The Journal of the American Forensic Association

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Argument Strategies: Antidote to Tylenol's

Poisoned Image

William L. Benoit & James J. Lindsey

To cite this article: William L. Benoit & James J. Lindsey (1987) Argument Strategies: Antidote to
Tylenol's Poisoned Image, The Journal of the American Forensic Association, 23:3, 136-146, DOI:
10.1080/00028533.1987.11951338

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00028533.1987.11951338

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 ARGUMENT STRATEGIES: ANTIDOTE TO TYLENOL'S
POISONED IMAGE
William L. Benoit and James J. Lindsey

The Tylenol capsule poisonings created a potentially disastrous situation that

could easily have cost the reputation and market share of one of Johnson and
Johnson's leading products. The manufacturers responded with a well-conceived
advertising campaign to defend Tylenol's image. This campaign is an important
instance of practical reasoning in which key actions were coordinated with related
arguments: the link between Tylenol and the poisoning was denied, Tylenol's image
as a safe product was bolstered, and capsules were differentiated from other products.
These arguments worked well together, and they were sufficient to accomplish the
goal: Tylenol's sales were restored to very nearly the market share enjoyed prior to
the poisonings. This analysis extends the applicability of the genre of apologia as a
source of argumentative topoi for analysis of (a) a media campaign (b) on behalf of a
consumer product (c) which did not receive a prior discursive attack.

The cyanide poisoning of seven users of
Tylenol brand aspirin-free pain reliever
in September 1982 is a tragedy we recall
too vividly. Recent recurrences poignantly
remind us of our shock and horror during
the initial crisis. The repercussions suf-
fered by the manufacturers of Tylenol
(McNeil Consumer Products Division
and its parent company, Johnson and
Johnson) were quite serious as well. In
1982, sales of all Tylenol products
dropped immediately after the news of the
poisonings broke and it was widely
believed that the Tylenol brand name
could never be salvaged (Company turn-
arounds, 1984 ). Johnson and Johnson
launched an extensive advertising cam-
paign in order to defend its product. This
investigation analyzes the public argu-
mentation employed in support of
Tylenol. As a study of practical argumen-
William L. Benoil is an Assistant Professor of Com-
munication al the University of Missouri; James f.
Lindsey earned a Bachelor of Arts in Communication
at Bowling Green Stale University.
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Volume 23, Winter 1987
tation, this essay contributes to our under-
standing of how arguments are made and
the impact they have on their audiences.
Accordingly, we first describe the circum-
stances of this tragedy, describe the apolo-
getic method of analysis, which provides
our topoi for critical analysis, analyze the
arguments contained in this advertising
campaign, and, finally, evaluate the effec-
tiveness of these argumentative strategies.
In doing so, this essay not only provides
insight into Johnson and Johnson's argu-
mentative response to this tragedy, but
also tests the utility of the apologetic
method as a set of topoi for the analysis of
defensive discourse in a variety of circum-
stances.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE TYLENOL
POISONINGS
Johnson and Johnson enjoyed an envia-
ble position in September of 1982. Its
subsidiary, McNeil Consumer Products
Company, produced a series of pain
reliever products under the brand name
 TYLENOL'S POISONED IMAGE
Tylenol which were extraordinarily suc-
cessful, accounting for 37% of the non-
prescription pain reliever market. This
share was larger than all other non-
aspirin pain reliever products combined
and even larger than the top three brand
names of aspirin products combined
(Kleinfield, 1983, p. B 1). Tylenol's mar-
ket share had increased an astounding
nine hundred percent in six years from
1976 levels of 4% (Church, Griggs, &
Zagorin, 1982, p. 19), generating in
excess of four hundred million dollars in
revenue for Johnson and Johnson each
year (Sloan, 1983, p. 1). This success was
a result of the fact that Tylenol was the
first non-aspirin pain reliever on the mar-
ket, a position they exploited through an
extensive effort to establish brand loyalty
and trust. An important component of
Tylenol's appeal was its safety compared
with the traditional pain reliever (aspi-
rin).
