Kufan Political Aalignments

Kufan Political Alignments and Their Background in the Mid-Seventh Century A.D.
Author(s): Martin Hinds

Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Oct., 1971), pp. 346-367
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162722
Accessed: 24-08-2016 00:38 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Journal of Middle East Studies
This content downloaded from 143.106.201.18 on Wed, 24 Aug 2016 00:38:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
346 Int. J. Middle East Stud. 2 (I97I), 346-367 Printed in Great Britain
Martin Hinds
KUFAN POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS
AND THEIR BACKGROUND IN THE
MID-SEVENTH CENTURY A.D.
The period of the so-called Patriarchal Caliphs con

questions which can be investigated only with materia
than adequate. Among the more intriguing questio
with the role of Kufa and the emergence there of the
which representatives both of the early Umayyad calip
Ibn al-Zubary had later to deal, viz. the Khawarij,
ashrdf. The remarks in this article are intended to p
conclusions reached in a more detailed study of the fo
alignmentsI - conclusions which are based on evidence
Islamic historical sources available to us, notably t
Tabari, Ibn Sa'd, Ibn A'tham al-Kufi, Khalifa b. Khayy
al-Minqari.2
I. The years from 34/654-5 to 40/660-I were a ti
Egypt and the Fertile Crescent-a crisis which began w
arose under 'Uthman and led to his murder, continue
'Ali and Mu'awiya, and ended with the murder of
'Ali's death we can discern at Kufa three broad pol
preceding circumstances it is the purpose of this art
warij, who had been so named since the time of the co
appeared in opposition both in the time of 'All and
Shi'a, who had originally been 'Ali's supporters and w
ment thereafter; and tribal leaders, usually termed as
the intermediaries in the official power structure of 'I
I The early history of Islamic schism in Iraq (Ph.D. thesis, U
2 The following abbreviations are used: A'th. = Ibn A'tham
MS Topkapi Sarayl (Ahmet III), no. 2956; BA/MS. = al-Baladhuri, Ansdb al-ashrdf
2 vols, MS Siileymaniye Kiutuphanesi (Reisiilkiittap Mustafa Efendi), nos. 597, 598;
BA. v = al-Baladhuri, Ansab al-ashrdf vol. V [pp. 9I8-II27 of BA/MS.I], ed. S. D. F.
Goitein (Jerusalem, I936); BF = al-Baladhuri, Futuih al-bulddn, ed. M. J. de Goeje
(Leiden, i866); IS. = Ibn Sa'd, Kitab al-tabaqat al-kabzr, ed. E. Sachau et al. (8 vols
Leiden, 1905-17); Khal. = Khalifa b. Khayyat, Tdirikh vol. I, ed. A. D. al-'Umari (al-
Najaf, 1386/1967); Tab. = al-Tabari, Tdrzkh al-rusul wa'l-muluk, ed. M. J. de Goeje et al.,
3 series (Leiden, I879-I901); WS. = al-Minqari, Waq'at Siffin, ed. A. M. Harun (2nd.
ed. Cairo, 1382/1962-3).
Kufan political alignments 347
period. The regime in 'Iraq from the time of Mu'awiya and Ziyad until the
time of al-Hajjaj rested on a tribal organization in which tribal leaders were
supposed to support, and were in turn supported by, the government. The
pre-Islamic clan organization was the essential basis, but in the changed environ-
ment of a central government and the garrison towns of Kufa and Basra.
Fighting men (muqdtila) were organized in tribal groups which in turn made up
the arbd' and akhmds of Kufa and Basra; each tribal group was made up of
clans, and the units known as 'irdfdt were straight-forward subdivisions of
these. The ashrdf al-qabd'il were the 'establishment' of Iraq, and central autho-
rity, whether Umayyad or Zubayrid, was concerned to exercise power both
over and through them. This state of affairs changed only with the appointment
of al-Hajjaj, the introduction of Syrian troops into 'Iraq and the revolt of the
most prominent of the ashrdf al-qabdail, 'Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad b.
al-Ash'ath b. Qays al-Kindi.
What then of the Khawarij and the Shi'a in the early Umayyad period? The
main conclusion to which this article seeks to point is that Khariji and Shi'i
opposition of that period was not so much directed against central authority
per se as against the authority of the tribal leaders through whom that central
authority was exercised. Their opposition differed in that at that stage the
Khawarij were essentially reactionaries and the Shi'is revolutionaries, but they
were at one in that they were advocates of an Islamic social order which had no
place for the traditional type of tribal leadership. Their ideas of the form
that this Islamic social order should take naturally differed; the Khawarij harked
back to the disorganized days of 'Umar, while the Shi'a idealized the egalitarian
policy of 'All and gradually evolved the notion of an infallible imam. The for-
mative stages of each were conditioned by their opposition to the existing tribal
order. In the case of the Khawarij, it can be noted that the very word khadriji is
defined as 'one who goes out and acquires sharaf on his own account, without
his having possessed a long-standing [sharaf]'.' In traditional tribal terms,
sharaf reposed in 'one who has three consecutive forbears as leaders and is
himself the fourth; the bayt of a tribe (qabila) [then rests] in him'.2 In these
terms ' Khawarij' simply meant people who claimed sharaf but did not possess
tribal sharaf according to traditional criteria; what the Khawarij did in fact claim
was an 'Islamic' sharaf and the attendant privileges accorded to 'Iraqi early-
comers in the time of 'Umar, and it was in defence of these that they clashed with
government-backed tribal leaders.
The Shi'a in the early Umayyad period consisted (i) of some Kufan early-
comers who had been among 'Ali's supporters but subsequently had no role
Ibn Manzur, Lisdn al-'arab (Cairo, 1300-7) vol. III, p. 74, where the sense is further
illustrated in a line by al-Kuthayyir: aba Marwana lasta bi-kharijiyyi"//wa-laysa qadim"
majdika bi'ntihadl.
2 al-Isfahani, Kitdb al-ag_hani (Cairo, 1285), vol. xvI, p. io6 (cited by W. W. Rajkow-
ski, Early Shi'ism in Iraq (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1955), p. i6).
348 Martin Hinds
to
to play
playininthe
thegovernment-backed
government-backed tribal
tribal
organization
organization
(e.g. IHujr
(e.g.b.IHujr
'Adl al-
b. 'Adl al-
Kindi,
Kindi,who
whowas
wastotally
totally
eclipsed
eclipsed
by Muhammad
by Muhammadb. al-Ash'ath
b. al-Ash'ath
al-Kindi),
al-Kindi),
and (ii) and (ii)
predominantly
predominantlyofof newcomer
newcomer tribesmen,
tribesmen,
manymany
of whom
of whom
had nothad
reached
not reached
Kfifa Kfifa
until
until the
thetime
timeofof
'Ali
'Ali
or or
later,
later,
whowho
resisted
resisted
the authority
the authority
of the of
established
the established
tribal
triballeadership
leadershipinin
thethe
hope
hope
of bettering
of bettering
theirtheir
condition.
condition.
CertainCertain
Kindi, Ham-
Kindi, Ham-
dani
dani and
andBajali
Bajaligroups
groupswhowho
first
first
emerge
emerge
as 'Ali's
as 'Ali's
most zealous
most zealous
supporters
supporters
re- re-
emerge
emergeasassupporters
supporters of of
HujrHujr
b. 'Adi,
b. 'Adi,
al-Husayn
al-Husayn
b. 'Alib.and
'Ali
al-Mukhtar
and al-Mukhtar
b. b.
Abi
Abi 'Ubayd.
'Ubayd.InInthe
the
extremely
extremely detailed,
detailed,
almost
almost
step-by-step
step-by-step
accountaccount
by Abu by Abu
Mikhnaf
Mikhnafof ofthe
thevictory
victory
of of
al-Mukhtar
al-Mukhtarover over
the tribal
the tribal
leaders,'
leaders,'
it becomes
it becomes
abundantly
abundantlyclear
clear
that
that
al-Mukhtar's
al-Mukhtar's
Kufan
Kufan
support
support
was inwas
the in
tribaljabbdnas
the tribaljabbdnas
and and
that
that the
thetribal
triballeaders
leaders
themselves
themselves
livedlived
in Kufa
in Kufa
proper.
proper.
Now whatever
Now whatever
the the
jabbdnas
jabbdnashad
hadbeen
beenat at
an an
earlier
earlier
stage
stage
of the
of evolution
the evolution
of the of
city
the
of city
Kufaof
- whether
Kufa - whether
graveyards
graveyardsororsimply
simplyopen
open
spaces
spaces
for for
the grazing
the grazing
and watering
and watering
of animals-
of animals-
it is it is
plain
plain that
thatby
bythat
that
stage
stage
they
they
had had
beenbeen
builtbuilt
upon upon
as more
as people
more settled
people at
settled at
Kufa;
Kufa; they
theyhad
hadbeen
been
thethe
obvious,
obvious,
indeed
indeed
the only,
the only,
places places
where where
newcomers
newcomers
during
duringthe
theprevious
previoustwenty
twenty
oddodd
years
years
had been
had been
able toable
settle.
to settle.
When al-Mukhtar
When al-Mukhtar
revolted,
revolted,the
thetribal
tribal
leaders
leaders
went
went
out out
and unsuccessfully
and unsuccessfully
tried to
tried
take to
control
take of
control of
their
their respective
respectivejabbdnas;
jabbdnas;
thereafter
thereafter
theythey
were were
concerned
concerned
to prevent
to prevent
the Shi'athe Shi'a
from
from entering
entering'old'
'old'
Kufa,
Kufa,
as the
as the
attention
attention
paid by
paid
Abu
byMikhnaf
Abu Mikhnaf
to fighting
to fighting
where where
the
the streets
streetsdebouched
debouched (afwdh
(afwdh al-sikak)
al-sikak)
shows.2
shows.2
WhenWhen they entered
they entered
'old' Kffa,
'old' Kffa,
the
the Shi'a
Shi'abesieged
besiegedthe
the
tribal
tribal
leaders
leaders
in the
in citadel.
the citadel.
Their Their
shortlived
shortlived
victory victory
was was
one
one of
ofrebellious
rebellioustribesmen
tribesmen overover
the the
established
established
tribal tribal
leadership.
leadership.
The important
The important
point
point about
aboutal-Mukhtar's
al-Mukhtar's famous
famousrantings
rantings
was that
was they
that foretold
they foretold
a collapse
a collapse
of of
the
the established
establishedtribal
tribal
leadership
leadership
and and
a redistribution
a redistribution
of wealth.3
of wealth.3
In
In the
theearly
earlyUmayyad
Umayyad period,
period,
then,
then,
the social
the social
orderorder
at Kufa,
at and
Kufa,elsewhere,
and elsewhere,
was
was essentially
essentiallyanan
order
order
of of
clans
clans
and and
tribes,
tribes,
rendered
rendered
different
different
from the
from
pre-the pre-
Islamic
Islamicorder
orderonly
onlyin in
so so
farfar
as central
as central
authority
authority
and garrison
and garrison
town arrangements
town arrangements
were
were conducive
conducive toto
anan
unprecedented
unprecedented
cohesion.
cohesion.
This tribal
This tribal
order was
order
fostered
was fostered
by by
Mu'awiya
Mu'awiyaasasa abasic
basic
feature
feature
of the
of the
Umayyad
Umayyad
powerpower
structure.
structure.
With itWith
came it
thecame the
end
end of
ofaashort-lived
short-lived attempt
attempt
in the
in the
period
period
of the
ofPatriarchal
the Patriarchal
Caliphs Caliphs
to promote
to promote
a different
differentkind
kindofof
social
social
order.
order.
To this
To this
period
period
we now
weturn,
now beginning
turn, beginning
with some
with some
general
generalremarks
remarks about
aboutthethe
caliphate
caliphate
of 'Umar.
of 'Umar.
II.
II. It
It isisclear
clearfrom
from 'Umar's
'Umar's
actions
actions
thatthat
his overriding
his overriding
political
political
aim wasaim
the was the
preservation
preservationofof thetheMedinan
Medinanhegemony
hegemonyset upsetbyup
Muhammad
by Muhammadand maintained
and maintained
by
by Abu
AbuBakr
Bakrininthetheface
face
of of
the the
serious
serious
threatthreat
posed posed
by theby
ridda
theleaders.
ridda leaders.
He He
sought
soughtto toachieve
achieve this
this
purpose
purpose
by vesting
by vesting
leadership
leadership
and other
and powers
other powers
in those in those
whose
whoseloyalty
loyaltywas
wasto,to,
andand
whose
whose
interests
interests
lay in,
laythe
in,preservation
the preservation
of that of
hege-
that hege-
mony;
mony;hence
hencethe
theprominent
prominent rolerole
played
played
by sahdba,
by sahdba,
Ansar Ansar
and others
and possessed
others possessed
of
of Islamic
Islamicsdbiqa
sdbiqa(priority
(priorityor precedence)
or precedence)duringduring
his caliphate.
his caliphate.
He sought
He to
sought to
' Tab.
Tab. II,
II,pp.
pp.613
613ff;ff;
BA.v,
BA.v, pp. pp.
224 224
ff; A'th.
ff; A'th.
I, fols.
I, 226B
fols. ff.,
226BII, ff.,
fols.II,
i Bfols.
ff. i B ff.
22 Tab.
Tab.II,
II,p.p.626;
626;A'th.
A'th.
II. II.
fol.fol.
3 B.3Note
B. Note
that that
BA.v,BA.v,
p. 225 p.
refers
225 refers
also to sikak
also to
al-umara'
sikak al-umara'
within 'old' Kuifa.
3 BA. v, pp. 235-6; A'th. I, fol. 236 A, 11, fol. 5 A.
establish
establish this
this sdbiqa
sdbiqaasasthe
themain
maincriterion
criterion
ofof
worth
worth
in in
a system
a system
of social
of social
organiza-
organiza-
tion
tion and
and control
controlwhich
whichwould
wouldprovide
provideanan
over-all
over-allunity
unity
in society,
in society, embracing
embracing
the
the changing
changing and
andfluid
fluidpatterns
patternsofof
ephemeral
ephemeralalliances
alliances
between
between
clansclans
and and
groups
groups
of clans.
clans. The
The underpinning
underpinningofofthis
this
organization
organization waswas
to to
be be
thethe
'Islamic
'Islamic
leader-
leader-
ship'-
ship'- supporters
supportersofofMedinan
Medinanhegemony,
hegemony, propounders
propoundersof of
an an
accompany-
accompany-
ing
ing ideology,
ideology, and
andcounterweights
counterweightstoto
the
the
influence
influence
of of
forces
forces
forfor
disunity;
disunity;
notable
notable among
amongthese
theselast
lastwere
werethe
theformer
former
ridda
ridda
leaders,
leaders,
whowho
werewere
specifically
specifically
debarred
debarred from
fromholding
holdingcommands.'
commands.' When,
When,
toward
toward thethe
endend
of his
of his
caliphate,
caliphate,
'Umar
'Umar was
was confronted
confrontedwith
withthe
theneed
needfor
for
initiating
initiating
organization
organization
to em-
to em-
brace
brace the
the newly
newlyconquered
conqueredterritories,
territories,the
the
principle
principle
of of
sdbiqa
sdbiqa
waswas
central
central
in in
his proposal.
This is clear in the system of distribution of stipends laid down in 20/641, in
which the three main categories were: (i) various grades of Muhajirin and
Ans.r, who received from 5,000 to 3,000 dirhams per annum, (ii) people involved
in the operations preceding Yarmuk and Qadisiyya (ahl al-ayydm) and people
who were at Yarmuk or Qadisiyya, who received 3,000 and 2,000 respectively,
and (iii) rawddif (people who came after [Yarmuk or Qadisiyya]), who were in
a variety of grades, depending on the time when they first participated in the
conquests; there is some disagreement about these grades, but they probably
ranged from 1,500 to 200 dirhams per annum. At both Kufa and Basra the
'irdfa became a unit for the distribution of ioo,ooo dirhams; twenty men at
3,000 plus allowances for dependants in the case of ahl al-ayydm, forty-three
men at 2,000 plus dependants in the case of ahl al-Qddisiyya, and sixty men at
1,500 plus dependants in the case of the first wave of rawddif (al-rddifa al-uld).
'Umar's diwdn of 20/641 made use of genealogical arrangement, as his employ-
ment of experts on genealogy (nussdb) shows, but the principle of Islamic
priority was what counted. In most cases 'irdfas were probably composed of
people from the same clan, but an 'irdfa was essentially a group of people with
identical Islamic priority.2
At first sight it may seem that this principle of Islamic priority, which at a
certain level constituted an acknowledgement of the privilege of the provincial
early-comer, had little or no further place in decisions concerning the land itself,
for 'Umar decided that the Sawad should not be divided among its conquerors
but should instead be reserved for 'those Muslims who come after us'. By this
decision, which authorities other than Sayf b. 'Umar describe as a decision to
make the Sawad fay' for the Muslims, the population of the Sawad were to be
allowed to cultivate the land as people under protection (dhimma) and to pay
taxes; Sayf b. 'Umar always refers to this type of land as sulh or dhimma land.
E.g. Tab. I, pp. 2225, 2327, 2617.

