EDWARD CONZE INSTITUT FUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE UNIVERSITAT WIEN S-O270- SA 23/(=/6 On “perverted views” From “EA 1 AND WEST., (Year VII, N. 4 ~ January, 1987) IsMEO, Via Merulana 248, ROMA ]On “perverted views” xcept for the few who are prepared to receive them, the metaphysical theo- ties of Buddhism are bound to remain remote, inaccessible and elusive. They pre- suppose a close and long-standing familiarity with the laws of the spiritual universe and the rhythns of a spiritual life, not to mention a rare capacity for prolonged disinterested con- templation. In this article I intend to deal with one of the more immediately convincing 1 readily intelligible items of the doctrine, .e. with the theory of perverted views (viparyasa). "This. theory is fundamental to Buddhism, although not peculiar to it. But then there is no reason to assume that only the distinctive tenets of a religion are vital to it. A very similar theory is found in the Youa system of Patafjali (Yogasatra IL 5), and Aevaghosha’s Buddhacarita (XTL 25-6) attei- hutes at least one side of it to the Samkhya teacher Arada, In Europe also it has not remained entirely unnoticed, thogh not so much among professional philosophers who have, on the whole, found the attribution of widespread and far-reaching self-deception to the human intellect rather distasteful. Tts development was left to the psychologists, and. of course, to the poets. In England Wordsworth’s « Ode to Immortality » is known to nearly all those who went to school, and later on I will quote a poem by Sully: Prudhomme with substantially the same A thorough investigation of all the impli vations of the « perverted views » would easily fill an entire book. ‘There is no time here to seale the very heights, but at least we can comfortably get to the foot of the hills, and have a look at what is higher up. This short contribution of mine falls into two parts: After some preliminary remarks about the meaning of the viparyasas, I first say a few words about them as empirical mistakes which can be easily verified by ordinary observations within the reach of everyone. From that T proceed, by way of philosophical and psycho- logical reasoning, to show that they a on a misconception of our relation to. the Absolute. If they are viewed in that light, we can understand the further developments of the concept of the viparyasas in Buddhism, particularly within the Mahayana. The further details of these developments do, however, lie outside the scope of this article. First, as to the ostensible meaning of this dloctrine, — it is well known that ignorance (avidya) is for Buddhists the root evil. In the technique of meditation the concept of «ignorance » is made amenable to analytical reflections by being divided up into four «perverted views ». These are regularly defined by a short formula which states that under their influence one looks « for the Permanent in the impermanent, for Ease in suffering, for the Self in what is not self, and for the Lovely (Subha) in the repulsive (asubha) ». In other words, they consist the attempt to seek, or to find, 1. permanence in what is essentially impermanent, 2. ease in what is inseparable from suffering, 3. selfhood in what is not linked to any self, and 4. delight in what is ally repulsive and disgusting. The noun viparyasa is derived from the sa. As, asyati, means root as. as vi-pary 313«to throw », and viparyasa is used of the «overthrowing » of a wagon. Vipartta and viparyasta are the corresponding verbal forms. ‘The translation hy « perverted views » | much to be desired, and others have preferre to translate as « inversion », « perverseness », «wrong notion », «error», «what can upset », or « upside-down ». Tn any ease, the viparyasas are mis-searches, — one looks for permanence, ete., in the wrong place. They are mis-takes, reversals of the truth, and, in consequence, overthrowers of inward cali, For no fact as such ean ever upset anyone, except when wrongly interpreted. The Serip- tures identify the viparyasas with « unwise attention » (ayoniso manasikaro), — the root of all unwholesome dharmas, — and with ignorance, delusion, and false appearance. «As long as their thoughts are perverted by the four perverted views, beings will never transcend this unreal world of birth and death » (Pras, XVI 296). It is, on the other hand, the prerogative of Wisdom to understand that which is unperverted, Wisdom has for its object the « unperverted own-being (sabhava) of dharmasy (Ud-A 20). The Niddesa (1 291) treats «unperverted » asa synonym of «truth », and the Prajfiaparamita (P 198) netually defines the « own-being » of dharmas as « the unpervertedness of their essential nature». So far about the philological background. We can next proceed to consider the mean- ing and significance of the « perverted views ». First of all, they constitute an empirical mistake, which, once pointed out, is easily discovered. A great deal of anxiety and mental turmoil quite obviously comes from our expeet- ing a degree of permanence, happiness, ete.. which far exceeds the amount of permanence, ete. found