On September 29, 1982 the situation
facing Johnson and Johnson changed dra-
matically when people began dying from
Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules contami-
nated with cyanide. Seven people eventu-
ally died as a result of ingesting poisoned
Tylenol; not surprisingly, extensive pub-
licity was accorded this tragic occurrence.
One network head observed that "20% of
his network's news time was devoted to
the Tylenol story during the first eight
days of the crisis" (Clare, 1983, p. 40).
The crisis was not ignored by newspapers
either-news clipping services developed
files of over 125,000 stories on the Tylenol
poisonings (Foster, 1983, p. 4). In light of
this widespread attention, in both elec-
tronic and print media, it is not surprising
to find that the general public became
aware of the poisonings almost immedi-
ately. Surveys by Johnson and Johnson
revealed that 99% of the public was aware
of the poisonings after two weeks (Clare,
1983, p. 39). Hence, virtually all consum-
ers learned very rapidly of the poisoned
Tylenol capsules and the resultant
137
deaths-a true nightmare for any con-
sumer product manufacturers, but a par-
ticularly detrimental development for a
product which employs safety as a major
selling point.
Diverse industry experts predicted
severe damage to Tylenol's image from
this crisis. One New York University
business professor declared that "this
brand has suffered a mortal wound"
(Wallace, 1982, p. 12); a brokerage firm
analyst agreed that "use of the name
Tylenol is dead" (Church, Griggs, &
Zagorin, 1982, p. 19). A marketing ana-
lyst explained that "when a brand name is
so clearly established and then so tarred
and feathered, it is difficult or impossible
ever to separate the two in consumers'
minds" (Wallace, p. 12). These dire pre-
dictions, amounting to a claim that Tyle-
nol's image had been poisoned as surely as
the seven human victims, paralleled con-
sumer buying patterns following the
deaths.
While sales of all non-prescription pain
relievers dropped 16.7% after the poison-
ings, sales of Tylenol products plummeted
even further. Within one month of the
deaths Tylenol products' market share fell
from 37% to 12% (Church, Griggs, &
Zagorin, 1982, p. 19). Moreover, this
drop cannot be attributed to Tylenol's
voluntary removal of all capsules from the
market, because capsules accounted for
only a small proportion of Tylenol's mar-
ket share (Kleinfield, 1982, p. B 1).
Johnson and Johnson faced an enor-
mous problem. They had built up an
immensely popular and lucrative line of
products with the brand name Tylenol. In
only a month the reputation and trust
they had built up over the years lay in a
shambles. Recapturing their consumer
loyalty and market share called for a care-
fully conceived and executed advertising
campaign. The arguments advanced in
response to this tragedy will be analyzed
from the apologetic perspective on dis-
course.
138 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
THE APOLOGETIC PERSPECTIVE ON
DISCOURSE
Apologetic criticism was originally de-
veloped by B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linku-
gel. They describe apologia as a genre
developed from "the recurrent theme of
accusation followed by apology," claiming
that "in life, an attack upon a person's
character, upon his worth as a human
being, does seem to demand a direct
response" (1973, pp. 273-74). Drawing
on the work of social psychologist Robert
Abelson (1959), Ware and Linkugel iden-
tify four strategies of self-defense.