2 Tab. I, pp. 2412-3, 2496; BF. p. 449; IS. III, pt. i, pp. 213-5; al-Ya'qubi,
Tdrikh, ed. M. T. Houtsma (Leiden, 1883), vol. II, p. 175, see also G.-R. Puin, Der
Diwan von 'Umar ibn al-Hjattdb (Bonn, 1970) and a review of this in BSOAS, xxxiv
(I97)-.
350 Martin Hinds
It was
was to
to be
bethe
theinalienable
inalienable(mawquf)
(mawquf)
property
property
of the
of the
Kfifans
Kfifans
and the
andrevenues
the revenues
from
from it,
it, termed
termedjizd'
jizd'byby
Sayf,
Sayf,
were
were
to to
be be
used
used
to pay
to pay
their
their
stipends,
stipends,
whichwhich
constituted
constitutedpayment
paymentfor
forthe
the
maintenance
maintenance
of the
of the
dhimma;
dhimma;
no fifth
no fifth
was to
was
be to
sent
be sent
to
to Medina
Medinafrom
fromthis
thisrevenue,
revenue, and
and
any
any
surplus
surplus
waswas
to betodivided
be divided
among among
those those
who
who were
wereentitled
entitledtotostipends.I
stipends.I
However,
However,thisthis
decision,
decision,
although
although
it applied
it applied
to to
the
the bulk
bulk of
ofthe
theSawad,
Sawad,diddidnot
not
apply
apply
to to
all all
of it
ofand
it and
provincial
provincial
Islamic
Islamic
priority
priority
did
did in
in fact
factcount
countfurther
furtherinin
connexion
connexion
with
with
a second
a second
category
category
of land,
of land,
whichwhich
was was
not
not dhimma
dhimmaland
landand
andis isconsistently
consistently
referred
referred
to by
to Sayf
by Sayf
asfay'.
asfay'.
This This
was the
wasland
the land
generally
generally called
calledsdfiya
sdfiyapl.pl.
sawdfi,
sawdfi,
which
whichterm
term
is also
is also
usedused
by Sayf,
by Sayf,
and consisted
and consisted
of
of land
land that
thathad
hadbelonged
belonged toto
the
the
Sasanian
Sasanian
king,
king,
his his
family
family
and those
and those
who had
who had
fled
fled with
withhim,
him,and
andofofvarious
various
other
other
types
types
of land
of land
suchsuch
as swamps,
as swamps,
thickets,
thickets,
roads roads
and
and post-stations.
post-stations.Sayf's
Sayf'saccount
account
says
says
that
that
thisthis
landland
was was
for the
for exclusive
the exclusive
use ofuse of
the
the original
originalconquerors,
conquerors,whomwhom hehe
terms
terms
'ahl'ahl
al-fay'...
al-fay'...
wa-hum
wa-hum
ahl al-Madd'in',
ahl al-Madd'in',
i.e.
i.e. those
those who
whohad
hadbeen
beenatatthe
the
conquest
conquest
of of
Mada'in
Mada'in
in I6/637.
in I6/637.
'Umar'Umar
ruledruled
that that
they
they might
mightdivide
divideititand
and
settle
settle
in in
it as
it they
as they
wished,
wished,
provided
provided
that that
one-fifth
one-fifth
went went
to
to him,
him, but
butSayf
Sayfgoes
goesonon
toto
say
say
that
that
thethe
division
division
of the
of the
sawdfi
sawdfi
land land
did not
didcome
not come
about
about because
becauseititwas
wasscattered
scattered
throughout
throughout
thethe
Sawfd
Sawfd
and and
because
because
thosethose
who who
were
were entitled
entitledtotoititdecided
decidedthat
that
they
they
should
should
notnot
disperse;
disperse;
in addition
in addition
it is probable
it is probable
that
that some
someof
ofthem
themwere
werebyby
that
that
stage
stage
remote
remote
from
from
'Iraq.'Iraq.
TheyThey
therefore
therefore
estab-estab-
lished
lished the
thesawdfi
sawdfiland landasas
anan
inalienable
inalienable bequest
bequest
(hab(hab
s) for
s) for
themselves,
themselves,
and putand put
in charge
charge ofofitit'those
'thosewith
withwhom
whom they
theywere
were
satisfied'.
satisfied'.
It was
It was
this this
class class
of landof land
that
that ahl
ahl al-fay'
al-fay'claimed
claimedforfor
themselves
themselves (yastad'dhu
(yastad'dhuahl al-fay'),
ahl al-fay'),
says says
Sayf,Sayf,
not not
the
the main
main part
partof ofthe
theSawad
Sawad (ld(ld
'uzm
'uzmal-Sawdd).2
al-Sawdd).2
The
The arrangement
arrangementwas, was,then,
then, that
thatthethe
early-comers
early-comers werewere
to betoentitled
be entitled
not not
only
only to
to large
largestipends
stipendsout
out
ofof
the
the
dhimma
dhimma
revenues,
revenues,
and and
so tosoproportionately
to proportionately
large
large shares
sharesin
inany
anydivision
divisionofof
thethe
surplus
surplus
of those
of those
revenues,
revenues,
but also
but to
also
exclusive
to exclusive
enjoyment
enjoymentof
offour-fifths
four-fifthsofof
the
the
revenue
revenue
of the
of the
sawdfi
sawdfi
lands.
lands.
That That
this arrangement
this arrangement
amounted
amountedto toan
anattempt
attempt toto
regularize
regularize andandlimit
limit
what what
theythey
had already
had already
arrogated
arrogated
to
to themselves
themselvescannot
cannotbebeinindoubt.
doubt. When
When it comes
it comes to asking
to asking
how howquickly
quickly
and and
comprehensively
comprehensivelythisthisarrangement
arrangement waswascarried
carried
out,out,
however,
however,
it seems
it seems
that there
that there
are
are no
no grounds
groundsforforbelieving
believing that
that'Umar's
'Umar's decisions
decisionsof 20/641
of 20/641
werewere
put into
put into
effect
effect immediately.
immediately.HeHemade made a start
a starton onthethediwdndiwdn
in 20,
in but
20, itbutwas
it almost
was almost
certainly
certainly unfinished
unfinishedbybythethetime
timeof of
hishis
death
death
at the
at the
end end
of 23.3
of 23.3
Similarly,
Similarly,
the the
decision
decision about
aboutthe
theSawad
Sawad was
was taken
taken in in
20 20
butbutits implementation
its implementation couldcould
not not
even
even begin
beginasaslong
longasasareas
areasofofthethe
Sawad
Sawad werewere
notnoteffectively
effectively
pacified;4
pacified;4
only only
then
then could
couldthe
thebusiness
businessofof distinguishing
distinguishing between
between dhimma
dhimmaand sawdfi
and sawdfi
start.start.
In In
short,
short, it
it was
wasonly
onlyatatthe
thetail-end
tail-end of of
'Umar's
'Umar's caliphate
caliphate
thatthat
the beginnings
the beginnings of of
Tab. I, p. 2418; BF. p. 384 (and p. 453 for an example of the distribution of the
surplus); Ibn Sallam, al-Amwdl (Cairo, I353), nos. 151, 153. See also D. C. Dennett,
Conversion and the poll tax in early Islam (Cambridge, Mass. 1950), pp. 20-21.
2 Tab. I, pp. 2371-2, 2467-9. See also BF. pp. 272-3; Ibn Sallam, op. cit., no. 694;
Abiu Yusuf, Kitab al-khardj (Cairo, I302), p. 32; and cf. Dennett, op. cit., p. 26.
3 Tab. I, p. 2752; BF. p. 452; IS. III, pt. i, p. 214.
4 Note e.g. the pacification of Zandaward in 21/642 (Khal. p. 122).
Kafan political alignments 351
administrative
administrative organization
organization
in 'Iraq appeared;
in 'Iraqandappeared;
by then the
andearly-comers
by then the early-co
had
hadenjoyed
enjoyedwhatwhat
amounted
amounted
to a freetoruna of
free
the area
runfor
offive
theyears
areaorfor
more.
five years or m
Of
Ofthe
thevarious
various
centres
centres
in territories
in territories
conquered byconquered
the Arabs in
bythethe
time
Arabs
of in the t
'Umar,
'Umar,Kffa
Kffa
was was
the one
thecentre
one at
centre
which his
at envisaged
which hispolitical
envisaged
and social
political and
order
order seemed
seemed
for afor
timea most
time likely
mostto succeed
likely intotaking
succeed
root.in
At taking
the beginning
root. At the be
of
ofhis
hisvolume
volume
of Kuifan
of Kuifan
biographies,
biographies,
Ibn Sa'd records
Ibn aSa'd
number
records
of traditions
a number of tra
according
according to which
to which
'Umar 'Umar
referredreferred
to the Kufans
to asthe
ra'sKufans
ahl al-Isldm,
as ra's
jumjumat
ahl al-Isldm, ju
al-Isldm
al-Isldm etc.,I
etc.,I
and we
and arewe
entitled
are entitled
to ask whytotheask
Syrians
whyor,the say Syrians
the Basrans,
or, say the B
were
werenot not
singled
singled
out for
outsuch
forcomment.
such comment.
The answer toThethisanswer
seems to tobe that
this seems to b
the
thesystem
systemwhich
which
'Umar'Umar
aspired to
aspired
establish
towas
establish
best served
was
by best
the heterogeneity
served by the heteroge
of
ofthe
the
Kufan
Kufan population.
population.
Those Arabs
ThosewhoArabs
seized the
who first
seized
opportunity
the first
to fight
opportunity
and
andaccordingly
accordingly went went
to Syriatowere
Syria
organized
were inorganized
relatively large
in relatively
and cohesive large and c
groupings.
groupings. In the
In Basran
the Basran
territories,
territories,
Tamimis and Tamimis
Bakris predominated
and Bakrisandpredominated
only a
aa handful
handful of about
of about
300 early-comers
300 early-comers
had come from
had further
come from
away. At
further
Kufa, away. At
on
onthe
the
other
otherhand,
hand,
such early-comers
such early-comers
from a distance
from perhaps
a distance
numberedperhaps
Io,ooo numbere
or
ormore2
more2 andand
werewere
of a miscellaneous
of a miscellaneous
compositioncomposition
in which there in
waswhich
a relative
there was a
absence
absence of of
large
large
dominating
dominating
clans or groups
clans of
or clans.
groupsThis of
reflected
clans.anThis
important
reflected an im
feature
feature of of
the the
earlyearly
conquests,
conquests,
viz. that Syria
viz. was
thatfirst
Syria
regarded
was as
first
the main
regarded
front, as the main
and
andthenthenJazira,
Jazira,
whilewhile
'Iraq was 'Iraq
regarded
was as regarded
a secondary asfront.3
a secondary
The hodge- front.3 The h
podge
podge Arab
Arabforceforce
whichwhich was victorious
was victorious
at Qadisiyyaat consisted
Qadisiyya of (i) aconsisted
number of of (i) a num
small
smalland andmostly
mostlysedentarysedentary
Hijazi andHijazi
Yemeniand groups,
Yemeni at least groups,
some of which
at least some of
were
weremustered
mustered by 'Umar
by 'Umarand could andbe spared
could for be 'Iraq
spared becausefor of 'Iraq
Arab success
because of Arab
in
inSyria
Syriain I4/635,
in I4/635,(ii) a miscellany
(ii) a miscellany
of settled andof nomadic
settled groups and nomadic
who lived groups who
between
between Hijaz
Hijaz
and 'IrAq
and and 'IrAq gravitated
and gravitated
to the front, toandthe (iii)front,
fragmentedand groups
(iii) fragmented
of
ofbordering
bordering nomadic
nomadicBakris Bakris
and Tamimis, and who Tamimis,
had longwho been accustomed
had long to been accustom
raiding
raiding into
into
Sasanian
Sasanian
'Iraq. The'Iraq.
founding
The founding
(ikhti.tdt) of(ikhti.tdt)
Kufa, which of marked
Kufa, the which mark
beginning
beginning of aofholding
a holdingoperation operation
in 'Iraq whilein the
'Iraq Jazira
while front
the wasJazira
activated front was ac
in
inthethenorth,
north, probably
probablyinvolvedinvolved
all of typeall (i) of
and type
most of (i)type
and(ii),
most
but theof type (ii), bu
provision
provision mademade
for groups
for groups of type (iii)
of type
from Rabi'a
(iii) from
(i.e. Bakr Rabi'a
and others)
(i.e. Bakr
and and other
Tamim
Tamim waswas
small;
small;
evidentlyevidently
most of themmostreturned
of them to their
returnednomadicto habits
their nomadic h
in
intheir
theiradjacent
adjacent
home hometerritory territory
when theywhen were not they fighting,
wereand not there
fighting,
can be and ther
little
littledoubt
doubt thatthat
they they
also spilled
alsooverspilled
into the
over newly
into conquered
the newly territories,
conquered territ
where
where thethe
grazing
grazing
was superior.
was superior.
The khitatThe of Kufakhitatwere of therefore
Kufa primarily
were therefore pr
intended
intended forforthosethose
who had who come hadfromcomefurther
from away.further
'Umar's notion
away.was 'Umar's
that notion w
Kuifa
Kuifa should
shouldbe ddr
be hijra
ddrfor hijra
the for
Muslims,
the and Muslims,
these settlers
and werethese thesettlers
muhdjirinwere the m
of
ofKuifa.4
Kuifa.4 TheirTheir
heterogeneous
heterogeneous composition composition
led 'Umar to hope led 'Umar
that his to Islamic
hope that his
experiment
experiment wouldwould
meet with meet success
withamong success them, among
with the them,
influence
with of clan
the influence
leaders
leaders being
beingsubmerged
submerged in the bodyin theof early-comers
body of early-comers
and the 'irdfa system and the and 'irdfa sys
the
thefellowship
fellowship of hijra
of forming
hijra formingthe accepted the basis
accepted
of society. basis
The ofpresence
society.of The pres
370
370early
early
sahdba
sahdba
domicileddomiciled
at Kufa presumably
at Kufa presumably
fortified him in fortified
that hope.5 him in that hop
I IS. vi, pp. I-3.
2 See Tab. I, pp. 2222, 2236, 2356; BF. pp. 255-6; Khal. p. ioI.
3 See Tab. I, pp. 2488ff. 4 Ibid. p. 2360; BF. p. 275. 5 IS. vI, p. 4.
352 Martin Hinds
III.
III.TheTheveneer
veneer
of unity
of under
unity Medinan
under hegemony
Medinan was hegemony
maintained during
was maintaine
the
thecaliphate
caliphate
of 'Umar,
of 'Umar,
but it wasbut
a veneer
it wasthatahad
veneer
worn thin
thatby had
the time
worn
of thin by t
his
hisdeathdeath
in 23/644.
in 23/644.
Once there
Oncewas there
a lull in was
military
a lull
activities
in military
and men began
activities and
to
tobebe concerned
concernedwith carving
with up carving
the proceeds,
up theand proceeds,
once there wasand
needonce
for the
there was n
establishing
establishing of some
of sort
someof civil
sortadministration
of civil administration
rather than the exercising
ratherof than the exe
plain
plain military
military
leadership,
leadership,
the problem
the
of problem
maintainingof
unity
maintaining
became more complex
unity became mor
and
andthe
the
remoteness
remoteness
of Medina
ofproved
Medinamoreproved
of a handicap.
moreTheofconqueror
a handicap.
of The conq
Egypt,
Egypt, 'Amr
'Amr
b. al-'As,
b. al-'As,
came near
came
to overt
near
disobedience;
to overt in disobedience;
Syria the Abu in Syri
Sufyan
Sufyan family
family
was quick
wastoquick
build on
toitsbuild
pre-Islamic
on its
interests
pre-Islamic
there and interests
entrench there an
itself;
itself; andand
at Kufa
at Kufa
there grew
thereup during
grewthe upyears
during
20/641the
to 29/649-50
years 20/641
a state ofto 29/649-
tension
tension in which
in which
the main
theelements
main were:
elements
(i) the existence
were: (i) of athe
bodyexistence
of early- of a bod
comers,
comers, privileged
privileged
by their
bysdbiqa;
their(ii) the
sdbiqa;
arrival(ii)
of newcomers
the arrival
(rawddif);
of newcomers
(iii)
(iii)the
the
power
powerof clan
ofleaders;
clan (iv)
leaders;
the continuing
(iv) the
attempt
continuing
to organizeattempt
conquered to organize
territory;
territory; and (v)
and the(v)
slowing
the down,
slowingalmost
down,
to a standstill,
almostofto thea thrust
standstill,
of of the
Kufan
Kufan expansion
expansionthat followed
that followed
NihAwand. NihAwand.
During
During thethe
yearsyears
20-29 there
20-29 emerged
there at emerged
Kufa and in attheKufa
Kfifanand
territories
in the Kfifan t
aa situation
situationin which
in which
the posture
theofposture
many, butofnotmany,
all, of the
butKufan
notearly-comers
all, of the Kufan e
assumed
assumed an 'old-guard'
an 'old-guard'
character.
character.
One of the causes
One of ofthis
the
laycauses
in the influx
of this
of lay in th
so-called
so-called rawddif,
rawddif,
who had
who
comehad
to Kufa
comeafterto
theKufa
original
after
settlers
theandoriginal
so sett
received
received smaller
smaller
stipends,
stipends,
had not shared
had innottheshared
early great
in hauls
the ofearly
booty great
and hauls of
up
uptoto 20/64I,
20/64I,
were were
kept onkept
an inactive
on an front.
inactive
It is therefore
front. scarcely
It is surprising
therefore scarcely
that
that once
once
the the
conquests
conquests
of Syria, of
Egypt
Syria,
and Jazira
Egypt wereand
effected
Jazira
and there
werewaseffected an
no
nolonger
longerany any
reasonreason
for preventing
for preventing
a large-scale eastward
a large-scale
offensive,eastward
these new- offensive,
comers
comers were
were
the readiest
the readiest
of the Kufans
of the
to volunteer
Kufans their
to services;,
volunteer moreover
their services;,
there
there took
took
placeplace
after the
after
battle
the
of Nihawand
battle of(21/642)
Nihawand
an important
(21/642)
modification
an important m
of
ofthe
theprinciple
principle
of Islamic
of Islamic
priority when
priority
the stipends
when of the
new-comers
stipends
who had
of new-comer
'shown
'shownvalour'
valour'
there there
were raised
wereto the
raised
level of
tothe
thestipends
levelofof
ahlthe
al-Qddisiyya,
stipends of ahl al
i.e.
i.e.2,000
2,000
dirhams
dirhams
p.a.2 It p.a.2
is probable
It isthat
probable
the influxthat
of newcomers
the influxincreased
of newcomers
from
from that
that
time,time,
for Arabfor control
Arab ofcontrol
'Iraq was now
of assured
'Iraq was
whilenow
previously
assured
it while pr
had
hadbeen
beentenuous
tenuous
and theandKufan
the
holding
Kufan operation
holding
had constituted
operation a recognition
had constituted a
of
ofthe
thepossibility
possibility
that it that
might it
be might
lost if pressure
