Single Women and The Rural Credit Market in Eighteenth-Century France

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Single Women and the Rural Credit Market in

Eighteenth-Century France
Article in Journal of Social History · August 2014

DOI: 10.1093/jsh/shu041
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ELISE M. DERMINEUR
Single Women and the Rural Credit Market

in Eighteenth-Century France
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Abstract
This article examines the strategies, actions, and meaning of the credit activities of
single women in rural credit markets in eighteenth-century France. For the purpose
of this article, gender and, more importantly, marital status, are considered as crit-
ical categories of historical analysis, and this approach has yielded key data in the
examination of loans records from 1733 to 1790. This article concludes that not
only did single women gradually become major agents in the circulation of capital
within their communities but that they also gained greater social freedom and
empowerment thanks to their role as creditors.
Barbe Bettevy was born in 1713 in the village of Florimont.1 Her father, Pierre
Bettevy, was a prosperous laboureur who has been mayor of their village for some
time. Perhaps because of the influential position of her father within their com-
munity, Bettevy managed to enter the domestic service of the local seigneur,
Gaspard de Barbaud, a somewhat respected position for the daughter of a peasant.
Bettevy served her lord and his family in their mansion in Florimont for many
years, in the same way that other young women entered into service, and pro-
gressed, throughout Europe at that time. Indeed, it was common for a girl—or a
boy—from a modest family to seek employment outside of the parental house-
hold, before getting married, in order to save money for a dowry, learn a trade or a
craft (especially for men), and to acquire necessary work experience and the
required domestic skills for a future household.
In 1729, Bettevy’s mother, Claudine Thomas, died. Barbe Bettevy inherited,
along with her eight (at least) siblings, her mother’s lineage property and a third
of the community property her mother had acquired with her husband through-
out their married life.2 But Barbe Bettevy continued to work as a domestic for the
seigneur, delaying an eventual marriage and continuing to save money. Pierre
Bettevy, her father, passed away in 1744. Again she inherited, probably a more
significant amount of money and property this time as her father was entitled to
more of the community property than his wife. Thanks to her inheritance and
her savings, Barbe became one of the most active female creditors in the credit
market in Florimont in the second half of the eighteenth century.
Journal of Social History vol. 48 no. 1 (2014), pp. 175–199

doi:10.1093/jsh/shu041
© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
176 Journal of Social History Fall 2014
We can find traces of her investments through the loan contracts she signed
with several debtors, contracts she registered with the notary.3 From the notarial
registers, we know that her first step as a creditor remained confined to the fami-
lial circle as she lent money to her uncle Jean Claude Bettevy and his wife (200
livres), to two of her brothers, Pierre (300 livres) and Jean (100 livres) in 1745–
1746. If she did not ask for any guarantee from her uncle, she secured the loans
with her brothers through specific pieces of land mortgaged to her.4 A few years
later, her networks and presumably her influence growing steadily, she started to
extend credit to other community members. We can suppose that she rapidly

gained the attention of her master as she lent him money in cash but she also pro-
vided grain supplies and other merchandise to him and his family on credit, a
common procedure in early modern Europe. In 1755, Gaspard de Barbaud owed
her 3,998 livres, including her wages as a domestic for 12 years (1,200 livres). As
he certainly knew it would be difficult to reimburse this huge amount of money,
Barbaud made a gesture to her through a donation to Bettevy that appeared as a
disguised gift on January 1759.5 The notary wrote:
Considering the long and good services that Barbe, an adult and daughter of the
late Pierre Bettevy from Florimont, has provided to him as head housekeeper in
his household, declared gifting her as a rightful reward and through an inter vivos
donation, real, simple, and definitive, the holding for her lifetime of a house,
barn and stable, located in Florimont and purchased by the donor from her
parents, a holding for her lifetime that means nobody will threaten her or worry
her under any pretext whatsoever.6
Five years later, the seigneur, Barbaud, an inveterate borrower, asked for an
additional 783 livres from her.7 Barbe Bettevy continued to extend credit, as her
capital did not seem lost, despite her lord’s heavy demands. In 1764, she lent 218
livres to a young woman, Jeanne Marie Guenat, who wanted to take back a mort-
gaged house that she had inherited. But she never managed to reimburse her cred-
itor and the house was seized and sold in 1766 in order to repay Bettevy.8 Henry
Monnier, Bettevy’s brother-in-law, borrowed 312 livres from her in order to pay
for his son’s education in Besançon. Despite the fact that he was supposed to reim-
burse her within five years, it took him an additional five years to do so. Indeed,
his son, Joseph, who became an abbot, borrowed 522 livres in 1779 in order to
repay his father’s debt to Bettevy, including the interest.9 In the meantime,
Bettevy continued to extend credit to her lord and even served as a guarantor for
him on several occasions.
Barbe Bettevy, who had never married, was aging, childless, and not as fit as
she was, wrote a will to make her brother François her sole heir. In 1786, a few years
later, she died in her brother’s house. The authorities took great care to place the
seal on her belongings in order to make sure that nothing could be diverted by
anyone before the judge had time to write up an inventory. Monsieur de Salomon,
a somewhat impoverished noble living in the village of Florimont, and the great
rival of Gaspard de Barbaud in the seigneurie, wrote personally to the local judge in
1785, several months before her death, to tell to him “to take great care, soon after
the passing of Barbe Bettevy of Florimont, to oppose the seals on her furniture and
personal belongings in order to do the inventory,” suggesting not only her wealth
but also her social importance within the community.10
Single Women and the Rural Credit Market 177
The story of Barbe Bettevy, as a creditor, a daughter of a peasant, a lifelong

single woman, and a domestic, unusual as it might be, illustrates some aspects of
the role fulfilled by women in the rural credit market and, in particular, the role
of single women. It is a common assumption that early European women had
little latitude in the area of financial responsibility within their households and
within their communities. And yet, it is incontrovertible that peasant women made
economic contributions to their households in the management, care, and sale of
livestock and farm products, and in the production of textile items. However, the
significance and extent of their larger economic role has been neglected thus far,

especially when it comes to financial exchange and credit.11
One group in particular—single women—has received little attention from
historians.12 While studies on women and gender usually give considerable space
to married women and/or widows, the examination of single women has been, to
date, rare.13 One reason for this neglect could be that single women have been
discarded from the scope of historians because they were supposedly difficult to
track in the archives, leaving only little information behind, as they lived on the
margins of society, escaping the watch of traditional authorities, the main pro-
ducers of documents. While this lack of resources may have been an obstacle,
their marital status does not constitute an insurmountable barrier for historians.
Using gender as a category of historical analysis as a primary method of investiga-
tion, marital status appears as a key category, especially in the analysis of credit
transactions. But perhaps, more importantly, scholars have neglected their role
because they were thought to have achieved very little. In recent historiography,
historians, and especially demographers, have begun to reconsider their role,
highlighting their significant number within society. But their role in the eco-
nomic sphere, and in particular in financial transactions, continues to suffer from
a lack of attention.
This article focuses therefore on the participation, strategies, and the social
and economic role of one particular group, single women, in the rural credit
market in early modern France from 1730 to 1790.14 It also explores the meaning
of the involvement of single women in the credit market as creditors, and its con-
sequences, not only on the local economic fabric but also in relation to the
meaning of community and norms of cooperation. Finally, this article also seeks
to question the significance of credit as a tool of female empowerment and eman-
cipation. What was the extent of the credit capacity of single women in terms of
lending and borrowing? What did the participation of single women in the credit
market mean for the community, and especially in reference to the paradigm of
patriarchy?
When we refer to early-modern single women, we target the group of women
to have reached reproductive age, who were able to work, who remained single for
some time—this period could be more or less long depending on several factors—
or who never been married at all. All these women had in common the fact they
had lived without the authority and social protection of a husband. Marital status
was usually perceived as a transition status in early modern Europe; marriage rep-
resented the norm in a traditional society in which women could not remain on
their own as they would most likely lack resources, support, labour, a strong
mutual aid network, and so on.15 Some of these women were still minors, living
on the familial farm under the authority of their fathers, some had reached their
majority and could legally carry their interests on their own. We shall see that
that the authorities did not always legally enforce this minority/majority boun-
dary, and single women could possibly represent their own interests on their own
whatever their adult age. For the purpose of this study, I have excluded widows.16
Most often, the life of a single woman is depicted as difficult, on the margins,
either a life of exclusion or a transitional stage. This essay attempts to show that
single women could possibly have real power within their families and commun-
ities, and that their significance should not be overlooked.
As a case study, I have selected a rural area located in the south of Alsace, on
the border with the Swiss cantons, and only a few kilometres away from Basel.