The first strategy, denial, "consists of
the simple disavowal by the speaker of
any participation in, relationship to, or
positive sentiment toward whatever it is
that repels the audience" (Ware & Linku-
gel, 1973, p. 276). Advocates using this
strategy seek to disassociate themselves
from the object of the audience's displeas-
ure. Bolstering, the second strategy, "rein-
forces the existence of a fact, object, or
relationship. When he bolsters, a speaker
attempts to identify himself with some-
thing viewed favorably by the audience"
(p. 277). In other words, bolstering
attempts to counterbalance or offset the
source of audience displeasure by associat-
ing the speaker with a different object,
something for which the audience has pos-
itive affect. The third strategy is differen-
tiation, an attempt at "separating some
fact, sentiment, object, or relationship
from some larger context within which
the audience presently views that attri-
bute" (p. 278). This strategy attempts to
remove the advocate's image from its cur-
rent negative context, assuming that it is
the negative context which arouses the
audience's hostility. Transcendence is the
remaining strategy. It attempts to couple
"some fact, sentiment, object, or relation-
ship with some larger context within
which the audience does not presently
view that attribute" (p. 280). In contrast
to differentiation, which separates the
object from an undesirable context, tran-
scendence places that object into a larger
and more favorable context. Ware and
Linkugel suggest that the latter functions
to "move the audience away from the
particulars of the charge at hand toward a
more abstract, general view" (p. 280).
While identifying these four strategies,
Ware and Linkugel argue that each
speech of self defense must contain both
reformative (denial or bolstering) and
transformative (differentiation or tran-
scendence) strategies. Combining these
strategies gives rise to four general pos-
tures: absolution, consisting of denial and
differentiation; vindication, denial and
transcendence; explanation, bolstering
and differentiation; and justification, bol-
stering and transcendence (p. 282). While
these categories may be useful in some
circumstances, it is not clear that all apol-
ogetic messages, especially those which
are part of an extensive media campaign,
must be limited to one of these postures.
Indeed, Ware and Linkugel recognize that
even in a single speech more than two
strategies may be present (p. 282).
With this analysis of apologetic dis-
course in hand, we will turn to the dis-
course employed to defend Tylenol's
image. While previous applications of this
approach have examined single speeches
or groups of single speeches in a genre
(see, e.g. Butler, 1972; Gold, 1978; Har-
rell, Ware, & Linkugel, 1975; Kruse,
1977, 1981), we see no conceptual reason
barring its use on a mass media campaign.
On the contrary, the pervasiveness and
importance of the mass media invite an
attempt to extend this method to ca.m-
paigns. Similarly, while the initial formu-
lation of apologetic criticism assumed the
existence of a prior attack, Tylenol's
image had been seriously damaged by the
extensive media coverage of the poison-
ings. Even though there was no "attack"
from a hostile opponent, there can be no
 TYLENOL'S POISONED IMAGE
question that McNeil and Johnson and
Johnson intended their campaign to
defend their image.
PuRIFICATION OF TYLENOL'S
POISONED IMAGE
Johnson and Johnson evolved a com-
plex (and expensive) response to the tragic
events. First, we wiii present the chro-
nology of actions taken (see Fannin,
1983). While some of their actions were
not directly aimed at the general public,
they deserve mention as an important
component of the carefully orchestrated
overall strategy. Second, we will focus on
three media events which were aimed at
consumers and then turn to a critical anal-
ysis of argumentative strategies employed
in this campaign.
As soon as they were notified of the
tainted capsules (on the morning of Sep-
tember 30, 1982), Johnson and Johnson
suspended all Tylenol advertising and
recalled 93,000 bottles from across the
country. On October 1, Johnson and
Johnson established emergency telephone
lines to answer questions from health care
personnel and consumers. On October 5,
they withdrew all Tylenol capsules from
the market, and sent over two million
messages to health care personnel, whole-
salers, and retailers. Both print and elec-
tronic media were put to use in this cam-
paign. Advertisements in 184 newspapers
nationwide offered to trade Tylenol tab-
lets for capsules. McNeil Chairman
David Coli ins appeared on Nightline, the
President of Johnson and Johnson, David
Clare, appeared on Today, and James
Burke, Johnson and Johnson's CEO, was
on the Phi! Donohue Show, unprece-
dented moves for executives of these com-
panies (Clare, 1983, p. 41 ). On October
24-27, a commercial featuring Dr. Bill
Gates, McNeil's medical director, was the
first in a series of television advertise-
ments aired since the poisonings. J ames
139
Burke (accompanied by David Collins
and David Clare) held a nationwide press
conference in New York City (fed to 30
other cities) announcing the new triple-
safety seal packaging for Tylenol cap-
sules, and announcing the upcoming free
coupon offer. A total of 80 million cou-
pons were distributed through newspa-
pers; 430,000 calls were received on toll-
free numbers requesting coupons. Finally,
on January 2, 1983, a series of commer-
cials featuring testimonials from women
went on the air.