be loston the
if pressure
Byzantine front
on the
became
Byzantine fron
too
toogreat.
great.
The The
figurefigure
of 40,000ofKufan
40,000
fighting
Kufan
men at
fighting
the time ofmenthe appoint-
at the time of t
ment
ment of of
al-Walid
al-Walid
b. 'Uqbab.to'Uqba
Kuifa (24/645
to Kuifa or 25/646)3
(24/645 givesor
some
25/646)3
idea of thegives some
number
number of newcomers
of newcomers by then, byfor then,
the totalfor
number
theoftotal
Arabs number
who had foughtof Arabs who
at
atQadisiyya
Qadisiyya can incan
no circumstance
in no circumstance
be regarded asbehaving
regarded
exceededas 30,0004
having exceeded
and
andnot not
all of
allthese
of these
had stayed
had in stayed
Kufan territory;5
in Kufan moreover,
territory;5
it is by no moreover,
means it is b
certain
certainthat that
all who
allhad
who donehad
so were
done willing
so were
to serve
willing
as fighting
to men
serve ten as
years
fighting me
later.
later. As As
a result
a result
of the of
arrival
theofarrival
newcomers ofatnewcomers
Kfifa, reports at
SayfKfifa,
b. 'Umarreports
in Sayf
his
hisaccount
account
of the
ofikhtitdt,
the ikhtitdt,
there was athere
rapid change
was aofrapid
the pattern
change
of settlement
of the pattern of s
as
asitit
had
had
originally
originally
been when
been
the when
allotments
thewere
allotments
made over to
were
ahl-ayydm
madewa'l-
over to ahl-a
I Tab. I, p. 26I6. 2 Ibid. p. 2633.
3 Ibid. p. 2805. 4 See particularly ibid. p. 2222.
5 Ibid. p. 24I4.
Qddisiyya;
Qddisiyya; whenwhen
the newcomers
the newcomers
became numerous
becamethe allotments
numerous became
thetoo
allotments b
small,
small, so that
so that
those those
whose newcomer
whose newcomer
fellow clansmen
fellow
were particularly
clansmen numerous
were particularly n
left
lefttheir
their
original
original
allotments
allotments
and joined them,
and joined
while those
them,
whose while
newcomers
those
werewhose newcom
less numerous either were able to settle them in vacated allotments or else had
to make room for them at the cost of discomfort to themselves.' An evident
result of this influx was that the proportion of early-comers to the total number
of fighting men was diminished and in these circumstances tension between
early-comers and newcomers might be expected. But Sayf's reference to some
early-comers being met by many newcomers while others were not shows that the
situation was more complex than that, for it presaged a distinction within the
ranks of the early-comers.
Turning to the clan leaders, the extent to which their influence in Kffa was in
fact held in check should not be exaggerated. In particular, the prominent r6le
in the conquests of some former ridda leaders sheds doubt on the effectiveness of
'Umar's ruling debarring them from holding commands. al-Ash'ath b. Qays,
for example, joined Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas' army with a following of I,700 Yemenis
and, soon after this, he figured in the battle of Qadisiyya at the head of 700
Kindis.2 As a former murtadd he must be assumed 'officially' to have been the
leader of less than Ioo men,3 but many more than ioo evidently regarded him
as their leader. By the time of Nihawand there appears to have been some relaxa-
tion of the ruling, for only two men, viz. 'Amr b. Ma'dikarib and Tulayha b.
Khuwaylid, were barred by name from holding command, without the reason
being given explicitly,4 and al-Ash'ath is both named in the chain of deputy
commanders and mentioned as commander of the right flank.5 In short, the
conspicuous role on the battle field of a leader such as al-Ash'ath suggests that
at other times his influence was masked rather than effectively counterbalanced by
the policy of Islamic leadership. There were moreover other clan leaders who
had not been murtadds, such as Jarir b. 'Abdallah al-Bajali, Sa'id b. Qays al-
Hamdani and Mikhnaf b. Sulaym al-Azdi, and they too stood to gain in stature
if they were joined by rawddif connected with their respective clans.
A further element that needs to be taken into account in considering Kufan
political change during the years 20-29 was a widespread early-comer sensitivity
to any apparent increase of Medinan control. 'Umar's decisions concerning the
diwdn and the disposition of the Sawfd were made in 20/641, but they can only
gradually have been put into effect and it seems likely that Jarir b. 'Abdallah
and others opposed 'Ammar b. Yasir when he was governor (probably 22/643)
and secured his dismissal precisely because 'Ammar sought to exercise more
authority than they were prepared to allow him. The raising of the stipends of
some of the Nihawand rawddif may well have been one source of contention,
and it was probably to exercise closer control over the Sawad that 'Ammar
I Ibid. pp. 2490-I. 2 Ibid. pp. 2222, 2335.
3 See e.g. ibid. p. 2327. 4 Ibid. p. 2617.
5 BF. pp. 303, 305. See also Tab. I, p. 2645.
354 Martin Hinds
planned
planned to to
move
move
his base
histobase
Mada'in;I
to Mada'in;I
this intention
thiswas
intention
vigorously was
opposed
vigorously oppo
by
byJarir
Jarirb. 'Abdallah,
b. 'Abdallah,
who had
whointerests
had interests
in the Hulwan
in area.2
the Hulwan
This reaction
area.2
against
This reaction aga
'Ammar,
'Ammar, however,
however,
was merely
was merely
a foretaste
a foretaste
of further early-comer
of further reactions
early-comer
at reactio
Kufa
Kufaininthethe
timetime
of 'Uthman's
of 'Uthman's
governorgovernor
al-Walid b. 'Uqba,
al-Walid
whoseb.efforts
'Uqba,towhose effort
apply
applyorganizational
organizational
measures
measures
involved involved
a measure of
a measure
control which
of was
control
regarded
which was re
as
as entirely
entirely unwarrantable.
unwarrantable.
For example,
For example,
we are told we
thatare
there
told
was that
set up,there
on was set u
'Uthman's
'Uthman's instructions,
instructions,
a guestahouse
guestadministered
house administered
by Ibn Mas'ud,bywhoIbnwas Mas'ud, who
at
atthat
thattime
time
in charge
in charge
of the of
treasury,
the treasury,
for those grain-dealers,
for those grain-dealers,
notably Kalbis, notably K
whose
whose clans
clans
werewere
not represented
not represented
at Kufa, and
at that
Kufa,there
and
wasthat
a strong
there objection
was a strong ob
to
tothis
thisarrangement
arrangement
from an
from
early-comer,
an early-comer,
Abu Sammal Abu
al-Asadi,
Sammal
who had
al-Asadi, wh
hitherto
hitherto taken
taken
uponupon
himself
himself
the lodging
theoflodging
such people.3
of such
Since people.3
most of the
Since
taxa- most of th
tion
tionofofthethe
Sawad
Sawad
was probably
was probably
paid in the
paid
forminofthe
grain,
formwe should
of grain,
evidently
we should evid
understand
understand thisthis
as a move
as a in
move
the direction
in the direction
of governmental
of governmental
control of that control of
taxation.
taxation. TheThe
basicbasic
issue was,
issuethen,
was,that
then,
of the
that
authority
of theof Medinan
authority hegemony
of Medinan heg
represented
represented by 'Uthman
by 'Uthman and al-Walid
and al-Walid
as against the
as against
right of Kffans
the right
to take
of Kffans to
the
thelawlaw
into
into
their
their
own hands,
own hands,
and thereand
are numerous
there are illustrations
numerous of illustrations
this issue of thi
in
inthe
thecourse
course of al-Walid's
of al-Walid's
governorship.
governorship.
We find 'UthmanWe findordering
'Uthman
the execu-ordering the e
tion
tionofof some
some KufanKufan
youthsyouths
who hadwho killedhad
a man,
killed
and verses
a man, about
and theverses
affair about the
show
showa clear
a clearobjection
objection
to his to
interference
his interference
in what was in regarded
what as wasa purely
regarded as a pur
domestic
domestic matter.4
matter.4The same
Thewas
same truewas
in the
true
case in
of the
the killing
case of of the
theconjuror,
killing of the con
which
which is is
extensively
extensively mentioned
mentioned
in the sources.5
in theA sources.5
further example
A further
of increasing
example of incr
control
control cancan
be seen
be seen
in al-Walid's
in al-Walid's
granting granting
of small allowances
of small to slaves
allowances
and others
to slaves and
who
whowere
were notnotin receipt
in receipt
of stipends,6
of stipends,6
so reducingso further
reducing
a surplus
further
which was
a surplus whic
presumably
presumably already
already
depleted
depleted
by the payment
by the of payment
stipends toof rawddif.
stipendsIt is to
there-
rawddif. It is
fore
forescarcely
scarcely surprising
surprising
that Sayf
thatb. 'Umar
Sayf remarks
b. 'Umar upon
remarks
al-Walid's upon
popularity
al-Walid's popu
among
among thethe
'dmma'
'dmma'
(by which
(by which
we should we perhaps
should understand
perhapsrawddif
understand
of all kinds,
rawddif of all
whether
whether or or
not not
they they
received
received
stipends)stipends)
and the hostility
and thetowards
hostility
him among towards him a
the
the'khdssa'
'khdssa'
(i.e. (i.e.
early-comers
early-comers
with maximum
with maximum
stipends (sharaf
stipends
al-'atd') and
(sharaf al-'atd
other
otherprivileges).7
privileges).7
Finally,
Finally,
there was
there
the dispute
was thebetween
dispute
al-Walid
between
and Ibn al-Walid and I
Mas'ud about some money borrowed by al-Wallid from the treasury. Ibn
Mas'ud pressed for repayment and 'Uthman, in writing to him to refrain, pre-
faced this instruction with the words 'You are merely a treasurer for us' ;8
Ibn Mas'iud forthwith relinquished his custodianship, declaring that he had
thought himself to be 'treasurer for the Muslims'.9 His departure marked an
I Ibid. p. 2484. 2 See, e.g. ibid. p. 2677.
3 Ibid. p. 2842. Abfu Sammal had fought at Qadisiyya (BA/MS. II, p. 737; W. Caskel
Gamharat an-nasab: das genealogische Werk des Hisdm ibn Muhammad al-Kalbi (Leiden,
I966), vol. II, p. 513 (Sim'an b. Hubayra).
4 Tab. I, pp. 2840-I.
5 Note particularly al-Walld's reported warning to the Kucfans 'alli yuqzmu 'l-hudu
duna 'l-sultdn. fa-innd nuqayyid al-mukhti' wa-nu'addib al-musib' (Tab. I, pp. 2845-6
BA. v, pp. 3I-32).
6 Tab. I, p. 2845.
7 See particularly Tab. I, p. 2849; also pp. 28I3, 2840, 2850.
8 BA. v, pp. 30-3I (innama anta khdzin land). 9 Ibid. p. 36.
Kzufan political alignments 355
important
important stage
stage
in the
in the
fading-out
fading-out
of the of
old-style
the old-style
representatives
representatives
of Islamic of Islamic
unity
unityunder
underMedinan
Medinan hegemony.
hegemony.
The
Thefinal
final
element
element in Kffan
in Kffan
developments
developments
between between
20 and 29 20
wasand
the 29
slowing
was the slowing
down
downalmost
almost
to to
a standstill
a standstill
of theof
great
the thrust
great of
thrust
Kfifanof
expansion
Kfifanwhich
expansion
followed
which followed
Nihawand.
Nihawand. This
This
is not
is not
to say
tothat
say any
that
specific
any specific
effort was
effort
made to
wasmaintain
made the
to maintain th
momentum;
momentum; on on
thethe
contrary,
contrary,
it is probable
it is probable
that a fear
that
of aover-extension
fear of over-extension
prevailed. prevailed.
Our
Ourinformation
informationabout
about
the 40,000
the 40,000
fighting
fighting
men at the
mentime
at of
the
al-Wallid's
time ofappoint-
al-Wallid's appoint-
ment
mentsays
saysthat
that
Io,ooo
Io,ooo
would
would
each year
eachand
year
by and
rotation
by campaign
rotation at
campaign
the two at the two
Kufan
Kufanmarches
marches(sing.
(sing.
thaghr)
thaghr)
of Rayy
of (4,000)
Rayy and
(4,000)
Adharbayjan
and Adharbayjan
(6,ooo).I It (6,ooo).I I
therefore
therefore appears
appearsthatthat
thesethese
two fronts
two fronts
were to were
be heldtobut
benotheld
necessarily
but not necessarily
advanced,
advanced, and
and
thisthis
continued
continued
to be the
to becasetheduring
caseal-Walid's
during al-Walid's
governorship.governorship.
Of
Of Rayy
Rayyduring
during
thisthis
period
period
there there
is littleisinformation,
little information,
but it is evident
but itthat
is evident
the that th
limit was reached with the Dasht-i Kabir on the one hand and the mountains of
Tabaristan on the other; Arab control of much of the territory short of that
was tenuous, and at Rayy itself there were revolts by the local population.2
In the case of Adharbayjan (i.e. Ardabil and surrounding territory), more
material is available, although much of it is fragmentary and confusing, parti-
cularly as far as chronology is concerned; but here too the Arabs were pre-
occupied with holding on to the area initially conquered and there are no grounds
for believing that they made any lasting conquests north of the Araxes while
al-Walid was governor of Kufa and its territories.3
Viewed in general terms, Kuifan tension in the latter part of the governorship
of al-Walid stemmed from a reaction to central Medinan authority, and al-
Walid's opponents succeeded in ridding themselves of him by pressing charges
which were considered proved according to the legal standards of the time.
The hostility towards al-Walid came from among the early-comers, but that
does not mean that it came from all the early-comers in equal measure. Rather,
the most active opponents appear to have been people about whom the sources
have little to say in earlier contexts;4 of particular interest is the information
that there were among them persons who had been dismissed from appoint-
ments by al-Walid.s In fine, the evidence points to the conclusion that his most
active opponents were the least influential of the early-comer leaders, i.e.
leaders of clan splinter groups, who were the most sensitive to any change and
who, because they had the smallest followings, were the most tenacious of the
order promoted by 'Umar. The relative importance of such people was diminish-
ing with the arrival of rawddif, who joined other clan leaders and constituted
a drain on resources which were not being increased by further expansion;
Tab. I, p. 2805. 2 BF. p. 3I9; Khal. pp. I31-2.
3 On Adharbayjan during this period, see BF. pp. 197-8, 325 ff.;
2660 ff., 2805-9, II. p. 977; Khal. pp. I32, 135, 138-9; Encyclopaedia
in progress (Leiden and London, I960-), vol. I, p. 636, art. 'Arminiy
4 For names, see Tab. I, p. 2852; BA. v, p. 32. Note particularly Yazid b. Qays
al-Arhabi and Malik al-Ashtar al-Nakha'i.
5 Tab. I, p. 2848.
23 MES 2 4
356 Martin Hinds
since
since their
theirstatus
status
as as
early-comers
early-comerswas was
not supplemented
not supplemented
by status
by as
status
clan leaders
as clan lead
of
of any
anyimportance,
importance, they
they
necessarily
necessarily
tooktook
a reactionary
a reactionary
position.
position.
The
The situation
situationthat
that confronted
confronted'Uthman
'Uthman
was clear.
was clear.
HavingHaving
succeeded
succeeded
to the to the
caliphate
caliphatemainly
mainlyas as
a result
a result
of his
of readiness
his readiness
to declare
to declare
his adherence
his adherence
to the to t
existing
existingorder
orderinin
itsits
entirety,
entirety,
and and
having
having
set out
settoout
implement
to implement
the organizational
the organizational
measures
measuresinitiated
initiatedbyby 'Umar,
'Umar,he found
he foundthat that
the control
the control
necessary
necessary
for suchfor su
implementation
implementation was
was
rendered
rendered unpalatable
unpalatable
for many
for many
Kufan Kufan
early-comers
early-comers
by by
the
the circumstances
circumstances consequent
consequent upon
upon
a lack
a lack
of new
of conquests
new conquests
and a continuing
and a continuin
influx
influxof ofnewcomers.
newcomers. TheTheobvious
obvious
solution
solution
was towas
findto fresh
find Kffan
fresh conquests
Kffan conques
to
to relieve
relievethe
theincreasing
increasing strain
strain
on the
on existing
the existing
territories;
territories;
in the Basran
in the terri-
Basran terr
tories
toriestoo
toothere
there were
were pressures
pressuresfor for
expansion,
expansion,
although
although
circumstances
circumstances
differeddiffer
there
there ininsome
someimportant
important respects.
respects.
'Uthmin
'Uthmin
expected
expected
that once
thatnew
once
conquests
new conques
provided
providedthe
thenecessary
necessaryoutlet
outlet
for for
newcomers
newcomers
a desirable
a desirable
modus modus
vivendi viven
could
could be
bereached
reachedwith
with
thethe
early-comers,
early-comers,
who would
who would
enjoy their
enjoyprivileges
their privileges
in i
the
the territory
territoryconquered
conqueredby by
them:
them:
so much
so much
is clear
is clear
from his
frompolicy
his statement
policy statement
of
29/649-50
29/649-50that
that'conquered
'conquered
territories
territories
belong
belong
to those
to those
who first
whotook
first
charge
tookof charge
them'.
IV. The appointment of Sa'id b. al-'As to Kufa in 29/649-50, and that

