches a selected band of frequencies
to find frequencies of interest for which the system has been programmed. The
jamming transmitter is then automatically tuned and activated on the target
frequency. For the victim station, the jamming appears to be continuous.
Sometimes a capability is incorporated into the system to look through the
jamming transmissions and follow any changes in frequency made by the victim.
Complex systems will include a computer management function, which allocates
power resources to simultaneous targets.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-19
411. JAMMER PLATFORMS
1. To be effective, a ground-based jammer has to be sited close to the forward line of own
troops (FLOT) so it can take advantage of the high power output (which is typically between 1
kW and 2 kW). This siting allows the jammer to be effective against targets that are in depth
(for example, artillery nets), but it makes the jammer vulnerable. Thus the jammer should be
mounted in an armoured vehicle. Mounting the jammer on an elevated platform such as an
UAV can eliminate the loss of power of a jamming signal caused by intervening terrain
(attenuation). This technique provides a line of sight path from the jammer to the target
receiver, thus enabling a lower power jammer to be used. An airborne jammer of as little as 200
watts output at a distance of 40 km can be as effective as a ground-based jammer of 2 kW
output at 15 km.
412. EXPENDABLE JAMMERS
1. Expendable jamming involves placing a low power jammer within a few hundred metres
of a target receiver. This can have the same disruptive effect as a high power jammer 15 to 20
km away. Expendable jammers can be hand-placed, airdropped or artillery delivered. They can
be programmed to lock on to strong local signals, or they can be programmed to switch on to a
certain frequency at a predetermined time. If expendable jammers are delivered as a mix with
explosive ordnance, they could seriously degrade the adversary's efforts to restore order out of
chaos. Special Forces, reconnaissance and forward troops may be tasked to place expendable
jammers. Their use would be coordinated, as with other jamming, through the targeting
process.
SECTION 4
ELECTRONIC PROTECTION
1. Electronic protective measures are defined as: That division of EW involving actions
taken to ensure friendly effective use of the EM spectrum despite the adversary's use of EM
energy. There are two sub-divisions of EP:
a. Active Electronic Protection. Detectable measures, such as altering

transmitter parameters as necessary, to ensure friendly effective use of the EM
spectrum.
b. Passive Electronic Protection. Undetectable measures, such as operating

procedures and technical features of equipment, which are meant to ensure
friendly effective use of the EM spectrum.32
32
4-20 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
413. ELECTRONIC ATTACK AS ELECTRONIC PROTECTION: JAMMING IN NON-

ELECTRONIC WARFARE UNITS
1. Systems are now available that can provide protection for LF by using jammers against
electronic artillery fuses such as variable-time or proximity fuses. The jammer causes the
artillery round to detonate prematurely. The system detects the signal from the artillery round
and automatically sends a signal, which detonates the round. The system is, in fact, a
combination of ES and EA that provides EP.
SECTION 5
ORGANIZATION FOR EMPLOYMENT
1. There are two broad organizational paradigms for EW employment:
a. Light EW; and

b. Medium EW.
414. LIGHT ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1. Light Electronic Warfare (EW) assets have the full spectrum of operational capability and
are mounted in wheeled soft-skinned vehicles thus having the ability to operate dismounted to a
limited degree. Logistical limitations of the platforms employed may dictate a slightly degraded
capability that is offset by increased mobility and reduced logistical support requirements.
2. Light EW can also be man-pack or man-portable systems that can be used in

conjunction with patrols, reconnaissance, light infantry work and work in complex terrain against
low-powered communications.
415. MEDIUM ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1. Medium Electronic Warfare (EW) assets are equipped with wheeled armoured sensor
platforms. Medium EW may have an increased technical capability due to the increased load-
carrying capacity of the platform and provide increased operator protection. Medium EW has
increased logistic support requirements.
2. For all deployments, subject to resource constraints and based on the assigned mission,
the EW team/detachment/troop/squadron will be formed on a grouping of the following building
block functions/entities tailored to the operation:
a. Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell or Signals Electronic Warfare Coordination
Cell;
b. Electronic Warfare Liaison Officer;
c. Electronic Warfare Operation Centre or Signals Electronic Warfare Operation
Centre;
d. Mobile Electronic Warfare Team;
e. Electronic Attack; and
f. Combat Service Support.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-21
3. Mobile Electronic Warfare Teams. A Mobile Electronic Warfare Team (MEWT) is a

grouping of EW capability, usually ES, at the lowest level, formed to meet a mission
requirement. It can be an existing ES detachment, an ES detachment augmented with
intelligence analysis capability or a grouping of both an ES and EA detachment together. A
MEWT grouping is mission dependant.
4. Electronic Warfare Liaison Officers. Small-scale short-term deployments, such as a

non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), might be provided with a single vehicle (or
manpack) detachment, which is capable of providing EW liaison, advice, connectivity to national
or allied assets and a limited capability to perform ES33.
5. Electronic Warfare Coordination Centre/Mobile Electronic Warfare Teams. A two-

or three-vehicle grouping capable of providing EW liaison, advice and connectivity to national or
allied assets, a full-time presence at the ISTAR table, and a team capable of mobile ES
operations, either vehicle mounted or foot borne, to carry out EM spectrum reconnaissance and
provide target situational awareness and threat warning to the supported commander.
6. Rapid Deployment Troop. Electronic Support Team, Analysis Team, one EWLO team,
a wheeled vehicle baseline capable of full spectrum ES and limited EA and integral specialist
technical support.
SECTION 6
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1. When speaking of command and control of EW, this normally refers to specialist EW
units/detachments within formations. Electronic warfare units provide formation commanders
with capabilities to conduct ES and EA operations. All units and formations conduct EP with
EW units providing specialist advice. Electronic Warfare must be coordinated centrally at each
level of command. This does not prevent the allocation of EW capabilities to subordinate
formations and units. Internal to an EW unit, command and control is exercised via the EWCC,
which exercises command on behalf of the EW unit and the EWOC exercises operational
control of the EW assets. However during specific tasked tailored operations the EWCC could
be augmented with an analyst team to take over the control function from the EWOC.
416. COMMAND OF EW
1. Electronic Warfare unit commanders exercise command over their organic EW assets
and, depending on the command relationship,34 exercise control (on behalf of the commander)
of additional EW assets assigned. The EW commander is also the arms adviser to the
commander on EW matters. Because of this, it is imperative that the EW commander be
involved in the supported unit’s operational planning process (OPP) to allow for proper usage of
the assets available or to allow for the EW commander to request additional support from higher
HQ’s EW.
33
The level of ES that can be provided by a single detachment is limited to essential force protection and short-term
warning.
34
B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations provides details of various command relationship under
which forces can be assigned.
4-22 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
2. For the purposes of this document, the EWCC will be the central capability referred to for
the operational control of the supported unit’s EW capabilities. As the EW unit becomes
smaller, for example, a Troop at the battle Group level, the EWCC may simply be the EW
commander and his or her senior EW non-commissioned officer (NCO).
3. The EWCC is located at the tactical headquarters and acts as the EW unit commander’s
operations (Ops) staff. This coordination is primarily in the form of direction with regard to
movement and allocation of EW assets in support of specific units during different phases of
formation operations. The EWCC should be considered the same as any other CC located at
the unit HQ.
417. ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION CELL
1. The EWCC is the focal point for all EW activities within a given level of command. The
supporting EW unit normally provides the EWCC. Each level of command that has EW assets
allocated will have an EWCC. The EWCC performs the following functions:
a. Develop the EW plans to support the commander’s operation and ISTAR plan.
b. Coordinate ES and EA activities with other combat capabilities within the

formation.
c. Coordinate ES and EA activities with higher and flanking formations.
d. Provide specialist EW advice to the commander and other staff, including EP.
e. Direct ES and EA activities on behalf of the EW commander.
f. Control EA operations on behalf of the EW commander.
g. Conduct analysis during tasked tailored operations (the EWOC function is

replaced with an analyst team located in the EWCC).
h. Provide ES results in support of the ISTAR system.
2. Coordination of EW activities across various levels of command is critical. This prevents

the duplication of effort and enhances the sharing of EW information. The chain of command
takes precedence over any EW technical control. The senior formation EWCC has technical
control of all EW activities.
3. In the context of joint and multinational operations, the same technical control
relationship would occur. The joint EWCC would exercise technical control over the Land
component EWCC (as well as those of the Air and Maritime elements). Canadian LF formations
will normally be allocated to an allied formation for operations. The allied formation SEWCC is
responsible for the coordination of all EW activities within the formation. Technical control and
passage for EW information to other nations will be based on national agreements and policies.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-23
418. ANALYSIS AND CONTROL ELEMENT
1. The EWOC exercises operational real time control of the formation EW capability
specifically with regard to ES in accordance with the EW unit commander’s direction. The
primary function of the EWOC is to control the ES system as it executes search, intercept and
direction-finding tasks. However during tasked tailored operations, the EWOC function could be
replaced with an analyst team located in the EWCC carrying-out the ES control functions.
419. ELECTRONIC WARFARE LIAISON OFFICERS
1. Electronic warfare liaison officers (EWLOs) are normally allocated from the formation
EW unit to subordinate formations that do not have an organic EW unit. The purpose is to allow
subordinate formations and units access to the capabilities of the EW system, in particular, ES
information and EA. If a subordinate formation or sub-unit is allocated EW resources, an
EWCC, depending on the size, organization and mission of the supported sub-unit or formation,
is provided for its support.
2. An EWLO at the EW squadron (Sqn) level will normally be a Captain. At the Brigade
(BG) level, an EWLO will be a Sergeant or a Warrant Officer.
SECTION 7
ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLANNING AND PROCESSES
420. THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS
1. Formation HQs use the OPP to produce a plan based on the mission, concept and intent
of the higher commander. The IPB process and the targeting process support the OPP. The
SIGINT IPB creates a picture of the EM spectrum for the EW commander to be able to better
advise the G2, G# and the supported commander with respect to how best to employ the EW
assets available.
2. The OPP is a six-step process:
a. Receipt of Tasks. The formation HQ normally receives its tasks as a warning

order, operations order or fragmentary order from the higher formation. The
receipt of the tasks initiates a new planning cycle;
b. Orientation. In this step the commander conducts mission analysis and
prepares guidance. The commander's guidance will include commander's
critical information requirements (CCIRs). Priority intelligence requirements are
the component of CCIRs that provide guidance to the overall ISTAR effort and
by extension, the ES effort;
c. Develop Courses of Action. The staff develops courses of action (COA)
based on the information. The IPB process develops possible adversary COA
and questions for the ISTAR system. The staff then compares COA by means
of a war game. The EWCC would support the ISTAR system in helping to
answer questions from IPB by directing ES activities and obtaining any available
SIGINT from other sources including information provided through a SIGINT
IPB;
4-24 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
d. Decision. The staff presents the results of COA war game to the commander
for a decision on which COA to develop into a plan.
e. Plan Development. Another war game is conducted to refine the selected COA
and develop the decision support template (DST), the synchronization matrix
and high payoff target list (HPTL). The targeting process produces the attack
guidance matrix (AGM). The EWCC supports the targeting process with
coordination of EA. The result of this step is the production of an order with an
EW annex; and
f. Plan Review. The coordination of the details of the plan with subordinate units
is conducted during this step. The EWCC coordinates the EW plan with higher
and lower formations as necessary.
421. ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND THE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE

BATTLEFIELD PROCESS
1. The IPB process provides a continuous analysis of the adversary, weather and terrain.
The result of the process is the information collection plan (ICP). The process has four steps:
a. Define the Battlefield. The staff refines the AO and defines the area of
intelligence responsibility (AIR) based on the higher formation orders and the
commander's initial planning guidance.
b. Describe the Battlefield Effects. The G2 collects information about the

battlefield or updates information provided by other sources. The effects of
terrain and weather on the AO are also evaluated.
c. Evaluate the Threat. The G2 assembles all available information on the

adversary and prepares doctrinal and event templates.
d. Determine Threat Courses of Action. The G2 prepares threat COA based

upon the available information.
2. The EWCC must participate in IPB. In fact, in conjunction with National Assets, it is
responsible to prepare the SIGINT IPB. This will allow the G2 to more fully understand the
electronic battlefield when preparing the ICP. This in turn will provide direction to the EWCC for
ES through the ISTAR CC. The IPB process is a useful tool for the EWCC in preparation for ES
operations.
3. Targeting is defined as “the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate
response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.”35 The targeting
process assists the commander by determining which targets are to be acquired and attacked,
when they are to be attacked and what is required to defeat the target. A target is an adversary
function, formation or equipment, facility or terrain planned for destruction, neutralization or
35
AAP 6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-25
suppression in order to delay, disrupt, divert, limit or destroy the adversary.36 Targeting links the
commander, the sensors and the engagement systems. The targeting process has four
functions:
a. Decide. Decide is the cornerstone of the targeting process and requires close
coordination between the commander and the intelligence, plans, operations
and targeting team elements. The process begins with receipt of a mission,
whether assigned by higher HQ or deduced by the commander. The
commander, with input from his staff, analyses the mission and considers the
tasks that must be performed. Targeting priorities must be addressed for each
phase or critical event of an operation.
b. Detect. Detect is the next critical step in the targeting process. The G2 is the
main figure in this step as he coordinates the effort to detect high payoff targets
(HPTs) identified in the decide function. To ensure there is no duplication of
effort, specific direction is given to target acquisition systems capable of
detecting high priority targets. Information needs are expressed as priority
intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs). The detect
function is carried out through the execution of the ICP.
c. Deliver. The deliver function of the targeting process executes the AGM and
supports the commander’s battle plan once the HPTs have been located and
identified. During the detect function, it is the TA assets that have to be
managed. The deliver function provides the framework for the efficient
employment of firing assets. The attack of targets must satisfy the attack
guidance developed during the decide function.
d. Assess. Combat assessment is the determination of the effectiveness of force

employment (FE) during military operations. It is composed of three elements
as follows:
(1) Battlefield Damage Assessment. Battlefield Damage Assessment

(BDA) is the timely and accurate assessment of damage resulting from
the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a
target. It provides commanders with an estimate of the adversary’s
combat effectiveness, capabilities and intentions.
(2) Munitions Effect Assessment. Munitions Effect Assessment (MEA) is

used as the basis for recommendations for changes to increase the
effectiveness of tactics, methodology, weapon system selection,
munitions and weapon delivery patterns.
(3) Recommendations for Re-attack. This aspect considers the

requirement for another attack if the desired effect on the target has not
been achieved.
36
B-GL-300-007/FP-001 Firepower Chapter 3.
4-26 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
4. The EW system is involved in the targeting process in two ways. Firstly, EA is integrated
as an engagement system with all of the other engagement systems at the commander’s
disposal. The EWCC, which is a member of the targeting team, is responsible for the
integration, tasking and control of EA based on the targeting priorities. The second way that the
EW system is involved in the targeting process is that the entire EW system is required to
conduct its own targeting process for effective EA support.
5. The EWCC with the targeting team conducts the decide function for EA. The targeting
team will recommend the use of EA and the control measure37 to be in effect. The ES provides
the detection function for EA. This involves the collection of information (in effect target
acquisition) in sufficient detail to allow for effective EA. For example, determination that a
specific frequency is an artillery net and its general direction is sufficient information to allow the
EWCC to target that particular net. The deliver function is conducted by the EA detachments as
directed and coordinated by the EWCC. The ES then provides the assess function by
determining if the EA has been effective and recommends new targets to the EWCC to ensure
the EA remains effective.
422. THE ISTAR PLANNING PROCESS
1. The ISTAR planning process within the formation is a continuous process much like IPB
and targeting. A cycle begins with the receipt of the commander’s guidance on completion of
his or her mission analysis. The guidance contains the PIRs that are of concern to ISTAR.
423. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
1. At this stage in the process, PIRs should be considered to be of two types. Some PIRs
are things that the commander will need to know for the execution of the mission. For example,
the commander may want to know if the adversary will delay or defend. As a result, during
execution, ISTAR will look for indications that the adversary is thinning out in preparation for a
withdrawal. Other PIRs will be for planning. For example, the commander may want to know
the extent to which the adversary’s defences have been prepared. These latter PIRs are
immediately translated into tasks in the ISTAR coordination centre (ISTAR CC) and issued out
to sensors. The EWCC converts tasks from the ISTAR CC into ES tasks.
424. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
1. Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance provides the terrain and
environment information that allows the G2 to describe the battlefield effects. The ISTAR CC
also contributes to the evaluation of the threat by providing intelligence from existing databases
and from the results of the collection efforts resulting from the PIRs issued for planning. The
EWCC will work with the ISTAR CC and the G2 to add the electronic battlefield to the G2’s IPB.
This will in turn keep the EW commander as part of the planning process and overall IPB so that
the supported commander, the G2 and the G3 have an understanding and appreciation for what
electronic targets are available and prosecutable in support of the operation.
37
See chapter 6 of B-GL-358-001/FP-001 for EA control measure measures.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-27
425. OPERATIONS PLAN DEVELOPMENT
1. As the formation operations staff develops the COA, EW planners contribute to the
development by advising on the EW contribution to each COA. The EW planners participate in
the COA war game and the plan war game in order to ensure that EW tasks are fully
synchronized with the remainder of the plan.
2. During plan development, the EWCC continues to contribute to the common operational
picture, as it collects information based upon the PIRs issued for planning. The updated
common operational picture allows the COA to be adjusted to a change in adversary disposition
or in increase in our knowledge of the adversary disposition.
426. ISTAR PLAN
1. The ISTAR plan is included as an annex to the formation operation order. Like the Fire
Support annex, the ISTAR plan is prepared by the ISTAR CC and is issued as part of the
formation operation order. The ISTAR plan describes how the assets of the ISTAR system will
be used to collect the information required in the ICP.
2. The ISTAR CC will coordinate unit ISTAR plans on behalf of the G3 ISTAR. This will
identify gaps in the ISTAR coverage and allow action to be taken to cover the gaps if possible.
It will also identify to the ISTAR CC, the ISTAR priorities of subordinate commanders, so that
information that is collected that is particularly relevant to their battles can be processed on their
behalf. The EWCC will assist in this coordination by evaluating the ES coverage of a
subordinate formation in conjunction with the SIGINT IPB.
3. ISTAR Overlay. The ISTAR overlay links the ISTAR plan, IPB and the targeting
process. The overlay details the named area of interest (NAI) and target area of interest (TAI)
that are developed during the formation OPP. Collection tasks within these NAI and TAI will be
detailed in the ISTAR annex and the ISTAR matrix.
4. ISTAR Matrix. The ISTAR matrix is an appendix to the ISTAR annex. It is based upon
the ICP produced by the G2. The ISTAR matrix relates the ICP to the ISTAR system sources
and agencies. It identifies collection tasks to ISTAR sensors and is prepared by the ISTAR CC.
The EWCC will be represented on the ISTAR matrix and is the main tasking document for ES.
It also allocates tasks to other formation units since it forms part of the formation operation
order.
5. Information Collection Plan.38 The ICP identifies the PIRs, the IRs and the combat
indicators necessary to evaluate the adversary’s COA and to predict the adversary’s future
activities. It is an appendix to the Intelligence annex to the formation operation order. It allows
all units to understand the information required to draw the appropriate conclusions about the
adversary. This is a very important document for the EWCC and the EW analyst. It allows the
EWCC to focus its analytical efforts. Conclusions drawn by the analysts must support PIRs and
IRs.
38
Examples of the ISTAR overlay, ISTAR matrix and the ICP can be found in B-GL-352-001/FP-001 Land Force
Information Operations—Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Chapter 3.
4-28 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
427. THE EW PROCESSES
1. There is not one EW Process. The EW system conducts two processes: ES and EA
processes. The EWCC is the focal point of both of these processes.
2. The Electronic Support Process. The ES process is a sub-process of the ISTAR and
intelligence processes. The ES process mirrors the intelligence cycle in that it consists of
direction, collection, processing and dissemination. The process begins with direction from
collection management on the areas to be covered. This consists of the ICP, ISTAR overlay
and ISTAR matrix. The EWCC converts these documents into specific targets such as
networks (C2, artillery, reconnaissance nets), critical nodes (command posts, communication
centres) and activities (radar, movements) that will satisfy the collection tasks. The targets are
passed to the EWOC or the analyst team for additional analysis, refinement and tasking to the
sensor systems. The sensors, both COMINT and ELINT, conduct the collection phase of
search, intercept and. The search systems continuously look for targets and pass those of
interest to intercept for further detailed collection. Direction finding is conducted to determine
locations, and this information is fused with the intercept information.
3. The EWOC or the analyst team then processes the information into a single source
intelligence product (SIGINT) disseminated in the form of TACREPs or EWSUMs. The EWOC
can also re-task the sensors as necessary. The products are then disseminated to the EWCC
who provides the results to the ASIC. The ASIC may ask for additional information from the
EWCC or request additional ES tasks through the collection managers to the EWCC.
4. The Electronic Attack Process. The EA process is a sub-process of the targeting