There were three major facets of the
media campaign designed to redeem Tyle-
nol's poisoned image. The first was the
Gates commercial, which ran for one
week. This advertisement had extensive
exposure, because it ran simultaneously
on all three networks each of the eleven
times it was aired, and was aired at times
which would insure the largest and most
diverse audience possible (Sioan, 1983, p.
1). This commercial did reach the public,
for an Advertising Age survey showed that
it had the highest level of awareness by
consumers for any medical/drug adver-
tisement (Winski, 1982, p. 2).
The second noteworthy event was the
televised news conference from New York
City. Mike Wallace observed that this
event afforded Tylenol extensive coverage
for their message:
It was the best publicity money could buy. To get
bigger media bang for the buck, the New York City
press conference was piped into 30 cities around the
country, so local reporters could feel involved and be
more likely to run Tylenol's story. The outcome:
plugs for the new safer packaging of Tylenol,
reported as news, in just about every paper and on
every newscast in America (Wallace, p. 16).
Since newspaper stories and electronic
media newscasts made the public aware of
the Tylenol poisonings, there is justice in
Johnson and Johnson's decision to exploit
the media in this fashion to announce
their triple-safety seal packaging. A news
release simply would not have generated
140 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
the exposure this press conference pro-
vided.
The third aspect of the Tylenol cam-
paign which deserves mention is the series
of advertisements when "normal" adver-
tising resumed in January 1983. These
ads were quite similar, each featuring a
woman telling how much she trusted
Tylenol so as to reassure viewers that
Tylenol was indeed a safe product.
The following is a critical analysis of
the strategies of self-defense adopted by
Johnson and Johnson. First, arguments
that functioned to deny responsibility for
the deaths will be elucidated. Then, argu-
ments that functioned to bolster Tylenol's
image of safety will be identified. Finally,
arguments that instantiate the strategy of
differentiation will be discussed (transcen-
dence was not a part of this campaign).
Denial
In the first commercial of this cam-
paign, Dr. Gates constantly referred to
the poisonings as "the work of a mad-
man." This attributes the deaths to some-
one (unknown) other than the manufac-
turers of Tylenol. This argument is a
classic case of scapegoating, shifting the
blame, or, to use Kenneth Burke's ( 1962,
pp. 406-08; 1968, p. 450; 1970) terminol-
ogy, victimage: if "a madman" poisoned
the capsules, Tylenol did not do so, and
hence did not cause the deaths. Further-
more, this attribution implicitly exoner-
ated Tylenol from the potential accusation
that they should have been able to prevent
the tragedy: no one can predict a mad-
man's actions, so Tylenol could not be
held responsible for the acts of such per-
sons.
The nationwide news conference
stressed that the poisoning did not occur
in the Tylenol plant. Mr. Burke empha-
sized that "the tampering and the poison-
ing of the product did not take place in
our plant. The Food & Drug Administra-
tion confirmed that after a careful inspec-
tion of our manufacturing facilities." Ref-
erence to the FDA confirmed that Tylenol
was not responsible for the poisoning.
Another argument that supported the
strategy of denial occurs in reference to
the other products which had been poi-
soned. Dr. Gates argued that since other
(i.e., non-Tylenol) products were also
contaminated, Tylenol cannot be held
responsible for the poisoning and result-
ing deaths. Early in the campaign both
the Gates commercial and the news con-
ference employed several arguments to
deny responsibility for the poisoning
deaths. All of these arguments, to use
Ware and Linkugel's words, employ "dis-
avowal by the speaker of any participation
in" the poisonings.