'Abdallah b. 'Amir to Basra at about the same time, marked the beginni
of a new phase of eastward expansion, in two thrusts. Only the Basran thrus
however, met with success; Ibn 'Amir consolidated the Arab hold on Fars, ma
a victorious advance through Kirman and Sistan, and entered Sasanian Khurasa
Sa'id b. al-'As, on the other hand, failed to get beyond Quimis and Tabarista
and the route was in fact for long after rendered insecure and often impassa
by the hostile mountain people of the area. Sa'id therefore turned his attent
to the northern front, where Arab held territory adjoined Khazar territor
but here too the Kuifans made no headway and instead sustained a serio
defeat at the battle of Balanjar in 31/65I-2.
The consequence of the failure of these attempts to increase Kufan terri-
tories by conquest was that, whatever Sa'id may earlier have had in mind wh
he settled forces at Ardabil, as well as at Qazwin,2 these places remained front
garrisons and he continued to be faced with the problem of excessive strain
the resources of the existing conquered territories. Certainly he was unable i
these circumstances to adhere to 'Uthman's edict that 'the conquered territor
belong to those who first took charge of them'. The best that he could do was
take some pressure of the Kufan misr by keeping the larger groups in the ter
tories, and as a consequence the distinctions already adumbrated began
become clearer, with the leading early-comers falling into three broad categor
(i) the strongest clan leaders, who acquired increased power in the territori
and were followed by both early-comers and newcomers; (ii) less influentia
clan leaders, with smaller followings; (iii) leaders of clan splinter groups.
I Ibid. pp. 2825-6 (wa-amma 'I-futu.f fa-li-awwal man waliyahd).
2 BF. p. 322.
Kzfan political alignments 357
In connexion
connexionwithwiththe
thefirst
firstcategory,
category,an an
important
important
development
developmentwas was
the the
appointment
appointmentof ofal-Ash'ath
al-Ash'athb.b.
Qays
Qaysal-Kindi
al-Kindi
in in
Adharbayjan,
Adharbayjan,where
where
he had
he been
had been
left
left by
by al-Walid
al-Walidafter
afterananoperation
operation in in
28/648-9,
28/648-9,andand
the the
despatch
despatch
to him
to him
of of
large
large numbers
numbersof ofpeople
peoplewho
whowere
were
to to
form
forma permanently
a permanentlysettled
settled
force
force
basedbased
at Ardabil.I
Ardabil.IThat
Thata aleader
leaderwith
withal-Ash'ath's
al-Ash'ath's
background
background
should
should
receive
receive
an an
appointment
appointmentwas wasclearly
clearlya amajor
major departure
departure from
from thethe
existing
existing
order,
order,
so much
so much
so that
that Sayf
Sayfb.b.'Umar
'Umarconsiders
considers it it
relevant
relevant
to to
allude
allude
to it
toinitconnexion
in connexion
withwith
the the
Arab
Arab defeat
defeatat
atBalanjar,
Balanjar,which,
which, hehe says,
says,
took
took
place
place
when
when the
the Kfifans
Kfifanshad
hadbeen
beenchanged
changed
about
about
in in
thethe
rulerule
of 'Uthman
of 'Uthman
because
because
of his
of his
appointments
appointmentsof ofthose
thosewhowhohadhad[earlier]
[earlier]
apostatized,
apostatized,
[thereby]
[thereby]
seeking
seeking
concord
concord
for for
them
them (i.e.
(i.e. the
theKufans).
Kufans).[But]
[But]that
thatdiddid
notnot
setset
them
them
to rights;
to rights;
[rather]
[rather]
it increased
it increased
themthem
in corruption
corruptionthatthatthose
thosewhowho ledled
them
them sought
sought
earthly
earthly
things.2
things.2
Another
Another important
importantexample,
example, this
this
time
timeinvolving
involvinga man
a man
whowho
had had
not not
beenbeen
a a
ridda
ridda leader,
leader,can
canbe
beseen
seeninin33/653-4,
33/653-4, when
whenoneone
of aofnumber
a number
of new
of new
appoint-
appoint-
ments
ments made
madebybySa'id
Sa'idb.b.al-'As
al-'As
was
wasthe
theappointment
appointment to Rayy
to Rayy
of Sa'id
of Sa'id
b. Qays
b. Qays
al-Hamdani;3
al-Hamdani;3he hecame
camefromfromone one
ofof
thethe
most
mostinfluential
influential
families
families
of Hamdan,
of Hamdan,
namely
namely the
theAl
AlMarib
Maribofofthe
theclan
clanofof
al-Sabi',
al-Sabi',
andand
his his
importance
importance
as a as
mobilizer
a mobilizer
of Hamdan
Hamdan had
hadearlier
earlierbeen
beenrecognized
recognized byby'Umar.4
'Umar.4
At
At the
the other
otherend
endofofthe
thescale,
scale,
there
therewaswas
displacement
displacementfrom
from
various
various
territories
territories
of early-comers
early-comerswhose
whosestatus
status
was
was
more
more
'Islamic'
'Islamic'
thanthan
tribal.
tribal.
In the
In the
case case
of of
Adharbayjan
Adharbayjanwe
wepossess
possessa alist
list
ofof
names
names
of of
such
such
persons,
persons,
and and
it isitevident
is evident
that that
they
they were
were withdrawn
withdrawnimmediately
immediatelyafter
after
thethe
battle
battle
of Balanjar.5
of Balanjar.5
Attention
Attention
should
should
also
also be
be paid
paidtotoMu'awiya's
Mu'awiya'sorganization
organization of of
Jazira,6
Jazira,6
thethe
governorship
governorship of which
of which
had
had certainly
certainlybeen
beenadded
addedtotohis
his
governorship
governorship of of
Syria
Syria
by 26/646-7.7
by 26/646-7.7
ArabArab
forces
forces
from
from 'Iraq
'Iraq had
hadearlier
earlierparticipated
participated in in
thethe
conquest
conquest
of Jazira,
of Jazira,
and and
it is it
significant
is significant
that
that such
such 'Iraqi
'Iraqiearly-comers
early-comers as as
al-Musayyab
al-Musayyab b. Najaba
b. Najaba
al-Fazari,
al-Fazari,
Malik
Malik
al- al-
Ashtar
Ashtar al-Nakha'i
al-Nakha'iand
andSa'sa'a
Sa'sa'ab.b.
S.uhan
S.uhanal-'Abdi,
al-'Abdi,
whowho
hadhad
beenbeen
among
among
thosethose
forces,
forces, receive
receivefurther
furthermention
mentionin in
thethe
context
context
of the
of the
Kufan
Kufan
misrmisr
onlyonly
fromfrom
aboutabout
29/649-50
29/649-50 onwards.
onwards.The
Theevidence
evidence
is is
scanty,
scanty,
butbut
suggests
suggests
thatthat
these
these
people
people
werewere
displaced
displaced by
byMu'awiya's
Mu'awiya'sorganization.
organization. Further
Further
east,
east,
we we
findfind
thatthat
at the
at time
the time
of of
the
the appointment
appointmentofofSa'id
Sa'idb.b.Qays
Qaysal-Hamdani
al-Hamdani
to Rayy,
to Rayy,
Yazid
Yazid
b. Qays
b. Qays
al-Arhabi
al-Arhabi
was
was withdrawn
withdrawnfrom
fromHamadhan,8
Hamadhan,8 where
where
he he
hadhad
been
been
probably
probably
sincesince
22/643.9
22/643.9
The
The scant
scant attention
attentionpaid
paidtotoYazid
Yazidb. b.
Qays
Qays
in in
thethe
IklilIklil
addsadds
weight
weight
to the
to conclusion
the conclusion
that
that he
he possessed
possessedstatus
statusmainly
mainlyas as
anan
Islamic
Islamic
leader
leader
andand
thatthat
in Hamdani
in Hamdani
terms
terms
he was
was aa nonentity.?I
nonentity.?IWhen
Whensuch
such
examples
examples
of of
displacement
displacement
are are
taken
taken
into into
account
account
I Ibid. pp. 328-9. 2 Tab. I, p. 2668. 3 Ibid. p. 2927.