There, peasants traded, exchanged, and lived in traditional communities. The
period selected is of critical importance, since the eighteenth century witnessed
the delicate transition away from traditional forms of exchange and commerce,
and a form of pre-capitalism, especially in the context of the credit market.17
In early modern France, peasants relied increasingly on private credit to
either sustain their investments or to make ends meet. A copy of deeds signed at
the local notary by both creditors and debtors was kept there to keep track of the
loan and capital movements, but above all to secure and conserve a proof of the
transaction, essential in case of non-repayment and the consequent lodging of a
complaint before the law. For this paper, I have used mainly the loan registers
kept by two notaries, covering all the villages of the two seigneuries, from the
1730s to 1790.18 The sample covers roughly sixty years. In the period before the
1730s, there are only a few loans indexed in the archives. We might think that
the credit registers have disappeared. The sample stops in 1790 when the French
Revolution disrupted not only the national economy but also the proper func-
tioning of local institutions. Looking beyond the French Revolution would have
tremendously expanded the scope of the analysis; therefore this study concen-
trates on the last 60 years of the Ancien Régime. To a lesser extent, I have also
used the records of the local civil court and the parish registers.19 Using gender as
a category of historical analysis, as well as marital status, I have examined the role
of single women as creditors in this rural credit market through a quantitative
multivariate and qualitative cross-analysis of these sources.
In order to grasp the relevance of the involvement of single women in finan-
cial transactions, I first examine the mechanisms of credit markets in early
modern France, and more specifically the features of the credit market in the sei-
gneurie of Delle and Florimont. Then, I turn to the examination of the role of
women, and in particular single women, in this market, highlighting major char-
acteristics about their investments and strategies. Finally, through an analysis of
their networks in the credit market, I question the influence and social and eco-
nomic impact of single women within the community.
The Rural Credit Market in Early Modern France
To appreciate the role played by single women in financial exchange, it is

essential to review their actions within the framework of the credit market. Indeed,
in early modern Europe, credit and debt were the two most essential features of
economic exchange. Warding off temporary shortages in the cycle of agrarian eco-
nomic activity constituted the primary function of credit in traditional societies.20
But in the early modern period, economic development, characterized by
substantial growth, notably thanks to improvements in proto-industrialization and

boosts in agricultural outputs, also required more capital and financial exchange
for further investments, engendering growing indebtedness especially on the part
of peasants.21 Credit was therefore an essential financial tool for millions of
Europeans, either to sustain their investments or to make ends meet.22
In rural areas, such as the seigneuries of Delle and Florimont, peasants
borrowed and lent money to each other in a hermetic market where strangers in
the community were rare.23 Intercession of the notary to bring potential creditors
and debtors together was not always required in such a local market, where every

peasant knew his or her neighbour. In fact, in each seigneurie there was to be found
only one notary. Once the two parties reached an agreement on the transaction and
its conditions, they usually met at the notary’s office to register their deal.
Non-official loans did exist but they elude us for the most part, either because they
were oral agreements or because the written private contracts unfortunately have
not reached us.
Registering a loan transaction at the notary’s office allowed both parties to
secure their transaction, especially in the context of uncertainty about the repay-
ment capacity among peasants.24 Increasingly throughout the eighteenth century,
official authorities such as the notary became indisputable guarantors, and peas-
ants gradually resorted to their services more and more often.25 The deed itself
followed specific legal norms. Indeed, the document traditionally contained the
names of both parties, their marital status, their place of residence, sometimes
their professions and their kinship relations if any, the amount lent and received,
the interest fee (5% was the common legal norm and cap in early modern
France), the duration of the loan, the guarantees and mortgages promised, and
often the name of one or several guarantors.26
As Table 1 below shows, I uncovered a total of 2,085 deeds housed at the
archives du Territoire de Belfort. In the seigneurie of Delle, the registers contain a
total of 1,463 contracts while in the seigneurie of Florimont, the registers account
for 622 contracts.27
Not everyone in the community could borrow and/or lend money. If
lending capacity depended mostly on the creditor’s personal wealth, patrimony
and cash savings, the borrowing capacity of an individual rested mainly on his or
her honour, reputation, and potential guarantees. If small amounts of money or
payments on credit could be allowed informally, larger transactions gradually
necessitated a strong legal framework, trust and guarantees. In this context,
women who traditionally had more difficult access to capital were clearly
disadvantaged.28
Table 1. General overview of the credit market in the seigneuries of Delle and Florimont
1730–1790 (in livres)
Seigneurie of Delle Seigneurie of Florimont
Number of contracts 1,463 622

Volume 442,573 304,534
Average loan 302,5 489,6
Median loan 200 200
Single Women and the Credit Market: Capital and Allocation of Credit
Women as creditors
In a common assumption, financial transactions in early modern Europe were

traditionally associated with business and trade and almost automatically
excluded women. Historians have nonetheless found evidence that women did
become involved in credit markets. In fourteenth-century Ghent, for instance,
women accounted for 16% of its moneylenders. In Writtle, an English village, the

female lenders represented 14% of creditors at the time.29 In early modern Paris,
despite women being described as “rare as lenders,” Hoffman found 23% of female
lenders who provided 20% of the credit. But there is little data available about
the role and proportion of women as lenders in the credit market.30 On the
whole, two reasons explain this. First, economic and social historians have to date
discarded gender as a category of historical analysis when it comes to credit. And
second, women as creditors did not provoke much interest as they represented
only a fraction of creditors, notably because they were less well connected, had no
legal access to public charges, and had less incentive and opportunity regarding
business transactions, which in turn diminished their chances of meeting poten-
tial borrowers. In fact, most of the female lenders in Paris, for instance, were
wealthy widows investing money to support their retirement and therefore were
aging women with financial capacities.31 Most of these female creditors belonged
to the upper-class or the nobility, and hence they had broader access to capital.32
If we know little about the role of female creditors, we know even less about
the involvement of women in rural credit markets. In rural areas things were dif-
ferent, mostly because the monetization of exchange entered slowly into the
mechanisms of the local economy in the early modern period, and because
women’s access to capital was more difficult than in urban areas, as we shall see.
Nonetheless, in the seigneurie of Delle, female investors, regardless of their marital
status, signed 278 contracts (19% of the total contracts) for a volume of 83,453
livres (18.8% of the total exchanged), while in the seigneurie of Florimont female
investors appeared on 127 deeds (20.4%) for a volume of 81,035 livres (26.6%). If
we compare these data with those currently available elsewhere, female peasants in
the seigneurie of Delle and Florimont lent a little bit more in proportion than did
women in Paris around the same period.
Single women
Unmarried women and widows represented the majority of the women who
extended credit in both seigneuries. Intriguingly, unmarried women ranked first
among female creditors.33 In the seigneurie of Delle, 152 contracts were signed by
unmarried women out of a total of 1,463 contracts (10.4%) for a total amount of
32,948 livres out of 442,573 livres in total (7.44%). Similar figures are found in
the seigneurie of Florimont, where unmarried women signed 59 contracts
(9.48%) for a total of 31,062 livres (10.2%). It is essential to specify that, in
theory, minors of either sex (under twenty-five years old) could not sign contracts
without the express authorization of their fathers. Once they reached their major-
ity, men and women could contract and manage their property, if they had any,
under their own name. Unmarried women above twenty-five years old could, for
Table 2. Marital status and the allocation of capital in the credit market of the seigneuries of Delle and Florimont, 1730–1790
N V Median per Mean per N V Median per Mean per

contract contract contract contract
Singlewomen 152 (10,4%) 32,948 (7,44%) 162,5 216,7 59 (9,48%) 31,062 (10,2%) 200 526,4
Married 48 (3,3%) 17,877 (4%) 200 372,4 24 (3,85%) 22,415 (7,36%) 200 933,9
couples
Widows 78 (5,3%) 32,628 (7,37%) 200 418,3 44 (7,07%) 25,125 (8,25%) 336,5 571,2
Groups 3 (0,2%) 1072 (0,2%) 200 357,3 9 (1,4%) 2433 (0,8%) 259 270,3
Men 1182 (80,8%) 358,048 (80,9%) 200 303,1 486 (78,1%) 223,499 (73,4%) 200 459,8
Total 1463 442,573 200 302,5 622 304,534 200 489,6
N: Number.
V: Volume.
181
Table 3. Single women as creditors in the seigneurie of Delle and Florimont in the
eighteenth century
Number of contracts 152 59