process. The EWCC receives EA tasks through the AGM which is developed by the targeting
team and approved by the commander. This process also provides additional ES collection
tasks that the EWCC must direct to the EW system. The ES provides the detection (target
acquisition) system for EA. The ES system must provide detailed information to allow EA to be
effective. The results of detection are provided to the EWCC to allow for the integration of EA
into the fire support plan. The G3, through the fire support coordination centre (FSCC), then
authorizes EA. The EWCC then tasks EA elements to conducts attacks. The ES then monitors
and provides an assessment of EA effectiveness to the EWCC. This EA assessment is
provided to the targeting team who start the process again.
5. The conduct of EA will have a direct effect on the ES collection. The ES resources
normally dedicated to ES tasks will be required to monitor the effects of EA and will thus cause
some degradation of the ES effort. Normally, many of the EA targets have been well developed
and, therefore, the ES effort will not be completely degraded to support EA. ES should continue
during EA activities. If necessary, the G3 ISTAR will make the decision on the priority of effort
based on advice from the EWCC, the G6 and the G2. The G6 must be involved in the planning
process regarding EA assets to ensure the RFL is being obeyed, on behalf of the G3, and to
ensure there is a limitation of any signals fratricide. This is a risk assessment that must be
presented to the supported commander.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-29
SECTION 8
ELECTRONIC DECEPTION
All warfare is based on deception.
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War, c. 500 BC, tr. Griffith.
1. Electronic deception (ED) is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption

or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract or seduce an adversary or
his electronic systems. Electronic deception is a component of the commander’s overall
deception plan39, which, in turn, is part of the commander’s overall information operation plan.
428. AIM
1. The aim of deception is to mislead the adversary commander and induce him into doing
something counter to his interests. The EM spectrum is an ideal medium to employ deceptive
techniques because it is shared with the adversary. His ES system is a means to provide him
false information. Electronic deception is employed as part of an overall tactical deception plan
and cannot be practiced indiscriminately. Careful scripting and control at the highest possible
level are required as well as highly skilled operators who must be well briefed. On the other
hand, low-level imitative deception can be attempted by EW elements if the aim is limited to
delaying adversary traffic from a few minutes to a few hours or if there is an opportunity to
temporarily confuse adversary commanders at formation or unit level. Electronic deception is a
potent weapon with few of the disadvantages of jamming, but it can be very expensive in
manpower and equipment.
429. PLANNING
1. Electronic deception must be considered during the planning phase of any deception
plan. The G3 has responsibility for developing the overall deception plan. The planning of ED
is the responsibility of the EWCC on behalf of the G3 (via a designated G3 IO). Many other
staffs are involved with the development of deception plans. Annex B to this chapter provides a
guide for the EWCC to plan and coordinate ED. Electronic deception is particularly effective in
the following circumstances:
a. When the adversary relies heavily on a communications and information

systems (CIS) using the EM spectrum. Electronic deception may cause the
adversary—by the manipulation, distortion or falsification of electronic
transmissions—to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
b. When the adversary ISTAR system is dependent on the ES (tactical and

national level).
39
More information on deception can be found in B-GL-354-003/FP 001
Land Force Deception.
4-30 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
c. When it is skilfully conducted and fully integrated into the overall deception plan.
d. At a critical time in the adversary’s operations.
2. All units in a formation could be involved in ED. Electronic deception is divided into
three categories:
a. Manipulative Electronic Deception. This type of ED puts out false information

over our own emitters so it can be intercepted by the adversary and treated as
real information (for example, dummy radio traffic).
b. Simulative Electronic Deception. This type of ED is the creation of electronic

signatures (for example, false radio net).
c. Imitative Electronic Deception. This type of ED emits signals designed to

convince the adversary these signals belong to the adversary (for example,
intruding on an adversary net).
SECTION 9
ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION
430. GENERAL
1. Electronic neutralization (EN) is the deliberate use of EM energy to either temporarily or

permanently damage adversary devices that rely exclusively on the EM spectrum. Electronic
neutralization is usually brought about as a result of a directed energy (DE) or particle beam
(PB) weapon depositing sufficient EM energy on a target so as to render useless the target, its
electronics or both. The use of lasers to destroy sensitive optical viewing devices is one such
example. Electronic neutralization is characterized by the requirement for LOS and the near
instantaneous time of flight (approaching or at the speed of light).
2. Electronic neutralization carries with it a risk to our own troops. As a consequence,

great care and safety must be used when employing certain types of DE weapons. Directed
energy weapons will have applications in close combat, LOS engagements. The doctrine for
employing these weapons will be contained in the manuals of those arms that employ the
weapons. EW units are not involved directly with EN. Land EW operational support may be
involved in the reprogramming of systems to detect the use of EN.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 4-31
CHAPTER 5
SIGNALS PLANNING
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1. Signals and staff have a symbiotic relationship that demands that both entities fully
understand the requirements of the other to achieve mission success. In order for Signals to
successfully provide the Command Support necessary for the staff to support the Commanders
decision-action cycle, Signals needs to understand the information exchange requirements of all
involved in that cycle in the context of the Land Operating environment (LOE). Further, Signals
must be able to provide the most suitable environment within that LOE from which to execute
that decision-action cycle efficiently and effectively. There are a significant number of factors
that affect Signals’ ability to achieve that aim. The goal of this chapter is to outline the process
and the factors that affect Signals in their provision of Command Support services. By
understanding the process and the requirements that drive it, Commanders and staff will
understand what is required of them to ensure that the Command Support provided by Signals
is the best possible, given the operational requirements.
2. A formation's Signal element is responsible for providing the Commander and staff with
the personnel, equipment and vehicles required to exercise command over subordinate
formations and units, for electronic warfare (EW) support and for the administrative support and
security of the headquarters (HQ). These responsibilities cannot be met properly unless the
efforts of the general staff and Signals are complementary. Each has to know and accept its
responsibilities towards the other.
501. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GENERAL STAFF TO SIGNALS
1. Training. The general staff assists in the preparation of training plans. The staff must
ensure that these plans direct and facilitate training of all elements of the formation in
communication procedures, equipment and facilities.
2. General responsibilities of the staff are to:
a. Inform Signals as to planned operations at the earliest possible time. This

includes information on tactical plans, e.g., groupings, movement of
headquarters and special communication requirements and specific Information
Exchange Requirements (IERs).
b. Issue orders for the opening, closing and joining of communication nets.
c. Allocate sites and routes for deployment of communications and electronic

warfare elements.
d. Enforce communication procedures, including discipline on voice nets, use of

precedence, security classifications, special handling procedures and measures
to reduce traffic.
e. Enforce policy concerning the distribution and use of codes and encryption
devices.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-1
f. Establish priorities for, and authorize issue of, communication equipment.
g. Establish priority of means to be used in communications and the order of

priority for establishing communications to units
h. Authorize the use of special dispatch service.
i. The G3 staff, with G2 and Signals advice, develops a Commanders’ EW policy

and provides staff direction to the Electronic Warfare Coordination Centre
(EWCC). The G3 staff carries out the following specific tasks in this area:
(1) Planning the employment of interception and direction-finding (DF) assets

based on the priority of intelligence requirements. The G3 also provides
assistance to these elements through the provision of advice on enemy
organizations, locations, capabilities and intentions.
(2) Establishing formation policy on the use of jamming.
(3) Preparing electronic deception (ED) plans for the formation.
(4) Establishing communications security policy, namely the application of

electronic protection measures (EPM), including policies for emission
control, such as rules for the imposition, breaking and lifting of radio or
electronic silence.
j. Through the EWCC, the general staff:
(1) Establishes lists of guarded, protected and prohibited frequencies.
(2) Adjusts tasking to intercept and DF elements and disseminates

intelligence received.
(3) Controls the employment of jammers.
502. RESPONSIBILITIES OF SIGNALS TO THE STAFF
1. General Responsibilities. The formation Signal unit has the following responsibilities:
a. Providing advice on the following communications matters:
(1) training;
(2) priority of use of communications means; and
(3) siting and moving the HQ.
b. Operation, engineering and technical control of tactical communications

(TacComms) and tactical command and control information systems (TacC2IS)
in support of the identified IERs.
c. Performance of communications and electronics equipment maintenance.
5-2 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
d. Provision of administrative support and local defence of formation HQ.
e. Managing and allocating the frequency spectrum, including maintaining and

disseminating lists of guarded, protected and prohibited frequencies.
f. Recommending sites and routes for the deployment of communications and EW

elements.
g. Advising on the state of communications, including information about delays in

handling traffic.
h. Monitoring communications security and reports security breaches.
i. Drafting the Command and Signals paragraphs and the Communications and
Electronics Annex to Operation Orders and the preparation of Communications
and Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOIs).
j. Maintaining and disseminating the correct time.
k. Providing advice on the policy and planning of EW activities and the allocation of
EW elements.
l. Adjusting the employment of intercept, DF and jamming as directed.
m. Controlling the execution of ED tasks.
503. SIGNALS COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. To work efficiently, the tactical Signal systems must be co-ordinated as one entity;
therefore, a control system must be established at all levels of command. Control aims at the
best utilization of all systems in order to meet operational requirements. A considerable degree
of centralized planning and overall control is necessary to eliminate undesirable duplication or,
alternatively, to exploit available systems to their full potential. However, substantial delegation
of authority is required in the execution of the Signal plan.
2. Controlling agencies are fielded as part of Signal units; they exist to assist key Signal
officers in discharging their responsibilities towards Commanders and staffs. Control and co-
ordination of tactical systems is exercised from the highest to the lowest levels of command;
thus, at any level, a Signal officer (Sig O) is operationally responsible to his or her Commander
and subject to technical control instructions issued by the senior Sig O at the next higher level of
command.
504. SIGNALS PLANNING PRINCIPLES
1. To be effective and meet the requirements of Commanders at all levels, Signals must
provide the Command Support necessary to sustain the Land Command Support System
(LCSS) in accordance with certain principles. All of these principles are interrelated although
they may not be mutually compatible in all circumstances. Their application and their relative
importance in planning and in operations must therefore be weighed against the specific needs
in every situation.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-3
2. Capacity. The system must be capable of handling the traffic generated by the users
within the specified time frame, in the required mode and without inhibiting the tempo of
operations. Constant monitoring of the LCSS must be carried out to ensure that operated
systems are engineered to meet the capacity needed for peak loads. These peak load periods
can be anticipated with the co-operation of users.
3. Economy. The increasing complexity of warfare means that more and more of the effort
has to be diverted from the primary function of fighting to tasks that, although essential, are
ancillary. One of these tasks is the provision of an LCSS. It must therefore be as economical
as possible and demand the least amount of human and material resources for its operation and
maintenance. It is important that LCSS facilities be allocated in accordance with operational
priorities and that their use be strictly controlled to ensure they serve the intended purpose.
4. Economy is realized by ensuring that:
a. demands for facilities are kept to a minimum;
b. signal plans are based on the minimum scale needed to accomplish the tactical
mission; and
c. signal spares and reserve holdings are properly planned to promote reliability
and flexibility.
5. Flexibility. This is the ability to react to changing situations and unexpected

developments. Changes in requirements may result from alterations to operational plans or
from enemy action.
6. Flexibility also implies the ability to provide systems which are interoperable and can be
adapted to diverse operations and/or combat functions.
7. Flexibility is gained by:
a. forethought in planning and anticipation of contingencies;
b. standing operating procedures (SOPs) and drills to reduce the time needed to
plan and redeploy LCSS components;
c. high standard of efficiency in establishing and maintaining LCSS components;
d. close co-ordination between the user and the Signal planner; and
e. systems that are user-oriented and can be used for a variety of combat
functions.
8. Mobility. This is the ability to deploy everywhere on the battlefield and to meet the
needs of the user without restricting freedom of action and ability to manoeuvre. LCSS
components must have the same tactical mobility as the forces being supported.
9. Mobility is also enhanced by the design of communication systems that allow for
separate movement of user HQs and Signal facilities (e.g., an area trunk system).
5-4 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
10. Reliability. Reliability is the capability of a system to operate efficiently within the
specified performance standards, for a planned period of time and under the conditions likely to
be encountered. The system must remain available to the user for traffic despite damages and
technical failures. Its maintenance and restoration requirements must be satisfied within
allowed and available resources.
11. Reliability is mainly achieved by providing:
a. Diversity. The provision of multiple means for a particular combat function

lessens the probability of total failure.
b. Alternative Routing. Communication systems must be designed to provide
alternative paths between points in the system so that the loss of a single facility
or link does not result in the failure of the system.
c. Reserve. To replace a disrupted portion of the system, a reserve of personnel
and equipment must be available. To be effective, this reserve must be located
and placed on an appropriate stand-by status so as to be able to intervene
quickly.
d. Training. A high standard of individual and collective competence among all
personnel assigned to LCSS must be maintained in order to meet the
challenges of the land force (LF) operating environment.
e. Maintenance. The system must be engineered so as to be easy to maintain
with few resources. In the combat zone, the maintenance system must be
capable of immediate restoration of key elements.
12. Security. Security measures must be applied strictly in order to:
a. deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from

monitoring LCSS components; and
b. prevent intrusion and imitative deception.
13. To achieve security it is essential that every LCSS user know and observe the Signal
security procedures established to ensure the protection of classified traffic, documents and
equipment. Security should be applied in balance with the requirement to ensure that critical
information remains available to Commanders when and where they require it.
14. Simplicity. The simpler the system, the more likely it is to withstand the stresses of war.
Simple systems are easily operated, readily adaptable and easy to deploy and maintain.
15. Land Command Support System components must be designed as much as possible to
be operated by users with minimum training. Any design that increases the level of technical
complexity must produce equivalent improvements in operational effectiveness.
16. Survivability. The system has to be capable of withstanding physical and electronic
attacks by the enemy. In particular, equipments must be designed to operate effectively in an
environment with a severe electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threat. Equipment has to be hardened,
facilities protected and alternate facilities provided. Personnel are to be well trained in
defensive measures, EPM procedures and restoration drills.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-5
17. Timeliness. Combat information has a short useful life span. In order to be successful,
Commanders must complete their command and control (C2) process in a shorter time frame
than their opponents. The LCSS components must therefore be engineered, organized and
operated so as to allow the processing and transmission of combat information within the
required time frame. Staff and Signal personnel are to be imbued with a sense of urgency.
505. SIGNALS PLANNING PROCESS
1. To promulgate the direction required to execute Signal plans, a system of orders and
instructions is used. These may be issued through either staff or Signal channels, according to
their nature. In general, Signal matters which are part of the Commander's plan or that touch on
the authority or resources of subordinate Commanders are covered by orders issued by the
Commander or in his name by the formation Sig O. Detailed technical instructions necessary to
provide Signal support to further the Commander's plan are issued directly by Signals. The
major part of this chapter deals directly with the Signal Estimate by design, as it is the
foundation process used in generating the subsequent Signals orders and instructions.
2. The Figure 5-1 represents a Signals Planning Process model as applied to the current
LCSS, which may be adapted to cover any integrated information system/communications
system (IS/CS).
Figure 5-1: LCSS Planning Flowchart
5-6 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
SECTION 2
SIGNAL ESTIMATE
506. GENERAL
1. This section describes a Signal Estimate, which outlines the planning considerations and
process that is required to determine the requisite Signal support to the LF. The process of
Signal planning starts with a Signal estimate, which generates the plan used to formulate any
subsequent Signal orders and instructions. The estimate of the situation is a time-honoured
process, which is used by Commanders at various levels to ensure that complex problems are
considered thoroughly in a logical process of reasoning. The Signal estimate process can be
quickly stated as an activity by which a Sig O follows a logical process of reasoning to consider
all the circumstances and factors affecting the military situation and decide on the course of
action to be taken in order to accomplish the assigned tactical mission.
2. The mental process used is the same for both the tactical and the Signal estimate. It is
important to keep the following differences clearly in mind when considering the Signal estimate
vis-à-vis its tactical counterpart:
a. Relative Importance of Terrain. Tactical estimates tend to be terrain-centric.