4 al-Hamdani, al-Iklil, vol. x, ed. Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (Cairo, 1368
II5.
5 Tab. I, pp. 2891-2. Some of them are mentioned as having been at Kuffa and at
al-Rabadha, near Medina, soon afterwards (Tab. I, pp. 2896-7).
6 BF. p. 178. 7 See ibid. pp. I83-4; Tab. I, p. 2867.
s Abuf 'Abdallah Muhammad b. Yahya b. Abl Bakr al-Ash'ari al-Maliqi, al-Tamhid
wa'l-bayanfi maqtal al-shahid 'Uthmdn, ed. M. Y. Zayid (Beirut, I964), p. 6i; cf. Tab. I,
p. 2927. 9 Ibid. p. 2651. Io al-Hamdani, al-Iklil, vol. x, pp. I72-3.
23-2
358 Martin Hinds
it
it becomes
becomesclear
clearwhy
whySayf
Sayf
sayssays
thatthat
in 34/654-5
in 34/654-5
'Kufa 'Kufa
was empty
was empty
of leaders
of save
leaders save
those
those discharged
dischargedfrom
fromoffice
office
or caused
or caused
to fall
to into
fall sedition'.'
into sedition'.'
The
The term
termqurrd'
qurrd'first
first
occurs
occurs
in the
in the
sources
sources
in the
incontext
the context
of the of
governorship
the governorship
of
of Sa'id
Sa'idb.b.al-'As,
al-'As,
and
and
thethe
abundant
abundant
information
information
about about
them makes
them makes
it clear it
that
clear that
they
they were
wereearly-comers
early-comers of of
thethe
last last
typetype
described
described
above,above,
with al-Ashtar
with al-Ashtar
al- al-
Nakha'i
Nakha'iandandYazid
Yazidb. b.
QaysQays
al-Arhabi
al-Arhabibeing
being
particularly
particularly
prominent.
prominent.
We are We
told are told
that
that Sa'id,
Sa'id,when
when hehe
first
first
arrived
arrived
at Kufa,
at Kufa,
sent sent
to 'Uthman
to 'Uthman
a report
a report
in whichin which
he described the tension which had arisen there as a result of the influx of
rawddif, and that 'Uthman in reply counselled him to placate those possessed o
Islamic priority as far as possible.2 This, of course, was at a time when ther
were grounds for hoping that fresh Kufan conquests would provide a solution
and Sa'id forthwith took steps to appraise himself of the wants of the notabl
(wujuh) of ahl al-ayydm wa'l-Qddisiyya in general, and in particular of t
qurrd', notably al-Ashtar.3 What is remarkable is the length of time for whi
Sa'id succeeded in placating these early-comers, for the first overt trouble di
not occur until 33/653-4, on the occasion of one of his meetings with them
Then a disagreement about the Sawad led to a brawl in which al-Ashtar and
others assaulted one of Sa'id's officials; and as a result of this about a dozen
qurrd', including al-Ashtar, were deported to Syria.4 While they were there
further trouble flared up at Kfifa, starting with an anonymous letter of complain
purporting to be from the 'mala' of Kuifan Muslims', sent to 'Uthman by a
number of qurrd', notably Yazid b. Qays.5 These qurrd' also urged al-Ashtar
and the other deportees to return to Kufa during Sa'id's absence in Medina,
and soon afterwards al-Ashtar and Yazid were prominent in the repulse of
Sa'id from Kufa. The Kufifans then chose Abu MusA al-Ash'ari as their governor.6
The term qurrd' had an emotive value. It can be noted for example that the
forces at the battles of the Bridge, Yarmfuk and Qadisiyya had each had with
them a qdri', designated by 'Umar, whose task it was to recite suzrat al-anfdl,
known as surat al-jihdd, before the conflict; and in theory at least this sura was
learnt by all Muslim fighting men at that time.7 Further, 'Umar consistently
laid stress on the learning of the Qur'an and, in the period preceding the
measures of 20, he appears to have given fixed annual stipends of 2,ooo dirhams
to all who did so.8 What is interesting in the present context, however, is that
the actual term qurrd' does not occur in the sources until about the year 30/650-I,
just at a time when the division within the ranks of the Kuifan early-comers was
I Tab. I, p. 2928 (wa-khalat al-Kufa min al-ru'asa' illa manzu' aw maftun).

