CASE STUDY FOR PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL

ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

Submitted by

Sivaganga.S.R

B.A. LL.B.(Hons.)(4TH Year VIII th Semester)

20TH MAY 2021

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 Prahlad Saran Gupta vs Bar Council Of India And Another AIR 1997, SCC
585

Bench: Hon’ble Justice S.C. Agrawal and G.B. Pattanaik

Forums involved

1. Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh

2. Bar Council of India
3. Supreme Court Of India

Sections involved

Section 36B & 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961

Facts

The following are the facts of the case:

 That appellant, Shri Prahlad Saran Gupta has been practicing as an advocate
at Ghaziabad and is enrolled with the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh.
 That the appellant was appearing for the decree holder in Execution Case
No. 55 of 1974 M/s. Alma Ram Nanak Chand v. Shri Ram Contractor, in the
Court of Civil Judge, Ghaziabad. A complaint was received by the U.P.
State Bar Council from one, Rajendra Prasad. A copy of the said compliant
was sent to the appellant by the State Bar Council for his explanation.
 That the appellant submitted his reply to the complaint on December 12,
1979 wherein he denied all the allegations contained in the complaint.
 That the appellant denied having received Rs. 1,600 in collusion with the
judgment debtor and stated that after the writ for holing and action of the
judgment debtor's property had been handed over to the court Amin, Shri
Nanak Chand, the father of the complainant, as a partner of firm M/s. Atma
Ram Nanak Chand, entered into an arrangement with the judgment debtor
telling him that if he paid Rs, 1,500 at once then he would not get the
auction held and that he would accept the remaining amount in installments
within two months and that in pursuance to the Said arrangement the
judgment debtor paid a sum of Rs. 1,500 whereupon Shri Nanak Chand
made an endorsement on the writ with the Amin about this payment of Rs.
1,500 and the fact that he did not want the auction to be held on November
2, 1977.

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  That the appellant stated that he was prepared to pay up the amount of Rs.
1,500 to the decree holder if a receipt signed by both the judgment debtor
and decree holder firm was given to him but they were not prepared to grant
such a receipt and so he had retained the amount with him as a trustee and
soon after the receipt of the registered letter from the decree holder he had
deposited the amount in the court.
 That the appellant denied having received any amount from the judgment
debtor for engaging any lawyer for him for obtaining stay. He also stated
that he had not been careless or negligent in any manner as an advocate of
the 'complainant's firm in the execution case and that permission for bidding
by the decree holder under Order 21 Rule 72 C.P.C. was not taken by him
because it was not necessary in view of the amendment of the said Rule by
the Allahabad High Court and that no objection on that score had been taken
by the judgment debtor against the auction sale.
 That as regarding filing of Suit No. 10 of 1977 on behalf of M/s Atma Ram
Nanak Chand in the court of Munsiff, Gaziabad as a small causes suit, the
appellant stated that he had not acted carelessly and negligently inasmuch as
at that time that was the correct court. He also denied the allegation that he
was doing money lending business.
 That the appellant stated that the complaint had been lodged against the
appellant because of annoyance on the part of the complainant as the
appellant had declined to advance a loan of Rs, 12,000 which the
complainant was demanding from him.

Issues:

1) Whether the appellant had colluded with the judgment debtor and had
realised Rs. 1,600 from him out of Which the sum of Rs. 1,500 was withheld
by the appellant with himself and he did not pay it to the decree holder for a
period of eight months inspite of repeated requests and in order to harass the
decree holder, instead of handing over the same personally to him, he
deposited the said amount in Court on May 2, 1978. The balance amount of
Rs, 100 was taken by him as fee from the judgment debtor to enable him to
get time from the High Court for procuring stay order in the execution
proceedings ?
2) Whether the appellant received Rs. 245 from the judgment debtor for getting
some other counsel engaged to get the execution proceedings stayed and to
see that the auction of judgment debtor's property was not approved by the
court. The appellant got Shri Mahesh Prasad Tyagi, Advocate engaged from
the side of the judgment debtor and charged Rs, 110 for the purpose and that
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 the execution of the decree was delayed due to careless handling of the case
by the appellant since no permission for biding at auction from the court was
obtained deliberately in order to leave a lacuna for delaying the execution
and that Shri M.P. Tyagi, Advocate, taking advantage of the said lacuna,
filed objection under Order 21 Rule 72 C.P.C. for cancellation of the auction
?
3) Whether the appellant had collected from the judgment debtor a further sum
of Rs. 450 on account of fees and expenses for getting some counsel
engaged At Allahabad to get the execution proceeding stayed and for the
purpose he had given a letter dated April 5, 1978 to the judgment debtor Shri
Ram for Shri V.K, Gupta, Advocate at Allahabad and that Shri Ram instead
going to Allahabad with the aforesaid letter sent a reply paid letter to Shri
V.K. Gupta, advocate making enquiries about the stay but a reply came from
the clerk of Shri V.K. Gupta, Advocate on April 14, 1978 that no case of his
had been referred to him from the appellant ?
4) Whether the appellant, as counsel for the complainant's firm, had Filed Suit
No. 10 of 1977 against Pradhan Shri Ramnath Singh in the court of Munsiff
(Judge, Small Causes Court, Gaziabad) with utter carelessness with the
result that their new counsel had to take back the plaint on April 26, 1978 to
file it in the proper court, namely, the Court of Civil Judge (Judge, Small
Causes Court), Ghaziabad?
5) Whether the appellant was indulging in money lending business at very
high rate of interest and thus misconducting himself as an advocate and had
advanced loan to one Sunderlal of Ghaziabad?