For a manoeuvre Commander, the terrain is one of the most important factors to
be considered. The Sig O must, however, always bear in mind that the terrain is
seldom as important to his plan as it is to those of his combat arms colleagues.
The major concern for the Sig O will be the effects of terrain upon Signal
propagation, since issues such as routes (of great concern to the tactical
Commander) will normally be mandated in the operation order given him.
Consequently, Signal estimates seldom consider the terrain to the degree of
detail that the tactical estimate will; and
b. Relative Importance of Mission Analysis. Mission analysis, particularly at the

lower levels of command (combat team and battle group) tends to be relatively
simple for the tactical Commander. Most tactical tasks are well understood and
clearly articulated in our doctrine. Furthermore, the tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs) for accomplishing them are, in theory, standardized across
the Army. The supporting Signal Commander does not enjoy the same luxury.
Signal tasks are generally not well understood outside of the Signal community.
As a result, the Signal Commander will likely find the assigned task to be vague
and almost always open-ended (e.g. “Provide Signal support to … throughout
Op ….”). The Signal estimate must, therefore, spend considerable time and
effort on mission analysis to ensure that the full scope and implications of the
assigned task(s) are understood.
507. INFORMATION PRESENTATION
1. Prior to the advent of modern information technology, it was nearly impossible to quickly
produce and mass-distribute information in any other way than text based documents.
However, the text-based approach to a Signal estimate is inefficient. Large quantities of text are
required to communicate Signal concepts clearly, which can lead to fatigue, if not outright
confusion for the reader. In addition, a text-based estimate can take an inordinate amount of
time to produce.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-7
2. The following presents a methodology for conducting and presenting a Signal estimate
using a largely graphical format. It is a guide, not a template. Used intelligently it can make the
Signal estimate easier to conduct and to present. Used blindly, it will hinder, rather than help
the process. Remember, the estimate is a tool whose effectiveness will be dictated by the skill
with which it is applied.
508. METHODOLOGY
1. The Signal estimate can be effectively divided into the following stages:
a. Mission Analysis, in which we:
(1) determine the user requirement;
(2) translate the user requirement into Signal terms using a service-centric
approach; and
(3) determine the restrictions on our freedom of action in meeting the user
requirement.
b. Evaluation of Factors, in which we identify the internal and external factors that
will affect the operational situation and analyze the potential effects of each. For
ease of review, these factors are normally considered in the following standard
order:
(1) friendly forces (including the communications information systems (CIS)

capabilities of attached elements);
(2) enemy/opposing forces;
(3) environment;
(4) surprise;
(5) security;
(6) time and space;
(7) technical; and
(8) other.
c. Development of Potential Courses of Action, in which we:
(1) brainstorm options;
(2) assess the suitability of each potential option;
(3) prepare a shortlist of Courses of Action (COA) which are deemed to be

the best candidates for meeting the user requirement in this situation; and
(4) prepare a Decision Briefing.
5-8 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
d. Deliver the Decision Briefing, in which the Commander is presented with the
shortlist of options developed above.
e. Developing a Detailed Plan based upon the COA selected by the Commander.
2. On operations, assumptions will be inevitable throughout the estimate process, since

perfect situational awareness is virtually unachievable. When considering assumptions, three
things must be borne in mind throughout:
a. Realism. An assumption must be an extrapolation from known facts, not simply

a wild guess. An assumption must not be unduly optimistic (assuming away the
problem) and as a general rule should reflect the worst-case scenario.
b. Documentation. Assumptions must always be documented. For ease of

reference, assumptions should be listed in one place, whether at the beginning
of the estimate or in an annex to it.
c. Approval. Any assumption used in your estimate must be approved by a higher

authority. The approving authority may vary; however, one will always exist. If
you don’t know identity of the approving authority, find out before you start the
estimate.
3. Commanders, Operations Officers (Ops O) and Chiefs of Staff (COS) have a vested
interest in the success of the Signals Plan and are a valuable source of information to provide
clarification to any questions that may arise while completing your estimate. Seek out advice
when you do not understand something.
509. DETERMINING THE REQUIREMENT
1. During operations adequate preparation time is not the norm. At best, you may be
handed a draft operations order, given a few minutes in which to ask questions and then be
expected to produce a draft Signal plan in a matter of hours. At worst, you may find that you are
expected to develop your Signal plan concurrent with, if not in advance of, the development of
the tactical plan. To aid in production of the estimate the following points must be governing
factors:
a. Speak the User’s Language. Know your tactical doctrine at the level at which
you are employed. Be familiar with any modifications of meaning or terminology
that your supported tactical Commander uses;
b. Understand the Higher Signal Plan. Signals Officers frequently find

themselves in the situation of having to please two masters: their supported
tactical Commander and their higher Signal Commander. Consequently, you
would be well advised to conduct a mission analysis of both the tactical plan,
which must be supported, and the higher Signal plan, which you are expected to
integrate into;
c. Don’t Try to Do it All Yourself. Our métier is so complex that no one

individual, regardless of rank or appointment, can know everything. Engage
your experts at the very beginning of the estimate process. This will ensure that
your plan will not require a waiver to the laws of nature to be executed; and
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-9
d. Use Assumptions Judiciously. Avoid “assuming away the problem” with a

plan founded upon significant assumptions that are unlikely to be proven
correct. As further information becomes available throughout the planning
process the number of assumptions in your estimate should gradually be
reduced as they are replaced by constraints, restrictions or additional support
requirement.
2. Mission Analysis. Within the Estimate of the Situation, the accepted tool for
determining the user requirement is Mission Analysis. A detailed exposition of Mission Analysis
is found in B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations. It should be read in detail and
pondered at length. In summary, Mission Analysis consists of the following steps:
a. Determine the Superior Commander’s Intent. The “Superior Commander” is

the Commander two levels above you. (E.g. if you are the Sig O of 2 RCHA,
your Superior Commander will normally be the Commander of 2 CMBG).
b. Determine your Commander’s Intent and Concept of Operations. Your

Commander’s Intent tells you what the comd is going to do. The Concept of
Operations articulates how the comd intends to accomplish it.
c. Determine your Higher Formation Signal Commander’s Intent and Concept

of Communications. Assess the higher formation Signal plan to evaluate the
impact on your Mission Analysis.
d. Determine Assigned and Implied Tasks. An assigned task is obvious. An

implied task is one that, although you have not been specifically told to do it, you
must carry out to accomplish an assigned task. For example, frequency
deconfliction and clearance is an implied task within the assigned task
“coordinate Signal support for Joint Task Force ….” As stated earlier,
determining your implied tasks is critical. Your subject matter experts can
provide you with invaluable assistance here.
e. Determine your Constraints and Restraints. It is recommended that at this

point one focus only on the constraints and restraints handed down by higher
authority (operational and procedural) and ignore technological issues until later.
Constraints and restraints from higher authority will include such issues as radio
silence, timings to be met and routes to be used. Depending upon the nature or
scope of the operation, you may also find implied constraints expressed as
timings or milestones for the availability of certain services (e.g. “TITAN will be
used as the primary command and control system at JTFHQ beginning D+2”).
f. Regularly Review the Results. No plan survives contact and neither should
any Mission Analysis. As the situation changes or new factors come to light,
review the Mission Analysis to ensure that the results are still valid. If they are
not, then redo the Mission Analysis.
3. Define the Requirement in Signal Terms. Once the Mission Analysis is complete, you
should have a clear understanding of what is required. Producing a network diagram at this
point is a useful and efficient way of translating this into Signal terms. If supporting a multi-
phased operation with regroupings between phases, it will be useful to produce a separate
network diagram for each phase. A useful and logical methodology for determining the Signal
support requirement is to:
5-10 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
Figure 5-2: Connectivity Overlay
a. Determine the Connectivity Requirement. Using a diagram similar to that

shown above, show each organization that you are responsible for providing
communications to, and indicate who needs to communicate with whom.
Include the relative priority of each link (This will be given to you. If it is not, use
standing operating procedures (SOPs) or common sense: e.g. a command net
always takes priority over an administration net.) For reasons that will become
obvious in a moment, it will be helpful to do this in the form of an overlay, scaled
to the map.
b. Determine the Information Exchange Requirements. Having determined the

connectivity requirements, the next step is to determine the nature, quantity and
classification of the information that must be shared between each station as
well as how often it must be shared. (A diagram similar to that shown below for
each element of your supported organization is useful) You will likely find that
for doctrinal organizations and operations determining IERs is straightforward,
since they are implicit in the tactical and Signal doctrines that describe how the
organization(s) conduct the operation. For non-doctrinal organizations and
operations you will have to take considerable pains to ensure that your mission
analysis has captured all the IERs of your supported organizations(s).
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-11
Figure 5-3: IER Overlay
c. Determine the Information Services Requirement. Having determined the

connectivity requirement and the IERs, the next step is to translate these into
the information services required to support them. Information Services
generally fall into one of three categories (voice, fax and data) delivered in either
secure or non-secure form. Voice and fax services are largely standardized, but
care must be taken when considering data services since the technical
requirements for delivery vary markedly between services. As with IERs, it will
be found that doctrinally standard situations are far simpler than non-doctrinal
ones.
Figure 5-4: Information Services Requirement Overlay
5-12 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
d. Determine the Restrictions on Your Freedom of Action. Having determined

the operational requirement and expressed it in Signal terms, it is imperative
that you fully understand those constraints and restraints that will limit the
options available in meeting them. Simply put, a constraint is a requirement to
do something (e.g. maintain a reserve) while a restraint is a prohibition (e.g. no
recce before last light). Constraints and restraints may be operational (e.g.
“radio silence will be in effect on all VHF nets from D – 1 until first contact”)
procedural (e.g. frequency clearance requests must be submitted to Directorate
Telecommunications and Spectrum Engineering and Support (DTSES) at least
90 days in advance of the requirement) or technical (e.g. a very high frequency
(VHF) link has more intrinsic bandwidth available than a high frequency (HF)
link.) A useful approach is to list these as shown in the table in figure 5-5 below
(Note: CIS equipment and systems listed in the table in figure 5-5 are current as
of the year 2006). Note that while operational and procedural requirements may
be relaxed, technical restrictions are notoriously inflexible.
CATEGORY CONSTRAINT/RESTRAINT EFFECTS

Operational Rad si in eff on all VHF nets from D – 1 until Alt comms means reqr.
first contact SAS unaval.
Wh veh tfc limited to HEART rte for Ph 2 Impact upon SDS rtes
Line may only be laid at ni fwd of BIG DOG May impact sequencing of line tasks
DAG to be completed by D-4 to allow time for Time aval for other pre-depl prep reduced.
pre-depl leave Possible scheduling conflicts.
Procedural TITAN is an CANUS-eyes-only system. LOs from other nations cannot have access to
TITAN or TITAN products. Must determine
Comd’s concept for empl of recv LOs and
ensure segregation of TITAN is achieved.
Cdn crypto may not be provided to non-Cdn Att UK Recce Sqn cannot be on Cdn secur nets
units without approval from NDHQ. Min 5 until approval recv. Advise G3. Develop
working days reqr to process req. contingency plan for use in the interim and in
the event that the req is denied.
Technical Cdn INMARSAT HSD lease limited to two Only two terminals will be able to browse
licenses for Theatre Activation. DWAN or pass large files. Remaining will be
limited to 9.6 kBps dial-up. Advise COS and
get pri of empl for HSD terminals.
North American standard STU-III incompatible Only two European-compatible STU-III aval.
with European eqpt. Seek loan from G6 of 1 (UK) Armd Div. Get pri
of empl of existing terminals from COS.
Figure 5-5: Table Describing Constraints and Restraints
510. CONSIDERATION OF EXTERNAL FACTORS (SIGNAL PREPARATION OF THE

BATTLEFIELD)
1. Having determined what Information Services are required, the next step is to determine
the best means of delivering them. In some situations the answer will be straightforward and
simple: usually because only one delivery means is available. Other situations may be more
complex. A thorough, logical analysis of the external environment and how it will affect your
delivery of information services (this process is sometimes referred to as the Signal Preparation
of the Battlefield) will give you a high degree of confidence that your resulting plan will not be
held up in future years as a good example of how not to do things.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-13
2. Signal Preparation of the Battlefield is best done link-by-link, rather than the terrain-
centric approach of ground left/centre/right used in the tactical estimate. Begin by considering
technical requirements and friendly force capabilities. While this will likely shock your
manoeuvre arm colleagues, it makes sense to eliminate alternatives that cannot support the
required Information Services as early as possible. Furthermore, this will enable you to identify
at the outset if you have Information Service Delivery requirements that your current equipment
cannot support due to technical limitations. Consider the remaining Information Service
Delivery options against, as a minimum, the following external factors:
a. Enemy/Opposing Forces/Local Population. The presence, location, strength

and intentions of the enemy/opposing forces/local population may affect such
things as physical security for your personnel.
b. Environment. Environment includes such things as distance, topography and
climate (with respect to their effects upon Signal propagation) as well as routes,
roads and existing CIS infrastructure.
c. Surprise. Surprise, in this case, refers to the effects upon the enemy.
d. Security. Consider all aspects of the security problem including, but not limited
to, physical security, cryptography, information security and emission security.
e. Time and Space (Scheduling). Manoeuvre estimates tend to treat time and
space as a relatively simple speed and distance problem (e.g. how long will it
take a tank squadron to move from BIG DOG to MANGY CAT during an
advance to contact). While the deployment of CIS equipment is limited by the
same constraints, which govern all army vehicles, this is not always the limiting
factor in determining how quickly Signal support can be provided. Network
configuration, database population/updating, Signal mapping (for satellite
systems) and the testing of cable plants can all impact on the speed with which
services can be provided or restored. Careful consideration here will enable you
to manage your supported Commander’s expectations early.
f. Sustainment and Support. Consider the requirements for resupply of
consumables (water, rations and fuel) spare parts, medical support etc. This is
of particular importance in countries where the existing CIS infrastructure is
limited.
g. Technical Issues. Consider any technical issues affecting the link which have
not already come to light elsewhere. Examples include interoperability with
allies and partners, user training, cost etc.
3. Presentation. Signal Preparation of the Battlefield presents its results in the form of a
graphical and tabular product: the Service Delivery Assessment (SDA). A separate SDA is
prepared for each required service identified to this point in the Signal estimate, identifying the
factors and deductions pertinent to each. If the SDA is large, it may be helpful to break it into a
number of smaller SDAs each of which considers a subset of the applicable factors. A sample
SDA for a single link (C/S 1 to C/S 0) is shown below. Note that this is an indicative example
only. An actual SDA would contain considerably more facts and deductions!
5-14 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
511. SERVICE DELIVERY ASSESSMENT
INFORMATION SERVICE REQUIRED POTENTIAL DELIVERY MEANS AVAILABLE

Secur Vox Tac rad
INMARSAT/STU-III
Civ Telecom
Secur Fax INMARSAT/STU-III
Civ Telecom
DEMS/DIN (high speed) Mil Wide Area System (WAS)
Civ Telecom
INMARSAT HSD
MMSGT
TITAN (high speed) Mil Wide Area System (WAS)
Civ Telecom
INMARSAT HSD
MMSGT
512. ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL FACTORS
FACTOR FACT DEDUCTION COMMENTS
Enemy/Opposing
Forces/Local
Population
Tac Rad: VHF only

Stations separated viable with RRB. HF a
by 150 km. Terrain possible option.
consists largely of INMARSAT/STU-III: no
undulating savannah issues
Environment with dominating Recce task to determine
ground around GR Civ Telecom: no issues if
if Civ Telecom svc aval
UT 7897 Civ Telecom aval
between these two stns.
MMSGT: No issues
Surprise
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-15
FACTOR FACT DEDUCTION COMMENTS

Tac Rad:
only op secure.
Coloc RRB with
Opposing Forces other elms for protection
have advanced
INMARSAT/STU-III: no
EW/SIGINT
issues
capability and are
expected to tgt Cdn Civ Telecom:
Contingent. Physical Only op secure
Security
atk of Cdn Do not make civ
Contingent possible. telecom “single pt of
failure.”
MMSGT: Bulk encryption
reqr.
Tac Rad: VHF assets

will likely reqr a wk to
depl to loc and set up. See att GANTT chart for
Nets should open by D-1 tac rad depl timelines
if no delays encountered
with RSOMI
See att GANTT chart for
INMARSAT/STU-III: no
INMARSAT depl
Sig Tp Main Body will issues
timelines
Time and Space not arr in theatre until
D-10 Civ Telecom: unknown if Cfm with NDHQ J6 Ops
civ telecom exists or is on state and aval of Civ
aval for lease. Telecom in theatre.
MMSGT: MMSGT will
reqr a min of 7 days after
arr to be OPRED. See att GANTT chart for
Alternate Rear Link MMSGT depl timelines
comms reqr during that
pd.
Sustainment
and Support
Technical
Issues
1. Only deductions that meet the following rules of thumb should be recorded:
a. Is This a Change to Normal Practice? If the deduction is an SOP activity,

then there is no point in including it, unless your non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) really like being told how to do their jobs. A deduction along the line of
“vehicles must be fuelled prior to the road move” is a waste of time. A deduction
that “vehicles must be issued two extra jerry cans of diesel prior to the road
move” is worth recording.
5-16 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
b. Is this my responsibility? If the deduction relates to somebody else’s job, it is

worth noting only as a potential restriction upon your own freedom of action. For
example, the medical and administrative preparation of you and your personnel
prior to a deployment (a DAG) will be done for you. There is no point noting
lengthy deductions about immunization requirements and rules of engagement
(ROE) briefings unless you are going to be “mounting yourself.” What you
should note in this case is that the time required for administrative preparations
for deployment will be a constraint upon the other pre-deployment activities
which you will be responsible for carrying out.
c. Is This Going to Affect My Plan? If the deduction is not going to affect how
you do business, don’t bother recording it. However, before you cast the
deduction aside be very certain that it will not, under any circumstance, affect
what you do. Not many deductions will fall into this category, but a few may. A
good example is a nationally mandated procedure where you have no flexibility
in its application (e.g. cryptographic storage and accounting).
513. ANALYSIS
1. Analysis, the application of expert judgment to facts to determine their significance, has
been referred to as the “dark mystery” of the estimate process simply because it is by nature a
subjective activity. While the expertise of one’s judgment is certainly a function of experience
(among other things) it is possible to conduct analysis in a structured and coherent way. The
following process is suggested as a starting point:
a. Summary of Requirements and Deductions. For each service, summarize

your requirements and key deductions in one place. This could be done in
tabular form, on a separate overlay or a link diagram.
b. Identify Options. For each service, eliminate those options that are precluded
by the laws of nature and/or other factors (e.g. if a high speed, large bandwidth
data capability is a requirement, you can safely eliminate HF as a means of
delivery). Further analyze the remaining service delivery options as follows:
(1) Augmentation Requirements. Identify any augmentation you would

require to your existing resources to make each option workable (e.g.
additional radio rebroadcast (RRBs)).
(2) Sustainment and Support Requirements. Identify any special logistical

requirements associated with each option. (E.g. a manned RRB
Detachment (Det) has sustainment and support requirements that an
unmanned Det does not have.) Furthermore, if cost is an issue, identify
the indicative cost associated with each option (i.e. this can be a planning
factor for such services as morale calls).
(3) Security. Identify the overall security risk (and the resources required to
mitigate it) associated with each option. A thorough understanding of this
will be essential if (when) changes are required to the plan and you are
required to provide rapid assessments of the security risks inherent in a
proposed change.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-17
(4) Flexibility. For each option consider the following:
(a) How easily can the scale of service provided be expanded?