In sum, three arguments supported the
strategy of denial and functioned to disas-
sociate the makers of Tylenol from the
deaths: ( 1) the poisonings were the work
of a madman (a plausible statement, for
what "normal" person would poison
people at random?); (2) the FDA (pre-
sumably perceived by the audience as a
recognizable, unbiased authority) ascer-
tained that the tamperings did not occur
in Tylenol plants; and (3) the argument
that other products (non-Tylenol prod-
ucts) have suffered tampering. The FDA
report clears the makers of Tylenol but
doesn't answer the obvious question in the
minds of consumers ("If they weren't poi-
soned at the factory, then who did it?").
The explanation that the tampering was
the work of a madman answers this ques-
tion, but doesn't have the authority or
neutrality of a pronouncement by the
FDA. Hence, these two arguments work
together well, the FDA statement exoner-
ating the manufacturer and Gates'
authoritative statement satisfying consum-
ers' curiosity about how the poisonings
did occur. The argument that other prod-
ucts had been tampered with also sup-
ported their claim that they were not
responsible for the tampering.
 TYLENOL'S POISONED IMAGE
Bolstering
Denial alone is an insufficient strategy
for restoring the damaged image of such
an important product line as Tylenol.
Once the link between Tylenol and death
was made, it would be risky to rest the
defense of its image on denial alone. Thus,
McNeil and Johnson and Johnson also
sought to restore Tylenol's former image
as a safe product. Three actions taken
during the crisis underscored their con-
cern for consumer safety: the recall of
93,000 bottles of Tylenol capsules, the
voluntary withdrawal of all capsules, and
the offer to trade Tylenol tablets for cap-
sules. Arguments supporting the claim
that Tylenol was safe received extensive
development in the advertisements an-
nouncing these actions. The Gates com-
mercial stressed one of these actions (that
Extra-Strength Tylenol was being volun-
tarily withdrawn from the market until it
could be packaged in tamper resistant
containers) emphasizing their concern for
the safety of the audience.
The nationwide news conference an-
nounced the new safety packaging. Mr.
Burke revealed that "this package has
three separate barriers to entry, and, with
the cooperation of alert consumers, affords
the best protection we could reasonably
devise." He then detailed the three seals
and the warning labels printed on the
packaging. The triple-safety seal was
designed to assure consumers that no one
could tamper with their Tylenol capsules,
thereby renewing the association of cap-
sules with safety. The "tamper-resistant"
argument also was stressed in the adver-
tisements which ran in January.
The series of commercials beginning in
January featured women stressing their
trust in Tylenol (Dr. Gates touched on
this theme as well). One spokeswoman,
Mrs. Paige Nagle, tells viewers that she,
"like most people, is very careful about
what she gives her family," and observed
141
that her pain reliever "has to be some-
thing worthy of her trust. For many years
now, we've taken Tylenol. I feel as good
about Tylenol now as I ever did and will
continue to use it." Mrs. Meek, another
spokeswoman, explained that "You can
trust Tylenol, hospitals do." Mrs. Mary
Lou Atterbury, a third spokeswoman,
related that she wants "a pain reliever I
can put my trust in. I always use Tylenol.
It has been my pain reliever for many
years and I have just as much confidence
in Tylenol now as I ever did .... I con-
tinue to trust it." These commercials
stressed the women's years of experience
with Tylenol-not a snap judgment-and
that they have retained their trust in this
product. Their testimonials contributed to
the positive image of Tylenol as a safe,
high quality product.
The final argument employed in this
advertising campaign to associate Tylenol
with safety was the claim that using this
product is a part of family tradition. This
series of appeals pictured Tylenol as an
old and trusted friend and Tylenol users
as a family. These appeals were most
blatant in the Gates commercial. Gates
spoke to tradition when he stated that
Tylenol "has been a trusted part of their
[millions of Americans'] health care for
more than 20 years." Stressing the idea
that these spokespersons have used Tyle-
nol for years may well remind consumers
of their own past buying patterns. Gates
also referred to 'the Tylenol family' when
speaking about those people who buy
Tylenol. In many of the January commer-
cials the woman's testimony concluded
that "Tylenol has been a part of our
family ever since," thereby bolstering
Tylenol's image as a safe and trusted
member of the family. These arguments
help create (or, recreate) a positive evalu-
ation of Tylenol as a safe pain reliever. In
Ware and Linkugel's words, these argu-
ments are "attempts to identify" Tylenol
"with something viewed favorably by the
142 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
audience," in this case the feeling of safety
and the tradition that comes from long
association with a trusted product.