in the actual behaviour of events There are many occasions when we wish for events or things to last longer than they do, and fret against their inevitable loss or decay The happi far execeds that which it can give, and so we flounder alternatively in vain hopes or in despair. And if our « self » contains the sum total of things which we possess and control then a persistent illusion urges us on, as also the Stoies have insisted, to treat as within our power a vast number of things and e which, even on superficial reflection, we admit to lie outside it, either altogether, or in part. When a man fights mentally against old age or the wearing away of dear poss which we expect from the world 314 sions, when he expects lasting comfort fr a bank account, from power over others, from xual relations or from company, if his mind ranges, complacently or triumphantly, over that section of this world which he has appropriated as his own, and rejoices at watch- ing persons or things apparently bending to his will, — in each case he does violence to the actual nature of things, in each case he attributes to them properties which are the opposite of those which they actually have, in each ease he heads for a fall, and is bound to he upset in due course All this we can see quite clearly in our more lucid moments, — but they are rather rare and infrequent. The technique of Buddhist meditation aims at inereasing their frequency and innumerable devices have been designed with the one purpose of impressing the state of affairs on our all-too reluctant m The most impressive account of these devic is contained in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga ‘The « perverted views » are fourfold whea we consider the features of the objective world they distort. They are threefold when we consider their location in our minds, — for they may concern either perception (samjiia). or thought (citta), or theoretical opinions (drsfi). Although the commentaries are none too helpful on this issue, this further subdi- vision offers no real difficulties to our unders- tanding: ‘To hegin with the third item, people may, on critical reflection, formulate a theory to the effect that the world contains permanent or eternal objects, — such as the sun, or the soul, or a Creator, ete. Or, we theoretical conviction that th good in the world outweighs the suffering there is in it, and that life as we find it is worth living. All such « optimistic »_ philosophies w he regarded as examples of « perverted opinion ». Many philosophers, again, maint- ain the existence of a « self » as an arguable opinion, and they either assert or imply that in actual reality some objective relation corresponds to such terms as « belonging » or In this sense the philosophy of may have the sum total of « owning ». Aristotle, for instance, based as it is on the notion of hyparckein, would be a clear instan- ce of drstiviparyasa, The strength of the perverted views does not, however, lie so much in explicit theor. tical formulations, as in our habitual acting as if things were the opposite of what they These habits result from two factors, —from the way in which appear to ordinary from false vision, i the data of experien unthinking perception, and from false desire. i.e. from the transformation which wishful thinking, almost unnoticed, works in their appearance. According to Nettipakarana, the e vision (difthi) is more decisive in our attitude to permanence and selfhood, the false desire (tauha) in that to happiness and loveliness. Perception is perverted insofar as the actual sensory experience often fails to contain a positive perception of the « marks » of impe manence, ill and not-self. Objects frequently look quite static and unchanging. Normally their perception includes neither their beg inning nor their end. When staring at things in their brutish being, we generally fail to attend to their « rise and fall ». The duration of things, their arising and their breaking up. remain normally outside the field of perceptual Similarly, a great deal of the suffer- in connected with a sensory expe vision ing and rience is concealed at the time when pleasurable contents are evaluated. I mention here only the hidden pain of others, and that which comes only in the future, As Thomas a Kempis observed, «so every fleshly lust with a smiling face, but at the end it and kills». The mark of « not-self », finally, is hidden by the fact that a person appears as one solid mass, and a great mental effort of analysis is needed to counteract this false appearance. Buddhaghosa regards the inability to analyse the undifferentiated clump » (ghana) into dharn chief sources of the widespread resistance to the anatta-doctrine. Terms like «ly and «self» ¢ used from mental laziness. In the same way we are, in our description of historical events, content to say that «Napoleon » did this or that, when we are just too indolent to enumerate the actual historical causes of @ certain event, such as the Code Napoleon. In their treatises on Abhidharma the Buddhists have set out long lists of elementary « dhac- mas », with rules for their combination, is