(b) How easily can the delivery option be reconfigured to meet
changing requirements?
514. DEVELOPING AND ASSESSING COURSES OF ACTION
1. The penultimate step in the estimate process is the development and assessment of
COA that will enable you to achieve your operational tasks within the existing operational
environment. This is often done in a two-phase process: a brainstorming session, in which
concepts of operations are generated, followed by an assessment of the merits and
shortcomings of each COA in relation to the operational situation. Regardless of the approach
taken it is essential that COA be:
a. Distinctive. To merit consideration as a distinct course of action, a concept of

operations must differ in some substantial way from all others under
consideration. If it does not, then it is not a truly unique option, but simply a
variation upon a theme. The distinctiveness (or lack thereof) of a concept of
operations from its fellows can be assessed by asking the following questions:
(1) Communications Means. Do the primary and alternate means of
communications differ for the operation or for any phase of the operation?
If they do not, then you are likely looking at a mere variation on another
concept of operations.
(2) Sequencing of Activities. Does the sequencing of activities differ from
other COA sufficiently to affect my subordinate’s tasks and priorities of
work? A major change to the sequence and priority of cable-plant
installation would qualify as “distinctive,” whereas a variation on a Signals
Dispatch Service (SDS) route would likely not.
(3) Support Concepts. Does the support concept differ significantly? For
example, a COA that envisioned all second-line support being provided
by allies would be distinct from one in which all second-line support was
provided by an in-theatre contractor. Two COA that both envisioned
contractor support (from different agencies) would be variations on a
theme.
b. Realistic. Courses of Action must not make unwarranted assumptions. As
discussed earlier, the estimate is no place for wishful thinking. Furthermore,
resist the temptation to produce a “throwaway” COA whose only purpose is to
demonstrate your creativity or to make an alternate COA look better by
comparison. One must be prepared to execute any of the proposed COA if
directed to do so.
2. Assessing the relative merits of COA is a largely subjective activity. However, it is

essential that one be able to readily present the merits and risks of each COA proposed. A
table similar to that shown in the table in figure 5-6 (Note: CIS equipment is current as of the
year 2006) below is an excellent way of doing this and, when considered in relation to the
Commander’s known priorities and concerns, should make it relatively easy to select the optimal
COA from the options under consideration.
5-18 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
COURSE OF
ADVANTAGES RISKS REMARKS
ACTION
1. INMARSATs with each patrol 1. Strategic link Strategic Comms
give high reliability comms in high- redundancy reduced since assets att
threat areas. INMARSATS det to ptls. TACOM – auth
2. Reliance upon our own cable 2. Line stores arrival date reqr from CF J6 to
RABID GERBIL assets in planning reduces risk in theatre cannot be det INMARSATs.
since theatre recce not yet guaranteed, possible Alternatively, add
completed. delays in full OPRED date INMARSAT terms
of JTF HQ and leases may
be reqr.
1. Use of IRIS VHF in ptls reduces 1. Mountainous terrain Guaranteed
trg burden on Sig Ops, since Coy means that VHF comms comms with ptls
signalers fully trg on IRIS OPCAP will reqr RRB depl to be essential since
DRUNKEN 1. reliable. Additional RRBs force protection is
DUCK 2. Contracting cable plant constr in may be reqr. Comd’s primary
theatre reduces work load on own 2. Unknown if cable stores concern.
tps. and expertise aval locally,
TAVs may still be reqr.
Figure 5-6: Table Describing Comparison of Courses of Action
515. THE DECISION BRIEFING
1. Once the COA has been developed and assessed, it will be time to present them to the
supported Commander, who will decide what they really want to do. A full discussion of
Decision Briefings is outside of the scope of this publication; however, the following guidelines
should be respected in all cases:
a. Clarity. Make the advantages and disadvantages of each potential COA

obvious. Make it clear which COA you are recommending and why.
b. Accuracy. Ensure that your briefing draws a clear distinction between facts,
inferences and speculation. There is a world of difference between knowing
something to be true and hoping that it is true.
c. Simplicity. Keep the structure of the briefing clean and easy to follow.
516. PRESENTING THE PLAN
1. Once the supported Commander has selected a COA for implementation, the estimate
will then have to be turned it into a clear, concise plan that subordinates can execute. There are
multiple ways of doing this:
a. a written operation order;

b. a Communications and Electronics (C&E) Annex to an operation order;
c. an overlay order with a Communications Electronics Operating Instructions
(CEOI) attached; or
d. a combination of the above.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-19
2. The primary difficulty in conducting the Signal estimate has not been the estimate
process itself, but rather the difficulty inherent in clearly and efficiently communicating the
reasoning process used. A more formatted formal method for drafting a Signal estimate will be
published in the Army Communications-Electronics Standard Instructions (CESI).
517. KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL PLANNING
1. The ability of Sig Os to plan successfully the Signal support of operations depends to a
great extent on:
a. the receipt of the accurate, complete, up-to-date and early information needed;
b. the ability to think through the Signal problem in a logical but expeditious
manner;
c. a thorough knowledge of Signal personnel and CIS equipment capabilities
including those of cooperating forces;
d. a thorough understanding of tactical concepts and plans;
e. streamlined battle procedure, aided by C2IS software programs, to speed up the
planning process and to enhance the ability to react to unforeseen events; and
f. good communication capability to be able to impart one's intention quickly and
accurately whilst gaining the cooperation of subordinates and allies.
2. Liaison and Visits. Visits are essential to confirm the adequacy of communications
services, to assess the situation and to obtain advance information. A Sig O makes frequent
visits to the various staff centres and to subordinate Sig Os periodically to gain early warning of
impending moves or operations visits. Also, the inspection of deployed detachments to ensure
that systems are functioning properly and to detect emerging problems is essential.
518. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS ANNEXES
1. Orders detailing the tasks and grouping of several Signal elements and giving the
essential coordination details required to ensure the execution of the Signal plan in support of
an operation are issued by formation Commanders or in their name by formation Sig Os.
Depending on the formation SOPs or the complexity of the tasks, formation Sig Os will normally
choose to issue simple orders in the appropriate paragraph of the Op O; further detailed orders
will be issued as an EW annex and a CE annex to the Op O. These annexes may be issued
simultaneously with or separately from the main body of the Op O when Signal deployment
timings preclude coordination of the issue. In all cases, the main body of the Op O makes
reference to the annexes. Supplemental instructions may be issued as Fragmentary Orders
(FRAGOs) to the main Op O at any time.
519. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS OPERATION ORDER
1. The Communications-Electronics Operation Order (CE Op O) is normally issued by the

Commander or Commanding Officer (CO) of a Signal formation or unit to those elements under
his command. Thus a CE Op O could be issued by the CO of a Bde HQ and Sig Sqn to his
troop Commanders. In a Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) operation a CE Op O
5-20 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
may be issued by the formation Sig O to other elements under command of the multinational
Signal organization or those elements not under his command when detailing tasks for a duly
authorized Signal operation.
520. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
1. The CEOIs are issued by formation and unit Sig Os at all levels of command to
coordinate the operation of CIS systems and subsystems. If CE Op Os and CE Annexes to Op
Os are concerned with the “who” and “what,” CEOIs deal with the "how" of CIS operations.
They contain the essential details needed for the operation and integration of CIS. They are
issued along Signal channels and are intended for CIS operators and supervisors. Topics
covered under the CEOI include:
a. Callsign and Net Diagrams;
b. Net Identifiers, Validity Period, Frequencies and Loadgroups;
c. Communications management system (CMS)-produced CEOI;
d. Telephony Network Directory;
e. Wide Area system;
f. Signals Dispatch Service/Air Defence System Schedule;
g. Situational Awareness System (SAS) Settings;
h. In Theatre BLOS;
i. Codewords;
j. Nicknames;
k. National command element (NCE); and
l. Unique Equipment Table.
521. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. The Communications-Electronics Technical Instructions (CETIs) are issued by

formations to unit Sig O where applicable to facilitate a central point of TacC2IS information.
This document is normally generated when mounting new operations and is of particular
relevance to system managers. Topics covered under the CETI include:
a. network configuration;
b. naming and numbering schemes;
c. Internet Protocol (IP) addressing scheme;
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-21
d. server configurations;
e. client configurations;
f. operational data bases (ODB) including order of battle (ORBAT);
g. SAS Network Plan;
h. Unique Equipment Table;
i. Exchange (messaging) Organization and Account structure; and
j. User Accounts and Folder Structure.
522. COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS STANDING INSTRUCTIONS
1. The Army Communications-Electronics Standing Instructions (CESI) should be issued

by the Army G6 on behalf of the Army Commander for all Army level communications issues. A
formation Sig O may also issue standing instructions on a variety of technical subjects.
Communications-Electronics Standing Instructions at all levels are semi-permanent and
normally deal with technical matters and procedures of interest to Signals only. They are not
connected directly with current or planned operations but are intended to facilitate CIS
operation, coordination or maintenance.
2. Subjects suitable for such instructions are:
a. method of dealing with a defect in widely used equipment;
b. details of enemy Signal equipment which may have to be used;
c. the use of local civilian communications;
d. system and circuit numbering;
e. method of operating CIS which cross unit/formation boundaries;
f. command and control information system management;
g. distribution and holding of CEOIs; and
h. distribution and holding of communications security (COMSEC) material.
523. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
1. Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) deal with a broad range of tactical, Signal and
administrative activities intended to become routine. These drills form the basis of all recurring
activities and promote efficiency by eliminating or reducing the need to detail these steps in
every plan. For Signal units they may cover Signal C2 measures, activities affecting staff and
other users as well as those pertaining to the administration, protection and movement of
headquarters.
5-22 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Signals Planning
524. ADDITIONAL PUBLICATIONS
1. Many publications are available to Signals that can be used to pass or to gain
information on personnel and equipment. Some of these are listed below:
a. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) provide information on specific

equipment and the step-by-step procedures used to perform certain tasks;
b. Tactical Aides Memoire (TAMs) provide refresher information highlighting key

points required to perform a certain function, for example, setting up defensive
perimeter arcs of fire; and
c. Life Cycle Materiel Manager (LCMM) publications deals with equipment and
covers the following areas that are of interest to Signals technical staff:
(1) Investigating and staffing Materiel Authorization Change Requests

(MACRs);
(2) Unsatisfactory Condition Reports (UCRs): and
(3) Technical Failure Reports (TFRs).
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5-23
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 5
SIGNAL ESTIMATE FORMAL TEMPLATE
Copy No __ of ___
SIGNAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
By
I. C.A.N. Write
Major
CO 20 CMBG HQ & Sig Sqn
at (place) at (hours) on (date)
References: A. MCE 6100/6/94/649413 Republique Rwandaise, Jun 94, 1:250,000
B. UN Security Council Resolution xxx/xx Aug 55
Time Zone: CHARLIE (ZULU plus three hours)
Assumptions:
(1) List any relevant assumptions made in the preparation of the estimate (i.e. this is filled
out as you go through the estimate).
Question/factor Consideration/deduction Tasks/constraints
(a) (b) (c)
MISSION The task(s) given, and the purpose, against which all factors are considered.
STEP 1— MISSION ANALYSIS
(Why?)
1. How must my action directly
a. Superior Commanders support my immediate superior,
taking into account his intent and
(1) Two levels up (Intent).
concept of operations, and the
(2) One level up (Intent and intent two levels up?
concept of Ops).
b. Superior Signal Commanders How does this effect the higher
(1) Intent and concept of Ops. Signal Plan, and will it effect my
(2) Analysis of en RECS/EW immediate superiors intent and
and tactical objectives in your area concept of operations?
of responsibility.
c. My Role in his Plan
(What?)
2. Tasks What task(s) must I complete to
a Assigned. accomplish my Mission?
b. Implied.
(What not? When?)
3. Constraints (if any) What constraints have been placed These constraints must be clearly
a. Time incl fixed timings. on me by both the Superior Tactical stated in your Aim.
and Signal Commanders
b. Space.
What limitations are there on my
c. Resources.
freedom of action?
By when do I need to decide?
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5A-1

(a) (b) (c)
4. Changes to the Tactical Situation changed since orders – No change. Mission confirmed.
Situation were received or the estimate – Same Mission, same Plan.
a. Mission no change. completed? – Possibly new Mission and new
b. Changed mission. – Nothing changed. Plan. Refer to Superior Comd,
or if not possible, act in
– Minor change. support of his Main Effort,
– Significant change. taking into account his Intent.
– Major change.
5. Commander’s Direction What has to be decided? Who is to For the purpose of the Estimate
a. Critical Information check what, if I am not going to the word “Aim” has the same
Requirements (to focus staff complete this estimate by myself? meaning as given to the word
effort). How long will it take to complete the “Mission”.
b. Planning Guidance (Down). estimate and prepare orders?
c. Clarification (Up). AIM: (Aim of the Estimate, for
example)To provide CIS to UNEFIR
with the following limitations:
– Adv party to be deployed NLT
222000R Aug 99; and
– Must provide UNHQ with
infrastructure CIS.
STEP 2—EVALUATE FACTORS
6. Environment Signal characteristics of the ground
a. Terrain/Ground General – advantages and disadvantages If the theatre of operations or
General description of the of CNR, trunk, line, SDS, ADS, area of responsibility is large
topographic features including soil SAT comm.; enough, you may have to cover
conditions, hydrography, flora – possible communications hydrograpghy, vegetation, and
(vegetation), availability of key and priorities; soil conditions as separate
vital terrain for communications, factors under environment.
– effects on propagation;
high spots, obstacles, axis of FLOCARK, GO/NO GO,
movement, boundaries. – suitability of communications
means; vegetation and hydrography
maps can be useful tools to
– requirements for RRBs and assist with the ground analysis
repeaters; process, and are useful tools to
– possible HQ locations; support your estimate graphically.
– movement scheduling; Identify possible tasks that fall
– coordination requirements; out of deductions.
– protection of communication
resources;
– key terrain features to assist
communications;
– vital terrain for the employment
of communications resources;
– resources available to support
mission pers, i.e. Sources of
water.
5A-2 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
Annex A to Chapter 5

(a) (b) (c)
b. Axis of Manoeuvre – key terrain for RRBs, repeaters, Identify possible tasks that fall
as facing the en and in the HQ out of deductions.
Signal characteristics of the axis
described from LEFT to RIGHT. and trunk nodes. Direction of
movement;
Each axis should be assigned a
letter starting with A. – propagation requirements
(need for RRBs, repeaters);
– obstacles to signal movement
and channelling of resources;
– screening from en RECS/EW;
– vulnerability to en RECS/EW
and/or physical attack;
– advantages and disadvantages
of lateral communications
movement;
– movement and possible HQ
locations;
– site accessibility;
– priority of
deployment/sequencing;
– civilian facilities available;
– coordination of requirements
with subordinate signal
elements for the use of key
terrain;
– ground clearance requirements/
coord with G3;
– logistic support;
– line and SDS routes;
– control measures;
– harbours and hides.
c. Transportation (can be – effects on signal mobility; Identify possible tasks that fall
displayed graphically) – possible routes; out of deductions.
Road networks and routes, aircraft – effects on signal logistic
available, clear bridges, airstrips support;
and Landing Zones. – use o f line/ SDS/ ADS;
– protection requirements for
signal assets.
d. Climate – effect on equipment and related Identify possible tasks that fall
support requirements, i.e. - air- out of deductions.
Arctic, Tropical, Temperate,
conditioning and ventilation;
Desert, Jungle, Seasons,
Temperature, light data (day & – effect on personnel;
night). – medical and immunization
requirements for personnel;
– pre-arrival and in-theatre
acclimatization requirements;
– effect on mobility;
– effect on propagation.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5A-3

(a) (b) (c)
e. Infrastructure – What infrastructure systems are Identify possible tasks that fall
available? out of deductions.
Availability of infrastructure
communications systems. – What systems must I upgrade?
– What systems must I install to
support the mission?
– What firmware, hardware and
software must/should I bring?
– What will my technical support
requirements be for both
equipment and personnel?
– Effects on signal logistic
support, what can I purchase
in-theatre and what must I
bring to the theatre or
operation?
f. Demography – requirement to observe local Identify possible tasks that fall
regulations, customs and out of deductions.
Local population, including
religion, culture including political religions;
culture, education, languages, – working language and need for
relative wealth of populations, interpreters;
employability and local attitudes – medical concerns;
towards force in-place (friendly & – possible CIMIC tasks in support
enemy). of mission objectives;
– driving customs and regulations
– deployments in populated
areas;
– effects on signal manoeuvre;
– RECS/EW;
– resources available;
– availability of accn, rations,
POL, etc;
– threat assessment,
requirements to protect
communications assets;
– close protection requirements.
7 Force Capabilities
a. Enemy – security of dets and local Knowledge of enemy resources
(1) Threat Evaluation defence of HQs; and tactics is essential to foresee
(Doctrinal Overlays); Organization, – special arrangements for possible contingencies.
Equipment, Support Services, defence of isolated
Identify possible tasks that fall
Tactical Doctrine. installations or protection of
out of deductions.
transient individuals or groups
(2) Threat Integration (as to
in area where clandestine or EMCON policy will normally be
how it will effect the
penetration forces are active; tied to a specific phase of an
communications plan); possible
aims and intentions, dispositions, – routing of communications operation or mission.
strengths and weaknesses, Enemy through areas where physical
COA Overlays. security cannot be assured;
5A-4 B-GL-351-001/FP-001

(a) (b) (c)
(3) Dominance of manoeuvre – emission control (EMCON)
area, NBCW threat, organisation, policy, and ECCM measures is
air superiority, and use of special/ case of RECS/EW attack;
unconventional troops in forward – COMSEC, protection of
areas. Defensive or protective information and action in the
measures with respect to event of compromise;
RECS/EW capability infiltration – priority of communication
and attack. systems;
– advantages and disadvantages
of each friendly C2 means;
– movement restrictions;
– measures to reduce the risk of
disclosure to enemy
reconnaissance, search, and
intercept;
– deception programs and
alternative means of
communications when either
electronic or radio silence is
imposed;
– en vulnerabilities which might
be exploited.;
– EW (EA/ES) activity and
possible tasks/priorities in
support an operation.
b. Friendly Forces. – channel allocations as required Possible EW tasks in support of
(1) Consider higher/lower – requirement to support Operation/Mission.
resources that are allocated, and additional callsigns; Includes any limitations imposed
the comms requirements for – reserves and spares; by the command and
flanking formations, and lower – signal security; administrative relationship of the
formations not normally affiliated. forces involved (see
– D & S resources;
c. Air and Maritime Situation. B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command
– interoperability requirements in Land Operations, Figures 4A-1
(1) In OOTW, joint and (Joint, Combined Ops, C2IS,
combined operations there may be and 4B-1.
radio, IM/IT, etc);
a requirement to support and
– what are the Commander’s
coordinate National level, Maritime
Critial Information
and Air forces, as well as Allied
Requirements;
forces.
– air support (ADS);
(2) Own force capabilities
must include not only the signal – restrictions on employment;
order of battle but all other – sustainment constraints;
formations and units in the – Identify possible tasks that fall
command. The analysis should out of deductions.
include restrictions of pers and
eqpt, lines of communications, en
action, re-supply, and
maintenance.
– disposition and availability
of own resources (committed
/available);
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5A-5