Amount exchanged 32,948 31,062
Median 162,5 200
Average 216,7 526,5
Min 39 60

Max 1620 6000
instance, borrow and lend money in the credit market without being accompa-
nied by a male relative. In practice, however, young and single people had limited
access to capital, as marriage remained the determining factor in transferring to
wedded couples parental assets and sufficient authority for future business transac-
tions. On the other hand, young rural men and women, as we shall see, could
seek employment as domestics in neighbouring farms and save money before
getting married.34 Young women in particular were numerous in turning to this
option, as their domestic wages contributed to supplying their dowries.35 Contrary
to widows, who regained legal independence at the death of their husbands, unmar-
ried women had, in theory, more constraints regarding their investment possibil-
ities. Most of the single women encountered in the notarial records, however,
extended credit in their own name without the assistance of a male relative, suggest-
ing that either they were all over the age of twenty-five, or that both the notary and
the debtors were not attentive to their age.36
Comparing these figures with those of similar studies proves to be difficult as
we still lack available data. Some studies, however, have shown the dynamism of
single women lenders. In Southampton, 45% of single female testators mentioned
loans due to them.37 A similar percentage can be found in British cities such as
Bristol, Oxford and York.38 Judith Spicksley contends that, in seventeenth-century
England, “single women had on average 73% of their personal assets tied up in
lending.”39 Unfortunately such estimates are not yet available for early modern
France. Whatever the case, the involvement of single women in the credit market
appeared to be an important activity.
Throughout the eighteenth century, we can note a change in the number of
single women who extended credit and in the amount of capital they lent. In the
seigneurie of Delle, they consistently lent around 7% of the total volume over the
whole period. But more of them extended credit over the period. While only 11
unmarried women extended credit at the beginning of the period, there were 47
by the end (see Tables 4 and 5). Compared to the other data gathered, single
women’s progression in absolute value reached +76% over the entire period,
while men’s participation progressed at a slower pace (+74%).40 Married couples’
progression remained stagnant while widows’ participation showed signs of irregu-
larity throughout the period. The relative success of unmarried women in the
credit market might have played a key role, setting perhaps successful examples
for other adventurous single women investors.
In the seigneurie of Florimont, single women were gradually more numerous
in extending credit, but lost influence in the last decade before the French
Table 4. Creditors according to their marital status in the credit market of the seigneurie of Delle, 1730–1790
1730–9 1740–9 1750–9 1760–9 1770–9 1780–9
N V N V N V N V N V N V
Single women 11 1690 15 2754 22 3287 20 3723 37 8548 47 12946

Married couples 7 1578 12 7528 6 1111 5 673 10 5147 8 1840
Widows 1 50 18 2742 15 3068 16 6334 19 17286 9 3148
Groups 0 0 0 0 1 200 0 0 0 0 2 872
Men 112 20349 134 31788 150 39243 166 38242 214 69306 406 159120
Total 131 23667 179 44812 194 46909 207 48972 280 100287 472 177926
183
Table 5. Creditors according to their marital status in the credit market of the seigneurie
of Florimont, 1740–1790
1740–9 1750–9 1760–9 1770–9 1780–9
N V N V N V N V N V
Single women 7 963 8 6988 13 5938 22 11598 9 5575

Married couples 6 1251 2 130 5 1890 5 17444 6 1700
Widows 0 0 1 144 3 718 8 2499 32 21764

Groups 3 805 2 202 0 0 3 926 1 500
Men 39 12021 47 18519 50 18203 160 60165 190 114591
Total 55 15,040 60 25,983 71 26,749 198 92,632 238 144,130
Revolution as their number decreased steadily, while, on the other hand, widows
became more numerous in extending credit in this last period (see Table 5).
In England, Judith Spicksley has also observed that single women who
extended credit tended to be gradually more numerous towards the end of the sev-
enteenth century.41 She observes that the shift was neither uniform nor consis-
tent throughout the period.42 While the lending activities of single women were
probably not a new phenomenon, they were overall progressively more called
upon throughout the period. I shall come back to the motivations these women
had to extend credit later.
We cannot exclude that single women lent money to their friends, neighbours
or family members through unofficial means, and did not register their loans with
the notary. But why did some women decide to register their loans officially? My
contention is that these women entered the credit market to make an investment,
perhaps with someone they did not know well or with whom they did not have
blood ties, and therefore wanted to formally secure their transactions.
Single Women and Their Capital: Where Did it Come From?
Entering into the credit market as a creditor supposes sufficient financial

means. In traditional societies, we might ask where the money came from that
these single women possessed. Where did they find the necessary resources to
have surplus to invest and lend? While most of the unmarried female creditors
had a limited lending capacity—the median was 162,5 livres in Delle, while it
was 200 livres in Florimont—we can draw out the profiles of several single
women creditors.43
First, many of them invested their rural domestics wages in the local credit
market. Ogilvie estimates that ‘between the ages of 25 and 45, about one quarter
of unmarried women still lived as servants’.44 In the seigneurie of Delle and
Florimont, young men and women often worked as domestics in wealthy farms
before establishing a household. If a few young men worked as apprentices in
artisan shop in villages and neighbouring towns, some young women could find
employment as qualified workers in market-based sectors, especially in textile pro-
duction. These qualified workers, however, had to emigrate to larger towns and—
despite the fact that they remain difficult to track for the historians—they seem to
represent only a few cases. Elisabeth Bettevy, daughter of better-off peasants, for
instance, signed an apprentice contract with a maitresse tailleuse d’habits who lived
in Porrentruy, a neighbouring town located in a Swiss canton.45 Even if some of
these young domestics had to emigrate to enter service, they remained strongly
connected to their native villages and their kin living there. For instance, Marie
Anne Vilbois, a cook in Delle, agreed to lend 200 livres to one of her relatives in
Lachapelle Sous Rougemont.46 Margueritte Duprez, a domestic in Delle, extended
credit to people from her native village, to Joseph Tallon le Jeune (120 livres) in
1777, and a few years later, in 1784, to Pierre Michelat and his wife Catherine
Crelier (220 livres), keeping thus a strong bound with her native village.47

Olwen Hufton estimates that “in Brittany a farm servante could expect about
twenty livres annually, in the Sologne she could expect anything from 60 to 90
livres [. . .] A servant spinner or the type who was an industrial employee housed
by a master carder could expect about 100 livres as she could in Bordeaux.”
Hufton also states that “normally a girl expected to work for fourteen to sixteen
years before marriage.”48 In Alsace, Jean-Michel Boehler found that the monthly
wage of a female servant varied between 13 and 18 livres.49 Not only did female
domestics earn an annual wage, they also worked for many years before getting
married and therefore accumulated a substantial capital over the years.50 Some of
these female domestics, such as Barbe Bettevy, would never marry at all. Jeanne
Baptiste Godot, the priest’s servant in the village of Réchésy, unmarried and ill,
wrote her will naming the priest and her relatives as heirs. She left them a few
belongings, especially cash and a few garments. She perhaps did not accumulate
enough savings to find a suitable match.51
As Laurence Fontaine puts it, female servants were at the heart of a system of
capital redistribution.52 The capital amassed by these female domestics could not
be kept safely at home and it was undoubtedly more secure invested in the credit
market. I have found evidence that male domestics also invested their wages in
the credit market. We cannot totally exclude, however, that in certain cases the
loan was perhaps the disguised recognition of a debt owed by a master to his/her
servant. Gaspard de Barbaud recognized that he owed his servant Barbe Bettevy
her wages for a period of twelve years.53 But if the master opted to recognise the
debt before the notary, he had to pay an interest fee of 5% for his late payment. I
doubt, therefore, that many loans made by unmarried women were in fact dis-
guised late payment for their wages. I would rather suggest that they invested their
income in the credit market in order to keep it safe, and also to make a small profit
thanks to the payment of annual interest in the prospect of a future marriage.54
Marie Margueritte Beuné is a good example. She lent 512 livres in May 1745
to three different creditors, thus diversifying her investment. In November 1747,
she married Antoine Betevy and could count on her returns from the credit
market to increase her dowry and her new household’s capital.55 Her assets were
protected and returned a small profit into the bargain. Marguerite Duprez, the
domestic working in Delle in our previous example, also opted for this strategy.
She was born in the village of Saint Dizier L’Evêque in 1739.56 The eldest of six
siblings, she was sent to the town of Delle in order to enter service. As such, she
accumulated some savings and was able to extend credit at least twice. In
November 1777, she lent 120 livres to a Joseph Tallon from her native village.
She secured her investment by asking for a guarantor. Tallon promised to repay
her within a year.57 Six years later, she lent 220 livres in cash to a couple of inn-
keepers from Lebetain. The pair promised to repay her in a year and also secured
the transaction with a guarantor.58 In January 1786 Marguerite Duprez married