Held:

The following are the summarized decisions and judgement at different forums:

 Decision of State Bar Council

The State Bar Council referred the case to one of its Disciplinary Committees but
the said Committee could not complete the proceedings in the prescribed time of
one year and, therefore, the proceedings were transferred to the Bar Council of
India under Section 36b of the Act and thereafter the Disciplinary Committee dealt
with the proceedings.

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  Decision of Bar Council of India

The Disciplinary Committee has, however, found the appellant guilty of gross
professional mis-conduct on the basis of the following findings:

(i) The version of the complainant regarding receipt of Rs. 1,500 by the appellant
from the judgment debtor was acceptable and finds support from the endorsement
by Shri Nanak Chand on the writ for auction which states that his advocate had
accepted Rs. 1,500 out of the decretal dues from the judgment debtor and had told
him that he had given the judgment debtor two months time. The Said endorsement
falsifies the version of the appellant that Shri Nanak Chand had received Rs. 1,500
from the judgment debtor and had deposited the amount with him. From the endor-
sement it cannot be deduced that any arrangement had been arrived at between the
decree holder and the judgment debtor and that the decree holder had accepted Rs.
1,500. It was the appellant who had granted two months time to the judgment
debtor.

(ii) The explanation of the appellant that the amount of Rs. 1,500 was deposited in
trust with him by both the decree holder and judgment debtor and it had been
agreed that the appellant would pay back the amount if a receipt signed by both the
judgment debtor and decree holder was given for it was riot acceptable.

(iii) The appellant was an advocate for the decree holder and according to his own
version the amount had been received by Shri Nanak Chand, decree holder from
the judgment debtor and deposited by him with him and in such a ease there could
be no question of any requirement of a receipt signed by the judgment debtor also
for payment of the amount to the decree holder and that the professional duty of
the appellant required that he should have asked the decree holder to take the
amount from him and only in case the decree holder did not come up to take it after
granting a due receipt that he could retain the amount with himself. The appellant
does not say that he had called upon the decree holder either verbally or in writing
to take the money from him.

 Final Appeal

Prahlad Saran Gupta filed an appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961
against the judgment of Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India.
Supreme Court were of view that appellant has been rightly held guilty of
professional mis-conduct for his having wrongfully retained Rs. 1,500 which had
been kept with him in connection with the seltlement in the execution proceedings.

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We think that the ends of justice would be met if the punishment of reprimand is
imposed on the appellant for the said mis-conduct on his part.

Therefore, Supreme Court partly allow the appeal and, while holding the appellant
guilty of professional misconduct in wrongfully retaining the amount of Rs. 1,500
which was kept with him in connection with the settlement in the execution
proceedings till he deposited the said amount in the Court on may 2, 1978 and in
not paying the said amount to the decree holder in spite of demand, we impose the
penalty of reprimand on the appellant for the said misconduct.

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 JOHN D’SOUZA v. EDWARD ANI, AIR 1994,SCC 975 (2) 64

Bench: Hon’ble Justice Pandian,S.R (J) and Sawant, P.B.

Forums Involved:

 Karnataka Bar Council

 Disciplinary Committee of The Bar Council Of India
 The Supreme Court Of India

Sections & Acts involved:

Section 35 of Advocates Act, 1961.