(a) (b) (c)
– additional communications
resources available;
– availability to use/deploy
own communications and EW
resources;
– coordination of Joint
Information Operations liaison
requirements and support.
(3) What comms support will
be required to support air and
maritime ops.
– national level
communications coordination,
national circuits, non-
forecasted national
requirements, ITSEC,
COMSEC, frequency
management;
– command relationships;
– frequencies management
within formation coordination
and support.
d. Communication Assets. What assets are available to
support the plan?
What additional assets to I need to
support the plan?
8. Surprise and Security. – communications deception plan
Involves deception planning and and sub-unit tasks;
possible Information Operations – EA, EP, ES tasks in support of
task. the plan;
– possible OPSEC tasks.
9. Time and Space – time for signal elements to The Time and Distance Matrix
a. Time. Time in which deploy; can be done as one matrix.
communication systems must be – time available for preparation; Distance to be covered in units of
in and operating. Prepare a time – do restrictive timings preclude time. Timings may include time
matrix of locations. the use of certain systems; by Air as well as by road.
b. Space. Prepare a distance – battle procedure sequence;
matrix of locations. – recce times; Loc Dis Ref Time
– lead time required for request Point Comm
of commercial services; Sys Op
– phasing of the tactical Bde 55 km Bde 0400
manoeuvre; Main Release D-3
– move timings for various HQ Point
elements; BP 122 4 km Bde Last Lt
– suitability of communications Main D-1
means; HQ
5A-6 B-GL-351-001/FP-001

(a) (b) (c)
– distance over which signal Line of sight (LOS) is important
elements may deploy (by LOS for all relay and long distance
and by land); communications facility planning.
– ECM threat to friendly
elements;
– requirement for RRB or relay
facilities.
10. Other Relevant Factors (P Aff, Host Nation Support, legal Anything that may effect or assist
constraints, CIMIC tasks, media, the communications plan in
population areas, ROE. Etc.) support of the mission and
assigned tasks.
11. Assessment of Tasks
a. Summary of Possible Tasks – decide on the list of tasks to be A Matrix of the systems to tasks
b. Essential Tasks considered in order of priority; will best illustrate this point.
c. Optional Tasks – suitability of communications (NOTE: for electronic users - this
means; matrix is done in Excel and
d. Requirements inserted here - it may be edited
– capacities of various systems;
(1) analysis of the type of by double clicking on the table)
traffic to be passed (capacity, – security of transmission;
voice, data, admin, ops, etc); – requirements for specialty Gp Time
(2) analysis of specific link equipment; Task Reqr Reqr Pri
requirements (additional nets, line – possible allocation of a. Lay
communications, res dml nets, UN resources; cable to
nets, A/G/A, etc). – coordination requirements for BP221, Line
e. Priorities timings/ line/; 224 Sect 6 hrs 2
f. System Availability – procurement of equipment; b. est Bn
g. Surpluses and Deficiencies – allocation of resources; HQ CP Sect 2hrs 1
h. Suitability of – critical timings for priority c. recce
Communications Systems to communications; Altn HQ
Tasks – taskings required to establish loc Sig O 2hrs 3
priority;
– communications;
– requirement for additional
resources;
– reallocation or reassignment of
resources;
– redundancy of systems;
– requirement for controlled
stores;
– feasibility of options.
12. Summary of Major As required, may disperse
Deductions summary at various point in the
estimate if the estimate is long.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5A-7

(a) (b) (c)
STEP 3—CONSIDERATION OF COURSES OF ACTION (COA)
13. What is common to all COA? Advantages Use principles of Communication
Disadvantages to assist in the process of
assessing the advantages and
disadvantages.
Principles of Communications
Capacity, Economy, Flexibility,
Mobility, Reliability, Security,
Simplicity, Survivability, and
Timeliness.
14. COA 1. Concept Including Advantages
Main Effort and Schematic. Disadvantages
17. Comparison of Courses of
Action.
a. Compare advantages and Assess flexibility of each course vis Use principles of Communication
disadvantages of the COA based to assist in the process of
a vis possible (2) en actions and
on the Mission Analysis and the development of your own assessing the advantages and
Evaluation of Factors. commanders manoeuvre. disadvantages.
Principles of Communications
Identify critical areas and possible Capacity, Economy, Flexibility,
adjustments in the planning or Mobility, Reliability, Security,
execution phase. Simplicity, Survivability, and
Timeliness.
STEP 4—COMMANDERS DECISION

18. Decision
a. Selection of COA; Choose best COA. Briefly
b. States outline Concept of describe chosen COA and state
Operations (including What? reason for choosing it. Also include
Where? When? How?). any adjustments to the COA made
during the selection process.
Does this choice accomplish the
aim within the limitations imposed?
Will this choice be able to meet the
challenge of the enemy reactions?
Does it provide the best support to
friendly tactical manoeuvre at a
minimal or acceptable degree of
risk?
STEP 5—DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN
19. Plan This is not your C&E Op O but it
must include sufficient details to
allow a staff officer to write
complete orders.
5A-8 B-GL-351-001/FP-001

(a) (b) (c)
20. Task Org
21. MISSION
22. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operation Concept of Operation to include
b. Unit/Sub-Unit #1 Commanders intent and is based
on your Selection of COA.
(1) Grouping
(2) Tasks
c. Unit/Sub-Unit #2
(1) Grouping
(2) Tasks
d. Unit/Sub-Unit #3
(1) Grouping
(2) Tasks
e Unit/Sub-Unit #4
(1) Grouping
(2) Tasks
f. Coord Instructions
(1) Timings
(2) Deception Plan (if any)
(3) Recce priorities (if
appropriate)
(4) Physical protection
(5) EMCON
(6) CBRN
(7) Orders and instructions,
CEOIs, CESI, etc
(8) Radio.
(9) Nets (changes to SOPs)
(10) Voice and Data (Changes
to SOPs) i.e. CEOI 3/99
(11) Trunk System
– Access Node
– Repeaters
– Trunk Fibre
– Data
– Directory
(12) Line
– Priority of work
– Allocation of tasks
(13) SDS
– Routes
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 5A-9

(a) (b) (c)
– Schedules
– DRs
(14) SIGSEC
– Codes and crypto keys
– Changeover
– Compromise
(15) EW
(16) TacC2IS
(17) Time Standard
23. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. General Outline
b. Material and Services
c. Medical
d. Personnel
e. Maintenance
24. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Locations
b. Codewords, Nicknames, and
Passwords
25. SIGNATURE BLOCK
5A-10 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
CHAPTER 6
SIGNAL TACTICS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS
SECTION 1
601. INTRODUCTION
1. Land Force (LF) operations are conducted in the face of a myriad of threats, on varied
terrain and environments and across the complete spectrum of conflict. Signal tactics must
continue to include the support for traditional force-on-force peer conflict while remaining
adaptable to support full spectrum LF operations fought in complex or urban terrain within an
asymmetrical, non-linear, and non-contiguous battlespace.
2. This chapter explains the implications on Signals of the tactical doctrine for various types
of operations. It looks at tactical communications (TacComms) and tactical communications
information systems (TacC2IS) planning considerations and provides guidance for Signal
Officers (Sig Os) with regards to the three main categories of tactical operations: offensive
operations, defensive operations and stability operations. It also addresses considerations for
enabling activities and underlying tactical tasks or activities associated with these tactical
operations. Signal support to unique operations (airborne, airmobile and amphibious) along
with the Signal support to operations undertaken in specific environments such as Chemical,
Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear (CBRN), mountain; desert; artic and jungle will also be
described.
3. Guidance provided in this chapter does not relieve Sig Os from the obligation of making
a proper Signal estimate. These are general observations derived from the types of TacComms
available to the LF as they are applied using the operational tactics and principles of Signals.
Signal Officers are still required to adapt this general guidance to the tactical situation at hand.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-1
Tactical Offensive Defensive Stability Operations Enabling

Operations Operations Operations Operations
Tactical Attack Defence Security and Control Reconnaissance
Activities Raid Delay Support to Demobilisation, Security
Ambush Disarmament and Advance to Contact
Reintegration (DDR)
Exploitation Meeting
Support to Security Sector Engagement
Pursuit Reform (SSR)
Break-Out Link-up
Support to Civilian
Feint and Infrastructure and Withdrawal
Demonstration Governance Retirement
Reconnaissance Assistance to Other Relief of Troops in
in Force Agencies Combat and
Encircled Forces
NOTES
1. Security and control refers to the establishment of a safe and secure environment, in which other
non-military agencies may operate and assist in the operational and strategic objectives.
2. Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance will see military forces, at least initially,
conducting tasks that (re)build civilian infrastructure and conduct or assist with certain aspects of
governance such as provision of health care, rule of enforcement and humanitarian aid.
3. Assistance to other agencies refers to military assistance to specific agencies, helping them to
reach operational objectives. For example, military forces may be allocated to assist election organizers
with security and logistical support.
4. Enabling operations link or lead to other tactical operations and their effects. For example, an
advance to contact leads to an attack (and eventual effects such as “seize”) and a withdrawal leads from
one defence to another defence.
5. Each of the tactical activities is realized through tactical tasks and effects that normally comprise
of a mission statement (see text on following pages). Enabling operations consist of activities, as given
above, and these will be issued in mission statements in terms of “conduct…” In order to prosecute
them, enabling activities will be broken down into supporting or constituent tasks for subordinates. For
example, security will be assigned as a covering force or guard force and supporting tasks assigned.
See B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties in the Field for further details.
Figure 6-1: Table Describing Land Tactical Operations and Constituent Activities
602. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1. The purpose of offensive operations is to impose the commander’s will upon the enemy
by the focused application of force, when and where required to achieve military objectives.
Successful offensive operations are often decisive.
2. An explanation and description of the characteristics of the aforementioned tactical tasks
of offensive operations can be found in B-GL-300-001/FP-001 Land Operations or B-GL-321-
006/FP-001 Combat Team Operations.
3. Offensive operations are not limited to high intensity peer conflict and could be
undertaken at any point within the spectrum of conflict. The Signals considerations discussed
below are equally applicable to any of the tactical tasks or activities associated with offensive
operations; however, a few select tactical tasks will be described.
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Signals Tactics in Support of Land Operations
603. SIGNAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A HASTY ATTACK
1. In a hasty attack, the major command and control (C2) consideration is the ability to
pass orders quickly, maintain situation awareness (SA) and to effectively direct and control the
manoeuvre of forces. To do so, all major Signal systems must be used but most often combat
net radio (CNR) will be the primary means, both line of sight (LOS) and beyond line of sight
(BLOS). As a result, it is imperative that effective measures be taken to counter enemy
electronic warfare (EW) action.
604. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR A DELIBERATE ATTACK
1. In a deliberate attack, security is paramount at least until H-hour. Use of electronic

systems must be strictly regulated to prevent tipping the enemy on the attack's time, location
and objectives. In the mounting stage, maximum use must be made of Liaison Officers (LOs),
Signals Dispatch Service (SDS) and line in preference to CNR and radio relay (RR). Emission
control (EMCON) directives must be strictly enforced.
2. Once the assault is launched, all means can be used, but Sig Os must be wary of enemy
EW action and must take measures to ensure the effective operations of electronic systems
despite enemy electronic deception and jamming. Physical security will remain a major concern
for all forward elements until mopping up has been completed during the consolidation stage.
3. Sig Os must foresee the requirement for communications during an eventual exploitation
phase and ensure that the TacComms can be extended with little or no notice. Further,
Signallers must be prepared to support Commanders as they move forward in their rovers and
tactical armoured command post vehicles (Tac CPs). The Main Headquarters (HQ) must also
be ready to move forward quickly to keep pace with the progress of forward elements during
high intensity mobile warfare.
605. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS IN AN EXPLOITATION OR PURSUIT
1. During an exploitation and or pursuit, the major tactical considerations affecting Signals
are the speed of movement, the fluidity of the front and the extended distances that are required
to be supported. Electronic means of communications will be stretched to the limit and a
premium will be placed on timeliness, quick reconnaissance and short set-up and tear down
times of any mobile HQ or TacComms detachments.
2. The fluidity of the front will demand that calculated risks be taken in regard to the
physical security of isolated elements. Extended distances will probably require the use of
BLOS TacComms such as high frequency (HF) CNR, satellite telephone, cellular phone or
helicopters for radio rebroadcast (RRB) purposes. The area trunk system may have to be
deployed in a linear configuration along the major axis of the pursuit rather than in the full grid
configuration. The insertion of cut-off forces deep in enemy territory will further complicate the
task of Signal planners. Finally, the need for Combat Service Support (CSS) units to follow the
lead elements may well require extensive traffic control communications.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-3
606. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
1. Defensive operations are usually undertaken when the enemy has the initiative in order
to prevent him from seizing terrain or breaking through a defended area. Doctrinally, defensive
operations are considered to consist of two specific tactical tasks: the delay and the defence.
Although considered to be separate tasks these activities may overlap in part and are described
as follows:
a. The main defensive battle, including countermoves (reinforcing, blocking and

counter-attacking); and
b. The delaying battle is fought during the covering force stage of defensive
operations to determine the enemy's main axis of advance, to gain time for the
preparation of the main defensive position and to weaken the enemy by inflicting
casualties.
607. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE MAIN DEFENSIVE BATTLE
1. A Sig O must reconcile the high capacity and resilient communications needed to allow
the extensive coordination required during the defensive battle with the need for extreme
discretion until the main battle is joined. During the preparation stage and whilst the covering
force battle is going on, radio silence should be enforced in the main defensive area. This is
particularly important for earmarked reserves and countermoves forces. Liaison Officers, line
and SDS should be the mainstay of communications. Extensive reconnaissance should allow
the positioning of Signal emitters so as to shield them from enemy EW elements.
2. Once radio silence is lifted and the main battle is joined, close co-ordination of electronic
support (ES) and fire support elements is required to ensure the neutralization or destruction of
enemy EW jammers and to preserve our ability to affect the C2 of our own forces.
Communication discipline and skilfully conducted electronic protection (EP) drills will also be
paramount.
3. Signals Officers within the main defensive area must also take measures to coordinate
with the covering force Sig O for the rearward passage of lines by the returning covering force
troops.
4. Laying of communications cables and lines in the main defensive area will require care
and a lot of time if the line grid is to have maximum resilience once the battle is joined. Line
reinforcements should be sought from higher formation and line crews should be deployed very
early in the preparation stage of the main defensive area. Whenever possible, the area trunk
system should use lines including civilian telephone lines, in preference to RRB, especially in
the forward part of the main defensive area. Current CIS trunk nodes permit data access to the
Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN) through a modem at restricted bandwidth.
5. During the countermove battle, Signals difficulty must ensure the coordination and the
compatibility of signal systems among the rapidly regrouping troops. For example, re-
subordination of units to the proper domain in C2 will be difficult. Troop density will become
very high for short periods and at the same time; there will be an extensive need for
coordination amongst reinforcing, blocking and counter-attacking troops. Signals Officers must
ensure they fully understand the details of all regrouping orders, the manner in which command
will be exercised, the critical timings and the adjustments made to the various control measures
(axis, boundaries, etc.).
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6. Physical security will become problematic until mopping up is completed if the enemy
has achieved infiltration or widespread penetration. Additional protective measures may be
warranted at this stage.
608. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DELAY
1. During the covering force battle, the covering force Sig O must have a thorough
understanding of the Commander's concept of operations. A Sig O must be aware of the delay
to be imposed, the manoeuvre to be adopted, the various delaying positions and the handover
arrangements back at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). Because of the difficult
psychological conditions of the delaying battle, the Signal Officers will have to ensure his or her
Signal troops are briefed in detail to ensure they understand the battle plan they must support
and the risks that must be accepted.
2. Prudent Sig Os will carry out extensive reconnaissance of the covering force area (CFA)
before the delaying battle is joined so as to be in a position to move signal elements quickly and
effectively once contact is made and time is critical. In particular, withdrawal routes must be
reconnoitred in detail and reserved demolition timings must be known.
3. Liaison must be affected with the main defensive area Sig O through whose area the
final withdrawal must occur so as to coordinate Signal control measures at the handover line
and for the subsequent passage of lines. A covering force role will be extended in depth and
frontage. In the initial stage and until physical contact is made with the enemy, the emphasis
will be on information gathering. Signals Officers will therefore plan for the forward deployment
of EW assets especially ES resources and for a discreet C2 posture. Line, LO and SDS should
be used in preference to other TacComms to prevent tipping the enemy prematurely. Extensive
use should be made of the civilian telephone system employing on-line encryption.
4. Once the delaying battle is joined, the emphasis must switch to providing Commanders
with timely and mobile Signal support. All TacComms will be necessary to support the rapid
deployment of tactical forces from one delay position to the next. Physical security will also
become a problem for isolated signal components. Electronic protection activities such as
jamming support may be required to neutralize the action of forward enemy. The extension of
the area trunk system into the forward battlespace must be carefully weighed against the risk of
destruction or the impossibility of withdrawal and the need for its full exploitation during the main
defensive battle.
5. Covering forces normally carry out extensive grouping and regrouping from one delay
position to the next and affect multiple rearward passages of lines. Signal Officers must ensure
the compatibility of the various systems during these critical stages.
609. STABILITY OPERATIONS
1. A tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with
other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a climate of order, stability operations have a
basis in both cooperative and coercive activities. They can occur at almost any portion along
the spectrum of conflict and may happen prior to, during, or following offensive and defensive
operations, or as the primary objective of a campaign. Stability operations are a contributing
factor to creating an environment conducive to allowing diplomatic, informational and
economical instruments of power to predominate in cooperation with a lawful government.
Doctrinally, the tactical tasks and activities considered to fall within stability operations are the
following:
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-5
a. Control and Security to establish a framework of security in which other

agencies and a civil populace may function.
b. Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) operations such as reconstruction and

humanitarian aid activities.
c. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants

and Security Sector Reform (SSR) which could involve multi-agency lines of
operation within a campaign all of which will include their own specific military
tactical tasks.
d. Assistance to Other Agencies in which the military is directly supporting civilian

and other government agencies.
2. Stability operations are most often conducted within an asymmetric warfare

environment, which is non-linear in concept within a non-contiguous battlespace with a threat
from all points external and internal to the area of own forces control. There are similarities to
encircled operations described later in this chapter with the exception that it is a planned state
rather than one that is temporary awaiting the linear battle geometry to be regained. These
types of operations are most prevalent in the conduct of peace support missions or peace-
making counter insurgency operations (COIN) although not restricted to them. Brigade Group
(Bde Gp) level HQ and higher tend to be large while remaining in static positions for extended
periods rather than highly mobile and lightweight as with conventional linear high intensity
mobile warfare. In addition, the assigned area of operations (AO) tends to be complex and
quite large where the communications distances often stretch the capability of the vehicle
mounted TacComms where reliance on the primary means of communications is generally on
CNR.
610. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS
1. Formation sub-units are often dispersed at distances throughout the AO where planning
for the extension of CNR nets is the norm and the adoption of satellite based tactical
communications, as a primary means or as a way to extend CNR enclaves, becomes a
necessity. Signals must plan within the same constraints and restraints described in normal
offensive and defensive operations, but with the knowledge that terrorists, insurgents, guerrilla
forces, conventional enemy military forces and unfriendly indigenous members of the population
pose a significant threat to isolated TacComms resources inside and outside the area of control.
Depending upon the nature of the deployment and the timeline associated with it, a decision
must be made with regards to the type of communications infrastructure best suited to it:
a. Mounted. Mounted TacComms and TacC2IS are normally found in a more fluid
operation and can be established within urban areas as well as open terrain.
Signals must consider the extreme vulnerability and consequential protection
required for mounted, isolated TacComms such as RRB detachments, area
trunk system resources as well as line and SDS routes.
b. Dismounted. Tactical Communications and TacC2IS within this scenario are

normally considered for more long-standing/semi-permanent scenarios that
involve base camp establishments or buildings within built-up areas. Special
considerations to Signals are as follows:
6-6 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
(1) use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems to permit extension of