2 Ibid. p. 2852. 3 Ibid. p. 2853; BA. v, p. 40.
4 Tab. I, pp. 2907-9, 2915-7, 2921; al-Ash'ari al-Maliqi, op. cit., pp. 5
Athir, al-Kdmilfi 'l-tarikh, ed. C. J. Tornberg (Leiden, I851-76), vol.
BA. v, p. 41; A'th. I, fols. 7 A ff.; al-Isfahani, op. cit., vol. xi, pp. 29-30.
5 BA. v, p. 4I; A'th. I, fol. io A.
6 Tab. I, p. 2928; BA. v, pp. 44-5; A'th. i, fol. I3 A.
7 Tab. I, pp. 2095, 2I82, 2294, 2295, 2749.
8 IS. vii, pt. i, pp. 89, 94; Ibn Sallam, op. cit., nos. 641-2; BF. pp. 377, 456.
beginning
beginning to
tobecome
becomefully
fully
apparent.
apparent.
The
The
qurrd'
qurrd'
were
were
those
those
early-comers
early-comers
for for
whom
whom the
the fact
factthat
thatthey
theywere
were
early-comers
early-comers
constituted
constituted
their
their
onlyonly
real claim
real claim
to to
status,
status, since
sincethey
theylacked
lackedstatus
status
as as
clan
clan
leaders
leaders
of any
of any
importance
importance
at all.
atTo
all. To
someone
someone like
likeMu'awiya
Mu'awiyathey
theyappeared
appeared simply
simply as greedy
as greedyand and
ungrateful
ungrateful
parvenus,
parvenus,
and
and hehe was
wasnot
notslow
slowtotosay
say
as as
much
muchto to
those
thosewhowhowere were
deported
deported
to Syria;
to Syria;
his his
assessments
assessmentsof ofthem
themthatthatthey
they 'ya'tuna
'ya'tuna'l-nds
'l-nds
- za- 'amu
za 'amu
- min
- min
qibalqibal
al-qur'dn'
al-qur'dn'
etc.
etc. and
and 'innama
'innamahammuhum
hammuhum al-fitna
al-fitnawa-amwdl
wa-amwdl ahl ahl
al-dhimma'
al-dhimma'
are particularly
are particularly
noteworthy.I
noteworthy.I
So far
far it
it has
hasbeen
beensuggested
suggestedthat
that
thethe
qurrd'
qurrd'
were
were
those
those
of the
of the
early-comers
early-comers
who
who had
had the
thesmallest
smallestfollowings;
followings;
there
there
were
were
of course
of course
other
other
early-comer
early-comer
wujuhwujuh
who
who were
were not
notqurrd',
qurrd',and
andthe
the
reaction
reaction
of of
thethe
qurrd'
qurrd'
was was
largely
largely
against
against
the grow-
the grow-
ing
ing influence
influenceofofsome
someofofthese
these
as as
clan
clan
leaders
leaders
andand
against
against
'Uthman
'Uthman
and Sa'id
and Sa'id
for
for allowing
allowingthis
thistotohappen.
happen. The
The
lack
lack
of of
fresh
fresh
conquests
conquests
was was
in the
in background
the background
and
and it
it has
has already
alreadybeen
beenpointed
pointedout
out
that
that
this,
this,
at aattime
a time
of newcomer
of newcomer
influx,
influx,
meantmeant
that resources did not increase while demand on those resources did; one
casus belli of the qurrd' in 34/654-5 was a threatened or actual reduction of
stipends and subsistence allowances.2 Of even more importance, however, was
the question of the Sawad, which was the issue behind the brawl of 33/653-4,
was a subject used by al-Ashtar to excite hostility to Sa'id and 'Uthman in
34/654-5, and was the object of the attention of the qurrd' on the occasion of
their repulse of Sa'id in the same year.3 Here the qurrd' were reacting to the
consequences of organizational measures which affected the Sawid; al-Walid
had begun the work of applying uniform administration and Sa'id continued
it.4 Of particular interest in this context was 'Uthman's decision concerning
what Sayf calls the fay' (i.e. the sawdfl) of the Sawad to liberate the shares of
'those of the Medinans who witnessed Qidisiyya and MadW'in and who [sub-
sequently] stayed (i.e. kept to Medina) and did not make hijra to 'Iraq' by
permitting the transfer of their rights to such land in exchange for land nearer
Medina (i.e. in the H ijaz and southern Arabia). The proportion representing the
share of such Medinans was calculated and with general concurrence there was
effected an exchange, as a result of which Talha b. 'UbaydallAh, Marwan b. al-
IHakam, al-Ash'ath b. Qays and 'men from the tribes (qabd'il) in 'Iraq' came to
possess considerable areas of what had hitherto been sawdfi in 'IrAq, acquired in
place of property owned by them elsewhere.5
Now it is clear that one effect of this measure was to strengthen further the
position, vis-a-vis other early-comers, of Kufan clan leaders who owned land in
Tab. I, pp. 2913, 2920.