A number of arguments were advanced
to bolster Tylenol's image of safety. First,
the fact that the manufacturer voluntarily
removed the product from the market and
the offer to trade tablets for capsules
strongly suggested that the company was
more committed to the safety of its con-
sumers than to profits. The argument that
only capsules can be contaminated in this
fashion should provide some assurance to
the users of tablets, but of course it would
do nothing to reassure capsule users.
Probably the strongest arguments are ( 1)
the claim that Tylenol products will be
safe in the future because of the new triple
safety seal packaging, and (2) the testi-
mony from users who still trust it. The
latter appeal also reminds consumers
(who had been Tylenol users) of their
past buying patterns and their tradition of
Tylenol use.
Differentiation
Dr. Gates also argued that most Tyle-
nol products were not even susceptible to
poisoning, thus attempting to dissociate
certain Tylenol products from the poison-
ings. He explained that it was possible to
do this kind of tampering with only one
kind of product: capsules. Hence, the only
Tylenol brand product which could even
conceivably be affected was Extra-
Strength Tylenol Capsules. By thus disso-
ciating other Tylenol products, Gates
sought to narrow the "damage" to a single
product. When combined with other argu-
ments (that Tylenol was not responsible
for the poisoning of the tainted capsules,
and that all Tylenol capsules will be
tamper-proof in the future), there should
be no reason to distrust the safety or
quality of any Tylenol product.
The attempt at differentiation should
be successful at promoting the safety of
tablets. This is an important point, for
Tylenol sold far more tablets than cap-
sules. While the differentiation strategy
does nothing to defend capsules, and while
relatively little time or effort is spent
developing this argument, it is part of a
larger campaign which both denies
responsibility for capsule deaths and pro-
motes capsule safety through tamper-
resistant packaging. The strategy also
illustrates how the separate arguments of
the campaign work together well; had dif-
ferentiation occurred in this argument
without denial and bolstering, consumers
would have been given no reason to trust
capsules.
DISCUSSION
The mass media campaign thus had
two major well integrated components.
The program to restore Tylenol's image
and market share required both decisive
action and appropriate argumentative
strategies that made optimum use of those
actions. Neither the actions nor arguments
alone were sufficient to cleanse Tylenol's
image. The actions were necessary to
reassure consumers of Tylenol's concern
for their safety. The arguments conveyed
the implications of these actions to the
audience. Hence, they are each an integral
component of a well-developed campaign
to restore Tylenol's image, one which
should have worked effectively.
The early statements in the public
argumentation on behalf of Tylenol
focused on denial-several arguments
denied that Tylenol was in any way
responsible for the poisonings (and, more
subtly, that they could have been expected
to foresee and prevent them). As time
went on, the emphasis shifted toward bol-
stering, where argumentation reinforced
Tylenol's image as a safe product. Tran-
scendence was not a part of the campaign.
Use of denial was extremely important
to the success of this apologetic campaign.
 TYLENOL'S POISONED IMAGE
Tylenol had been vividly associated with
death, through national electronic and
print media stories about the poisonings.
There was an urgent need to establish
that they had not caused the deaths and
that they should not be held responsible
for them. While breaking the link of
Tylenol and death was a necessary aspect
of this campaign, it was not sufficient.
Action also was necessary to reestablish
the image of Tylenol's safety; bolstering
strategies were used to place actions in a
positive light. Hence, the argumentative
strategies of denial and bolstering were
instrumental in cleansing Tylenol's
tainted image. The immediate goal for
Tylenol was to establish the proposition
that it had not in any way caused the
deaths. Once this important goal had been
accomplished through arguments denying
Tylenol's culpability in the poisonings,
the focus of the advertising campaign
could shift to reinforcing Tylenol's image
as a safe product. This shift was accom-
plished through several arguments that
bolster and one argument that differen-
tiates.