TacComms and TacC2IS into building configurations and its effect on
overall accreditation;
(2) increased protection requirements of isolated TacComms resources;
(3) added physical security requirements of building based HQ complexes;

and
(4) increased protection requirements in built-up areas, as there is the

inherent provision of areas of isolation and resulting vulnerability to key
communications facilities.
611. ENABLING ACTIVITIES
1. Enabling Activities are those tactical tasks and activities that are considered as linking
actions between decisive tactical operations. The types of tactical tasks or activities currently
considered to doctrinally be categorized as enabling activities are listed in Figure 6-1.
2. This section will not discuss all the aforementioned tactical tasks associated with
enabling activities but will focus on a few. However, the Signals considerations discussed
below can be easily extrapolated to be applicable to many of the aforementioned tactical task or
activities associated with enabling activities. Further details on Signals considerations for link-
up and relief of encircled forces activities is described under operations in enemy controlled
territory in section 6 of this chapter.
612. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ADVANCE TO CONTACT
1. Signal Officers must consider the following when planning support for an advance to
contact:
a. Advance to contact may well be extended in depth and frontage. Distances to

be covered will be greater than in most other operations.
b. Physical security of isolated TacComms elements will be at risk because of the

necessity to bypass certain enemy elements. Losses may be higher and more
reserves should be planned and maintained. It may be necessary to assign
additional protection elements or to collocate with other troops.
c. Passage of information is a vital task of forward elements; yet Signal security is

critical if friendly intentions are not to be revealed prematurely to enemy EW
troops. Depending on the enemy EW threat and the commander's EMCON
policy, means of communication that do not emit in free space (SDS, LOS, line)
may have to be used extensively. If freely emitting means are allowed, close
coordination with ES elements will be required for threat identification and
destruction. Area trunk system access through nodes may be limited by the
tempo of an advance and distances covered. Use of CNR will be the primary
communications means forward of the FEBA.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-7
d. Unless friendly forces are advancing on well charted and known territory, siting
of TacComms installations and HQs may have to be done with inadequate
knowledge of the ground unless Signal reconnaissance parties follow closely
behind lead combat elements.
e. Commanders will want to move forward either in their rovers or Tac CPs. This
will further complicate the task of Signal support for the various HQ components.
Movement of Main HQ using Step-Up procedures will require careful planning to
keep up with a rapid advance.
613. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR A MEETING ENGAGEMENT
1. In a meeting engagement, the major C2 consideration is the ability to pass orders

quickly, maintain SA and to effectively direct and control the manoeuvre of forces. To do so, all
major TacComms must be used, but effective measures must be taken to counter enemy EW
action.
614. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS
1. Relief of troops includes operations whereby combat activities are taken over by one
force from another. There are two types of tactical activities considered to be relief operations:
a. Relief in Place. This includes both relief of encircled forces and relief of troops
in contact wherein all or part of a force is replaced in a sector by an incoming
unit that takes over operations at this point.
b. Passage of Lines. Passage of Lines is an operation in which one force moves

through another force’s area. This is conducted either to come into (forward
passage), or out of (rearward passage) contact with the enemy.
2. Relief operations are delicate operations because of the inherent danger of congestion,
confusion and the coexistence of two parallel TacC2IS within one area. To ensure success,
liaison at all levels between forces must be established and deception, including electronic
deception and Signal security, must prevent enemy interference. The incoming and outgoing
Sig Os must start planning early and ensure the closest coordination between their two
elements.
3. Relief in Place. In a relief in place, the outgoing Sig O is concerned with the following:
a. ensuring Signal security by maintaining the right patterns of traffic;
b. making provisions for the reception and briefing of incoming Signal troops;
c. maintaining the in-place CIS for as long as possible, this is especially critical for
CNR, other systems (C2, trunk, line, SDS) can be taken over gradually by the
incoming Sig O until only the CNR is left;
d. extricating his or her Signal personnel and equipment after handover has been
done; and
e. coordinating with the higher Sig O the Signal plan for his next position.
6-8 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
4. Also in a relief in place the incoming Sig O is concerned with the following:
a. ensuring Signal security by remaining electronically passive until as late as

possible in the relief procedure—this is especially true of CNR operations;
b. making provision for the early reconnaissance and coordinating take over with
the outgoing Sig O;
c. introducing Signal personnel and equipment gradually into service starting with
SDS, line, C2 trunk and CNR; and
d. taking over as late as possible during the relief operations.
5. Forward Passage of Lines. During a forward passage of lines the moving force Sig O
is concerned with the following:
a. ensuring Signal security by remaining electronically passive until H hour;
b. planning early reconnaissance and coordinating with the in-place Sig O;
c. collocating key Signal personnel with the in-place key Signal personnel early in
the passage of lines so as to ensure a smooth passage; and
d. extending the higher formation CIS beyond the line of departure as coordinated
with the higher Sig O.
6. Also during a forward passage of lines, the in-place Sig O is concerned with the
following:
a. ensuring Signal security by maintaining the right pattern of traffic on electronic

systems;
b. making provisions for the reception and briefing of the moving force key Signal
personnel;
c. making provisions for traffic control communications during the passage of lines;
d. maintaining the in-place CIS until the passage is complete; and
e. initiating Signal planning for the commander's next mission after the passage of
lines.
7. Rearward Passage of Lines. During the rearward passage of lines the moving force
Sig O is concerned with the following:
a. ensuring Signal security behind the handover line where the moving force
should become electronically silent as soon as disengagement is achieved;
b. making provision for early reconnaissance and liaison with the in-place Sig O;
c. co-locating key Signal personnel with the in-place CP early in the passage of
lines so as to ensure a smooth passage; and
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-9
d. coordinating with the higher Sig O for the Signal plan in the new rearward
position.
8. Also during the rearward passage of lines, the in-place Sig O is concerned with the
following:
a. ensuring Signal security by maintaining radio silence until contact is established

at the handover line;
b. making provisions for the reception and briefing of the moving force Signal
personnel; and
c. making provisions for traffic control communications during the passage of lines.
615. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR A WITHDRAWAL
1. A withdrawal is a tactical activity that occurs when a force disengages from an enemy in
accordance with the will of its commander. A withdrawal takes place in the following four
stages, which overlap in part:
a. thinning out of the position to be evacuated;
b. preparation of intermediate and new positions;
c. disengagement of the main body; and
d. protective and delaying action by the covering force.
2. Since the enemy will have the initiative during the withdrawal, it is extremely difficult to
maintain security and achieve surprise. Signals Officers must participate in the planning of
withdrawals as early as possible so as to take measures to put in place an effective signal
security plan. In particular, transmission patterns must not betray the intentions of the
commander and electronic deception must be used to achieve surprise and deceive enemy EW.
3. Maintenance of morale is critical, especially for isolated TacComms elements that may
get the feeling of “having been forgotten behind.” Sound system management may well require
the reinforcement of Signal leadership elements with forward isolated elements at the very time
when leaders are required in the forward position as well as in the new position to the rear.
4. The Signal considerations during the thinning out stage of a withdrawal are as follows:
a. Signal reconnaissance must start during this stage. Security requirements may
force the reconnaissance to be conducted at night or under conditions of poor
visibility, so additional resources may have to be devoted to this task to offset
the slower pace of activity. Reconnaissance has to take into account the total
distance to be covered, the going on the withdrawal routes, demolition timings,
withdrawal timings, intermediate positions, defiles if any, and the possible sites
for TacComms installations. Care should be taken to screen TacComms
installations from enemy EW.
6-10 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
b. It may well be necessary to send the second-in-command of all Signal elements

involved back for this task. This will place an additional burden on leadership
elements in the forward area.
5. The Signal considerations during the preparation of intermediate and new positions are
as follows:
a. The TacComms infrastructure for the withdrawal is put in place during this
stage. Radio silence should be enforced to the rear of the position to be
evacuated. The area trunk system should be deployed axially along the
withdrawal routes but line, rather than RR, should be the main transmission
means if at all possible.
b. An important traffic control TacComms will have to be established. It should be

based on LOs and Military Police (MPs) at various checkpoints using secure
telephone or SDS. CNR should only be a last recourse.
c. In all likelihood, Signal support for a withdrawal will exceed the capability of the
withdrawing force. Reinforcements by the higher formation Signal organization
will be required.
d. TacComms in the position to be evacuated must continue to be used in a

normal pattern so as not to raise enemy suspicion. Dummy stations may have
to be set up to deceive the enemy during the preparation stage. Deception
activities must be carefully coordinated with G2/G3 and higher formation staffs.
6. Signals considerations during the disengagement stage of a withdrawal are as follows:
a. In the early stage of the disengagement, the electronic part of the deception
plan should move into full gear in conjunction with other elements of the plan.
b. Electronic deception will not likely succeed very long and the Sig O must be
ready to use all electronic TacComms to provide signal support once the
withdrawal is uncovered and the delaying battle is joined. In particular, ES and
EP resources will be required to neutralize enemy C2 and augment the delay
imposed.
7. Protective and Delaying Action. During this stage, the Signal problem and
considerations follow that of the covering force battle already explained above.
616. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS OBSTACLE CROSSING AND BREACHING
1. A crossing or breaching task involves the crossing or breaching of a natural or artificial

obstacle and can occur during offensive, defensive and delaying operations, during passages of
lines, or anywhere in an AO. A crossing refers to the opening of a route over a water obstacle,
while a breaching refers to the securing of a passage through a land obstacle.
2. The two types of obstacle crossing/breaching activities are described as follows:
a. Hasty. This activity takes place from the line of march with little preparation.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-11
b. Deliberate. This tactical task requires extensive preparation and is only

undertaken if a hasty crossing cannot be achieved. The Signal considerations
associated with this activity will be described in detail below.
3. Since an obstacle crossing or breaching activity is a subsidiary part of other types of

operations, the tactical considerations for these types of tactical operations must also be taken
into account; however, only those aspects peculiar to obstacle crossing and breaching activities
will be discussed here. An obstacle crossing or breaching activity is done in four stages:
a. reconnaissance;
b. assault to gain lodgement;
c. build up of the bridgehead; and
d. consolidation before the break out.
4. The Signals considerations during the reconnaissance stage are as follows:
a. Signals Officers must reconnoitre carefully all areas where communications for
the crossing force must be put in place. The enemy threat against the crossing
and the terrain largely dictate the means of communications to be used. It is
unlikely that complete surprise can be achieved. Line and SDS should be used
for the traffic control and crossing area organizations so as not to tip off the
enemy as to the exact crossing place and timing.
b. The crossing force when possible should minimize radio emissions until the
battle is joined. Thereafter, the area trunk system should be used in preference
to CNR for the crossing and traffic control organizations.
c. Electronic support resources will be useful at this stage to locate enemy forces
on the far side.
d. In cases where the force in place belongs to another formation, the Sig O must
make the necessary coordination arrangements to ensure an efficient forward
passage of lines.
e. The TacComms infrastructure for the crossing should be put in place as soon as
the force in place has been established on the near side of the obstacle and in
time to control the advance of the assault force through the crossing area.
f. Tactical communications resources required for this task are extensive and will
have to be made available by regrouping the resources of various units in the
formation, such as reconnaissance units, MP units, TacComms resources of the
force in place, TacComms resources of the controlling HQ, etc.
g. If sufficient TacComms resources are available, electronic emissions may be

used to deceive the enemy as to the place and time of the crossing.
5. The Signals considerations during the assault stage of the obstacle crossing are as
follows:
6-12 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
a. Signal support for the assault force relies mainly on its integral resources
supplemented as required by the crossing formation area trunk system
resources.
b. Provision has to be made for the assault force’s passage of lines through the
force in place and for its cooperation with the traffic control organization that it
will direct until the full crossing area is established, after a lodgement is seized
on the far side of the obstacle;
c. As in the deliberate attack, electronic emissions should be discreet before H-
hour; thereafter radio silence can be lifted at the discretion of the assault force
commander; and
d. As soon as intermediate objectives are seized, the crossing area is established
and the traffic control reverts from the assault force commander to the crossing
force commander.
6. The Signals considerations during the final two stages of the build up and the
consolidation of the Bridgehead before the breakout are as follows:
a. The major concern of the bridgehead force Sig O is to ensure that sufficient EW
and TacComms resources cross the obstacle to permit the orderly support of
the consolidation and break out.
b. A balance must be kept between overcrowding the far bank with superfluous
TacComms resources and keeping enough resources to offset equipment
losses and casualties and to allow the support of subsequent stages of the
crossing activity.
c. The bridgehead force Sig O must also make the necessary preparations for a
forward passage of lines by the break out force.
d. The bridgehead is extremely vulnerable at this stage and maximum use of EW
resources must be made to locate and neutralize or destroy enemy C2
elements. As soon as possible, alternate TacComms to CNR must be used on
the far bank to lower the electronic profile of our own TacC2IS.
e. Physical security will also be low until mopping up is complete during the
consolidation phase, requiring further prudence and defensive measures to be
practiced.
SECTION 2
UNIQUE OPERATIONS
617. AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS
1. General. An airmobile operation is the movement of combat forces and their equipment
about the battlefield in air vehicles, usually helicopters or Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL)
aircraft, under the control of an LF Commander, to engage in ground combat. It can be
undertaken separately or as part of any type of ground operations. An airmobile force can be
employed independently or in conjunction with other land forces.
2. Airmobile operations are planned in the reverse sequence of their execution as follows:
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-13
a. a ground tactical plan to cover the employment in the objective area once the
lifted force is landed;
b. a landing plan, to place the lifted force in the objective area;
c. an air movement plan to fly the lifted force to the objective area;
d. the loading plan identifies the pick-up zone, provides guidance for its
establishment and control; and
e. the staging plan details the control area(s) and provides guidance on the
repositioning of the units, supplies, and equipment required.
618. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS
1. The Sig O must consider the following during the ground tactical stage of an airmobile
operation:
a. Signal support during this stage is the responsibility of the airmobile force Sig O.
In order to carry out his or her task, the Sig O has to know the enemy EW threat
en-route and in the objective area, the distance from the landing zone to the
objective area, the quantity and size of TacComms resources allowed to be
flown in (vehicular or manpack only), the arrangements made by the higher G6
staff for communications with supporting forces (link up forces, artillery, air
forces) and the method of extraction of the airmobile force.
b. Prior to the insertion of the main body of the airmobile force, it could be
necessary to insert pathfinders for the reconnaissance of the objective area and
marking of the landing zone (LZ). In such a case, special Signal arrangements
must be made for the pathfinders to report back and for recognition signals in
the LZ.
c. As a matter of principle, radio silence should be maintained in the objective area
as long as possible or at least until H-hour.
d. If link-up of the airmobile force with a main ground force is planned, the higher
formation Sig O will make the necessary coordination between the two elements
during the mounting stage.
e. Once the ground operation is on and radio silence has been lifted, an airborne
command post (CP) could be used to coordinate the movement of all
components and relay back to higher HQ reports and requests for support, if the
air situation is favourable and the air defence (AD) threat from the ground is
negligible.
2. Signals considerations during the landing stage of an airmobile operation are as follows:
a. The TacComms for the ground tactical stage must be on stand-by, ready for
use. Signallers in aircraft and disembarking should be on listening watch ready
to receive orders. Dispatch riders (DRs) or runners should accompany selected
commanders ready to transmit their orders to various points on the LZ or to
another LZ. Arrangements for contact with the pathfinder group should be
executed. This is particularly critical if routes are unmarked and guidance from
the LZ to the objective area is required.
6-14 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
b. Enemy reaction on the LZ may require breaking radio silence either by the
ground troops or by the aviation unit.
c. TacComms resources in personnel and equipment should have been dispersed

in various aircraft along with the various command elements to ensure adequate
back up in case of destruction during the air move.
3. Signals considerations during the air movement stage of an airmobile operation are as
follows:
a. The airmobile force Sig O should help the aviation component Sig O prepare the
Signal plan for this stage. Ideally, the flight to the objective should be conducted
under electronic silence, but it may be necessary to coordinate with
accompanying EW helicopters, armed helicopters and close support aircraft for
air space control and suppression of enemy air defence en-route. It will also be
necessary to decide on permissible active navigational aids.
b. Planning for air movement also includes planning for the return of aircraft after
the insertion and for the extraction sorties if a link-up is not planned. The
decision to be electronically silent on the various flights in and out depends on
the mission security requirement, on the enemy threat and, for the extraction
flights, on the immediate tactical situation at the time of extraction.
c. Signals must arrange for intercommunication between ground and aviation

commanders so that the ground commander can be updated on SA
developments as they occur.
4. Signals considerations during the mounting stage of an airmobile operation are as

follows:
a. As for any other type of operation, supporting Sig Os must have an intimate
knowledge of their Commander's intentions and plans. But since three separate
components (higher command, ground component and aviation component) are
involved, it is of the utmost importance that complete coordination between
these components' Signal plans be effected.
b. The higher Commander's Sig O must take the lead in planning and coordinating.
Before the higher Commander's orders are issued, the Sig O must put together
the major elements of the Signal plan between the airmobile force and the
outside world. Then, once the airmobile task force is formed, the higher
Commander’s Sig O should meet with the airmobile force Sig O and the aviation
component Sig O to explain clearly how he or she intends to provide Signal
support to the airmobile force and what are the constraints under which all must
operate.
c. The airmobile force Sig O is also the land component Sig O. He or she,
therefore, has a dual responsibility for planning the Signal support internal to the
ground component and also to coordinate the Signal support between the
aviation component and the land component.
d. The aviation component Sig O prepares the aviation Signal plan within the
constraints imposed by the airmobile force Sig O.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-15
e. Once planning is complete and marshalling is done, the airmobile force Sig O
must ensure that a complete Signal briefing is given to all signallers and key
land and aviation commanders and staff officers. All TacComms equipment
must also be inspected and tested for serviceability.
f. The mounting stage should normally be conducted under complete electronic

silence within the airmobile force, except for short (burst) pathfinder reports if
necessary. However, communications of host land and air elements will have to
be used to link the various commanders and the supporting elements during this
stage.
619. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
1. General. An airborne operation is a joint operation involving the air movement and
parachute landing of ground forces to interdict an area or to conduct a raid. This section
provides guidance only for additional aspects peculiar to airborne operations. Airborne
operations can be conducted independently or in conjunction with other land forces.
2. Airborne operations like airmobile operations are planned in the reverse sequence of
their execution as follows:
a. A ground tactical plan, to cover the employment once the forces have landed.
b. A landing plan, to organize the manner in which the ground forces will arrive on
the drop zones (DZ) in the objective area.
c. An air movement plan, to fly the force to the objective area.
d. A mounting plan, to assemble army and air force resources and load the aircraft
at departure airfields.
620. SIGNAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
1. In airborne operations, security and intelligence are imperative to success. Therefore,