Joseph Berger, a baker and a widower from Delle.59 She had probably worked in
service for over ten years, amassing savings for her dowry. Rosenthal observes that
‘quantitative analysis of credit activity suggests that individuals used these
markets to invest their savings and withdrew their funds when they needed to
provide for their children’; in the case of single women, it is likely they withdrew
their money in order to get married, demonstrating a certain independence from
their families, opportunities in the labour market, and an appreciation for invest-
ment and protection of their assets.60 Thanks to the greater monetization of the

local economy, and its greater penetration in rural areas throughout the eight-
eenth century, all kinds of transfers were made by peasants, not only by barter but
also in cash, with domestics truly at the heart of the redistribution system.
Some of these unmarried women—a minority though—investing their
capital in the credit market were also real investors seeking profit, using the same
strategies as men in order to succeed. If this phenomenon is rather well-known among
women of the urban nobility for instance, we still lack information about women
belonging to inferior socio-professional backgrounds. Marie Elisabeth Taiclet was
the daughter of the baillif of the seigneurie of Delle, Pierre Francois Taiclet. Born
in 1725, we find evidence of her involvement in the credit market after the death
of her parents. From 1762 to her death in 1779, Marie Elisabeth Taiclet extended
credit 22 times for a total amount of 4,568 livres, making her one of the top cred-
itors in the seigneurie with one of the largest portfolios. She extended credit to
artisans and peasants living in different villages around Delle. Most of her invest-
ments had a fixed term repayment and stipulated interest fees and collateral ensur-
ing her profit and security. If she probably knew most of her debtors, we can
assume that the notary, a close acquaintance of hers, managed to find her safe
clients for her investments. Jacques Vieillard from the village of Meroux, 15 kilo-
metres away from Delle, was looking for funds in order to finish building his
house. Marie Elisabeth Taiclet agreed to extend credit to him, securing the trans-
action with the house pledged and collateral.61 It is likely that the notary of Delle
introduced a debtor in need of cash and a potential creditor interested in a fruitful
investment such as Taiclet. She remained unmarried throughout her life and
could potentially count on her investments in the credit market to generate an
annual income, which in turn contributed to her independence. Women such as
Taiclet belonged to the upper strata of the rural community and had capital to
make use of. Their family have been active in lending before and they followed a
path already set.
Another source of capital for unmarried women was constituted in property
and money they might inherit. Judith Spicksley shows that this revenue moti-
vated most of the single women involved in lending activities in her British
sample of the seventeenth century.62 The seigneuries of Delle and Florimont
were both located in a region where partible inheritance was the norm. The
parental patrimony was shared equally among the heirs—the children—regardless
of gender. This legal norm, therefore, contributed greatly to the independence of
women, and certainly benefitted unmarried women deprived of an income or
family assistance since they could use their share in case of necessity. It is difficult,
however, to estimate precisely in which cases and on what occasions single
women chose to invest their inherited capital in the credit market. Some legal
guardians of the assets of young children were able to place this inherited capital in
the credit market, risking either its erosion and putting it in danger in case of non-
repayment. Pauline Vaicle was eight years old and the only child of the rural
seigneurial sergeant Jean François Vaicle when her father died, leaving his daughter
both money and property.63 Pierre Monnier, her guardian, invested part or most of
this inheritance in the credit market. On her behalf, capital was extended to
several individuals, diversifying her investments. When in 1783 she married Jean
Claude Simon Dadez, the son of a rich laboureur, she was able to bring a significant
dowry to her new household as her initial capital had grown over the years.64
The amount of money lent by unmarried women was usually small, at least

when compared to men or widows. This can be explained by the fact that unmar-
ried women had not yet accumulated enough capital to make bigger loans, espe-
cially if we take into consideration that most of the active single women creditors
were rather young and participated in the credit market before getting married.
Many young women (and young men) waited until their parents died before
getting married, as lineage property determined matches. It is my contention that
unmarried women creditors invested their domestic wages in the credit market for
at least two reasons. First, it was unsafe to keep cash at home, even in hidden
places, as it could be stolen or even used by family members and never reimbursed.
Second, unmarried women placing their wages in the credit market could hope to
make a profit through fructifying their capital, indicating their good management
of their own assets. On the other hand, spinsters who grew older without marry-
ing, and thus had no children, might decide to invest their small assets in the
credit market, perhaps to provide security for their old age, a strategy that widows
also employed.
Finally, we can explain the correlation of single women being both creditors
and domestics as most of their loans appeared to have been in cash. I have found
only a very few deferred payments. It is a possibility that their attractiveness as
creditors came from cash generating labour and accumulating capacities, espe-
cially since domestics did not have to pay for board and lodging.
It would certainly be useful to know precisely the age of the single female
lenders in order to fully appreciate the character of their transactions and its signifi-
cance on key life stages such as marriage. Determining the age of single women
creditors is, however, rather complex due to the high level of name duplication and
variations in the spelling of last names both in deeds and parish registers. Single
female lenders signed 211 in both seigneuries, I have been able to estimate the age
of these creditors in 112 of these cases.65 In the seigneurie of Delle, single female
creditors were on average 36.5 years old, while in Florimont they were younger
(26.2 years old). There was no significant variation of their age over time.66 These
figures may validate the two main single female lenders’ profiles: rural servants and
lifelong single investors who may have wanted to increase their capital before their
wedding or women who sought a pension for their old age.
Single Women’s Allocation of Credit and Networks
In the light of this last observation, we might therefore ask whether single
women with regular incomes, such as domestics and rural workers, and/or with
inheritance possibilities, were constrained to extend credit to their relatives.
Bernard Derouet suggests, for instance, that in regions where partible inheritance
was applied women had to give up their pretentions to their parents’ land in
favour of their brothers.67 Due to their lack of spousal support and their vulner-
ability—presumably higher than that of other community members—were single
women constrained to extend credit to their relatives? Were they in a position to
resist such demands? We certainly do lack points of comparison to answer this
complex question. In Paris, Hoffman found that only 3% of the borrowers and
creditors were blood related. In rural areas, this percentage was higher, given the
stronger norms of cooperation, solidarity, and endogamy. In England, Holderness
found that 40% of lenders and borrowers were blood related, while Wrightson
and Levine counted 17% of loans contracted by family members in a British village.68

In the seigneurie of Delle, 7.4% of all transactions were between members of the
same family while this rate reached 8% in Florimont. The amount of money lent
to family members was slightly above the median in the seigneurie of Florimont
(249.5 livres/200) while it was inferior to it in the seigneurie of Delle (174.5
livres/200). In both seigneuries, women, regardless of their marital status, were
more likely to extend credit to their relatives than men were, but they lent small
amounts of money in comparison with the overall median. In Delle, 10.6% of
single women extended credit to their relatives, while 23.7% did so in Florimont
—but in this seigneurie, they were also less numerous, which in turn biases the
significance of this percentage. As a point of comparison, Spicksley found that a
third of single women lenders provided credit for family and kin.69 While these
figures were slightly higher than average, nothing indicates that family members
took advantage of the incomes of single women, especially when we compare
them to other groups (see Table 6).
Compared to male creditors, single women did extend credit more often to
their relatives. This can be explained by the fact that, contrary to men, they lacked
business connections and public visibility. They lent money to people in their
direct circle of interaction without necessarily being constrained to do so. The
fact that unmarried women took the precaution to register their transactions
before the notary reinforced the argument that a loan to a family member had to
be repaid.
The following example shows just how complex it is for the historian to
answer this question. Catherine Frossard was the daughter of a couple of
Table 6. Same family contracts in the seigneuries of Delle and Florimont, 1730–1790
Same family contracts Volume Median
D F D F D F
Single 16/152 (10,5%) 14/59 (23,7%) 4,106 4,946 151 195

women
Married 11/48 (22,9%) 2/24 (8,3%) 6,154 236 150 118
couples
Widows 3/78 (3,8%) 5/44 (11,3%) 545 1,531 200 240
Groups 1/3 (33,3%) 2/9 (22,2%) 672 735 672 368
Men 77/1181 (6,51%) 27/483 (5,6%) 25,578 10,608 179 288
Total 108/1463 (7,4%) 50/622 (8%) 37,055 18,057 174,5 249,5
(8,4%) (5,9%)
D: Seigneurie of Delle.
F: Seigneurie of Florimont.
innkeepers living in the village of Florimont. Like many other girls, Frossard was
sent off to work as a domestic in a household away from home. In Belfort, she
managed to find a good position, perhaps because her parents belonged to a
better-off strata in their village, with good connections. She saved at least 300
livres for her établissement, i.e. her marriage.70 In 1765, however, as her parents
had to repay a debt to the mayor of the village, they turned to her and borrowed
300 livres without interest, which she would get back at their deaths.71 By
helping her indebted parents, she undoubtedly delayed her own future marriage.
It is interesting to note that her parents also borrowed 200 livres on the same day