2 Ibid. pp. 2929, 2934; al-Isfahani, op. cit., vol, xI, p. 3I; S.A. al-'Ali, al-Tan. mdt
al-iqtisadiyya wa'l-ijtimd'iyya f 'l-Basra f'l-qarn al-awwal al-hijru (2nd. ed., Beirut, 1969)
pp. I67-8.
3 Tab. I, p. 2929; BA. v, pp. 45-6; A'th. I, fols. 13 B-I4 A.
4 Note, e.g. that Sa'id was 'awwal man wada'a 'l-'ushur 'ala 'l-jusur wa'l-qanaitir' (al-
Maqdisi, al-Bad' wa'l-tarikh, ed. C. Huart (Paris, I899--919), vol. v. p. 201.
5 Tab. I, pp. 2854-5.
360 Martin Hinds
western or southern Arabia. Indeed it can be noted that this is the first use in
the sources of the word qaba'il in a Kffan context. al-Ash'ath is named, and
Sa'id b. Qays al-Hamdani could easily have been another; on the other hand
leaders from northern Arabia did not benefit by this, and it is unlikely that a man
such as Yazid b. Qays can have had much or indeed any land in southern Arabia
with which to effect an exchange. These observations, however, do no more than
illustrate a point which has already been made, viz. that there were variations in
the influence of different early-comer leaders, and cannot have been the main
point at issue as far as the Sawad was concerned. We are specifically told that
there was no objection to the arrangement from those who were entitled to
sawdfi land, and it would seem that this was because (i) they did not dispute
the entitlement of those Medinans, and (ii) implicit in the arrangement was a
confirmation of the exclusive right of the remaining original conquerors to
what was left of the sawdfi. An important consequence of the arrangement, how-
ever, was that it necessitated the determining of what was dhimma land and what
was sawdfi with an exactitude which was unprecedented; up to this stage early-
comers had both 'protected' the dhimma and enjoyed exclusive rights to the
sawdfi, and little or no actual distinction can ever have been drawn in practice.
Sa'id, in regularizing the position, was interfering with defacto privileges of fif-
teen years standing or more; and it is here that the point of Mu' awiya's remark
'innamad hammuhum al-fitna wa-amwdl ahl al-dhimma' comes out clearly. This
issue constituted the main casus belli of the qurrd' against Sa'id; in an operation
led by al-Ashtar and Yazid b. Qays and consisting of several groups numbering
between 500 and I,ooo, to a total of over 3,000, the qurrd' repulsed Sa'id and
took control of the Sawad.2
The figure of 3,000 indicates that the qurrd' represented an extreme body of
opinion in the misr, not a majority opinion; in particular, al-Ashtar and the
others had been agitating for the removal of 'Uthman, but this view was not
shared by a more moderate body of early-comer opinion there (i.e. leaders of
clan groups), who took a neutral position at the time of Sa'id's repulse. This
situation explains why Abu Musa, when requested by al-Ashtar to take charge
of the saldt, stipulated the expression of obedience to 'Uthman, and why
al-Ashtar and the others had to accept this compromise. Moreover at least two
leaders, one of them Jarir b. 'Abdallah al-Bajali, moved at this time to the misr
from their posts in the territories and did not leave until after Abu MiusA had
taken over, by which time they had presumably satisfied themselves that the
situation in Kufa would remain stable.3 The modus vivendi achieved at Kffa
in 34/654-5 therefore rested on a middle position in which direct Umayyad
control was removed but a semblance of Islamic unity was preserved. Abu Musa
I Arhab were from the a'rdb of Hamdan - see Tab. III, p. 2487; IS. VI, p. 172; Caskel,
op. cit., vol. II, pp. 47, 66-7.
2 BA. v, pp. 45-6; A'th. I, fols. I3 B-I4 A.
3 Tab. I, p. 2936.
was
wastotohold
hold
a Kiufan
a Kiufan
balance
balance
betweenbetween
the Ashtar the
group,
Ashtar
the moderates
group, the
at themoderates at
misr
misrand
andthethe
leaders
leaders
who were
whoinwere
the territories,
in the territories,
and was at the
andsame
wastime
at to
the same time
act
actasasanan
intermediary
intermediary
between
between
the Kfifans
the and
Kfifans
'Uthman.
and 'Uthman.
V.
V. Following
Followingthe the
repulse
repulse
of Sa'id,
ofthere
Sa'id,
was
there
a lull at
wasKffa
a lull
for aattime.
KffaIn for a time
Egypt,
Egypt, however,
however,
therethere
was brewing
was brewing
a furtheracrisis,
furtherwhichcrisis,
was caused
which
by circum-
was caused by circum
stances
stances which
whichwerewere
almost
almost
identical
identical
with those
with
obtaining
thoseatobtaining
Kffa; this crisis,
at Kffa;
far this crisis
from
frombeing
beingsettled
settled
locally,
locally,
was transferred
was transferred
to Medina, towasMedina,
joined by was
otherjoined
dis- by other
affected
affected parties
partiesand led
anddirectly
led directly
to the murder
to theofmurder
'Uthman. of
This'Uthman.
is no place This
for is no place
aa digression
digressionon the
on details
the details
of these
ofevents,
thesebut
events,
it can be
but
noted
it can
that be
some
noted
Kfifans
that some Kf
participated
participated in them
in them
and, in
and,
viewinofview
what has
of what
been said
hasabove
beenabout
saidthe
above
compro-
about the com
mise
miseeffected
effectedat Kufa,
at Kufa,
the persistence
the persistence
of the resolve
of the
of atresolve
least some
of of
atthe
least
Ashtar
some of the Ash
group
grouptotobe be
rid rid
of 'Uthman
of 'Uthman
is scarcely
is scarcely
surprising.surprising.
After 'Uthman's
Aftermurder,
'Uthman's murd
'All
'Allemerged
emerged as caliph
as caliph
with the
withbacking
the backing
principallyprincipally
of the Ansar of
andthe
the Ansar
rebel and the r
provincials
provincials whowho
had gone
had gone
to Medina.
to Medina.
In opposition
In opposition
to him thereto emerged
him there
at emerged
Mecca
Meccaa body
a bodyof Qurashis,
of Qurashis,
many ofmany
them of
sahdba
them andsahdba
Muhajirin,
and who,
Muhajirin,
while who, whi
being
beingopposed
opposedto Umayyad
to Umayyad
domination,
domination,
in fact under
in fact
their under
masks astheir
Muhajirin
masks as Muhaj
favoured over-all Qurasht domination. The scene of the conflict moved to
'Iraq, where the Meccans mobilized tribal support in the Basran territories.
'All went to Kufa, mobilized support there and defeated the Meccan/Basran alli-
ance at the battle of the Camel. Mu'awiya remained passive in Syria throughout.
With 'Ali's move in the direction of Kufa, Abiu Msa's attempt to maintain
the neutrality of the Kufifans failed, for in the light of 'A'isha's urging of the
Kuifans not to support the opponents of the Meccans, his position took on the
appearance of being pro-Meccan. 'All arrived in the neighbourhood of Kfifa
with about i,ooo men and was joined by 9,000-Io,ooo Kufans, who made up
the main part of his force at the battle of the Camel soon afterwards. These
were probably the main part of the early-comer Kufans then at the misr, and the
distinction among them between activists and moderates, noticed above, is
aptly drawn by Sayf with the terms nuffdr and [ahl al-] jamd'a.' al-Ash'ath and
Jarir b. 'Abdallah, who in any case were not at the misr at that time, did not join
'Ali; nor did Sa'id b. Qays al-HamdAnl, who was at the misr.2 After the battle
of the Camel, 'All made for Kufa, scarcely ahead of the Kuifans who had sup-
ported him, and addressed himself to the need for forming a viable 'Iraqi, but
mainly Kffan, coalition which would support him against Mu'awiya. The
evidence runs counter to any conclusion that 'All from the first intended to use
Kufa as a permanent capital; rather, we are told that when he reached Kifa
he did not enter the qasr there.3
'Ali's need to form a coalition in which the Kufans were by far the main
constituent involved securing the support of the existing clan leaders, but at
the same time holding the strongest in check and counterbalancing them where
possible with leaders whose power and influence were deliberately built up by
I E.g. ibid. p. 3155. 2 BA/MS. I, pp. 35I, 363; WS. p. 7.
3 Ibid. pp. 3, 5; A'th. I, fol. 44 B; IS. vi, p. 6.
362 Martin Hinds
'All
'Allhimself.
himself. TheThe
twotwo
mostmost
important
important
of this of
latter
this
type
latter
weretype
al-Ashtar
wereand al-Ashtar and
Hujr
Hujrb.b.'Adi
'Adi
al-Kindi,
al-Kindi,
while
while
'Adi b.
'Adi
Hatim
b. Hatim
was another;
was another;
these three,these
as well
three,
as as well as
others
otherswhose
whose positions
positions
werewere
strengthened
strengthened
by 'All, by
had 'All,
earlier
had
beenearlier
qurrd' been
and qurrd' and
then
thenwhat
whatSayf
Sayf
callscalls
nuffdr.
nuffdr.
al-Ashtar
al-Ashtar
became became
the leaderthe
of an
leader
entity
ofofan
Madhhij,
entity of Madhhij,
made
madeup up(i)(i)
of ofhishis ownown
Nakha'i
Nakha'i
following,
following,
(ii) probably
(ii) probably
of recent Nakha'i
of recent
new-Nakha'i new-
comers,I
comers,Iand and (iii)(iii)
of two
of two
groups
groups
of Harithis
of Harithis
and theirandleaders;2
theirhis
leaders;2
position his
was position was
further
furtherstrengthened
strengthened whenwhen
'Ali assigned
'Ali assigned
to him theto him
appointment
the appointment
over Jazira.3over Jazira.3
As
As for
forHujr,
Hujr, 'Ali's
'Ali's
orders
orders
to al-Ash'ath
to al-Ash'ath
went through
went through
him and he him
was and
designated
he was designated
leader
leaderofofKinda
Kinda at Siffin;4
at Siffin;4
the greater
the greater
part of part
his following
of his following
was probably was
made
probably mad
up
up ofofKindi
Kindi newcomers.5
newcomers.5 'Adi was
'Adibacked
was backed
by 'Ali asbythe'Ali
leader
as the
of all
leader
Kffanof all Kffan
Tayyi',
Tayyi',asas
anan
incident
incident
at Siffin
at Siffin
showed;
showed;
then there
thenwas
there
opposition
was opposition
to this to thi
arrangement
arrangement on on
thethe
partpart
of the
ofsub-clan
the sub-clan
of HIizmir,
of HIizmir,
6 to which6belonged
to whichnotably
belonged notably
Zayd
Zaydb.b.Hisn,
Hisn,whowho
had had
beenbeen
one ofonetheof
qurrd'
the in
qurrd'
the time
in the
of 'Uthman
time of
and'Uthman
at and at
the
thetime
timeofofSiffin
Siffin
was was
one of
onetheofqurrd'
the qurrd'
who 'afterwards
who 'afterwards
became Khawarij'.
became Khawarij'.
Such
Suchleaders
leadersas as
al-Ashtar,
al-Ashtar,
Hujr Hujr
and 'Adi,
andtogether
'Adi, together
with theirwith
followers,
their formed
followers, formed
the
theKufan
Kufan part
partof 'Ali's
of 'Ali's
hard hard
core of
core
support
of support
(shi'a). The
(shi'a).
bulk ofThe
thebulk
Kufans,
of the Kufans,
however,
however, were
wereled led
by clan
by clan
leaders
leaders
who did
who not did
owe not
theirowe
positions
theirtopositions
'All and to 'All and
accordingly
accordingly were
werelukewarm
lukewarm in their
in support
their support
of him. Indeed
of him. theIndeed
strongest
the ofstrongest of
these,
these,notably
notablyal-Ash'ath,
al-Ash'ath,
JarirJarir
and Sa'id
andb. Sa'id
Qays,b.stood
Qays,
to lose
stood
influence
to loseininfluence
the in the
equilibrium
equilibrium which
which
'Ali 'Ali
was trying
was trying
to establish.
to establish.
However,However,
al-Ash'ath, al-Ash'ath,
who who
remained
remained inin
Adharbayjan
Adharbayjan
until until
just before
just before
the Siffin
theconfrontation,
Siffin confrontation,
decided decided
against
againstsiding
siding
with
with
Mu'awiya
Mu'awiya
and soand
making
so making
himself simply
himself
onesimply
of a number
one ofof a number of
powerful
powerful clan
clan
leaders,
leaders,
and instead
and instead
sought,sought,
by making
by amaking
formal gesture
a formal
of support
gesture of support
for
for'All,
'All,toto
profit
profit
from
from
his position
his position
as the strongest
as the strongest
of the 'Iraqi
ofclan
theleaders;
'Iraqi clan leaders;
clearly
clearlyhishis
interests
interests
promised
promised
to be served
to be served
best by abest
deadlock
by abetween
deadlock'Allbetween
and 'All and
Mu'awiya.
Mu'awiya. Jarir
Jarir
too too
at first
at first
expressed
expressed
formal formal
support for
support
'Ali, but
forsoon
'Ali,
withdrew
but soon withdrew
to
to take
takeananostensibly
ostensiblyneutral
neutral
position.
position.
Sa'id b. Sa'id
Qays contrived
b. Qays contrived
to remain asto remain as
Hamdani
Hamdanileader
leader
by by
manifesting
manifesting
an apparent
an apparent
willingnesswillingness
to bend to to'Ali's
bendwill.to 'Ali's will.
None
Noneofofthethe
clan
clan
leaders,
leaders,
however,
however,
had any hadinterest
any interest
in fighting
inMu'awiya;
fightingwhile,
Mu'awiya; while
during
duringearly
earlynegotiations
negotiations
with with
Mu'awiya,
Mu'awiya,
al-Ashtar al-Ashtar
and other and
Shi'l other
leaders Shi'l leaders
at
at Kufa
Kufaconsistently
consistentlyurged
urged
'All to'All
attack
to attack
withoutwithout
delay, mostdelay,
of the most
Kufansof the Kufans
I Evidence for Nakha'i and other newcomers is provided by Ibn A'tham when he
(i) notes the names of a number of Yemeni leaders who came professing their allegiance
to 'All when he was at Medina (I, fols. 24 A-B) and (ii) later in his account, gives some of
the same names in his list of people killed on 'All's side at the battle of Nahrawan
(i, fol. I55 B). Of particular interest are the tribal names Arhabi, Hamdani, Bajall, Kindi
and Nakha'i, and the information that 'All sent al-Ashtar to welcome these leaders.
2 See e.g. Tab. I, pp. 326I-2; WS. p. I54; BA/MS. I, p. 371; A'th. I, fol. 76B. Note
also the reference to Shurayh b. Hani' al-Madhhiji (A'th. i, fol. 94B) and to al-Ashtar
as Ashtar Madhhij (WS. p. I4) and as akhu Madhhij (Tab. I, p. 3394).
3 WS. p. 12; A'th. I, fol. 45A; BA/MS. I, p. 333.
4 BA/MS. i, p. 370; WS. p. 205; Khal. p. I77.
5 See note i above. References to Kindis who distinguished themselves at Siffln suggest
that Hujr's following included newcomers from B. Badda', B. Hind and B. al-Tumh
(see Tab. I, pp. 3307-8; WS. pp. 268, 276-7, 285-6; Caskel, op. cit. I, pp. 233, 234).
6 Tab. I, p. 3279-80.
advised
advisedhim
himtoto
stay
stay
as he
as was
he was
(ashdra
(ashdra
'alayhi'alayhi
'dmmat'dmmat
al-nds bi'l-maqdm
al-nds bi'l-maqdm
bi'l- bi'l-
Kufa).I
From the time of 'Ali's arrival at the Kufan misr, through the time of the
confrontation at Siffin and subsequent developments in 'Iraq, and until the time
of his death, the position of these two alignments remained consistent. The
Shi'i leaders urged 'Ali to fight Mu'awiya, they were opposed to the arbitration
proposal and they pledged themselves to 'Ali unconditionally.2 Most of the clan
leaders, on the other hand, showed no inclination to fight Mu'awiya, went to
Siffin in a spirit of indifference, and accepted with alacrity the peace offered by
the arbitration proposal. Although we know little of 'Al1's fiscal measures, we
know enough to say that their egalitarian nature, which was a major cause of
newcomer support for the Shh'i leaders, was also the major cause of an attitude
among the other leaders which wavered between indifference and treachery and
which became more pronounced as 'Ali's position vis-a-vis Mu'awiya weakened.3
After Siffin, 'Ali was never again able to mobilize them against Mu'awiya.
The third and last of the Kufan alignments was that of the qurrd' who 'after-
wards became Khawarij '.4 The stance of these people was much as that of the
qurrd' in the time of 'Uthman had been; indeed, at least some of them, such
as Zayd b. HIisn, had been qurrd' in the time of 'Uthman. On the other hand,
some erstwhile qurrd', notably al-Ashtar, Hujr and 'Adi, became Shi'i leaders
under 'AlI. Another important difference was that the qurrd' in 'All's time were
more numerous;S the earlier qurrd' had been from the smaller early-comer
groups in the misr and perhaps the nearer parts of the Sawad, while the events
leading up to Siffin brought in many more such groups from further away in
the Kufan (as well as the Basran) territories.6 At Siffin, the basic organization of
'All's following was in about twenty-five clan or tribal groups,7 each with a
leader appointed or confirmed by him, and his formations and dispositions were
made up of these groups. The qurrd', however, are always mentioned as
separate (i.e. para-clan, para-tribal) elements, which were then attached to for-
mations.8 A reference to an Azdi 'who was among the qurrd' who were with
'Ammar and was killed with him', coming as it does after a list of Azdis who
I A'th. i, fol. 5I B. See also Tab. I, p. 3256.
2 Tab. I, pp. 3350, 3367; BA/MS. I, p. 387.
3 'All b. Abi Talib, Kitab nahj al-baldgha, with the commentary of 'Abd al-Hamid
b. Hibatallah, called Ibn Abi '1-Hadid (Cairo, 1329/1911I), vol. i, p. i8o (al-Mada'ini);
al-Jahiz, 'Risala fi 'l-hakamayn wa-taswib amir al-mu'minin 'All b. Abl Talib fi
fi'lihi, ed. C. Pellat in al-Mashriq, 52e annee (I958), pp. 429-30. On 'Ali's fiscal measures,
see further Tab. I, p. 3227; BA/MS. I, pp. 32I, 322; al-Ya'qubi, op. cit., vol. II, p. 213;
Ibn Sallam, op. cit., no. 649; A'th. I, fol. I59A.
4 Tab. I, p. 3330; WS. pp. 489-90o; A'th. I, fol. i26B.
5 They are supposed to have numbered 20,o00 (see references in note 4 above and cf.
WS. p. I88).
6 See e.g. A'th. i, fol. 65B; WS. p. II5; Ibn al-Athir, op. cit., vol. in, p. 230. Note
also 'Adi b. Hatim's mobilization of I,200 men in the region of Mada'in (WS. p. I43).
7 WS. pp. zo5-6; Khal. p. I77.
8 Tab. I, pp. 3283, 3289; WS. pp. 208, 232-3; BA/MS. I, p. 373.
364 Martin Hinds
were killed
killed while
while fighting
fighting in
in the
the tribal
tribalgrouping,
grouping,provides