Facts

The following are the facts of the cases:

 That the appellant, Mr. John D’Souza is an advocate in Bangalore practicing

since 1942 was proceeded against for professional misconduct on the basis
of a complaint lodged on date November 7, 1986.
 That the respondent, Mr. Edward Ani is the son-in law of Mr.N.E. Raymond
and Mrs. Mary Raymond who were the clients of the appellant
 That under the instructions of Mrs. Mary Raymond, the appellant drafted a
will for her which was entrusted the same after execution with the appellant
in respect of which the appellant had given receipt dated July 5,1956.
 That the execution had appointed her husband, Mr. N.E. Raymond as the
executor. But later in the year 1974, the executor passed away.
 That Mrs. Raymond changed her lawyer, the appellant herein and engaged a
new one, named Mr. George Da Costa, as her advocate.
 That then Mr. George Da Costa have requested the appellant in 1978 for
letting him have his client’s will which bears the serial No.576 in the register
of wills. But this request was immediately denied by the appellant.
 In spite of the letters the written by the respondent ,which one dated 4th
January,1982 was sent in behalf of Mrs. Mary Raymond under Certificate of
Posting from Manchester, U.K. and another letter by himself on 14 th April,
1986. The appellant continued denying the requesting by keeping
conspicuous silence.
 That the second will executed in 1978 was probated on 21st Feburary, 1984
after death of Mrs. Mary Raymond on 29th October, 1983.

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  That aggrieved by the appellant’s behavior, the respondent complained to
the Karnataka Bar Council dated on 7th November 1986 but by a Resolution
 Then he appealed to the Bar Council of India which held the appellant for
professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for one year.

Issue:
 Does the appellant’s action of not returning the Will under his custody,
after repeated demands for the same, result in breach of trust and amount
to professional misconduct?

Judgment:

The following are summarized contentions of both sides and decision of the
Supreme Court:

 The Counsel for the appellant (Late Adv.Jethmalani), contended that the
respondent son-in law has not substantiated that George Da Costa had
requested the appellant for the will which he allegedly denied having. On the
other hand, George Da Costa had sent a letter to the State Bar Council
Disciplinary Committee stating that he never requested the will nor had the
appellant denied having it.
 The Counsel also contended that the will had been revoked by Mary
Raymond when she was alive and this was supported by an endorsement
made by the appellant’s wife in the Register of Wills. So even if the will has
not been returned, the appellant is not committing breach of trust as a
revoked will has no value (res nullius) and has become a mere scrap of
paper. He does not hence have any hidden agenda of pecuniary interest in
holding the will. It was also admitted that the second letter was received but
not the first.
 The respondent contended that the will which was in the appellant’s custody
was held by him in the nature of a trustee and he was obligated to return the
will on demand. Further, neither Mary Raymond nor the respondent son-in
law had abandoned the will which was their property and cannot be res
nullius. The appellant must have deemed to have received the letter.
 The State Bar Council held that the actions do not amount to professional
misconduct as there was strained relationships and delay in complaint. BCI
and Supreme Court did not take this into account. George DaCosta’s letter
denying the demand made came into being only after proceedings began and
hence cannot be taken in as valid evidence against respondent son-in law’s
claim. The entry in the Register of Wills has been manipulated.

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 In a disciplinary proceeding, the charging party has the burden of proving
the misconduct (the respondent). On overall evaluation of the evidence, the
appellant has not returned the will after repeated demands. He initially
denied having it and then said he returned it. He was duty bound to return
the will. He is responsible for professional misconduct as he has blatantly
violated lawyer attorney relationship created under law. BCI order of
suspension of one year upheld.

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 Lalit Mohan Das v. AG, Orissa,AIR 1957 SC 250
Bench: Hon’ble Sudhi Ranjan Das, C.J., N.H. Bhagwati, S.K. Das, B.P. Sinha and
T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, JJ.
Forums involved:
 Orissa High Court
 Supreme Court of India
Sections and Acts involved:
Section 13 and 14 of Legal Practitioners Act, 1879