from their son François Frossard. In 1765, Catherine Frossard was already 32 years
old and still in service. In 1771, a few years later, she can be found working in the
town of Masevaux, probably still as a domestic. She extended credit to her father,
Joseph Frossard,72 lending him 150 livres, refundable within three years.73 Her
parents died within a few years of signing the deeds and Catherine Frossard
married Jean Antoine Clerc, a widower,74 in 1776, at the age of 43. In this case,
the children had to help their parents. Catherine Frossard certainly had to work
for longer and marry when it was almost impossible for her to have children. It is
nonetheless interesting to note that parents and children made their transactions
official before the notary. In this case we can assume that they did so to protect
Catherine and François Frossard’s loans from other potential heirs and/or other
creditors on the deaths of their parents.
Catherine Frossard’s experience was not unique, but it did not reflect the
majority of cases. I have found no evidence to support the argument that women
had to give up their rights in favour of their relatives. On the contrary, women
had the legal and practical capacity to choose their debtors, and many of these
women were careful investors. Indeed, in order to assure the safety of their capital,
unmarried women appear to have made it a priority to lend to married couples
and to men in both seigneuries.
When we examine closely the network of debtors of single women—see
Table 7 below—it appears that these women chose to extend capital principally to
men (48.7% in Delle, 44% in Florimont) and married couples (respectively 39.5%
and 35%), denoting a safe strategy on their part. Indeed, in the case of married
couple debtors, both spouses guaranteed the loan. If one of the borrowers died, the
other was still accountable for that share of the debt along with the heirs, increasing
somehow the safety of the capital investment. Men were also sought after borrowers
as they could easily bring collateral and mortgages to secure the transactions. Amy
Froide has highlighted the same lending strategy on the part of single women in
Bristol. There, women also overwhelmingly extended capital to men (ten out of
twelve loans).75 Despite the strong norms of solidarity and cooperation in tradi-
tional communities, it seems that single women were also careful investors.
We might also legitimately ask whether single women’s allocation of credit
to men was perhaps a premarital strategy to secure a potential alliance with a pos-
sible suitor. Cross-checking the names of single women creditors with parish regis-
ters, I have found no evidence that any marriage between a female creditor and a
debtor took place. While we cannot totally discard this idea, it seems that the
credit market was not a place in which to strengthen a promise of marriage but
rather to find capital and to make a small profit.
Nor does there appear to have been any solidarity among women in the
credit market. Indeed female solidarity was low, and single women did not extend
Table 7. Behaviour of single women creditors in the seigneurie of Delle and Florimont in
the eighteenth century
Single women lent to Seigneurie of Delle Seigneurie of Florimont
N V N V
Men 74 (48,7%) 14,868 26 (44%) 22612

Men living in the 23/74 4,667 18/26 14230
same village

Single women 3 (2%) 446 3 (5%) 741
Single women living 1/3 100 3/3 741
in the same village
Married couples 60 (39,5%) 14,646 21 (35%) 5977
Married couples living 25/60 4,856 13/21 5977
in the same village
Widows 14 (9,2%) 2,788 7 (11,8%) 1353
Widows living in the 3/14 566 4/7 763
same village
Groups 1 (0,65%) 200 2 (3,4%) 379
Groups living in the 0 0 1/2 279
same village
Total 152 (100%) 32,948 59 (100%) 31062
Total living in the 52/152 (34,2%) 10,189 (30,9%) 39/59 (66,1%) 19266 (62%)
same village
credit to their fellow female villagers, with the exception of widows (around 10%
in each seigneurie). Solidarity between women has therefore to be nuanced, since
the volume of exchange between unmarried women and other women remained
marginal, contradicting William Chester’s argument of a high female solidarity
pattern in credit markets.76 Unmarried women preferred to extend credit to
credit-worthy clients and were, therefore, more likely to turn to married couples
or men, who had some assets.
In the seigneurie of Delle, creditors and debtors, regardless of their gender,
lived in the same village in 32% of the cases (exchanging 151,645 livres, 34.2%
of the volume), while men were 30% more likely to exchange with fellow villagers
(to a volume of 112,492 livres). Female creditors, regardless of their marital status,
however, had a greater propensity to extend credit to their fellow villagers, as
40.5% of them did (39153 livres representing 8.8% of the total volume and
46.9% of the volume lent by female creditors). Single women extended credit to
their fellow villagers in the same proportion as men (34% for a volume of
10,189), married women did so by 41.6%, while widows extended credit to their
neighbours by 52% (for a volume of 20,092 livres). Once again, we can explain
the transactions of single women with their fellow villagers in the light of their
restricted circle of interaction, presumably debtors they previously knew.
Deeds do not reveal much information about the purpose of loans. If we can
suppose that investments and vital needs were at the heart of the exchange, and
the main reasons for debtors to seek credit, it is difficult to discern both types in
contracts. As Thomas Brennan notes “it is rarely clear how borrowers used their
loans.”77 Therefore, we cannot be specific about why single women allocated
Table 8. Same family contracts in the seigneurie of Delle and Florimont, 1730–1790
Same family contracts Volume Median
D F D F D F
Unmarried 16/152 (10,5%) 14/59 (23,7%) 4,106 4,946 151 195

women
Married 11/48 (22,9%) 2/24 (8,3%) 6,154 236 150 118
couples
Widows 3/78 (3,8%) 5/44 (11,3%) 545 1,531 200 240

Groups 1/3 (33,3%) 2/9 (22,2%) 672 735 672 368
Men 77/1181 (6,51%) 27/483 (5,6%) 25,578 10,608 179 288
Total 108/1463 (7,4%) 50/622 (8%) 37,055 (8,4%) 18,057 (5,9%) 174,5 249,5
their money in particular ways. Did they extend credit for investment? Were they
more inclined to charity? If we consider the credit markets of Delle and
Florimont, cash and deferred payments were the two main types of credit alloca-
tion. Single women, however, lent predominantly cash (over 80% in both sei-
gneuries). The fact that they had access to cash, thanks to their service-oriented
income, made them interesting creditors for those in need of such a resource
either for investment or charity. But we can also assume that single women in a
position to allocate cash might possibly enjoy a greater social latitude and respect
from other community members. Does this mean that their capacity to extend
credit empowered them?78 While it is difficult to assert this with conviction, it
seems nonetheless that women with resources could discharge, partly or fully,
their families from the burden of dowries, or could therefore pretend to choose
their partners more freely.79 In traditional communities, where a lot of emphasis
was put on lineage, marriage was an incontrovertible stage in life. Therefore,
young single women investing their savings in the credit market might have been
keeping in mind the critical provision of their dowries, rather than the idea of sup-
porting an independent lifestyle. In any case, it is undeniable that their increasing
participation in the credit market may have changed the traditional approach to
marriage and as Spicksley puts it, it may have forced them to re-evaluate their atti-
tudes towards marriage.80 We still lack information and undoubtedly further research
will shed some light on this.
Single Women Creditors and Risk Evaluation: Were Female Lenders Repaid?
As many single women creditors were rather young and lived outside of the
safety of wedlock, we can affirm that, in all probability, securing their invest-
ments, and therefore their life savings, was a critical factor in their credit opera-
tions. Investing money in the credit market was most definitely a risky business, as
debtors had tremendous difficulty in meeting their repayment obligations in time,
if they met them at all. The norms of cooperation, and the high level of endog-
amy in traditional societies, may have pressured bad debtors into prompt repay-
ment. Additionally, throughout the eighteenth century, the justice system
permitted better enforcement of repayment of loans for creditors.81
But nonetheless we can question the access to this justice system for unmar-
ried and young women; both categories were discriminated against when acting in
the public sphere. When we examine the civil court registers, it appears that single
women constituted very few of the plaintiffs in debt repayment cases, compared
to other groups.82 If it is true that the ratio of female plaintiffs in debt repayment
cases was rather low, single women as plaintiffs were almost inexistent.83 Regarding
these data, two hypothesis can emerge: either single women secured their transac-
tions fairly well by picking safe debtors, guarantors, and mortgages, or they did not
have access to the justice system, due presumably to their young age and/or marital
status. Here, they could legally defend their interests in courts but traditional social
norms may have prevented them from suing older and/or male debtors.