an effort to enable us beyond th apparent unity of persons and things, and to penetrate to. a manifoldness of dharmic processes which allows us to altogether dispen- se with the notion of a « self » We speak of a perversion by thought where the inclinations of the heart p false construction on events, where their appearance is manifestly distorted by phantas- sas one of the a patently 316 tic alterations and additions which are due to wishes and ‘The fourth perverted view is obviously almost entirely a matter of wishful thought. Tt concerns objects whieh have a direct appeal to our basic instinets, chiefly food and sex. If an instinet can be defined as that which maki rested in something which is inherently uninterestic then it is easy to see that those objects of the outer world which feed the instincts owe their lustre and fascination in the main to a rich The loveliness of the surface of jer the us i imagination the feminine body, when viewed influence of sex hormones, is a case in poin ‘To counteract its temptations, the monks were taught to recall the repulsiveness of the human tirety, in its ‘ng, or in its decay. Monastic ci ways made much of this fourth hody, when considered in its viperyasa. ‘To it belongs the example which Buddhaghosa (J/M 20-21) gives of « perverted thought », when he refers to a woman who Jecred at Mahatissa the Elder with perverted, or corrupt, thought (vipallatta-citta). The distorting effect of thought is, however, just as easily observed in the first three perverted Both fear and hope will induce us to anence of things, and we overstress the pe often deliberately avert our minds from the aten rain to what we hold causes which th dear. Fear will also make us close our eyes to much suffering, if only to prevent us from. hecoming too depressed. And as for our belongings orl «self» and its possessions achievements, — our vanity and pride magnify what we have got, the security of our tem is usually overestimated, and the signifieat of our existence in proportion to the universe ridiculously exaggerated. And yet, although the empirieal facts ean quite easily be verified by anyone who takes the trouble to do so, it takes years of assiduous before we are able to confront eet in the world with the wietion that « all practice everything we living and unshakeable ¢ conditioned things are i ill and not the self », that « this is not mine, Tam not this, this is not myself ». When we con: sider that all men happiness, and that by nursing excessive expectations, they ry upon npermanent impose an themselves, we are led to the question thy jormous burden of 1 men should persistently make such excessive demands on their environment, although all the evidence points to their foolishness in doing 50.When compared with the empirical facts, the perverted views constitute, as we saw, series of empirieal mistakes. When consid- ered in relation to the Absolute, they are seen to result from a metaphysical error. One might that, if Tam nothing else than the Jute, if Tam identical with the Uncondi- If, then the demands 1 make for permanence, bliss and self-control are really quite legitimate. The mistake only consists in that T look for these things in the wrong place, — in this world, and not in ‘The metaphysical interpretation of the pe verted views is clearly much less self-evident the latter only se is needed, for the former some afraid, required. ‘This faith ean than the empirical one, faith is, T then slowly be replaced by knowledge, to the extent that we gain a fuller insight into the true status of our personality. But this insight nd depends does not grow from study alone on self-discipline becoming more firm, med tation more assured, wisdom more mature. Buddhism, like most religions, distinguishes tworsets of facts, or two «worlds ». In the one everything bears the three « marks », it is impermanent, ill, not self; in the other, in that which « is unborn, not become, not made. uncompounded », all is permanenee, bliss, in full possession of itself. The impermanent etc., facts are actual, the permanent, ete ideal, or normative. ‘They cannot possibly «exist » in the sense in which we conceive of things around us as « existing ». For our al conception of « existence » goes back ultimately to. the experie touch, and that is naturally absent in what we may call « spiritual » realities This being so, it may very well be argued that all the time we seck to realise an absolute eof resistance to Permanence and Ease in this world. ean be discerned to our ambi e. which we persist in building on through our childre through fame and « lasting » achievements, through «monuments more enduring than brass », through far-flung illusions of per- sonal immortality, ete. Similarly, a desire for an absolute Ease seems to be behind the efforts to make ourseh and the kind of fool-proof happi often known as «security ». And. absolute Selfhood, just like and ease, is constantly ive concept by whieh to What then would an ns for a pi shifting sands, ome in this world, to attai whieh is finally, also absolute perma das a norma late our lives « absolute Self » be like? If T call