Sig Os have to take strict measures to ensure that Signal planners disseminate information on a
strict need-to-know basis. Briefings to troops occur only once all elements are mustered and
quarantined on the departure airfields. Equally important, higher formation EW resources must
be fully exploited to gain maximum signal intelligence (SIGINT) for exploitation during the
various stages of the operation.
2. The Signal considerations during the ground tactical stage of airborne operations are as
follows:
a. If one replaces the expressions “airmobile” and “LZ” by “airborne” and “DZ,”
previous guidance given on airmobile operations is also applicable for airborne
operations planning.
b. The major difference between airmobile and airborne operations is probably the
depth of insertion into enemy territory. Airborne forces will usually be inserted
deeper than airmobile forces. Consequently, the communications back to
higher HQ and to external supporting forces must be conducted over much
longer distances and will require different means.
6-16 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
c. The airborne force Sig O must also be aware that immediately after landing, the
airborne force is extremely vulnerable and that the ground commander will want
to ensure that regrouping of forces into fighting formations is done as
expeditiously as possible. Depending on the conditions after landing, the
airborne force commander may wish to break radio silence in order to speed up
regrouping. Cohesion of the tactical force would thus take precedence over
security.
d. Finally, the airborne force Sig O must plan for air-ground-air (A/G/A)
communication and DZ control during follow-up resupply missions.
3. The Signals considerations during the landing stage of an airborne operation are as
follows:
a. The same guidance as for airmobile operations applies. However, Sig Os must
be ready to react to adverse conditions immediately after landing. The
likelihood of destruction and casualties in flight and on landing and of
unacceptable dispersal on and off DZ may jeopardize the Signal plan.
b. In advising airborne commanders on EMCON policy on arrival in the objective

area, Sig Os must carefully weigh the threat, the need for rapid direction if the
plan must be changed and the overwhelming need for a rapid concentration of
force immediately after landing. If the plan develops as expected and surprise is
achieved, retaining radio silence as long as possible may be worthwhile. In this
case, DRs could be used provided they are well briefed on the relative positions
of the various DZs and have some means of transport (bicycles or motorcycles).
4. The Signal considerations during the air movement stage of an airborne operation are
identical to those for airmobile operations. During this stage, EW aircraft could accompany the
transport aircraft to neutralize air defence and surveillance radar en route and in the objective
area. The task force Sig O should be ready to advise the airlift commander on this aspect.
5. The Signal considerations during the mounting stage of an airborne operation are as
follows:
a. The same guidance as for airmobile operations applies only change the “higher
commander's Sig O” for “joint task force Sig O,” the “airmobile force Sig O” for
“airborne force Sig O” and the “aviation Sig O” for “airlift force Sig O”.
b. Prior to airborne operations, not only briefings but also rehearsals must be
conducted. The airborne force Sig O will ensure that the complete Signal plan is
rehearsed and “walked through.” Inspection of platform rigged TacComms
equipment must also be carried out in detail.
c. Because of the higher rate of casualties at the outset, the airborne force Sig O
will ensure that the plan includes the requirement for a small reserve of
personnel and equipment in the initial assault as well as in the immediate follow-
up resupply drops.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-17
621. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
1. General. An amphibious operation is a joint operation involving the sea movement of

naval, land and/or air forces into an objective area to conduct an amphibious assault/landing on
a hostile shore; or, an amphibious raid or an amphibious demonstration. Alternately, it could
also involve an amphibious withdrawal of a land force from a hostile shore by naval forces.
Such an operation may be conducted independently or in conjunction with other land forces.
2. Amphibious operations are normally planned in five stages and in the reverse sequence
of their execution, as follows:
a. Assault. This stage starts with the arrival of the amphibious task force in the
objective area and ends when the mission of the amphibious task force is
accomplished.
b. Movement. The components of the amphibious task force move from the
points of embarkation to the amphibious objective area.
c. Rehearsal. During this stage, the plans, including the Signal support plan, are
tested and practiced.
d. Embarkation. This covers the period during which troops and their equipment
are embarked in assigned shipping.
e. The Planning Stage. This covers the period from the issue of the initiating
directive by a higher commander to the embarkation of forces.
622. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
1. General. Signal considerations for amphibious operations are as follows:
a. An amphibious task force is a joint operation and it will usually be led by a naval
officer.
b. The key C2 appointments from a Signal point of view are:
(1) naval amphibious Task Force Commander and assigned naval

communication officer, and
(2) Landing Force Commander and assigned Sig O.
c. Signal planning must encompass communications required for the command of

the amphibious task force as a whole; for lateral communications between the
naval, land and air components; and for communications internal to each
component. Responsibilities are shared as follows:
(1) the amphibious task force Sig O plans Signal support for the task force as
a whole and coordinates requirements for communication between
components and between the task force and external supporting forces,
6-18 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
(2) the landing force Sig O plans Signal support for the land component and
coordinates all Signal requirements for operations once the force is
landed, and
(3) the air force communications-electronics officer will plan the Signal
support for air force elements integral to the task force.
d. The critical Signal planning element is in providing the amphibious Task Force
Commander and the LF Commander the required Signal support afloat and
ashore, and to effect an orderly transfer of the Landing Force Commander's CP
from sea to shore without discontinuity. Signal planners must be aware of Joint
Operations doctrine.
2. Signal considerations during the assault stage of an amphibious operation are as

follows:
a. The formulation of an assault concept of operations is the first step in the overall
planning process. The landing force Sig O must participate in this process and
cooperate closely with the task force communication officer to ascertain whether
the concept can be supported by communications ashore and afloat.
b. Signal support for operations ashore is conducted as for other offensive

operations except that the Signal plan must:
(1) provide for an early build up of TacComms ashore,
(2) provide for an orderly transfer of C2 of the landing force from afloat to the
beachhead,
(3) provide for the LF Commander to command initially from a joint CP afloat
with the Task Force Commander,
(4) provide a communications capability between naval and land CIS on the
initial stages of the assault when all systems are operated from ships,
(5) integrate the requirement to operate rear and lateral links from shore to
the naval task force CP afloat and to supporting air force elements afloat
or on land beyond the objective area, this includes complex landing ship
and beach control communications,
(6) where link-up with other ground forces is planned, include the
requirement for communication during link-up,
(7) where extraction by sea is planned, include the reverse of the process
explained in (1) to (5) above, and
(8) when subsequent operations on land are planned, include the provisions
for a forward passage of lines by follow-on forces.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-19
3. During the movement stage of an amphibious landing the landing force TacComms
should be silent. Naval force communications must be used when necessary if the naval
EMCON policy allows.
4. Rehearsals are a necessity for amphibious operations due to their extreme complexity.
Supporting Sig Os must ensure that all aspects of the Signal plan are rehearsed and
adjustments made where necessary. This provides an opportunity to test the understanding of
the plan by all concerned. Rehearsal requirements must be foreseen in the distribution of
TacComms equipment and personnel among ships during embarkation.
5. Signals considerations during the embarkation stage of an amphibious operation are as

follows:
a. Sig Os should delegate embarkation control responsibility to ensure that all

Signal personnel and TacComms equipment are embarked and distributed
among shipping so as to allow the orderly transfer from ships to landing craft in
the objective area.
b. If an enemy threat is foreseen during the movement phase, cross loading of

TacComms equipment and Signal personnel should be planned to overcome
losses or destruction.
6. Planning. Unlike other types of operations, the Landing Force Commander, one of the
subordinate commanders, assumes a pre-eminent role during this phase. The amphibious Task
Force Commander merely acts as a coordinator to ensure all other elements of the task force
take effective measures to support the Landing Force Commander's concept of operations.
This relationship ceases upon the start of embarkation when the Task Force Commander
assumes overall command responsibility. It is the Sig Os responsibility to be intimately familiar
with the overall concept of operations in order to effectively plan and coordinate the various
aspects of CIS support to the amphibious operation.
623. OPERATIONS IN ENEMY CONTROLLED TERRITORY
1. Operations in enemy controlled territory include:
a. Operations by Encircled Forces. These in turn include the defence of the

encircled force and its break out.
b. Link-up Operations. This occurs when a force joins another friendly force in
enemy controlled territory.
c. Special Operations. These are operations conducted by special troops in

order to attack or disrupt vital points or to secure important information deep
behind enemy lines.
624. SIGNALS CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS IN ENEMY CONTROLLED

TERRITORY
1. The Signals considerations for operations by encircled forces in enemy controlled

territory are as follows:
6-20 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
a. Encirclement is not normally a planned activity but one with which military
commanders may have to cope. Once a force has been encircled, the first
priority is to re-establish the integrity of the TacC2IS in the pocket including its
Signal element in order to plan and direct the immediate defence of the forces
encircled.
b. Once the defence is organized, the Sig O must attempt to lower the electronic
profile of the TacComms in order to avoid enemy EW attack and avoid DF of
critical C2 elements. If at all possible, line and SDS should be used in
preference to radio during the defensive stage of the encirclement. However, in
the event of an attack, CNR may have to be used especially by the
reserve/countermoves force.
c. The Sig O must also try to re-establish communications with the higher
commander outside the pocket so that relief, break out, combat support and
combat service support may be coordinated. If it is not possible electronically,
the use of a messenger, DR or LO should be considered.
d. If a break out is planned, the Sig O must ensure that absolute Signal security is
maintained until H-hour in order to achieve surprise; this may conflict with the
need for coordination with external forces. A decision to coordinate by radio will
depend on the relative importance of surprise and support from external forces,
and on the quality of Signal security procedures (crypto systems and traffic
patterns). Once the break out starts, all TacComms means available are used
to ensure immediacy of control and maintenance of the momentum. If at all
possible, the Sig O must coordinate frequencies, crypto and recognition signals
between the encircled troop lead elements and the external friendly forces with
which it is planned to establish contact.
2. A link-up operation is planned much like a normal attack or advance to contact, but
specific aspects of C2 between the two converging forces need explanation. The guiding
principles for the planning and conduct of link-up operations are security to achieve surprise,
speed to prevent timely enemy reaction and coordination of manoeuvre and control measures to
prevent needless friendly casualties. The Signal considerations for link-up operations in enemy
controlled territory are as follows:
a. The higher commander's Sig O is responsible for coordinating Signal support

between the two converging forces; once this is done, the link-up force Sig O
must take the initiative to establish contact with the static force. In all likelihood,
CNR will be the only means of communications with the force in enemy territory,
so precautions must be taken not to tip the enemy about link-up plans.
b. As for break out operations, coordination between converging forces must cover
passwords, frequencies, crypto keys, contact location, timings, C2 contracts and
visual signals.
3. Signals considerations for special operations conducted in enemy controlled territory are
as follows:
a. Special operations teams operating behind enemy lines are equipped with
special, long range, secure radio or satellite communications equipment to
contact their controlling HQ.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-21
b. Communications security (COMSEC) measures may include;
(1) varied calling schedules;

(2) varied frequency plans;
(3) burst transmission and frequency hopping;
(4) use of low power transmitters in the operational area and highly sensitive
receivers at the controlling HQ; and
(5) remote radio transmitters away from the operational base or CP.
SECTION 3
TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS
1. Formations will conduct operations on what can be termed “complex terrain” most of the
time. This is not to say that there will not be conflict on open terrain nor does it imply that all
complex terrain is the same. Each type of terrain presents particular challenges and engenders
specific Signal doctrinal methods for dealing with the characteristics of the terrain in question.
This section provides guidance to Sig Os supporting forces operating in specific environments.
The following specific environments will be discussed:
a. operations in a chemical, biological, radioactive, and/or nuclear (CBRN)

environment;
b. operations in mountains;
c. operations in the arctic and cold weather;
d. operations in jungles; and
e. operations in deserts.
625. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS EFFECTS ON SIGNALS
1. Continuity of C2 is essential during periods of gas or chemical attacks. Signals will play
a vital role in:
a. rapid collection and dissemination of information related to enemy capabilities,

location and use of biological and chemical resources; and
b. warning of own troops and those of flanking formations of attacks, impending
attacks (if possible), and contaminated areas.
2. Biological and chemical agents are primarily anti-personnel weapons. The survivability
of TacComms and TacC2IS is therefore dependent on the ability of personnel to survive and to
operate and maintain these systems in a reliable manner. Survival of personnel is dependent
on:
a. personal protection measures; and

b. collective protection.
6-22 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
3. Personal Protection. Personal protection is achieved mainly by wearing protective

masks and protective clothing ensembles. The use of radio and telephone communications will
be difficult even when aided by special types of ancillary equipment. Moreover, problems will
also arise in the operation of keyboard equipment, handling of messages, maintenance and
repair of systems, etc. Signal personnel, as well as users, must be highly trained in the use of
protective clothing and equipment and be capable of effectively carrying out their responsibilities
while wearing such clothing.
4. Collective Protection. Collective protective measures for CP personnel is possible

through the provision of overpressure shelters in which personnel can continue to carry out all
necessary actions needed for the operation of the TacC2IS. The shelters may be of permanent
or field construction, depending on location and the tactical situation, but should contain special
air filtration and circulation plants. Operators and users will require suitable airlock entrances
and exit facilities for prolonged operations.
5. Decontamination. The need for decontamination significantly affects any operational

plan. The Commander has to decide on the degree of decontamination to be achieved and on
the control measures to be adopted. Priorities for decontamination must be laid down clearly;
initial measures being limited to those essential for operations to continue.
6. Reserves. A reserve of personnel and equipment must be available to Signals to re-

establish any part of the TacC2IS rendered inoperative by an enemy CBRN attack, either
through destruction or contamination.
626. NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON SIGNALS
1. Aside from the devastating results of a nuclear explosion, there are other effects that
could have an impact on TacComms equipment even at great distances away from ground
zero. These are:
a. electromagnetic pulse (EMP);

b. nuclear blackout; and;
c. Transient-Radiation Effects on Electronics (TREE).
2. Electromagnetic Pulse. Electromagnetic pulse originates with the release of massive

charges of gamma rays, X-rays and neutrons in the atmosphere as the result of a nuclear
explosion. This pulse of electromagnetic radiation is many times more powerful than that of
lightning; as a result, it can enter CIS equipment through antenna systems, power connections
and signal input connections. Integrated circuits and solid-state circuitry is particularly
susceptible to damage; spares and spare parts should be kept in steel boxes or be shielded
whenever possible. The following paragraphs describe the effects of EMP on different means of
communications as well as the actions to be taken to minimize damage:
a. Radio. The first protective measure is to disconnect the antenna if the threat is
imminent. Further, equipment, power and antenna connectors should be
disconnected when the radios are not in use or during periods of electronic
silence. Equipments should be shielded from direct penetration of EMP
whenever possible.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-23
b. Multi-channel Radio. Electromagnetic pulse will likely damage the sensitive

receivers. In order to minimize damage, all spare equipment should be
disconnected from the antennae and from power and Signal cables. Planning
should stress shielding equipment whenever possible, flexibility in routing and
re-routing critical circuits and allow for spare equipment to minimize the
likelihood of losing entire systems.
c. Information Systems. Computer based systems (laptops, desktops, servers,
displays and peripherals) are susceptible to EMP damage as is any other
equipment containing integrated circuits. Shielding of these devices will reduce
or prevent damage (related directly to the strength of the EMP) although
damage to supporting medium (line, radio, radio-relay) will isolate the ability to
provide a voice/data network.
d. Line. Electromagnetic pulse does not affect fibre optic cables; however, the
peripheral equipment (switches, hubs, routers, etc) on which they terminate is.
Non-shielded line and cable is susceptible to arcing and insulation failure.
Replacement and repair is required after EMP exposure. Shielded cable should
be grounded at one end and cable shield connectors must be inspected
frequently to ensure proper connection. Cables and lines between equipments
can become unintentional antennas; this can be avoided by:
(1) keeping the lengths of cable and line as short as possible (the amount of
energy collected is directly related to the length of the conductor),
(2) burying all cables and lines, including power cable, at least 1 m deep,
(3) never leaving line or cable coiled on a reel connected to equipment (the
coil will pick-up more energy than a straight cable run);
(4) always using a common ground for all equipment, shelters and power
sources, and
(5) ensuring that all antenna guy lines are properly insulated and grounded.
e. Visual and Sound. Should EMP cause the loss of radio and line
communications, the use of visual and sound signalling may be necessary for
C2.
f. Signals Dispatch System. Extensive use of SDS, courier and liaison may be
necessary in a nuclear environment when and where EMP has damaged
equipment.
g. Shielding. Shielding prevents direct penetration of EMP into TacComms
equipment. Shielding effectiveness is related to the type of shielding and its
thickness. For effective electrical field shielding, any metal can be used. For
magnetic shielding, iron or steel is required. Loss of otherwise good shielding is
due to openings, such as doors, panels and vents in the shield enclosures.
Other conductors, such as water pipes and cooling and heating ducts, also
provide good access paths for EMP penetration. In order to minimize the effects
of direct penetration of EMP, all access panels and other equipment apertures
should be closed and sealed at all times, except when they absolutely must be
removed or opened for operation or maintenance. Where feasible, TacComms
equipment may be buried 1 m deep, in soil, to reduce the effects of EMP.
6-24 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
3. Nuclear Blackout. A nuclear blast always produces large disturbances in the

atmosphere. For airbursts, below an altitude of 25 km, the most significantly disturbed region is
within a well-defined fireball varying from one km to tens of km. For underground blasts or at
very low altitudes, large dust clouds are generated in addition to the fireball. When a radio
transmission goes through a nuclear blast region, there will be degradation of the radio wave
that results in the partial or total blackout of radio communications.
4. Nuclear Blackout Variables. The characteristics of this blackout, as well as actions to

minimize its effects, are described below. The three variables of nuclear blackout that concern
communications are:
a. altitude and direction of the nuclear blast;
b. yield of the weapon; and
c. frequency of the radio waves.
5. Radio Waves Interactions. The basic interactions of radio waves with the nuclear
fireball and the dust created by the blast are refraction, absorption and scattering. As a result,
signals arriving at the receiver will vary rapidly in phase, strength and in direction of arrival. The
three phenomena may occur singly or concurrently. In addition, the fireball will radiate thermal
noise. In the case of tactical radio systems, HF to SHF may be catastrophically affected by
these radio wave interactions.
6. Blackout Environment. The actual amount of blackout interference to be encountered

will not be known unless a nuclear war occurs. Tests and simulations cannot confidently predict
the results. However, in such an environment it can be expected that the following three main
combinations would cause blackout for varying periods of time:
a. High altitude blasts with the resulting disabling of all but the most rigorously
hardened communications satellite relays.
b. High altitude blasts with the resulting major disruption of HF communications

systems (skywave).
c. Dust clouds produced by low altitude blasts resulting in disruption to LOS,