Facts
The following are the facts of the case:
 That appellant, L.M. Das is a pleader in the courts at Anandpur, Orissa. The
Munsif, Shri.L.B.N.S. Deo, drew up a proceeding against the appellant on a
charge under s. 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act referring to three incidents
as mentioned below.
 That on July 15 1953, before the munsiff of Anandpur there were 3 cases
pending of which the munsiff took the oldest suit for hearing and postponed
the case in which the appellant was appearing. When informed of this
postponement appellant made a remark that, “If the Peshkar is gained over,
he can do everything.” Munsif asked the appellant to explain his conduct and
appellant denied such a conduct in very improper terms.
 That Appellant who was appearing on behalf of a defendant applied for time
on the ground of illness of defendant without any medical certificate in
support and thus it got rejected. When on a later date the case was called up
for hearing the appellant remarked that the court is very unfair to him.
 That a preliminary point of jurisdiction and sufficiency of court fees was
raised by the court in a case where the appellant was appearing. This case
got decided against the appellant and a civil revision petition to HC
subsequently got rejected. When an order was passed dismissing the
preliminary objection, the appellant stood up and shouted that he challenges
the order and that the court has no principles.
 As a reply to show cause notice issued to appellant, he denied all charges
and took up the stand that the munsif is not competent to hold the enquiry as
the munsif was in the position of the complainant. The proceeding against
the appellant under the Legal Practitioners Act started, and Munsif sent the
record to the District Judge in connection with the plea of the appellant that

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 the enquiry should be made by some other judicial officer. The District
Judge, however, took the view that the enquiry should be made by the
Munsif himself and the records were accordingly sent back. Thereafter, the
appellant non-co-operated and did not appear at the enquiry though
more than one communication was sent to him. The enquiry was concluded
and Munsif submitted his report to the HC though District Judge.
 At the same time appellant filed an application to the Additional District
Judge for time to move the High Court to get an order to have the matter
heard by some other judicial officer. One month's time was accordingly
granted. The Additional District Judge, it appears, made an effort to settle
the trouble, and there was some resolutions passed on this behalf. In January,
appellant appeared in court and filed a written apology and thus order was
passed to the effect that the proceeding against appellant was dropped.
However, Munsif expressed the view that this resolution passed did not fully
carry out the terms of settlement suggested by the Additional District judge.
 Accordingly, the proceeding was re-opened and the record was resubmitted
to the District Judge. The District Judge thereupon sent the report of the
Munsif to the High Court accompanied by his opinion that the pleader
should be suspended from practice for one year. HC held that the pleader
was guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspended him from
practice for a period of five years. Appellant then obtained special leave
from HC to appeal against the order and judgement of Orissa HC. The case
now stands at SC.

Issues

a) Whether there was any valid reason for reviving the proceeding against the
appellant, after the dropping of proceedings and submission of apology and
expression of regret?

b) Quantum of punishment to be awarded?

Held:

The following are the summarized observations and decisions in the judgement:

 The order passed by the learned Munsiff on January did not have the effect
of terminating and bringing to an end the proceeding against the appellant. It
was as a result of the well intentioned efforts taken by the Additional District

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 Judge, but at the same stage Munsiff had already made a report to HC and
thus HC alone was competent to pass final orders in the matter.
 Even though it is true that the appellant did express his regret and to that
extent the settlement was carried out, it cannot be said to have met with the
terms of settlement suggested by the Additional District Judge. Resolutions
passed were so worded as to give the impression that the misunderstanding
between the Munsif and the appellant was all due to the bench clerk and that
there was nothing in the resolution to show that theappellant was in any way
at fault.Thus it is concluded that the appellant is guilty of grave professional
misconduct.
 Ethics points discussed:

 A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and must
place before the Court all that can fairly and reasonably be submitted
on behalf of his client. He may even submit that a particular order is
not correct and may ask for a review of that order. At the same time, a
member of the Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the
Court in which he is appearing. He must uphold the dignity and
decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the Court
itself into disrepute.
 “The appellant before us grossly overstepped the limits of propriety
when he made imputations of partiality and unfairness against the
Munsif in open Court. In suggesting that the Munsif followed no
principle in his orders, the appellant was adding insult to injury,
because the Munsif had merely upheld an order of his predecessor on
the preliminary point of jurisdiction and Court fees, which order had
been upheld by the High Court in revision. Scandalising the Court in
such manner is really polluting the very fount of justice; such conduct
as the appellant indulged in was not a matter between an individual
member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service: it brought
into disrepute the whole administration of justice.”

 Munsif himself had recommended a one year suspension from practice

which was increased to five years by HC. Also appellant did file an apology
and expressed his regret. Considering these two circumstances as mitigating
ones, punishment is reduced to two years of suspension.

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