I. Chavez v.

Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the
Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and
leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila
Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future
projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the
transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to
develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would
later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a
TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these
events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim
that the contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA
between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of
the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged
areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
II. PALOMO v. CA
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997

FACTS:
                Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive
Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the
same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April
1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the
Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the
Court of First Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay
issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in
October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into
the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management, protection and
administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the
Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to
disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the
Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the
property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting
rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de
Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the
parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine
Islands.

ISSUE:
                Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.

HELD:
                The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public
domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned
by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified
and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the lots here
forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public domain. As to
the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that the
government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification
for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
III. ERNESTO BALBIN v. PEDRO C. MEDALLA, GR No. L-46410, 1981-10-30
IV. Republic of the Philippines vs Norma
Royales

in 1970, the Director of Lands in Camarines Sur filed a cadastral case. Norma
Royales was a claimant and notice was published in the Official Gazette. In 1975,
the lower court rendered a decree ordering the registration of lands in her name.
But before the certificate of finality and the order directing for the issuance of the
decree of registration can be issued, the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur was
destroyed by fire.

27 years later, Royales applied for reconstitution. The lower court ruled in her
favor. The petitioner averred that the ruling is invalid because the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case because no publication was made. Under Section
10 of Act 3110, publication was necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
a petition for reconstitution of a final and executory decision in a cadastral case.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is correct.

HELD: Yes. This is a cadastral proceeding for which a special procedure is provided.

Section 10 of Act 3110 specifically provides that pending cadastral cases, if wished
to be reconstituted, the court shall issue an order for all interested persons to re-
file their claims anew. Such order shall be published in the Official Gazette.

The cadastral case, in the case at bar, is considered pended when the decree was
not entered in the RD due to the fact that it was razed by fire.

However, There is no need to re-file the application anew from the start. Royales
can just start from where the case left off. Publication just needs to be complied
with.

NOTE: Purpose of Reconstitution

The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or

destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may
continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss
of the records. The law contemplates different stages for purposes of
reconstitution.
V. Director of Lands vs. Santiago
G.R. No. L-41278
April 15, 1988
FACTS: this is a petition for certiorari, to nullify and set aside the orders and decision
of the respondent Judge, and mandamus to order the respondent Judge to give due
course to the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial. The petitioner also prays for the
dismissal of the respondent corporation’s application for registration.
On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in
the CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the
director of Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed an opposition to this
application, and at the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized
the Provincial Fiscal to appear on his behalf at the hearing of the same. Subsequently,
respondent IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., with the conformity of the respondent
Garcia, filed a Motion to Substitute Party Applicant from Maria Garcia to Imperial Corp
without amending the boundaries of the area stated in the original application. Said
motion was granted by the respondent Judge Santiago.

A notice of initial hearing was sent by respondent Judge to all parties concerned, with
the warning that a party who failed to appear would be declared in default. The same
notice was likewise published in the Official Gazette and posted by the sheriff as
required by law.

On Jan. 23, 1975, the date of the initial hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel was
present; an order of general default was issued by the respondent Judge on the same
date. After the reception of the evidence for the applicant before the clerk of court, the
respondent Judge rendered the questioned decision and adjudicated the lands in favor
of the respondent corporation.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds that the failure of his
counsel to appear at the initial hearing was excusable,a nd that the decision was
contrary to facts and to law. The motion was however denied.

ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Santiago erred in decreeing the following orders and
decisions:
1. Admitting the Amended Application for Registration and adjudicating the parcels of
land in favor of respondent corporation,

2. Declaring the Director of Lands in default,

3. Denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial.;

HELD: The petition is GRANTED; the Order of general default against the petitioner,
and the Order denying the Motion for New Trial, the Decision dated February 17, 1975,
as well as the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto, if any, are all declared
VOID and SET ASIDE. The respondent corporation’s subject application for land
registration is hereby DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
1. The lower court gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent
corporation’s application for registration, without sufficient proof that the applicant
possessed an imperfect and incomplete title that is registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act.
The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and
with the arguments of the respondent corporation that the latter, through its
predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years.
First, it appears that Maria Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the respondent
corporation purchased the subject lots, have pending sales applications as evidenced in
the plans submitted to the land registration court by Maria Garcia herself. As such sales
applicants, they manifestly acknowledge that they do not own the land and that the same
is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to which the
applications were submitted. Therefore, their possession was not that of an owner, as
required by law. (The private respondents were conspicuously silent on this point, as if
they were trying to conceal this vital fact)
More than anything else, however, registration in this instance can not be granted on
the basis of Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act as said provision applies
exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain. It appears from Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1157, dated April 28, 1971,  that the subject lands…were
forest lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption that the applicant
herein, through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession for at least thirty
years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. The respondent Garcia and
Vicente Obdin must have applied for sales patents precisely because they wanted to
acquire ownership over the subject lands. An examination of the dates will show that
the filing of the sales applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was done after the
lands had been declared as alienable and disposable.
1. The opposition or answer filed by the Director of Lands, which is based on substantial
grounds, having been formally filed prior to the issuance of the Notice of Initial
Hearing, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such
registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear
on the day set for the initial hearing. The declaration of default against the petitioner
was patently invalid because when the same was made, he had already entered an
appearance and filed his opposition or answer.
The pertinent provision of law which states: “If no person appears and answers within
the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded …,”  cannot be interpreted to
mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed, for
such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust
Especially in this case where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to
be registered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have received
the applicant’s evidence and set another date for the reception of the oppositor’s
evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner herein should have been
accorded ample opportunity to establish the government’s claim.