THE RESULTS OF THE TYLENOL
CAMPAIGN
The success of this aggressive advertis-
ing campaign is reflected in the sales fig-
ures for Tylenol products. Despite the
prophecies of doom for Tylenol, on J an-
uary 1, 1984 brand name Tylenol prod-
ucts were once again the non-prescription
pain reliever industry leader. They
regained an impressive 93o/o of the market
share previously held on September 28,
1982 (Company turnarounds, 1984, p.
63). This is not to say the company did
not suffer. Aside from the reported
$100,000,000 spent on recall and testing,
McNeil executives believed in 1982 that
they would capture more than SOo/o of the
pain reliever market by 1986 (Fannin,
1983, p. 130). However, with only 35o/o of
143
the market, that goal was not met. While
many factors influence consumer actions,
if we find that an argumentative strategy
is well-conceived, and if desirable results
occur, and no other explanation for the
results is plausible, the conclusion that the
discourse is probably responsible for the
observed effects appears reasonable. Our
consideration of both the general apolo-
getic strategies and their instantiations in
specific arguments concludes that the
advertising campaign was capable of
defending Tylenol's image. The only
other conceivable explanation Tor this
extraordinary turn-about in sales is that
the public may have gradually forgotten
the tragedy and subsequently returned to
former buying patterns. While consumers
may have notoriously short memories, the
increase in market share for Tylenol-
especially on the heels of dire predictions
by market and industry analysts and espe-
cially over such a relatively short period of
time-cannot reasonably be accounted for
without giving the campaign credit for
much of the positive results. Hence, there
is support available for the claim that the
arguments employed in Tylenol's adver-
tising campaign were extremely success-
ful.
THE 1986 POISONINGS
While space precludes a detailed analy-
sis of the more recent poisoning incident, a
brief consideration may provide a broader
context for interpreting our remarks.
Given the phenomenal success of the ear-
lier advertising campaign, temptation
exists to employ the past campaign as a
guide for action in the more recent trage-
dy. Johnson and Johnson, however,
apparently had little confidence in trying
to reuse their old campaign's applicability
to the latest incident. The manner in
which they met the problem of a new
poisoning differs in key regards. Of
course, since capsules were adulterated in
144 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION
1986, Tylenol could hardly rely on the
argument that their packaging was tamp-
er-resistant.
The largest difference in Johnson and
Johnson's response to these two tragedies
concerns their decision to save capsules.
While in 1982 they decided to fight for the
life of their product, in 1986 they chose to
drop the manufacture of Extra-Strength
Tylenol capsules. One reason for this
could be that by 1986 they had prepared a
new form of product to replace capsules-
caplets. This allowed them to drop the
source of potential contamination without
abandoning either the entire line of brand
name Tylenol products or one of the prod-
ucts.
Note that the decision to remove cap-
sules from the market entirely was, argu-
ably, presaged in the earlier crisis. In
1982 Johnson and Johnson were distin-
guishing capsules from other products.
Their differentiation strategy argued that
capsules are uniquely susceptible to tam-
pering. It is not surprising that having
once tried (and failed) to make capsules
tamper-proof, they decided to abandon the
capsule medium entirely, and, conse-
quently, an important argument of the
previous campaign. These differences
strongly suggest that McNeil and John-
son and Johnson carefully consider the
situation facing them when crafting apol-
ogetic arguments, adapting to changes
instead of blindly using what worked in
the past.
This is not to say that these two cam-
paigns were entirely dissimilar, though. A
strong similarity between their responses
in 1983 and 1986 is the use of an authori-
tative spokesperson in an often repeated
advertisement explaining to the public
exactly what was happening. In the 1986
advertisements the argument of safety is
again highlighted, as is the claim that only
capsules were susceptible to this sort of
contamination. Third, the company again
offered to exchange any capsules the pub-
lie might still have with the new, safe
caplets.