Another aspect can explain their absence from court records as plaintiffs in
cases of non-repayment. In the seigneurie of Delle, about 70% of single women
secured their transaction with specific material goods and/or with guarantors,
while only 30% secured it in their deeds, with the normative sentence “all mov-
ables and immovable goods.” If we compare this with male creditors alone, they
were 55% likely to ask for specific material guarantees and/or guarantors. Single
female lenders, therefore, seemed to make safer investments, which could partly
explain in turn their absence from court records as plaintiffs.
Single Female Creditors and the Empowerment Process
As we have seen, single women creditors did play a dynamic role in the local
economy, increasingly extending more capital throughout the eighteenth
century. If their participation in the local credit market corresponds to an increas-
ing need for liquidity and funds, we can nonetheless suppose that these women
benefitted socially from their lending activities. The fact that financial institu-
tions developed and expanded greatly in the eighteenth century, refining the
system of exchange and relying on a greater monetization of the economy, cannot
be correlated with a growing female emancipation. The involvement of more
single women in the credit market corresponded to a community need, rather
than to an active involvement on women’s part in financial activities. But because
single women had greater access to cash because of their service oriented labour
and their savings capacity (most of these female servants were rural servants, as we
have seen, and benefitted from room and board, amplifying their saving capacity),
they represented potential creditors and we can argue that their participation in the
credit market was sought out. Many historians have underlined the link between
access to resources and involvement in the credit market on the part of women.
Indeed, land-rich widows and heiresses were active lenders, benefiting themselves
but also playing a key role in the redistribution of capital within the community84
The importance of norms of cooperation within rural communities may thus have
played a role in their involvement.
We might ask what kind of social benefits did these single women lenders
obtain. I would like to propose that these women, who invested their savings and
domestic wages in the credit market, might have been able to relieve their parents
of part, or perhaps fall, of their endowment at marriage. Several marriage con-
tracts in the area mentioned cash in the dowry provision.85 We still lack data on
this critical issue and can only hypothesise. If we consider the inheritance system
—partible in this region—and if we suppose that some brides were able to provide
for their own dowry, then we might reconsider the traditional pattern of inheri-
tance. Indeed, in regions of partible inheritance historians have asserted that, in
practice, daughters were often excluded from their parent’s inheritance after they
had been endowed at marriage, while their brothers would be endowed and
receive their share of the family property at the death of their parents, creating an
inheritance practice that was highly discriminatory and based solely on gender.86
In the case that some women were able to provide their dowry themselves, there
was no obstacle to them accessing their parent’s property and inheriting the same
share as their brothers. While this is an interesting hypothesis, more data and
research could help to verify it.
A second hypothesis could also be developed. We might suggest that these

single women had more freedom to choose their life partner thanks to their ability
to negotiate loan contracts, their access to resources and their possible dowry provi-
sion. To date, historians know very little about the choice of marriage partner in
traditional communities. This issue would need more data and research but could
prove to be significant.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that not only did the number of single women
creditors increase throughout the eighteenth century, but that the capital these
women injected into the credit market became progressively more significant.
While Judith Spicksley argues that, in seventeenth-century England, single
women’s increased lending activities could be explained through the migration of
these activities to official channels embodied in the development of the formal
credit market, another argument can be advanced for early modern France.87 Here,
we have to look at a multi-causal explanation. Indeed, even if we cannot com-
pletely disregard the increasing efficiency of notaries in drawing up loan contracts,
the greater effectiveness of the justice system in responding to cases of non-
repayment, and the growing trust placed in the formal credit market in the eight-
eenth century, other factors have to be assessed to complete the picture.88 Among
them, we must certainly consider the growing indebtedness context that in turn
generated inflation, the need for liquidity, the resort to credit to sustain investment
and to make ends meet. To this, we could also add the rise of consumption and
consumerism that gradually penetrated the countryside.89 A comparison between
probates at the beginning and at the end of the period shows the presence of more
domestic objects.90 Finally, the progressive democratization of the use of cash in the
local economy, with more money penetrating and circulating in the countryside,
completes the explanation of why the credit markets were attracting more investors
and developed further throughout the eighteenth century.91
All these elements may explain the increasing presence and activities of
single women in the credit market, most notably because of their easy access to
liquidity thanks to labor service oriented activities, either in the textile proto-
industry or in domestic service. While service employment was barely a new phe-
nomenon, the paradoxical combination of the relative economic growth and
increasing indebtedness of households in the eighteenth century may explain
why rural young people sought such positions and had access to cash.92 Moreover,
some single women who inherited capital may have chosen to invest it in the
credit market to generate an annual pension to secure their old age, in the case
that they remained childless and single, employing the same strategy as widows to
secure their old age. While investing in the credit market could be an option to
acquire substantial benefits, this activity was probably too uncertain to rely on it
exclusively in order to lead a single life. While it might have been possible for
some women, marriage remained the norm in traditional communities.
Thanks to their credit activities, single women creditors benefitted from
some social improvements regarding their status. In a common assumption,
gender and marital status constituted a fundamental barrier to independence,
privileges and social prerogatives, especially in preindustrial rural communities.
But thanks to their involvement in the credit market and their lending activities,
single women fulfilled a key social function, rewarded in turn by greater social lati-

tude, especially regarding marriage, an important stage in life not only for women
but also for their families. First, investing their wages and savings in the credit
market might allow these women to relieve their families from part—or all—of
the dowry. By doing so, perhaps these women could in turn freely choose their
future spouse. More work needs to be done in this area to suppportp this idea.
Finally, the activities and gradual presence of single women in the credit
market also had an important impact on the social fabric and the interaction of
women with their families and towards men. To some extent, a proportion of
these women were needed actors in the credit market, a social and public sphere
in which, in a traditional assumption, they were not expected to interact. More
research on this topic will shed more light on these critical issues.
Endnotes
Address correspondence to Elise M. Dermineur, Lund University, Department of History,
Magle Stora Kyrkogatan 12D, 22100 Lund Sweden. Email: elise.dermineur@historia.umu.
se, elise.dermineur@gmail.com.
1. Archives Départementales du Territoire de Belfort (ADTB hereafter) Registre paroissial
de Courtelvant 028 E dépôt GG 1–3.
2. In this particular region, partible inheritance was the norm. However, spouses were sub-
jected to the local custom, which granted the widower two thirds of the community prop-
erty and granted the widow only a third of the community property.
3. We cannot exclude that she could have been involved in informal credit transactions as
well.
4. ADTB 2E4/408–409.
5. ADTB 2E4/389.
6. ADTB 12B 164 “En considération des longs et bons services que Barbe fille majeure de
feu Pierre Bettevy de Florimont lui a rendu en qualité de gouvernante de son ménage, a
declaré lui donner comme effectivement il lui donne par les présents, par manière de juste
récompenses et par donation entre vifs, pure, simple et irrévocable la jouissance pendant la
vie d’elle ditte donataire de toute la maison, grange, écuries, appartenances et dépendances
situés audit Florimont, acquis par monsieur le donateur desd. père et mère d’elle ditte dona-
taire dans laquelle ditte jouissance l’on ne pourra l’inquiéter sous quelques prétexte que ce
puisse être.”
7. Gaspard de Barbaud appeared several times in the notarial loan records. He borrowed a
consequent amount of money over the years to several different creditors.
8. ADTB 2E4/410.
9. ADTB 2E4/444.
10. ADTB 12B163.

11. Recently several historians have devoted more attention to women’s financial activ-
ities. See among others Barbara A. Hanawalt, The Wealth of Wives: Women, Law, and
Economy in Late Medieval London (New York, 2007). Julie Hardwick, Family Business:
Litigation and the Political Economies of Daily Life in Early Modern France. (Oxford, 2009).
Anne Laurence, Josephine Maltby, and Janette Rutterford, eds. Women and Their Money,
1700–1950: Essays on Women and Finance (London, 2008). Sheilagh Ogilvie, A Bitter
Living: Women, Markets, and Social Capital in Early Modern Germany (Oxford, 2003).
Allyson M. Poska, Women and Authority in Early Modern Spain: The Peasants of Galicia