3. The respondent Judge, in denying the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial, ignored the
established rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside a default judgment. “The
Court, in the exercise of wise discretion, could have restored their standing in court and
given them an even chance to face their opponents.

Tthe Supreme Court no longer deem it imperative to order a new trial of this case which
would only prolong the litigation unnecessarily, for as it said in a recent case, the
remand of a case to the lower court for Lither reception of evidence is not necessary
where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before on the
records before it.

In view of the basic presumption that lands of whatever classification belong to the
State, courts must scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate.
But this the respondent Judge sadly failed to heed; the tax declarations and plans
submitted by the private respondents were not carefully analyzed, and the allegations in
the petitioner’s opposition to the application were so casually ignored.

NOTES:
1. The respondent corporation maintains that the appropriate remedy in this instance is
appeal, which is expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and not
certiorari. In Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation vs. Vallejos the Supreme Court laid
down the doctrine that appeal is not an adequate remedy where a party is illegally
declared in default. Thus, it stated:
The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule (i.e. Sec. 2, Rule 41) is properly,
though not exclusively, available to a defendant who has been validly declared in
default. It does not preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in default from
pursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the
judgment by default set aside as a nullity.

2. Section 48, paragraph b, of the Public Land Act, to wit:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:…

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
 presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. ..

VI. THE BISHOP OF CEBU, REPRESENTING THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH,

plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIANO MANGARON, Mangaron-
appellant.

FACTS
The Bishop of Cebu in this case relates to a tract of land in the district of Ermita of this
city, it is alleged is at present occupied by the Mangaron. The object of the original complaint
was to recover the possession of the said land, while in the amended complaint the Bishop of
Cebu prays that the said land be declared to be the property of the Catholic Church and that it be
restored to the latter.
Neither party has exhibited any title papers to the land in question nor pay other
documentary proof. They have only offered certain parol evidence as to the former possession of
the land and as to certain acts of the ownership exercised by the parties over the same.
Mangaron's parents and brothers had been in possession of the land in question until
about the year 1877.
About the year 1877, Mangaron and his relatives vacated the land by the virtue of an
order from the municipality, which declared that the land was included within the zone of
materiales fuertes (fire zone) and the houses in which they lived upon the said land without
objection.
Around 1879, the parish priest of the Ermita Church fenced the land and cleaned the same
without any objection whatsoever on the part of anyone. The Bishop of Cebu claimed that this
property had belonged to the Catholic Church from the time immemorial.

In the year 1898 Mangaron, without the consent of anyone, entered upon the land in
question and built thereon a nipa house and continued to live thereon without the consent of the
parish priest of the Ermita Church.
The court then ordered, "that Mangarons vacate the land described in the complaint and
pay the costs of this action".

ISSUE WON Mangaron has the right to possess the land in question.

HELD No.

The doubt arises from the provisions of article 460 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
The possessor may lose his possession —
1. By the abandonment of the thing.
2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.
3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming
unmarketable.
4. By the possession of another, over against the will of the former
possessor, if the new possession has lasted more than one year.

Paragraph 4 of article 460 is not an innovation in the Civil Code, nor does it mean the
modification or reformation of the old law. Law 17, title 30 of the third Partida contains the
same provision: "One who holds property cannot lose the possession thereof except in one of the
following manners: (1) If he is ejected from it by force; (2) if another person occupies in while
he is absent and upon his return refuses him admission. . . . But although he may lose the
possession in either of the aforesaid manners, he can, however, recover the same, and even the
title thereto by an action in court."

The possession held by Mangaron in 1898 cannot be added to the former possession, which was
interrupted in 1877 by the order of the municipality, so as to consider such possession
continuous, the time intervening not being of sufficient duration to cover the statutory period of
"a person who recovers possession according to law, which was improperly lost, is considered
as having enjoyed it redound to his benefit." But in this case, it appears (1) that it cannot be
affirmed that the possession enjoyed by Mangaron was improperly lost; that possession ceased
by virtue of an order from the municipality and no proof to the contrary has been offered on this
point; (2) that it is impossible to say what was the nature of the possession prior to the year 1877
— that is to say, whether it was held by right or by the mere tolerance of the plaintiff in this
case.

The lessee, the depositary, the pledgee, the intruder, the usurper, the thief himself, after the
expiration of a year would not be responsible for the possession of which the lawful possessor
was wrongfully deprived, and if the latter could produce no evidence of his right of ownership
— the only thing that he could do according to the contrary theory — it would be impossible for
him to recover such possession thus lost by any other means.

If, in addition to the fact of possession, the action for the enforcement of which prescribes after
the expiration of one year and one day, there exists without any doubt whatsoever the right to
possess (or more properly speaking in the case at bar, to continue to possess, which said right of
possession would be a right in rem, such possession would not be on a less favorable footing
than a mere possession de facto; and, if in the latter case the interdictory action lies, the action
which existed prior to the enactment of the code, to wit, the accion publiciana, should continue
to lie in the former case. The code establishes rights and the Law of Civil Procedure prescribes
actions for the protection of such rights, and we cannot look to the code to find any provision
defining the action which every civil right carries with it.

We consequently conclude that the action brought by the plaintiff in this case to recover the
possession of which he was unlawfully deprived by Mangaron can be properly maintained under
the provisions of the present Civil Code considered as substantive law, without prejudice to any
right which he may have to the ownership of the property, which ownership he must necessarily
establish in order to overcome the presumption of title which exist in favor of the lawful
possessor, the plaintiff in this case, who had been in the quiet and peaceful possession of the
land for twenty years, more or less, at the time he was wrongfully dispossessed by Mangaron.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian
Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in
the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority
in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same. 
 LAND
TITLES &
DEEDS