Chanakyaniti Features and Principles

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Chanakya (BC 371- BC 283) was an Indian teacher, philosopher, economist, jurist and royal

advisor. Kautilya was the key adviser to—and the genius of the strategy undertaken by—the
king Chandragupta Maurya (c. 317–293 B.C.E.), who defeated the Nanda kings (several related
kings trying unsuccessfully to rule India together), stopped the advance of Alexander the Great’s
successors, and first united most of the Indian subcontinent in empire. Kautilya composed his
Arthasastra, or “science of politics,” to show a wise king how to defeat his enemies and rule on
behalf of the general good. He helped Chandragupta, noting “This science has been composed by
him [Kautilya], who . . . quickly regenerated the science and the weapon and [conquered] the
earth that was under control of the Nanda kings.”

Kautilya’s Arthasastra is a science of politics intended to teach a wise king how to govern. In this
work, Kautilya offers wide-ranging and truly fascinating discussions on war and diplomacy,
including his wish to have his king become a world conqueror, his analysis of which kingdoms
are natural allies and which are inevitable enemies, his willingness to make treaties he knew he
would break, his doctrine of silent war or a war of assassination against an unsuspecting king, his
approval of secret agents who killed enemy leaders and sowed discord among them, his view of
women as weapons of war, his use of religion and superstition to bolster his troops and
demoralize enemy soldiers, the spread of disinformation, and his humane treatment of conquered
soldiers and subjects.

 Although Kautilya proposed an elaborate welfare state in domestic politics, something