BLOS, in particular satellite and HF communications systems.
7. Remedial Actions. When blackout occurs, the following actions may reduce
communication outage time:
a. Line communications that have not been affected by EMP may be used.
b. Alternative routing or relaying around the blackout region may be possible.
c. Assigned alternative frequencies may be used. (If it is suspected that an ionised

region is causing interference, higher frequencies should be tried first but when
dust appears to be the problem, lower frequencies should be tried).
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-25
8. Transient-Radiation Effects on Electronics. Transient-Radiation Effects on

Electronics is another important electrical effect caused by the radiation emitted by a nuclear
explosion that can interact with components of electronic circuits to produce ionization or atomic
displacements in the semiconductor and insulating materials. The effect ranges from
momentary changes in conductivity to permanent changes in crystal lattices. Semi-permanent
effects, such as trapped charges in insulating materials, may also occur. Transient radiation
effects on electronics may upset memories, produce spurious circuit responses (logic errors),
drive circuits into abnormal states, or cause permanent damage. As with most other EMP
forms, damage caused by TREE can also occur through secondary effects. Self-inflicted
damage may be triggered by abnormal conductivity in a junction that allows stored energy to be
released. In addition, one circuit may be caused to instruct another circuit or another part of the
system to perform some forbidden act that destroys the circuit or even the system.
627. OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINS
1. Mountainous terrain is characterized by a marked difference in elevation with steep

slopes and valleys over an extended area. Weather conditions can also vary considerably over
a small area. It may include built-up areas and plains between mountain ridges, plateaus,
passes and the mountainsides themselves. Communications practices will differ in this
environment from normal operations.
2. The communications means available to support operations in mountainous regions are

the same as those to support operations in other regions of the world. However, rapid and
reliable communications are especially difficult to achieve and maintain in mountainous areas.
Mountainous environments require electronic equipment that is light, rugged, portable and able
to exploit the advantages of higher terrain. The combined effects of irregular terrain patterns,
magnetic and ionospheric disturbances, cold, ice, and dampness on TacComms equipment
increases operating, maintenance and supply problems and requires precise planning and
extensive coordination.
3. Since even a small unit may be spread over a large area, retransmission and
rebroadcast sites may be needed to maintain radio communications and to increase range.
These sites require extensive preparation and support to ensure the survival of personnel and
the continued maintenance of TacComms equipment. Retransmission systems are often
placed on the highest accessible terrain to afford them the best LOS; however, through simple
analysis, these locations are often predictable and make them more vulnerable to enemy
interdiction.
4. Physical range limitations, difficulties in establishing LOS paths due to intervening

terrain, and limited retransmission capabilities often make it difficult to establish a brigade and
larger-sized CNR net. However, commanders can, if within range, enter subordinate nets and
establish a temporary net for various contingencies. In the mountains or if the network is not yet
fully developed, commanders should consider the increased use of HF AM radios and single-
channel tactical satellite communications terminals, if available, for extended distances.
5. Directional antennae, both bi-directional and unidirectional, may be needed to increase

range and maintain radio communications. Although easy to fabricate, directional antennae are
less flexible and more time-consuming to set up. Positioning of all antennae is also crucial in
the mountains because moving an antenna even a small distance can significantly affect
reception and/or transmission.
6-26 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
6. Antenna icing, a common occurrence at high elevations, significantly degrades

communications. Ice may also make it difficult to extend or lower antennae and the weight of
ice build-up, combined with increased brittleness caused by the cold, may cause them to break.
Antennae should have extra guy wires, supports and anchor stakes to strengthen them to
withstand heavy ice and wind loading. All large horizontal antennae should be equipped with a
system of counterweights arranged to slacken the antenna wire before the wire or poles break
from the excess weight of ice or pressures of wind.
7. Ground rods and guy wires are often difficult to drive into rocky and frozen earth.
Mountain pitons are excellent anchors for antenna guys in this type of soil. Adequate grounding
is also difficult to obtain on frozen or rocky surfaces due to high electrical resistance. Where it is
possible to install a grounding rod, it should be driven into the earth as deeply as possible or
through the ice on frozen lakes or rivers. Grounding in rocky soil may be improved by adding
salt solutions to improve electrical flow. In many instances it will be impracticable to secure a
ground and it will be necessary to install a counterpoise antenna.
8. Field cable is normally one of the most reliable means of communication. Unfortunately,
in rugged mountains and particularly during the winter months, field cable is more difficult and
time consuming to install, maintain and protect.
9. Snow-covered cables and line can cause the loss of many man-days in recovering or
maintaining circuits. Allowances must be made for drifting snow when determining the height
above ground at which to support the lines. If long-distance line communications are required,
the integration of radio relay systems must be considered.
10. Computers and computer based systems, as well as the peripheral equipment, are
sensitive to extreme cold or heat. Operating temperatures fall within the range of -40 to 70 C for
TacComms and Tac C2IS equipment based on Military Standards but COTS items are
significantly less. Consideration must be taken into account to ensure that the equipment
environment meets the optimum temperature requirements.
628. OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC AND COLD WEATHER
1. Operations in arctic and cold weather conditions demand special techniques, training
and equipment. This section concentrates on outlining the communications considerations for
such operations during the winter season but also gives some guidance on operations
conducted during arctic summer conditions.
2. Military operations in northern latitudes may be characterized by the employment of

independent task forces, usually beyond mutual supporting distance of each other. The lack of
major land lines of communication, the necessity of relying upon air lines of communication and
the great dispersion between forces mean that primary reliance must be placed on radio as a
means of communication. Operations over extended areas will require augmentation of radio
equipment and personnel. When these factors are considered in conjunction with the extreme
cold and deep snow, it can be seen that, under some circumstances, operations of isolated task
forces will be practically impossible unless these forces are able to communicate.
3. Tactical radio (i.e. VHF/UHF) equipment operating in the LOS frequency band (30 MHz
and upwards; the frequency modulated series of tactical radio sets are included in this band) is
not affected adversely by auroral activity. In fact, the greater ionization of the upper atmosphere
that takes place during auroral activity will, on occasion, increase the range of the tactical VHF
radios. The use of VHF and microwave radio relay equipment will provide the greatest degree
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-27
of reliability for multi-channel means of communications in northern areas. Tactical tropospheric

scatter radio equipment, when available, is another reliable means of providing multi-channel
communications for distances up to approximately 300 kilometres.
4. High frequency (HF) radio transmission and reception, while capable of spanning the
extended distances dictated by tactical requirements, are subject to interference by magnetic
storms, aurora borealis and ionospheric disturbances, which may completely black out reception
for hours or even days. Transmission and reception under most conditions is possible providing
proper installation and operation procedures are followed.
5. Line communication has the same capabilities and limitations in northern latitudes as in
temperate zones. Due to the distances involved and the difficulty of overland movement, wire
communications may be limited to serving local installations. If long distance wire
communication trunks (telephone and data transmission) are required, radio relay systems that
can be integrated into the wire system must be considered because of relative ease of
installation, economy of transport and other logistical factors.
6. Batteries of all types show decreased power capacity at low temperatures; however,
some (such as Lithium Ion) are better than others in cold weather. Batteries should be stored at
supply facilities between temperature ranges of -12°C to 2°C. Upon removal from storage, and
prior to use, the batteries should be heated slowly to a temperature of 20°C. Warm batteries will
give good results if used promptly upon exposure to cold. The conventional dry cell type battery
loses efficiency rapidly at low temperatures and decreases in capacity as the temperature drops
below 21° C. (The terminal voltage of the battery is not affected by cold, but its capacity, life, or
effectiveness to supply operating voltage over a period of time is affected.) At -17°C. it is 40
percent effective; at -23°C., 20 percent; and at -34°C., only 8 percent effective.
7. Similar to mountainous terrain operations, difficulties will be experienced in erecting

antennae in the north. The frozen ground makes it difficult to drive the antenna base support,
guy line stakes and ground rods. Vertical antennae are preferred for ground wave propagation
in the HF band; but the use of fractional wavelength whip antennas is not recommended except
for short distances. Suitable grounds are difficult to obtain under conditions of extreme cold
since the frozen ground offers high electrical resistance. The permafrost which underlies much
of the far north offers as much obstruction to ground rods as solid reinforced concrete. Where it
is possible to install a ground rod, the rod should be driven as deeply as possible into the frozen
earth or preferably through the ice of one of the lakes or rivers that abound in the north. In
many instances, it will be impracticable to secure a ground and it will be necessary to install a
counterpoise antenna.
8. Computers and computer based systems, as well as the peripheral equipment, are
sensitive to extreme cold or heat. Operating temperatures fall within the range of -40°C to 70°C
for equipment based on Military Standards but COTS items are significantly less. Consideration
must be taken into account to ensure that the equipment environment meets the optimum
temperature requirements.
9. Auroral effects are considered the reflecting properties of the ionosphere and are directly
related to the position and radiation activity of the sun. The sun's bombardment of the earth's
atmosphere coupled with strong magnetic activity concentrated near the poles causes a visual
effect that is called the aurora borealis in northern latitudes. Ionization of atmospheric particles
is increased and radio waves reaching distant receiving points by means of sky wave
propagation are reduced in intensity by increased absorption. This absorption becomes more
6-28 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
pronounced during violent eruptions of the sun's surface that is visible in the form of sunspots.
During such a period, a radio blackout may occur on nets crossing or passing through the
auroral zone. The greatest auroral activity occurs between 60°C and 70°C North latitude and
occurs at intervals of 27 to 28 days. Signals from distant stations are usually much stronger
prior to such periods. Monthly predictions of expected sunspot conditions are published by the
National Bureau of Standards and are available to signal staff officers at all levels of command.
It must be emphasized that “blackouts” occur throughout the HF spectrum and down to 26 KHz
and may last several days. In addition, HF sky wave transmissions are subject to sporadic
blackouts that are, at present, unpredictable and erratic as to duration and coverage. During
such periods, alternate means of communications, such as satellite or line, possibly integrated
with radio relay, must be available.
10. In the medium frequency band (300 to 3,000 KHz) very little continuous high level static
is experienced in northern latitudes, but steady rushes of high level noise are common and
signify an auroral blackout on the frequency being monitored. Flakes or pellets of highly
charged snow are occasionally experienced in the north just as rain and sand static are
encountered in many tropical and desert regions during periods of high winds. This
phenomenon is commonly called precipitation static. Charged particles of snow driven against
metal vehicles, antennas, and other objects usually discharge with a high pitched static roar that
can blanket all frequencies for several hours at a time. While these phenomena are uncommon
except in aircraft, they can take place just when communications are vital to some operations.
629. OPERATIONS IN THE JUNGLE
1. Rapid, reliable communications are essential in jungle operations. Command and

control, fire support, resupply and evacuation are all dependent on effective communications.
The importance of establishing and maintaining reliable communications cannot be
overemphasized. For this reason, a commander must give Signals high priority in his planning
and supervision.
2. Jungle operations place additional demands on the resources of Signal units and
personnel. Signal units may require augmentation of Signal personnel and TacComms
equipment to accomplish the C2 functions. Besides providing normal tactical communications
networks, Signal units may have to operate long distance radio sets. Airborne platforms will
have to be used in many instances to provide a radio rebroadcast capability as well as to assist
line-laying operations.
3. Very High Frequency communications in a jungle environment are significantly reduced
due to the dense undergrowth, heavy rains, and hilly terrain. All means of communications
should be used in a manner that complements one another. For all operations, backup means
of communications must be planned.
4. The usefulness of radio communications is reduced in jungle operations. Very High
Frequency and UHF radios are particularly limited by the jungle growth and terrain that absorb
and obstruct the transmissions. It is not unusual for the range of a set operated in the jungle to
be reduced by 10 to 25 percent.
5. In order to overcome environmental conditions in the jungle, existing antennae must be

used properly and field expedient antennae produced to extend the capacity of current
equipment this is a must in jungle with dense overhead canopies of vegetation. The problems
of LOS antenna locations are best solved by remoting the transmitter from the CP.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-29
6. Line based systems should be established whenever feasible. Field cable and line are
more secure than radio, hard to jam and their use allows for normal telephone (as opposed to
push-to-talk) conversations. The heavy rain and high humidity of the tropics reduces the range
(about 20 percent) and reliability of line communications. Line laying in the jungle requires more
time and suitable routes are limited. The increased cover and concealment make it easier for
the enemy to intercept or interrupt line communications and to ambush maintenance crews.
Wire laid by air on top of the jungle canopy is extremely difficult to maintain and recover;
however, it is less likely to be damaged by vehicles or weather.
7. The speed of surface messengers (i.e. SDS and runners) is severely limited by jungle
terrain and vegetation. The lack of roads restricts full use of motor vehicles. Foot messengers
may have difficulties with land navigation and natural obstacles. The use of air messengers
maybe a better alternative, but one that is limited by availability of aircraft, scarcity of good
landing zones, weather conditions and the fact that air activity aids the enemy in locating
friendly troop areas. When using a messenger, messages should be written or be transferred to
magnetic media. Their text must be clear, concise and complete.
8. Jungle climates (i.e. high temperatures, high humidity, and heavy rain) can have serious
effects on TacComms equipment. Frequent cleaning and more detailed inspection for mildew,
moisture and rot of TacComms equipment will mitigate the effects of the climate.
9. Computers and computer based systems as well, as the peripheral equipment are
sensitive to extreme cold or heat. Most TacComms equipments operating temperatures fall
within the range of -40 to +70 °C for equipment based on Military Standards although COTS
items are significantly less. Requirements exist for consideration of air conditioning as a means
to maintain the optimum equipment environment. Particular attention should be placed on
ensuring equipment fans and airflow paths are not restricted.
630. OPERATIONS IN DESERT AND EXTREMELY HOT CONDITIONS
1. This section describes the effects that desert terrain and extremely hot conditions will
have on communications in the conduct of land operations and considerations Sig Os must take
into account. Operations in desert and extremely hot weather conditions demand special
techniques.
2. High temperatures adversely affect communications support. The heat causes

anomalies in radio and other electrical transmissions and radio battery life is reduced. Radio
range is shorter during the day than at night. At night, range improves but static electricity may
cause interference. VHF communications ranges can be reduced by as much as 50 percent
because of high temperatures. HF ground wave propagation over the dry sandy soil is also
reduced. Night communications make communications security a concern notwithstanding the
fact that nets are encrypted, since the range of VHF radios is significantly increased, without
RRB, and they could therefore be more readily subjected to enemy direction finding.
3. TacComms equipment, in particular radios and computers, regardless of type, must be

kept cool and clean. They must be in the shade whenever possible and should be located in a
ventilated area (air-conditioned shelter). Additional key TacComms equipment should be
available in vital communications centres, such as tactical operations centres, to allow
immediate replacement if the equipment in use shows signs of overheating. The interval
between computer system back-ups should be decreased to reduce the effects of any
catastrophic system failure and allow for a rapid reconstitution of the tactical operational picture.
6-30 B-GL-351-001/FP-001
4. It is essential that antennae be cut or adjusted to the length of the operating frequency.
Directional antennae must be faced exactly in the required direction; approximate azimuth
produced by guesswork will not do. A basic whip antenna relies on the capacitor effect between
itself and the ground for efficient propagation. The electrical ground may be very poor and the
antenna performance alone may be degraded by as much as one-third if the surface soil lacks
moisture, which is normally the case in the desert. If a ground-mounted antenna is not fitted
with a counterpoise, the ground around it should be dampened using any fluid available.
Vehicle-mounted antennae are more efficient if the mass of the vehicle is forward of the
antennae and is oriented towards the distant station.
5. Desert operations require dispersion, yet the environment is likely to degrade the
transmission range of radios, particularly VHF fitted with secure equipment. This degradation is
most likely to recur in the hottest part of the day, approximately 1200 to 1700 hours.
6. If stations start to lose contact, especially if the hotter part of the day is approaching,
alternative communication plans must be ready. Alternatives include the following:
a. Using RRB stations, including airborne RRB (the aircraft must remain at least
4,000 meters behind the FEBA) and deploying RR repeater detachments if the
area trunk system is in jeopardy.
b. Deploying any vehicle with a radio as a manual relay between stations.
c. Using alternative radio links such as HF satellite Single Side Band (SSB) voice
or data.
d. Using Line. Normally, line would not be used as operations will be fluid, but it
may be of some value in some static situations.
e. Using SDS or runners for hand messenger service to maintain communications.
B-GL-351-001/FP-001 6-31

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B-GL-351-001/FP-001

SIGNALS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS

PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS

Supersedes B-GL-321-001/FT-001 dated 1991-07-26.

This publication is issued on the authority of the Chief of Land Staff.

SIGNALS IN SUPPORT OF LAND OPERATIONS

PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS

Supersedes B-GL-321-001/FT-001 dated 1991-07-26

This publication is issued on the authority of the Chief of Land Staff.

OPI DAD 6 2008-05-01

1. B-GL-351-001/FP-001, Signals in Support of Land Operations, Volume 1, Principles and

2. The French version of this publication is B-GL-351-001/FP-002, Les Transmissions au

3. Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded to LFDTS DAD 6.

a. the requirement for a command and control information system;

b. the principles for the provision of this system;

c. the characteristics of major system components; and

7. The primary references were:

a. B-GL-310-001/AG-001 Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for

b. B-GL-300-003/FP-001 Command in Land Operations;

c. B-GL-331-001/FP-001 Command Support in Land Operations;

d. B-GL-358-001/FP-001 Land Forces Information Operations Electronic Warfare;

e. B-GL-331-002/FP-001 Staff Duties for Land Operations; and

f. Capability Development Record—Command Version 1.1, Draft-8 September 2006.

127. Command Support Capability .......................................................................... 1-20

SECTION 2 MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS .....................................................................3-2

404. Electronic Warfare Capabilities .......................................................................... 4-4

SECTION 9 ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION .................................................................4-31

604. Signals Considerations for a Deliberate Attack .................................................. 6-3

Figure 1-1: Signals Two Main Components CIS and EW ........................................................1-2

102. ROLE OF SIGNALS

103. SIGNALS’ FUNCTIONS

b. Signals must be able to conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations as

104. SIGNALS’ COMPONENTS

Figure 1-1: Signals Two Main Components CIS and EW

105. COMMAND AND CONTROL

106. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

1. The exercise of command and control is accomplished through a combination of

a. Chain of Command. A chain of command designates commanders at various

b. Staff System. It is described in B-GL-331-001/FP-001, Command Support in

c. Headquarters Facilities. The functioning of headquarters will be discussed in

d. Communication and Information Systems. Communications and Information

(1) Communications System: Communication System (CS) provides

(2) Information System: An Information System (IS) is used by individuals

107. ARMY OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

a. Command. Signals provide the means for commanders to exercise command

c. Sense. Signals role in this operational function is associated with information

e. Sustain. Signals role in this operational function is to maintain the operational

108. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

a. The Military Information Environment (MIE) is defined as “the environment

b. The Global Information Environment (GIE) is defined as “all individuals,

a. Support the decision-making process;

109. SIGNALS’ COMMAND AND STAFF

1. To enable operational commanders to execute effective command and control and

Figure 1-2: Signals System Management in Network Operations

110. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEM MANAGEMENT (SM)

1. The general principles of system management (SM) include capacity, economy,

2. Capacity. The SM capability should be built on a modular basis to permit it to cater to a