CONCLUSION
The story of the Tylenol deaths is a sad
one since an unknown murderer took the
lives of seven innocent people. This trag-
edy could have been compounded by the
potential loss of reputation to an innocent
company: Tylenol could easily have
become the eighth innocent victim of the
1982 poisonings, thereby making the com-
pany's employees and their families addi-
tional indirect victims. Johnson and John-
son responded to the 1982 crisis with a
well-designed and effective advertising
campaign that successfully integrated
action and argumentation to defend this
product from responsibility for the poison-
ings and to bolster Tylenol's image. Each
of these general strategies was instantiated
with several particular arguments. One
argument was advanced to differentiate
capsules from tablets as well. These argu-
ments are arguably sufficient to accom-
plish the two overall goals. Examination
of sales figures reveals that the arguments
were adequate to the task: Tylenol's mar-
ket share rebounded, and came close to
equalling its earlier share. Johnson and
Johnson, along with their subsidiary,
McNeil Consumer Products Division,
had formulated a remarkably successful
campaign on behalf of Tylenol.
This study also has important implica-
tions beyond our understanding of how
arguments functioned in an important
advertising campaign. We have seen how
the apologetic strategies can serve as argu-
mentative topoi, pointing to important
issues and arguments in apologetic dis-
course. In addition, this case study
prompts three observations concerning
apologetic criticism as a method of analy-
sis in media campaigns.
First, the strategies employed in apolo-
getic analysis can be extended beyond the
 TYLENOL'S POISONED IMAGE
conception developed in Ware and Linku-
gel's original essay. In fact, the ease with
which such strategies have been identified,
and the importance in the overall cam-
paign, suggest that these strategies may be
generic topoi for defending an image. This
analysis identifies three different ways the
scope of apologetic criticism can be wid-
ened: (a) these strategies can be applied to
a mass media campaign as well as to
single speeches (or to a set of speeches in a
genre); (b) they can be applied to dis-
course which does not reply to a prior
attack per se, but still functions to defend
an image; and, (c) they can be applied to a
consumer product's image as well as to a
person's image.
Second, in a mass media apologetic
campaign such as this, with several dif-
ferent messages employed over a period of
time, the focus of argumentative claims
may shift over time. In the case of the
defense of Tylenol's image, denial pre-
dominated early on, with the emphasis
gradually shifting to bolstering strategies.
This sort of shift may not be a necessary
component of such campaigns generally,
but it was appropriate in this one. The
most important immediate goal for Tyle-
nol was to deny that it had not in any way
caused the poisonings. However, after this
vital purpose had been accomplished,
argumentation could be employed to rein-
force Tylenol's image as a safe product. It
is worth noting that an earlier study of
what is essentially apologetic discourse
(although it did not employ the apologetic
method) found shifts of emphasis over
time in Nixon's Watergate discourse (Be-
noit, 1982). Further research should
investigate the possibility that the focus of
a mass media apology develops or shifts its
focus over time.
Third, this analysis casts doubt on
Ware and Linkugel's assertion that apolo-
getic discourse must consist mainly of two
strategies, a reformative strategy (denial
or bolstering) and a transformative strat-
145
egy (differentiation or transcendence).
This campaign consisted primarily of two
reformative strategies. The one transfor-
mative strategy used did not pervade the
campaign to the extent the two reforma-
tive strategies did. Nor were these inap-
propriate choices for this situation. While
these four postures may have utility in
some circumstances, they do not appear to
be mandatory for successful apology.
Indeed, as noted earlier, Ware and Linku-
gel recognize that more than two strate-
gies may be present. They may have
found that the apologetic discourses they
analyzed focused on one reformative and
one transformative strategy, but they do
not explain why it is necessary for apolo-
getic discourse to do so (nor does Abelson
(1959), from whom they derive the four
strategies, make this claim). Again, future
research should address this issue.
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