that has been called a socialized monarchy, he proved willing to defend the general good
of this monarchy with harsh measures.
 He advised his king to ethical towards his people domestically but in external affairs as a
political realist, Kautilya assumed that every nation acts to maximize power and self-
interest, and therefore moral principles or obligations have little or no force in actions
among nations.
 While it is good to have an ally, the alliance will last only as long as it is in that ally’s as
well as one’s own self-interest, because “an ally looks to the securing of his own interests
in the event of simultaneity of calamities and in the event of the growth of the enemy’s
power.”
 Whether one goes to war or remains at peace depends entirely upon the self-interest of, or
advantage to, one’s kingdom: “War and peace are considered solely from the point of
view of profit.”
 One keeps an ally not because of good will or moral obligation, but because one is strong
and can advance one’s own self-interest as well as the self-interest of the ally, for “when
one has an army, one’s ally remains friendly, or (even) the enemy becomes friendly.”
 Because nations always act in their political, economic, and military self-interest, even
times of peace have the potential to turn abruptly into times of war, allies into enemies,
and even enemies into allies.
 Kautilya was describing a foreign policy not of a great empire like that of the Mauryas,
but of small warring states in incessant conflict, such as India experienced before the
Mauryan empire. Kautilya probably assumed that peaceful empires cannot last forever,
and that conflict among smaller states is more common in history.
 For Kautilya, this principle of foreign policy—that nations act in their political,
economic, and military self-interest—was a timeless truth of his science of politics, or
artha´ sastra. He did not believe that nations never act in an altruistic manner—indeed,
Kautilya advocated humanitarian acts that also coincided with one’s self-interest—but he
did believe that one must assume, if entrusted with political or military power, that one’s
neighbors will eventually act in their own interests.
 Put another way, one would be betraying one’s own people if one did not assume a
worst-case scenario. A nation forced to rely on the kindness of neighboring states is weak
and, unless it can change rapidly, doomed to destruction. This same assumption can be
seen in the work of Thucydides, who discussed foreign policy a century before Kautilya,
and in the thoughts of the Chinese Legalist Han Fei Tzu, who wrote about fifty years after
Kautilya’s Arthashastra.
 Kautilya is famous for outlining the Mandala theory/Rajmandala Theory of foreign
policy, in which immediate neighbors are considered as enemies, but any state on the
other side of a neighboring state is regarded as an ally, or, the enemy of my enemy is my
friend.
 Imagine a series of states to one’s west, and then number them starting with oneself.
States numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on will likely be friends, whereas states 2, 4, 6, 8, and
so on will probably be enemies. (The same thing can be done with concentric circles,
which would look more like a mandala, but it is difficult to envision these circles as
states.)
 Kautilya put this basic principle in a number of different ways, but most simply as, “One
with immediately proximate territory is the natural enemy.” Elsewhere he stated this
Mandala theory of foreign policy in more detail: “With respect to the middle king [he
himself], the third and the fifth constituents are friendly elements. The second, the fourth,
and the sixth are unfriendly elements.
Rajamandala {Circle of States}
 The Rajamandala theory consists of four principal types of states viz. Vijigishu (desirous
for or would be world conqueror), Ari (enemy, whose territory if contiguous to
Vijigishu), Madhyama (Middle king with territory adjoining those of Vijigishu and Ari
and stronger than both) and Udasina (kingdom lying outside or neutral and more
powerful than that of Vijigishu, Ari, and Madhyama). Each of them has an ally and ally’s
ally thus making 12 kings and 60 types of combinations called material constituents (for
example, enemy’s enemy, mitra’s enemy, enemy’s mitra, mitra’s mitra and so on). This
together combines into the total 72 elements of Raja Mandala.
 This scheme is based on assumption that two neighbouring states which share their
borders are hostile to each other; and the enemy of hostile neighbour is a natural ally. The
Vijigishu is located at the center of this circle.
Shadguna Sidhanta {Six-Fold Diplomatic Policy}
 This doctrine is a six-fold foreign policy for attainment of one’s national interests and
goals based on realpolitik (Meaning: Politics grounded in realism). Kautilya had
suggested this recipe for a Vijigishu to realise his dream to become world conqueror. The
six principles are Sandhi, Vigraha, Asana, Yana, Sansraya and Dvaidhibhava. A very
brief explanation of these is as follows:
 Sandhi (making peace with strong enemy) has been advised for a weaker nation with
strong enemy. When you enemy is stronger than you, don’t confront with him and rather
make peace on terms and conditions of your enemy {i.e. surrender troops, treasury or
territory}. Sandhi will thwart the strong enemy and will give enough time to get strong
enough to overthrow the strong enemy. Thus, this policy is based on “opportunism” and
seeks time to become strong and wait for enemy to get weaker.
 Vigraha (policy of hostility) has been advised for stronger nation with relatively weaker
enemy. There can be two dimensions of policy of hostility viz. Defensive and Offensive.
Kautilya says that policy of Vigraha is advisable only when you are sure that you should
be either repel attack of enemy or are strong enough to ruin enemy or seize his territories
(in such case go ahead with Yana).
 In this policy, Kautilya has hinted some kind of cost-benefit analysis and says that if cost
appears more than benefit, then Sandhi is preferred over Vigraha.
 Asana: The Asana is basically a stance of keeping quite. It is to wait for enemy to get
weaker either by plunging itself in some difficulties or getting involved in war at some
other front. Asana also includes secret efforts to weaken the enemy or some kind of proxy
war in modern terms.
 Yana {March or Expedition} is direct manifestation of a policy of Vigraha and is to be
followed when you are sure that you shall ruin the enemy and win over him.
 Sansraya means seeking shelter with another king. If a king is weak and threatened to be
attacked by a powerful enemy, it’s better to seek protection from another King or another
place / fort etc. This policy corresponds to status of Protégé in modern sense.
 Dvaidhibhava refers to the double policy of Sandhi with one king and Vigraha with
another at a time. It is suggested for a King who is strong enough to fight but may not
win without getting additional strength of an ally.
 Apart from the above Shadgunas, Kautilya has mentioned four tactics to overcome the
opposition viz. Saman (Conciliation), Dama (Gifts), Bheda (Dissension) and Danda
(Force).
 In Arthashastra, Kautilya has made arguments about power, governance, statecraft etc.
without any reference to any religion or divinity, which makes him eligible as true
founder of what we call realpolitik. However, above description makes it very clear that
Kautilya suggests a state to act in order to enhance its power and self-interest. There does
not seem to be any moral / ethical or religious obligation in his policy. War and peace are
solely on basis of profit. Many criticize this policy of Kautilya as ruthless realpolitik,
intrigue, deceptive and immoral. Despite of criticism, the policy holds relevance because
Kautilya said something which has always been actually practiced by states everywhere.
 At the same time, when discussing about India’s foreign policy, many observers connect
the ancient Indian strategic thought of Kautilya with contemporary Indian strategy,
whereby foreign policy takes place within three widening concentrics, with the first circle
encompassing India’s immediate neighbourhood region, the second its extended
neighbourhood; and the third the entire global stage. Many observers consider such
principles to be both applicable to, and evident in, the conduct of Indian foreign policy
since 1947.

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