something «my own» because I believe T have some control over it, then my « real self » would le with that over which, — nothing hty — I could have complete and unlimited control. Only the Absolute itself would deserve to be called my « true » or realy self. When I have found it, everything would take place as, in complete There would be no suffering, and also no change, at least agai will. The standard self, in other words, would have the three attributes of absolute permanence, absolute bliss, abso- lute freedom. And, strange as it may seem, there is, I think, reason to believe that all the unknowingly take this most exalted view of ourselves, and that, what is more, it is a healthy thing for us to knowingly do so. A well-known commonplace of all spiritual tradition assures us that we are « spirits ill at mortal being has somehow got lost in this world. Sully- Prudhomme has set it out with great clarity in his poem L’étranger. short of al liberty, I would wish it to happen. ease », and that our true Je me dis bien souvent: De quelle race os-tu? Ton coeur ne trouve rien qui Venchaine ou ravisse, Ta pensée et tes sens, rien qui les assouvisse: Ni semble qu'un bonheur infinite soit dit. Pourtant, quel paradis as-tu jamais perdu? A quelle auguste cause as-tu rendu service? Pour ne voir ici-bas que laideur et que vice, Quelle est ta beauté propre et ta propre vertue? A mes vagues regrets d'un ciel que jlimagine, { mes dégouts divins, il faut une origine Vainement je la cherche en mon coeur de limon: E1, moi-meme éionné des douleurs que j'exprime, Pécoute en moi pleurer un étranger sublime Qui ma toujours caché sa patrie et son nom. ‘This spiritual postulate has gained a somewhat unexpected confirmation from modern psychology. K. A. Menninger (The human mind, 1930, pp. 312-351) describes and illustrates in detail a number of « persist- ent phani we regard ourselves as much more power than we are. He begins with the « J complex », according to whieh «Tam God sies of the Unconscious », in which i himself, omnipotent, omniscient, inseruta- ‘This becomes explicit only in a lunatic asylum, It is followed by the «Jesus complex». hy @phantasies of extraordinary birth and ble ». 317royal lineage ». by the « theme of the maz wand. which potent, an badge of supreme power and authority; if 1 possess it, the world is mine »; by the idea of rebirth in Nirvana, or in a Jerusalem, of which it is said: «In thee no sorrow may be found, No grief, nor care, nor toil». All these p ned up in the words « Behold me! Lam God. If not God, at least his son... The common earthly parents with whom T live are not my own, Fam not one of them... Again, I must be purified. [ must secure the magic wand, the golden hough. the elixir of life (which T once had, but lost, — or which I have, but am about to lose). By its power [am made invincible, and by it Tam T escape into a heaven of refuge, the womb of my mother, my earliest and ntasies are si paradise. ‘There T remain peacefully quietly, oblivious of time and space, for So this, according to Menninger, is every- body’s @ pipe-dream ». The Buddhist, as distinct from the American psychologist, insists that it should he taken seriously Menninger naturally scoffs at the idea that the phantasies he has listed might he literally true. He regards them as pure « wishful thinking », ct from childhood experiences, chiefly the well-known « Oedipus » and qeastration> xes, ‘They spring. clinging to « souy care-free days when + according to him. nirs of the ba ty entailed no obligations ». He would certainly be ineredu: lous and displeased if told that they r the recollection of our life with the Gods. If the interpretation of the scientific psychologist is correct, these absoluteness are obviously worth spiritual and religious interpretation adopted hy the Buddhists is correct, it follows that it is this world which is worthless. If absolute permanence, for instance, is taken as the norm, then nothing empirical is worth being regarded as permanent, and the Scriptures conclude that « what is impermanent, that is not worth delighting in, not worth being impressed by, not worth clinging to». The comparison of everything in this world with the Absolute must then lead to a total rejection of the world, to @ total renunciation of all that is not the Absolute, as essentially alien to us. If we prefer the religious to the s¢ a n it is because it is truer to the nd leads to a life of higher quality. is not the place to argue the religious thesis in detail. Nor can we entirely close our minds to the observation that, in order to result, we have introduced a re- obtain o lation of the Absolute to ourselves, when the very definition of the Absolute excludes the very possibility of such a relation. So we seem to be really caught in wrong thinking again. to the extent of propounding a manifest absurdity Tt has always heen a character- of Buddhist thought, that both y and the impossibility of such statements about the Absolute have be: recognized, and have been treated as starting points for further developments, But that is which must be told another another story time. Edward Conze