providesa aclear
clearexample
exampleofofthis
this
para-tribal
para-tribal characteristic.'
characteristic.' AnAn even
even more
morestriking
strikingreference
referenceisistotothe
therallying
rallyingofof
'kulla qabilatin
qabilatin aw
aw kat'batin
kat'batin min
min al-qurrd'".2
al-qurrd'".2
These qurra'
qurra' had
had atat first
first been
been unwilling
unwillingto tocommit
committhemselves
themselvestoto'Ali's
'Ali'sside,3
side,3
but had nevertheless
nevertheless gonegone to
to Siffin,
Siffin, where
whereat atleast
leastsome
someofofthem
themtook
tookpart
partinin
fighting.4
fighting.4 InIn their
their reaction
reaction toto Mu'awiya's
Mu'awiya'sproposal
proposalatatthe
thetime
timeof ofthe
theraising
raisingofof
the masdhif
masdhif and
and in
in their
their subsequent
subsequent volte-face,
volte-face,we
wecan
candiscern
discernmore
moreclearly
clearlywhat
what
they wanted.
wanted. The
The proposal,
proposal, which
which was
was both
bothpresented
presentedasasand
andunderstood
understoodasasa a
call for peace,
peace, was
was in
in fact
fact addressed
addressed neither
neitherto
to'All
'Allnor
norto
tohis
hisfollowing
followingasasa awhole,
whole,
but to the
the 'Iraqis;
'Iraqis; Mu'awiya
Mu'awiya waswas trying
trying to toisolate
isolateasasmuch
muchofof'All's
'All'sKuffan
Kuffan(and
(and
Basran) following
following as as possible
possible byby appealing
appealingto totheir
theirinterests
interestsasas'Iraqis,
'Iraqis,and
andal-
al-
Ash'ath and
and the
the clan
clan leaders
leaders were
were quick
quickto torespond.
respond.Mu'awiya's
Mu'awiya'ssuggestion
suggestionatat
this stage was
was merely
merely that
that there
there should
shouldbe betwo
twoarbiters
arbiterswho
whowould
wouldabide
abidebyby
kitdb alldh,
alldh, and
and he
he made
made no no specific
specific reference
referenceto tothe
thesubject
subjectabout
aboutwhich
whichthey
they
should act
act as
as arbiters;
arbiters; al-Ash'ath,
al-Ash'ath, who
who was
wasacting
actingasasnegotiator
negotiatorwith
withMu'awiya,
Mu'awiya,
clearly had
had nono interest
interest inin forcing
forcing this
this issue.
issue.The
Thequrrd'
qurrd'who
who'afterwards
'afterwardsbecame
became
Khawarij' also
also insisted
insisted that
that 'All
'All should
should accept
acceptthe
theproposal,
proposal,which
whichthey
theytoo
too
understood
understood as
as aa call
call for
for peace,
peace, but
but they
theywere
wereacting
actingininthe
thebelief
beliefthat
thatMu'Awiya
Mu'Awiya
meant a peace
peace inin which
which 'All
'All would
would bebe recognized
recognizedasasamir
amiral-mu'minin
al-mu'mininby byboth
both
Syrians and
and 'Iraqis;
'Iraqis; they
they envisaged
envisaged aa situation
situationin
inwhich
whichhe hewould
wouldreturn
returntoto
Medina as an
an amir
amir al-mu'minin
al-mu'minin after
after the
thefashion
fashionof
of'Umar,
'Umar,confining
confininghimself
himselftoto
the application
application of
of the
the prescriptions
prescriptions of
of kitdb
kitdballdh,
alldh,leaving
leaving'Iraqis
'Iraqisand
andSyrians
Syrians
to look after
after their
their own
own affairs
affairs and
and so
so acting
actingasasthe
thesort
sortof
ofamir
amiral-mu'minin
al-mu'mininthey
they
wanted.5 The
The disagreement
disagreement about
about who
who should
shouldbe
bethe
thearbiter
arbiterfrom
from'Al1's
'Al1'sside
side
stemmed from
from the
the fact
fact that
that 'Ali
'Ali wanted
wantedthethearbiter
arbitertotorepresent
representhim,
him,while
while
all the Kufans
Kufans save
save the
the Shi'a
Shi'a wanted
wanted the
thearbiter
arbiterto
torepresent
representthem;
them;thethelatter
latter
prevailed in
in their
their insistence
insistence that
that Abu
Abu Musa
Musa(i.e.
(i.e.the
therepresentative
representativeofofthe
thestate
state
of affairs
affairs at
at Kufa
Kufa before
before 'Ali's
'Ali's arrival)
arrival) should
shouldbe benamed
namedasasarbiter.
arbiter.InInthe
thedocu-
docu-
ment of agreement
agreement by by 'All
'All and
and Mu'awiya
Mu'awiyato toarbitration,
arbitration,the
thetask
taskofofthe
thearbiters
arbiters
was defined
defined merely
merely asas 'an
'an yuslihd
yuslihd bayna
bayna'l-umma'
'l-umma'and andtheir
theirdecision
decisionwaswastotobebe
regarded as
as binding;
binding; beyond
beyond this,
this, however,
however,two
twonew
newfeatures
featureswere
wereintroduced
introducedinto
into
the document:
document: (i)
(i) the
the lack
lack of
of acknowledgement
acknowledgementof of'All,
'All,agreed
agreedtotoby
byhim,
him,asasamir
amir
al-mu'minin,
al-mu'minin, and
and (ii)
(ii) the
the stipulation
stipulation that
thatthe
thearbiters
arbiterscould
couldrefer
referbeyond
beyondkitdb
kitdballah
allah
to 'al-sunna
'al-sunna al-'
al-' ddila
ddila al-hasana
al-hasana al-jdmi'a
al-jdmi'aghiayr
ghiayral-mufarriqa'.6
al-mufarriqa'.6Neither
Neitherofofthese
these
Tab. I, p. 3304; WS. p. 263. 2 Ibid. p. 475; cf. Tab. I, p. 3327. 3 WS. p. Ix8.
4 E.g. Tab. I, pp. 3273, 3292, 3298, 3223; WS. pp. i96, 246, 248, 354-6.
5 The most important direct evidence for this assessment occurs on the final authority
of Shaqiq b. Salama at WS. p. 517, where these people later describe what they had
expected to happen, concluding 'fa-yusamma (i.e. 'Ali should be named) amira (the
editor's reading amiru makes nonsense) 'l-mu'minin min kullin hattd yuqirrahu 'l-kitab 'ald
manzilatihi ').
6 Almost identical renderings of the document are given in Tab. I, pp. 3336-7; BA/MS.
I, p. 382; A'th. I, fols. I3iB-I32A; WS. pp. 509-II. The differing version given by
WS. pp. 504 ff. should be regarded as spurious, for reasons which this writer hopes to
give in detail in the near future.
troubled
troubledthe Kffan
the clanKffan
leaders, whose
clan principal
leaders,concernwhose
was the avoidance
principalof conce
fighting,
fighting, but forbut
the qurrd'
forthese
the twoqurrd'
new features
these
put an two
entirely
new
new complexion
features put an
on
onthethe
situation.
situation.
Not only wasNot
'All not
only
recognized
was as 'All
amir al-mu'minin,
not recognized
far less as am
the
thekind
kind
they wanted,
theybutwanted,
also the notion
butof kitdb
alsoalldh
theas the
notion
sole authority
of kitdb
was alldh as
so
socompromised
compromised as to be virtually
as to meaningless;
be virtuallythe exact signification
meaningless;of the the exa
phrase
phrase al-sunna...
al-sunna...
al-jdmi'a is not
al-jdmi'a
clear, and it is
is tempting
not clear,
to think and
that this
it was
is temptin
precisely
preciselywhat Mu'awiya
whatintended.
Mu'awiya Certainly
intended.
there are no grounds
Certainly
for believing
there are n
that
thathe meant
he meant
it as, or that
itthe
as,qurrd'
or understood
that the it as,qurrd'
no more than
understood
Muhammad's it as, no
sunna
sunna; and ;inand
the absence
in theof further
absence
definition
ofit further
could refer todefinition
any precedent it could
for
for unity.2
unity.2
The qurrd'
Thetherefore
qurrd'
urged therefore
'All to withdraw from
urgedhis argeement,
'All to but
withdraw fr
he
he would
wouldnot - and
notcould- not
andsincecould
the clan not
leaderssince
favouredtheit. Theclan
qurrd' leaders
then favo
took
took as their
as basic
theirground
basic
for opposition
ground this for
fact ofopposition
the compromising this
of kitdb
fact of th
alldh
alldh (alternatively
(alternatively
amr alldh, dinamralldh); and
alldh,
their call
din of 'ld
alldh);
hukma illd
and
li'lldh'
their call
acquired
acquired the double
the signification
double first signification
of calling upon 'Ali first
to resumeofhostilities
calling upon 'A
against
against Mu'awiya
Mu'awiya
and secondly,andwhen secondly,
he refused to dowhen so, of rejecting
he refused
him as to do
amir al-mu'minin.3
Little remains to be said about these alignments in the time of 'Ali. When,
after Siffin, he did enter the qasr at Kufa, the implications of this as far as Kufan
autonomy was concerned were obvious.4 Much of the qurrd' opposition, now
called Muhakkima, gathered at Hariura' and so became known as Haruriyya.
The most prominent figure among them - none other than Yazid b. Qays al-
Arhabi - was bought off by 'All with the appointment over Isfahan and Rayy,5
and most of the rest of the Haruriyya opposition broke up for a time. But it was
impossible for 'All to build up the positions of all the less important early-comer
leaders either by giving them appointments or by making them into more sub-
stantial Shi'i-type leaders, and those whose positions were not built up in this
way were not prepared to acquiesce in his system of political control. 'All is
mentioned as having retorted to the call 'ld hukma illd li'lldh', when it was
heard at Kufifa that it was 'words of truth by which falsehood is intended', for
those who called it out meant by it 'Id imrata', while it was his belief that an
amir was essential.6 Those who rejected the authority of the leaders through
whom 'All sought to preserve unity - whether Shil' leaders or clan leaders in
their own right - arranged to gather at Jisr Nahrawan, beyond their reach;
various of these Khawarij then encountered efforts on the part of their respective
fellow-clansmen to prevent this and, while some evaded these, others were
I See WS. pp. 515, 5i6 and cf. L. Veccia Vaglieri, 'Traduzione di passi riguardenti il
conflitto 'Ali-Mu'iwiya e la secessione kharigita' in Annali, Istituto Universitario Orientale
di Napoli, n.s. vol. v (1953), pp. 88-92.
2 I am grateful to Professor R. B. Serjeant for pointing out the pre-Islamic use of the
phrase hilf jdmi' ghayr mufarriq (see, e.g. Ibn Hablb, Kitdb al-munammaq ft akhbdr
Quraysh (Hyderabad, 1384/I964), p. 90).
3 Tab. I, p. 3339; WS. pp. 5I2-3; BA/MS. I, pp. 382-3, 383-4; A'th. I, fol. I32A.
4 Tab. I, p. 3349. 5 Ibid. p. 3352.
6 Ibid. pp. 336i, 3362; BA/MS. I, pp. 389, 392, 399.
366 Martin Hinds
forcibly
forcibly restrained.'
restrained.'
In thisIn
time
this
of time
tension,
ofthe
tension,
Shi'a reaffirmed
the Shi'a
their
reaffirmed
uncondi- their un
tional
tional oath
oath
to 'Ali.
to 'Ali.
The arbitration
The arbitration
had meanwhile
had degenerated
meanwhileinto degenerated
a fruitless into a fr
discussion
discussion of how
of howblameblame
for 'Uthman's
for 'Uthman's
death should death
be apportioned
should be andapportioned
who and
should
should be be
amiramir
al-mu'minin;
al-mu'minin;
it was noitmore
wasthanno more
an irrelevant
than sequel
an irrelevant
to a suc- sequel to
cessful
cessful divisive
divisive
manoeuvre
manoeuvre
by Mu'awiya,
by Mu'awiya,
and it accordingly
and itcame
accordingly
to nothing. came to not
When
When this
this
waswas
apparent,
apparent,
'Ali wanted
'Ali to
wanted
march against
to marchMu'awiya,
against
but most
Mu'awiya,
of but m
the
theforce
forcehe he
thenthen
succeeded
succeeded
in mobilizing
in mobilizing
had no intention
had ofnodoing
intention
any more of doing any
than
thandealing
dealingwithwith
the Khawarij,
the Khawarij,
and 'All hadand no'All
option
had butno
to option
move towards
but to move tow
Nahrawan.
Nahrawan. TheTheKhawarij
Khawarij
refusedrefused
to negotiate to and
negotiate
laid downand the laid
impossible
down the imp
condition
condition thatthat
theythey
would would
follow him
follow
only him
if he would
only treat
if hethem
wouldas 'Umar
treat hadthem as 'Um
done
done('fa-lasnd
('fa-lasnd nutdbi'ukum
nutdbi'ukum
aw ta'tuna awbi-mithli
ta'tuna'Umar').2
bi-mithliThey'Umar').2
were then They wer
defeated
defeated in battle
in battle
and 400
and of 400
themof who
them
were who
found were
woundedfound
on thewounded
battlefield on the batt
were
werehanded
handed overover
to their
to clans
their ('ashd'ir).3
clans ('ashd'ir).3
Thereafter 'Ali
Thereafter
wanted to proceed
'Ali wanted to pr
against
against Mu'awiya,
Mu'awiya, but al-Ash'ath
but al-Ash'ath
and the other
and clan
theleaders
otherinsisted
clan leaders
on returning
insisted on ret
to
tothe
the misr.
misr.The The
maintenance
maintenance
of their of
authority
their asauthority
Kufan clan leaders
as Kufan was what
clan leaders wa
mattered to them.
Examination of the tribal names of Khawarij shows that almost all of them
came from central and north-eastern Arabia and that most of these were from
Bakri and Tamimi clans whose home territory had been close to, or had adjoined,
'Iraq. They were early-comers who for the most part had not formed close
ties with the misr, as did most early-comers from further away, but instead moved
in an uncontrolled fashion into the conquered territories and not until this stage
experienced serious efforts to control them. Of the many examples which can
be cited, mention can be made here of the Taymi brothers, Hilal and al-Musta-
wrid the sons of 'Ullafa. Hilal led some Ribabis at the battle of Buwayb and
was at the battle of Qadisiyya, and al-Mustawrid led some Ribabis in a body of
afnd' Tamim and was probably also at Qadisiyya.4 There is no further mention
of either of them in the sources until NahrawAn, where al-Mustawrid was
on the Khariji side and escaped.5 Hilal's revolt soon afterwards with 200
men in Masabadhan was one of a post-Nahrawan spate of Khariji revolts which
resembled each other closely in the numbers involved and the type of area
chosen; he was killed by the Shi'i Tamimi leader Ma'qil b. Qays al-Riyahi.6
al-Mustawrid led another Khariji revolt in the forties.
'Ali therefore failed in his attempt to form a political coalition which took some
account both of what was at the time the necessary reality of clan organization
and of the established principle of sharaf by Islamic priority. What he produced
was a more egalitarian concept of an Islamic order, but the pressure from Syria
was too great, and the Kufan extremes of al-Ash'ath on the one hand and the
Khawarij on the other hand were too far apart for this to be a viable solution.
I Tab. I, pp. 3365, 3367; BA/MS. I, pp. 391, 392, 393-4.
2 Tab. I, p. 3377; BA/MS. I, p. 396.
3 Tab. I, p. 3384, II, p. 17; BA/MS. I, p. 398.
4 Tab. I, pp. 2188, 2245, 2336. 5 Khal. pp. I8o-x.
6 BA/MS. I, pp. 429-30; Ibn al-Athir, op. cit., vol. III, pp. 3I3-I4.
K2fan political alignments 367
When
When Mu'awiya
Mu'awiyatook
tookover
over Kffa
Kffahe he
hadhad
neither
neither
the inclination
the inclination
nor thenorneed
theto need to
effect
effect any
anycompromise
compromise there.
there.
He He
built
built
on the
on the
clan clan
system
system
and used
and anyone
used anyone
who who
could
could make
makethe thegrade
gradeas as
a clan
a clan
leader.
leader.
Lip-service
Lip-service
was occasionally
was occasionally
paid topaidthe to the
dignity
dignity ofofIslamic
Islamicpriority,
priority, butbut
thethe
attendant
attendant
privileges
privileges
were were
sweptswept
away. away.
The The
sawdfz
sawdfz ofofthe
theSawad,
Sawad,ofof
which
whichwe we
know
know
nothing
nothing
for the
for time
the time
of 'Ali,
ofwere
'Ali, made
were made
into
into state
stateproperty
propertybyby Mu'awiya.'
Mu'awiya.' TheThe
extent
extent
to which
to which
the system
the system
of stipends
of stipends
laid
laid down
downby by'Umar
'Umarhad
had been
been
modified
modified
by 'Ali
by 'Ali
is unclear,
is unclear,
but itbut
is likely
it is likely
that that
the
the principle
principleofofequality
equality
had
had
notnot
been
been
extended
extended
to include
to include
the stipends
the stipends
of early-
of early-
comers;2
comers;2under
underMu'awiya,
Mu'awiya,however,
however,thethe
amount
amount
of stipends
of stipends
was completely
was completely
at
at his
his discretion.3
discretion.3InIn
the
the
time
timeof of
Mu'awiya,
Mu'awiya,
the the
ashrdf
ashrdf
al-qabd'il
al-qabd'il
came out
cameonout
top on top
at
at Kffa;
Kffa;separately
separatelyopposing
opposing
them
them
were,
were,
on the
on the
one hand,
one hand,
'Umar's
'Umar's
type of
type of
ashrdf,
ashrdf, who
whofirst
firstofof
allall
fought
fought
to take
to take
overover
the the
misrmisr
but were
but were
increasingly
increasingly
forced forced
to
to fight
fightaarearguard
rearguardaction
action
outside
outside
it, it,
andand
on the
on other
the other
hand hand
the adherents
the adherents
at at
the
the misr
misrof
ofthe
theorder
orderadumbrated
adumbrated
by by
'Ali,'Ali,
seeking
seeking
as anasideal
an ideal
an egalitarian
an egalitarian
world world
which
which was
wasdevoid
devoidofof
both
both
such
such
types
types
of ashrdf.
of ashrdf.
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE
ENGLAND
al-Ya'qubi, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 258-9, 277; al-'All, op. cit., p. 141
2 al-Jahiz, al-'Uthmdniyya, ed. A. M. Harmn (Cairo, I955), p. z28;
I59A.
3 Note his reported remark 'mi adri ff ayyi kitab alldh tajidana
'ata' '(Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, Futuah Misr wa-akhbaruha, ed. C. C. Tor
1922), p. IOI).

Kufan Political Aalignments

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Kufan Political Aalignments

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Kufan Political Alignments and Their Background in the Mid-Seventh Century A.D.

Author(s): Martin Hinds

KUFAN POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS

AND THEIR BACKGROUND IN THE

MID-SEVENTH CENTURY A.D.

The period of the so-called Patriarchal Caliphs con

E.g. Tab. I, pp. 2225, 2327, 2617.

IV. The appointment of Sa'id b. al-'As to Kufa in 29/649-50, and that

I Ibid. pp. 328-9. 2 Tab. I, p. 2668. 3 Ibid. p. 2927.

I Tab. I, p. 2928 (wa-khalat al-Kufa min al-ru'asa' illa manzu' aw maftun).

Tab. I, pp. 2913, 2920.

You might also like