(Oxford, 2006). Deborah Simonton, and Anne Montenach, eds. Female Agency in the
Urban Economy: Gender in European Towns, 1640–1830 (London, 2013).
12. Only recently have historians started to devote their attention to single women. See
especially Cordelia Beattie, Medieval Single Women: The Politics of Social Classification in
Late Medieval England (Oxford, 2007). Judith M. Bennett and Amy M. Froide. Single
Women in the European Past, 1250–1800 (Philadelphia, 1999). Amy M. Froide, Never
Married: Single Women in Early Modern England (Oxford, 2007). The literature on the role
of single women in financial transaction and credit still suffers from a deficit but one can
cite Judith M. Spicksley, The Business and Household Accounts of Joyce Jeffreys, Spinster of
Hereford, 1638–1648 (Oxford, 2012), “‘Fly with a Duck in thy Mouth’: Single Women as
Sources of Credit in Seventeenth-Century England.” Social History 32, no 2 (2007): 187–
207. We must be careful, however, in a comparison with England because of the coverture
system that differed from the French system regarding women’s legal capacities.
13. British historians have opened the path in examining the history of single women,
especially in the light of demography. See among others Judith M. Spicksley, “The Early
Modern Demographic Dynamic: Celibates and Celibacy in Seventeenth-century England.”
(University of Hull, 2001). Bridget Hill, Women Alone: Spinsters in England, 1660–1850
(New Haven, 2001). On early modern French single women, Christine Adams, “A Choice
Not to Wed? Unmarried Women in Eighteenth-Century France,” Journal of Social History
29, no 4 (1996): 883–894. Olwen Hufton, “Women Without Men: Widows and Spinsters in
Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Family History 9, no 4 (1984):
355–376. Yvonne Knibiehler, De la Pucelle à la Minette: les Jeunes Filles de l’Age Classique à
nos Jours (Paris, 1983).
14. Continuous loans registers with no gap between these dates are housed in the archives.
15. Yet historians and demographers have found evidence that the number of singlewomen
remained high throughout the early modern period. See especially Maryanne Kowaleski,
“Single Women in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. The Demographic Perspective” in
Judith M. Bennett and Amy M. Froide. Singlewomen in the European Past, 1250–1800
(Philadelphia, 1999), 38–81.
16. In this paper, I use mainly the term single women. Indeed, the term spinster has a nega-
tive connotation linked to age and the term unmarried woman could also include widows.
17. On the general economic context see especially Jean-Yves Grenier, L’Economie d’Ancien
Régime: Un Monde de l’Echange et de l’Incertitude (Paris, 1996). And Philip T. Hoffman,
Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450–1815 (Princeton, 2000).
18. ADTB 2E 4/155–159, 2E 4/194, 2E 4/222–223, 2E 4/245–246, 2E 4/257–258, and
2E4/279–280.
19. ADTB 8B19, 20, 21,31, 32, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97,
98, 156, 157, 158, 159, and 160 (seigneurie of Delle). ADTB 12B15, 16, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 78, 79, 80, 81, and 82 (seigneurie of Florimont). And Registres paroissiaux de
Brebotte, Bourogne, Courcelles, Courtelvant, Croix, Delle, Faverois, Fêche l’Eglise,
Florimont, Froidefontaine, Grosne, Montbouton, Morvillars, Réchésy, Saint Dizier

l’Evêque, and Réchésy.
20. See especially Holderness, B. A. “Credit in English Rural Society before the
Nineteenth Century, with Special Reference to the Period 1650–1720,” The Agricultural
History Review 24, no 2 (1976): 97–109.
21. See especially Philip T. Hoffman, Growth in a Traditional Society.
22. Credit markets in early modern France have been widely examined by Philip Hoffman
and his coauthors Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal.

“Économie et Politique: Les Marchés du Crédit à Paris, 1750–1840,” Annales. Histoire,
Sciences Sociales 49, no 1 (1994): 65–98. “Information and Economic History: How the
Credit Market in Old Regime Paris Forces Us to Rethink the Transition to Capitalism,”
The American Historical Review 104, no 1 (1999): 69–94. Priceless Markets: The Political
Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660–1870 (Chicago, 2001). “Private Credit Markets in Paris,
1690–1840,” The Journal of Economic History 52, no 2 (1992): 293–306. “Redistribution
and Long-Term Private Debt in Paris, 1660–1726,” The Journal of Economic History 55, no
2 (1995): 256–284. See also among others: Gérard Béaur, “Foncier et Crédit dans les
Sociétés Préindustrielles: Des Liens Solides ou des Chaînes Fragiles?” Annales. Histoire,
Sciences Sociales 49, no 6 (1994): 1411–1428. Thomas Brennan, “Peasants and Debt in
Eighteenth-century Champagne,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 37, no 2 (2006): 175–
200. Laureunce Fontaine, L’Economie Morale: Pauvreté, Crédit et Confiance dans l’Europe
Préindustrielle (Paris, 2008). “Antonio and Shylock: Credit and Trust in France, c. 1680-c.
1780” The Economic History Review 54, no 1 (2001): 39–57. “Espaces, Usages et
Dynamiques de la Dette: Dans les Hautes Vallées Dauphinoises (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles)”
Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 49, no 6 (1994): 1375–1391. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal,
“Rural Credit Markets and Aggregate Shocks: The Experience of Nuits St. Georges, 1756–
1776,” The Journal of Economic History 54, no 2 (1994): 288–306.
23. See Elise M Dermineur, “Female Peasants, Patriarchy, and the Credit Market in
Eighteenth-century France,” Proceedings of the Western Society for French History 37 (2009):
61–84.
24. Cases of non repayment were numerous in the early modern period, as the civil and
criminal court records indicate. Several contextual and structural reasons could prevent an
individual from repaying a loan (inflation, bad harvests, illness, death, increase in taxes,
etc).
25. In the sixteenth century, the State favoured the intercession of notaries for contract
making with the establishment of the justice reform (1566), which, among other things,
stipulated that loans over 100 livres had to be, from then on, registered with the notary.
Not until the eighteenth century was this legal stipulation fully enforced in rural areas.
26. Lending money was a risky activity and guarantees were almost always sought to secure
the transaction. Debtors pledged their land, livestock, upcoming harvests, houses and
dependent buildings and so on. In case their assets did not match the desired sum bor-
rowed, a third party underwriter was added to the deal.
27. The seigneurie of Delle was composed of about twenty villages, while the seigneurie of
Florimont was made up of about ten villages.
28. On women and credit markets see especially Chris Briggs, “Empowered or Marginalized?
Rural Women and Credit in Later Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-century England,” Continuity
and Change 19, no 01 (2004): 13–43. Elise M. Dermineur, “Female Peasants, Patriarchy, and
the Credit Market in Eighteenth-Century France,” Proceedings of the Western Society for
French History 37 (2009): 61–84. Julie Hardwick, The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and the
Politics of Household Authority in Early Modern France (University Park, 1998). Beverly
Lemire, Ruth Pearson, and Gail Grace Campbell, Women and Credit: Researching the Past,
Refiguring the Future (London, 2001). Craig Muldrew, “‘A Mutual Assent of Her Mind?’
Women, Debt, Litigation and Contract in Early Modern England,” History Workshop Journal
no 55 (2003): 47–71.
29. William Chester Jordan, Women and Credit in Pre-Industrial and Developing Societies
(Philadelphia, 1993), 20.
30. To date, most of the data focus on urban women’s activities in the credit market and
most of them deal with early modern England. See for instance Chris Briggs, “Empowered
or Marginalized? Rural Women and Credit in Later Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-century

England,” Continuity and Change 19, no 01 (2004): 13–43. Judith M. Spicksley, “Fly with a
Duck in thy Mouth.”
31. Philip T., Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. Priceless Markets,
66. The same phenomenon has been observed in England, B. A. Holderness, “Widows in
Pre-Industrial Society: An Essay Upon Their Economic Functions,” in Richard M. Smith,
ed, Land, Kinship and Life-Cycle, 423–42 (Cambridge, 1984).
32. Philip Hoffman, “Private Credit Markets in Paris 1690–1840,” 300.
33. Amy Froide states that in Southampton single women loaned out more money than
widows. Froide, Amy M. Never Married: Singlewomen in Early Modern England, 133.
34. Labor service was a common feature for early modern rural young women. Allyson
M. Poska, Women and Authority in Early Modern Spain: The Peasants of Galicia (Oxford,
2006), 60.
35. Rural domestics usually received room, board, and clothing, in addition to a small
salary every year. The literature on domesticity is vast. See especially Bridget Hill, Servants:
English Domestics in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1996). R. C. Richardson, Household
Servants in Early Modern England (Manchester, 2010).
36. Interestingly, in the records used by the judge most people were not certain of their age.
37. Amy M. Froide, Never Married: Single Women in Early Modern England, 130.
38. Ibid.
39. Judith M. Spicksley. “Fly with a Duck in thy Mouth,” 202.
40. The evolution of creditors over the entire period in absolute numbers reached +72%.
41. Judith M. Spicksley. “Fly with a Duck in thy Mouth,” 191.
42. Ibid.
43. William Jordan argues that women were providers of small or “domestic” loans. But
their importance, despite their less limited lending capacity, should not be overlooked as
these loans did serve a purpose as well. William Chester Jordan, Women and Credit in
Pre-Industrial and Developing Societies, 23.
44. Sheilagh Ogilvie, A Bitter Living: Women, Markets, and Social Capital in Early Modern
Germany (Oxford, 2003), 271.
45. ADTB 2E4/389.
46. ADTB 2E4/257.
47. ADTB 2E4/279 and ADTB 2E4/280.
48. Olwen Hufton, “Women and the Family Economy in Eighteenth-Century France,”
French Historical Studies 9, no 1 (1975): 1–22.
49. Jean-Michel Boehler, Une Société Rurale en Milieu Rhénan: la Paysannerie de la Plaine
d’Alsace (1648–1789) (Strasbourg, 1995), 1045.
50. To the annual wage paid in cash, one must also include room and board, and some
clothing.
51. ADTB 2E4/347.
52. Laurence Fontaine, L’Economie Morale, 156.
53. ADTB 2E4/410.

54. The official credit market was not a place for the recognition of hidden debt, mostly
because of the fee charged by the notary. Peasants preferred to turn to the informal recogni-
tion of debt, called a “contrat sous seing privé” as many can be found in probates.
55. ADTB 2E4/ 157.
56. ADTB Registre paroissial Saint Dizier l’Evêque E-dépôt GG1–8.
57. ADTB 2E4/279.
58. ADTB 2E4/280.
59. ADTB Registre paroissial 033-E-dépôt GG1–5.
60. Rosenthal, “Rural Credit Markets and Aggregate Shocks,” 305.
61. ADTB 2E4/245.
62. Judith M. Spicksley, “Fly with a Duck in thy Mouth,”198.
63. ADTB Registre paroissial de Suarce, 095 E dépôt GG 1–5. Her mother had previously
died, her father remarried Anne Marie Grimont in 1767 (ADTB 2E4 391).
64. ADTB Registre paroissial de Suarce, 095 E dépôt GG 1–5.
65. I have cross-checked their names with parish registers. We have to be careful with
these estimates as the error margins are high because of the high coincidence in names and
variations in spelling.
66. Mostly because the sample may be too limited.
67. Bernard Derouet, “Le Partage des Frères: Héritage Masculin et Reproduction Sociale
en Franche-Comté aux XVIIIe et XIXe Siècles,” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 48, no 2
(1993): 453–474.
68. B. A. Holderness, “Widows in Pre-Industrial Society: An Essay Upon Their Economic
Functions” in Richard M. Smith, ed., Land, Kinship and Life-Cycle, (Cambridge, 1984),
423–42. Keith Wrightson, and David Levine, Poverty and Piety in an English Village:
Terling, 1525–1700 (Oxford,1995), 100.
69. Judith M. Spicksley, “Fly with a Duck in thy Mouth,” 198
70. “Somme provenant de son pécule et de ses épargnes pour son établissement.”
71. ADTB 2E4/410.
72. Marie Barbe Caille, her mother, had died in 1767. ADTB registre paroissial de
Florimont 0046 E-Dépôt GG1–4.
73. ADTB 2E4/411.
74. Archives Municipales de Belfort GG 09–36.
75. Amy M Froide, Never Married, 135.
76. William Chester Jordan, Women and Credit.

77. Thomas Brennan, “Peasants and Debt in Eighteenth-Century Champagne,” Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 37, no 2 (2006): 175–200.
78. On empowerment see especially Marie-Hélène Bacqué and Carole Biewener,
L’Empowerment, une Pratique Emancipatrice (Paris, 2013).
79. It is also the contention of Merry Wiesner Hanks in “Having her own Smoke. Employment
and Independence for Single women in Germany, 1400–1750,” Bennett, Judith M. and Amy
M. Froide, Single Women in the European Past, 1250–1800 (Philadelphia, 1999), 192–216.

80. Judith M. Spicksley, “Fly with a duck in thy mouth,”204.
81. On the greater efficiency of the civil justice system in early modern France see especially
Jeremy Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism: Seigneurial Justice and Village Society in Eighteenth-
Century Northern Burgundy (Rochester, 2008). Zoë A. Schneider, The King’s Bench: Bailiwick
Magistrates and Local Governance in Normandy, 1670–1740 (Rochester, 2008).
82. ADTB 8B19, 20, 21,31, 32, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97,
98, 156, 157, 158, 159, and 160 (seigneurie of Delle). ADTB 12B15, 16, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 78, 79, 80, 81, and 82 (seigneurie of Florimont). See Elise Dermineur, “Women
in Rural Society: Peasants, Patriarchy and the Local Economy in Northeast France, 1650–
1789” (Purdue University, 2011).
83. A feature also observed by Judith M. Bennett, Ale, Beer and Brewsters in England:
Women’s Work in a Changing World, 1300–1600 (New York, Oxford, 1999). 203. And
Chris Briggs. “Empowered or Marginalized? Rural Women and Credit in Later Thirteenth-
and Fourteenth-Century England,” Continuity and Change 19, no 01 (2004): 13–43.
84. See Briggs, Chris. “Empowered or Marginalized?” 31.
85. Elise Dermineur. “Women in Rural Society,” Chapter 3.
86. See especially Bernard Derouet, “Le Partage des Frères. Héritage Masculin et Reproduction
Sociale en Franche-Comté aux XVIIIe et XIXe Siècles,” Annales. Économies, Sociétés,
Civilisations 48, no 2 (1993): 453–474.
87. Craig Muldrew has also explained the increase number of debt litigations through the
improvement of the judicial system in early modern England. Both Muldrew and Spicksley
place an emphasis on the development of the state, capable of regulating the economy. See
Craig Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in
Early Modern England (London, 1998).
88. On the improvement of the justice system see especially Jeremy Hayhoe, Enlightened
Feudalism. Zoë A Schneider, The King’s Bench.
89. See among others Daniel Roche, A History of Everyday Things: The Birth of
Consumption in France, 1600–1800, (Cambridge, 2000). See also Alain Collomp, La
Maison du Père: Famille et Village en Haute-Provence aux XVII. et XVIII. Siècles (Paris,
1983), especially chapter 7 on the exceptional expenses related to clothes and textile.
90. Raffaella Sarti, Europe at Home: Family and Material Culture, 1500–1800 (New Haven,
2002).
91. Jean-Yves Grenier, L’Economie d’Ancien Régime. Jean Meuvret, “Circulation Monétaire
et Utilisation Economique de la Monnaie dans la France du XVIe et du XVIIe Siècle”,
Etudes d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 1 (1947): 15–28.
92. On economic growth in traditional communities in the eighteenth century see espe-
cially Hoffman, Philip T. Growth in a Traditional Society.
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Single Women and the Rural Credit Market in

Article in Journal of Social History · August 2014

Debt in Pre-Industrial Europe View project

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Single Women and the Rural Credit Market

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Journal of Social History vol. 48 no. 1 (2014), pp. 175–199

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The story of Barbe Bettevy, as a creditor, a daughter of a peasant, a lifelong

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The Rural Credit Market in Early Modern France

To appreciate the role played by single women in financial exchange, it is

substantial growth, notably thanks to improvements in proto-industrialization and

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Seigneurie of Delle Seigneurie of Florimont

Number of contracts 1,463 622

In a common assumption, financial transactions in early modern Europe were

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Seigneurie of Delle Seigneurie of Florimont

N V Median per Mean per N V Median per Mean per

Seigneurie of Delle Seigneurie of Florimont

Number of contracts 152 59

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1730–9 1740–9 1750–9 1760–9 1770–9 1780–9

Single women 11 1690 15 2754 22 3287 20 3723 37 8548 47 12946

1740–9 1750–9 1760–9 1770–9 1780–9

Single women 7 963 8 6988 13 5938 22 11598 9 5575

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Single Women and Their Capital: Where Did it Come From?

Entering into the credit market as a creditor supposes sufficient financial

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the transaction with a guarantor.58 In January 1786 Marguerite Duprez married

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Single Women’s Allocation of Credit and Networks

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Same family contracts Volume Median

Single 16/152 (10,5%) 14/59 (23,7%) 4,106 4,946 151 195

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Single women lent to Seigneurie of Delle Seigneurie of Florimont

Men 74 (48,7%) 14,868 26 (44%) 22612

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Same family contracts Volume Median

Unmarried 16/152 (10,5%) 14/59 (23,7%) 4,106 4,946 151 195

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Single Female Creditors and the Empowerment Process

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10. ADTB 12B163.

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Florimont, Froidefontaine, Grosne, Montbouton, Morvillars, Réchésy, Saint Dizier

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76. William Chester Jordan, Women and Credit.

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